Incentive Regulation and Utility Benchmarking for Electricity Network Security
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
Incentive Regulation and Utility Benchmarking for Electricity Network Security. / Nepal, Rabindra; Jamasb, Tooraj.
In: Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 48, No. December, 2015, p. 117-127.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
CBE
MLA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Incentive Regulation and Utility Benchmarking for Electricity Network Security
AU - Nepal, Rabindra
AU - Jamasb, Tooraj
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - The incentive regulation of costs related to physical and cyber security in electricity networks is an important but relatively unexplored and ambiguous issue. These costs can be part of cost efficiency benchmarking or, alternatively, dealt with separately. This paper discusses the issues and proposes options for incorporating network security costs within incentive regulation in a benchmarking framework. The relevant concerns and limitations associated with the accounting and classification of network security costs, choice of cost drivers, data adequacy and quality and the relevant benchmarking methodologies are discussed. The analysis suggests that the present regulatory treatment of network security costs using benchmarking is limited to being an informative regulatory tool rather than being deterministic. We discuss how alternative approaches outside the benchmarking framework, such as the use of stochastic cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis of network security investments can complement the results obtained from benchmarking.
AB - The incentive regulation of costs related to physical and cyber security in electricity networks is an important but relatively unexplored and ambiguous issue. These costs can be part of cost efficiency benchmarking or, alternatively, dealt with separately. This paper discusses the issues and proposes options for incorporating network security costs within incentive regulation in a benchmarking framework. The relevant concerns and limitations associated with the accounting and classification of network security costs, choice of cost drivers, data adequacy and quality and the relevant benchmarking methodologies are discussed. The analysis suggests that the present regulatory treatment of network security costs using benchmarking is limited to being an informative regulatory tool rather than being deterministic. We discuss how alternative approaches outside the benchmarking framework, such as the use of stochastic cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis of network security investments can complement the results obtained from benchmarking.
KW - Benchmarking
KW - Network security
KW - Incentive regulation
KW - Exceptional events
KW - Benchmarking
KW - Network security
KW - Incentive regulation
KW - Exceptional events
UR - https://sfx-45cbs.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/45cbs?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:azlist&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=110975506070117&rft.object_portfolio_id=&svc.holdings=yes&svc.fulltext=yes
U2 - 10.1016/j.eap.2015.11.001
DO - 10.1016/j.eap.2015.11.001
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84949239203
VL - 48
SP - 117
EP - 127
JO - Economic Analysis and Policy
JF - Economic Analysis and Policy
SN - 0313-5926
IS - December
ER -