American Dream Delayed: Shifting Determinants of Homeownership

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Abstract

This paper develops and estimates a dynamic model of discrete choice for labor supply, fertility and transition from tenant to homeowner, to investigate the secular decline in homeownership over the past several decades, wholly attributable to households postponing the purchase of their first home. House prices only partly explain the decline; higher base level wages led to lower fertility also contributing to the decline, because households with children are more likely to own a home than those without. Somewhat surprisingly we find higher levels of female education ameliorated this trend, highly educated women placing greater value on home ownership.

KEYWORDS: Housing Demand, Fertility, Labor Supply.
JEL: R21, J13, J22, D14, D91

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1 Introduction

The average age of a first-time home buyer increased from 28 years old in the 1970’s, to 30 in the 1990’s, and now stands at 32.\footnote{US Bureau of the Census, American Housing Survey, Chicago Title and Trust Co. survey, and authors own calculations based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.} Delaying the transition to homeownership resulted in the stagnation and subsequent reduction of homeownership rates for all cohorts of population in working age (Goodman, Pendall, and Zhu 2015). Since homeowners rarely revert to renting permanent accommodation and the rate of reverting to renting is fairly stable over the period, the decline in home ownership is almost entirely attributable to postponing the first home purchase. Figure 1 illustrates that the delay in first homeownership coincided with postponing marriage and fertility; the average age of mother at first birth rising from 22 forty years ago to 24 two decades ago, and currently stands at about 26. Labor-force participation of females in their fecund period rose dramatically from 48 percent in 1970’s, to 74 percent in 1990’s and continues increasing.

There are many studies showing that household decisions about fertility, labor supply and housing are jointly determined. Homeownership is associated with lower job-to-job mobility, lower unemployment risk and higher wage rates (Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer 2008). Increased women’s labor force participation is tightly linked to the delay in giving birth to children, due to the competing allocation of time between work and raising children (Hotz and Miller 1988). Childbearing is strongly associated with the transition to homeownership (Öst 2012). According to Fannie Mae’s National Housing Survey, homeownership as the best environment for raising children, is a very important reason to buy one. Therefore delays in fertility stemming from greater female labor force participation might cause women and their partners to postpone homeownership. Since marriage and homeownership are correlated, the decline in marriage might also explain the reduction in homeownership (Fisher and Gervais 2011). Unanticipated increases in house prices reduce the utility of first time home buyers at the point of purchase, but increase the utility of
Figure 1: Labor force participation rate by age for 1970 - 2000. “Star” denotes median age at first marriage, “circle” denotes average age at first birth, “triangle” denotes average age at first homeownership. Age at first marriage is taken from the US Census Bureau, age at first birth is taken from the National Vital Statistical Reports (Mathews and Hamilton 2002), age at first homeownership is computed from the PSID, whereas labor force participation rates are taken from publications of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Toossi 2002; 2012).

Those with housing equity, differentially affecting fertility rates (Dettling and Kearney 2014).

Whereas the inseparable nature of labor supply, fertility, and homeownership choices is widely acknowledged, to the best of our knowledge, a unifying framework integrating these joint decisions has yet to be analyzed. Our analysis seeks to fill this gap by developing and estimating a dynamic discrete choice model of female labor supply and the timing of births as well as the transition from tenant to homeowner with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in order to explain the secular decline in homeownership within the US. Although the PSID is not a fully representative of the US economy, the trends in our sample, described in the next section, reflect national aggregates.
To provide a satisfactory explanation we must overcome challenges in estimation and prediction arising from the inherent nonstationarity of the secular trends mentioned above, that are further complicated by the path of interest rates, which first rose and then fell over this period. Inferring the tastes of individuals from their behavior in nonstationary environments is complicated by the fact that some of their important decisions made at the times they are sampled reflect aspects of their life that were relevant after the panel ends, which are the outcomes not observed in the data. To capture these considerations in an internally consistent way, we leverage the close relationship between current (estimated) conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) and future expected utilities impounded within differences between the continuation values (the conditional valuation functions) for alternative choices. In this way the model impounds their expectations about the future within the current equilibrium choices that have long-term ramifications in a nonergodic world evolving over time.

Section 3 explains our model and empirical strategy. The parameters of the model capture household fixed costs of transition to homeownership, preferences over homeownership, working (and leisure) choices, the number and timing of children. Technical details on the estimation are relegated to an online Appendix. The results of the structural estimation are reported in Section 4. The estimated preference parameters are mostly statistically significant with intuitively appealing signs and magnitudes. Moreover the one-period ahead forecasts obtained from solving our model with the estimated parameters track both individual life-cycle decisions and aggregate secular changes over this period quite well. All else being equal, households prefer becoming homeowner earlier in life. Therefore the delay in homeownership is not a preference, but rather a result of a trade-off between homeownership and other important life-cycle decisions. The estimated preference parameters suggest that the transition to homeownership is positively related to labor market participation and the presence of children in a household. This finding implies that whereas an increase in labor market participation can speed up the transition to homeownership, having fewer children later in life reduces homeownership.
Given a path for wages, interest rates, house prices and educational attainment, the estimated model can be used to disentangle the effects of fertility decisions and labor supply on housing choices, and to quantify the dynamic feedback that homeownership induces on households’ fertility choices and labor supply. A second challenge in analyzing nonstationary environments is how to make inferences about counterfactuals when the nonstationary process is unknown, almost always the case for a short panel. Even in a model where individuals have perfect foresight, it is impossible to make predictions about future realizations of such processes without drawing upon information not in the data set. Here we follow a common practice in macroeconomics of comparing the long run steady states of different regimes. Our counterfactuals compare wages, educational backgrounds, house prices and interest rates roughly corresponding to the beginning and end of the two-decade sample frame.\(^2\)

Section 5 reports the results from simulating the counterfactual regimes. Summarizing, higher female wages lead to postponing the first home purchase. The effects are indirect, because workforce participation by itself raises the value of homeownership: however higher base wages also increase the opportunity cost of leisure and child care and reduce fertility, which are complementary activities to homeownership. These negative effects swamp the amenity value of owning a home when working. A second contributing factor to the secular decline in homeownership is higher house prices, which prompt households to postpone purchasing their own home, and also choosing smaller homes if they buy. We find that increasing educational attainment leads to earlier homeownership, and the direct effects of greater benefits from homeownership to more educated females are reinforced by their greater labor-force participation. Thus later cohorts, more educated than their predecessors, retarded the trend away from homeownership. Lastly, we find that lower interest rates induce households to postpone homeownership, a feature that is evident in the data, both in our sample period and also in the years that followed; it

\(^2\) In our framework it is also straightforward to predict the evolution of one steady state to another, and these results are available from the authors on request.
is also a characteristic of the solution to our estimated dynamic optimization model. Intuitively households save throughout their lifecycle, and the wealth effect from an earlier purchase dominates the intertemporal lifecycle substitution effect of reducing consumption when young. However since interest rates rose and then fell over this period we hesitate to emphasize the role of interest rates in explaining the decline in homeownership over this period. Section 6 concludes. Overall, rising house prices and higher female wages explained the trend in postponing homeownership over that 20 year period, a trend that was ameliorated by greater female educational attainment.

2 Lifecycle Patterns and Secular Changes

Our empirical analysis draws upon the PSID for the years 1968 through 1993. This data set and the time frame has three key advantages for the purpose of this study. First, it contains broad and comprehensive information on household housing, labor supply, income, and detailed family characteristics for a moderately representative sample of households of the US population. Second, the PSID data set has a panel dimension so that we can measure household transition to homeownership, intertemporal labor-supply dynamics and changes in family composition due to births of children. Third this time frame captures the secular changes at the heart of this study well, with declining fertility, increased female education, rising female workforce participation, and decreasing homeownership.  

Our model controls for whether the household is headed by a couple or a single woman, along with the characteristics of partners. The study is conducted from the perspective of females: they bear the children; mothers spend more time with their children than fathers; throughout the period under consideration mothers were almost invariably awarded child custody in the event

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3. We exclude the poverty subsample and the Latino subsample added to the PSID closer to the end of our study period.
4. In addition we avoid the disruptions in the years leading up to the housing boom and subsequent bust in 2006, as well as the complications associated with the PSID changing its format from an annual to a biennial survey in 1997.
of divorce; on average females spent more time at home than males because their workforce participation rate was lower; female labor supply exhibited more variation in the lifecycle over the time frame in which households are most likely to purchase their first home. Most first homeownership choices are made before the age of 45, her labor-force participation settles in this phase of life, and almost all births occur then too. For these reasons, our study considers single and married females in their fecund stage of life between the ages of 22 and 45.

Demographic characteristics include age, education and marital status of the individual, family size of household, number of children and their ages. Labor-force participation data include number of hours put into working activities and earnings. We also used information on household housing arrangements, including number of rooms in a dwelling, indicator for homeownership, value of primary residence for homeowners and amount of rent paid by tenants. All monetary values, such as house value for homeowners, rent paid by tenants and labor income, are adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index and converted into 1984 dollars.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data sample used in the analysis. Over the observed time period, the average homeownership rate for the sample of 22-45 years old females constitutes 64 percent, thus matching the homeownership rate reported by other nationally representative data over the same time period (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Housing Vacancy Rate Survey, Smith, Rosen, and Fallis 1988). The demographic profile of homeowners differs from tenants along several dimensions, some of which are directly related to their age, where they are in the lifecycle. Compared to tenants, homeowners are older, slightly more educated, more likely to be married, have more children, have more living space, are less likely to work, and conditional on workforce participation, work fewer hours.

Some of these differences can be attributed to the fact that homeowners have progressed further through their lifecycle than tenants. Because they are older, homeowners are more likely to be married and have more children, and if their children are young likely to work less hours, but conditional on
Table 1: Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full sample</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Renters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership rate</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House value for home owners</td>
<td></td>
<td>66,381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual rent for renters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to owned house</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own-to-own**</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rent-to-own***</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move to rental house</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rent-to-rent***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own-to-rent***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of rooms in dwelling</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours worked*</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>1,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor income*</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>11,504</td>
<td>10,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>43,504</td>
<td>27,871</td>
<td>15,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample averages for females between 22 and 45 years old; data covers 1968 through 1993.

*Conditional on working.
**Including observations on households who spend one or two years of renting between two consecutive home ownerships.
***Excluding observations on households who spend one or two years of renting between two consecutive home ownerships.

working they are also likely to have more experience and hence earn a higher wage. These kinds of differences require a dynamic approach to satisfactorily resolve.

The table also shows tenants move much more frequently than homeowners. Almost one third of tenants move each year, and about 6 percent of homeowners were tenants in the previous year. Presumably the costs of moving increase with the size of the household, for example from school aged children switching schools, to spouses coordinating employment. Since rental contracts
are generally designed for a much shorter term duration than home purchase, it is reasonable to speculate that as households grow, their preferences shift towards homeownership, and hence delays in forming multiperson households might be associated with postponing home purchase.

There is, however, scant evidence that the reverse movement, from ownership to renting, changed over the period under consideration. Our estimates from the PSID, illustrated in Figure 7 of the Supplementary Appendix, show that over the period 1970 through 1995 the transition from ownership to rental was roughly constant at the roughly 4 percent reported in Table 1, experiencing a statistically insignificant and quantitatively small decline. Thus the decline in homeownership over this period was almost entirely driven by fewer transitions from renting to ownership rather than greater transitions in the other direction.

Figure 2 illustrates homeownership profile over the life cycle, broken down by marital status and children. Broadly speaking, larger and older households are more likely to be homeowners. For both married and single households,
homeownership is greater for households with children. On average, the homeownership rate of families with children is 5 to 7 percent higher compared to families with the same marital status but without children. Similarly households with two heads are more likely to be homeowners than single headed households.

Figure 3 illustrates the delay in fertility is associated with the delay in homeownership. As the average age at having first child steadily increased, the average age at the birth of second child also increased with the timing between consecutive birth at about 2 years in 1970s and 1980s, and a reduction of the average time between the first and second child to 1.5 years by 1990s. Figure 3 shows the timing of purchase of the first home has a delayed pattern over the life cycle similar to the delay in fertility. Figure 3 shows the age at first homeownership closely follows the birth of the second child. In early 1970s first homeownership occurs on average one year after the birth of the second child, while in late 1970s and up to early 1990s the timing of the first homeownership and the birth of the second child nearly coincide. Indeed, two thirds of households have one or more children at the time of purchase of their first home; half of first time home buyers have only 1 or 2 children, and one third have only one child at the time of home purchase. Most firstborns were
at least one year old at the time of the home purchase, observations consistent with the findings of Öst (2012).

Finally, postponing homeownership is associated with ultimately purchasing a larger residence. Figure 4 illustrates the delay is aligned with the growing size of first home as a number of rooms per family member (the right-hand scale). The US Census Bureau reports that over time the average size of a single-family house increased from 1600 square feet in 1970 to 2400 square feet in 2010. Furthermore increased residential housing size is observed not only for homeowners, but also for tenants. In an economy where household size grows though time, and large households prefer more dwelling space, households tend to be tenants when they are young and homeowners when they are older. Moreover exogenous delaying home purchase would plausibly induce both average rental tenements and increased homeowner dwellings to increase in size. Part of the puzzle, then, is to explain how these behavioral shifts were resolved by the underlying driving factors over this period.

3 The Model

The evidence presented above strongly suggests that households jointly determine their fertility, labor supply and housing decisions over the life cycle. The first parts of this section develop a dynamic model of discrete choice of housing demand, fertility choice and labor supply to explain households’ decision making process. Then we propose an estimator for the preferences of the model.

Only a tiny fraction of mothers put their babies out for adoption, and very few homeowners become tenants, rarely selling their first homes within a few years of purchase.\(^5\) Empirically it is not possible to separately estimate (nonparametrically) the current utility a household receives from a child on an annual basis. Therefore we assume giving birth and becoming homeowner are

\(^5\) Thus we treat becoming a homeowner (or equivalently marrying/having a spouse who is/becomes one) as a stopping problem. With a larger data set on homeownership that covers the housing crisis after the financial crash of 2008, our model can be adapted to analyze foreclosure as an unanticipated event in a nonstationary economy.
irreversible choices, and model the expected lifetime benefits from offspring at their point of birth. Of course all the benefits from having children do not literally occur at the time of birth, but there is an observational equivalence when only data on births, not current benefits of children, are available. For similar reasons, we model the expected lifetime benefits of first homeownership as accruing at the point of sale. When becoming a homeowner, the household balances the transaction cost of purchase and a size inertia inherent to homeownership against the benefits of tailoring their own property to individual tastes and having more geographic stability to cultivate social and economic opportunities within the neighborhood.

Current female labor supply is treated as a period-by-period decision; her choices affect her future wages through learning by doing, inducing persistence in labor supply over time. Hours worked are modeled as a stochastic process conditional on participation and the state variables in the model, including past participation and past hours. Finally, since the timing of first birth and marriage are correlated (Figure 1), and since it essentially involves an implicit (sometimes explicit) contract about dividing assets upon separation, we treat the event of marriage as a stochastic process driven by the state variables (such as the age and number of children) rather than an explicit choice variable, and interpret declining marriage rates throughout this period as reflecting a decline in activities the marriage contract facilitates, not a causal factor itself.

3.1 Choices

Each period \( t \in \{1, 2, \ldots \} \) the household makes a continuous current consumption choice denoted by \( c_t \), a discrete labor-force participation choice \( w_t \in \{0, 1\} \), where working is denoted by \( w_t = 1 \), and a fertility choice \( b_t \in \{0, 1\} \), where a birth is indicated by \( b_t = 1 \). If she is a tenant at \( t \), she also decides whether to continue renting by setting \( h_t = 0 \) or changing her accommodation status and purchasing a home, by setting \( h_t = 1 \). We assume giving birth is only possible up to age \( T_1 \), and at age \( T_2 \), where \( T_2 \geq T_1 \) the household retires, and, if still a tenant at that age, remains one forever. These
assumptions are innocuous because our empirical work focuses on women less than 45 years old. To represent the choice set parsimoniously, let \( d_{jt} \in \{0, 1\} \) where \( d_{jt} = 1 \) for:

\[
j \equiv (1 - h_t) b_t (1 - w_t) + 2 (1 - h_t) (1 - b_t) w_t + 3 (1 - h_t) b_t w_t \\
+ 4h_t (1 - b_t) (1 - w_t) + 5h_t b_t (1 - w_t) + 6h_t (1 - b_t) w_t + 7h_t b_t w_t.
\]

Thus \( \sum_{k=0}^{7} d_{jt} = 1 \) and the base choice \( d_{0t} = 1 \) involves setting \((h_t, b_t, w_t) = (0, 0, 0)\). Since purchasing the first home is a once-in-a-lifetime decision, if \( h_t = 1 \) then \( h_{\tau} = 0 \) for all \( \tau \in \{t + 1, \ldots , T\} \), and hence \( \sum_{j=0}^{3} d_{jt} = 1 \). In this way the model restricts homeowners to four (two) choices each period until (after) age \( T_1 \), while tenants pick one of the eight (four).

### 3.2 Household preferences

The household derives utility from consumption, leisure, offspring, and housing. Her preferences are characterized by a discounted sum of a time-additively separable, constant absolute risk-aversion utility function.\(^6\) We model the household’s lifetime utility from age \( t \) onwards as:

\[
- \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{j=0}^{7} \beta^{s-t} d_{js} \exp(-u_{j\tau}^b - u_{j\tau}^l - u_{j\tau}^b - \rho c_\tau - \varepsilon_{j\tau})
\]

where \( \beta \) denotes the subjective discount factor, \( \rho \) is the constant absolute risk aversion parameter, \( u_{t}^b \equiv h_t u_{t}^b \) indexes the expected lifetime utility payoff from becoming a homeowner, \( u_{t}^l \equiv w_t u_{t}^l \) indexes the current utility payoff from leisure time, \( u_{t}^b \equiv b_t u_{t}^b \) indexes the discounted utility stream from another birth, and \( \varepsilon_{j\tau} \) is a nonsystematic component of the flow utility capturing a choice-specific idiosyncratic taste shock for each \((j, t)\).

\(^6\) We adopt the CARA utility function, because we lack reliable information on wealth. During the period of 1968 - 1993, the PSID provides detailed questions on household wealth for only two years, 1984 and 1989, insufficient for modeling of changes in household wealth within a dynamic framework. As explained in Margiotta and Miller (2000), the CARA assumption is useful in this context because it is consistent with consumption smoothing from accumulated wealth and accommodates risk aversion in a parsimonious fashion.
The indices for homeownership, leisure and births are themselves mappings of socioeconomic demographics, partly determined by past and current interactive choices. In our framework homeownership confers upon the household a right to adapt their living quarters to their own lifestyle in ways that a landlord might object.\textsuperscript{7} We define the homeownership index as:

\[ u_h^t \equiv x'_t \theta_0 + x'_t s_t \theta_1 + \theta_{20} s_t^2 + \theta_{21} s_t s_{t-1} + \theta_{3} s_t l_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where \( s_t \) measures house size in period \( t \), \( l_t \in [0,1] \) is female labor supply in \( t \), and \( x_t \) is a set of fixed or time varying attributes that characterize the decision maker (age, education and marital status) along with previous fertility and labor-market outcomes. Presumably \( u_h^t \) is concave increasing in \( s_t \), implying \( \theta_{20} < 0 \). The rationale for including \( s_{t-1} \) in the index is that when moving from a rental unit to homeownership, the change in size reflects the terms of trade between renting and owning: for example, relatively larger homes tend to be purchased if rental accommodation is relatively expensive. The last expression in (2) is an interaction with current labor supply that captures whether purchase is more likely to occur when the woman is working, and by extension whether she is more likely to work in the future.

The indices for fertility and labor supply follow the literature.\textsuperscript{8} The lifetime utility of giving birth and raising one more child is given by:

\[ u_b^t \equiv x'_t \gamma_0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where the marginal lifetime utility of a second child is affected by the age of the first through \( x_t \). Finally, we define:

\[ u'_t \equiv x'_t \delta_0 + \delta_1 x'_t l_t + \delta_{20} l_t^2 + \delta_{21} l_t l_{t-1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

\textsuperscript{7} In this way we implicitly treat moral hazard issues arising from tenants lack of care for the premises they rent, and other agency issues associated with landlord/tenant relationships.

where \( x_t' \delta_0 \) is the fixed cost of working, and lagged labor supply affects the marginal utility of current leisure, defined as \( 1 - l_t \).

### 3.3 Budget constraint

Denote by \( e_t \) household financial wealth at the beginning of period \( t \). Household income from real wages paid to the female if she works in period \( t \), is denoted by \( Y_t \). Rent in period \( t \), denoted by \( R(s_t, q_t) \), depends on house size \( s_t \), quality and aggregate factors \( q_t \), as does the price of a house, denoted by \( H(s_t, q_t) \). These definitions imply the law of motion for household wealth is:

\[
e_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
(1 + i_t) \left[ e_t - c_t + \sum_{j=0}^{3} d_j Y_t - R(s_t, q_t) \right] & \text{if } h_\tau = 0 \text{ for all } \tau \in \{1, \ldots, t\} \\
(1 + i_t) \left[ e_t - c_t + \sum_{j=4}^{8} d_j Y_T - \sum_{j=4}^{7} d_j H(s_T, q_T) \right] & \text{if } h_t = 1 \\
(1 + i_t) \left[ e_t - c_t + \sum_{j=4}^{8} d_j Y_T \right] & \text{if } h_\tau = 1 \text{ for all } \tau \in \{1, \ldots, t - 1\}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( i_t \) denotes the one-period interest rate in period \( t \), and \( \varphi \) is the real estate commission rate incurred by household upon completing the transaction of home purchase. To simplify the econometric implementation of our model, rather than imposing stationarity in the economy, we assume house prices, aggregate wages and interest rates to fluctuate over time, but can be perfectly forecasted. Thus fertility and homeownership decisions are not driven by short term financial exigencies in the model but by life-cycle considerations.

### 3.4 State variables

The state variables in the model include (1) those the household controls directly, namely the composition of the household, labor-force experience, and whether she owns her home or not, (2) state variables that affect life style but are optimized outside the model conditional on the discrete choices made inside the model, including the size and quality of housing accommodation, and (3) calendar time, which captures future movements in the nonstationary aggregates, including shifts in house prices, aggregate wages and interest rates.

The timing and spacing of children affect the benefits they confer upon the
household. We track the number and ages of children until they turn 18, when the child becomes a young adult and is assumed to leave the household. We denote by \( a_{it} \) the age of the \( i^{th} \) child in \( t \) for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, I\} \). Let \( n_t \) denote the number of offspring living in the household in period \( t \):

\[
n_t = n_{t-1} + b_{t-1} - \sum_{i=1}^{I} I \{ a_{it-1} = 17 \}
\]

Thus \( a_t \equiv (a_{1t}, \ldots, a_{It}) \) represents both the number and ages of offspring under 18 in the household in period \( t \).

The household also decides whether to work or not, but we do not model how many hours labor-force participants work. Age, education, and hours worked in the previous period affect her current wage rate. Denoting female leisure by \( l_t \in [0, 1] \), the last remark implies lagged leisure \( l_{t-1} \) is a state variable. House size and quality is not directly determined by the household in our framework, but nevertheless enters as a state variable because of their intertemporal dependence.

### 3.5 Intertemporal choices

At the beginning of period \( t \) the household observes the vector of disturbances to its preferences, \( \varepsilon_t \equiv (\varepsilon_{0t}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{7t}) \), her non-housing assets \( e_t \) and other state variables described above, denoted by \( z_t \). Households are expected utility maximizers, sequentially optimizing the expected value of (1) subject to (5) by choosing \( j \in \{0, \ldots, 7\} \) if they are currently tenants less than \( T_1 \) years old, and otherwise choosing from the more restricted choice sets we defined.

We define \( \pi H(s_t, q_t) \) as the downpayment on a house priced at \( H(s_t, q_t) \) in period \( t \) and equal repayments in perpetuity starting in period \( t + 1 \) on the loan \( (1 - \pi) H(s_t, q_t) \) by \( \tilde{R}(s_t, q_t) \). A competitive loans market implies:

\[
\tilde{R}(s_t, q_t) = (1 - \pi) H(s_t, q_t) \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \prod_{r=t}^{\tau} (1 + i_r)^{-1} \equiv (1 - \pi) H(s_t, q_t) (B_t - 1)
\]

where \( B_t \) is the current price of a bond in \( t \) that pays one consumption unit each period in perpetuity. Denoting disposable income net of housing expenses
by $y_{jt}$, it follows that:

$$y_{jt} \equiv \begin{cases} 
\sum_{j=0}^{3} d_{jt} Y_t - R(s_t, q_t) & \text{if } h_t = 0 \text{ for all } \tau \in \{1, \ldots, t\} \\
\sum_{j=4}^{7} d_{jt} [Y_t - (\pi + \varphi)H(s_t, q_t)] & \text{if } h_t = 1 \\
\sum_{j=0}^{3} d_{jt} Y_t - \tilde{R}(s_t, q_t) & \text{if } h_t = 1 \text{ for some } \tau \in \{1, \ldots, t - 1\}
\end{cases}$$

Let $p_{jt}(z_t)$ denote the probability of choosing $j$ at year $t$ conditional on the value of the household state variable vector $z_t$ (but not $e_t$), and denote by $\varepsilon_{jt}^*$ the truncated variable that takes on the value of $\varepsilon_{jt}$ only when $d_{jt} = 1$. Adapting Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2015) to our framework, let $A_{T+1}(z_{T+1}) \equiv 1$, and recursively define an index of household capital for a household at year $t$ as:

$$A_t(z_t) \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{7} p_{jt}(z_t) \exp \left( -\frac{u^h_{jt} - u^b_{jt} - u^l_{jt} - \rho y_{jt}}{B_t} \right) E_{jt} \left[ \exp \left( -\frac{-\varepsilon_{jt}^*}{B_t} \right) \right] A_{t+1}(z_{t+1})^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}$$

(6)

where $z_{t+1}^{(j)}$ is the value of the state vector at $t + 1$ following the choice $j$ in period $t$ applied to $z_t$, the value of the state vector in period $t$. The index is strictly positive; lower values of $A_t(z_t)$ come from higher current income and lower rent, both incorporated within $y_{jt}$, as well as less distasteful $x_t$ values that increase the sum of the three indices, $u^h_{jt} + u^b_{jt} + u^l_{jt}$. Denote by $d_t^i = (d_{1t}^i, \ldots, d_{7t}^i)$ the discrete choices that along with the optimal consumption choices, $c_t^i$, maximize the expected value of (1) subject to (5). The theorem below shows that all the household dynamics are transmitted through $A_t(z_t)$.

**Theorem 1.** For each $t \in \{1, 2, \ldots\}$ the optimal choices $d_t^i$ maximize:

$$\sum_{j=0}^{7} d_{jt} \left( \rho y_{jt} + u^h_{jt} + u^b_{jt} + u^l_{jt} - (B_t - 1) \ln A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)}) + \varepsilon_{jt} \right)$$

(7)

Intuitively, the household maximizes a weighted sum of net current income, the three indices in current utility, which in the case of a birth and homeownership also impound the future benefits of making a durable choice, as well as adjustments to household capital that reflect the option value for delaying
homeownership, the impact of gaining work experience, and changes to family composition.

3.6 Identification and estimation

The model is identified from (7) up to a probability distribution for \( \varepsilon_t \equiv (\varepsilon_{0t}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{7t}) \) and normalizing constants for each state. We assume \( \varepsilon_{jt} \) is independently and identically distributed as a Type I extreme value with location and scale parameters \((0, 1)\). Let \( p_{jt}(z_t) \equiv E_t\left[d_{jt}^{\varepsilon_t} | z_t \right] \) denote the conditional choice probability (CCP) of optimally making the \( j \)th choice. Noting \( u_{0t}^h = u_{0t}^b = u_{0t}^l = 0 \), it is well known that under this parameterization of the disturbances:

\[
\ln \left[ \frac{p_{jt}(z_t)}{p_{0t}(z_t)} \right] = \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) + u_{jt}^h + u_{jt}^b + u_{jt}^l - (B_t - 1) \ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1})}{A_{t+1}(z_{0t+1})} \right]
\]

Let \( z_{\tau}^{(j)} \) define the value of the state vector in period \( \tau \in \{t + 1, \ldots, T\} \), when choice \( j \) made at \( t \) is followed by choice zero for all successive periods. Estimation is based on successively telescoping \( \ln[A_{t+1}(z_{\tau+1})/A_{t+1}(z_{0t+1})] \) into the future through to the end of the discrete choice phase at \( T \). The following theorem provides the basis for the CCP estimator used in our application.

Theorem 2. For each \( j \in \{1, \ldots, 7\} \) and \( t \in \{1, \ldots, T\} \):

\[
\ln \left[ \frac{p_{jt}(z_t)}{p_{0t}(z_t)} \right] = \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) + u_{jt}^h + u_{jt}^b + u_{jt}^l + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{T} \prod_{r=t+1}^{\tau} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i_r} \right) \ln \left[ \frac{p_{0\tau}(z_{0\tau})}{p_{0\tau}(z_{\tau}^{(j)})} \right] - \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \prod_{r=t+1}^{\tau} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i_r} \right) \rho \left[ \tilde{R}(s_{\tau}, q_{\tau}) - R(s_{\tau}, q_{\tau}) \right]
\]

This theorem shows that the log odds of the conditional-choice probability

---

9. See Hotz and Miller (1993), Magnac and Thesmar (2002) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2019). In fact this model is overidentified because the coefficients on preferences are not separately indexed by calendar time and state.
in period $t$ for buying a house and working but not giving birth (setting $d_{0t} = 1$), versus the base choice of not working, not giving birth and continuing to rent (setting $d_{0t} = 1$), depends on four factors. First is the difference in net income this period $y_{jt} - y_{0t}$, scaled by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion $\rho$. The second factor is the difference in current utility this period $u^h_{jt} + u^b_{jt} + u^l_{jt}$ and the one from the baseline setting with $(h_t, b_t, l_t) = (0, 0, 0)$. Third is the difference in the discounted streams of rental payments from period $t + 1$ onwards, where both streams are generated by making the base choice, but one stream begins with the household owning a home and the other pertains to a household who never becomes a homeowner; the terms involving $\tilde{R}(s_t, q_t) - R(s_r, q_r)$ on the second line of (8) comprise this factor. The remaining terms in (8), a discounted sum of future CCPs, are correction factors to account for the fact that always choosing the base action in future periods is not optimal.\(^{10}\)

The estimation of the primitives in equation (8) follows a two-step strategy. The first step nonparametrically estimates the CCPs as nuisance parameters using a kernel estimator. The CCP estimates are substituted into equation (8), and the parameters of the utility function are estimated off the empirical counterpart to the resulting moment conditions. Further details about the estimation procedure can be found in the Appendix.

4 Results

This section presents the structural parameter estimates of household preferences and compares the model predictions with in-sample behavior. First we report on model fit by comparing household choices predicted by the model with choices observed in the data, and then we discuss the estimated utility function that characterizes the benefits of homeownership, children and leisure.

\(^{10}\) See Proposition 1 of Hotz and Miller (1993).
4.1 Model fit

From the PSID sample we obtain relative frequencies on homeownership, labor-force participation and number of children, conditional on the state variables in the previous year, and compare these cell estimates with the model’s predictions for one period ahead. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 5. This figure compares homeownership rate, home size, labor-force participation rate, and number of children per household generated by the model to the analogous data characteristics computed from the PSID sample.

Figure 5 illustrates that our model closely tracks in-sample one-period-ahead predictions for homeownership, home size, labor supply and the number of children in a family relative to outcomes observed in the data for householders between 22 and 45. The model closely matches homeownership choices from age 25 and on, but over-predicts homeownership rate for the very young...
households between age 22 and 25. Home size is closely matched as well. The model matches the overall level of labor-force participation, somewhat over-predicting working by the very young females, but staying within five percentage points from then on. The model provides a close description of the average number of children born to the households over the life cycle, reaching the peak at about age 35, followed by a decline. In summary the model generates choices that track the life-cycle trends in homeownership, labor-force participation and family size, closely matching the choices observed in the data within the life phases we are focused on.

4.2 Utility parameters

Table 2 reports the estimated utility function, grouped by the utility components given in equation (1), which incorporates parameters for the utility from housing services (2), raising children (3), and the disutility from working (4). Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimated parameters of the fixed utility of buying a home (along with their estimated standard errors), column (2) shows the estimates of the utility of home size, column (3) reports the estimates of the utility of raising children, while columns (4) and (5) respectively report the coefficient estimates of the fixed and marginal disutility from working.

Before describing the estimates in detail, we note that the trend evident in the time series in Figure 4, away from becoming homeowners earlier in life towards buying larger homes when they are older, has a cross-sectional analogue. Households face a trade off between buying a smaller house earlier in life and being a home owner for a greater number of years, versus holding out for a larger residence that is lived in for fewer years: demographic groups that buy earlier tend to own smaller homes, and vice versa. There is only one exception to this rule: the older the youngest child, the less likely a renting household buys a home, and conditional on purchase, the smaller the home is likely to be. Loosely speaking, the shorter the time frame in which the maximal number of members anticipate living together, and the longer the delay until that the time frame, the lower the premium the household is willing to pay
for space. In this way the size of the first home evolves over the lifecycle of a household that rents as it decides when to switch. However the time trend in Figure 4 is not simply a composition effect of the results displayed in Table 2: a major demographic shift in this sample is the increased formal education of women, yet higher education is associated with the earlier purchase of a smaller home, at odds with the aggregate trend towards buying later and bigger.

Turning to the estimates, as indicated by the rows 2 and 3 in Table 2, buying a first home and having a child in the same year gives the strong disutility from simultaneously doing both, only exacerbated by concurrently working. Intuitively, undertaking all three activities at once is overwhelming. Column (2) shows the estimated utility from house size is increasing and concave. We find that new homeowners choose larger homes relative to the size of the previously rented homes, consistent with the stylized fact that rental-occupied housing is typically smaller than owner-occupied housing. Our findings support the hypothesis that amongst other factors, households value accommodation by the amount of total time spent at home, as roughly measured by the product of the number of household members and the frequency with which they spend time at home. Thus column (1) shows the utility from becoming a homeowner is initially increasing (with the addition of a spouse and a first child) but declines in household size thereafter. On this interpretation utility diminishes as the children grow older, aging children having the opposite effect of an aging spouse, because the former grow detached and eventually leave the household. On another dimension of time spent at home, working women, and those with greater market capital (as measured by labor-force participation in the previous period, which increases current wages) tend to prefer smaller homes. Such households are likely to spend less time at home, therefore benefit less during waking hours from housing space, and have less leisure time for housing upkeep, which is greater in bigger houses.

The estimated utility of becoming a homeowner is higher for younger and more educated women, but in the case of married women, dampened by having a younger and more educated spouse. Higher formal education is correlated with skills that facilitate business transactions in property acquisition. On the
Table 2: Period-Specific Utility

\[ u_t^h = h_t(x_t'\theta_0 + x_t's_t\theta_1 + x_{20} + x_{21}s_{t-1} + x_3s_t) \]
\[ u_t^b = b_t x_t'^2 \gamma_0 \]
\[ u_t^l = w_t(x_t'd_0 + d_1 x_t'l_t + d_{20}l_t^2 + d_{21}l_t'l_{t-1}) \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utility from:</th>
<th>home purchase</th>
<th>home size</th>
<th>birth</th>
<th>work</th>
<th>work hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>-3.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work*Birth</td>
<td>-22.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic characteristics ((x_t))</td>
<td>(h_t\times)</td>
<td>(s_t\times)</td>
<td>(b_t\times)</td>
<td>(w_t\times)</td>
<td>(l_t\times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female age</td>
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<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husbands education</td>
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<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>-5.78</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>-11.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single*Non-White</td>
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<td>2.38</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
<td>13.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children at (t-1)</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children sq. at (t-1)</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-2.47</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of last child</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner at (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single*Homeowner at (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-16.37</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current home size ((s_t))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior home size ((s_{t-1}))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed at (t-1) ((d_t^w))</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work time ((l_t))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.11</td>
<td></td>
<td>-130.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work time at (t-1) ((l_{t-1}))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td>97.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
flip side, spouses with less formal education have a comparative advantage in home maintenance, which utilizes manual skills not taught much in schools. Similarly homeownership confers greater control and security over one’s living arrangements, features we think are more highly valued by younger women and married women with older spouses. Finally, utility from homeownership is smaller for non-white households, consistent with the lower homeownership rates for these population segments.

While the choices households make about buying their first home are informative about its value to them, the value derived from their labor supply and fertility choices are affected by their housing status. Column (3) shows the utility of married women from having a(nother) child is enhanced by living in their own home, although this is emphatically not true for single women. More generally these findings are consistent with empirical evidence that homeownership is beneficial for families with children (Green and White 1997; Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin 2002), and is highly correlated with the fertility decisions (Öst 2012). Homeownership also affects the (mainly nonpecuniary) costs and benefits of labor supply, raising the cost of participation, as reported in column (4), but for those women supplying labor reducing the burden of working extra hours, column (5). Thus homeowners tend towards a lower labor-force participation, but if they work, tend to choose longer working hours (which is consistent with having longer commuting costs, amongst other factors). This last finding contrasts with Table 1 which shows that if we do not condition on the characteristics of the household, the average number of hours worked by homeowners is lower.

Our findings on the utility of giving birth to a child and the disutility of working and work hours, presented in columns (3) - (5) are also intuitive. The utility of giving birth decreases with age and is larger for more educated households: these effects capture the higher fertility rates of more educated older households relative to less educated households, who tend to complete their families at an earlier age. The utility from giving birth is lower for single households, higher if a family already has children, and increasing in the age of their youngest child: since young children draw their mothers from the
workforce, and human capital from working depreciates with absence, there are investment gains from bunching.

The utility of work declines with age, is higher for more educated and single households, and lower for non-white households. It is decreasing with children but higher for households with older children. Households are more likely to work if they worked in the previous periods. The utility of supply of working hours is increasing and concave. It is increasing with age, is lower for more educated and single households, and higher for non-white households. The utility from working hours is decreasing with the number of children in a family and with the age of youngest child.

5 Counterfactual Decompositions

In our model, first home purchase, household composition and size, as well as female labor supply, are endogenous variables driven by predetermined schooling attainment, and prices, namely wages, housing and interest rates, that individual households are too small to affect through their own decisionmaking. Figure 6 shows that over this period educational attainment and female wages more or less monotonically increased, house prices peaked and slumped three times with an overall upward trend, while roughly speaking interest rates were quite volatile, rising in the first half of the period and falling in the second half. To disentangle the strength of these factors on the endogenous variables, the last part of our analysis conducts counterfactual simulations, by quantifying the response of homeownership, labor-force participation and child birth to greater education, wage increases, increasing house prices and changes in interest rates.

Although any given factor might be dominant in predicting a particular counterfactual simulation (for example, wages on labor supply), it is difficult to cleanly isolate the effect of each, as they are tightly interconnected both contemporaneously and through dynamic propagation. The simulations compare steady state allocations in an economy populated by households with the estimated utility function where wages, education attainment, interest rates
and house prices are comparable to those found at different points in the data. First, we construct two benchmark simulations for steady state economies approximating conditions in 1971 at the beginning of our data sample, and two decades later towards the end of the sample, in 1991. Then we simulate four further steady state economies, by changing just one factor at a time from its 1971 level to its level in 1991.

From a theoretical perspective house prices, interest rates and wages are endogenous within a general equilibrium framework, jointly determined by the preferences we estimate, as well as the supply of rental versus owned housing, the demand for labor, and the supply of credit. The fluctuations in house prices and interest rates are a major source of aggregate nonstationarities that our estimation procedure accounts for, but it would be a huge computational challenge to also solve for the general equilibrium of a nonstationary economy, further complicated by the fact that household decisions made towards the end of the sample are partly determined by aggregate effects that are only revealed after the sample ends. Although our approach is not definitive, it accounts for the endogeneity and dynamics of household composition, labor supply and first home purchase, and therefore gives insight from the impact of the most important driving factors.

5.1 Benchmark economies

According to Figure 6, the early parts of the data are characterized by the lower levels of education, a lower wage rate for a standardized skill unit which is captured by the time fixed effects, and relatively low levels of house price index and interest rates. Imposing these starting characteristics, we simulate benchmark patterns in homeownership, labor-force participation and children using the estimated model parameters. Appendix B explains how each stationary economy was simulated. Briefly, using the PSID sample we first estimated processes for the house size, marital status and wages as a function of the state variables. Then we solved the dynamic programming model recursively for different household types and cohorts at the steady states.
Figure 6: Educational attainment for female population 15 years old and over measured as the average years of total schooling, constructed based on data from Barro and Lee (2013). Wage rate is computed by the authors based on the PSID data sample. US National Home Price Index is based on Shiller (2015), whereas one-year Treasury constant maturity rate (GS1) is retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Decennial Censuses (Ruggles et al. 2019) are used for construction of 1970 – 1990 homeownership rates.

The top panel in Table 3 summarizes homeownership rates, average home size, labor-force participation and average number of children for the benchmark 1971 stationary economy where the distribution of household types, wages, house prices and interest rates are set to their 1971 values. Further, Table 4 reports average age at first child, first homeownership and labor-force participation rate for householders before and after age 35. Table 4 shows, in the 1971 stationary model economy the average age at first birth is 22.9 years, 78 percent of younger women (ages 25 - 34) work while the labor-force
Table 3: Counterfactual simulation results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Benchmark for 1971</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership rate</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home size</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benchmark for 1991</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeownership rate</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td>Home size</td>
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<td>5.23</td>
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<td>Labor force participation</td>
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<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
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<td>1.16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Steady state change</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Homeownership rate</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Home size</td>
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<td>-11.5%</td>
<td>-12.8%</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Labor force participation</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Children</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Wage as in 1991

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Homeownership rate</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.88</td>
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<td>-6.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home size</td>
<td>4.94</td>
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<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-21%</td>
<td>-30%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Education level as in 1991

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership rate</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home size</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor force participation</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
participation rate for older women (between 35 and 45) is 67 percent, and the average age at becoming a homeowner is 28 years. These statistics are remarkably close to the data patterns for the PSID documented in Figure 1, and in the economy at large. According the National Vital Statistical System, the average age of mother at first birth in the US was about 22 in 1970s (Mathews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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</table>

C. House prices as in 1991

<table>
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<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homeownership rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
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<td>-6.8%</td>
<td>-8.2%</td>
<td>-7.1%</td>
<td>-6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor force participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Interest rate as in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Difference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homeownership rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
<td>-4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor force participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-5.2%</td>
<td>-10.2%</td>
<td>-13.6%</td>
<td>-11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and Hamilton 2002). While nationally representative records on the average age at first homeownership are scarce, Figure 3 shows the average age at first homeownership in 1970s is around 27.

By 1991 the wage rate had almost doubled, average schooling per female increased by about 1.5 years, house prices grew by about 15 percent and interest rates were 1 percentage point higher than in 1971. The steady state for 1991 is calculated in a similar way to the 1971 economy: we hold the distribution of household types unchanged from 1971, adjust the prices to their 1991 values, and then resolve the optimization model. As Table 3 shows, the effect on homeownership is slightly ambiguous; it falls for all cohorts except the 31 - 35 cohort. Overall the homeownership rate declines by 0.4 percent, but the average age at becoming a homeowner in the benchmark of 1991 also falls slightly from 28.0 to 27.8 (see Table 4). Table 4 further shows, with regards to fertility and labor supply, the average age at first child increased to 23.5, labor-force participation increased by 7 percentage points up to 85 percent for younger women (ages 25 - 34), and by 9 percentage points up to 76 percent for older women (ages 35 - 44).

5.2 Wages

The first policy experiment constitutes an overall and permanent increase in base wages from its level in 1971 to the level reached by 1991, almost double the 1971 level (as Figure 6 shows). Table 4 shows higher wages increase the opportunity cost of leisure and child care, increasing labor-force participation by 9 (18) percent for women less (more) than 35 (and less than 45) years old, and resulting in less children per household, and increased childless. Panel A of Table 3 shows that the differences are most stark at about age 35, where the gap between labor force participation rates is about 19 percent and the reduction in the average number of children per family is about 0.7. The longer a woman postpones giving birth, the higher the wages from accumulated work experience, and consequently the more attractive work and the weaker the incentives to give birth. The reduction in fertility later in a life cycle resulted
Table 4: Counterfactual simulation results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average age at</th>
<th>LFP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first child</td>
<td>first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark in 1971</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark in 1991</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Wage as in 1991</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Education level as in 1991</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. House prices as in 1991</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Interest rate as in 1991</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in the average age at first birth shifting to earlier, now being 21.6 (see Table 4).

The effect of higher base wages on housing demand operates through multiple channels. All else equal, higher labor-market compensation and greater wealth increases spending on housing (and other goods), inducing homeownership at younger ages. However the substitution effect away from domestic activities, including leisure and child rearing reduces the demand for homeownership, a complementary good. The second effect, most evident in Table 3 from the decline in the number of children for all cohorts, dominates the first, leading to less homeownership. Panel A of Table 3 reports homeownership falls for every cohort, the average age at first home purchase rising by 1.3 years to 29.3 (see Table 4). The effect on home size is mixed: the solution to the estimated model shows that higher wages induce women to substitute smaller families and larger homes purchased later in life for larger families and smaller homes purchased earlier in life.
5.3 Education

The next policy experiment compares the benchmark 1971 steady state outcomes with those of a steady state in which education is increased by 1.5 years, roughly the amount Figure 6 shows average schooling per female increased between 1970 and 1990. Table 2 shows more educated females exhibit stronger preferences than the less educated towards home purchase, placing a lower premium on home size, and also towards offspring, by itself an impetus for home ownership. Because they command higher wage rates (reported in Table 5 of Appendix B), working is also more lucrative. This potentially gives a third reason for buying a home, since working females place a higher reservation price on owning a home than nonworkers.

Solving the model with higher educational attainment, Panel B of Table 3 shows that the homeownership rate rises for every cohort. Furthermore Table 4 shows the average age at the time of purchasing the first home declining by approximately 6 months. The trade off between age at purchase and size of home, evident in the cross section, is reinforced here: Table 3 shows the size of an average first home shrinks in this experiment. We conclude that if anything, increased educational attainment dampened the trend away from home ownership over this period.

While not the main focus of this study, the effects on life cycle labor supply and fertility are also noteworthy. Overall there are fewer children, but because average age at first birth increases by almost a year (Table 4), the number of children in older households, that is for women over 35, rises, as show in Panel B of Table 3. Our findings suggest delaying fertility is matched by younger women increasing their labor supply, and women over 40 reducing it.

5.4 House prices

We also investigate how a 15 percent increase in house prices, the net increase over the two decades starting 1971, would affect steady state allocations. Intuitively the wealth effect reduces the demand for all normal goods, while the substitution effect encourages households to reallocate their consumption
bundle away from homeownership to other goods. Panel C of Table 3 shows the intuition for a static framework extends to this dynamic context, with the wealth effect dominating the substitution effect for nonhousing goods, not surprising given the share of expenditure on accommodation within the total household budget. Both the home ownership rate and the house size fall for every cohort (Table 3), while the average age at first purchase rise by 0.4 years (Table 4), implying even those who buy spend less of their summed discounted lifetime time in their own home. Fertility falls for all but the youngest cohort, where there is no change, yet labor-force participation increases for all cohorts except the youngest, essentially reducing nonwork time as well.

These results also highlight a major finding of our study. Comparing Panels A and C in Table 3, with the exception of the oldest cohort, the effect of increased female wages is markedly greater than the effect of rising house prices on the homeownership rate, and from Table 4, on the timing of first home purchase as well. Raising house prices and raising female wages have the same qualitative effects on home ownership rates and age at first purchase, but the quantitative impact of higher wages is greater: the key to understanding this result is that wages almost doubled but house prices only increased by about 15 percent. Nevertheless rising house prices do have a more pronounced negative effect on one dimension: when prices rise the size of the first house purchase falls across all cohorts by up to 8 percent, but when wages increase the effect is ambiguous for the reasons mentioned above.

5.5 Interest rate

The final counterfactual exercise we conducted determines how sensitive the endogenous choices are to interest-rate changes: following the same protocol the benchmark model is simulated with the conditions of 1971, when interest rate was 4.8 percent, and then with the 1991 rate, 5.8 percent. When the interest rate rises, households, who are saving for the future, experience both a positive wealth effect and a substitution towards market goods consumed in the future. In our model households have completed their education, so
they are reducing their debt and saving for retirement. The combination of substitution and wealth effects are perhaps most apparent in labor-force participation and fertility. Panel D of Table 3 shows the number of births increase, especially later in life; similarly the women are less likely to work, spending more time with children and on leisure, especially as they get older. Homeownership increases for all cohorts, while the size of first homes declines.

Unlike wages, educational attainment and house prices that generally show a steady growth over the period of 1970 - 1990, interest rates had a decade of dramatic growth and then a decade of decline back to the levels of 1970s. For this reason we are reluctant to take a stand on how those fluctuations might have affected first home-purchase decisions over this period. We note though, that this feature of the solution to our estimated model, homeownership rates and interest rate moving together but house size moving in the opposite direction, corresponds to the stylized facts of more recent times out of sample: as current interest rates hit historical lows, homeownership rates for the working cohorts of population are also in decline (Goodman, Pendall, and Zhu 2015), and home sizes for owners grow larger.\footnote{Reducing the interest rate by 1 percentage point in the benchmark model yields results similar to those reported in Panel D of Table 3, but with the opposite sign, results that are available from the authors upon request.}

6 Conclusion

The delay in first home purchase fully accounts for the decline in homeownership in the US over two decades spanning the 1970s through the 1990s. During that time the average age of the first time home buyer and the average age of the mother at first birth increased by two years, and female labor-force participation grew substantially. There is widespread agreement that these trends are interrelated but previous empirical research has not sought to reconcile these three life-cycle choices, fertility, female labor supply and home buying, to explain why Americans are making their first home purchase at an older age than previous generations did. Our lifecycle optimization model seeks to explain
these trends within a competitive paradigm based on household responses to market fundamentals and changing demographics, specifically higher wages, greater education, higher house prices and fluctuating interest rates. Our dynamic model provides an intuitive transmission mechanism linking the female labor market, fertility, and the housing market, and yields plausible estimates from the PSID data. Our counterfactuals provide a dynamic decomposition to explain what happened during the sample period.

One might speculate that higher levels of education would lead to lower homeownership, because college graduates start their working careers years after those with high school education, delay childbirth and have smaller families. We find no support for this conjecture. Highly educated females value homeownership more than less educated women. Furthermore controlling for the upward shift in female wages, a stronger schooling background increases labor-force participation; this also brings forward home purchase because working females also exhibit a preference for homeownership. Taken together these two factors more than offset the combined effect on homeownership of later entry into the workforce and the prospect of smaller families.

Similarly we find no evidence that financial markets played an important role. Our estimated dynamic optimization model rationalizes why lower interest rates lead to reduced homeownership: savers lose wealth, leading them to decrease their consumption at every point in their life, and postpone their first home purchase. On this score our model correctly predicts, out of sample, that the trend towards postponing first home ownership would be exacerbated after the sample period ended because of lower interest rates. In principle a more complicated model than ours might also incorporate borrowing constraints and other housing market imperfections. We are skeptical the additional complexity can be justified. What is the compelling institutional feature that has increasingly curbed the ability of households to borrow for home purchase? In the years following our sample period the transition rate to homeownership further slowed, although interest rates continued to fall and by many accounts borrowing for homeownership became easier.

This essentially leaves two factors to explain why the American dream was
delayed. First, housing prices increased over this period and, not surprisingly, reduced homeownership. Second, since first home purchase is coordinated with fertility outcomes, the solution to our dynamic model with the estimated parameters shows that the indirect effect of higher wages was to delay homeownership, because higher wages increased the opportunity cost of childcare, leading to postponing first birth, raising smaller families, and thus lowering and postponing the demand for homeownership. In short, we find there is strong complementarity between homeownership and raising children, who became more expensive relative to alternative uses of time and money. Empirically the magnitude of this transmission mechanism proved comparable to, if not more important than, the effect of increased house prices, in retarding first home purchases.

References


For Online Publication: Appendices

A Appendix

*Proof of Theorem 1.* Define the date zero price of a bond that pays a consumption unit each period from date $t$ onwards as:

$$
\tilde{B}_t \equiv \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i^{(s)}} \right) = \tilde{B}_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 + i^{(t)}}
$$

where $i^{(t)} \equiv \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + i_s) - 1$ is the compound interest rate over the first $t$ periods. Let:

$$
\tilde{Q}_t \equiv \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \frac{\ln[\beta^s (1 + i^{(s)})]}{(1 + i^{(s)})} = \tilde{Q}_{t+1} + \frac{\ln[\beta^{t} (1 + i^{(t)})]}{(1 + i^{(t)})}
$$

For convenience we also define:

$$
\alpha_{jt} \equiv \exp\left(u^h_{jt} + u^b_{jt} + u^l_{jt}\right)
$$

(9)

and note that $\alpha_{0t} = 1$ for all $t$.

After making all its discrete choices before period $T$, the household chooses
its remaining lifetime consumption profile \( \{c_t\}_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \) to maximize:

\[
- \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} \beta^t \exp(-\rho c_t)
\]  

(10)

subject to a sequence of budget constraints:

\[
(1 + i_t)^{-1} e_{t+1} \leq e_t - c_t
\]

The indirect utility function for this Lagrangian problem is:

\[
V_{T+1}(e_{T+1}) = -\tilde{B}_{T+1} \exp \left( \frac{\tilde{Q}_{T+1}}{\tilde{B}_{T+1}} - \frac{\rho e_{T+1}}{(1 + i(T+1)) \tilde{B}_{T+1}} \right)
\]

Suppose a household with state variables \( z_T \) makes choice \( j \) at age \( T \) for one period and then retires. Let \( y_{jT} \) denote net income for the last period in which the household makes discrete choices; it includes wage income for the last period and the discounted sum of all future rents:

\[
y_{jT} = (1 - l_{jT}) w_T - \sum_{t=T+1}^{\infty} R \left( s_{t}^{(j)}, q_{t}^{(j)} \right) \frac{1 + i(T)}{(1 + i(t))}
\]

Note that future rents payable depend on the final housing choice. After selecting choice \( j \), and receiving income \( y_{jT} \), she chooses consumption and next period’s endowment \( (c_T, e_{T+1}) \) optimally to maximize:

\[
-\beta^T \alpha_{jT} \exp(-\varepsilon_{jT}) \exp(-\rho c_T) - \tilde{B}_{T+1} \exp \left( \frac{\tilde{Q}_{T+1}}{\tilde{B}_{T+1}} - \frac{\rho e_{T+1}}{(1 + i(T+1)) \tilde{B}_{T+1}} \right)
\]

(11)

subject of her budget constraint:

\[
\frac{e_T}{1 + i(T)} + \frac{y_{jT}}{1 + i(T)} = \frac{e_{T+1}}{1 + i(T+1)} + \frac{c_T}{1 + i(T)}
\]

Denoting by \( V_{jT}(e_T) \) the discounted sum of expected utility for a householder of age \( T \) onwards with wealth \( e_T \) who chooses \( j \) and makes optimal consump-
tion choices thereafter, we can apply Lagrangian methods to show:

\[
V_{jT} (e_T) = -\overline{B}_T \frac{1}{\alpha_{jT}} \exp \left\{ \widetilde{Q}_T - \frac{\varepsilon_{jT}}{\overline{B}_T [1 + i(T)]} - \frac{\rho (e_T + y_{jT})}{\overline{B}_T [1 + i(T)]} \right\}
\]

\[
= -\frac{B_T}{(1 + i(T))} \alpha_{jT} \exp \left[ \frac{Q_T}{\overline{B}_T} - \frac{\varepsilon_{jT}}{\overline{B}_T} - \frac{\rho (e_T + y_{jT})}{\overline{B}_T} \right] \tag{12}
\]

where the second line exploits the relationships \( B_T = \overline{B}_T (1 + i(T)) \) and \( Q_T = \widetilde{Q}_T (1 + i(T)) \).

Appealing to the definition of \( A_t (z_t) \) given in the text, we can now prove by an induction argument that, conditional on choosing \( j \), the value function at \( t \) discounted back to date zero is:

\[
V_{jt} (e_t, z_t, \varepsilon_{jt}) = -\frac{B_t}{(1 + i(t))} \alpha_{jt} \exp \left[ \frac{Q_t}{B_t} - \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{B_t} - \frac{\rho (e_t + y_{jt})}{B_t} \right] A_{t+1} \left( z_{i+1} \right) \tag{13}
\]

At time \( t \) the household chooses \( j \) to maximize \( V_{jt} (e_t, z_t, \varepsilon_{jt}) \). Since maximizing an objective function is equivalent to minimizing the logarithm of its negative, the maximum can be found by minimizing:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{B_t}{(1 + i(t))} \right) + \ln \alpha_{jt} + \frac{Q_t}{B_t} - \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{B_t} - \frac{\rho (e_t + y_{jt})}{B_t} - \left( 1 - \frac{1}{B_t} \right) \ln A_{t+1} \left( z_{i+1} \right)
\]

The proof is completed by multiplying the expression above by \( B_t \), subtracting terms that do not depend on \( j \), appealing to (9) and rearranging. \( \square \)

**Proof of Theorem 2.** It is helpful to define the date zero price of a bond which pays a consumption unit each from date \( t \) onwards as:

\[
\overline{B}_t \equiv \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i(s)} \right) = \overline{B}_{t+1} + \frac{1}{1 + i(t)} \tag{14}
\]

where \( i(t) \equiv \prod_{s=0}^{t} (1 + i_s) - 1 \) is the compound interest rate over the first \( t \) periods, and that:

\[
\frac{\overline{B}_{t+1}}{\overline{B}_t} = 1 - \frac{1}{\overline{B}_t [1 + i(t)]} = 1 - \frac{1}{\overline{B}_t} \tag{15}
\]

It is well known and note that if \( \varepsilon_{jt} \) is independently and identically distributed as a Type I extreme value with location and scale parameters (0, 1)
then from Theorem 1:

\[
\ln \left[ \frac{p_{0t}(z_t)}{p_{jt}(z_t)} \right] = \rho y_{0t} - (B_t - 1) \ln A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right) - \left[ \rho y_{jt} - \ln (\alpha_{jt}) - (B_t - 1) \ln A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \rho \left( y_{0t} - y_{jt} \right) + \ln (\alpha_{jt}) + (B_t - 1) \ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right)}{A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)} \right]
\]

Exponentiating the result and raising to the power \( 1 / B_t \), we obtain:

\[
\left[ \frac{p_{0t}(z_t)}{p_{jt}(z_t)} \right]^{\frac{1}{B_t}} = \alpha_{jt}^{\frac{1}{B_t}} \exp \left[ - \frac{\rho \left( y_{jt} - y_{0t} \right)}{B_t} \right] \left[ \frac{A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right)}{A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)} \right]^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}
\]

Rearranging equation (16) we obtain:

\[
\alpha_{jt}^{\frac{1}{B_t}} \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{jt}}{B_t} \right) A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}} = \left[ \frac{p_{0t}(z_t)}{p_{jt}(z_t)} \right]^{\frac{1}{B_t}} A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}} \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{0t}}{B_t} \right)
\]

From the definition of \( A_t(z_t) \):

\[
A_t(z_t) = \sum_{j=0}^{J} p_{jt}(z_t) \alpha_{jt}^{\frac{1}{B_t}} E \left[ \exp \left( - \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{B_t} \right) \right] \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{jt}}{B_t} \right) A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}
\]

Substituting the left hand side into the recursion for \( A_t \) given in Equation (17) yields:

\[
A_t(z_t) = \sum_{j=0}^{J} p_{jt}(z_t) E \left[ \exp \left( - \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{B_t} \right) \right] \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{0t}}{B_t} \right) \left[ \frac{p_{0t}(z_t)}{p_{jt}(z_t)} \right]^{\frac{1}{B_t}} A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}
\]

But from the online appendix of Gayle, Golan, and Miller 2015:

\[
E \left[ \exp \left( - \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{B_t} \right) \right] = p_{jt}(z_t)^{\frac{1}{B_t}} \Gamma \left( \frac{B_t + 1}{B_t} \right)
\]

where \( \Gamma (\cdot) \) is the complete gamma function. Substituting for the left hand in
the expression derived for $A_t(z_t)$ above it thus yields:

$$A_t(z_t) = p_{0t}(z_t) \frac{1}{t!} \Gamma \left( \frac{B_t + 1}{B_t} \right) \sum_{j=0}^{J} p_{jt}(z_t) \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{0t}}{B_t} \right) A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}$$

$$= \Gamma \left( \frac{B_t + 1}{B_t} \right) p_{0t}(z_t) \frac{1}{t!} \exp \left( - \frac{\rho y_{0t}}{B_t} \right) A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{B_t}}$$

or:

$$\ln A_t(z_t) = \ln \Gamma \left( \frac{B_t + 1}{B_t} \right) + \frac{1}{B_t} \ln p_{0t}(z_t) - \frac{\rho y_{0t}}{B_t} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{B_t} \right) \ln A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)$$

Using this expression to difference $\log A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(j)} \right)$ with $\log A_{t+1} \left( z_{t+1}^{(0)} \right)$ gives:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)})}{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(0)})} \right] = \frac{1}{B_{t+1}} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{0t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)})}{p_{0t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(0)})} \right] - \rho(y_{t+1}^{(j,t)} - y_{t+1}^{(0,t)}) \right\} + \left( 1 - \frac{1}{B_{t+1}} \right) \ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+2}(z_{t+2}^{(j)})}{A_{t+2}(z_{t+2}^{(0)})} \right]$$

where the second line follows from (15). Telescoping to period $T$ and appealing to the fact that $A_{T+1} \left( z_{T+1}^{(j)} \right) = 1$ yields:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)})}{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(0)})} \right] = \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \frac{1}{B_s} \prod_{r=t+1}^{s-1} \tilde{B}_{r+1} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{0s}(z_s^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_s^{(0)})} \right] - \rho \left( y_s^{(j,t)} - y_s^{(0,t)} \right) \right\}$$

$$= \frac{1}{B_{t+1}} \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \frac{\tilde{B}_{s}}{B_s} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{0s}(z_s^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_s^{(0)})} \right] - \rho \left( y_s^{(j,t)} - y_s^{(0,t)} \right) \right\}$$

$$= \frac{1}{B_{t+1}} \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \frac{1}{1 + i(s)} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{0s}(z_s^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_s^{(0)})} \right] - \rho \left( y_s^{(j,t)} - y_s^{(0,t)} \right) \right\}$$

Taking the logarithm of (16), multiplying by $-B_s$ and substituting the expres-
sion for $A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)})/ A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(0)})$, obtained in (18), yields:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{p_{jt}(z_t)}{p_{0t}(z_t)} \right] = \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) - \ln (\alpha_{jt}) + (1 - B_t) \ln \left[ \frac{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(j)})}{A_{t+1}(z_{t+1}^{(0)})} \right]$$

$$= \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) - \ln (\alpha_{jt}) + \left(1 - B_t\right) \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \frac{1}{1 + i^{(s)}} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{os}(z_{s}^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_{s}^{(0)})} \right] - \rho (y_{s}^{(j,t)} - y_{s}^{(0,t)}) \right\}$$

But from (15):

$$\tilde{B}_{t+1} = \tilde{B}_t - \frac{\tilde{B}_t}{B_t} = \frac{\tilde{B}_t (B_t - 1)}{B_t}$$

implying:

$$\frac{1 - B_t}{B_{t+1}} = (1 - B_t) \frac{B_t}{B_t (B_t - 1)} = - \frac{B_t}{B_t} = - [1 + i^{(t)}]$$

Therefore:

$$\ln \left[ \frac{p_{jt}(z_t)}{p_{0t}(z_t)} \right] = \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) - \ln (\alpha_{jt}) - \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \frac{1 + i^{(t)}}{1 + i^{(s)}} \left\{ \ln \left[ \frac{p_{os}(z_{s}^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_{s}^{(0)})} \right] - \rho (y_{s}^{(j,t)} - y_{s}^{(0,t)}) \right\}$$

$$= \rho (y_{jt} - y_{0t}) - \ln (\alpha_{jt}) + \sum_{s=t+1}^{T} \sum_{r=t+1}^{s} \frac{1}{1 + i^{(r)}} \left\{ \rho (y_{s}^{(j,t)} - y_{s}^{(0,t)}) + \ln \left[ \frac{p_{os}(z_{s}^{(j)})}{p_{0s}(z_{s}^{(0)})} \right] \right\}$$

Appealing to (9) and definition of $y_{s}^{(j,t)}$ the theorem is proved.

\[ \square \]

### B Simulation details

First we describe the elements of the state vector. Let $t$ denote the age of a female. Household fixed characteristics include education and race. Education is divided into 4 categories, which correspond to “less than high school”, “high school”, “some college”, and “college degree”. Race includes two categories: white and non-white. Marital status is modelled as stochastic exogenous shock, conditional on demographic characteristics. Aggregate factors include the level of house prices and interest rates. Such elements of state vector, as homeowner indicator, labor-force participation indicator, children and their ages, as well as home size and hours of work supplied by the household arise through decision making process within the model.
We solve the model by computing conditional choice probabilities for each combination of the state vector. The participation ratios \( p_{j,t} \), \( j = 0, \ldots, J \) are computed by solving the model backwards, starting from the termination condition. Termination condition is set to occur at age 65 after which a household retires and terminates. A household may enjoy a payoff period 64 payoff, however no future decisions are possible, which results in the ratio of conditional choice probabilities being set to one: 

\[
\frac{p_{0,t}(z_{65})}{p_{0,t}(z_{65}^{(j)})} = 1,
\]

so that we have:

\[
\ln \frac{p_{j,64}(z_{64})}{p_{0,64}(z_{64})} = \rho (y_{j,64} - y_{0,64}) + u_{j,64}^h + u_{j,64}^b + u_{j,64}^l.
\]  

(19)

Equation (19) allows us to evaluate \( p_{j,64}, j = 0, \ldots, J \), which are then being fed into an equation for age 63:

\[
\ln \frac{p_{j,63}(z_{63})}{p_{0,63}(z_{63})} = \rho (y_{j,63} - y_{0,63}) + u_{j,63}^h + u_{j,63}^b + u_{j,63}^l + \left( \frac{1}{1 + i} \right) \ln \left( \frac{p_{j,64}(z_{64})}{p_{0,64}(z_{64})} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{1 + i} \right) \rho \left[ \tilde{R}(s_{63}, q_{63}) - R(z_{63}) \right].
\]

The procedure is continued recursively until the age 22:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{p_{j,22}(z_{22})}{p_{0,22}(z_{22})} \right) = \rho (y_{j,22} - y_{0,22}) + u_{j,22}^h + u_{j,22}^b + u_{j,22}^l + \sum_{\tau = 23}^{22+17} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i} \right)^{\tau-22} \ln \left( \frac{p_{0,\tau}(z_{\tau}^{(0)})}{p_{0,\tau}(z_{\tau}^{(j)})} \right) - \sum_{\tau = 23}^{22+17} \left( \frac{1}{1 + i} \right)^{\tau-22} \rho \left[ \tilde{R}(s_{22}, q_{22}) - R(z_{22}) \right] \]  

(20)

From equation (20) one can notice that the planning horizon cannot exceed 17 years. If a female gives birth to a child, she expects to care for this child until the child turns 18, when, according to our assumption, the child leaves the parent family and forms her own household. Once the youngest child reaches age of 18 and leaves a household, no more children are born to the household as the probability of such cases is very small. The planning horizons for three decisions, which we consider in this paper, do not have to coincide. For decision to work, we can rely on finite dependence (shown in Altug and Miller 1998, and further formalized in Arcidiacono and Miller 2011), which occurs in two periods in our model specification.

Having the conditional choice probabilities computed for each combination
of the state vector, we have simulated outcomes ready. To account for potential pre-existing conditions, the initial distribution by the education, race, marital status, homeownership status, labor-force participation indicator, children and the age of the youngest child, as well as home size and hours of work supplied by the household at ages 20 - 22 are drawn from the joint empirical distribution in the PSID data.

C Estimation of wage equation

The summary statistics in Table 1 show homeowners and renters differ in their labor force participation, average hours worked, and labor income. Our first set of estimates shed light on why those differences emerge. The estimated wage equation is for the most part standard, including basic demographic characteristics, including age, education, and marital status, along with lagged labor force participation and working hours (see Miller and Sanders 1997; Altug and Miller 1998; Gayle and Miller 2006, for a similar wage equation specification). In view of the last two rows of Table 1, that imply homeowners earn a higher wage rate than tenants, we control for home ownership to investigate the direct effects of ownership status on the wage rate.

Column (2) of Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients on demographic and labor input variables interacted with the homeownership dummy. All the coefficients on variables related to labor supply history interacted with the homeownership dummy are insignificant. Therefore we do not reject the main-
Figure 7: Transition from homeownership to renting.

tained null hypothesis that home ownership does not directly affect the wage rate. If the model is to explain differences in the wage rate between homeowners and renters, they must arise from differences either in their labor supply behavior that feed into the determination of the wage rate, or in the background variables of age, education and marital status.

The results from Table 5 provide mechanisms that might reconcile these differences. Since education interacted with age has a positive effect on wages, part of the positive correlation between home ownership and the wage rate is due to the fact that homeowners are more educated than tenants (shown in the second row in Table 1). Similarly we find marriage magnifies the effect of past hours worked on the current wage rate, a result that resonates with similar conclusions reached by Killewald and Gough (2013) and Eckstein, Keane, and Lifshitz (2019), and homeowners are more likely to be married (see the third row of Table 1.) Apparently these two factors dominate the negative effect on wages of homeowners working fewer hours than tenants.

D Additional evidence from the data

Figure 7 shows that homeowners rarely revert to renting permanent accommodation and the rate of reverting to renting is fairly stable over the period between 1970s and 1990s.