

# Reforming the OIC's Role in Peace and Security Institutional Gaps and Strategic Pathways

Volkdal, Christina Plesner

## *Document Version*

Final published version

## *Publication date:*

2025

## *License*

Unspecified

## *Citation for published version (APA):*

Volkdal, C. P. (2025). Reforming the OIC's Role in Peace and Security: Institutional Gaps and Strategic Pathways. Centre for Business and Development Studies. Centre for Business and Development Studies. Policy Brief No. March 2025/3

[Link to publication in CBS Research Portal](#)

## **General rights**

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

## **Take down policy**

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us (research.lib@cbs.dk) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 25. Apr. 2025



## **Reforming the OIC's Role in Peace and Security: Institutional Gaps and Strategic Pathways**

---

Christina Plesner Volkdal

### **Introduction**

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as the second-largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations (UN), holds a broad mandate to promote peace, security, and conflict resolution across its 57 member states. However, despite its aspirations, the OIC has struggled to exert substantial influence in resolving conflicts such as those in Palestine, Kashmir, and Myanmar (Özerdem, 2012). Unlike the UN, the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU), which have structured institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacekeeping, the OIC remains hindered by political fragmentation, a lack of enforcement power, and financial constraints (Bilawal, 2022).

The evolving nature of global security challenges - including intra-state conflicts, violent extremism, geopolitical tensions, and humanitarian crises - requires multilateral organizations to adapt their peace and security mechanisms accordingly. The OIC, given its unique position in representing Muslim-majority states, has a critical role in shaping conflict resolution frameworks and fostering intra-regional security cooperation. However, its historical reliance on diplomatic statements and non-binding resolutions has limited its practical impact. By drawing comparative insights from the UN, AU, and EU, this paper critically examines the structural deficiencies of the OIC's peace and security architecture and proposes comprehensive reforms to enhance its effectiveness. These include establishing a Peace and Security Council, developing a Standby Force, strengthening mediation frameworks, and institutionalizing a

sustainable financing mechanism for peacebuilding.


### **Institutional Deficiencies of the OIC**

The OIC's peace and security framework relies on non-binding resolutions and voluntary commitments, which severely limit its capacity to implement decisions (Özerdem, 2012). The absence of an independent peacekeeping force, coupled with a reliance on ad hoc diplomacy, has rendered the OIC ineffective in preventing and managing conflicts. Unlike the UN Security Council, which possesses legally binding resolutions and enforcement mechanisms, the OIC lacks an equivalent structure to ensure compliance with its peace and security mandates (Farasin Trtworld, 2024).

Geopolitical rivalries, particularly between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, have obstructed the OIC's ability to adopt unified security policies (Ahmed & Akbarzadeh, 2021). These divisions have weakened the organization's credibility as a neutral mediator and have hindered coordinated responses to conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Libya (Bukhari et al., 2024).

Unlike the AU's African Standby Force (ASF) and the UN's robust peacekeeping operations, the OIC lacks a rapid deployment capability for conflict intervention (AU, 2015a). Additionally, financial constraints and the absence of a structured Peace and Security Fund have prevented the organization from effectively supporting mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, and security initiatives (SESRIC, 2019).

**Figure: OIC’s Peacebuilding Integration: Gaps and Potential**



### Comparative Analysis of OIC, AU, EU, and UN Approaches to Peace and Security

The AU, EU, and UN have established structured security frameworks that allow them to engage in peace operations with greater effectiveness. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has decision-making authority similar to the UN Security Council, enabling enforcement of sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms (Amani Africa, 2024). The EU employs a hybrid security model integrating military and civilian crisis management through the Common Security and Defence Policy (EEAS, 2022a). The UN has a multi-tiered approach incorporating the Peacebuilding Commission, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and peacekeeping forces (UN, 2025a). In contrast, the OIC’s institutional structure remains declaratory rather than operational, lacking enforcement capabilities.

The AU has developed the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene in crises, although its deployment has faced logistical challenges (AU, 2015a). The EU’s security operations emphasize hybrid peacekeeping missions that integrate military support with governance capacity-building (EEAS, 2022a). The UN has the most extensive peacekeeping mandate, with missions deployed worldwide. The OIC, however, lacks a comparable mechanism and instead relies on member states' voluntary contributions and ad hoc diplomatic missions.

The UN’s mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts, coordinated through Special Envoys and Political Missions, have played central roles in conflict resolution in Yemen, Libya, and Syria (UN, 2025c). The EU’s Mediation Support Team provides structured diplomatic engagement in crisis regions (EEAS, 2021b). The AU’s Panel of the Wise has facilitated peace negotiations across Africa (AU, 2015a). In contrast, the OIC has failed to institutionalize a dedicated mediation unit, resulting

REFORMING THE OIC’S ROLE IN PEACE AND SECURITY: INSTITUTIONAL GAPS AND STRATEGIC PATHWAYS

in inconsistent engagement and limited impact in conflict zones (Farasin Trtworld, 2024).

The UN’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) ensures financial backing for post-conflict recovery but faces underfunding challenges (Gaston et al., 2024). The EU’s European Peace Facility (EPF) supports military assistance programs, enhancing

regional security partnerships (EEAS, 2023b). The AU’s Peace Fund relies on external donors but ensures some level of financial independence (AU, 2016a). The OIC, however, lacks a dedicated financial instrument for peace and security operations, relying on voluntary contributions from member states (Bukhari et al., 2024).

**Table: Comparative Overview Across Organizations**

Organization	Institutional Mechanisms	Peacekeeping & Military Engagement	Mediation & Conflict Resolution	Financial & Logistical Support
OIC	Lacks enforcement mechanisms; relies on non-binding resolutions	No peacekeeping force; ad hoc diplomatic efforts	No dedicated mediation unit; inconsistent engagement	No structured funding mechanism; reliant on voluntary contributions
AU	Peace and Security Council (PSC) with decision-making authority	African Standby Force (ASF); slow deployment	Panel of the Wise for mediation	Peace Fund supported by donors but limited independence
EU	Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)	Hybrid peacekeeping combining military and civilian approaches	Mediation Support Team for diplomatic engagement	European Peace Facility (EPF) for military assistance
UN	UN Security Council with binding resolutions	Largest peacekeeping force; post-conflict stabilization	Special Envoys & Political Missions for mediation	Peacebuilding Fund (PBF); underfunded


**Data Transparency in Visualizations**

The following figures are based on structured assessments of institutional mechanisms, financial sustainability, and conflict prevention capacities. The ratings were assigned based on:


- **Institutionalized Mediation** – Evaluating whether organizations have structured mediation frameworks and specialized diplomatic mechanisms.
- **Local Inclusion in Peacebuilding** – Assessing the extent to which organizations engage local actors in peacebuilding efforts.
- **Conflict Prevention Capacity** – Measuring the effectiveness of early warning systems and preventive diplomacy initiatives.
- **Sustainable Financing Mechanisms** – Examining financial sustainability, dedicated peace funds, and reliance on external donors.

These ratings were derived from institutional reports, academic literature, and policy evaluations from the OIC, UN, AU, and EU.

**Figure: Comparative Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacebuilding Approaches**



**Figure: Sustainable Peacebuilding Financing Mechanisms**



## Discussion: Peace and Security Architecture of International Organizations

The application of peacebuilding theory to the peace and security architectures of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and African Union (AU) reveals critical insights into their comparative strengths and limitations in conflict prevention, resolution, and post-conflict stabilization. Peacebuilding, as conceptualized by Galtung (1976), emphasizes both negative peace (the cessation of violence) and positive peace (the establishment of long-term societal structures that prevent conflict recurrence). While all four organizations engage in peacebuilding, their approaches differ in institutional structure, enforcement mechanisms, and sustainability of interventions.

Peacebuilding theory underscores the importance of institutionalizing peace efforts to ensure long-term stability (Richmond, 2011). The UN exemplifies this approach through its Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), which integrate diplomacy, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction strategies (UN, 2025). The AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) employs a similar institutional approach,

featuring the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Panel of the Wise, which provide structured conflict resolution mechanisms (AU, 2015a).

In contrast, the OIC lacks a dedicated peacebuilding institution, relying instead on diplomatic summits and ad hoc mediation efforts (Özerdem, 2012). While the EU incorporates peacebuilding within its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and European Peace Facility (EPF), its approach is more integrated into broader foreign policy objectives (EEAS, 2022). The absence of a centralized peacebuilding architecture within the OIC significantly limits its ability to mediate conflicts effectively and contribute to sustainable peace.

A fundamental principle in peacebuilding is conflict sensitivity, ensuring interventions do not exacerbate existing tensions (Grewal, 2003). The AU’s mediation efforts, particularly in Sudan and the Sahel, emphasize African-led solutions, leveraging traditional governance systems to foster stability (Amani Africa, 2024). The EU’s mediation support unit integrates bottom-up approaches, aligning with the hybrid peacebuilding model that blends international frameworks with local ownership (De Coning, 2018).

The UN’s integrated peacebuilding approach prioritizes stakeholder engagement, but criticisms remain about its top-down approach that often overlooks local agency (McCann, 2014). Similarly, the OIC’s peace efforts, such as in Palestine and Myanmar, have faced challenges due to a lack of engagement with grassroots actors, limiting the sustainability of its interventions (Farasin, 2024). A peacebuilding architecture within the OIC should therefore incorporate localized conflict resolution mechanisms, such as community-based mediation and Islamic reconciliation frameworks (shura councils, tribal negotiation mechanisms).

Mediation is a core function in peacebuilding, requiring institutionalized structures for sustained diplomatic engagement. The UN Special Envoy System and the AU’s Panel of the Wise exemplify institutionalized mediation models

that provide structured conflict resolution (UN, 2025a; AU, 2015). The EU's Mediation Support Team similarly integrates diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian responses to peacebuilding (EEAS, 2021).

The OIC lacks a formalized mediation unit, leading to inconsistent engagement in conflicts such as Yemen and Libya (Bukhari et al., 2024). Without an independent Mediation and Crisis Response Unit, the OIC's ability to facilitate Track I and Track II diplomacy remains limited. Establishing such a unit would enhance its neutrality, credibility, and strategic coordination in conflict zones.

The role of peacekeeping forces in sustaining peace is well established within UN, AU, and EU frameworks. The UN Peacekeeping Missions, with over 87,000 personnel deployed globally, play a central role in stabilizing post-conflict environments (UN, 2024b). The AU's African Standby Force (ASF), while facing deployment delays and funding constraints, remains a key regional peacekeeping force (Vines, 2013).

The EU employs hybrid peacekeeping models, integrating civilian and military crisis response units under the CSDP (EEAS, 2022). The OIC, by contrast, lacks a dedicated peacekeeping force, relying on individual member states for security interventions (Bilawal, 2022). Establishing an OIC Standby Force (OIC-SF), modeled after the AU's ASF, would significantly enhance its ability to intervene in conflicts and support post-conflict peacebuilding.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is another essential component of post-conflict stabilization. The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) integrates SSR into its peacebuilding strategies, yet challenges remain in coordinating with national governments (McCann, 2014). The OIC has no structured SSR framework, limiting its engagement in post-war governance, disarmament, and reintegration initiatives. Institutionalizing an Islamic Security Sector Reform (ISSR) program, incorporating Islamic governance principles and local justice mechanisms, could bridge this gap.

Financial constraints often undermine peacebuilding initiatives. The UN's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) faces chronic underfunding, with reliance on voluntary contributions limiting its long-term sustainability (Gaston et al., 2024). The AU's Peace Fund, although partially operational, remains heavily dependent on external donors, particularly the EU and UN (AU, 2016). The EU's European Peace Facility (EPF), however, provides a flexible financing model, supporting regional security partnerships (EU, 2023).

The OIC lacks a structured Peace and Security Fund, relying on ad hoc financial commitments from Gulf states (Bukhari et al., 2024). Establishing an OIC Peace and Security Fund (OIC-PSF), leveraging Islamic finance instruments such as zakat, sukuk bonds, and waqf endowments, would provide a sustainable funding mechanism for peacebuilding operations.

Applying peacebuilding theory to the OIC's peace and security architecture reveals critical institutional gaps and strategic deficiencies. Unlike the UN, AU, and EU, which have structured peacebuilding institutions, mediation frameworks, and sustainable financing mechanisms, the OIC remains largely diplomatic and declaratory in its conflict resolution efforts.

To strengthen its peacebuilding role, the OIC must:

- Establish a Peace and Security Council with decision-making authority, modeled after the AU's PSC and the UN Security Council.
- Develop an OIC Mediation and Crisis Response Unit, ensuring structured, neutral diplomatic engagement.
- Create an OIC Standby Force (OIC-SF) for rapid deployment in Muslim-majority conflict zones.
- Institutionalize an Early Warning System (IEWS) to anticipate and prevent emerging security threats.
- Launch an OIC Peace and Security Fund (OIC-PSF) using Islamic finance mechanisms for sustainable funding.

- Enhance collaboration with global security actors (UN, AU, EU, NATO) to leverage diplomatic influence and operational capacity.

Without these structural reforms, the OIC risks continued marginalization in global peace and security governance. By integrating peacebuilding theory into its institutional framework, the OIC can transition from a rhetorical entity into an effective security actor, capable of addressing the pressing conflicts affecting the Muslim world.

## Overlapping Mandates of the OIC and the Arab League

A critical issue in strengthening the OIC's role in peace and security is its potential overlap with the Arab League (AL), given that approximately 40% of OIC members also belong to the AL. The Arab League has historically played a role in conflict resolution through mechanisms such as the Joint Defense Council and its discussions on establishing a rapid response force (Ahmed & Akbarzadeh, 2021). The question arises: does strengthening the OIC's security functions complement or compete with the AL?

Both the OIC and the AL share a common goal of promoting regional security and conflict resolution among their member states. While the AL has established a formal defense mechanism through its Joint Defense Council, it lacks the enforcement capacity necessary to implement its decisions effectively. Similarly, the OIC faces challenges in enforcing security measures despite its broad mandate. However, unlike the AL, the OIC extends its focus beyond the Arab world, addressing security challenges across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This wider scope positions the OIC as a more encompassing entity in global security discussions.

Given the differences in their mandates, the OIC and AL have the potential to complement each other rather than compete. The OIC's broader reach allows it to engage in peacebuilding and mediation efforts that transcend Arab states, filling gaps where

the AL's influence is limited. Enhanced coordination between the two organizations could facilitate a more effective division of responsibilities. In such a framework, the AL could concentrate on security concerns specific to Arab states, while the OIC could provide a global Islamic security framework that addresses conflicts affecting the wider Muslim world.

Despite their potential for complementarity, competition between the OIC and AL remains a risk, particularly if the OIC expands its security mandate without clear coordination. Overlapping initiatives could lead to duplication of efforts and inefficiencies. Additionally, political divisions among key member states—such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran—pose a significant challenge to cooperation. These geopolitical rivalries could hinder joint efforts and weaken institutional effectiveness.

## Strategic Recommendations

To enhance cooperation and minimize institutional fragmentation, both organizations should take concrete steps toward collaboration. Establishing a joint working group on peace and security would help delineate their respective roles and prevent redundancies. Additionally, developing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlining shared objectives and operational coordination could provide a formal basis for structured cooperation. A joint mediation task force would further strengthen their conflict resolution efforts by optimizing resources and ensuring a more coordinated response to regional crises.

By addressing these institutional overlaps and fostering a collaborative approach, the OIC and AL can enhance their collective impact on regional and global peace initiatives, avoiding fragmentation while maximizing their effectiveness in conflict prevention and resolution.

## Policy Recommendations for Strengthening the OIC

## REFORMING THE OIC'S ROLE IN PEACE AND SECURITY: INSTITUTIONAL GAPS AND STRATEGIC PATHWAYS

To address the structural weaknesses and enhance its role in global and regional peace and security, the OIC must implement the following strategic reforms:

- Establishing an OIC Peace and Security Council (OIC-PSC)
    - Modeled after the AU's Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, this body should be vested with decision-making authority to oversee conflict resolution efforts, enforce sanctions, and facilitate peacekeeping operations.
    - The OIC-PSC should have a permanent secretariat, ensuring institutional continuity and operational efficiency, rather than relying solely on summit declarations.
  - Developing an Islamic Standby Force (ISF)
    - Inspired by the AU's African Standby Force (ASF), the OIC should establish a rapid deployment peacekeeping force that can intervene in crisis situations, especially in member states experiencing internal or cross-border conflicts.
    - The ISF should be regionalized, with military contingents from different OIC subregions (Middle East, Africa, Asia) to ensure operational flexibility and burden-sharing.
  - Institutionalizing an Early Warning and Conflict Prevention System
    - An intelligence-driven early warning mechanism, similar to the EU's Early Warning System (EWS), should be developed to monitor security risks and conflicts in OIC states and anticipate emerging threats.
    - This system should integrate data analytics, intelligence-sharing,
- and cooperation with regional security actors (such as the AU and EU) to enhance proactive conflict prevention measures.
- Enhancing Mediation and Political Dialogue Frameworks
    - The OIC must establish a dedicated Mediation and Crisis Response Unit, modeled after the AU's Panel of the Wise and the UN's Mediation Support Unit.
    - This unit should be staffed by experienced diplomats, religious scholars, and peace practitioners to engage in Track I and Track II diplomatic efforts.
    - Leveraging Islamic reconciliation mechanisms such as Shura councils and tribal mediation processes could provide culturally relevant peacebuilding approaches.
  - Establishing a Dedicated Peace and Security Fund (OIC-PSF)
    - Unlike the UN's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the AU's Peace Fund, which have structured financial mechanisms, the OIC lacks a sustainable funding model for peace and security operations.
    - The OIC-PSF should be financed through Islamic financial instruments, including zakat-based funding, sukuk bonds, and waqf endowments, ensuring financial sustainability for peacekeeping and mediation initiatives.
    - Contributions should be mandatory for member states, rather than voluntary, to prevent financial instability in OIC peace operations.
  - Strengthening Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity Cooperation
    - The OIC should establish a counterterrorism intelligence-



- sharing platform, akin to NATO's intelligence coordination framework, to enhance regional collaboration in countering violent extremism and terrorism.
  - Cybersecurity threats, including disinformation campaigns and cyber warfare, should be integrated into the OIC's security strategy to protect member states from emerging digital security challenges.
- Enhancing Institutional Coordination with the UN, AU, and EU
  - The OIC should develop structured partnership frameworks with the UN, AU, and EU to leverage their expertise, resources, and operational capabilities in peacekeeping and conflict resolution.
  - The OIC should engage in joint peace missions, particularly in crisis-prone regions such as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East, where multilateral cooperation is essential.

Without significant structural reforms, the OIC risks continued marginalization in international security affairs.

With approximately 40% of OIC member states also part of the AL, their overlapping security mandates present both opportunities and challenges. While the AL's Joint Defense Council focuses on Arab regional security, the OIC's broader membership provides a wider platform for global Islamic peace and security cooperation. To prevent duplication and enhance effectiveness, the OIC should complement AL efforts by prioritizing mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding beyond the Arab region. Establishing joint frameworks for early warning systems, mediation task forces, and coordinated peace operations could strengthen both institutions. Without such reforms, the OIC risks continued marginalization in global security governance, underscoring the urgent need for institutional and operational enhancements.

To strengthen its role as a credible peace actor, the OIC must prioritize institutional development, financial sustainability, regional coordination, and mediation capabilities. Establishing a Peace and Security Council, an Islamic Standby Force, an Early Warning System, and a dedicated Peace and Security Fund would enhance its strategic effectiveness. Additionally, fostering regional partnerships with the UN, AU, and EU would enable the OIC to benefit from technical expertise and operational synergies in global peace efforts. The OIC, if it embraces these reforms, has the potential to transform itself into a proactive security actor, capable of addressing conflicts, preventing crises, and promoting sustainable peace across the Muslim world. However, without decisive action, it risks remaining a passive diplomatic entity, unable to respond effectively to the security needs of its member states. Thus, the need for urgent structural reforms cannot be overstated. The OIC must move beyond rhetoric and commit to institutional, operational, and financial enhancements that align with contemporary global peacebuilding best practices.

## Conclusion

The OIC's current peace and security architecture remains structurally inadequate, characterized by fragmented decision-making, political divisions among member states, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Despite its vast membership and mandate to promote stability, the OIC has failed to institutionalize effective conflict resolution mechanisms, leaving its role in global security marginal.

Comparative analysis with the UN, AU, and EU reveals critical institutional gaps in the OIC's peace and security framework. Unlike the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the AU Peace and Security Council, and the EU's hybrid security mechanisms, the OIC remains declaratory rather than operational in its conflict resolution approach.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christina Plesner Volkdal is a PhD Fellow at Copenhagen Business School, affiliated with the Department of Management, Society, and Communication. Her research centers on the Triple Nexus, an innovative intervention approach that bridges humanitarian operations, development programs, and peacebuilding efforts. With a background in the UN, particularly in humanitarian coordination, and an approach as a participant observer, she leverages first-hand experiences to offer profound insights, enriching her contributions to the field.

## REFERENCES

- Ahmed, S., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2021). *The Sectarian Dynamics of OIC's Security Challenges*.
- Amani Africa. (2024). *Peace and Security Council Analysis*.
- AU. (2015). *The African Peace and Security Architecture*.
- AU. (2016). *The African Peace Fund: Securing Sustainable Peace in Africa*.
- Bilawal, B. (2022). *The OIC's Challenges in Global Security Governance*.
- Böttcher, C., & Wittkowsky, A. (2021). Give "P" a Chance: Peacebuilding, Peace Operations, and the HDP Nexus.
- Bukhari, S., et al. (2024). *Financial Constraints in OIC Security Operations*.
- Byrne, D. (1998). *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences*.
- De Coning, C. (2018). *Adaptive Peacebuilding: A New Approach to Sustaining Peace in the 21st Century*.
- EEAS. (2021). *European Union's Mediation Support Team: Enhancing Conflict Prevention Mechanisms*.
- EEAS. (2022). *European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)*.
- EEAS. (2023). *The European Peace Facility: Strengthening Regional Security Partnerships*.
- Farasin, T. (2024). *Institutional Weaknesses in OIC Peacekeeping*.
- Galtung, J. (1976). *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, II*.
- Gaston, E., et al. (2024). *The UN's Peacebuilding Fund: An Evaluation of Funding Sustainability*.
- Grewal, B. (2003). *Positive and Negative Peace: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives*.
- McCann, J. (2014). *The UN's Peacebuilding Dilemmas: Balancing Stability and Local Agency*.
- Norman, J. M., & Mikhael, D. (2023). Rethinking the Triple-Nexus: Integrating Peacebuilding and Resilience Initiatives in Conflict Contexts. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 18(3), 248–263. doi: 10.1177/15423166231200210.
- Norman, L., & Mikhael, M. (2023). *Localizing Peacebuilding: The Role of Communities in Conflict Prevention*.
- OIC. (2025). *Counterterrorism Intelligence and Security Strategy*.
- Özerdem, A. (2012). *The OIC's Role in Conflict Resolution*.
- Richmond, O. (2011). *A Post-Liberal Peace*.
- SESRIC. (2019). *Financing Peace Initiatives in the OIC: Addressing Structural Constraints*.
- UN. (2024). *The UN's Global Peacekeeping Operations: Trends and Challenges*.
- UN. (2025). *The UN's Peacebuilding Commission and Mediation Framework: Strengthening Institutional Resilience*.

Vines, A. (2013). The African Standby Force: Challenges and Prospects for Deployment.