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WHY TRANSNATIONAL CLASS AND STATE? – A RESPONSE TO IAN TAYLOR

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Abstract

Ian Taylor challenges the concepts of a transnational capitalist class and state, suggesting that Poulantzas' notion of the 'internal bourgeoisie' is a better theoretical starting point for the analysis of transnational class formation and that the transnational state is a step too far. This critique is not convincing. It is debatable to what extent it is a 'Poulantzian reading.' The rejection of the notion of a transnational capitalist class is unsustainable because of compelling evidence for the existence of such a class with articulated shared interests and organizations tasked with pursuing them. The critique of the transnational state has some validity, but largely because proponents of the concept have been insufficiently clear on the consequences of upscaling the state concept to the global level. When this is acknowledged, the relevance and usefulness of the concept is that it enables state theoretical analysis of demonstrably existing transnational state apparatuses that perform transnational state functions, shaped by transnational relations of power between social forces, involving both structural power and direct engagement in transnational sites of contestation. There are now transnational elements of all fundamental characteristics of the capitalist state except one, the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Finally, Taylor does not provide an alternative approach to theorizing what descriptively is known as global governance.

Keywords:

Transnational class, Transnational state, Historical Materialism, Global governance, State theory, Poulantzas

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Why Transnational Class and State? A response to Ian Taylor

Ian Taylor's recent article in *Alternatives*, *Transnationalizing Capitalist Hegemony – a Poulantzian Reading*,¹ challenges both the concept of a transnational capitalist class (TC) and the concept of a transnational state (TNS), suggesting that Poulantzas' notion of the 'internal bourgeoisie' is a better theoretical starting point for the analysis of transnational class formation and that the transnational state is a step too far.

This is a welcome intervention. It calls attention to an important question in theorizing the contemporary world order, especially the proliferation of global governance arrangements. It is also welcome because it is based on a 'Poulantzian reading;' welcome because Poulantzas remains an underutilized resource in the study of international relations.² Furthermore Taylor's critique implicitly raises an issue that deserves much more attention by advocates of TC and TNS, namely the problem of 'upscaling' concepts to the global level. The lack of sufficient explicit attention to the theoretical implications of conceptual upscaling is a weakness in the TC and TNS literature, making the opposition to the concept to some extent self-inflicted. But it is a weakness that can and should be remedied, and one of my purposes here is to contribute to that.

But it is also a problematic intervention for several reasons. Important parts of the critique can be rejected on empirical grounds, on some points it constructs straw men, it fails to address the problem that transnationalism seeks to solve, and it is questionable whether Taylor's 'Poulantzian reading' is based on the only possible reading of Poulantzas and, indeed, whether it is the best one. Overall therefore, Taylor's critique is not convincing.

I will first summarize Taylor's critique. Then, as preliminary to addressing his arguments, I will discuss what a 'Poulantzian reading' can and should mean and offer some comments on how to analyse and work with theoretical concepts, given that two concepts, class and state, are central to the discussion. Then I engage with Taylor's critique of first the transnational class concept and then the transnational state, leading on to my conclusion.

TAYLOR'S CRITIQUE

Concerning a transnational capitalist class Taylor does not reject that transnationalization has happened, is ongoing and is important, also for capitalist classes. He states that 'it is true that ruling classes have been progressively integrated into transnationalizing class structures'³ and that 'transnationalization of class relations has considerably intensified with the onset of globalization'.⁴ Taylor

writes about 'the transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie' in the singular, for instance: 'The erstwhile hegemony of an essentially nation-based capitalist class has been elevated to the global scale by this transnationalizing class, the fraction with the greatest influence on international institutions.'⁵ But based on the context this must be read as a general statement about classes in several countries so that according to Taylor there is a *plurality* of such transnationalizing classes that together has a significant global political impact, and not *one* international or global or transnational capitalist class. Indeed, Taylor also makes this point explicitly; he rejects the notion of *a* transnational capitalist class.

To substantiate this he forwards three arguments. The first is to introduce the criterion of being 'a unified bloc' as a precondition for speaking about a capitalist class: 'the idea that a transnational capitalist class exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it underestimates the horizontal socioeconomic and political competitiveness and contestations between individual capitals.'⁶

The second argument is that while we have 'transnationalizing ruling classes', 'this process is ongoing and incomplete and *contra* the transnational capitalist class thesis, this has not been incompatible with state sovereignty and territoriality.'⁷ The third argument is that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.'⁸ Thus, Taylor in a sense accepts the drift of the transnational class argument, but claims that it has gone too far because there is no unified bloc, the TC thesis underestimates or ignores the domestic level, and more strongly: the domestic level is and will remain the primary terrain.

For this reason, Taylor argues, the better approach is to build on Poulantzas' concept of the internal bourgeoisie,⁹ 'the transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie' is the driving force behind 'neoliberalism at the national level, thereby effecting a globalizing trend.'¹⁰

The critique of the transnational state concept is stronger but also more central because, according to Taylor, 'a transnational state is at the heart of the global capitalism thesis.'¹¹ As in relation to the class concept Taylor acknowledges the reality and importance of the transnationalization of political processes: 'it is equally true that many pivotal economic, social, and political processes have become transnationally oriented.'¹² But then several arguments are forwarded about limits of this process, adding up to the conclusion that 'it is too far a conceptual leap to advocate the existence of a transnational state.'¹³

The most important argument, stated several times through the paper, is that the TNS thesis ignores the domestic level. Thus transnationalization processes 'are all permitted by the agglomeration of national-based power blocs';¹⁴ Morton is quoted approvingly for the verdict that 'the transnational state thesis ... offers a flattened ontology that removes state forms as a significant spatial scale in the articulation of capitalism,'¹⁵ 'Profit maximization is of course globally organized, but state power over different facets of territorial integrity is not cheerfully given up';¹⁶ the TNS thesis 'ignores the fact that states remain meaningful nodal points in the configuration of capitalist accumulation and because it fails to recognize the ongoing importance of how different expressions of capitalist development in its various stages is articulated between and within social formations.'¹⁷

There are two arguments here: one is the already mentioned that the nation state remains the primary site. The other is that the domestic level is ignored.

Another argument is that the TNS thesis holds that nation states are merely transmission belts for decisions made by the transnational state; “where we must part company with the transnational state thesis is when it claims that states already act as transmission belts for the spreading of global capital and that national states are mere “filtering devices” in pressing forward the agenda of monopoly capitalism;’¹⁸ ‘states are now transmission belts from the global to the local level.’¹⁹

Furthermore Taylor claims that the TNS thesis implies or assumes several implausible things: a) It ‘would require a unified class consciousness;’²⁰ b) ‘which in turn assumes a state-like global apparatus;’ c) and (crucially) an international terrain where competition had been overcome;’²¹ d) assumes ‘an omnipotent capitalism (and an omnipotent unified ruling class);’²² and e) ‘The argument underpinning the transnational state thesis appears to stem from the common interpretation [...] ‘that the state ‘also acts at the bidding of that class.’²³

Finally, a different kind of critique is forwarded, namely that ‘The idea of a transnational state owes its intellectual origins to Karl Kautsky’s Ultraimperialismus,’²⁴ an argument that Lenin rejected. With this argument Taylor in essence is saying that there is really nothing new here, the TNS thesis is a rerun of an old Kautsky argument that Lenin refuted effectively a century ago.

The alternative to the TNS and TC theses is summarized in this way: ‘the task is to conceptualize the internal relationship between an enduring state system and an evolving global capitalism with regard to the current transnationalization of production processes. Indeed the debate should be over the role that nation-states play in promoting home-based capitalist interests.’²⁵

These arguments will be considered critically below, but first the question of a Poulantzian reading.

WHAT IS A POULANTZIAN READING?

There is no questioning that Taylor uses and builds on central Poulantzian concepts: class, state, power bloc, hegemony, and interior bourgeoisie. I have no issue with this; these are indeed some of Poulantzas’ major contributions and they are useful and have continued relevance. In so far as Taylor’s argument utilizes these concepts he is on Poulantzian ground.

Still, there are reasons to question to what extent Taylor’s is a Poulantzian reading, or, at least whether it is the only or the best of such readings. My claim is that Taylor’s reading does not reflect the way Poulantzas worked. I am, of course, not referring to Poulantzas’ work habits of which I know nothing, but to what can be discerned from his published work about the material he worked with and the way he did it. In other words, I am referring to his *methods*, both to the way he engaged with empirical material and to his method in developing theoretical concepts and arguments. A Poulantzi-

an reading should in my opinion reflect his strengths but also seek to avoid or remedy the weaknesses, especially those that Poulantzas himself acknowledged.

An Inductive Element

My first point is that in spite of the self-acknowledged ‘theoreticism’²⁶ there was a *strong inductive element* in his work (which is different from empiricism as discussed below). Conceptual developments in his first book²⁷ were informed by his reading of historiographies of state development in England, France and Germany and by empirical analyses by Marx, Engels and other classics. His study of *Fascism and Dictatorship* drew, in addition to material from Marxist debates in the period, on more recent historiography and Poulantzas himself characterized the work as ‘a study in political theory – which of course cannot be carried out without thorough historical research.’²⁸

The next book, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* was about Europe at the time of writing and was clearly based on his close following of contemporary events, especially in France ‘because my own personal experience is situated here.’²⁹ It also utilized empirical studies of transnational companies and was informed by French statistics,³⁰ French discussions about industrial policy,³¹ by studies of the French elite, census data and more.³² In the same way, the analysis of the democratizations processes in Southern Europe was a theoretical interpretation of unfolding events that he had followed closely. This book, however, also illustrates one of the weaknesses in Poulantzas’ method.

A Neglect of Concrete Analyses

The book was ‘addressed to a relatively well-informed readership, who have been following the events in these countries with a political interest, and [the book] can thus to a certain extent dispense with a factual description and concentrate on underlying causes and their explanation.’³³ In other words: We all already know the relevant facts; here is my theoretical interpretation of them.

While underscoring the inductive element in his work this also illustrates what Jane Caplan diagnosed as ‘a pervasive deficiency of method ... an assumption, nowhere queried in the book, that at any given moment all the empirical knowledge required for the full expression of a theorized problem does, in fact, exist.’³⁴ Importantly, Poulantzas himself was aware of this. He acknowledged that his ‘theoreticism’ had led to ‘ultimately a certain neglect of concrete analyses.’^{35,36} Indeed, Poulantzas never really did engage in original empirical work himself. But still, many of his theoretical innovations were based on considerations of the evidence available to him about contemporary realities. This goes for instance for concepts such as ‘the internal bourgeoisie’, ‘the new petty bourgeoisie’, and ‘authoritarian statism’, and for his pioneering analysis of ‘the internationalization of capitalist relations.’

The question, then, for those who want to do Poulantzian work, is whether the relative neglect of concrete analyses is to be emulated or remedied. My position is clear: Poulantzas acknowledged this as a weakness; it is not ‘Poulantzian’ to emulate it.

Engaging With Methods Discussions

This distancing from empiricism has consequences for the understanding of the status of theoretical concepts. Thus, for instance, Poulantzas wrote about ‘an empiricist conception of knowledge which cannot recognize the proper *autonomy of theory*.’³⁷ The context for these comments was a discussion of how Marxist concepts differed from “schemas”, “models”, or “ideal types,”³⁸ all of which he saw as ultimately relying on an empiricist conception of knowledge. There are two elements in his alternative; one is that a concept is *not* to be constructed by ‘an abstraction from [...] real phenomena’; the second is that a concept should be elaborated in relation to other concepts; the concept of the capitalist state should be elaborated in relation to the concept of the capitalist mode of production.

This deserves a more thorough discussion than possible here. For present purposes it suffices to say that the second point remains valid but that the first point can be read as if empirical information is irrelevant for theoretical work (‘the autonomy of theory’) – contra the evident inductive element in his own work. It can also be read as a result of his first book’s carrying a valid point too far: the point that theoretical work is important in its own right and is a relatively separate activity, which is different from being ‘autonomous;’ later he acknowledged that his ‘theoreticism’ had led to ‘an over-rigid epistemological position.’³⁹

For present purposes the important thing is that Poulantzas strived to be clear and explicit about the status and nature of his concepts. Furthermore, a telling footnote testifies not only to this, but also to his willingness to acknowledge the shortcomings of his own immediate academic environment and to engage with and learn from discussions about such questions in the wider social sciences. On the ‘ideal type’ versus Marxist concept discussion he wrote:

‘This important problem is in fact the key one in contemporary discussions concerning methods in the social sciences. As these discussions are at a rudimentary level in France, I refer to an excellent book in which they are presented: E. Topitsch (ed.), *Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, Cologne/Berlin, 1965.’⁴⁰

Engaging With Non-Marxist Work

Finally, this willingness to engage with wider debates pertained not only to methods; Poulantzas was also open to build on contributions from ‘contemporary texts in political science,’⁴¹ whether Marxist or not. Thus, in his first book he mentioned many American political scientists, sometimes approvingly as when David Easton was credited with ‘two very important works.’⁴² Indeed, a good case can be made that both Easton’s systems theory and the structural-functionalist approach developed by Gabriel Almond and others had some impact on Poulantzas’ state theory as argued by Clyde Barrow⁴³ whose reading of Poulantzas is much in line with the one suggested here. The decisive question for Poulantzas was whether such contributions were *serious*, and concerning this, ‘their Marxist or non-

Marxist character does not in any way provide a relevant criterion of their seriousness or their lack of seriousness.⁴⁴

In summary, my understanding of a 'Poulantzian reading' is characterized by the following. 1) It is based on his historical materialist problematique as defined by concepts such as mode of production, social formation, state, class, power bloc, hegemony and more. 2) But is it also open to further theoretical developments and innovations, based *inter alia* on observations of contemporary realities while also guided by the overall problematique and existing concepts. Indeed, theoretical innovation in response to observed societal change is a central feature of his work. Therefore It is important not to neglect 'concrete analyses.' 3) It engages – critically so, but still engages – with contemporary discussions in the social sciences about methods and the nature and status of different kinds of concepts. 4) Finally, it is open to and engages with analyses of contemporary society from other traditions and schools of thought, as long as they are serious.

THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF CONCEPTS

Turning to my second preliminary issue, I will introduce a few distinctions and categories that are useful for analysing concepts. I draw these from methods discussions in political science, where, over the last decades, at least since Collier and Mahon⁴⁵, there has been a countermovement to the empiricist positivism that has been dominant and remains very influential in the field. A countermovement, in other words, that shares the Poulantzian emphasis on the importance of conceptual work. I find Goertz' contribution⁴⁶ especially useful. He insists that concepts do have empirical content; they say something essential about real phenomena, and he does not talk about 'the autonomy of theory' as Poulantzas did. But concepts, according to Goertz, are not simple descriptive definitions; they have theoretical content, and they need to be elaborated theoretically before they can be applied in empirical analysis. This seems to be fully compatible with a reading of Poulantzas that steps back from his early 'over-rigid epistemological position.'

Two of Goertz' points are especially relevant in the present context. The first is that all scientifically important concepts are structured and '*multidimensional* and *multilevel* in nature.'⁴⁷ He distinguishes between *the basic level* – the core or essence of the concept, and *the second level*, where the dimensions are expounded, unfolding the content of the basic level. Some concepts – but not all – have more levels where sub-dimensions to each level-two dimension are elaborated. Finally there is the operational level, where indicators for the abstract concepts are identified, i.e. the empirical *indicator/data level*.⁴⁸

The second point is the distinction between two types of concepts, '*necessary and sufficient condition concepts*' (NSC concepts for short) and '*family resemblance concepts*' – a distinction first introduced by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.⁴⁹ The first type specifies a set of conditions or criteria, where each is necessary for a phenomenon to fall under the concept, and where together they are sufficient for this to be the case. In other words: all the criteria must be met, and no other criteria

are required. The second type, family resemblance concepts or *family concepts*, are so labelled because of an analogy to human families. There is some resemblance between all members of a family, but all members differ from each other and there is not a definite set of features that all members share.⁵⁰ Two members can even have *no* features in common but still share enough features with *other* members of the family to be recognizable as members of the same family.

Drawing on these two preliminaries – my understanding of ‘a Poulantzian reading’ and of the nature, structure and dimensions of theoretical concepts - I now turn to Taylor’s critique of the concepts of transnational class and state.

A TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST CLASS?

The Class Concept

Following Poulantzas’ rendition of Marxist class theory, ‘social classes are groupings of social agents, defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process, i.e. in the economic sphere.’⁵¹ This is, in Goertz’ terminology, the basic level of the definition. But already at this level it is indicated that more is to come; and Poulantzas almost immediately moves on to the next level where additional dimensions are added. Still, the basic level is, indeed, fundamental and serves *inter alia* to distinguish classes from other groupings, such as the state bureaucracy, the military, and the clergy – labelled social categories by Poulantzas- that also can play important roles in politics.⁵² A basis in the production process is, then, the first dimension in the class concept.

To this dimension Poulantzas adds political and ideological criteria and matters become a bit more complicated. He writes that ‘*a class can be considered as a distinct and autonomous class, as a social force, only when its connection with the relations of production, its economic existence, is reflected on the other levels by a specific presence.*’⁵³ But this ‘specific presence’ comes in two varieties. One is exemplified by Marx’ analysis of the French peasantry in the 1848 revolution, an economic class that had neither a political organization nor an ideology of its own, but still was the factor that could explain the rise of Bonapartism.⁵⁴ Another and more recent example is the impact on French economic policy of ‘non-monopoly capital’, showing that this ‘class fraction’ that ‘exists in its own right but without constituting a social force’ nevertheless has ‘pertinent effects’ at the political level.⁵⁵ The second variety of a ‘specific presence’ is where a class has a political ideology and organization of its own, and therefore qualifies as a ‘distinct and autonomous class, as a social force’.

A Transnational Capitalist Class?

Turning now to the question of a transnational capitalist class, there seems to be agreement that such a class exists at the economic level. This is the implication of Taylor’s argument that ‘ruling classes have been progressively integrated into transnationalizing class structures’. Neither does

Taylor dispute that these transnationalizing class structures have pertinent political and ideological effects, so the disputed question is whether a transnational capitalist class exist in the strong sense of the word, as a social force. Does it have a political ideology and organization of its own?

When answering this we note that the weaker criterion – pertinent effects – is contained in the stronger one – ideology and organization. Hence we have a two-dimensional strong class concept: economic presence and ideology + organization. Both are necessary, together they are sufficient; class is a NSC concept. As there is no or only little disagreement about the first criterion, it is sufficient to consider the second. Whether this criterion is met is an empirical question and there is robust evidence to show that this condition is fulfilled.

The study of ‘the global corporate elite and the transnational policy-planning network’ by Carroll and Sapinski⁵⁶ clearly brings this out. To substantiate further and elaborate in relation to the sub-dimensions of the class concept, I will summarily mention a few examples. The first is *The International Chamber of Commerce*, which describes itself as ‘the world business organization’[...] ‘With a global network of over 6 million members in more than 100 countries’, representing ‘business interests at the highest levels of intergovernmental decision-making’ and working ‘to promote international trade, responsible business conduct and a global approach to regulation.’⁵⁷ The second example is the *Business20 or B20*; ‘the private sector’s voice of the G20 community. It addresses the global challenges and priorities defined by the G20 countries, by building solid consensus amongst business leaders, international organizations and civil society regarding how they should be approached’. [...] ‘B20’s trademark is the development of consensus based concrete policy proposals from the private sector’ [...] ‘The process involves the constitution of taskforces (TFs) of around 100 business representatives of the entire G20 and invited countries.’ The B20 submits ‘its policy recommendations to the G20 leaders.’⁵⁸

These two examples suffice to show that a transnational capitalist class do exist in the Poulantzian sense of the concept. The second and more restrictive criterion – the presence of an ideology in the sense of an articulated understanding of shared interests, and political organizations tasked with pursuing those interests - is met. It is an empirical fact that the ‘transnationalizing internal bourgeoisies’ have come together, articulated their shared interests and created organizations to pursue these interests politically.

The next example nuances the picture by bringing in the next levels of the class concept, where divisions and conflicts *within* the class between fractions, strata and, in this case, industries are introduced. I refer to the range of industry specific global business associations such as *The World Semiconductor Council*,⁵⁹ *The Institute of International Finance*,⁶⁰ and the many organizations listed as having consultative status with the United Nations, for example *International Organization of Automobile Manufacturers*, *International Textile Manufacturers Federation*, *World Steel Association*, *International Council of Forest and Paper Associations*, *International Council of Toy Industries*, and the *International Motorcycle Manufacturers Association*.⁶¹

In Poulantzas we find the distinction between industrial and banking capital, between 'monopoly' and 'non-monopoly' capital, contradictions between industrial monopolies, for instance over public finance and state support ; and between 'banking monopolies', for instance struggles for control over the money market.⁶² Elaborating on the category of 'contradictions between industrial monopolies' we can say more generally that this is about sections of capital whose accumulation strategies are affected differentially by present or prospective state policies. A major case in point in today's world is the conflict between green and black capital, taking opposing positions to climate change politics and other sustainability issues.⁶³

This conflict also has 'pertinent effects' in the form of transnational class formation, as evidenced by the *World Business Council for Sustainable Development* which describes itself as 'a global, CEO-led organization of over 200 leading businesses working together to accelerate the transition to a sustainable world.'⁶⁴

In sum: the structure of the class concept is such that it recognizes the existence and importance of divisions within the capitalist class but maintains that these are precisely divisions *within* a class. Whether there is a class or not is decided on the basis of the dimensions of the first two levels of the concept; the third level adds new dimensions and complexity to the picture of this class.

In consequence, Taylor's first argument against the TNC concept misses the point. The argument was that 'the idea that a transnational capitalist class exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it underestimates the horizontal socioeconomic and political competitiveness and contestations between individual capitals'. Claiming that a transnational capitalist class exists in the sense of identity, articulated shared interests and organizations is not the same as claiming that it is a 'unified bloc', nor does it deny the possibility or reality of conflicts and tensions between the nationally constituted parts of this class. Therefore, to some extent, the critical arguments forwarded by Sean Starrs⁶⁵ also miss the point. The fact that capital is much stronger organized at the national level does not preclude the possibility that it also is organized transnationally, and it does not preclude the existence of important cleavages and conflicts within the transnational power bloc. Indeed, no capitalist classes are 'unified blocs' and the fact that some fractions or sections of a class are more powerful than others, as shown convincingly by Starrs in the case of US capital,⁶⁶ does not preclude the existence of important shared strategic interests between them and the capacity to pursue those interests accordingly.

Taylor's second argument against the TNC concept is twofold: that state sovereignty and territoriality still exist and that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.'⁶⁷ These arguments bring in the state; and for good reasons in a Poulantzian context. Poulantzas was a state-and-class theorist, insisting that classes should be understood in their relations to the state and that conversely, a class perspective is essential in understanding the state. Therefore these arguments are addressed (and largely refuted) in the next section.

A TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALIST STATE?

Levels and Dimensions in the State Concept

Poulantzian state theory is complex with several themes and sub-themes. At the basic level the state is defined by its function as the factor of cohesion for a class-divided social formation or '*the regulating factor of its global equilibrium as a system*,'⁶⁸ and as being a 'material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions.'⁶⁹ This is the broadest definition of the state, covering all states including the capitalist state. Narrowing the definition to the latter, this type of state has several 'fundamental characteristics'⁷⁰ or defining features; i.e. what in Goertz's terminology are the dimensions of the concept.

At this second level the state is defined by the ideological, political and economic *functions* or modalities of its overall function as the factor of cohesion. These modalities are then further subdivided and specified at the third level of the concept. The political function, for instance, is to organize hegemony by organizing the power bloc and disorganizing the dominated classes; a basic economic function is to secure private property and other fundamental legal and institutional requisites for a capitalist economy.

The next dimension is that the capitalist state is materialized in *state apparatuses* that have a relative autonomy from the dominant classes,⁷¹ apparatuses that are running on bureaucratic principles and staffed by a professional bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. At the third level these are further specified into administrative state apparatuses, repressive (police, military etc.), ideological (education, church), and economic (economic policy, infrastructure, social services) apparatuses.

The third constitutive dimension – or 'fundamental characteristic' – of the concept is the state's structuring of sites of political contestation. Depending on the *form of regime*⁷² this can be an open political scene – e.g. a parliament, - where political parties openly compete for influence, but this is only a subset of the wider field of politics.⁷³ Political contestation can also take place inside the various state apparatuses where social forces can engage through interest groups and other channels. In 'exceptional forms' of the capitalist state (dictatorships, fascist states) this is the dominant pattern; normal capitalist states are liberal democracies, where, however the gravity of power has moved from the legislative to the executive.⁷⁴

Next come some equally important Weber inspired characteristics of the capitalist state. It 'holds a *monopoly of legitimate physical violence*,' a feature that Poulantzas accepts as constitutive for this type of state but not for all types.⁷⁵ The capitalist state is also characterized by the rule of law, it is based on and upholds a *legal order* that 'forms a set of *abstract, general, formal and strictly regulated norms*,'⁷⁶ differentiating it from non-capitalist legal orders. Thus 'the legitimacy of its concentration of organized force is a "rational-legal" legitimacy based on law.'⁷⁷ Finally, the capitalist state is a centralized *territorial state*. The monopoly on violence relates to a territory with fixed borders and to the population in that territory.⁷⁸

In short: the dimensions of the concept of the capitalist state are the power relations, state functions, state apparatuses, structured sites of contestation, monopoly on violence in relation to a fixed territory, and a codified rational legal order based on abstract principles.

A Transnational State?

There can be little doubt that this concept of the state is of the necessary and sufficient conditions type. A state that does not have all of these characteristics is not really a capitalist state according to the Poulantzian definition. The conclusion in the present context is obvious: based on this definition there is no transnational capitalist state; one observation is sufficient to make this clear: there is no transnational or global centralized monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Some would claim that the US state – the world’s only military superpower – serves this function.⁷⁹ This, however, is debatable. US military power undoubtedly has been important for the construction of global capitalism, as also shown by Panitch and Gindin,⁸⁰ but its reach has never encompassed the whole globe and it has always been and remains being contested. To argue that this amounts to a legitimate monopoly on the use of violence is, in my opinion, to take the argument too far.

Referring to a ‘transnational state’, therefore, clearly is stretching the concept. But conceptual stretching is not necessarily a bad thing, as argued by Collier and Mahon⁸¹ and Goertz,⁸² provided it is done explicitly, precisely, and with a clear understanding of the consequences. It may mean, for instance, that the concept is transformed from a NSC to a family resemblance concept. It also calls for a consideration of the analytical costs and benefits of this up-scaling operation.

It is fair to say that proponents of the TNS concept have paid insufficient attention to this, and this is why the critique of and opposition to the concept to some extent is self-inflicted. But before considering the consequences, costs and benefits of this operation, let us look at the empirical evidence for the relevance of a family resemblance concept of the transnational state.

Transnational State Apparatuses

Based on this definition of the state concept, the question is whether there is a transnational state, or rather in what way it makes sense to talk about the TNS? What are the phenomena that falls under the dimensions of the capitalist state concept?

There are *state apparatuses* that perform or contribute to the performance of *state functions* and are *transnational* in nature. Looking at the economic modality of the state’s overall function, this includes the provision of the *institutional requisites for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production*.⁸³ In this regard we can point to the IMF, the BIS and the Basel Committee, international organisations (IOs) that working with national ministries and central banks, i.e. being transnational, maintain and develop the payment infrastructure and monetary system that enables the swift transfer of money from one jurisdiction and national currency to another. The regulation of finance is similarly performed through transnational networks centred on these organisations.

To this we can add the large body of international commercial law that is a requisite for international trade and investment, along with the array of globalized business regulations and standards that are required for the routinized cross-border exchange of commodities. This is solidly documented in Braithwaite and Drahos' comprehensive and empirically rich study of global business regulation,⁸⁴ and discussed by me in a state theoretical context.⁸⁵ Beyond these areas we can also point to essential services such as the World Meteorological Organization' role in facilitating cooperation among national weather services to provide weather forecasts to shipping and aviation, and so on.

Another function is securing the *reproduction and qualification of the labour force*.⁸⁶ This involves education and training, health issues, labour standards, housing, and more. IOs such as UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the International Labour Organization and the OECD, working with national governments, contribute to the performance of various aspects of this state function.

The OECD deserves a special comment for two reasons. The first is that although it mainly has developed capitalist countries as members, its statutory purpose includes promoting global growth and furthermore, over the last several decades non-members have increasingly become directly involved in its work.⁸⁷ Hence its relevance in the present context. The second reason is that the OECD epitomizes the transnational mode of operation of many international organizations. It was aptly described by Anne-Marie Slaughter:

'The OECD is the quintessential host of transgovernmental regulatory networks, as well as a catalyst for their creation. Its primary function [...]has been to convene government officials in specific fields to figure out the best ways to fix a common economic or regulatory problem and sometime to promulgate a model code for its solution.'⁸⁸

To Slaughter's picture should be added that the OECD's own staff of experts in various policy fields also is a significant player in these networks and they do play a role of their own, as argued in the constructivist literature on IOs.⁸⁹

Moving on from state apparatuses and functions, we can also point to elements of a transnational *legal order*. International commercial law has already been mentioned; to this we can add the body of international law that regulates relations between states, as well as conventions and treaties on human rights and more.

Concerning *sites of contestation* the closest to an open political scene that resembles the parliaments typical for normal capitalist states probably is the UN General Assembly. More importantly, however, are the semi-open governing bodies of the international organisations, semi-open in the sense that meetings are not open to the public, but agendas and decisions are published. Participants in these bodies are generally state representatives, but the IOs are generally and increasingly giving access to non-state actors, whether such access is formalized or not.⁹⁰ Furthermore, much of the work in the IOs is done in lower levels committees, working groups and so on, and here non-state actors none the least from business organisations, are often involved.

Finally, the last constitutive characteristic of the capitalist state is the centralised *monopoly of violence*. As already said, such a monopoly does not exist at the global level, the formal charter of the UN Security Council notwithstanding. Still, it is worth mentioning that there are features pointing in this direction, such as international police cooperation and cooperation in the fight against terror and against piracy in the Bay of Aden. There obviously is very little in this glass, but it is not completely empty.

In conclusion: concerning four of the five basic characteristics of the capitalist state, there is solid empirical evidence to back up the claim that a transnational state exists. This implies that the concept is changed from a NSC concept to one of family resemblance; a theoretical move that carries both costs and benefits as will be discussed later.

Going back to Taylor's arguments, it is telling that he not really addresses the questions of state apparatuses, functions, sites of contestation, and legal order. In other words, he fails to consider and counter the empirically based arguments that are at the core of the transnational state concept. Instead, the core of his critique is based on two arguments relating to nation states. The first argument is the claim that 'class contradiction will always remain and the nation-state will be the primary terrain where such contradictions are resolved.'⁹¹ The second is that proponents of the TNS downplay or ignore the role of nation states and especially that they ignore the significant differences between them. Let me consider these in turn.

The Nation-State as the Primary Terrain

The claim that the nation-state will remain the primary terrain where contradictions are resolved will come as a surprise to most students of international political economy. The reason is that there is a considerable amount of research that shows a different picture. The following examples should suffice to make this point.

The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, signed in 1994, resulted from an international negotiation process where organized business interests played a major role. Indeed, Northern business interests got almost everything they wanted in the agreement and this was the result of the successful mobilization of and lobbying by a coalition of American, European, and Japanese business associations, targeting both their respective governments and the international negotiations.⁹²

A few years later, a rather different process took place. OECD member states launched negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that would considerably strengthen the hand of transnational firms against governments and was intended to eventually be broadened to non-member states. When the proposed agreement was leaked from the Canadian government, it triggered a large scale transnational mobilization.

'The MAI negotiations were targeted by hundreds of grassroots environmental, consumer, and development organizations and condemned by critics ranging from labour union leaders to movie actresses [...] More than 600 organizations in nearly 70 countries expressed disapproval of the talks.'⁹³

This mobilization was one major reason for why states gave up the project⁹⁴ and it signalled a more general change towards transnational patterns of contestation around international economic issues.⁹⁵

The regulation of finance is, as mentioned above, an international matter. It is robustly documented that these regulations, both before and after the great financial crisis of 2008, are created in transnational networks that involve international organizations, national state apparatuses, and private sector representatives.⁹⁶

Another important contemporary issue is the struggle against tax evasion and harmful tax competition, a battle that includes several IOs, nation states and non-state actors.⁹⁷ A large international coalition of NGOs, centred on and to some extent driven by the Tax Justice Network,⁹⁸ is active at all levels: nationally, regionally, and globally. For instance the Global Alliance for Tax Justice,⁹⁹ initiated by the Tax justice Network, listed as 'Advocacy targets' for its Global Week of Action in 2017 'National-level decision makers. This can include your Head of State, Finance Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and UN Permanent Representatives. [...] Regional and international decision-makers. This can include your representatives at regional fora such as the African Union and European Union'; [...] 'Local decision-makers. This can include municipal councils and other local bodies.'¹⁰⁰

Last but not least climate politics must be mentioned. Obviously, in this area decisive action has to be global, based on agreements between all major states, and relies therefore both on national and international political processes. In this case also, non-state actors both from business and civil society are important and active at both levels. The high level of engagement from the private sector at the global level is for instance documented by Corporate Europe Observatory.¹⁰¹

In all of these examples it would be wrong to claim that the domestic level is irrelevant or insignificant. But it would be equally wrong to claim that the international and global level does not matter. What is decisive is the combination and integration of the two levels and the fact that in major policy areas action at both levels is necessary and that the international level often is the decisive one. Thus it is misleading and going against a considerable amount of robust research to claim that the nation-state is and will remain the primary terrain. A possible counterargument to this could be, of course, that action at the international level only can happen as a result of decisions made at the national level. But then all major states would have to agree on the policy in question, and this in turn points back to the criticality of the international level. Indeed, it is not very illuminating to insist on identifying one of these levels as the primary one when both are critical.

This being said, however, there is some justification for Taylor's critique. Firstly because it is true that Robert Cox's went too far in downplaying the role of the domestic level when he in effect asserted that the nation-state is reduced to a transmission belt for decisions made internationally.¹⁰² The same can be said about William Robinson who argued that 'The nation-state is neither retaining its

primacy nor disappearing but is being transformed and absorbed into the larger structure of a TNS.¹⁰³ But both of them were actually more nuanced; Cox being more tentative and searching in his formulations, and Robinson giving a more nuanced discussion than simply positing of a fully-fledged transnational capitalist state.¹⁰⁴ Similarly Martin Shaw – also a target for Taylor’s critique – in spite of the title of his book made clear that he was referring to an *emerging* ‘global layer of state’, a layer that was added to and interacting with the still relevant nation-states.¹⁰⁵ The same goes for the present author who, in an article having the transnational state in the title, explicitly said that ‘strictly speaking there is no transnational state [...] and that the ‘transnational state’ refers to the *unevenly and partially globalized aspects of statehood*.’¹⁰⁶

Ignoring the domestic Level?

But even if this call for a more nuanced reading of proponents of the TNS concept is accepted, there is some justification for the critique that they have ignored or seriously downplayed the importance of the domestic level and especially ignoring the substantial differences between national political economies. This is the second element in Taylor’s critique and it is true that TNS scholars have written little about the domestic level.

This, however, is not a limitation that is inherent in the concept. On the contrary, the word *transnational* rather than *global* is chosen precisely to keep open and underscore the combined national-international/global nature of political contestation over state functions performed by national and international state apparatuses in combination. The concept as such does not imply a denial that states are ‘meaningful nodal points’, indeed, states are central to the argument, but only along with IOs and the transnational networks states are involved in. It is not a question of globalization leaving the nation states irrelevant, as claimed by some hyper-globalists, but rather, as also argued by Barrow and Peck,¹⁰⁷ that nation states are transformed by political globalization and integrated in transnational networks that include international organizations, networks in which nation states remain basic building blocks. This is what the notion of the transnational state refers to.

Furthermore, the scant attention to the domestic level can be seen as stemming from practical limitations. There simply is a limit to how many issues you can deal with seriously within the confines of a research paper or journal article, and even a book, especially if you want a solid empirical basis for your arguments. Thus the relative neglect of the domestic level is the cost of calling attention to important transnational political institutions and processes and making them the focus of analysis. In a more positive light it can also be seen as resulting from a sensible and productive division of labour among scholars.

Still, on this point proponents of the TNS concept must bear some responsibility for the critique by not being sufficiently explicit about the delimitations of their arguments. But on the other hand: it is not justified for critics to assume that focussing on one aspect of current transformations necessarily means that other aspects are deemed irrelevant. This illustrates one of the costs of upscaling the

state concept to the global level: you risk being misunderstood and attributed positions you don't take. This leads on to a brief consideration of the costs and benefits of upscaling.

The costs of upscaling

In addition to the just mentioned risk a more important one, from a scientific point of view, is the risk of losing some of the insights and explanatory principles that are inherent in the concept, in the case of the state the insights into the causal links between the dimensions of the concept. Specifically, state theoretical arguments that hinge of the monopoly of violence as a constituent feature cannot be replicated at the transnational level, or only be so in a weakened form. But this does not distract from the relevance of the arguments that can be upscaled.

Another cost is that upscaling increases complexity. This is well illustrated by Phil Cerny's upscaling of neo-pluralism to the global level. Where domestic neo-pluralism studied 'iron triangles,' i.e. stable networks of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups dominating decision-making in delineated policy-areas, Cerny suggested that transnational neo-pluralism should focus on 'flexible Pentangles' that include states, IOs and non-state actors at both levels.¹⁰⁸ Upscaling the state concept carries similar complexities.

This cost, however, is a consequence of changes in the real world. Policy processes have become more complex because they so often take place in transnational networks that involve a broader range of actors and institutions than previously was the case at the domestic level, and this must be reflected in theory.

Benefits of Upscaling

When considering the benefits it is worth first pointing out that proponents of the TNC and TNS concepts are not alone in finding upscaling of concepts useful. Cerny has already been mentioned, and so has Slaughter who described the 'conceptual shift' that was at the heart of her book in this way:

'stop imagining the international system as a system of states [...] Start thinking about a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.'¹⁰⁹

And even before these contributions, other scholars did in effect break with 'methodological nationalism' by applying concepts developed for the study of national systems to the international level. Clive Archer discussed the *functions* of international organisations in terms derived from comparative politics,¹¹⁰ Susan Strange found Easton's definition of politics useful for the analysis of power in the world economy,¹¹¹ Soroos focussed on *global policy analysis*¹¹², Kaul et al. on *global public goods*,¹¹³ and Deacon et al. on *global social policy*.¹¹⁴ See also my discussion of the case for transcending 'methodological nationalism.'¹¹⁵

The benefits of transnationalizing the concepts of class and state, with due attention to the consequences for the structure of the concepts, are straightforward. It enables the application to international and global political phenomena of insights developed in state theory into power relations, apparatuses, functions, and sites of contestation and how these dimensions impact, condition and interact with each other. It serves to call attention to and help analyse international and global class relations, using Poulantzian notions of the power block, hegemony, class alliances, supporting classes, and so on, and it enables the use of his understanding of different types of political crises, i.e. crisis of hegemony within the power bloc, crises between the power bloc and popular social forces, and fundamental crises. And beyond Poulantzas, transnationalizing the class and state concepts also enables the activation of the larger body of relevant theory in historical materialism to the study of what more descriptively is called global governance.

Finally, the alternatives should also be considered. Taylor offers no real alternative or a very weak one at best. While acknowledging that 'it is equally true that many pivotal economic, social, and political processes have become transnationally oriented,'¹¹⁶ the only suggestion he makes is that scholars should base their analyses on 'the internal bourgeoisie' and 'an enduring state system and an evolving global capitalism.'¹¹⁷ Given that Poulantzas introduced the concept of the 'internal bourgeoisie' to capture an important transformation that had taken place in the two decades preceding his analysis, it is odd to argue that there is no need for further theoretical innovation after four decades of globalization. In reality this amounts to ignoring the rise of global governance, the rise of climate politics and other sustainability issues, the rise of global business associations, and so on.

Global governance is a possible alternative concept. It is widely used and it is convenient for descriptive purposes and can serve to identify an object for study and further theorization. But leaving it at that, without drawing in historical materialist theory, would mean ceding this terrain to the various liberal, neo-pluralist, constructivist, realist and other approaches to global governance. In other words, it amounts to abstaining from making historical materialism a participant in and contributor to theoretical debates over important global political realities.

STRAW MEN AND OTHER PECULIARITIES

Before concluding let me briefly comment on the straw men Taylor has constructed to serve his critique. He writes that 'The idea of a transnational state owes its intellectual origins to Karl Kautsky's *Ultraimperialismus*.'¹¹⁸ I disagree. The intellectual origin, the source of inspiration, is not Kautsky's text but rather observation of real events and the proliferation of social science research, especially in the field of international political economy, in global and transnational political processes. The reason Taylor fails to appreciate this is perhaps that he himself ignores these developments. To the extent that Kautsky is invoked at all by proponents of the TNS, it is rather to show that arguments in this direction are not entirely alien to historical materialism.

Taylor writes that the TNS concept assumes '(crucially) an international terrain where competition had been overcome.'¹¹⁹ He offers no textual support or arguments for this claim and nobody to my knowledge has made such a claim. Equally unsupported and peculiar is the critique that the TNS concept 'assumes an omnipotent capitalism (and an omnipotent unified ruling class).'¹²⁰ Why should this be the case? Why would anybody suggest that the state concept in historical materialism would imply 'an omnipotent capitalism'; and what is 'omnipotent capitalism' supposed to mean anyway? A similar lack of foundation and reason marks the comment that 'the argument underpinning the transnational state thesis appears to stem from the common interpretation [...] 'that the state 'also acts at the bidding of that class.'¹²¹ In these cases Taylor ascribes propositions to the TNS argument without foundation; these are straw men.

CONCLUSION

Taylor's arguments and critique are not convincing. It is debatable to what extent it really is a 'Poulantzian reading' since it ignores the strong inductive element in his work, his openness to and engagement with non-Marxist scholarship and his engagement with contemporary methodological discussions. Since Poulantzas in his self-criticism acknowledged 'theoreticism', 'a relative neglect of concrete analysis', and an 'over-rigid epistemological position' as weaknesses, is it really Poulantzian not to consider the empirical support for the TC and TNS arguments?

Taylor's rejection of the notion of a transnational capitalist class is unsustainable on empirical grounds. There is clear and convincing evidence to the existence of a transnational group of actors that are based in transnational economic processes, have a set of articulated shared interests, and political organizations tasked with pursuing those interests. The Poulantzian criteria for the existence of a class are all met.

The critique of the TNS concept has some validity, largely because proponents of the concept have been insufficiently clear of the consequences for the state concept of upscaling it to the global level. Specifically it transforms the concept from a 'necessary and sufficient conditions' concept to a family resemblance concept.

When this is acknowledged, the relevance of the TNS concept is that it points to demonstrably existing transnational state apparatuses that perform transnational state functions, shaped by transnational relations of power between social forces, involving both structural power and direct engagement in more or less institutionalised transnational sites of contestation. There are now transnational elements of all fundamental characteristics of the capitalist state except one – the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The TNS concept is useful and productive for research because it enables the mobilization of insights from state theory and other elements from historical materialism to the analysis of what descriptively is labelled global governance, phenomena whose importance has grown significantly since Poulantzas wrote about 'the interior bourgeoisie' in the 1970s. This

growing importance is also evidenced by the proliferation of social science research into this topic; a development Taylor ignores. Taylor's alternative, which is to stick to a 'Poulantzian' world view anno 1978, is not convincing and not really Poulantzian in spirit. It is a step backwards.

ENDNOTES

¹ Ian Taylor, 'Transnationalizing Capitalist Hegemony', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 42.1 (2017), 26–40.

² Ian Bruff, 'The Relevance of Nicos Poulantzas for Contemporary Debates on 'the International'', *International Politics*, 2012, 177–94.

³ Taylor, p. 27.

⁴ Taylor, p. 28.

⁵ Taylor, p. 32, emphasis added.

⁶ Taylor, p. 29.

⁷ Taylor, p.27.

⁸ Taylor, p. 30.

⁹ Taylor, p. 26,29.

¹⁰ Taylor, p. 30.

¹¹ Taylor, p. 30.

¹² Taylor, p. 31.

¹³ Taylor, p. 32.

¹⁴ Taylor, p. 31.

¹⁵ Adam David Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007) quoted by Taylor p. 9.

¹⁶ Taylor, p. 34.

¹⁷ Taylor, p. 37.

¹⁸ Taylor, p. 33.

¹⁹ Taylor, p. 34.

²⁰ Taylor, p. 34.

²¹ Taylor, p. 34.

²² Taylor, p. 36.

²³ Taylor, p. 35.

²⁴ Taylor, p. 32.

²⁵ Taylor, p. 36.

²⁶ Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau', in *The Poulantzas Reader. Marxism, Law, and the State*, ed. by James Martin (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 270–93 (p. 273).

²⁷ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973).

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- ²⁸ Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship. The Third International and the Problem of Fascism* (London: Verso, 1979), p. 13.
- ²⁹ Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1978), p. 11.
- ³⁰ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 151 ff.
- ³¹ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 145,149.
- ³² Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 242 ff.
- ³³ Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships. Portugal, Spain, Greece* (London: NLB, 1976), p. 8.
- ³⁴ Jane Caplan, 'Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian', *History Workshop*, 3.3 (1977), 83–100.
- ³⁵ Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau', p. 274.
- ³⁶ Poulantzas speaks of 'concrete analyses' rather than 'empirical analyses', the common usage in social science today. 'Concrete analysis' is fairly standard in historical materialism, it marks a distance to an 'empiricist conception of knowledge,' signalling that the link between observable facts and theoretical concepts is not as simple as assumed by empiricist-positivism.
- ³⁷ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 145 emphasis added.
- ³⁸ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 145.
- ³⁹ Poulantzas, 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau', p. 273.
- ⁴⁰ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 145 n. 3.
- ⁴¹ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 19.
- ⁴² Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 222 n. 37.
- ⁴³ Clyde W. Barrow, *Toward a Critical Theory of States. The Poulantzas-Miliband Debate after Globalization* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016), pp. 11–12.
- ⁴⁴ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 19.
- ⁴⁵ David Collier and James E. Mahon, 'Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis.', *American Political Science Review*, 87.4 (1993), 845–55.
- ⁴⁶ Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts. A Users Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- ⁴⁷ Goertz, p. 6.
- ⁴⁸ Goertz, pp. 5–6.
- ⁴⁹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 32–36.
- ⁵⁰ Goertz, pp. 29, 35–39.
- ⁵¹ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 14.
- ⁵² Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 23.
- ⁵³ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 78 italics in original.
- ⁵⁴ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 79; referring to Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in *Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works Volume 11* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979), pp. 99–197.
- ⁵⁵ Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 160, note 6.
- ⁵⁶ William K Carroll and Jean Philippe Sapinski, 'The Global Corporate Elite and the Transnational Policy-Planning Network, 1996-2006: A Structural Analysis', *International Sociology*, 25.4 (2010), 501–38.

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- ⁵⁷ International Chamber of Commerce, 'We Are the World Business Organization', 2017 <<https://iccwbo.org/>> [accessed 26 December 2017].
- ⁵⁸ B20, 'About B20', 2018 <<http://www.b20argentina.info/Home/AboutB20>> [accessed 16 January 2018].
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- ⁶⁰ IIF, 'About the IIF', 2018 <<https://www.iif.com/about>> [accessed 29 January 2018].
- ⁶¹ United Nations Economic and Social Council, 'List of Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council as of 1 September 2016', 2016 <<http://undocs.org/E/2016/INF/5>>.
- ⁶² Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 137 ff.
- ⁶³ See Robert Falkner, *Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
- ⁶⁴ WBCSD, 'About Us', 2018 <<http://www.wbcsd.org/Overview/About-us>> [accessed 29 January 2018].
- ⁶⁵ Sean Kenji Starrs, 'The Global Capitalism School Tested in Asia: Transnational Capitalist Class vs Taking the State Seriously', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47.4 (2017), 641–58 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1282536>>.
- ⁶⁶ Sean Starrs, 'American Economic Power Hasn't Declined? It Globalized! Summoning the Data and Taking Globalization Seriously', *International Studies Quarterly*, 57.4 (2013), 817–30 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12053>>.
- ⁶⁷ Taylor, p. 30.
- ⁶⁸ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 44–45.
- ⁶⁹ Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, New Edition (London: Verso, 2000), p. 129.
- ⁷⁰ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 187.
- ⁷¹ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 261–62.
- ⁷² Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 317.
- ⁷³ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, pp. 246–47.
- ⁷⁴ Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 217 ff.
- ⁷⁵ Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, p. 226; Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 80.
- ⁷⁶ Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 86.
- ⁷⁷ Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 80.
- ⁷⁸ Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 93 ff.; Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*, p. 78 ff.
- ⁷⁹ e.g. William I Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism. Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp. 137–40.
- ⁸⁰ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism. The Political Economy of American Empire* (London & New York: Verso, 2012).
- ⁸¹ David Collier and James E. Mahon, 'Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis.', *American Political Science Review*, 87.4 (1993), 845–55.
- ⁸² Goertz, p. 69 ff.
- ⁸³ Elmar Altvater, 'Zu Einigen Probleme Des Staatsinterventionismus', *Probleme Des Klassenkampfes*, 1972, 1–53; Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, p. 167..

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- ⁸⁷ Morten Ougaard, 'The OECD's Global Role: Agenda-Setting and Policy Diffusion', in *Mechanisms of OECD Governance. International Incentives for National Policy-Making*, ed. by Kerstin Martens and Anja P Jakobi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 26–49 <<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591145.003.0002>>; Morten Ougaard, 'A New Role for the OECD? The "Enhanced Engagement" strategy toward Emerging Economies', in *Governing the Global Economy. Politics, Institutions, and Economic Development*, ed. by Dag Harald Claes and Carl Henrik Knutsen (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), pp. 91–109.
- ⁸⁸ Slaughter, p. 46.
- ⁸⁹ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).
- ⁹⁰ See the case studies in Jan Aart (ed.) Scholte, *Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- ⁹¹ Taylor, p. 30.
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