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REVIEW OF BARGAINING AND TRANSACTION PRICES: Future Avenues for Shipping Studies

Abstract

Purpose: In the shipping industry, *both* sales and purchases of second-hand ships *and* freight transport services are prevalently tailor-made and traded with intense bilateral negotiations. Price bargaining is the key step of this negotiation process and plays a crucial role in determining mutually-agreed prices. Despite its cruciality and applicability, the price bargaining has yet received due conceptual and/or theoretical attention in the shipping literature. This paper attempts to conceptually examine the role of bargaining in shipping transaction prices and subsequently put forward directions for future research. In doing so, the paper focuses on two types of transactions being taken place in shipping markets: that is, asset market trading of second-hand vessels and service market trading shipping freights.

Design/methodology/approach: The paper begins with a systematic literature review on price bargaining in the field of economics and management disciplines from a game-theoretic perspective. This approach does logically lead us to establish a conceptual framework for price bargaining in shipping sub-markets as a step towards having taken into consideration a variety of heterogeneities commonly existed in trading activities and market dynamics.

Findings: A set of research areas has been consequently identified where price bargaining and mechanisms for the shipping freight and asset markets could be further explored and analyzed in a way to make better pricing decisions under the more tangible framework.

Research limitations/implications: One of the critical challenges, when using bargaining mechanisms to make a decision on pricing shipping services and assets, is how to operationalize the study for empirical investigation, as some of the factors are internal information of the players and are not adequately revealed to externals: that is, an imperfect information sharing case. The current study aims, however, not to conduct an empirical analysis but to initiate a conversation among maritime economists by bringing their attention to this not-yet fully explored and potentially impactful field of research and by asking them to treat bargaining from a perspective for pricing shipping assets and services. It is claimed that, by doing so, we could better understand price differences between individual contracts.

Originality/value: Our study would be considered the first in its kind to provide a detailed survey of the bargaining theory and models from a game theoretical perspective as a theoretical lens to understand its importance and relevance in pricing shipping assets and services. It also provides a simplified operational case on utilizing bargaining in practically pricing freight services.

Keywords: Price bargaining, Bargaining power, Shipping markets, Pricing Assets and Services

Paper Type: Literature Review

1. Introduction

The concept and practice of bargaining are extensively used in everyday life to obtain better prices or terms and conditions for trade (Pen, 1952, Maynard, 1984, Nash, 2016). Bargaining could range from simply asking for a discount from a seller while shopping in an open market to exhaustively negotiating the terms of bank loans and even making formal bilateral trade agreements between countries. The essence of bargaining in these contexts is the same: negotiating the terms of a contract between two players and associated prices of tradable products, either in the form of tangible assets or intangible services.

The international shipping industry is no stranger to bargaining, given the extensive interactions between buyers and sellers when negotiating the sale and purchase of a ship or fixing freight services. This is due to the lack of standardization of most shipping transactions in terms of the characteristics of physical ships and freight services. The sellers or buyers of the assets or services negotiate actively through a physical broker to set the transaction prices. The outcome of this bargaining exercise is the resultant price of the physical ship traded in the sale and purchase market or freight as a service in the freight market.

Although the average market price provides a general indication of price trends, individual transaction factors hold greater significance when trading assets or services. For example, the price of a particular secondhand ship can vary based on its operational history. Well-maintained vessels favor sellers and command higher prices compared to similar ships with poor maintenance, despite similar specifications. In the freight market, service offerings have even more diversity, including contract terms like loading ports, discharge ports, cargo volumes, and voyage speed. While the dry bulk freight market shows characteristics of near-perfect competition, other shipping markets, such as tanker and container freight, and the sale and purchase markets for bulkers, tankers, and container ships, display an oligopolistic market structure. Bargaining plays a decisive role in determining individual transaction prices, allowing players to examine pricing mechanisms and consider behavioral aspects. However, there is a lack of literature on bargaining mechanisms in the shipping industry. Addressing this gap through future research can provide valuable insights into negotiation processes and behavioral dimensions that influence transaction prices, enhancing our understanding of pricing mechanisms in the shipping industry.

There has been a long-term academic interest in studying the average market prices in the shipping industry. For instance, Kavussanos and Alizadeh (2002), Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007) and Kalouptsi (2014) investigate valuation and investment timing in the shipping industry for asset gain, while Kavussanos *et al.* (2014), Tsouknidis (2016), Gavriilidis *et al.* (2018) and Yang *et al.* (2022) attempt to estimate the freight market movements. While investigating the average market prices helps to shed light on the ever-changing market

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3 conditions, it misses out on presenting the performance of individual transactions. Along this
4 line, a better understanding of individual transactions and their price drivers is essential to
5 achieving superior business and financial performance. Compared to extensive market level
6 study on pricing assets and services, there is scarce research on the asset and service prices for
7 individual shipping transactions, not to mention the role of bargaining in price determination.
8 This is striking, considering the great scale of daily ship-level transactions. Over 50,000
9 international ocean-going ships are continuously involved with international commodity
10 transportation, whose cumulative value of freight rates is over 500 billion USD annually.¹
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16 This study aims to address the two above mentioned research gaps by investigating shipping
17 prices at the transaction level, focusing on the role of bargaining in pricing individual ship
18 assets and freight services. The attempt is *first* made by investigating bargaining in shipping
19 markets, followed by reviewing the well-established bargaining fundamentals in economics
20 and management literature. Upon this, we divide the shipping markets into specific suitable
21 segments to which the concept of bargaining is applied. *Secondly*, this allows us to set up a
22 research framework of price bargaining in shipping sub-markets by considering the
23 heterogeneity in trading activities and market dynamics. The trade-and-bargaining analytical
24 lens helps us unveil how to apply generic bargaining concepts to analyze secondhand ship and
25 freight service prices in particular.
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32 The term *bargaining* might have an idiosyncratic interpretation with a different industrial
33 background. The current study limits the concept of bargaining from a strategic game-
34 theoretical approach to estimating the resultant asset or service prices – a concept that is widely
35 used in economics and management studies.² This paper could subsequently contribute to the
36 literature by (i) providing an in-depth understanding of price bargaining to set the transaction
37 prices between buyers and sellers strategically and (ii) suggesting potential research directions
38 for pricing assets and services in the shipping market. This review paper can initiate a
39 conversation within the maritime academic society to look at the pricing in shipping from a
40 bargaining perspective, thereby creating an applied case study for other areas of studies outside
41 of shipping literature.
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48 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the role of price bargaining in the
49 shipping markets, followed by section 3 with an overview and development of bargaining
50 models in economics and management studies. Section 4 looks at the applications of bargaining
51 in the economics literature and their implications for shipping literature. Section 5 proposes a
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56 ¹ Calculated from the International Chamber of Shipping and UNCTAD Report for the year 2020.

57 ² The bargaining theory can be broadly divided into two approaches: Strategic approach following the study by Rubinstein
58 (1982) and logical axiomatic approach following Nash (1950). The axiomatic bargaining solution by Nash (1950) is generally
59 referred as Nash Bargaining Solution, which is generalised by Binmore *et al.* (1986) and equated to the strategic approach
60 when the bargaining time is close to zero. As the axiomatic and strategic approach of bargaining somewhat converges by
limiting the time factor, we prefer to scope our study to the strategic approach of bargaining.

framework to implement the bargaining concept in shipping markets for future research, and finally, section 6 addresses the concluding remarks.

2. Pricing and Bargaining in Shipping Markets

2.1. Pricing of ships and freight services

Several studies in the shipping markets have attempted to understand the factors affecting asset and service prices and their volatilities to anticipate the market for efficient decision-making. Jing *et al.* (2008), Xu *et al.* (2011), Alizadeh and Talley (2011b), and Drobetz *et al.* (2012), amongst others, investigate the factors affecting the freight prices and volatilities while Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004), Kavussanos *et al.* (2014), Tsouknidis (2016), Alexandridis *et al.* (2017) and Angelopoulos *et al.* (2020) investigate the cross spillover effects between commodity and security returns and volatilities on freight markets. Similar studies are also observed in the sale and purchase market where Tvedt (1997) and Kavussanos and Alizadeh (2002) study the valuation of ships, Kalouptsidi (2014) suggests the optimal time to build a new vessel, while Alizadeh and Nomikos (2006) and Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007) develop a strategy for trading ships in the sale and purchase market.

Only a few studies investigate the prices at a per-contract level. For example, Alizadeh and Talley (2011a) and Adland *et al.* (2016) study the impact of charterers and shipowners on freight contract prices, and Merika *et al.* (2019) explore the individual prices of secondhand dry bulk vessels. It is worth noting that the contract prices of individual transactions in the shipping industry can vary significantly from the average market prices. For example, a significant difference in prices is observed between the market-averaged freight index (produced by the London-based Baltic Exchange) and individual transaction prices for carrying iron ore between Tubarao (Brazil) and Qingdao (China) in Figure 1. Analyzing the market average price movement at a macro level provides a good understanding of the market trend, but loses substantial information, failing to reflect individual transaction prices. For instance, on 11th May 2020, there were four fixtures with the same loading and discharge location by a single charterer but different ship operators. Interestingly, the freight rates ranged between 9.8-12 USD/tonne-mile, while the average market price on that day was 7.79 USD/tonne-mile. This indicates the need for a different perspective to understand individual transaction prices.

[Insert Figure 1]

Figure 1 illustrates two notable observations: a deviation between transaction prices and aggregate market prices and significant variability in individual freight contract prices. Understanding price variations requires considering individual utility functions and information accessibility. A bargaining theory perspective comprehensively examines

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3 transaction prices, integrating market factors and party characteristics. Analyzing the prices
4 from a bargaining standpoint reveals specific price discrepancies from iterative negotiations.
5 Studying the shipping industry enhances understanding of pricing dynamics and trade-specific
6 factors, illuminating pricing mechanisms.
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10 **2.2. Bargaining in determining contract ship prices and freight rates**

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13 Most shipping transactions involve extensive interactions between buyers and sellers, which
14 are facilitated by market agents or shipbrokers. Bargaining plays a crucial role in determining
15 the prices of individual ships and freight services within these interactions. An illustrative
16 example is the notable disparity observed in 2021 between the highest and lowest monthly
17 secondhand prices of Handysize bulkers (with similar technical specifications), amounting to
18 approximately 43%. Despite similar technical specifications, this significant price variation can
19 be attributed to diverse bargaining practices employed during the negotiation process. This
20 phenomenon is not exclusive to the shipping industry but is shared with other transportation
21 sectors. For instance, a study conducted by Gavazza (2016) utilizing a price bargaining model
22 reveals that approximately 20% of airline prices are misallocated due to information
23 deficiencies and search frictions. These findings suggest the existence of a substantial pool of
24 capital-intensive and volatile transportation markets, including the shipping industry, that can
25 be examined through the lens of bargaining. In comparison with other industries, the shipping
26 industry possesses several unique characteristics that further underscore the significance of
27 bargaining practices. These distinct features contribute to the complexity and dynamics of
28 negotiations, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of the bargaining process within the
29 shipping context.
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- 39 ● Heterogeneity nature of shipping contracts

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42 The shipping industry lacks standardization, with heterogeneous shipping contracts for freight
43 services and ship sales and purchases. Liner and tramp shipping are the main types of services
44 in the freight market. Larger container liner companies have more pricing power compared to
45 small shippers in setting liner shipping service prices. Tramp shipping exhibits even more
46 variations in cargo, ship, and route. Secondhand ships are tangible assets with unique
47 specifications with limited customization options. Buyers can only negotiate the price based
48 on the current technical specifications. In summary, the lack of standardization in shipping
49 contracts encourages bargaining, which is crucial in determining transaction prices.
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- 55 ● Active interaction between traders

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58 The heterogeneous nature of ships and freight services increases search friction, leading to the
59 involvement of physical brokers in matching buyers and sellers, similar to the stock trade in
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3 the past (Brancaccio *et al.*, 2020). In the case of a freight market, the charterer contacts the ship
4 operator through a freight broker, while in the sales and purchase (S&P) market, sellers reach
5 out to S&P brokers to find potential buyers. These brokers act as agents in matching buyers
6 and sellers, sometimes influencing decisions (Hausman and Welch, 2010). Human intervention
7 drives the bilateral bargaining process in each shipping trade, as depicted in Figure 2.
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10 [Insert Figure 2]

11 • Asymmetric information

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14 Unlike commodity or equity markets, the shipping industry faces illiquidity risks due to a
15 limited number of buyers and sellers. This scarcity makes it challenging for participants to find
16 suitable counterparties, leading to price jumps (Ådland and Koekebakker, 2004). Information
17 plays a crucial role in this illiquid market, as transaction prices do not fully reflect market
18 movements (Benmelech and Bergman, 2018). Although there is a trend of digitization and
19 shipping database companies providing market information, the market transparency remains
20 limited, resulting in asymmetric information. This information asymmetry leads to bounded
21 rationality and sub-optimal decision-making (Simon, 1990). Players with higher information
22 are motivated to trade assets and services through back-and-forth negotiations in an over-the-
23 counter market, exploiting the industry's asymmetric nature. Conversely, players with limited
24 information access prefer to trade through trusted brokers or agents to gain better bargaining
25 positions. Price negotiations allow each player to strive for the most favorable rates (Chatterjee
26 and Samuelson, 1987).
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37 Since bargaining is the lodestone to the pricing of individual ship assets and freight services in
38 the shipping industry, the following section presents the concept of the bargaining process from
39 the shipping perspective.
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43 **3. Back to Bargaining Fundamentals**

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46 There is already a vast body of literature on bargaining and its significance in pricing. This
47 section concentrates on the fundamental aspects of bargaining, aiming to establish a solid
48 comprehension of the theoretical underpinnings and provide a framework for the practical
49 application of bargaining in the context of shipping.
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53 **3.1. Bargaining process**

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56 A trade of assets or services only occurs if a potential buyer has the capacity and willingness
57 to pay at least as much as the seller values it. The bargaining surplus is the difference between
58 the maximum value at which the buyer is willing to buy the asset/services vis-à-vis the
59 minimum value at which the seller is willing to sell it. There are back-and-forth discussions
60

between the potential buyer and seller, negotiating the split of this surplus between them and finalizing the transaction's price (or term) with or without the broker's involvement. This dialogue between the buyer and seller is called the bargaining process. The surplus' associated with the bargaining process is graphically presented in Figure 3 and can be calculated as follows:

$$S_T = \max(P_B) - \min(P_S) \quad (1)$$

$$S_B = \max(P_B) - TP \quad (2)$$

$$S_S = TP - \min(P_S) \quad (3)$$

In this context, the bargaining surplus (S_T) is determined by the difference between the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay, $\max(P_B)$ and the minimum price the seller is willing to accept, $\min(P_S)$. The transaction price is denoted by TP, while S_B and S_S represent the split of surplus between the buyer and seller, respectively.

[Insert Figure 3]

In practice, the distribution of surplus between the players depends on bargaining power. Academic studies utilize bargaining power to select appropriate choice models for surplus allocation between players. Theoretical frameworks consider players' bargaining power to determine the optimal profit-maximizing split of surplus. The profitability of the bargaining process is assessed based on the surplus distribution among players.

3.2. Bargaining power

The players (buyers or sellers) estimate each other's bargaining power. Bargaining power is the players' relative ability to influence the terms and price of the contract in their favor (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981, Martin, 1992). Higher bargaining power for a player indicates that s/he receives a higher share of the surplus than those with lower bargaining power. Hence, the bargaining power of the buyer/seller can be represented as:

$$BP_B = \frac{S_B}{S_T} \quad (4)$$

$$BP_S = \frac{S_S}{S_T} \quad (5)$$

Where, BP_B and BP_S are the bargaining power of the buyer and seller, respectively. The buyer/seller would receive a higher share of the surplus with higher bargaining power. Studies suggest that the bargaining power of a player is primarily influenced by (i) the proposal she

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3 provides, (ii) patience, (iii) her past reputation, (iv) the amount of information, (v) signaling,
4 and (vi) the availability of outside options as explained in the following.
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8 *Proposal power* is the ability of a player to propose the terms of the contract and how to share
9 the bargaining surplus between the players (Yildirim, 2007). When a player proposes the split
10 of surplus, the counterplayer could either accept or reject the proposal. There is no benefit for
11 the counterplayer by only rejecting the proposal; instead, she could increase her profitability
12 by providing a counter-proposal that benefits her. Further, a player with lesser urgency to
13 accept the proposal has greater bargaining power. Kousser and Phillips (2009) suggests that a
14 higher level of *patience* increases bargaining power. Studies (Abreu and Gul, 2000, Atakan
15 and Ekmekci, 2014) also suggest that players with a higher market *reputation* generate a better
16 return from the bargaining process as they would be less likely to agree to lesser bargaining
17 terms. The player with greater *information* about the product, market, and the counterplayer
18 will get a better deal from the bargaining exercise (Roth and Murnighan, 1982, Chatterjee and
19 Samuelson, 1983, Fudenberg *et al.*, 1987, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990, Hite, 1998). For
20 example, if a player has adequate information about the market condition, such as if it is going
21 to be bullish or bearish in the future, she can negotiate better vis-à-vis a player with low market
22 information. On the same note, if a player is aware that the counterplayer desperately needs to
23 trade, she can get a better deal for herself. *Signaling* is the information that a player
24 intentionally passes on to the counterplayer. A valuable signal will help the player to make an
25 accurate judgment about the counterplayer and bargain efficiently (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989,
26 Croson *et al.*, 2003). An *outside option* is the opportunity cost of the player for getting into a
27 bargaining agreement; the player with more extensive outside options receives favorable prices
28 during the bargaining exercise (Bulow, 1982, Muthoo, 1995, Compte and Jehiel, 2002).
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39 Patience, reputation, and signaling are intangible factors that are difficult to quantify as they
40 are internal to the players empirically. Hence this study concentrates on using (i) *the*
41 *availability of outside options* and (ii) *the amount of information*, which are tangible factors, to
42 understand various bargaining models and their operationalization in a simplified manner.³
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46 Availability of Outside Options: If many buyers (sellers) are interested in buying (selling) the
47 same product (asset or service), there is a high demand (supply) for the product, generating
48 higher outside options for the sellers (buyers) in case of bargaining failure. Hence, with a large
49 number of market players, the product's liquidity is higher, and the player would have higher
50 bargaining power.
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54 Amount of Information: Having less information about the product to buy/sell, market, or
55 counterplayer can generate uncertainty in the trade, resulting in inefficient trade prices, reduced
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59 ³ The authors acknowledge that there are other ways of categorizing bargaining models, such as (i) static and dynamic
60 bargaining models and (ii) bilateral and group bargaining, however, in the shipping context, the number of players and amount
of information available would be a relevant form of classification to most shipping transactions.

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3 profitability, and bargaining failure under extreme conditions. Under those circumstances, if
4 the player bargains for a higher surplus, she might encounter bargaining failure, and if she
5 agrees to a lower surplus, she might have to give up the opportunity to maximize her
6 profitability. Hence usually, players adopt a marginal risk–marginal return tradeoff strategy to
7 improve their bargaining surplus without bargaining failure.
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11 These two parameters can generate four scenarios to split the surplus between the players, as
12 presented in Figure 4. The x-axis represents the number of players, and the y-axis represents
13 the information available. If there is a high amount of information available but fewer market
14 players, it is denoted as a base model, while having a relatively large number of market players
15 can be considered a *model with outside options*. Contrary to the high amount of market
16 information, if there is low information, a *model with incomplete information* or a *model with*
17 *incomplete information and outside option* can be developed, corresponding to a small and
18 large number of market players, respectively. The details of the models under various scenarios
19 for splitting the surplus between the players are presented in section 3.3.
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25 [Insert Figure 4]
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27 28 **3.3. Impact of bargaining power on surplus estimation and allocation** 29

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31 The four scenarios considered for the bargaining power determine the surplus allocation
32 between the buyer and seller and subsequently estimate the transaction price efficiently as
33 follows:
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36 *High information with a small number of players*: This is the simplest form of bargaining model
37 where each player involved in the trade has a high amount of information about the market and
38 counterplayer while there is a lower number of market players or competitors. In this
39 bargaining setting, a player proposes the surplus split with the counterplayer, who can either
40 accept the proposal or provide a counter-proposal. This chain of proposal and counter-proposal
41 continues until both the players agree on the outcome. However, the delays in the bargaining
42 process lower the actual payoffs for both players due to discounted cash flows. The players can
43 avoid this delay by splitting the surplus using Rubinstein's (1982) model, calculating the
44 surplus split instantaneously considering their respective discount factors. Hence Rubinstein's
45 (1982) bargaining model (hereby denoted as the *basic model*) is sufficient to estimate the split
46 of the surplus between the players instead of indulging in a continuous back-and-forth
47 negotiation (see Figure 5).
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54 [Insert Figure 5]
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56 In a simple Rubinstein (1982) bargaining game set-up, Player 1 (who could be either buyer or
57 seller) can propose to split the surplus between herself and the counterplayer at a ratio of $\frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1\delta_2}$
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and $1 - \frac{1 - \delta_2}{1 - \delta_1 \delta_2}$ as presented in Figure 5, where δ_1 and δ_2 denotes the discount factor of the players. The loss in bargaining surplus due to the delay in the bargaining process for a Player i is captured in δ_i . Therefore,

$$\delta_i = \frac{\text{Surplus of Player } i \text{ at time } t}{\text{Surplus of Player } i \text{ at time } t + 1} \quad (6)$$

Intuitively, a higher discounting factor represents a higher bargaining power of a player and gets a greater reward as s/he has lesser urgency to finalize the deal. Hence, if a player's discount factor increases, the surplus share for the counterplayer decreases.

High information with a large number of players: Along with the availability of adequate information, if there exists a large number of counterplayers, the bargaining power of the player can be greater as she would expect to receive at least certain payoffs from the outside option in case the ongoing bargaining fails (Ponsati and Sákovics, 1998, Mantin *et al.*, 2014, Roson and Hubert, 2015). Hence the player can combine a Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model with an outside option strategy to estimate the split of surplus between the negotiating players, as presented in Figure 6.

[Insert Figure 6]

Low information with a small number of players: It can be challenging for the player when there are fewer counterplayers, indicating limited or no outside options in case of bargaining failure, and the player has incomplete information about the market and also about the counterplayer (Riddell, 1981). Under this scenario, the player can utilize a basic bargaining model with incomplete information similar to Rubinstein (1985) for sharing the surplus with the counterplayer by using a marginal risk–marginal return strategy to maximize her surplus without causing a bargaining failure.

Low information with a large number of players: The integration of incomplete information and outside options amplifies the complexity of the bargaining process. Fudenberg *et al.* (1987) develops an outside option bargaining strategy on Rubinstein's (1985) bargaining model with incomplete information allowing the players to compare the payoffs of the ongoing bargaining process with the outside options. Looking for outside options under this scenario could have a search cost (Chatterjee and Lee, 1998). Hence, while bargaining for the share of surplus involving uncertainty and outside options, the players should keep in mind: (i) if the cost of rejection is high, the player should demand a lower share of the surplus, (ii) the marginal return of added surplus should be greater than the marginal risk of rejection to demand a higher surplus share, and (iii) if the outside option is not profitable, the share of the surplus should be lower.

4. Framework for Price Bargaining in Shipping: A Future Research Avenue

Despite the unique characteristics of the shipping industry, it shares some commonalities with other industries. The fluctuations in the asset prices in the shipping markets resemble the real estate markets (Greenwood and Hanson, 2015). Both industries experience cyclicalities due to lead-lag relationships between new orders and the physical deliveries of the assets. Harding *et al.* (2003), Novy-Marx (2009), and Agarwal *et al.* (2019) have employed bargaining theory to empirically analyze the bargaining power of the players in the real estate industry. Furthermore, the shipping freight market can be compared to the labor, supply chain, and healthcare industries, as the terms of the services can be customized. Cahuc *et al.* (2006) and Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009) examine wages and causes of bargaining failure in the labor market. Wu *et al.* (2009) and Leider and Lovejoy (2016) explore the role of information in pricing within the supply chain management literature. Brooks *et al.* (1997) investigate factors influencing insurance prices during negotiations between hospitals and health insurers. However, the utilization of bargaining from a game theoretical approach for pricing assets and services in the shipping industry is limited compared to real estate, labor economics, supply chain, and healthcare studies. The authors only found an article by Chen *et al.* (2016) proposing a bargaining model for estimating optimal freight rates in the container sector of the shipping industry.

Given the similarities between the shipping industry and other sectors, exploring the concept of bargaining offers a fresh perspective to analyze the pricing of individual transactions in the shipping literature. The forthcoming section presents specific insights into potential areas of research for pricing shipping assets and services using the bargaining framework.

4.1. Setting the Scene: Applicable Areas in Shipping

The shipping industry encompasses four key markets, as identified by Stopford (2008): (i) the newbuilding market for constructing new ships, (ii) the sale and purchase market for trading secondhand vessels, (iii) the recycling market for selling scrap vessels, and (iv) the freight market for buying and selling freight services. We categorize these four markets into asset and service markets to explore the potential application of bargaining theory as a future research direction in the shipping industry.

The asset market encompasses the trade of ships as assets, which includes the newbuilding, sale and purchase, and recycling markets. Among these, the sale and purchase market is particularly intriguing for studying one-on-one trades due to its higher transaction volume compared to the newbuilding and recycling markets. Additionally, the newbuilding and recycling markets can be considered close to oligopolistic due to the limited number of shipyards for building and recycling ships compared to their counterplayers (Garino and Martin, 2000). Due to the notable prevalence of market participants in the sale and purchase market,

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3 using price bargaining models to investigate the factors that impact trade prices can
4 considerably enhance bargaining efficiency. Consequently, this paper concentrates on price
5 bargaining within the sale and purchase market.
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8 The service market pertains to the freight market involving buying and selling of transportation
9 as services. This market encompasses the spot and time charter market. The international
10 shipping industry consists of three primary sectors, as outlined by Stopford (2008): (i) dry bulk
11 shipping, which entails the carriage of dry commodities in bulk form, (ii) tanker shipping,
12 which involves the transportation of liquid cargoes, and (iii) container shipping, which focuses
13 on the transportation of standardized container units carrying manufactured goods. Combining
14 these three major shipping sectors with the two shipping markets (sale and purchase and freight
15 markets) makes it possible to delineate six distinct sub-markets. Figure 7 serves as an
16 illustrative depiction of the potential areas within the shipping industry where price bargaining
17 models can be employed.
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23 [Insert Figure 7]

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26 Overall, the concept of bargaining could have wide-ranging applications within the shipping
27 industry. This study seeks to engage the maritime academic society in examining the pricing
28 of individual freight services and ship values from a bargaining standpoint. An initial step for
29 researchers is to assess the relative bargaining power between buyers and sellers. Researchers
30 should employ an operational approach integrating game theory and economic models to
31 analyze bargaining dynamics. The subsequent section of the research paper outlines a
32 framework for implementing these bargaining models, enabling researchers to understand the
33 interactive dynamics between participants within these specific shipping markets.
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38 4.2. Freight Service Pricing

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41 Over-the-counter (OTC) negotiations between ship operators and charterers determine freight
42 rates in the shipping industry. Ship operators provide maritime transportation services to
43 charterers in exchange for a service fee. Freight contracts are mainly of two⁴ types: (i)
44 spot/voyage charter contracts providing transportation services for a single voyage and (ii)
45 short- or long-term timecharter contracts, which span a specific duration. The market
46 information is more observed in the spot charter contracts compared to a timecharter contract
47 (Kavussanos and Alizadeh-M, 2001), making it relevant to observe the two types of charter
48 agreements separately. Using Clarkson's SIN data, Figure 8 provides insights into the choice
49 of bargaining models for the dry bulk and tanker spot freight markets. The standard deviation
50 and number of transactions are used as proxies for the amount of information and number of
51 players in the market. Hence, Figure 8 serves as an operational representation of Figure 4, with
52 the freight rate's standard deviation on the Y-axis representing the level of information and the
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59 ⁴ The freight contracts are classified into two types for simplicity. All other forms of contracts, say the bareboat contract or
60 the contract of affreightment can be categorised under time charter or voyage charter contract respectively.

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3 number of fixtures on the X-axis denoting the number of players. While the absolute number
4 of players and information availability may vary across sub-sectors, this figure offers a broader
5 understanding of the choice of bargaining models.
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8 For example, the dry bulk freight rates have a high amount of market information with fewer
9 market players compared to the tanker freight market due to lower uncertainties and a reduced
10 number of transactions, respectively. Hence, the basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model can
11 be employed to estimate freight prices. However, tanker freight fixtures would require the
12 usage of different bargaining models. Larger tankers such as VLCC and Supramax vessels have
13 relatively higher freight rates standard deviations requiring a bargaining model with incomplete
14 information, such as Rubinstein (1985) for freight pricing, while Panamax and Handysize
15 tankers would need to employ Rubinstein (1982) and Rubinstein (1982) with outside options,
16 respectively.
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22 [Insert Figure 8]

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24 Through Figure 8 focusing on price bargaining solely within the spot freight market, the
25 application can also be extended to the time charter freight market. This raises the opportunity
26 for researchers to explore the information availability and outside options within each freight
27 market to determine the appropriate bargaining model. For example, when investigating freight
28 prices in the coal trade within Asia, the freight rates for Panamax and Supramax dry bulk
29 vessels could be examined together, considering their shared services. Researchers can
30 combine markets with similar characteristics in terms of assets and services to assess the
31 influence of player interaction on resulting prices. Since the primary purpose of this section is
32 to highlight that there are multiple unexplored areas and emphasize the importance of
33 bargaining in price determination in the sale and purchase and freight markets, this study could
34 provide a potential unexplored but vital research direction in the shipping industry which could
35 improve market efficiency and bridge the gap between theory and practice.
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42 **4.3. Secondhand Asset Pricing**

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44 The sale and purchase market in shipping exhibits limited liquidity compared to other sectors
45 like commodities, equities, and foreign exchanges, with fewer buyers and sellers (Panayides *et*
46 *al.*, 2013, Kuester Simic *et al.*, 2016). It is important to note that price uncertainties and risks
47 of ships differ depending on their size (Kavussanos, 1996, Kavussanos and Alizadeh, 2002).
48 Larger vessels face technical constraints and reduced mobility across seaports, resulting in
49 higher price volatility. Conversely, smaller vessels have more market players, making the
50 market relatively more liquid than larger ships. Additionally, the shipping is derived demand
51 of the commodity market (Friedlaender and Spady, 1980), with the types of commodities
52 transported varying based on ship size (e.g., larger dry bulk vessels predominantly carry iron
53 ore and coal, while smaller bulk vessels transport agricultural commodities). Consequently, the
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3 market characteristics also change in accordance with ship size, as individual ships' unique
4 technical specifications restrict their trade among market players.
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7 Thus, the choice of bargaining models for splitting the surplus between the players can vary
8 depending on ship size and sectors, considering differences in available information and the
9 number of market players. Rather than focusing solely on secondary asset prices for the three
10 major shipping sectors (bulker, tanker, and container ship), this article proposes further
11 categorization based on ship size. As a result, bargaining models for pricing assets in the sale
12 and purchase market can be applied to four dry bulk sub-sectors, five tanker sub-sectors, and
13 two container sub-sectors.⁵ Extending the discussion in Figure 4, Figure 9 presents the choice
14 of price bargaining model for the shipping sale and purchase market. This paper utilizes the
15 actual transaction data from Clarkson's SIN between January 2018 and August 2021 to
16 calculate the amount of information and number of players in the market for each sector and
17 size to estimate the choice of the bargaining models, as presented in Figure 9.
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23 [Insert Figure 9]

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25 As presented in Figure 9, larger bulk carriers and oil tankers such as Capesize bulker, VLCC,
26 Suezmax, Aframax, and Panamax tankers have low sales numbers and low standard deviation
27 indicating that there exists a small number of market players and a high amount of market
28 information. So, a basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model would be sufficient to compute
29 the asset price. Contrary to larger vessels, small to medium-sized dry bulk and tankers such as
30 Handysize, Supramax, Panamax bulkers, and Handysize tankers have a relatively higher
31 number of sales and lower standard deviation; hence a basic Rubinstein (1982) with an outside
32 option strategy would be required for efficient pricing. For example, between 2019-2021, there
33 are only 160 sales of VLCC tankers involving 69 sellers and 68 buyers, while 466 sales of
34 smaller Handysize tankers are recorded between 218 sellers and 155 buyers. There are limited
35 trades for the larger vessels, so the outside option in the sale and purchase market is non-
36 existent compared to the smaller vessels. Unlike bulkers and tankers, container ships have a
37 high standard deviation and few players. Therefore, a bargaining model with incomplete
38 information would better estimate the asset price in line with the Rubinstein (1982) model.
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47 Around 1,000 vessels (including bulkers, tankers, and container ships) are sold in the sales and
48 purchase market annually with a cumulative market value of over 17 billion USD (computed
49 from Clarkson's SIN). Even though the annual volume of transactions in the sale and purchase
50 market is low, the value of transactions is high due to the capital-intensive shipping assets.
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55 ⁵ Using the classification of sub-sectors of ships as per Clarkson's SIN, the bulkers are categorised into four sub-sectors as
56 follows: (i) Capesize bulker ($\geq 100,000$ DWT), (ii) Panamax bulker ($100,000 > \text{and} \geq 70,000$ DWT), (iii) Handymax bulker
57 ($70,000 > \text{and} \geq 40,000$ DWT) and (iv) Handysize bulker ($40,000 > \text{and} \geq 10,000$ DWT), while tankers are categorised into
58 five sub-sectors as (i) Very large Crude Carrier – VLCC tanker ($\geq 200,000$ DWT), Suezmax tanker ($200,000 > \text{and} \geq 125,000$
59 DWT), (ii) Aframax tanker ($125,000 > \text{and} \geq 85,000$ DWT), (iii) Panamax tanker ($85,000 > \text{and} \geq 55,000$ DWT) and (iv)
60 Handysize tanker ($55,000 > \text{and} \geq 10,000$ DWT) and container ships are sub-categorised as (i) Large Container ($\geq 8,000$ TEU)
and Intermediate Container ($8,000 > \text{and} \geq 3,000$ TEU).

Hence, a price bargaining mechanism could attribute to efficient asset pricing, which can have a larger impact on the high-value sale and purchase shipping market.

4.4. An Exemplar Case

This section provides a simple case study for an easier understanding of the application of the bargaining model in pricing freight services. Let us consider a simple situation where a charterer and a ship operator want to trade for shipping iron ore from Brazil to China using a Capesize bulk carrier and are interested to know an acceptable range of freight rate in a spot market. As the spot freight market for the Capesize bulker has fewer players and lower uncertainties, from Figure 8, a simple Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model can be used to estimate the individual freight price. However, the players need to calculate the bargaining surplus and their discount factors for the calculation.

Bargaining Surplus calculation: In this voyage charter example, the charterer has two options: (i) to buy iron ore at CIF (cost insurance and freight) price, where the shipper takes care of the transportation-related costs and delivers the cargo in China or (ii) to buy the iron ore at FOB (free on board) price, where she has to hire a ship and pay the transportation-related costs to ship the cargo to China. If the charterer opts for the latter option, rationally, she would be willing to pay a maximum of the difference between the iron ore CIF in China and the iron ore FOB price in Brazil as the freight rates. From the seller's perspective, the ship operator would be willing to accept zero in an extreme situation where the ship operator has no outside options. Hence the bargaining surplus can be calculated as follows:

$$S_b = P_d^{CIF} - P_l^{FOB} - 0 \quad (7)$$

Where, S_b is the bargaining surplus, while P_d^{CIF} is the CIF price of iron ore in the discharge country, China and P_l^{FOB} is the FOB price of iron ore in the load country, Brazil. So, the charterer's surplus and ship operator's surplus from the freight fixtures can be as follows:

$$S_c = S_b - FR_{vc} \quad (8)$$

$$S_{so} = FR_{vc} \quad (9)$$

Where, S_c and S_{so} represents the charterer's and ship operator's surplus, respectively and FR_{vc} denotes the voyage charter freight rates. The share of surplus between the charterer and the ship operator can be calculated as $\frac{S_c}{S_b}$ and $\frac{S_{so}}{S_b}$, respectively.

Discount factor calculation: While estimating the bargaining surplus is a relatively straightforward task, calculating the discount factor requires a deeper understanding of game theory. In this context, the charterer aims to determine the minimum freight rate that she can

propose, which would be deemed acceptable to the specific ship operator. The discount factor is directly proportional to the bargaining power, whereby a lower discount factor corresponds to a lower share of the surplus for the player. Consequently, the charterer can examine the transaction history of the ship operator to gain insights into their minimum acceptable discount factor. The surplus of players are $\frac{1-\delta_2}{1-\delta_1\delta_2}$ and $1 - \frac{1-\delta_2}{1-\delta_1\delta_2}$ by Rubinstein (1982). As the charterer proposes the split of surplus, she would be Player 1, and the ship operator would take the role of Player 2. The surplus that the particular ship operator had given to any charterer is:

$$\frac{S_c}{S_b} = \frac{1-\delta_2}{1-\delta_1\delta_2} \quad (10)$$

If the discount factors for the players are constant, the discount factor of the charterer (δ_1) that corresponds to the minimum acceptable discount factor (δ_2) for the ship operator is zero (proven in the conclusion of Rubinstein (1982)). Hence the minimum acceptable discount factor for the ship operator is:

$$\delta_2 = 1 - \frac{S_c}{S_b}, \text{ when } \delta_1 = 0 \quad (11)$$

Substituting Eq (7) and Eq (8) in Eq (11):

$$\delta_2 = \frac{FR_{vc}}{P_d^{CIF} - P_l^{FOB}} \quad (12)$$

A simple OLS regression in δ_2 (minimum discount factor acceptable for the ship operator) estimated from Eq (12) on various shipping markets, contracts, and vessel-specific factors to evaluate the current minimum discount factor of the ship operator. This will help to estimate the minimum acceptable freight rate from the ship operator's perspective. Similarly, the minimum acceptable discount factor for the charterer can be calculated. This will generate the maximum acceptable freight rate from the charterer's perspective. Combining the minimum and maximum acceptable price for the ship operator and charterer, the researchers can safely evaluate an agreeable price range for future freight fixture transactions between the players.

Hence this concept of price bargaining can be operationalized to estimate the price range that the ship operator and charterer expect for a particular freight contract. Generalizing this idea, any buyer or seller can employ the bargaining concept in the shipping sale and purchase as well as freight market to estimate the range of prices which is acceptable for the counter player and thereby (i) increase the bargaining efficiency without indulging in a time-consuming back and forth negotiation and (ii) trade profitability by getting higher surplus for herself.

5. Concluding Remarks

This study examines pricing practices in the shipping industry from a bargaining perspective. Buyers and sellers interact in the freight and sale and purchase markets to create customized and heterogeneous contracts. The bargaining concept can help identify factors affecting trade prices. The discussed bargaining model uncovers a seemingly perfect Pandora's box for price determination and fixing mechanisms in shipping markets. Applying bargaining studies benefits ship owners, operators, and charterers by enhancing transaction pricing and profitability. Mainstream economics and management studies focus on theoretical development, but empirical applications of bargaining theory remain unexplored. This article identifies potential areas for future studies to test bargaining theory in pricing freight services and secondhand vessel prices, contributing to the theory-testing approach of bargaining. The goal is to encourage academic and professional researchers in the shipping industry to consider the bargaining-based framework for pricing assets and services. This approach helps understand complex business transactions, identify factors, and contribute to theory-building in the long term.

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
Appendix 1. Standard Deviation of Spot Freight Prices vs. No. of Fixtures

Sr. No.	Types of Vessels	Number of Fixtures	Standard Deviation
1	Capesize Bulker	5,897	12,362.54
2	Panamax Bulker	9,215	7,765.94
3	Handymax Bulker	3,722	8,457.42
4	Handysize Bulker	1,212	8,043.30
5	VLCC Tanker	5,534	33,643.61
6	Suezmax Tanker	7,522	22,222.28
7	Aframax Tanker	5,843	15,699.37
8	Panamax Tanker	4,653	12,513.85
9	Handysize Tanker	21,207	8,715.67

Appendix 2. Standard Deviation of Sale and Purchase Ship Prices vs. No. of Sales


Sr. No.	Types of Vessels	Number of Sales	Standard Deviation
1	Capesize Bulker	156	4.37
2	Panamax Bulker	399	2.37
3	Handymax Bulker	597	3.27
4	Handysize Bulker	447	2.39
5	VLCC Tanker	150	4.19
6	Suezmax Tanker	98	3.49
7	Aframax Tanker	134	3.79
8	Panamax Tanker	55	1.51
9	Handysize Tanker	450	1.01
10	Large Container Ship	81	10.40
11	Intermediate Container Ship	213	15.95

Figure 1. Market Price vs. Individual Freight Rate
(Capesize Iron Ore Shipment from Brazil to China)



Source: BCI C3 is extracted from Clarkson’s Shipping Intelligence Network, and AXS Marine’s AXS Dry database is used to collect the individual freight prices.⁶

Figure 2. Bargaining Process in the Shipping Industry




⁶ The increasing demand for data as a decision support system in the shipping industry has led to the emergence of numerous data providers in recent years. In this study, we have opted to utilize data from two prominent companies, namely Clarkson and AXS Marine, for mainly two reasons: *Firstly*, Clarkson’s Shipping Intelligence Network and AXS Marine’s AXS DRY and ALPHATANKER platforms offer unprocessed data on individual transactions encompassing sales and purchases, and the freight market. This unadjusted and uncorrected raw data enables us to obtain a comprehensive and unfiltered view of the industry, facilitating a more accurate analysis of the shipping market dynamics. *Secondly*, both Clarkson and AXS Marine have established themselves as trusted data service providers in the maritime industry, accumulating a track record of over 20 years. This extensive experience underscores the reliability and credibility of the secondary data they offer.

Note: The bargaining process is explained in detail in the later part of the text. The major difference between the generalized bargaining process and the shipping industry is the interaction between the buyers and sellers during the negation process through physical brokers presented in this figure.

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
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Figure 3. Representation of Surplus in Bargaining Context



Note:  represents the surplus received by the seller, while  denotes the surplus received by the buyer.


Figure 4. Types of Price Bargaining Models



Source: Drawn by the authors


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Figure 5. Game Tree for Rubinstein Bargaining Model



Source: Drawn by the authors


Figure 6. Game Tree for Rubinstein Bargaining Model with Outside Options



Source: Drawn by the authors


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Figure 7. Shipping Markets for Individual Trade Bargaining



Source: Drawn by the authors


Figure 8. Choice of Price Bargaining in the Spot Freight Market



Notes:

1. The number of freight fixtures for the data set between January 2018 and November 2021 is presented in the X-axis. The number of sales of the ships is regarded as proportional to the number of market players.
2. The standard deviation of spot freight rates is presented in the Y-axis. The higher degree of standard deviation represents higher uncertainties, hence denoting a lower amount of market information.⁷
3. The vessels are clustered and highlighted as per the suitable fitting bargaining mechanisms as follows:
 - Basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model
 - Basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model with outside options
 - Bargaining Model with incomplete information
4. The choice of bargaining model estimated for various vessel types could change with the change of sample period.

⁷ Appendix 1 presents the table of the standard deviation of the spot freight prices and number of fixtures for each vessel type in a tabular format from which this figure is generated.

Figure 9. Choice of Price Bargaining Model in the Sale and Purchase Market**Notes:**

1. The number of sales of vessels for the data set between January 2018 and August 2021 is presented in the X-axis. The number of sales of the ships is regarded as proportional to the number of market players.
2. The standard deviation of secondhand ship prices is presented in the Y-axis. The higher degree of standard deviation represents higher uncertainties, hence denoting a lower amount of market information.⁸
3. The vessels are clustered and highlighted as per the suitable fitting bargaining mechanisms as follows:
 - Basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model
 - Basic Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model with outside options
 - Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information
4. The choice of bargaining model estimated for various vessel types could change with the change of sample period.

⁸ Appendix 2 presents the table of the standard deviation of the secondhand ship prices and number of sales for each vessel type in a tabular format from which this figure is generated.