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The Intergenerational Reproduction of Elites

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9. The intergenerational reproduction of elites

Christoph Houman Ellersgaard

INTRODUCTION: THE FOUR WAYS IN WHICH ELITE REPRODUCTION MATTERS

From the hereditary transfer of power and privilege in feudalism to the meritocratic elites of contemporary societies, the subjects of elites have always been able to perceive how the children of their leaders, to a large, albeit varying, extent, became the leaders of their children. The strong tendency toward the intergenerational reproduction of elites is, in fact, a remarkably stable feature across many societies. For instance, corporate elites have, since the birth of the industrial revolution, largely been recruited from the children of corporate elites in earlier generations in the classic industrial nations of the US, the UK, France and Germany (Kaelble, 1980). However, the mechanisms and rigidity of the elite reproduction of course varies greatly. As Raymond Aron (1950, p. 141) famously argued 'that one of the most characteristic features of any society's structure is the structure of the elite, that is, the relationship between the groups exercising power, the degree of unity or division between these groups, the system of recruiting the elite and the ease or difficulty of entering it'. One way of understanding this feature of society's structure is through the study of the intergenerational reproduction of elites. This reproduction is important for society for four different reasons.

First, if chances of achieving an elite position are severely hampered for some groups, this situation challenges an egalitarian, or meritocratic, ideal of equal access to positions of power, privilege, prestige and pecuniary remuneration. While the meritocratic ideal has been challenged recently (Markovits, 2019; Sandel, 2020), the idea that merit and competencies are what promotes you to elite positions remain a core value in contemporary societies (Mijs, 2015; Mijs & Savage, 2020), not least among aspiring elites themselves (Khan, 2010; Khan & Jerolmack, 2013; Sherman, 2017; Ye & Nylander, 2020). Thus, a high degree of social closure in access to elite positions can, in due turn, undermine the elite as challengers to this elite become frustrated by the fact that elites monopolize positions of power and privilege. In extreme cases, high degrees of elite closure can be the incubator of revolutions, as Norbert Elias (1983) argues was the case when the nobility of the court society of Louis XIV failed to integrate upcomers from the rising bourgeoisie. Indeed, the study of elites was among the first ways in which overall societal social mobility was explored (see Chapter 4 by Heath and Li).

Second, it follows that if elites are recruited from a narrow set of social classes, this reduces the outlook and diversity of elites. Research suggests that diverse teams on average make better and more sound decisions (Galinsky et al., 2015; Herring, 2009; Nathan & Lee, 2013). Thus the homogeneity in elite recruitment can lead to groupthink (Janis, 1972) or even what C. Wright Mills (1956, p. 356) called 'crackpot realism', leaving elites unable to comprehend the world of everyday women and men, exemplified in the 'let them eat cake' attitude towards commoners attributed to Marie Antoinette.

Third, the institutions elites rise through matter. Whether elites are recruited based on hereditary status, through educational merit or by passing through other institutions such as

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the church, the corporation or the military puts an imprint on elites. As Max Weber (1978, pp. 1031–2) describes, historically elites reproduced through patrimonial relations, where the inheritor must convince the ruler of their fealty (see also Tobias Neely, 2018). This process forges strong bonds between future elites, the sponsors of their careers and the organisations and institutions they rise through. In the same vein, Pierre Bourdieu (1996) shows how alumni from the same elite universities adapt to a set of shared values integrating them into a particular *esprit de corps*. Furthermore, elite individuals trained in the same disciplines will forge strong professional bonds and shared worldviews (Adler & Haas, 1992; Fourcade, 2006; Fourcade et al., 2015). This point means that the institutions of elite reproduction also impact the ways in which elites use their disproportionate power when making decisions. For instance, a recent study suggests that corporate managers trained at business schools are more likely to make redundancies and lower wages in both the US and Denmark (Acemoglu et al., 2022). Thus, the institutions used in intergenerational elite reproduction, be that the family, the university or the military, become key aspects of elite legitimation. Furthermore, these also – based on the intrinsic institutional logics – open the doors to different types of outsiders. The illegitimate son, the child prodigy or the military hero may circumscribe the mechanisms of intergenerational elite reproduction and enter the elites.

Fourth, reproduction of different elites indicates the relative openness of these elites, but also the division and unity between these elites. The proportion of elites recruited within this narrow set of social classes changes the potential for cohesion and convergence among a set of core values within elite groups and across different elites. Classic studies of elites have highlighted how the upbringing among the typically white aristocracy enhanced social cohesion of elites because of their shared cultural outlook stemming from being socialised in the same milieu even if they later rose through different institutions (Baltzell, 1958; Mills, 1956). Furthermore, the intergenerational movements between elite groups can increase cohesion of the elite in general. For instance, if children of the captains of industry become military generals, this indicates a proximity of these elite social groups.

WHAT ARE 'ELITES'?

Before I look into the reasons for elites being intergenerationally reproduced and the extent of this reproduction, it is first needed to specify what 'elites' – which remains one of the most misused words in the vocabulary of the social sciences (Scott, 2003) – actually means. This task is not made easier by the fact that elites are often, rightly or wrongly, used as scapegoats in political rhetoric, meaning the societal use of the notion of elites varies depending on larger discursive power struggles. Most studies addressing intergenerational elite reproduction look at elites either as very select groups, usually measured in the hundreds or a few thousand at the apex of society, or as much broader groups at the top of income or wealth distributions or professional hierarchies. The size of the elite group relative to the population at large – and changes in this relationship – is naturally linked to the level of social mobility and reproduction of elites (Bendix & Howton, 1957). Thus it is key to understand the level of exclusivity used in different elite definitions.

When elites are analysed as a very select group, elites may be tied to specific sectors or fields, being *field-specific elites*, or they may be composed of elites across what scholars have defined as the main groups of the elite, in total encompassing what we, inspired by Mills

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(1956), can define as the *power elite* of a society. Identifying elites as a select group often implies that these individuals know one another, are connected to one another through social networks or at least know each other by name, and by implication, reputation. This group could for instance be the top 100 CEOs in a nation, all cabinet members or the 50 most important civil society leaders. In such studies elites are typically identified by holding 'command positions' in large bureaucratic organisations as opposed to being selected based on their wealth or status (Scott, 1996). However, elites could also be identified based on their reputation within a field, such as looking at prominent artists, the rising group of popular culture elites such as celebrities (including e.g. sport stars or influencers), most cited scholars (Korom, 2020) or simply the very wealthiest individuals as found, for example, from the Forbes rich list (Korom et al., 2017). When elites are defined as a very narrow group, their reproduction is best investigated in small-N studies (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2021) often drawing on prosopographical data, a small collective biographical database of a well-defined select group (Broady, 2002; Lunding et al., 2020). Because of the focus on concentration of capital and power at the very top and the implicit focus on identifying people in social relations with one another – and because of the laborious task of collecting biographical data – the population used in these studies often counts in the hundreds and are often named individuals.

Defining elites much broader, scholars focus on *professional elites* holding well-remunerated positions in key organisations based on their professional expertise or simply *income or wealth elites* based on being in the top percentile (or even decile) within the income or wealth distribution in society. The pioneering work of Thomas Piketty (Alvaredo et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014, 2020) has drawn renewed interest to this group. While the reason for the success of these groups has both been attributed to their greater experience or skills set as superstars (Rosen, 1981; Kaplan & Rauh, 2013) and to phenomena based on increasing the social power of managers (DiPrete et al., 2010), the increasing ability of the richest percent to pull away from the rest of the population demonstrated in this research has fuelled new research interest in how the most resourceful not only reproduce their social position, but manage to leave their children in an even more privileged position (Savage, 2014). Often studies of reproduction of these groups draw on either data derived from tax records or from register data (in particular in Scandinavia, see e.g. Bihagen et al., 2017; Björklund et al., 2012; Hansen & Toft, 2021; Melldahl, 2018). Another approach has been to identify groups of elite professionals, students at elite universities, boarding schools or even kindergartens (Koh & Ziqi, 2021) who either aspire to or have a social position that places them markedly above the rest of the population. Often these contexts have also served as empirical settings for qualitative studies enhancing our understanding of the mechanisms that drive intergenerational elite reproduction.

HOW DO ELITES MANAGE TO REPRODUCE THEIR SOCIAL POSITION?

While elites have been studied through the lens of varied definitions, these often see 'elites as those who have vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource' (Khan, 2012, p. 362). The intergenerational transfer of these resources happens through particular institutions with particular mechanisms, which – as mentioned above – have implications for the cohesion and outlook of the elite group.

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In his seminal work on elite French universities, *State Nobility*, Bourdieu (1996, pp. 272–299) distinguished between two modes by which elites manage to pass their position on to their offspring. The 'family mode' based on inheritance and other forms of direct placement in family-run organisations and the 'school-mediated mode' of reproduction using the transfer of cultural capital to ensure school success of children and thus use educational credentials to enter the elite. Bourdieu argued that the family mode of reproduction gradually lost legitimacy and became supplanted by modes of reproduction using the school system. Based on work of Bourdieu-inspired scholars, I will argue that a third institutional arena also provides a mechanism for the intergenerational transfer of elite positions, that of the organisational – or network based, if the field is loosely organised such as the artistic field – career. Thus, we can talk about elite reproduction mediated by families, schools or organisations.

While the *family mode* of reproduction could be seen like a feudal or patrimonial form of elite reproduction, it is still very much at play. For instance, while more self-made men have made the Forbes 400 list in the last four decades, the scions of great wealth still outnumber entrepreneurs amongst the wealthiest people in America (Korom et al., 2017). Another mechanism is seen through financial support which helps the offspring of wealth elites in Norway pass a financially advantageous position to their children (Toft & Friedman, 2020).

Explaining the *school-mediated mode* of reproduction was originally the catalyst for Bourdieu to develop the concept of cultural capital, in order to explain how the most prestigious universities and programmes were filled with children of the dominating classes (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). In elite universities, high tuition fees and other selection criteria based on evaluating the 'personal qualities' or character of students have been used to ensure not only advantages for the offspring of the elite, but also to exclude other minorities, such as selection criteria historically used by Ivy-league universities to filter out Jewish applicants (Karabel, 2006). Ranking systems even incentivize elite universities to accept the students most likely to succeed (Chu, 2021), which are more often than not those with access to resources through their parents. At elite institutions such as Harvard University, the same number of students come from families in the top 1% of the income distribution as from the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution combined (Chetty et al., 2020). As American universities have become more segregated with regard to class recruitment because of increasing economic differences between selective and non-selective universities, universities increasingly serve to reproduce elites and upper middle classes (Brezis & Hellier, 2013). Even in Scandinavian welfare states with no tuition fees such as Denmark, there are strong social differences not only in who enters particular university programmes (Thomsen, 2012), but also which fractions of elites or professions reproduce through which programmes (Andrade & Thomsen, 2017). However, while cultural capital passed on from families to their offspring help elite offspring distinguish themselves in elite educational institutions (Börjesson et al., 2016) these institutions also become their own social universes in which one no longer can expect to succeed only on ascribed status (Khan, 2010).

Educational merits are not enough to reach an elite position, however. Usually, elites are – outside of the most direct financial transfers of wealth – also selected for their position based on their organisational experience. Thus intergenerational transfer of resources by elites also employs an *organisational mode* of reproduction. This often works in conjunction with the school-mediated mode, as students from elite universities are recruited by the professional firms that often lead to elite careers. In this process, other dispositions, including taste, extra-curricular activities and the way one carries one-self – what Rivera (2012) calls 'cultural

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matching' between elite firm and applicant – often play a key role in who gets over the hurdle and lands the jobs with the very best career prospects (Rivera, 2011, 2012, 2015). As with elite universities, children of elites have advantages both to get into elite organisations and later to move up or between organisational hierarchies, navigating both the occupational structure of the firm and the larger organisational field to achieve the highest levels of professional status (on the tension between occupational and organisational status, see Borkenhagen & Martin, 2018).

In their book *The Class Ceiling*, Friedman and Laurison (2019) show how class background still matters for those advancing their careers in elite organisations. While access to elite education and the selection process for candidates in elite firms as mentioned above already matters for those who 'get in' elite organisations, Friedman and Laurison point to four key mechanisms for those who 'get on' and move up the organisational ladder. 1) Drawing on parental financial support – the 'bank of mom and dad' – one can take internships or low paid jobs in high cost-of-living areas, which is particularly important for elites in creative sectors. 2) Those who have the right tastes and demeanour are more likely to be seen as talented and to be supported by sponsors and mentors easing their way to the top. 3) Similarly, if you have an elite social background you may more easily 'fit in' to the organisation because you understand the cultural codes and you will more likely be regarded as suitable management material. 4) Lastly, those coming from non-elite backgrounds will be more likely to 'self-eliminate' – not apply for promotion or have the confidence to take on meriting tasks – because they fear they lack the qualifications for an elite position.

In a similar vein, German sociologist Michael Hartmann (2000) shows how children of the upper classes acquire the right 'class-specific habitus' and learn how to present themselves in, for example, the social worlds of large corporations – for instance by giving the right firm handshake or knowing how to comport themselves at a fine dining table – and thus are able to ascend the hierarchies in the corporate world, even without inheriting their position directly or using the connections of their family. As C. Wright Mills (1956, p. 141) points out, regarding career ascent of top executives:

> The fit survive, and fitness means, not formal competence – there probably is no such thing for top executive positions – but conformity with the criteria of those who have already succeeded. To be compatible with the top men is to act like them, to look like them, to think like them: to be of and for them – or at least to display oneself to them in such a way as to create that impression. This, in fact, is what is meant by "creating" a well-chosen word – "a good impression." This is what is meant and nothing else – by being a "sound man".

Based on this tendency to select successors which are similar to the incumbent, and the tendency of social networks to be forged by individuals with similar characteristics (McPherson et al., 2001), advantages gained through coming from the right family and attending the right schools are accentuated in many organisations.

Thus, both formal merits and personal relations to other elites matter when elites are intergenerationally reproduced. Turner (1960, p. 856) famously distinguished between contest and sponsored mobility: 'Contest mobility is a system in which elite status is the prize in an open contest and is taken by the aspirants' own efforts', whereas '[u]nder sponsored mobility elite recruits are chosen by the established elite or their agents, and elite status is given on the basis of some criterion of supposed merit'. In practice, elites often draw both on contests, when using their cultural capital to achieve school success, and sponsorship, when creating relations

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with those evaluating them for their achievements, be that in schools or organisations. Because elites most often act as gatekeepers for newcomers – as board members, in appointment committees, etc. – they can define and measure merit in these institutions in a way that gives someone sharing their characteristics an advantage (Rivera, 2015, p. 21). Either elites set the rules of the game or they are directly involved in selecting their peers and potential successors.

Each of the three modes of elite reproduction comes with a risk. The family mode of reproduction through inheritance risks – depending on the number of heirs – splitting up the family fortune or estate into parcels no longer worthy of elite status. Traditionally, this has been the reason why matrimony as a family-based mode of reproduction has been the main pathway to reproducing parental elite status for daughters of elites. This risk was also the historical reason for the rise of the clergy as an alternative, more school-based, path to elite status of the offspring of the nobility who were not first in the hereditary order in their families (Bourdieu, 1996). The school-mediated mode of reproduction, however, allows offspring of non-elite families who manage to hack the schooling game entry to elite positions, while elite children who fail to achieve school success will risk becoming déclassé. Similarly, entering the wrong organisation or not comporting oneself in the right manner can also lead to failure to reproduce parental elite status in the organisational mode of reproduction.

With these risks in mind, it is clear that elite status is not reproduced perfectly but rather differs between different elites and that these differences – along with the mechanisms elites draw upon – matter for how elites think and act. In the following, I will give some empirical examples of the extent to which elites have reproduced, focussing first on the more widely defined professional or wealth elites and then on more exclusive field-specific elites or power elite.

THE REPRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL ELITES AND WEALTH AND INCOME ELITES

One of the most striking features of elite reproduction is how general mechanisms of social reproduction are accentuated at the very top. Björklund, Roine, and Waldenström (2012) show, between fathers and sons in Sweden, the intergenerational income elasticity is approximately 0.9 – meaning that a father's position in the income hierarchy explains around 90% of the son's position – for the children of the 0.1%. Furthermore, mechanisms that have substantial explanatory power of one's position in the income hierarchy for the offspring of the non 0.1% – IQ, non-cognitive skills and education – are not important for the children of the extreme rich, suggesting that these rely on a family-based mode of reproduction with wealth as the primary mechanism (for results for Denmark, see Munk et al., 2016). Within different fractions of elites, the economic elite in particular is also able to transfer wealth between generations in Norway (Hansen & Toft, 2021; Toft & Friedman, 2020).

The same tendency of accentuated mechanisms of reproduction can be observed when looking at assortative mating. Here the level of homogamy rises with family wealth, being the highest in the top percentile in Denmark (Wagner et al., 2020). This marital homogamy not only applies to the apex of society in general, but different fractions of professional elites also have a higher tendency to intermarry (Toft & Jarness, 2020). Not only do professional elites in the top of income or wealth hierarchies find spouses in the same income bracket as themselves, they are also more likely to find jobs through family connections. Both in Canada

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and Denmark, the likelihood of finding employment in the same organisation as your father rises more than two-fold for any job and more than three-fold for main employers for those with fathers in the top earnings percentile (Bingley et al., 2011). For more on the role of educational institutions and reproduction of economic inequalities at the top end of the income distribution, see Chapter 5 by Nybom. Since changes in income inequality are increasingly tied to differences between workplaces (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2020), the ability of parents to get their children into the right organisations may also explain how professional elites are reproduced through the labour market.

This mechanism can also help explain substantial income differences found even between those in the same occupations based on social background in the UK (Friedman et al., 2015), leading to a significant 'class pay gap'. According to Laurison and Friedman (2016), those with a background in the upper middle classes on average earn £7,350 more than those from the working class *in the same jobs* in elite professions – such as lawyers, doctors or engineers – with similar patterns found in the US, France, Sweden and Norway (Friedman & Laurison, 2019, p. 47).

However, some of these mechanisms point to the enduring combination of resources transmitted through families, educational systems and organisations in conjunction. Two interesting examples of recovery from lost status speak volumes to the enduring effects of class in elite reproduction. Andrle (2001) shows that the post-communist business elite in the Czech Republic has lineages back to the pre-communist bourgeoisie. Ager, Boustan and Eriksson (2021) show how sons of the ex-slave owners in the US South, who lost substantial amounts of their wealth with the end of slavery, managed to recover in income and wealth, in part by shifting into professions and through marriage with elite families, arguing that social networks play a key role when inheritance fails as a mechanism for intergenerational elite reproduction.

THE REPRODUCTION OF POWER ELITES AND FIELD-SPECIFIC ELITES

Moving from these broader defined professional or wealth elites – what is also labelled the upper class – to the very exclusive field-specific or power elites in which many individuals potentially know one another by name or at least by reputation. As mentioned in the introduction, these elite groups have traditionally been very exclusive, exhibiting high levels of social closure. From the mid-18th to the mid-20th century, around half of the top corporate leaders have been children in business families in the US, UK, France and Germany (Kaelble, 1980). Similarly, between a third and two-fifths of the top 100 corporate leaders in France, Germany and Denmark were children of the upper class (Ellersgaard et al., 2013; Maclean et al., 2006). However, the mechanisms of reproduction differ. Whereas the French corporate elite relies on elite schools and high levels of career mobility between elite sectors, the British relies on affiliation with top universities, but much more unisectoral careers. Similarly to Germany, affiliations with elite schools are less important for elite reproduction in Denmark, whereas the organisational mode of reproduction – the career in key firms – is of key importance (Ellersgaard et al., 2013; Hartmann, 2010).

However, not all elites are disproportionately recruited from the upper classes. In his two studies of union and business leaders at the end of the Second World War, C. Wright Mills largely confirms the image of an exclusively recruited American corporate elite, whereas the

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parental occupations of union leaders were predominantly skilled workers (Mills, 1945; Mills & Atkinson, 1945).

Looking at cross-sectorial power elites, very high levels of social reproduction are also found. In their study of the individuals portrayed in the French *Who's Who* in 2009, Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet and Thine (2011) find that more than half of these were recruited from the class of owners or from intellectual or liberal professions. Similarly, in the UK, alumni of exclusive boarding schools, the nine Clarendon Schools, are almost 100 times more likely to find their way into the British *Who's Who* than those who attended any other school (Reeves et al., 2017), a trend that applies to all elite sectors.

Our recent work on the Danish power elite, identified as the core and an extensive elite network, supports this. Among the 400 highly networked corporate executives, union leaders, politicians, senior civil servants and members of the academic elite, almost a third are recruited from the upper classes, with a further quarter coming from the upper middle classes (Ellersgaard et al., 2019). The relative risk of having a position in the Danish power elite is more than 80 times higher if your parents are mentioned in the Danish equivalent to *Who's Who*, *Kraks Blå Bog* (Larsen et al., 2015).

The intergenerational reproduction of the Danish power elite reveals two interesting mechanisms. First, children of parents in the cultural or public sectors disproportionately follow a career in the public sector or in political organisations, whereas children of parents in the private sector disproportionately follow career trajectories in business. However, these differences only apply to those with parental background in the upper classes. Thus these trajectories seem not to be the result of different preferences but rather more direct reproduction based on the networks of parents within the field (Ellersgaard et al., 2019). Second, we can observe that those who are elected to their position – politicians and union leaders – have a more diverse profile, not only with regard to class background, but also gender, place of residence, type of education and career path (Lunding et al., 2021).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have described why intergenerational elite mobility matters. I argued that elite reproduction matters for society at large, because it affects the meritocratic legitimacy of elites, the diversity, or the level of groupthink, within elite groups, the extent to which particular institutions put their stamp on elites and cohesion between elite groups through family relations. Then I showed how elites could be defined either as broader groups of wealth or professional elites or as very exclusive field or power elites, and how these definitions proscribe different methodological approaches of collecting data on the social background of elites.

After this, I argued that elites primarily reproduce their status intergenerationally in three different social arenas: the family, the educational system and the (elite) organisations. Each of these modes of reproduction comes with a particular set of risks, either of opening the elite to outsiders or of elite scions failing to enter the ranks of the elite themselves.

Lastly, I gave empirical examples of how parental elite status matters for both professional and power elites. For instance, we saw a direct pecuniary advantage of more than £7,000 in yearly earnings of their offspring among professional elites in the UK. Similarly, we saw how children of the elite were staggeringly more likely to enter the elite themselves. In the UK, attending exclusive boarding schools led to one being 92 times more likely to be mentioned in

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Who's Who, whereas having parents mentioned in *Who's Who* led to their children being more than 80 times more likely to enter the core of the elite networks in Denmark.

Two last features of the intergenerational reproduction of elites deserve mention. First, we saw how general mechanisms of social reproduction – income elasticity, tendency to marry someone from your own social background or getting a job in a firm where a family member is employed – are greatly accentuated as we move towards the apex of society. This is also the case in countries with high overall levels of social mobility, such the Scandinavian countries. As Corak (2013, p. 99) argues, in countries with relatively high social mobility, such as Sweden or Canada, 'high mobility for most coexists with a "dynasty" for the top 1 percent'. This finding suggests that the mechanisms of reproduction – and the stakes of the game – increase for elites and that we cannot automatically assume that higher levels of overall social mobility also mean lower levels of intergenerational elite reproduction.

Second, since elites are still characterised by a lack, although decreasing, of diversity when it comes to gender and race or ethnicity (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2018), the issues of being a newcomer to the elite, when it comes to social class, are magnified for non-whites and women (Friedman, 2022). Studies show how those who enter the elite from a non-dominant gender or race tend to have even more privileged backgrounds (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2018) or are hit even harder by the class pay gap in elite occupations (Friedman & Laurison, 2019). Thus elite members often can only bring one type of diversity to the table, in total ensuring a highly homogeneous social group at the top of society.

While elites have undoubtedly become more diverse in recent years – albeit more in gender and race, than in the more invisible features such as social background – access to the elite is still very closed off for those who do not fit the image of the existing elites. Furthermore, newcomers will have had to adapt their behaviour to the institutions reproducing elites, either by achieving acceptance into the family firm through marriage, by showing the right cultural capital to succeed in elite schools or by comporting oneself in a way that exudes soundness to attract potential sponsors in elite organisations. In this way those who manage to break the class ceiling and enter elite positions will often have been through a long and thorough institutionalisation process ensuring that they can comport themselves in a way that does not challenge the privileges and power of elites. Thus, research into the intergenerational reproduction of elites cannot only look at the mobility rates of privileged groups, but must always also be related to an analysis of the pathways leading to elite position in order to understand the role played by family and culture in the shaping of elite groups.

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