

Competing Demand-side Explanations and Populism Cross-national Variation in a Recursive Ideational System

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Competing demand-side explanations and populism: cross-national variation in a recursive ideational system

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ABSTRACT


This article models the rise of populism in a country as a sequential recursive system driven by the interaction of voters' contextual demands and the supply of populist political responses. We introduce to this literature high-frequency media event data extracted from a corpus of two terabytes of articles drawn from 72 countries over six years using natural language processing. Further, we introduce vector autoregression to the study of populism, which allows us to model the way voters' grievances and politicians' rhetoric and policy responses influence each other bidirectionally over time. Our analysis reveals that voter demands and political responses are best modelled as a recursive system. Given the positive feedback loop, efforts to curb the growth of populism and limit democratic backsliding will require both addressing underlying grievances (i.e. demand) and weakening or substituting for the efficacy of existing populist rhetoric (i.e. supply).

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From the gilets jaunes (i.e. yellow vests) in France to QAnon in the United States to the rise of the business-evangelical-agricultural alliance in Brazil, mass movements are organizing around a mix of economic and cultural grievances that they feel are being ignored. Marine Le Pen and Éric Zemmour in France, Donald Trump and Ron DeSantis in the United States, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil not only respond to these demands but harness and direct them into anti-elitist and socially polarizing rage.¹ By every known measure, the vote share of such populist anti-establishment politicians is at an historical high, leading scholars to refer to the current era as “the age of populism”.² For the first time, populism poses a substantive threat not just to fragile transitional democracies or post-conflict polities but also to many institutionalized constitutional democracies.³ In case the trend was in doubt, Victor Orban, Hungary's current prime minister and a right-wing populist, recently declared that “the age of liberal democracy is over”.⁴

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Unsurprisingly, this rise of populism has received increasing scholarly attention, not only from multiple corners of political science but from sociologists and economists as well. Though a variety of approaches have emerged, including the structural, economic, and political-strategic approaches, the dominant academic framework from which to understand populism has been deemed the “ideational approach”. This approach posits that populism is best conceived as a “thin” ideology, and as such often attaches itself to a host ideology.⁵ This host ideology can range from nationalism to socialism and, as such, populism can take place across the left-right political spectrum and can focus on economic or cultural grievances. The ideational approach holds that what is distinctive about populism is the interpretation of the political universe as a struggle between good and evil,⁶ with this contrast accentuated by the performative entrepreneurship of populist leaders who successfully contrast their heroic interventions with the (corrupt) stasis offered by incumbents.⁷ Despite extensive efforts to develop and test a general theory, the primary analytic conclusion is that, beyond these common traits, the drivers of the rise of populism differ by context.

This article offers and tests just such a general theory. We put forth the recent rise of populism as a sequential recursive system driven by the interaction of voters’ contextual demands and the supply of populist political responses. In this sense, we build on scholarship that establishes that populism is not only a consequence of economic and cultural grievances in society but that populist rhetoric may also trigger such grievances via recursive spirals of supply and demand which undermine trust.⁸ Building on these studies based upon survey data in the Netherlands and Belgium, we offer high-frequency cross-national data to the study of populism for the first time. We measure demand factors, understood as economic and sociocultural grievances expressed by the mass public,⁹ using thematic natural language processing of two terabytes of daily media articles drawn from 72 countries. We also use media data to measure supply factors, understood as populist political responses instigated by politicians, as a daily function of expressions of social polarization. Further, we introduce a new method to the study of populism to best model the interaction of these demand and supply factors: we employ panel vector autoregression using country-days as the unit of analysis, which allows us to model the way voters’ grievances and politicians’ rhetoric and policy responses influence each other bidirectionally over time.

Our analysis reveals that while the specific economic and cultural grievances do indeed vary across countries and regions, both economic and cultural demand-side grievances influence expressions of populist rhetoric which, in turn, fan the flame of grievances. Voter demands and political responses are thus best modelled as a recursive system. Unlike many of the slow-moving political variables demonstrated in the existing literature, we demonstrate not only a recursive system but a high-frequency (daily) recursive system between supply and demand. Given the positive feedback loop, efforts to curb the growth of populism and limit democratic backsliding will require both addressing underlying grievances (i.e. demand) and weakening or substituting for the efficacy of existing populist rhetoric (i.e. supply).

National recursive ideational systems of competing demand-side factors and populism

Populism as a recursive ideational system

The historical study of populism is fragmented in perspective as between studies of economic demand for populism, structuralist supply constraints to policy

innovations that might counteract that demand, and the political strategies and performances of populist leaders and organizations responding to that demand. As a result, “the disagreement among scholars yielded rich case studies but little in the way of consistent, replicable measurement or causal analysis”.¹⁰ More recent comparative work in the ideational approach has identified a “common, minimal core” for the construct of populism that is empirically identifiable across countries. This core consists of a “cosmic struggle between a reified ‘will of the people’ and a conspiring elite”.¹¹ Critically, populism, as compared to richer ideologies such as fascism or socialism, is less a coherent programme but rather a thin ideology that can mobilize polities, politicians and policies towards a specific set of projects or outcomes.¹² This explains, in part, why we observe so much variation in the basis for populism¹³: while some populists build a platform on cultural factors such as the exclusion of immigrants or racial biases, others utilize economic factors just as rising inequality or job loss due to globalization and technological change. The choice of these platforms is, however, seen as contextually dependent and, as such, beyond the typical scope of analysis within the ideational approach, which seeks to generalize across these disparate contexts.

Despite this limitation, the ideational approach has the virtue of offering a more generalizable alternative to arguments that put more weight on contextual factors including economic or cultural demand drivers, status threat, obstacles in the supply of responses to these demands, or the entrepreneurial efforts of leaders or organizations to mobilize polities around such economic and cultural grievances using specific forms of discourse. We argue, by contrast, that each of these contextual elements plays a key role in a generalizable and analytically tractable recursive ideational system of populism. Importantly, by integrating these various elements (following the structure offered by Berman’s¹⁴ comprehensive review), we can explain or understand the limitations of partial analysis which looks only for correlations between one factor and populist outcomes. Furthermore, we can build an integrated theoretical framework that explains how demand factors can both be a trigger for and reinforced by the supply of populist ideology by politicians, especially those who are accomplished strategists and performers.

Demand

Economic or cultural demand factors and their joint role remain a prominent correlate of the rise of populism,¹⁵ joined more recently by explanations pertaining to status threat.¹⁶ Economists and political economists tend to focus on economic demand factors. For example, they have focused attention on the role of globalization and/or technological change¹⁷ in promoting inequality¹⁸ as well as deaths of despair.¹⁹ Such economic dislocation can enhance broader divisions across geographies, levels of education, and race.²⁰

However, rising inequality long predates the current surge of populism and studies have struggled to “establish consistent connections between individuals”²¹ and their particular economic circumstances – for example, their income, wealth, or employment status – and their propensity to support populism.²² The research linking subjective perceptions of risk from globalization to support for populism is, by contrast, much stronger,²³ particularly when triggered by existing political mobilization. However, this begs the question of the determinants of subjective perceptions of

risk or grievance and mobilization on these issues in the absence of objective harm, which affect the timing of attitudinal change.

Sociologists, by contrast, tend to place greater weight on cultural demand factors²⁴ related to rising immigration, the decline of traditional values, and the mobilization of women and minority groups ... Such trends, these scholars argue, have challenged ethnic and gender hierarchies, generating a counterreaction. Particularly among white men, the counterreaction has led to support for right-wing populists, who promise to defend their interests.²⁵

Once again, these demographic trends have been clear for some time, making it difficult to link the sudden rise in populism to any objective shift in cultural demand factors.²⁶ Furthermore, racist and nationalist beliefs are far less prevalent across a broad range of countries today than they were twenty or fifty years ago and local variation within them is not strongly correlated with populist support.²⁷

Existing literature has made numerous theoretical advances in how subjective perception influences support for populist ideologies.²⁸ First, scholars have demonstrated that support for populist movements may exist on a “V-curve”.²⁹ The term “V-curve” refers to a pattern where support for populism rises both at the lower and upper ends of the economic spectrum. Those on the lower end may support populism due to feelings of disenfranchisement and economic hardship, while individuals on the upper end might support such movements due to perceptions of cultural threats or dissatisfaction with the status quo, despite their economic advantage. This pattern suggests that both economic distress and relative prosperity can fuel support for populist policies, albeit for several reasons.

A complementary concept is that of relative gratification. Relative gratification in the populism literature explores the paradox where groups may experience upward economic mobility yet still support populist platforms due to feelings of relative deprivation compared to other groups advancing more rapidly. This theory posits that even if all demographic segments are improving, the perception that one’s group is not improving as fast as others can foster feelings of injustice and fuel populist sentiment.³⁰ Scholars have further dissected this, showing how perceived threats to social status, even amid overall positive economic trends, can push individuals towards populist leaders who promise to restore a sense of equity and national identity.³¹ Such dynamics underscore the critical role of perceived economic inequalities and are pivotal in understanding why regions experiencing growth might still harbour significant support for anti-establishment movements.³²

The V-curve and relative gratification theories converge to elucidate how perceptions of status threat can catalyse support for populist movements. Specifically, subjective deprivation can be successfully primed by populist leaders who may accentuate or frame the loss of status³³ due to economic or cultural change into a collective status threat.³⁴ Their appeal for a return to a nostalgic past in which the aggrieved enjoyed higher status can be a powerful motivator for political mobilization.³⁵ Together, these frameworks paint a complex picture of how economic, social, and cultural dynamics interact to foster a sense of status threat across different segments of society, thereby fueling populist demand.

Supply

These grievances drive populism to the extent that they are perceived as salient, which is largely under the control of politicians both incumbent and entrepreneurial. To the

extent that incumbent politicians fail to or are unable to effectively respond to economic anxiety, cultural backlash, and status threat concerns with policies that shift perceptions positively,³⁶ they leave the door open to political entrepreneurs who seize upon these grievances with populist appeals.³⁷ While the demand drivers and impediments to policy responses have been long-standing, there has been a marked shift in the supply of political entrepreneurs offering a populist alternative. These entrepreneurs seize on the lack of variation in the mainstream parties' approach to the threat of economic anxiety and cultural change³⁸ to offer a clear alternative which unite the mass public against the corrupt elites that had purportedly conspired against them. In a recursive ideational system such as we propose, this innovation or shock could itself set off a cascade of increased salience of economic and cultural grievances and support for populism.

Political-strategic

The political-strategic approach to populism focuses on the populist leaders' mobilization of the public into identic communities committed to "heroic missions" attacking "dangerous enemies" within the corrupt elite.³⁹ In contrast to the ideational approach, it focuses on the efforts of a leader or organization to dynamically define the issues or dimensions of conflict between the pure public and the corrupt elite. These issues are not stable as is the case in an ideology like fascism or communism but mutable. Rather than adhering to stable principles, "populism is notorious for its twists and turns, driven by opportunistic efforts of personalistic leaders to concentrate power and stay in office".⁴⁰ While Weyland⁴¹ focuses on the personalistic nature of the populist leader and their mobilization of the masses through quasi-direct mediated relationships, related work emphasizes the discursive elements of the leaders' strategy offering a link back to the ideational approach to populism which also emphasizes discourse. In short, to succeed, populist political strategies must effectively use discourse that taps into and fans the flames of pre-existing economic or cultural grievances.

Performative

Populist leaders engage in "the expression of pain, suffering, frustrations, prejudices, social fears or humiliations that often result from social cleavages" that "bond (with certain people) and antagonize (others)".⁴² This link between the expressions of the politicians and the reactions of the people is critical and understudied in much of the quantitative and, especially, comparative scholarship. Ostiguy⁴³ further notes that.

the current trend to study populism from a demand side of "populist beliefs" amongst the voters⁴⁴, separately from a supply side (of "populist speeches" by political leaders), is problematic ... populism is a relational phenomenon, defined by the connection established between the leader and supporters ... It is relational furthermore in terms of the people-leader's hostile relation to a "nefarious" Other." [It is not] "a merely *top-down* phenomenon, but rather, as a two-way phenomenon and process." (pp. 35–36)

These theoretical arguments in the socio-cultural or performative approaches to the study of populism thus emphasize not only the role of the performer as a political strategist but also the audience as a vessel for, or reactor to, the performance.⁴⁵ Central to the relationship between performer and audience is the performer's ability to foster a collective sense of identity in their followers which shifts the audience's perception of

their status relative to other groups as well as the bounds of acceptable action towards those groups and towards the corrupt elite.⁴⁶

Integration

We acknowledge each of these factors but seek to move beyond competing explanations or horse races to a more integrated theoretical perspective. Voters are aggrieved by economic and political conditions and struggling to make sense of the drivers both of these conditions and the policies that could reverse or mitigate them. Aspiring politicians supplying a populist narrative are both responding to this demand and reinforcing it by legitimizing arguments previously on the periphery or out of the mainstream of political discourse. The strategy and performances of such leaders vary in their efficacy leading to variation in feedback to expressed grievances across countries and across time.

Existing work problematizes the strict division of labour between supply and demand factors⁴⁷ and proposes conceptual models for studying the interplay between demand – and supply side factors.⁴⁸ However, with the exception of Kefford, Moffitt and Werner⁴⁹ and Love and Windsor,⁵⁰ we are unaware of prior empirical work that has sought to integrate the ideational approach with the literature on economic and cultural demand factors.⁵¹ Similarly, while Roodujin et. al.⁵² and Hooghe & Dassonneville⁵³ both argue for a similar integration of supply and demand factors, they rely on single country survey data raising questions regarding generalizability. Our analysis extends and builds upon these single country studies by expanding their theoretical and empirical analysis to encompass 72 countries and media (and other written) content instead of voter surveys. In addition, we adopt the methodology of vector autoregressive models, which allow for the identification of an endogenous relationship between grievances and populism. For a visual representation of this recursive system, see [Figure 1](#).

Cross-national variation in economic anxiety and cultural backlash

While we believe this recursive ideational system is generalizable across contexts, the specific grievances that trigger and are accentuated by populism will vary across countries.⁵⁴ Such national variation in the importance of economic (e.g. inequality, job loss or social mobility) versus cultural (e.g. race, immigration, gender, and sexual orientation) factors as well as the importance of specific issues within each dimension has long been highlighted.⁵⁵ While the ideational, political-strategic, and performative approaches to the study of populism generalized up from this




Figure 1. A recursive system of grievances and populism.

heterogeneity to focus on common elements across countries, demand-side grievances are clearly an important trigger for the rise (supply) of populism as well as a target of populist leaders. Our goal is to empirically explore the extent to which we can integrate these supply and demand components to study how populists “politicize grievances that are relevant in their own context”⁵⁶ to reinforce their political power. In other words, we are interested in whether the level of grievances (demand) affects the level of populism (supply) in a positive feedback loop.

The testable implications of this logic are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Past levels of grievance (i.e. demand) aid in the prediction of populism (i.e. supply), contingent on having already accounted for past levels of populism.

As well as its inverse:

Hypothesis 2: Past levels of populism (i.e. supply) aid in the prediction of grievances (i.e. demand), contingent on having already accounted for past levels of grievances.

We directly test these hypotheses using the econometric methods outlined below. These hypotheses contrast with those in the literature, which suggest that grievances alone predict populism and that populism alone predicts grievances. We argue, and test, that the two operate in a recursive system – a feedback loop. Grievances, as well as past levels of populism, will predict future levels of populism (and vice versa). Finally, it is worth reiterating that though we expect these patterns to hold overall, the specific content of this diverse set of economic and cultural grievances will vary across regional and country contexts.

Data, methodology and analysis

Both our data and our method are novel to the study of populism. We first discuss our data sources and then describe the methodology. We follow with a discussion of statistical results and a presentation of two country-level caselets.

Media data

Our measures of both grievance (demand) and populist rhetoric (supply) are derived from large-scale news content analysis. With the objective of understanding both the subject of an article (e.g. the government, elites, civilians, etc.) as well as its thematic content, we undertook the task of integrating two datasets from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDEL): the GDEL Events dataset and the GDEL Global Knowledge Graph (GKG). The GDEL Events dataset precisely records interactions between actor groups within articles using a subject-verb-object coding scheme. This allows for an acute analysis of specific events and interactions, such as disputes between businesses and governments. Conversely, the GKG offers a more expansive view by cataloguing a wider range of elements within the same articles, such as themes, people, places, and organizations. We were able to match these two datasets using the source URL, achieving a high degree of accuracy. Our testing shows that approximately 98% of articles in the GDEL Events can be matched to entries in the GKG, and approximately one in every seven GKG articles has a paired “event” (this makes sense given the number of articles that do not report events between actor groups).

Combining these two datasets enriches our analytical capability significantly. The GDELT Events dataset provides insights into the directional interactions and sentiments between actors, which are crucial for understanding the dynamics of specific events. However, it lacks in-depth contextual information such as the specifics about the actors involved and the broader themes associated with these interactions. The GKG compensates for this by providing detailed contextual data, although it does not specify the directional sentiment between actors.⁵⁷ By synthesizing the specific, coded event data from GDELT Events with the rich contextual data from GKG, we were able to code underlying grievance (i.e. demand) and populist rhetoric (i.e. supply) separately.

Supply

The coding for populist rhetoric (supply) involved first identifying sources of action in the GDELT Events dataset that are part of the government (including the legislature and judiciary), the political opposition, as well as other elites. We note that each article contains only one source of action, meaning we can clearly delimit whether this is a supply – or demand-side actor. Having identified articles that contained action by one of those actors, we cross-referenced these data with themes from the GKG that are indicative of populist rhetoric. While it is admittedly difficult to determine what type of thematic content should be included as populist rhetoric, we extrapolated from our theoretical priors and included all discussion of social polarization, social marginalization, social cohesion, inequality, discrimination, elites, and grievances. We did this by using GDELT's pre-programmed 3800 themes, which include everything from “protest” to “education” to “environment”. We then aggregated them to the level of the country-day. For example, if there were 300 articles in Canada on 7 January 2018 that talked about the theme of discrimination, we recorded that number and calculated the average sentiment, or tone, across them.⁵⁸

This combination of source and theme allows us to align closely with the ideational approach to populism, capturing both the actors typically involved in disseminating populist messages and the content of their narratives. To quantify the impact and reach of these populist messages, we employed a metric that multiplies the number of relevant articles by the tone reported in the GKG. This tone metric provides an additional layer of analysis, reflecting the sentiment and framing of the populist content within the media landscape. GDELT-GKG calculates tone by measuring the percentage of positive and negative words in an article and then calculating the positive score minus the negative score.

Demand

Conversely, our measure of the “demand” side of populism focuses on civilian sources within the Events dataset. Having identified articles with civilians as the source, we again delimit based on GKG themes. This aspect of our coding schema targets themes related to public grievances and socioeconomic issues as captured by the GKG. As such, we can measure both the frequency and intensity of discussion around broader topics, such as grievances, as well as more specific issues, such as immigration or inequality. Specifically, we first look at two broader themes of societal division (general grievances and discrimination), before moving on to analyse a group of three economic grievances (i.e. inequality, job creation, and economic or social mobility) as well as three cultural grievances (i.e. biases against immigrants, racial

identity, groups or Indigenous peoples) (Figure 2). Similar to the supply side, the demand coding also utilizes a quantitative approach by multiplying the number of articles pertaining to these themes by their respective GKG tone scores. This method allows for an empirical assessment of the intensity and nature of public grievances as reported and discussed across media platforms.

An example of a GDELT-GKG record can help to further explain the information we are aggregating. A fictional record could contain the following information: 1) date, down to the 15-minute interval: 1 July 2020; 2:45pm, 2) News source: CNN, 3) Article title: “Bolsonaro calls Indigenous people ‘impediment’ to land use,” 4) Article URL: www.cnn.com/latinamerica/bolsonaro/07-01-20/index.html, 5) The average tone of the article (as above, GDELT-GKG calculates tone by measuring the percentage of positive and negative words in an article and then calculating the positive score minus the negative score), 6) a list of the themes (of the 3800 themes in the database) included in this article: Indigenous; protected land; non-violent conflict; mining; fertilizer; protest, and 7) The named entities included in this article, which could include people, businesses, civil society organizations, etc.: Jair Bolsonaro; Yanomamo; Kayapo; Brazilian National Mining Agency.

Estimating sample

These data sources together provide us with 2,143 days of data on 72 countries (Appendix 1). We reject both unit roots and cointegration, a frequent threat to inference in VAR models, using a battery of statistical tests (Appendix 3). Table 1 provides summary statistics.

Panel vector autoregression models

Many statistical models impose a unidirectional relationship – the outcome variable is influenced by the predictor variables, but not vice-versa. However, our theory requires the reverse to also be allowed for – for all variables to affect each other. Such feedback relationships are allowed for in VAR models, which are a type of stochastic process model. In this framework, all variables are treated symmetrically and as if they




Figure 2. Grievance hierarchy.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	Mean	Max	Min	SD	Obs
Populism (supply)	1167.022	1.61e + 05	-5860.399	2703.132	116357
Grievances (demand)	23.478	1686.946	-66.335	43.572	46302
Discrimination (demand)	127.275	12163.827	-396.179	305.461	93371
Inequality (demand)	19.201	1927.837	-206.216	38.924	38139
Immigration (demand)	399.571	65089.148	-1641.078	1209.886	96585
Racism (demand)	91.905	8194.985	-297.666	229.730	61241
Mobility (demand)	13.067	1205.796	-109.477	27.063	42198
Job creation (demand)	33.977	9936.470	-391.015	101.873	72925
Indigenous (demand)	71.490	5314.848	-5262.123	231.634	72716

influence each other equally. In other words, the model treats the variables as endogenous.⁵⁹ We provide a detailed mathematical description of the method in Appendix 2.

We estimated the models using only one lag ($t-1$), as determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz' Bayesian Information Criterion (SIC/BIC/SBIC) test (Appendix 4), and as such the model results can be interpreted like an OLS regression. The choice of which variables to include as endogenous is of central importance to a VAR model. The addition of extra parameters makes it nearly impossible to make meaningful inferences about the magnitudes of individual coefficients and increases the likelihood that the model will overfit within the sample. As such, we choose not to include any additional endogenous variables, nor do we include any exogenous variables.

Any method that is not frequently used in a discipline merits a brief discussion of limitations. As described above, the VAR is not a model that lends itself well to estimating the impact of various control variables. Importantly, however, VAR models are designed to account for the effects of omitted variables, even if the researcher is not aware of all the relevant variables. Additionally, non-stationarity and time trends provide a threat to inference. F-tests do not perform well on non-stationary data. If time trends are included, they will soak up too much of the variance, leaving the researcher less likely to find a result. As such, we have done the appropriate diagnostics (Appendix 3). Finally, short time series can also present problems for VAR,⁶⁰ but with our sample of more than 2,000 days, we do not suffer from this issue.

Findings

We first test if our hypotheses hold at global and regional levels. We note that in doing so we treat each country as a separate unit in a time-series cross-sectional setup. We begin with overall grievances, then examine discrimination and economic versus cultural grievances. Next, we explore three sub-elements of each dimension. We will first look at three economic grievances followed by three cultural grievances. Figure 2 summarizes the hierarchical structure of these grievance measures. As we note in the limitations section, this analysis does not empirically account for status threat as a demand-side explanation. We leave this important, yet challenging, empirical avenue to future research.

Global and regional analysis

Our empirical testing happens in two stages. First, we estimate the model and can see both whether a variable is significant, and if so its direction and effect. This,

while interesting and important, does not directly tell us whether using past values of populism and grievances to predict grievances is more useful than just using past values of grievances to predict grievances. In other words, it does not directly tell us whether the recursive system is a statistically significant improvement. As such, we move on to the second stage, in which we directly test our hypotheses by using Granger causality testing. These tests allow you to investigate whether one variable “Granger-causes” another. This test regresses y and x on their own lagged values and uses an F-test to check if the lagged x values are zero. In other words, x is said to cause y if x does a better job of predicting y than past values of y alone.⁶¹ A statistically significant finding confirms the appropriateness and necessity of using VAR models, which allow variables to affect each other. In the context of VAR models, Granger causality should be understood primarily as a measure of predictive ability rather than true causal inference, indicating the extent to which past values of one variable can help predict future values of another, thus highlighting the strength of correlation rather than establishing direct causality.

As [Figure 3](#) demonstrates, we find that grievances writ large have a statistically significant impact on the supply of populism when we look at the entire global sample, as well as when we look at all other regions except for Asia. In other words, negative and frequent grievance sentiment (demand) is associated with higher rates of populism (supply). As for the opposite side of the model, we also find that for the entire global sample, as well as all regions, higher levels of populist supply lead to more frequent and negative discussion of grievances.

To understand effect size, take the Africa region as an example. The first lag of grievances has a coefficient of 5 when predicting populism. This implies that for each unit increase in the grievances score (which is calculated as the frequency multiplied by the tone of grievance-related articles), there is a corresponding increase of 5 units in the populism score (similarly calculated). To put this into perspective, consider the descriptive statistics of both variables. The mean value of populism is 1167, with grievances having a substantially lower mean of 23.5. Given the standard deviation of populism at 2703, a change of 5 units in populism represents a relatively small variation, about 0.19% of one standard deviation in the populism score. If grievances were to increase by one standard deviation (approximately 43.57), the expected change in populism would be about 84.5 units (1.941×43.57), which is




Figure 3. Endogenous relationship between grievances and populism (by region).

about 3.1% of the standard deviation of populism. This is a more tangible effect, particularly when considering the broader political and social implications. In practical terms, if the grievances variable reflects widespread societal issues that are picked up and amplified by media, even a small consistent increase in the measured populism in response to these grievances can indicate a sensitive dependency of populist rhetoric on the undercurrents of public discontent. In economic or political terms, this could translate to a situation where even slight escalations in public grievances could lead to noticeable increases in populist discourse, potentially influencing public opinion or election outcomes over time. Thus, while the statistical impact per unit change appears minor, its accumulation over time or across many instances of grievance articulations could be strategically significant for political actors or policymakers.

Scholars utilize long-run multipliers after applying VAR models primarily to quantify the cumulative impact of one-time shocks in one variable on the future values of another variable over an extended period. This approach is particularly useful in the social sciences to understand the enduring influence of policy changes, economic events, or societal shifts. Long-run multipliers capture the total effect after all dynamic interactions have played out, providing a comprehensive picture of how interdependent variables influence each other over time. In our study, the long-run multiplier for the global sample was calculated to be 1.9. This number indicates that a one-unit sustained increase in our independent variable leads to a cumulative increase of 1.9 units in our dependent variable across the specified lags. To contextualize this in terms of variability, considering the standard deviation of the dependent variable is 2703, a multiplier of 1.9 corresponds to approximately 0.07% of the standard deviation. This quantifies the impact as relatively modest but non-trivial, suggesting that even small changes in the independent variable can have a measurable long-term effect on the dependent variable, an essential insight for understanding the dynamics within the system we are studying. If we were to multiply the long-run multiplier by one standard deviation of the independent variable in this context, that would yield 82.65, corresponding to about 3% of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Next, we performed a set of Granger causality tests for each grievance and were able to confidently reject the null hypothesis that y does not Granger-cause x and vice versa ($p = 0.000$ on both sides), or in other words, the tone of grievances Granger-causes populism and vice-versa. This is evidence that our hypotheses hold. Scholars use Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to determine the effect's direction, magnitude, and how variable relationships change over time (note that IRFs do require you to impose an ordered relationship on the variables). We estimate the IRF for the relationship between populism and grievances in the United States in [Figure 4](#). We see the greatest effect of the "shock" of grievances immediately, whereas populist rhetoric seems to take a day or two to disseminate, at least in the US context.

Similarly, as we demonstrate in [Figure 5](#), we find that grievances related to discrimination (demand) are a significant predictor of populism across the entire global sample and in the Americas. We also observe that more populism leads to more discrimination grievances. Populists use us-versus-them language, leading to more discrimination and populism. Further, consistent with our hypotheses, we find that discrimination Granger-causes populism and vice-versa ($p = 0.000$ in both cases) across the global sample.




Figure 4. Impulse response functions.




Figure 5. Endogenous relationship between discrimination and populism (by region).

Economic grievances

We first analyse the extent to which economic grievances drive populism. We will look, in turn, at grievances related to inequality, job creation and economic/social mobility. We find evidence of inequality grievances driving populism globally, with the results driven by the Americas in particular (Figure 6). This is in line with scholarship that has found inequality to be an important driver for populism, particularly in Latin America populism.⁶² We look next at job creation grievances, which are closely




Figure 6. Endogenous relationship between inequality and populism (by region).




Figure 7. Endogenous relationship between job creation and populism (by region).

related to questions of technological change and globalization. These questions are particularly important because job loss can deepen broader divisions and has been linked to populism. Here we were more surprised by our results. While the coefficients of job creation on populism are all generally in the expected direction, only Europe’s coefficient is statistically significant (Figure 7). In terms of the effect of populism on job creation grievances, we find that populist supply *reduces* the frequency and negativity of discussion around job creation. We leave this interesting finding to future research, but one explanation would be that populists are adequately minimizing concerns about job creation with their rhetoric.

Finally, we look at social and economic mobility, which, while related to inequality and job creation, focuses more specifically on the question of fairness⁶³ and has been linked to populism. We find, again, that this economic grievance drives populism (Figure 8) in all regions except the Americas and Asia. On the other side of the model, we see the expected results except for Africa and Asia, though their coefficients are in the expected direction.

Of the economic grievances, we find inequality to have the largest effect on populism, which may be because this is the most inclusive category. Importantly, economic drivers are not always neatly separable from cultural drivers. For example, anti-immigration sentiment is often associated with the costs of globalization, particularly in Europe.⁶⁴ Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that these economic grievances Granger-cause populism and vice-versa.






Figure 8. Endogenous relationship between (economic) mobility and populism (by region).

Cultural grievances


We next turn to specific cultural grievances that may influence and be influenced by populism: immigration, racism, and treatment of Indigenous people. We look at these particular cultural grievances as they have been established in the existing literature.⁶⁵ As the literature would expect, we find that anti-immigrant grievances (measured as the negativity and frequency of discussion about immigration) predict higher levels of populism except in the Americas, where the finding just misses



1. Endogenous relationship between anti-immigration sentiment and populism (by region).



2. Endogenous relationship between racism and populism (by region).



3. Endogenous relationship between anti-Indigenous sentiment and populism (by region).

Figure 9. Cultural grievances (by region).

standard statistical significance (Figure 9.1). We also find consistent results when looking at the effect of populism on grievances related to immigration.

We also see evidence of an endogenous relationship between racial grievances and populism in the global sample and in every region (Figure 9.2). On the other side of the equation, we see that in some cases, populism feeds back into racial grievances. Finally, we find evidence of an endogenous relationship between attitudes towards Indigenous people and populism (Figure 9.3), particularly in Europe. The opposite side of the model has a less clear result: populism seems to continue to drive Indigenous grievances in the Middle East but has the opposite effect in the Americas.

Overall, we find ample evidence of cultural grievances (i.e. immigration, racism and treatment of Indigenous) affecting populist supply, and some mixed evidence of populism reinforcing these cultural divides. There are other cultural drivers of populism,⁶⁶ such as homophobia and the role of women, but they are beyond the scope of this study. Again, consistent with our hypotheses, we find that these cultural grievances Granger-cause populism and vice-versa.

Robustness

We first demonstrate robustness to an alternative measure of populism. Rather than turn to media data, we turn to daily data from GeoQuant, a company that develops specialized proprietary high-frequency political risk data. This data yields a particular advantage over other “off-the-shelf” data sources covering the construct of populism in that it is available daily and defined according to a taxonomy based upon social science scholarship. GeoQuant data is comprised of two parts. The first part, the structural score, relies on 250 quantitative variables across the 22 indicators, including election outcomes, public opinion polls, economic and political data from NGOs, multilateral institutions, etc. This data tends not to move quickly, as most of these sources are updated annually or quarterly. The second part, or the high-frequency score, relies on traditional media (as GDELT does) that is processed with both natural language processing and machine learning, though with human oversight. The two parts (structural and high frequency) are then fused together via a proprietary algorithm.

GeoQuant data are structured in 22 dimensions of political risk that are further grouped into seven sub-indexes (government risk, institutional risk, policy risk, social polarization, human development, internal security, and external security) which are then aggregated into three intermediate indexes (governance, social and security) as well as an aggregate political risk score. GeoQuant has used this data to construct a measure of populism which combines (1) the differences in support for the government from elite and mass publics, (2) the degree of social polarization, and (3) the threat to established political institutions.⁶⁷ The first factor, the differences in support for the government from elite and mass publics, measures intra-group mass-elite conflict as well as group conflict. The second factor, social polarization, measures three sources of polarization: 1) ethno-religious; 2) socio-economic (including inequality); and 3) migration/population issues. The third factor, threat to established institutions, measures popular demand for anti-establishment policy change, such as appeals by political entrepreneurs. The resulting populism factor closely conforms to the theoretical definition proposed within the ideational approach. Though traditional media constitutes only a portion of the GeoQuant data, we used diagnostic

testing to ensure that our GeoQuant and GDELT measures were not capturing the same thing.

We choose not to use GeoQuant as our primary measure of populism for multiple reasons. First, it is not most suited for our theoretical arguments about supply-side populism. Second, it is not most suited for our theoretical arguments about the ideational approach to populism. Third, it is proprietary, making access for other scholars more restrictive. That said, we think this is our best possible measure for robustness. Because this version of populism is capturing both the supply and demand side, we use sentiment towards grievances on the other side of the equation, rather than sentiment only from the “demand” side. We demonstrate in Appendix 5 the robustness of our main findings to this measure.

Secondly, we demonstrate robustness to modelling with weekly data instead of daily data. One might rightly question whether the effect is truly day-to-day or perhaps happening over longer periods of time. While our models certainly suggest that there is small daily effect, we also demonstrate that the results are robustness to weekly analysis by aggregating the media data to the country-week instead of country-day. We sum the number of relevant articles on each side of the equation and take the average (mean) tone. We present these results in Appendix 6.

Country-level caselets

We present selected country-level findings in the form of illustrative caselets designed to highlight the mechanisms underlying our theoretical arguments and the validity of our data with reference to recursive linkages between grievances and populism previously documented in the academic literature.

Immigration in South Africa. Though immigration has been a salient issue in South Africa for at least a century, Kaufman⁶⁸ argues that immigration issues and anti-immigrant sentiment have grown increasingly salient since the end of apartheid in 1994. The number of immigrants has tripled from one million to three million.⁶⁹ Polakow-Suransky⁷⁰ describes 2008 pogroms in major South African immigrant neighbourhoods that displaced 100,000 people, destroyed 30,000 homes, and killed 60. Even as recently as 2017, the government of Nigeria issued warnings regarding the safety of Nigerians in South Africa after multiple Nigerians were killed in attacks outside of Johannesburg.

Additionally, South Africa is an example of a post-colonial “civic” nation that can be classified as strongly “ethnic” in that ethnicity is a main political division.⁷¹ Given this, it is not unexpected that anti-immigrant sentiment would be fuelled into populist political mobilization. We have observed immigrant scapegoating within a variety of political parties. The South Africa First party claimed that the number of illegal immigrants in South Africa is more than four times the actual number.⁷² The Democratic Alliance released an “immigration plan” in advance of the 2018 elections that had a clear anti-immigration message (with the exception of highly-skilled immigrants).⁷³ Though anti-immigrant grievances are high throughout our entire sample, we observe spikes in these grievances that correspond with instances of anti-immigrant attacks. For example, in [Figure 10](#) we see a negative spike in the beginning of September 2019. For four days that month, looters raided foreign-owned businesses in Johannesburg.⁷⁴ Ten were killed and 700 were arrested. A similar episode occurred in February 2017⁷⁵ and is also reflected in our data. Populism feeds back into anti-immigrant sentiment, as politicians play up anti-immigrant attitudes to win votes, even




Figure 10. Spikes in anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa.

fuelling violence.⁷⁶ The feedback loop between supply-side populism and voter grievances is clear here, as political leaders use these anti-immigrant sentiments to galvanize support, reinforcing the cycle of populist rhetoric and grievance.

Indigenous in Brazil. The rise of populist president Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil has been the subject of much scholarly attention. Though Bolsonaro frames his us-versus-them politics in terms of many groups, the Indigenous people of Brazil are notable in terms of the wrath they have received under his tenure.⁷⁷ The core of the issue for Bolsonaro is that the Indigenous people of the Amazon make it more difficult for him to pursue economic interests in the region (14% of Brazilian territory is demarcated as Indigenous lands) through mining and agribusiness.⁷⁸ This is not something scholars are simply inferring: “Indigenous peoples in their territories are a clear impediment to the aggressive expansion of Brazilian agribusiness today. They represent lands off the market,” Bolsonaro said.⁷⁹ Bolsonaro has facilitated some business use of the Amazon, blocked the operations of the international Amazon Fund, and allowed for the construction of three hydroelectric dams, despite international outcry.⁸⁰

Bolsonaro has created a political identity using, among a list of things, anti-Indigenous rhetoric.⁸¹ Bolsonaro has gone so far as to advocate for the end of demarcation of Indigenous lands in Brazil⁸² and has called protecting Indigenous lands “nonsense”.⁸³ He has also been entirely unsympathetic to the Amazon fires. This is all perhaps more significant in light of the emergence of Indigenous political movements in the 1980s and 1990s, the constitutional reforms recognizing the rights of the Indigenous throughout Latin America, and the increase in international law in this domain.⁸⁴ Bolsonaro’s anti-Indigenous messaging, which presents Indigenous communities as obstacles to Brazil’s economic development, demonstrates the supply side of populism. His rhetoric has mobilized support from segments of the population who see Indigenous rights as conflicting with economic progress. In turn, this populist narrative has




Figure 11. Rise of anti-Indigenous sentiment after Bolsonaro took power in 2019.

Note: This figure represents a 14-day moving average, where higher values indicate more negative and frequent sentiment.

intensified anti-Indigenous grievances among voters, contributing to the recursive relationship between populist rhetoric and public sentiment. The spike in negative anti-Indigenous rhetoric from the time Bolsonaro took power in 2019 is clear in Figure 11.

Conclusion

The rising populist threat to liberal democracy has complex roots. These include the economic and social grievances of voters and the strategic and performative responses by politicians. While such factors are contextually dependent, they are still generalizable and analytically tractable in global empirical analysis. Building on the ideational approach, we show that voters' grievances and politicians' populist responses are effectively modelled in a recursive system. The model demonstrates that grievances do influence populism which, in turn, fans the flame of grievances. These results build a bridge between competing approaches which have continued to differ in their emphasis on partial explanations and mechanisms. We show each operates in a complementary manner within a recursive system. It is insufficient to explore grievances, a lack of policy response thereto, political strategies, or performances alone. Rather, each of these elements plays an important and interdependent role.

Our analysis introduced new media data to the literature on populism and applied novel automated text analytics to that media corpus. Further, we applied panel vector autoregression models to this area of study for the first time. This framework offers a theoretical synthesis while allowing for contextual variation across national contexts. We further hope it can serve as a platform for subsequent theoretical and empirical

extensions using a variety of methods. We close by acknowledging limitations of the approach and means by which they might be addressed in subsequent work.

By leveraging media data, we moved beyond coarse surveys and analyses of speeches and election outcomes to examine high frequency (daily) shifts in the salience of particular grievances and in support for populism among a broad range of relevant stakeholders. We drew upon prior work in the ideational approach that had coded media and political speech⁸⁵ for populist content but leveraged newly available computational power and data sources to scale this approach to over 4 billion news articles from 72 countries.⁸⁶ Critically, this comparative approach allowed us to combine, within the same coding protocol, an analysis of economic and cultural grievances and show how the strength of these varied systematically across regions. We further explored specific caselets highlighting this country-level variation to provide richer illustrations. In the future, our approach will allow more systematic follow-on analysis in the complementarity of economic and cultural demand factors, the importance of the failure of traditional parties to respond to grievances, the seeding of new grievances by politicians, and the efficacy, rather than substance, of a politician's performances.

Given the clear two-way feedback in this system, subsequent research designed to understand both the rise of populism or, perhaps more importantly, the efficacy of various "treatments" designed to preserve liberal democracy or enhance its resilience⁸⁷ should work from an integrated rather than a partial model and allow for substantial cross-national variation in the drivers of populism's rise. Such "treatments" should include both efforts to address underlying grievances and/or the introduction of alternative or competing frames of discourse by competing politicians. These "treatments" should be tailored to the specific pattern of grievances in a country at a moment in time and the pattern of discourse of its mainstream and populist politicians. Researchers could explore the impacts of actual policy interventions and variation in discourse or use vignette experiments or surveys of voting age populations.

Despite its strengths, our approach has limitations. First, our data only records grievances which are expressed in media from 2015-2020. This does not allow for us to study changes in patterns over time in a meaningful way. Second, while the public nature of the competition for political support incentivizes demanders and suppliers of policy and political frames to make their preferences known in a public manner, not all voices will be reflected in media accounts particularly, but not exclusively, in countries with less media freedom, though these concerns are abated somewhat by inclusion of domestic and international sources.⁸⁸ Third, while GDELT-GKG is a valuable resource for researchers, there are numerous potential sources for error. One source of error in GDELT-GKG is that it is based on automated extraction of information from news articles. This process can be imperfect, leading to errors in transcription, translation, and identification of entities. However, even if there are errors resulting from this process, it is still possible to get reliable signal from noise in large-N analyses of GDELT-GKG data. This is because the errors in GDELT-GKG are largely random. When averaging over a large number of observations, the random errors largely cancel out, leaving behind the underlying signal.

Fourth, as previously discussed, our VAR models are good at indicating the extent to which past values of one variable can help predict future values of another, thus highlighting the strength of correlation rather than establishing direct causality. Fifth, our model leaves out the strategic role of civil society organizations and corporations who might both seek to disrupt the positive feedback system we model in a

manner that either addresses or obfuscates political responsibility for economic and cultural grievances. Sixth, our data does not allow us to account for varieties of populism. Seventh, we do not account for or model the outcomes of populism, such as the erosion of liberal democratic institutions or the policy responses that either address grievances or provide particularistic benefits to the other constituents of populist leaders. Eighth, our empirical analysis does not directly account for status threat as a demand-side explanation,⁸⁹ though we do not deny the importance of this newer explanation. Unfortunately, our data does not provide us information on the economic, political, or social status of the actor expressing grievances necessary to explicitly compare the distribution of expressed economic hardship and concerns surrounding cultural change across sub-populations.

Some weaknesses can be addressed in future research. For example, more complex models could consider the precursors of grievances and better model competition for attention between grievances and performative frames or strategies. Models could be extended to consider outcomes beyond populism and grievances such as changes in political institutions, specific manifestations of policy risk, and the redistribution of economic resources. The identity of actors expressing grievances as well as populist and other political frames could be incorporated within the framework to produce a model of discursive coalitional politics around the societal response to a menu of potential grievances. The analysis could also consider the generalizability to less frequently mentioned issues and frames either through oversampling on such cases or focusing on alternative media that might be more representative. Our initial effort to develop and test a recursive system will hopefully spur a demand for such innovative responses which will, in turn, spur a demand for even further refinement in our modelling of the drivers and impacts of populism.

This research yields several important implications. First, our country-level comparative analyses indicate differing substantive drivers of populism. These findings can serve as a basis for theory-building in these contexts. Second, our proposed feedback loop suggests that a “circuit-breaker” could be possible. For example, if elites respond favourably to the masses, does that interrupt the feedback loop? If a particular grievance is addressed, does that prevent the rise of populism? What is the role of markets? Policies? These are important questions for future research. Similarly, future research should consider the importance of both the timing of elections and whether populists are currently in power. Third, our research demonstrates that panel vector autoregression models could be increasingly used in the social sciences as they are a compelling way to model recursive political dynamics.

Notes

1. Hartevelde, Mendoza, and Rooduijn, “Affective Polarization and the Populist Radical Right”; Roberts, “Populism and Polarization in Comparative Perspective.”
2. Krastev, “The Age of Populism”; Ricci, *A Political Science Manifesto for the Age of Populism*; Nandy, “What the Age of Populism Means for Our Liberal Democracy.”
3. Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism.”
4. Santora and Biennu, “Secure in Hungary, Orban Readies for Battle with Brussels.”
5. Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.”
6. Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”; Mudde, “Populism in Europe”; Rooduijn, *A Populist Zeitgeist?*
7. Kessel, “A Matter of Supply and Demand”; Moffitt, “How to Perform Crisis.”

8. Rooduijn, Van Der Brug, and De Lange, “Expressing or Fuelling Discontent?”; Hooghe and Dassonneville, “A Spiral of Distrust.”
9. Recent populism scholarship identifies at least three demand-side factors driving populism: economic anxiety, cultural backlash, and status threat. The latter is a newer finding (see, for example, Mols and Jetten, “Explaining the Appeal of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Times of Economic Prosperity” and Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote.”) but it helps explain why populist parties often attract people from different socioeconomic backgrounds (Lefkofridi and Michel, “Exclusive Solidarity?”), a phenomenon that cannot be explained by the two traditional factors (economic anxiety and cultural backlash). While we acknowledge this new demand-side factor, we leave empirical investigation of it to future research.
10. Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to Populism,” 514.
11. Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”; Mudde, “Populism in Europe”; Rooduijn, *A Populist Zeitgeist?*; Hawkins and Kaltwasser, “The Ideational Approach to Populism,” 514.
12. Schroeder, “The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology.”
13. We note that we begin from the theoretical assumption that there is a common populist umbrella. An alternative assumption would be that these examples are potentially manifestations of different phenomena. It is reasonable to assume that there is a unifying populist umbrella because, despite the variation in populist movements and parties, they all share some core features. These core features include a focus on the “people” versus the “elite”, a rejection of the status quo, and a promise to restore national sovereignty.
14. “The Causes of Populism in the West.”
15. Some would label what we refer to as cultural factors, such as immigration, as “right-wing” populism and economic factors, such as job loss due to globalization, as “left-wing” populism (see, for example, Schroeder, “The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology.”). As one of the main objectives of this paper is to be as specific about the nature of the grievance as possible, we avoid these terms.
16. Jetten, Mols, and Postmes, “Relative Deprivation and Relative Wealth Enhances Anti-Immigrant Sentiments”; Jetten and Mols, “Support for Populist Parties: Economic Deprivation, Cultural Backlash, or Status Anxiety?”; Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote.”
17. Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth, “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash”; Burgoon et al., “Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties”; Colantone and Stanig, “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe”; Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi, “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure”; Milner, “Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right”; Pastor and Veronesi, “Inequality Aversion, Populism, and the Backlash against Globalization”; Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.”
18. Appel and Orenstein, *From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Postcommunist Countries*; Huber and Stephens, “Income Inequality and Redistribution in Post-Industrial Democracies: Demographic, Economic and Political Determinants”; Milanovic, *Global Inequality*.
19. Case and Deaton, *Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism*.
20. Iversen and Soskice, *Democracy and Prosperity*.
21. Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” 75.
22. Gidron and Mijs, “Do Changes in Material Circumstances Drive Support for Populist Radical Parties? Panel Data Evidence from The Netherlands during the Great Recession, 2007–2015.”
23. Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote”; Rovny and Rovny, “Outsiders at the Ballot Box: Operationalizations and Political Consequences of the Insider – Outsider Dualism.”
24. Inglehart and Norris, “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse”; Oesch, “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland.”
25. Berman, “The Causes of Populism in the West,” 75.
26. Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
27. Schäfer, “Cultural Backlash? How (Not) to Explain the Rise of Authoritarian Populism.”

28. Burgoon et al., "Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties"; Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra, "The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives."
29. Grofman and Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence"; Guimond and Dambrun, "When Prosperity Breeds Intergroup Hostility"; Jetten, Mols, and Postmes, "Relative Deprivation and Relative Wealth Enhances Anti-Immigrant Sentiments."
30. Jetten, Mols, and Postmes, "Relative Deprivation and Relative Wealth Enhances Anti-Immigrant Sentiments."
31. Petersen, Osmundsen, and Arceneaux, "The 'Need for Chaos' and Motivations to Share Hostile Political Rumors."
32. Gest, Reny, and Mayer, "Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain."
33. Gest, Reny, and Mayer; Gidron and Hall, "The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist Right"; Gidron and Hall, "Populism as a Problem of Social Integration."
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 57. GDELТ-GKG updates every 15 min with worldwide media and text[56] in 65 languages.[56] Each article is tagged for sentiment, themes, actors, and places. The data uses translated international and national news sources. We note that GDELТ-GKG is based on automated information extraction from news articles, which can be imperfect and lead to errors in transcription, translation, and entity identification. However, even if these errors exist, large-N analyses of GDELТ-GKG data can still produce reliable results, because the errors are largely random. When averaged over a large number of observations, the random errors cancel out, leaving behind the underlying signal. Odziemkowska and Henisz, in "Webs of Influence", provide an extensive discussion of the potential biases as well as the novel measures that can be constructed only using the GDELТ dataset. In their online Appendix (page 3), they further show statistically significant correlations between several GDELТ derived constructs and numerous correlates concluding that the "we believe the benefits in terms of coverage offered by GDELТ dominate the costs in terms of false positives and duplicated events." Reliance on both domestic and international news reduces the likelihood of bias created by domestic press suppression because foreign correspondents present in the country increase the odds of reporting. Leetaru, "The GDELТ Global Knowledge Graph (GKG) Data Format Codebook V2.1."
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