

“Third Worlding” International Organization

The Parallel Quests of Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan for a New International Institutional Order (1946–2002)

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“Third Worlding” International Organization: The Parallel Quests of Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan for a New International Institutional Order (1946–2002)

The Bible tell us that only in Paradise could humankind find such perfection in nature in which there were no food (or otherwise related) concerns. But what we know for certain is that men and women have had to fight for their livelihoods since the most remote ages, a struggle we have now inherited.

— Hernán Santa-Cruz¹

The awkward truth about human deprivation is that it demeans those who permit or ignore it, more than it does those who are deprived.

—Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan²

Introduction: “Third Worlding” International Organization in the ‘Nehruvian Moment’ of (Inter)national Liberation and Decolonization

As David Kennedy well noted some decades ago, for most international lawyers, religion “is something we used to have.”³ This sentiment holds especially true for those specialized in the law and practice of international organizations (IOs). In traditional narratives, international institutions sit at the pinnacle of the Enlightenment-triggered secular development, looking down at centuries of religious strife and leaning toward a promised age of rational ordering of the human life in the “long march of mankind from the cave to the computer.”⁴ Notions of technocratic rationality remain central to both functionalist accounts of international institutions—with states as masters of the world order—and constitutionalist imaginaries—with IOs as tools of global governance.⁵ In this vein, the expansion of the mandates of IOs is often explained as a process of social engineering through secular expertise and depoliticization of social conflicts.⁶ Hence, the work of international civil servants and independent experts within these institutions is often understood through their laic education and expert socialization. The light of Western secularism shines especially bright when compared to the “lethargic” hold of religion over public authority in the premodern Catholic, Islamic, East Asian, or African traditions—isn’t that what the adjective *Medieval* is supposed to signal in contemporary debates about Afghanistan?⁷ IOs, in this narrative, appear as the culmination of this long march to overcome superstition and tradition, promising a global order of expert bureaucratic practices.⁸

The underlying assumption is that IOs are modern and secular institutions that order modern global governance—following the template of the modern and secular European state.⁹ For that reason, the ways in which nonsecular and non-European actors attempted

to reimagine global governance (especially, but not exclusively, through the invocation of religious visions of universal cosmopolitanism) remains at the periphery of international institutional law and its histories.¹⁰ Despite the growing literature on the “human composition” of IOs in international history,¹¹ the “biographical turn” in international legal history,¹² and the rising tide of scholarship on anticolonial imaginaries and solidarities across disciplines,¹³ the archetype of the international civil servant remains that of a (allegedly secular) white man in a gray suit.¹⁴

Conversely, in this article, we explore the life and careers of two “Third Worldist” figures in the United Nations system during and after the “Nehruvian moment” and its corresponding “high tide of anticolonial legalism” (1950s to 1990s): Hernán Santa-Cruz and Sadrudin Aga Khan.¹⁵ The article particularly focuses on their projects to “Third-World-ize” global governance as part of a broader generation of lawyers, diplomats, and thinkers from formerly colonized territories who attempted to erect a postcolonial New International Economic Order (NIEO).¹⁶ After this short introduction, (II) we first refer to the life and work of Hernán Santa-Cruz, an eclectic Chilean Catholic lawyer with socialist (but anticommunist) affinities, who was involved in the early debates of the UN and had a long international career in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1958–1979. Subsequently, (III) we turn to Sadrudin Aga Khan, who acted in various humanitarian functions with the UN system between 1959–1993, relying on his image as an impartial figure to tackle complex political situations.

By placing the trajectories of these two Third Worldist figures in conversation, (IV) we aim to highlight their parallel struggles for the reform of international organizations during the Cold War’s “battle for international law.”¹⁷ In this context, we understand “Third Worldism” not as the product of a certain geography, but as an anticolonial worldview that recognized the root causes of the plight of formerly colonized peoples and favored transnational redistribution of resources beyond the confines of liberal development aid and Christian charity.¹⁸ The trajectory of both Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan, interestingly, demonstrate long professional-personal journeys shaped by a sense of a shared mission and career aspirations within the project of “International Organization,”¹⁹ which will allow us to conclude with some remarks on (V) the promises and challenges of the recovery of the anticolonial legacies of these two and other figures. We do not seek to replace a tired narrative about “white men in gray suits” with one that merely adds “Brown men”—or navy suits and red ties—and stir.²⁰ Nor do we seek to erect a new hagiography, for we would be the first to recognize the limitations of the worldmaking proposals espoused by our protagonists.²¹

In our view, the histories of international civil servants and independent experts are an integral part of the history of IOs and the world order,²² as the product of both material evolutions and competing imaginaries of “people with projects.”²³ Transformative ideas and solutions distant from institutional ideologies and hegemonic structures are, of course, difficult to advance in liberal institutions. International civil servants toil within the constrained spaces of law-making, and their choice of argumentation and vocabulary is partly defined by the existing configuration of material capability, ideas, and institutions in every historical epoch. Any radical move must be translated into the language of IOs’ state-conferred mandates. By highlighting Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan’s efforts to expand the mandates of their institutions in a “counter-imperial fashion,”²⁴ we hope to offer some lessons about the promises and perils of translating radical claims into an

international legal vernacular for our own contemporary struggles. Let us begin with Hernán Santa-Cruz.

I. “An Almost Mystical Sense of Mission”: Santa-Cruz, FAO, and World Agrarian Reform

For quite a long time, Hernán Santa-Cruz remained a rather unexplored figure in the literature on global governance in both English and Spanish. Santa-Cruz’s strong personal and political connections to the socialist Salvador Allende partially explains why the coup of 1973 in Chile eviscerated any public interest in his international career.²⁵ It would be a mistake, however, to read Santa-Cruz as a card-carrying Chilean socialist (let alone Marxist) “lawyer-diplomat.”²⁶ Indeed—as he himself explains in the first volume of his memoirs—despite his friendship with Allende and alignment with some of his political goals, he felt more closely allied with the Christian Democrats led by Eduardo Frei.²⁷ His staunch Christian convictions and deep distrust of the Soviet Union stands in the way of any easy categorization of him within “the Left.” Yet, his close ties with Raul Prebisch’s dependency theory,²⁸ and the non-aligned movement show his commitment to what Adom Getachew has aptly called “anticolonial cosmopolitanism.”²⁹ For that reason, “Santa-Cruz offers a rare vision of human rights cosmopolitanism, in which Catholicism, socialist constitutionalism, and developmentalist economic thinking merge in a rare blend by contemporary standards.”³⁰

To understand Santa-Cruz’s cosmopolitanism, we must first contextualize him as an heir of what has been called Catholic social teaching in, but also beyond, Latin America. Indeed, our understanding of Catholic thought is now more nuanced than the Whig accounts of nineteenth-century anti-Papist history that accompanied the rise of liberalism.³¹ While it is true that the Church of Rome remained a steadfast holdout of reactionary imaginaries and practices until the early decades of the twentieth century, new historiographical interventions have highlighted that certain strands of Catholic thinking attempted to develop a “modernist” project within their fold.³² The rise of labor agitation (and, eventually, of the ghosts of communism) led some Catholics to reflect on how the congregation of the faithful could strike a better balance between the interests of capital and the pious working class. The “age of catastrophe” that unfolded in the interwar years prompted new experimentations within grassroots Catholic organizations around the general theme of *Catholic Action*, providing an alternative to fascist and communist mass movements in the age of extremes.³³ Santa-Cruz was deeply involved in the Chilean Catholic Action movements of the 1930s, seeing himself as a follower of the “modernizing” papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).³⁴ In the aftermath of World War II, modernizing Catholics sought to articulate a moderately liberal and decisively anti-fascist version of Catholicism that could respond to the challenges of the Cold War. We have now come to understand these movements as Christian Democratic parties.³⁵ As mentioned previously, Santa-Cruz was also quite close to the Chilean Christian Democrats—and it was under the tenure of President Frei that Santa-Cruz’s bid for the leadership of FAO was put forward.

Years before that, Santa-Cruz’s international career began rather suddenly when the popular front government of González Videla appointed him as Chile’s permanent representative to the United Nations in 1946, a post that he maintained until 1958. In this capacity, he was a prominent participant in some of the most important debates in the

early years of the UN: he was part of the committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); pushed for the creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA);³⁶ presided over the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) several times;³⁷ witnessed crucial debates on the thorny issue of the partition of Palestine;³⁸ and actively engaged with questions of racial discrimination in South Africa within the UN's purview.³⁹ In what follows, we will focus mostly on his later career (and the period he calls the "mature years" of the UN) in, and beyond the FAO.⁴⁰ It is worth noting, however, that Santa-Cruz's engagement with the human rights project in the early UN was marked by his staunch defense of social and economic rights—including, for example, a failed proposal to include a mention of the "social function" of property in the UDHR.⁴¹ This idea, rooted in the land reform struggles of early twentieth-century Latin American contexts, would be repurposed for his agenda of global land reform within the halls of the FAO.⁴² Famously, FAO was born into two competing visions of the post-1945 world food order. One was "social farming," where peasants' welfare and the improvement of local production "within the culture" of each region were given priority. Another perspective that gained salience was "increasing productivity and growth through Western expertise and along the lines of Modernization Theory." While the dawn of the Cold War and the Korean War overshadowed the former vision, concern for rural welfare lived on in the FAO—thanks to protagonists like Santa-Cruz.⁴³

Santa-Cruz's first contact with FAO came in 1958, when Director Binay Ranjan Sen recruited him to do a short-term consultancy on the role of the FAO in rural welfare. This took him from FAO's headquarters in Rome (originally built to house Mussolini's Ministry of Colonies!) to Chile, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, India, and Venezuela—but not, alas, to more African countries, as most of them were still under the "colonial yoke."⁴⁴ His task was to identify the activities that FAO could undertake to improve the general conditions of peasant life in the so-called Third World. Of all the provocative anecdotes included in his memoirs of this voyage,⁴⁵ perhaps his experiences in India are the most relevant for our purposes. Not only was he offered a state dinner by Jawaharlal Nehru to thank him for his anti-apartheid efforts at the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, but he also met again with his friends Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. While the former was serving as the Swedish Ambassador to India, the latter was working on his monograph *Asian Drama*. Seeing that Myrdal's proposals for a "welfare world" have been recently revisited for our contemporary struggles,⁴⁶ it is important to note that Santa-Cruz—among other actors from the Third World—was also actively involved in these conversations about the reimagination of the world economic order. In his view, the 1958 report that he had prepared for Binay was the "point of departure for a new scope of FAO's work . . . which later was entrusted to carry out as FAO Regional Office Director [. . . and a] decade later with more depth at the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Welfare."⁴⁷

But Santa-Cruz did not anticipate joining the FAO full time. Instead, he saw himself as an ally to the organization at ECOSOC in his position as the head of the Chilean delegation. The 1958 national elections in Chile, however, changed his course. Seeing that both of his close friends (who were, however, archnemeses) Frei and Allende were defeated by the more traditional and liberal candidate Jorge Alessandri, Santa-Cruz resigned from the mission and took Sen's offer to serve as regional director of the FAO in Latin America until 1967. In this capacity, he moved his base of operations to his home city of Santiago,

where the ECLA and its cohort of dependency theorists were already based, to carry out a comprehensive reimagining of the FAO's mandate in the region.⁴⁸ In this capacity, for instance, he was deeply involved in shaping the agenda of the United Statesean anti-communist developmental project "Alliance for Progress."⁴⁹ In particular, he recalls that under his tenure, FAO participated actively at the *Punta del Este* meeting, convincing the American states to create standing technical regional institutions to tackle the challenges of rural poverty and material deprivation.⁵⁰ The most famous of these was the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, which was entrusted to a former collaborator of the ECLA: Hugo Trivelli. This experience convinced him of the importance of establishing FAO regional offices, giving him the munition to respond to later critiques of these institutions by North Atlantic powers at the FAO Council.⁵¹ In fact, one can even say that Santa-Cruz was a protagonist of what a recent special issue of the *International History Review* has described as a transformation in the FAO's mandate from "reconstruction to development."⁵² It is in this period that the institution evolved from a United Statesean "creature of the war" into a South-facing organization concerned with rural transformation,⁵³ and during his work in the regional office, Santa-Cruz continued to put questions of rural welfare at the forefront of the debate.⁵⁴

While much more can be said about Santa-Cruz's program for FAO's technical cooperation in the Americas, we would like to turn now to his (ultimately failed) ambitions to globalize this expansive vision of the FAO. According to his memoirs, Santa-Cruz was asked by Sen to launch a bid for director-general of the FAO following the end of Sen's tenure in 1967, as the latter was afraid that their "third worldist" vision of the organization would be truncated once he left the institution.⁵⁵ Santa-Cruz, then, decided to officialize his bid after the FAO Regional Conference held in Viña del Mar (Chile) in 1965, after meeting Frei (now president of Chile) and Sen in the presidential palace (where Allende would meet his dismal fate in the '73 coup). He was also motivated by the encouragement of Pope Paul IV, Gunnar Myrdal, and the Catholic priest and economist Louis-Joseph Lebret.⁵⁶ He even arranged to be named as the chair of the upcoming 1966 World Land Reform Conference in Rome to consolidate his candidacy.

Santa-Cruz, however, struggled to create a coalition of anticolonial Third Worldists. Not only did he feel betrayed by Sen's sudden decision to run for reelection, but he also lost the support of the Arab caucus once he opposed the dismissal of some of the problematic Zionist members of the staff in a closed-door meeting.⁵⁷ As part of his electoral strategy and due to his tensions with Sen, he left the FAO's office in Santiago and became Frei's ambassador and representative to the United Nations in Geneva—right in time, of course, to catch up with Prebisch, who had been serving as secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 1964. In this capacity, he was the head of the Latin American delegation at the First Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 (G-77) and actively participated in the drafting of its Charter of Algiers.⁵⁸ He also toured certain African countries on the invitation of Senegal's socialist politician Léopold Senghor and Tanzania's anti-colonial prime minister Julius Nyerere, which only reinforced the rumors that he was "a combative character—an especially dangerous sin for those who come from a Third World country."⁵⁹

If the Third World's votes were divided between Sen and Santa-Cruz, the same did not hold for the North Atlantic, which rallied behind the candidacy of Dutch A. H. Boerma. Unsurprisingly, this led to the election of the latter of director-general,⁶⁰ which in turn

allowed Santa-Cruz to devote himself fully to the upcoming session of UNCTAD in 1968 in New Delhi (and, eventually, to hosting the UNCTAD III in Chile in 1972).⁶¹ Yet, awkwardly perhaps, his commitment to chairing the 1966 Land Reform Conference suddenly tied him back to Rome, where he was elected chairman of the 1969 and 1970 FAO world conferences. In fact, even when he was no longer affiliated with the FAO, he kept pushing for the inclusion of land reform in the global agenda, which can also be seen in his proposal to include the agenda issue “the world food crisis” (*la crise alimentaire mondiale, el problema mundial de alimentos*) within UNCTAD’s scope.⁶² In this vein, he led the effort to adopt the UNCTAD declaration on the world food program,⁶³ which—inter alia—highlighted the pivotal role of FAO, demanded a high commitment of “developed countries,” urged for the reform of “international organizations concerned.”

The speech he delivered to close the 1966 World Land Reform Conference, delivered on July 2, 1966 in Rome, gives us a glimpse of how Santa-Cruz would have undertaken his tenure if he had been elected to lead the FAO.⁶⁴ He begins by thanking all delegates for the “devotion to their labor”—which had not been tarnished by “belligerent intentions, ideological arrogance, or the spirit of superiority over one’s brothers”⁶⁵ He then cited Myrdal’s work to reiterate that “the disparity of wealth between the developing and industrialized countries” was not only growing, but also that the disparity in production was perhaps the “most pressing demand” in a global struggle for equality and social justice.⁶⁶ Enlisting the “authorized voice” of Pope Paul VI in this common cause (who argued that the question of land reform were of “vital” importance), Santa-Cruz then urged the delegations to commit to multilateral and binding measures that would make a “global” land reform possible.⁶⁷ It is worth noting that land reform here is not understood merely as project of aid to farmers, but instead an expansive project for agrarian redistribution and transformation. It is in this vein that Santa-Cruz noted that “traditional agrarian structures . . . which enable a minority to own the lion’s share of the resources and opportunities for progress” had to be dismantled as they have proven to be “incompatible with social and economic development” throughout the globe.⁶⁸ In other words, Santa-Cruz was pushing for an agenda of double redistribution: land reform efforts had to be pursued at the national scale to reduce domestic inequality, with the hopes that this transformation in land tenure in the global south would also diminish international patterns of inequality.

And yet, Santa-Cruz recognized that there was no “one size” policy for land reform.⁶⁹ He asserted that the conference had noted a variety of measures states could take to promote land reform (from tax exemptions to expropriations). What mattered, as the conference concluded with consensus in his view, was that such measures were “sufficiently and rapid enough to guarantee that the traditional agrarian structure will be transformed, ideally in less than fifteen years.”⁷⁰ Additionally, he urged delegates to allow for the “effective participation” of rural workers in “all of the steps” related to “political processes of land reform” within their national jurisdictions, an idea that was “vigorously supported by the conference participants.”⁷¹ Seeing, however, that many newly decolonized states lacked the technical capacity or resources to undertake such massive projects of land reform, Santa-Cruz entrusted “international cooperation”—and, in particular, the FAO and other UN agencies—a crucial role in this global struggle.⁷² In his view, this was but a natural development of the principles long established in the UN Charter: for that reason, the

1966 conference constituted a milestone in a winding path that had been originally created by “the organized international community” to win the war against fascism and continued working together now to create a world without want.⁷³

Alas, with Santa-Cruz’s defeat, his speeches and lofty statements are all that remain of his vision of a South-facing FAO. The defeat, of course, did not mean resignation to Santa-Cruz. Even in his “ceremonial role” as chair of posterior conferences on land reform he actively advanced a Third Worldist and expansive view of the FAO’s mandate in rural welfare. In his opening remarks of the General Commemorative FAO Conference in 1970, Santa-Cruz noted a stark contrast between the “spirit of 1945” with the dark mood of his times.⁷⁴ The early UN, in his mind, was

born in one of those supreme moments in the life of mankind when man feels the bonds that tie him to his fellow-man; when his eyes and mind are opened and he is able to discern the needs of his [neighbor] and the injustice and exploitation suffered by individuals as well as by whole peoples; when, as happens very rarely, peoples and their leaders are capable of penetrating into the underlying causes of war and conflict and of prescribing suitable remedies.⁷⁵

Immediately after, our staunch Catholic yielded the floor to Pope Paul IV—residing only a stone’s throw away from the FAO office in the nearby Vatican City-State, who in turn urged the delegates to turn away from an “economy, too often tainted by power, waste and fear, which must be transformed into an economy of service and brotherhood.”⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, they had plenty of common ground, for instance, in their critique of the West’s lack of commitment to international cooperation, their praise for the work of UNCTAD, and the deeply Christian and religious overtones of their interventions.

Due to the coup in Chile in 1973, Santa-Cruz lost all platforms as a lawyer-diplomat on the international stage and remained in exile in Paris presiding over the NGO *Centre International pour le Développement*. He remained, however, committed to the pursuit of what he called a “new international food order,”⁷⁷ which would bring him, once again, to the halls of the FAO, in 1977. At this time, the Lebanese Edouard Saouma (director-general 1976–1993) recruited him to serve as his special representative to oversee the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform. Santa-Cruz, now at the twilight of his career, served as the secretary-general of this summit, bringing again the language of the NIEO into the realm of food security and rural welfare. In this sense, he pushed for the making of a “new international food order” (*hacia un nuevo orden alimentario*), inscribing this reformist agenda in a broader call for the reimagination of international order.⁷⁸ He had come full circle, from an initial foray into the early UN to a phase in which he advocated for a local and global vision of welfare that would benefit the largest portion of the formerly colonized peoples: rural agriculture workers. And for that reason, he pushed for an international developmentalist agenda that took the precarious situation of these workers seriously, a vision that continued to be pursued at the ECLA and certain FAO projects, and ultimately served as a template for later struggles within the UNCTAD. While Santa-Cruz is no longer remembered in our mainstream histories of IOs, we think that recovering his trajectory (which begins in the early debates surrounding human rights and anti-discrimination, passing through issues of regional development all the way to world technical reform⁷⁹) offers a template for future projects of anticolonial reform. The same

can be said, of course, of our second protagonist. And for that reason, we were interested in reading their parallel trajectories in tandem.

II. Sadruddin Aga Khan: The Prince, the Reformist

Sadruddin Aga Khan was born in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, in 1933. He was the only child of then spiritual leader of Ismaili Shias, Sultan Sir Mohammed Shah (known as Aga Khan III), and a French mother.⁸⁰ Sadruddin's paternal lineage on his father's side is said to go back to Mohammed, the prophet of Islam and his name in Arabic means "the leader of the religion." His grandmother was the granddaughter of the Persia's Qajar King Fath-Ali Shah (1797–1834), who gave the title "Aga Khan (the Lord)" to his great-grandfather in the early nineteenth century.

Ismailism is a sect within the Shia Islam, and Ismailis constitute the second largest Shia community after the Twelver Shias. They both find their origins in the formative period of Islam and "the rights of the *ahl al-bayt* [Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib] to the leadership of the Muslims" and "divinely instituted religious authority."⁸¹ In the eleventh century, Ismailis in Persia (Nizari Ismailis) set up the Alamut State under the leadership of Hassan-i-Sabbah before being overthrown by Mongols in 1253. Over the centuries, Nizari Ismailies scattered across the Levant, South and Central Asia. Aga Khan I settled in India in 1846 and his successors, Aga Khans II and III, developed a strong relationship with the British Empire, which also involved transforming the Ismaili community in and beyond South Asia into "model citizens" and "good Muslim interlocutor for the Empire."⁸² Interestingly, an 1866 High Court of Bombay's inheritance case adjudicated by the British judge in India established the authority of Aga Khan I as "the rightful leader of Ismailis,"⁸³ and, to return the favor, he supported the empire throughout the colonial era and the two world wars.⁸⁴

Sadruddin's father, Aga Khan III, mobilized Ismaili communities from South and central Asia to Levant and East Africa around a certain identity that distinguished them from Twelver Shias and Sunnis yet promoted cosmopolitanism and tolerance. In 1930s, he led the Indian Muslim Delegation to the Round Table Conference and represented India at the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1932. He was elected as the president of the League in 1937, before settling down in Switzerland in 1944. The creation of a series of development initiatives by Ismaili Imam—what became the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in 1967—helped institutionalize the transnational authority of the Imam in an era shaped by decolonization and the emergence of new nation-states in Asia and Africa, but also neocolonialism and the reign of the Modernization Theory.⁸⁵

Although Sadruddin Aga Khan's career in and beyond the UN system materialized in the context of his family's history and connections, his trajectory was also shaped by his changing visions of the global order and systems of power underpinning it. His childhood trips to Muslim countries with his father, as well as his studies in Islamic Studies and Government at Harvard University in 1950s, equipped him with a better understanding of Asia and Africa. In Harvard, he founded the Islamic Association and acted as the president of the Council of Islamic Affairs in New York for many years. He called Iran the "Cradle of his family"⁸⁶ and himself, "an emotional Middle Easterner" belonging to the "People of the Third World"⁸⁷ and, despite having two European passports (Swiss and French), he used his Iranian passport for his UN appointments.

His forty years of international service, indeed, manifest an evolution from an international bureaucrat with a technocratic understanding of global crises to a vocal opponent of imperialism, capitalism, and elitism in humanitarian and development sectors, and later the industrial lifestyle. He maintained a volatile relationship with the U.S. and the UK governments throughout his UN appointments. At times, he benefited from the U.S. financial aid and support in his humanitarian missions, and at other times, he challenged the country's strategic interests. As with the UK, and despite the historically amorous relationship between Aga Khans and the British Empire, the postwar British government kept a "discreet eye on [Sadrudin's] activities, while rendering some practical diplomatic support to his activities."⁸⁸

Aga Khan started his career in the UNHCR in 1959, following a disappointing episode in which both his half-brother Aly Khan and he were passed over by their father in the Ismaili Imam line. Aly Khan moved to become the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in 1958, while Sadrudin joined the UNHCR as the special envoy for the World Refugee Year, running from July 1959 to June 1960. The WRY was intended to act as an institutional break from the old UNHCR created for European refugees, and to revitalize the interest of the "Free World in the problems of the refugees," solicit contributions from firms and governments, and stimulate the solidarity of developing countries' governments for resettlement of millions of refugees in their regions.

As Cohen details, the post-World War II humanitarian regime and the work of bodies such as the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and International Refugee Organization (IRO) were shaped around the mass migration of Europeans in the aftermath of 1930s and 1940s events. The relief operations of the two organizations, mostly funded and controlled by the United States and following decades of humanitarian assistance by private charity organizations to uprooted people, revolved around the notion of "Displaced Persons." The category was invented by the Truman administration and the 1948 Displaced Persons Act and captured two groups of non-German refugees: Holocaust survivors and anti-communist refugees, "particular victims of Hitler and Stalin."⁸⁹

Even though European refugees were also categorized along national and ethnic lines by humanitarian organizations, the racial underpinning of the post-World War II refugee regime disfavoring non-Europeans became particularly visible when the "Displaced Persons" episode ended with the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The convention limited assistance to refugees created by events before January 1, 1951, and only those who were outside their country of origin with "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."⁹⁰ At the time of drafting the convention, the United States had opposed including non-European refugees and in general signing a "blank check" considering the ongoing refugee crises since the end of the war. The French government also supported the position.⁹¹ While the foundation for transnationalization of capital was being laid by Bretton Woods institutions, immigration was viewed in the industrialized world as something to manage and regulate.

With the humanitarian crisis in Europe coming to an end, and despite new waves of displacement induced by the partition of India, the Algerian war of independence, the Korean War, the migration of Chinese refugees to British Hong Kong, and Jewish exodus from Egypt after the Suez Crisis, just to name a few, the contributions to the UNHCR's

budget were becoming severely insufficient to meet the needs of its operations. Even in Europe, Hungarian refugees fleeing their country following a failed revolt against the communist regime in 1956 did not fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention. The UNHCR, however, had managed to resettle many of the Hungarian refugees and the hope was that the World Refugee Year (WRY) campaign would build upon that momentum of institutional pragmatism.⁹²

The WRY was a fundraising initiative by private citizens in the Anglo-American world and had successfully expanded across developed and developing countries.⁹³ As the campaign gained success, the UN stepped in and helped create national WRY campaigns in its member states. Aga Khan involved many faith-based organizations such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Jami'at al Islam (Muslim Relief Agency).⁹⁴ He also joined hands with the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and seventy-two postal administrations across Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America to coordinate the simultaneous release of five hundred million stamps with UNHCR logo and images inspired by refugees on April 7, 1960.⁹⁵ Sadruddin's stamp campaign collected a total of USD 1.6 million, which, in addition to the USD 8 million donation from the WRY campaigns (out of the 95 million dollars), was allocated to the UNHCR's work toward "clearing the camps" by resettling refugees.⁹⁶

Aga Khan's work on the WRY campaign was the beginning of a long career for him in the UNHCR; one marked by decisive moves to extend the moral and institutional mandate of the organization to new geographies. In 1962, Aga Khan was appointed the deputy High Commissioner to Félix Schnyder. Aga Khan's hiring followed years of discontent with the absence of Asian and African staff in the organization.⁹⁷ In December 1965, he was elected by the General Assembly as the new High Commissioner. His election was a strategic response by the assembly to the complexities of displacement and refugee flows in Asia and Africa. Having one foot in the East and another in the West, Aga Khan's appointment was intended to be "a test of UNHCR's claim to be a non-political refugee protection agency."⁹⁸ In the era of Third World nationalism and anti-West tendencies, he was seen as the figure to give full potential to the "good offices" already institutionalized by his predecessors. Historian of the UN Louise Holborn wrote in 1975, "Prince Sadruddin's cultural and religious links with Islam had provided distinctive insight and understanding for his visits."⁹⁹ The United States, however, was not on the same page as European and developing countries. The U.S. delegate argued that Aga Khan was "young," "inexperienced," and "too Afro-Asian oriented," which meant he would not pay enough attention to the problem of European refugees "who remained of special interest to the US."¹⁰⁰ After the election, nevertheless, the U.S. delegate lauded "his compassionate concern for refugees throughout the world."¹⁰¹ Aga Khan became the youngest High Commissioner (thirty-two years old) and longest serving High Commissioner for Refugees (twelve years) by the end of his term.

The expansion of the UNHCR's mandate had already started with Aga Khan's predecessors, August Lindt and Félix Schnyder. What perhaps distinguished him was his later challenge of the law and practice of international refugee protection, his efforts to extend the protection of the UNHCR to major humanitarian crises in Asia and Africa mainly from 1970s through 1990s, and going as far as delivering development aid under the UNCHR's "humanitarian mandate."¹⁰² In the Muslim world, he relied on his religious background and connections, and outside that world, he portrayed his office as

one striving to address humanitarian crises in the developing world with a spirit of impartiality.

Aga Khan began his tenure with a campaign for the adoption of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention by many governments, most notably the United States. The document was essential to removing the temporal and geographical restrictions in the convention and extending the mandate of the organization to new humanitarian situations sprouting in Asia and Africa. When it came to relief operations, however, Aga Khan's early years in the office were marked by a rather "legalist" approach. For instance, the office avoided intervening in civil wars such as the 1967–1970 Biafra War, before ultimately facilitating the repatriation of five thousand children from neighboring Gabon and Ivory Coast to Nigeria toward the end of the hostilities.¹⁰³

The 1971 East Pakistani crisis was a different story. The case involved East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), West Pakistan (now Pakistan), and India. In April 1971, 1.2 million people fled from East Pakistan to India after the invasion by the Pakistani Army. India under Indira Gandhi was a key political actor not only because of its deep-rooted conflicts with Pakistan and supporting the independence of the East Pakistan, but also due to hosting the East Pakistani refugees without being party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The national/international character of the conflict was at the core of the political battles. U Thant decided to assign the UNHCR as the focal point to coordinate the work of other UN agencies in managing the crisis and Aga Khan took up the role of mediator between India and Pakistan. The East Pakistani case was the largest UNHCR's relief and voluntary repatriation operation at the time and involved a mass operation of supplying relief items from India. Taking a pragmatic approach, Aga Khan framed the UNHCR's operation as a "money-channeling" tool in India and avoided engaging with the legal status of the refugees, while encouraging the Pakistani government to "take advantage of the internationalization of the issue" and avoid the persecution of the returnees.¹⁰⁴ At one point, Aga Khan came under attack by India and others for his possible bias in favor of Pakistan (as allegedly caused by his Muslim background and his family history in Karachi), but he navigated the accusations successfully.¹⁰⁵ The same year, Aga Khan used his Iranian connections, including the Shah of Iran himself who supported the position of Pakistani government against the potential Soviet-India alliance, to mediate between East and West Pakistan, rather unsuccessfully.¹⁰⁶

The 1971 Sudanese Civil War was another important episode. Aga Khan's connection to Sudan went back to his brief appointment as the executive secretary for the International Action Committee for Preservation of the Nubian Monuments, located in Upper Egypt and on the border with Sudan in 1961, where he mediated between the two countries and brought architects from Eastern Europe, the United States, and the western bloc together.¹⁰⁷ With the First Sudanese Civil War coming to an end in the early 1970s, Aga Khan focused on repatriation of south Sudanese refugees from neighboring countries and dispatched his cousin and personal assistant Assad K. Sadri to Sudan to assess the situation at different stages.¹⁰⁸ Sudan was a strategic interest to the United States. Fearing the Soviet influence in the country, the United States had long been providing military and economic assistance to anticommunist factions in the country.¹⁰⁹ The United States needed the UNHCR's humanitarian image to combat communism and the UNHCR needed the United States' money. Aga Khan used the opportunity and convinced Nixon's administration to fund the UN programs for economic development in the south of

Sudan to facilitate the return of Sudanese refugees from neighboring countries.¹¹⁰ With the hostilities coming to an end, Aga Khan relied on the financial and logistic support of the western bloc for relief items, airlift, and other means of transport to bring seven hundred thousand south Sudanese home.¹¹¹

Unlike the case of Sudan, Aga Khan declined the United States' appeal for providing relief to South Vietnamese in mid-1960s, arguing publicly that "we are not competent for Vietnam refugees inside Vietnam as we are indeed not competent for East German refugees in Western Germany or North Koreans in South Korea."¹¹² Nevertheless, he channeled some funds to Cambodia for the benefit of Khmer Vietnamese refugees in the country.¹¹³ The 1973 Paris Agreement between the South Vietnam and North Vietnam brought a change. In 1974, Aga Khan visited both Laos and Vietnam. Two country offices were set up in Saigon and Hanoi and an Indochina regional office in Vientiane, Laos. Very shortly, however, Khmer came to power in Cambodia and Saigon fell to the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Amid all the chaos and sufferings, and relying on his image as a neutral humanitarian, Aga Khan became the first UN official to visit the remnants of the U.S. bombing and with the authorization of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, he facilitated the communications between the U.S. and Vietnamese authorities regarding the bodies of the U.S. soldiers, and made necessary arrangements for the airlift of foreigners out of the country.¹¹⁴ None of the countries hosting the Indochina refugees such as Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, or Hong Kong had acceded to the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol and the UNHCR had to strategically navigate its protection mandate in these countries. Unlike the Khmer Rouge regime, Laos and Viet Nam authorities were flexible in their interaction with the UNHCR, allowing the office to deliver some development programs and relief supplies.¹¹⁵

Another complex humanitarian crisis took place in Cyprus in July 1974, and following the invasion of the island by Turkey and the displacement of 164,000 Greek Cypriots from the north of the island, but also the victims of the conflict. The UNHCR was appointed as the coordinator of humanitarian assistance. Aga Khan successfully brought the work of UN agencies together on the island, and navigated his mandate through the complex operations of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). He himself drove around the northern part of the island and made sure the victims of the conflict are treated. In a Reuter's video, he is seen following up on the recovery of a young man with a bullet in his head and trying to take him out of the conflict zone in the mission's vehicle, before the victim was dragged away by a Turkish-Cypriot police officer.¹¹⁶

Beyond mass exoduses, Aga Khan engaged with the resettlement of persecuted communities on an ad hoc basis. He assisted the resettlement of Ugandan South Asians—many of whom were Ismaili Muslims—following Idi Amin's expulsion decree in August 1972. Alongside his nephew and the holder of the Ismaili Imam, Karim Aga Khan IV, he pleaded to prime minister of Canada Pierre Trudeau, who agreed to admit thousands of expelled South Asians into the country.¹¹⁷ Sadruddin also quietly assisted the resettlement of thousands of Jewish and Christian minorities from the Middle East throughout the 1960s–70s by affording them refugee status even though many of them were still within the territories of their home countries. He sent personal appeals to heads of government and coordinated with the Red Cross for the departure of persecuted minorities.¹¹⁸

Aga Khan was simultaneously fighting on normative and moral fronts in the north to justify the expansion of the UNHCR's mandate not only in terms of categories of

protected individuals but also as to the type of assistance the organization could deliver. In the early days of his tenure, he argued before the General Assembly that the question of displacement in Asia and Africa is closely linked to development and could not be resolved without the North's development aid.¹¹⁹ He sought to use the UN Charter as a supplementary mandate for the UNHCR to justify his office's development projects.¹²⁰ In a presentation before the UNHCR's executive committee in 1971, he argued, "In many ways, the problem of refugees and stateless persons are very similar. Many refugees are indeed stateless. The difference, it seems to me, is that whereas refugee is de facto unprotected person, stateless person is de jure unprotected person."¹²¹ In 1976, Aga Khan was invited to give a lecture on refugee law at The Hague Academy of International Law, an institution set up adjacent to the International Court of Justice in 1923 to offer courses to diplomats and international law students. In his lecture, he questioned the exclusion of the right to asylum from the Refugee Convention and the onerous burden on asylum seekers to prove not only their exclusion from the protection of their countries but also the subjective element of "well-founded fear."¹²² To compensate for the problematic treaty norms, he insisted, "the job of my office is to make sure asylum continues to be given generously hopefully not only temporarily for limited number of weeks but permanently for people who can stay."¹²³ Pushing for a pragmatic approach, he insisted that "international solidarity" is the foundation of international legal protection of uprooted individuals;¹²⁴ that "because of the very nature of these humanitarian operations, action often preceded legislative texts,"¹²⁵ and that normative constraints must not ultimately determine who was "worthy of United Nations protection or assistance."¹²⁶

Aga Khan's insistence on a new international humanitarian order continued after his departure from the UNHCR. In 1981, the UN Human Rights Commission appointed him as the special representative for a study on the link between violations of human rights and mass exoduses. Compared to international civil service, such positions usually provide a broader space for vocalizing criticism and radical ideas. In his report, he drew attention to how bilateral aid provided by great powers to the South and in line with the North's geopolitical interests would shrink the space for grassroots development and called for a more integrated aid approach capturing development assistance to both recipient and home countries.¹²⁷ He also highlighted the heavy burden that the South was carrying in refugee crises but also as a result of losing its young force to emigration.¹²⁸ Becoming gradually cognizant of the limited space for advocacy within the UN system and amid the global economic crisis, Aga Khan joined Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan in 1983 to establish the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICHI). The commission issued several thematic reports on famine, mass displacement, deforestation, Indigenous people, urbanism, street children, modern wars, and the forced disappearance, among others.¹²⁹ Navigating humanitarianism through an international institutional order influenced by the "social capital," the studies were led or featured by figures such as the Algerian jurist and ICJ judge Mohamad Bedjaoui, former U.S. government official and World Bank president Robert McNamara, and Italian liberal democrat member of the European Parliament Susanna Angeli, among others. Aga Khan himself chaired the Working Group on Refugees, which advanced several reform proposals such as expanding the international regulatory framework to protect stateless persons, displaced people who could not cross international borders, those fleeing climate-induced disasters, among others, and setting up early warning mechanisms and contingency plans

to prevent humanitarian disasters following mass scale displacements.¹³⁰ The refugees report was one of the initiatives that paved the way for the development of the 2004 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a strategically drafted document to generate authority for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies in the context of non-international conflicts.

Outside of the global policy-making milieu, he criticized the colonial legacy and technocracy in global governance, arguing that “even the terms of the debate as to how the Islamic world could gain its independence were dictated indirectly by the fact of Western territorial and political expansion . . . For the departure of coloni[z]ing European powers heralded the arrival of the era of the ‘Superpowers’ and their escalating global confrontation.”¹³¹ He questioned elitism in IOs’ work, the credibility of experts being paid “Western salaries” to “teach people of the Third World to improve their living conditions,”¹³² and misrepresentation of the south populations as “underdeveloped” and dependent on the “the humane and privileged, usually white, developed world.”¹³³

Following the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in 1988, Aga Khan was appointed UN Coordinator of the Economic and Humanitarian Assistance Programme for People of Afghanistan.¹³⁴ He appointed the former Pakistani diplomat Zia Rizvi as his assistant. Repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan and delivery of survival items and mine clearance involved difficult interactions with the Afghan government (supported by the Soviets), Mujaheddins supported by the CIA, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISA), and finally the Iranian neighbor coming out of a long war with the U.S.-supported Saddam Hussain. It also required extensive fundraising that, with the West’s declining interest in Afghanistan, became extremely difficult and ultimately impossible.¹³⁵ Aga Khan sharply criticized broken promises and opposing political and humanitarian stakes endangering the future of Afghanistan, calling on the Bush administration to create “separate ministries or departments for humanitarian affairs” to balance the big power’s urge for winning political games at the expense of human life.¹³⁶

In the meantime, the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis led to mass displacements and various humanitarian situations in the region. Following the defeat of Iraq in February 1990, the UN Security Council mandated the Secretary-General to deliver humanitarian assistance to Iraqi civilians.¹³⁷ Aga Khan was appointed as the Executive Delegate of the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme. He negotiated with the Government of Iraq for delivery of humanitarian assistance to Kurds in the north and Shias in the south. Following extensive embargos by the UN on Iraq, he led a humanitarian mission to study the alarming humanitarian situation in the country. His vocal report on disastrous effects of sanctions contributed to the creation of the “Oil-for-Food” program,¹³⁸ which went on to allow only \$1.6 billion of oil purchase for a six-month period,¹³⁹ less than 25 percent of what Aga Khan’s report had proposed.¹⁴⁰ These last three UN appointments, indeed, put Aga Khan face to face with the far-reaching implications of the United States and Soviet imperialism. His second lecture at The Hague Academy reflected his disappointment with the “law” itself. He said, “the law is often inadequate, late in a war or crisis, and the institutional arrangements appear derisory compared to the immensity of the tasks . . . The work of international organizations is too often piecemeal. It is made difficult by politicization and bureaucratic red tape. Most often, the action is reduced to meetings of diplomats in which resolutions are voted but remain a dead letter.”¹⁴¹ This was not only a radical comment to make at The Hague Academy—the temple of “International Rule of

Law”—it was also in a way a departure from his 1976 Hague Academy lecture, which reflected his optimism about the role of international law in global governance.

In parallel to his UN appointments, Aga Khan repeatedly sought to get elected to the position of the UN Secretary-General through nominations advanced by the Iranian government both pre- and post-1979 revolution. In 1971, he received the minimum nine votes required for his election but was ultimately vetoed by the Soviet Union, which viewed him as “too Western.”¹⁴² In Gil Loeschner’s account Aga Khan’s bitter failure made him “determined to make the UNHCR the most important international humanitarian organization” in his second term.¹⁴³ His 1981 and 1991 campaigns were equally unsuccessful.

Capitalism was the last enemy that Aga Khan sought to tackle before his death. As the World Trade Organization and the global free trade regime were taking over in the 1990s, he organized an international conference “Policing the Global Economy: Why, How and For Whom,” where he criticized global free trade and unregulated global markets.¹⁴⁴ Later, he called for a slowdown in the ceding of national sovereignty to the global marketplace. He also spoke against what he viewed as the deception embedded in narratives of “responsible capitalism,” “sustainable development,” and “self-regulation,” and more broadly “the ethical, social, spiritual dimension” of capitalist production.¹⁴⁵

III. Whose Expertise? Cosmopolitan Third Worldism and the Quest for a New International Institutional Order

If global order is shaped (for better or worse) by expert knowledge,¹⁴⁶ our article seeks to expand our understanding of these “canonical” experts. The characters we foreground are not part of the usual suspects of the discipline’s *dramatis personae*. Yet their struggles warrant inclusion in international law’s historical record—not necessarily because they *won*, but rather because they illustrate the difficult balancing act that lawyer-diplomat *engagés* face in their quest to push their personal and political agenda while also pursuing a career within the milieu of global governance—a burning question for our own times of “scholactivism.”¹⁴⁷ As we saw, the ideological choices and policy positions undertaken by our protagonists were not without risks—as was perhaps painfully clear for Santa-Cruz in 1973, after the coup in Chile effectively wiped out any platform to engage as a state delegate within the UN system. Aga Khan’s trajectory also bears witness to the challenges of effective humanitarianism and redistribution in liberal international institutions. In fact, given that these two figures started their careers in a period in which the UN found itself under siege by United States anxieties of Soviet infiltration,¹⁴⁸ and had to navigate their career trajectory in a period marked by the shadow of left-wing suspicion within the UN Secretariat,¹⁴⁹ one can only speculate that the professional incentives of “caving in” must have been substantial. And yet, our two protagonists managed to walk the line between commitment and compromise as they attempted to “Third Worldize” the structures of international order. But how?

The mandate expansion of international organizations is often discussed in international law and IR as a process of rational and moral argumentation for transfer of authority from the “local” and “national” to the “global” and “international.”¹⁵⁰ In traditional narratives, the bureaucratic interests of liberal IOs fuel their urge to expand their spheres or instruments of intervention. Like Frankenstein—to retrieve an overused Genevan metaphor—the staff of IOs read founding treaties as “living” instruments to push the boundaries of their work for liberal purposes.¹⁵¹ In this vein, Clark identifies a teleological

turn in the legal interpretation of IOs' mandates that can be read as a "reorientation towards the *efficacy* of international [organizations]," which inevitably "comes at the expense of the sovereignty side of the equation."¹⁵² Sinclair aptly noted that the "expansion of the legal powers exercised by international organizations (IO expansion) can best be understood in light of its interconnections with the making and remaking of modern states on a broadly Western model."¹⁵³ This brings into international law the long-standing argument by constructivist international relations scholars like Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett, who argued that "rationalization has given IOs their basic form (as bureaucracies) and liberalism has provided the social goals which IOs all now pursue (democracy, human rights, and material progress via free markets)."¹⁵⁴ Taking a historical materialist perspective, Craig Murphy argues that different generations of IOs have emerged (and their mandates have grown) as part of the need to improve the conditions of life and contain class antagonism under industrial capitalism.¹⁵⁵

Drawing from this critical literature, we suggest that international law and IR scholars view mandate expansion beyond the binaries of "liberal lawful evolution" versus "nationalist claims of unlawful mission creep."¹⁵⁶ We argue that international civil servants might also renegotiate their mandates as a strategy for resource distribution and strengthening the position of formerly colonized peoples in the "global" plane. We follow Ian Hurd's invitation to retheorize "international cooperation" in a way that goes beyond our traditional liberal assumptions.¹⁵⁷

The trajectory of Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan also offer valuable insights into the narrow scope of activism within liberal international institutions. Critical inquiries into international institutional reform could indeed explore similar invisible histories by breaking free from the idea of "global" as the exclusive realm of capitalist constitutionalism and think of internationalization of the "local" as a strategy for redistribution and empowerment of the global subaltern. One could, however, understand international civil servants' contestation of the world order by contextualizing it within Robert Cox's notion of the "hegemonic fit" or "framework for action," as the product of the existing configuration of material capability, ideas, and institutions. Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan's proposals, respectively, for a new international economic/food order and a new international humanitarian order, were indeed efforts to create new hegemonic horizons by enhancing the control by formerly colonized people over conditions of their social reproduction and ideals of self-sufficient life, and their institutionalization through international law and institutional mechanisms. In their quest for alternative world orders, of course, they did not abandon technical expertise and transnational networks of knowledge production.

IV. Concluding Remarks: Rescuing the Legacies of Anticolonial Struggles without Hagiographies nor Excuses

Despite decades of anticolonial scholarship—for instance, in the wake of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholarly movement and similar currents in IR, history, and the humanities—there is still a tendency in the literature to read non-European wor(l)d-makers as "passive junior imitators of their Western counterparts."¹⁵⁸ Conversely, in our article, we wanted to highlight two—out of many figures—who attempted to grapple with the question of what the age of self-determination would demand of the UN and its web of international agencies. They were part of a generation that, in retrospect, has been called TWAIL I—a label mostly used to distinguish later

scholarship informed by post- and decolonial theory from the practice-oriented reformist of the era that immediately followed decolonization.¹⁵⁹ We do not have evidence that Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan directly knew each other, nor of any of the other famous names associated with this movement. However, we place them in conversation, as they belonged to the same generational experience of practicing lawyers who actively sought to reimagine the UN—or international law—“behind enemy lines.”¹⁶⁰ They were, in our view, not merely bureaucrats or pencil pushers—as the organic intellectuals of formerly colonized peoples are often dismissed, in comparison to the great thinkers of the metropole. This, however, neither means that their projects were flawless, nor that they were *per se* proposals that could (or claimed to) speak on behalf of the “subaltern” or “from below.” After all, it was due to their elite training and resources that these two figures got their seats at the UN table. Accordingly, when engaging with their lost imaginaries, our challenge was to do so without reproducing a hagiographic narrative of colonized or nativist purity without, at the same time, falling into the Eurocentric trap of having always to excuse our interest in figures who take inspiration from Santiago or Tehran, and not only those who gravitate toward Paris or New York.

In sum, our argument is that Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan are provocative protagonists in debates surrounding twentieth-century international ordering *not in spite but because of* their religious traditions. For them, religion was not a coat that one had to shed to wear the gray suit of the rational international civil servant, but rather an integral part of their approach to world affairs. Christianity (or Protestantism, if we are to believe in the critique of secularism) had no monopoly over the keys of the kingdom of global governance. Santa-Cruz’s eclectic social Catholicism and Aga Khan’s anticolonial humanitarianism are but two of many other projects that actively wrestled for the mantle of internationalism—one could further include other anticolonial,¹⁶¹ fascist,¹⁶² or Jewish¹⁶³ cosmopolitan imaginaries. To be sure, our argument is not that any of these projects is epistemologically or normatively superior to the liberal tradition that has, until recently, reigned supreme in our discipline. Nor do we aim to erect a new hagiography that merely expands the liberal cannon but stirs in token Brown figures.¹⁶⁴ Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan’s projects were flawed for their times, and perhaps their religious blend of anticolonial sympathies offers no solutions to the problems of our day. Nevertheless, they offer a testament of the plurality of modernist imaginaries that struggled to erect the international order we have come to inherit. With liberal internationalism on retreat, our times will be marked for the search of alternative imaginaries.¹⁶⁵ As policy and intellectual debates around a New International Economic Order are resurfacing,¹⁶⁶ Santa-Cruz and Aga Khan’s modernist approaches to the law and practice of international organizations for reformist, progressive, and anticolonial aims can offer contemporary struggles a lesson or two. For the alternative, as Nathaniel Berman reminds us, is despair—or perhaps even worse.¹⁶⁷

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NOTES

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13. Daniel Ricardo Quiroga-Villamarín, "Review: Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, Written by Adom Getachew," *Journal of the History of International Law* 24, no. 4 (2022): 589–95.
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