

Teaching for Practical Wisdom in Management Education

(Praktisk visdom som undervisningsideal i erhvervsøkonomiske uddannelser)

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Kasper Worm-Petersen

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Adviser: Rasmus Johnsen

Censor:

Kasper Worm-Petersen

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Abstract

The economic crisis of 2008 raised questions about widespread business practices and the relation between business and society. These questions inspired the 2011 publication *Rethinking Undergraduate Business Education*, in which Colby et al. argue that the traditional ideas of business are out of date (Colby et al., 2011: 2). Colby et al. identifies business education as a key component in realigning the interests of business and society. They propose the integration of liberal learning in management education and suggest that management education should seek to foster practical wisdom within students. Practical wisdom is characterized by three modes of thinking: Analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning. However, reading Colby et al. it is unclear what teaching for practical wisdom actually entails.

In this thesis, the question of what teaching for practical wisdom in management education entails is sought answered by drawing on the thoughts of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Rancière, and Paulo Freire. The Gadamerian concept of *Bildung* is used as an analog to practical wisdom and Gadamer's theory of understanding is subsequently used to enrich the concept. Rancière's ideas provides an agency-focused perspective on learning, which helps open the concept of teaching for practical wisdom by highlighting the importance of equality and emancipation. The Freireian perspective presents the transformative power of education and reveals the need for student engagement in teaching for practical wisdom. The three perspectives are weaved together into a complementary vocabulary, which provides a fruitful and productive common ground that adds a proactive and inclusive aspect to the concept of *Bildung*. With this vocabulary at hand, Colby et al.'s framework for rethinking management education is revisited with special attention given to the three modes of thinking. It becomes clear that teaching for practical wisdom entails a constant focus in all subjects on both analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning. Teaching for practical wisdom should emphasis subject familiarity, teach students to embrace uncertainty, expose students to actual decision-making, and ensure that the subjects are relevant and engaging. It entails abandoning the traditional lecture format and placing the students at the center of the learning environment. These findings can provide the basis for a continued discussion on how management education can assist in developing contemporary and relevant business practices, which can realign the interests of society and business.

Introduction: A call to rethink business education

In the 2011 publication *Rethinking Undergraduate Business Education*, Colby et al. argue that the traditional ideas of business are out of date (Colby et al., 2011: 2). Especially following the economic crisis of 2008, it has become increasingly obvious that actions that provide immediate advantage to some do not necessarily benefit society as a whole (Ibid.: 14). In the wake of this realization business leaders have been faced with ever more complex problems and have had to navigate fragile interdependent environments (Ibid.). This new reality has caused many to question some of the fundamentals of business: “In short, these new times raise questions about widespread business practices, the meaning of leadership and expertise, and, ultimately, the very purpose of business” (Ibid.).

In face of such questions, it is natural to turn to business education for some of the answers. After all, business education forms the mindset of the future business professionals. If we need to rethink business, we should start by rethinking business education. With the intention of doing exactly that, Colby et al. set out to research the current state of business education in America. What they found was a widespread immersion into the logic of the marketplace (Ibid.: 5). As such, a heavy focus on the values and mindset peculiar to the field is expected from professional preparation, but as the authors note: “This immersion holds the attendant danger that students will lose sight of the larger pluralism of institutional sectors and spheres of value within which business has to operate” (Ibid.).

The danger of this immersion is intensified by the current development where more and more students choose business as their field of study (Ibid.: 2). With less diversity in the educational backgrounds of future business professionals the burden is on business education itself to provide a more diverse outlook. Or in the words of Colby et al: “In order to ensure that its graduates develop the breadth of outlook and conceptual agility for living in a global century, higher education also needs to ensure that students understand the relation of business to the larger world and can act on that understanding as business professionals and as citizens” (Ibid.).

The question is then how best to do this. In short, Colby et al.'s answer is the integration of liberal learning (Ibid.). By combining the technical and instrumental mastery of business education with the intellectual perspectives and capacity for dealing with complex problems, which characterizes liberal learning, we can prepare business students for the challenges they will face. "In keeping with this aim, business programs should uphold and cultivate among students a sense of professionalism grounded in loyalty to the mission of business to enhance public prosperity and well-being" (Ibid.: 4). In addition, to serving the greater good this vision actually coincides with the capacities that distinguishes the most innovative and successful business professionals (Ibid.: 31).

Colby et al. conceptualizes their vision in the idea of teaching for practical wisdom (Ibid.: 68). It is the epitome of practical reasoning, which again is the synthesis of three modes of thinking: analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning (Ibid.: 60). The concepts are borrowed from liberal learning and in essence, they encompass "the multifaceted expertise embodied in wise, capable, and thoughtful practice" (Ibid.: 68). Teaching for practical wisdom thereby signifies teaching for the development of technical expertise combined with a thoughtful practice and a wise outlook on the world. It is undoubtedly a worthy ideal and, I would argue, one that business education should strive for. In doing so, however, we must acknowledge that practical wisdom is an ideal and not necessarily in line with the praxis, it seeks to influence.

If we are to take the challenges and dangers identified by Colby et al. seriously, and I believe we should, we need to consider whether the current educational environment allows for an ideal like practical wisdom. We must explore whether it is even possible to fully live up to the ideal of teaching for practical wisdom in the educational institutions of today. Still, to assess these questions we must first get a better understanding of what teaching for practical wisdom actually entails. We need to put some more flesh on the bone of practical wisdom to grasp the challenges that we are faced with.

In this thesis, I will therefore seek to answer the question: *What does teaching for practical wisdom entail in management education?* Answering this question will provide the basis for a more qualified discussion of how business education can help address the current challenges faced in the business environment and society as a whole. I do not propose to present a

definitive answer. Rather, I wish to contribute to the ongoing discussion of how to rethink business education by providing a new perspective on the task of teaching for practical wisdom.

I will draw on the richer Gadamerian concept of *Bildung* (Gadamer, 2004: 9) as an analog to practical wisdom in my efforts to answer the posed question. I believe there are great commonalities between the two concepts (I will substantiate this further in Chapter 1) and by having *Bildung* as the driving concept I get access to a larger vocabulary and a more comprehensive philosophy. This will provide a more in-depth perspective while simultaneously opening up for novel and potentially valuable insights in the analysis.

The thesis presents a philosophical inquiry into Colby et al.'s ideas of teaching for practical wisdom. It is not an empirical study, and hence it is not subjected to a strict scientific methodology. Rather, the intention is to philosophically explore practical wisdom as an ideal for teaching management education and reveal some of its hidden assumptions and aspects. The approach is inspired by philosophical hermeneutics, which seek to transcend the confines of scientific method by showing that truth in human sciences is not dependent on method (Gadamer, 2004: 8). Instead, the value of an analysis is determined by its applicability, explanatory power, and the extent to which it appears self-evident. The findings in this thesis is thus to be evaluated on the extent to which they succeed in presenting relevant and applicable insights to the subject of teaching for practical wisdom in management education.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters 1-3 constitutes the first part dedicated to establishing a theoretical framework by exploring the ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Rancière, and Paulo Freire. In chapter 1, I will focus on Gadamer's work *Truth and Method* (2004). I will present his concept of *Bildung* and justify the decision to use it as an analog to practical wisdom. Then, I will look into his ideas on how we understand and learn, before finally touching upon his take on authority. The main intention with this chapter is to establish a solid understanding of *Bildung*, and hence of practical wisdom. Chapter 2 will present my reading of Rancière's book *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* (1991). I will focus on his critique of the explicative order of education, before exploring his ideas of equality and emancipation as well as the concept of universal teaching. The reading of Rancière will provide a complementary, critical and praxis-oriented perspective to the concept of *Bildung* in an educational context. In the third chapter, I will explore Freire's educational ideas as presented in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2005). The focus will be on the transformative power of education and the need for student

inclusion and engagement. This chapter will present a novel perspective on the potential of education, which complements and challenges the thoughts and assumptions put forth by Gadamer and Rancière.

Chapter 4 forms the second part, where the divergent viewpoints of the three philosophers are brought together in an effort to develop a complementary perspective that can shed new light on the question of what teaching for practical wisdom entails. In the chapter, the figure of Socrates is used as a catalyst for exploring some of the conflicting viewpoints of especially Gadamer and Rancière, as he appears in both of their philosophies but for very different reasons. Gadamer and Rancière's shared aversion against method is also presented and finally the Freirean perspective is brought in to show how education can become an active force in the quest for Bildung or practical wisdom.

Chapters 5 and 6 represents the third part, in which the learnings from part 1 and 2 are applied to the investigative question of what teaching for practical wisdom entails. In Chapter 5 I return to the four concepts developed by Colby et al., namely analytical thinking, multiple framing, the reflective exploration of meaning, and practical reasoning, and reread them based on the theoretical framework and perspectives developed in part 1 and 2. Thereby, I seek to provide an answer to what teaching for practical wisdom entails on a conceptual level. Finally, Chapter 6 offers some praxis-oriented reflections on some of the challenges and consequences teaching for practical wisdom might entail.

Chapter 1: Bildung as Practical Wisdom

Hans-Georg Gadamer is widely known for his magnum opus *Truth and Method* (2004) in which he seeks to rehabilitate the human sciences by introducing his philosophical hermeneutics. This work will provide the basis for the philosophical framework of this thesis. I will not seek to cover all of *Truth and Method* but instead focus on passages and concepts that are central to this thesis. Specifically I will focus on *Bildung* as an analog for practical wisdom, his theory of understanding, the concept of experience, and the priority of the question. Lastly, I will touch upon his ever-controversial concept of authority in order to clarify how I interpret it in the context of this thesis.

Bildung as the purpose of philosophy

As mentioned in the introduction I intend to use Gadamer's concept of *Bildung* as an analog to Colby et al.'s concept of practical wisdom. This will provide a richer vocabulary and present novel perspectives on the concept of practical wisdom. I will therefore initially explore Gadamer's definition of *Bildung* and based on this provide a justification for the use of *Bildung* as the guiding concept in this thesis. In *Truth and Method* (Gadamer, 2004) *Bildung* is the first of four guiding concepts of humanism (the others being *Sensus Communis*, Judgment, and Taste) which Gadamer examines in order to establish a foundation for his exploration of hermeneutics. Amongst these four concepts, *Bildung* has a privileged role, as Gadamer sees *Bildung* as philosophy's condition of existence (Ibid.: 11). It thus serves not only as an introduction to the subject field, but as the focal point of his entire work. In reading Gadamer, we must therefore always seek to understand his arguments in relation to this explicitly defined purpose.

Now, the question is then how we should understand Gadamer's concept of *Bildung*. Gadamer provides an initial explanation by citing Wilhelm von Humboldt in saying that: "[...] when in our language we say *Bildung*, we mean something both higher and more inward [than *Kultur*], namely the disposition of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavor, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character" (Ibid.: 9). We here get a sense of *Bildung* as being a privileged striving to develop a certain disposition of mind that affects both sensibility and character. Equally important is the idea that this disposition of mind stems from "the knowledge and feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavor". It is in other words through the realization (knowledge) and internalization (feeling) of the universality of

human endeavor that you can build your character and sensibility. Only by moving beyond your own particularity can you enter the process of Bildung.

This abandoning of your of own particularity is, according to Gadamer, a basic but required move: "To recognize one's own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other" (Ibid.: 13). It is not a matter of abandoning yourself, but instead requires of you to recognize that you are part of the universality of the humanly constituted world, and with this knowledge develop yourself within and in relation to this universality. It is a process of moving beyond your naturalness to gain the ability to make the world your own: "Every single individual who raises himself out of his natural being to the spiritual finds in the language, customs, and institutions of his people a pre-given body of material which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own" (Ibid.: 13). To make the world your own does not mean to seclude yourself from others. On the contrary, it means to recognize that you share the world with others. That your experiences, feelings, and knowledge are communicable and hence common to others. This opens for the realization that you are part of a greater universality and that you too have a role to play in it. Your task, which is the human task, is to take this role upon you and act not solely based on your own self-interest, but in accordance with the interests of the universality that you are part of (Ibid.: 11).

It is not, however, a self-sacrificing process. By recognizing yourself in the universality you move beyond your own self-interest, not to be restrained by the interests of the universality, but in order to become free from your immediate desires and the constraints of the desired objects (Ibid.: 11). In this sense, Bildung is what separates animals, who is blindly being led by their desires, from humans, who know the virtues of self-constraint. Bildung is hence what is required if you are to become fully human.

In sum, Bildung is the process of becoming fully human by going beyond your own self-interest and recognizing and accepting your role in the universality. It is a disposition of mind that allows you to realize the totality of human endeavor and form your sensibility and character accordingly. Now, if we return to Colby et al.'s definition of practical wisdom we recognize a strong similarity: "[Practical wisdom] captures the multifaceted expertise embodied in wise, capable, and thoughtful practice" (Colby et al., 2011: 68). To Colby et al., a wise, capable, and thoughtful practice entails acting in a way that is "aligned with the public purposes, ethical principles, and ideals of the profession" (Ibid.). Central to both Bildung and practical wisdom is

thus the ideal of acting in accordance with a greater community and with principles that go beyond self-interest. Both concepts are formative in nature, as they strive for the cultivation of humans and believe in the idea of a common purpose that we can realize and fulfill if we act thoughtfully. Based on these central and distinct commonalities I believe that Bildung and practical wisdom essentially are concerned with the same ideal and I will henceforth use the concepts interchangeably.

While this may provide an initial clarification on what Gadamer means by Bildung, and thus how we can understand practical wisdom, it says little if anything about how to achieve it or enter into the process of it. If Bildung is the task of being human, we need to explore what the above-mentioned disposition of mind entails as well as how to develop it. To enter into these discussions it will be beneficial to first inquire further into the foundations of human understanding, as presented by Gadamer, in order to establish a framework for the following exploration.

How we understand

One could argue that Truth and Method in its entirety is concerned with how we understand, so providing an extensive framework of Gadamer's theory on this subject would be beyond the capacity of this thesis. Instead, I will focus on four central aspects: fore-meanings, prejudices, historical horizon, and application. These four aspects will combined constitute a solid framework that we can build on in the following explorations and analysis.

The importance of fore-meanings

The basic structure of understanding is that of the circle, as recognized by Heidegger (Ibid.: 268). This does not mean a movement from praxis to theory to praxis, but rather, in the words of Gadamer, "in correcting (and refining) the way in which constantly exercised understanding understands itself" (Ibid.: 268). Now, what does this mean? How does a "constantly exercised understanding understand itself"? It does so by projecting a meaning for the text that is then to be corrected and refined in the meeting with the text until it corresponds with every aspect of it (Ibid.: 269). The act of projecting a meaning is the most fundamental act in all of understanding. Whenever we are presented with a text (or another object that we seek to understand), we generate a fore-meaning for the entire text. In reading the text, we test its parts against our fore-

meaning in order to examine the validity of our fore-meaning. When faced with a discrepancy between the text and our fore-meaning we are forced to correct our fore-meaning to assure alignment between the text and our understanding of it. The projection and constant revision of fore-meanings is the constant task of understanding (Ibid.: 270).

Now the privileged position of the text or “the things themselves” also becomes clear. The only “objectivity” is to be found in “the things themselves”. It is only by proving that your fore-meaning is in alignment with “the things themselves” that you can claim to have understood anything (Ibid.: 270). Therefore, to reach a legitimate understanding an initially adequate fore-meaning is required. A completely arbitrary fore-meaning would lead you astray and possibly distract you to the extent that you fail to realize the discrepancies between the text and your fore-meaning. Any interpreter therefore has the responsibility of examining the legitimacy of his or her fore-meaning before approaching the text: “Thus it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying solely on the fore-meaning already available to him, but rather explicitly to examine the legitimacy—i.e., the origin and validity—of the fore-meanings dwelling within him” (Ibid.: 270). The task of examining your own fore-meanings requires a great level of understanding of yourself, a matter that I will return to later, but it also requires an openness towards the text and a willingness to let it challenge your own beliefs (Ibid.: 271).

There is always a multiplicity of potential meanings, signified by the many different fore-meanings that we can project, but this does not entail that everything is possible. When confronted with a text we wish to understand, we cannot ignore what the text is trying to tell us and only seek to confirm our own fore-meaning. We must instead pay intense attention to what is being said and constantly pose the question of whether this corresponds with our current understanding (Ibid.: 271). Without such openness, no understanding will take place, only a blind affirmation of constructed assumptions.

Still, understanding does not equal agreement. Seeking to understand something or someone does not entail accepting the argument put forth. It merely entails understanding the content, intention, and context of the argument, which then subsequently allows you to decide whether you agree with the argument and wish to subscribe to it (Ibid.: 394). Hence, being open and willing to challenge your own fore-meanings is not an act of self-sacrificing. It is rather a necessary means to develop and further your own understanding of the world.

The suspension of prejudices

A central aspect of examining your own fore-meanings is knowing what constitutes these, namely your prejudices. Prejudices are here not to be understood negatively. Prejudices are at their core simply provisional judgments and can be both positive and negative (Ibid.: 273). To prevent prejudices from becoming the negative and unjust judgments that they in common language have become synonymous with, we need to realize that all understanding involves prejudices (Ibid.: 272). All fore-meanings and hence all understanding are built on prejudices. Even the idea that we should disregard prejudices builds on the prejudice that prejudices are invalid (Ibid.: 273).

There is therefore no escaping prejudices. Instead, the task is to become aware of your prejudices so that you can challenge them: "For as long as our mind is influenced by a prejudice, we do not consider it a judgment. How then can we foreground it? It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, provoked." (Ibid.: 298). The question is then, obviously, how to provoke our prejudices? According to Gadamer, it can only happen in the meeting with a text, in being confronted with the meaning that a text wishes to convey (Ibid.: 295). The provocation happens due to the nature of the hermeneutic task, which is based on the polarity between familiarity and strangeness (Ibid.: 295). The familiarity of knowing that we are dealing with the same thing, that it is the same human intelligence dealing with the same world that has created or thought of this. The strangeness of knowing that you are in different historical contexts, which leads you to perceive of the world differently.

We become aware of our own prejudices when the discrepancy between our fore-meaning and the strangeness of the text makes it impossible to arrive at a true understanding. We are then forced to identify and examine the prejudices that led us to projecting our fore-meaning and engage in the task of distinguishing the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false prejudices, by which we misunderstand (Ibid.: 298). This task is often made easier if there is a temporal distance between the text and you, but even when no such distance exists the task remains the same only more difficult and demanding in nature.

Having identified our false prejudices we need to suspend them in order to ensure that they do not influence our attempt in understanding the text: "We now know what [understanding] requires, namely the fundamental suspension of our own prejudices. But all suspension of judgments and hence, a fortiori, of prejudices, has the logical structure of a question" (Ibid.:

298). Any true suspension of prejudices must happen through an honest and open question that allows the text to correct and refine any false prejudices. This does not mean that you should seek to present yourself, as a tabula rasa nor that you should try to subtract yourself from the process of understanding. Neither is possible and an attempt would only lead to further misunderstandings.

As mentioned above, we always approach a text with a fore-meaning and hence with prejudices, and any understanding will therefore be inextricably linked to and determined by ourselves. Because there is no way of eliminating ourselves from the process, we must be willing to put our prejudices and ourselves at risk: "In fact our own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the other's claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself" (Ibid.: 299). We need to be willing to let go and allow for the other's claim to truth to affect us and gain legitimacy. This inevitably involves the risk of being proved wrong and having some fundamental beliefs being negated. The process of true understanding can therefore be an uncomfortable experience that exposes our own inadequacy. However, this experience and realization of inadequacy is exactly what is needed to allow for the development of the disposition of mind that characterizes the process of Bildung.

To acquire a horizon

In the quest to understand ourselves better we are faced with the challenge of never being able to fully understand ourselves. This is the paradoxical consequence of us being historical beings: "To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete" (Ibid.: 301).

Because we are situated within a historical context that far exceeds our own comprehension and constantly and inevitably influences our prejudices, we find ourselves being unable to gain a complete understanding of ourselves. Nevertheless, we are required to tirelessly seek an ever-greater understanding of ourselves. Not in the hopes that we one day will be able to reach a complete understanding, but in the acknowledgement that avoiding reflection will lead to misunderstanding and fallacies.

What is called for is the realization that every finite present has its limitations (Ibid.: 301). It is an understanding both of our own limited knowledge but also of our present time's limited explanatory power. It is based on this understanding that Gadamer introduces the concept of horizon: "Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of "horizon." The horizon is

the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth” (Ibid.: 301). Understanding ourselves is a matter of understanding the limits of our own horizons, as well as what constitutes these limits. It is a matter of examining our own particular vantage point, not to disregard it, but to become aware of the implicit assumptions and prejudices that are born out of this particular vantage point.

Still, the concept of horizon is not limiting. Instead, it opens for the possibility of expanding our horizons and seeing new horizons. The concept of horizon introduces the possibility of transposing ourselves into a situation. Only by already having a horizon, and being aware of it, can we try to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes (Ibid.: 303). If we are unaware of our own horizon in trying to understand the other, we can at most affirm our own beliefs and make claims to our own perceived superior understanding. Without acknowledging the limits of our own horizon, we implicitly expand its validity to all of history and all contexts, thus invalidating any other vantage point and horizon. Obviously, no true and mutual understanding can happen in such a situation.

Consequently, we must bring ourselves into the other’s situation if we are to reach true understanding, which involves going beyond our own particularities: “Transposing ourselves [...] always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other. [...] To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion” (Ibid.: 303). Understanding is not a process of counter posing different opinions or beliefs. It is a process going beyond ourselves and reaching for a higher universality, different from anyone of us but only attainable through our combined efforts of reaching a mutual understanding. By acquiring a horizon, we become able to see our own particularity in the right proportions and acknowledge its limited reach and claim. We see that our own horizon, constantly in the process of being formed, is part of a mesh of horizons existing within the universality of our shared history.

The task of understanding is not to acquire new horizons in addition to your own, as if they existed in isolation. Rather, understanding is the fusion of horizons: “In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs—which means that as the historical horizon is

projected, it is simultaneously superseded" (Ibid.: 306). It is in this fusion of horizons that the past and the present is unified in a new understanding that makes the previously distant past relevant to us in the present, and thereby expands our horizon. What we must seek is to achieve this fusion in a controlled and regulated way. By mastering the process of the fusion of horizons, we ensure that we do not become blinded by our own particularities but are open and willing to engage in the higher universality.

However, seeking to make the past relevant to us in the present confronts us with the central problem of hermeneutics: application.

The problem of application

To hermeneutics, application is as central an aspect as understanding and interpretation (Ibid.: 307). In fact, understanding only ever happens through application. As all understanding involves the fusion of horizons that makes the text relevant to us we see that we ourselves play an integral part in understanding and that the understanding we reach are to some extent determined by us. Understanding a text is not simply reading what is there. Understanding is taking what the text is saying and applying it to the context in which we are in (Ibid.: 307), to make connections between our own horizon and that of the text to enable a fusion of the two. It is in this process that the application takes place. By applying the meaning communicated by the text to the particular situation that we are in, we understand the meaning as an expression of the universality that connects us with the text. We cannot stay indifferent to this understanding as it, in being applied to our previous understanding, affects our convictions and urges us to act differently.

This, however, necessitates that the understanding of a text always must be different and new. When understanding is only fulfilled in the application of the meaning to our own particular situation, the understanding is inevitably linked to us: "[...] all reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text that he is reading. The line of meaning that the text manifests to him as he reads it always and necessarily breaks off in an open indeterminacy" (Ibid.: 335). We must accept that the meaning we derive from a text will differ from what others will garner from it. We can therefore not simply accept another person's interpretation of a text. We must ourselves go through the process of understanding and application in order to fully grasp the meaning of a text. A second-

hand interpretation is only be a free-floating piece of information unable to affect us. We might be able to recite it, but we will not be able to act upon it.

That no two understandings are alike, however, does not mean that we are set free from the text. The possible understandings are given by the text alone (Ibid.: 328). The privileged position on the text, as mentioned earlier, still apply. It is in our ability to ensure complete alignment between our whole fore-meaning of the text and all its parts that we can claim to have understood the meaning. It is the process of applying this meaning to our own context, which is integral to the process of projecting and refining fore-meanings, which distinguishes one understanding from the other.

We now see the contours of the Gadamerian concept of understanding. In sum, understanding is the constant process of correcting and refining our fore-meanings in accordance with the text. Our fore-meanings are symptoms of our prejudices, which in turn are determined by our historical horizons. The task of understanding consists of aligning our fore-meanings with the meaning of the text by suspending our prejudices and hence make the text's meaning relevant and applicable to ourselves.

Learning to learn

With this basic framework of understanding, we can continue our explorations into how we obtain the disposition of mind required to achieve Bildung. We will do so by looking into the concept of experience and the priority of the question.

The negativity of experience

According to Gadamer is the historical activity of the mind, and hence the central activity in the disposition of mind that we here are concerned with, experience (Ibid.: 341). In our everyday language, we can talk about experience both as something that confirms our beliefs and as something new, that occurs to us (Ibid.: 347). For Gadamer, however, it is only the latter that qualifies as experience in the genuine sense. What characterizes this form of experience, or simply experience as such, is that it is always negative: "If a new experience of an object occurs to us, this means that hitherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better. Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning" (Ibid.: 347). Having an experience is thus the realization that we have previously been wrong.

Still, experience is not an act of disregarding. Rather it is a process of becoming more familiar with the object in question (Ibid.: 349). New experiences do not completely overturn our previous understanding of the object it merely refines it. As we saw earlier, any understanding has to build on an at least approximated alignment of our fore-meaning with the meaning of the object. To completely overturn a previous understanding would entail that the meaning we had derived from the object was entirely wrong, which would disqualify it as a true understanding to begin with.

Experience differs from the continuous process of understanding by manifesting itself as an event (Ibid.: 347). It is an event that no one has control over, in which particular observations coordinates and combine in an incomprehensible manner. It is this nature of experience that is revealed to us when we say that something *occurred to us*. Experience is an event of realizing a unity between the meaning of the object and ourselves (Ibid.: 349). This demands of us that we are present and that we are involved in our dealings with the world. Here we recognize a clear link back to the concept of horizons and the importance of being aware of ourselves.

This also reveals the difference between knowledge and insight. Where knowledge is something we have of certain things, insight is something we come to (Ibid.: 350). Insight entails that we have escaped from something that has deceived us, and hence it involves self-knowledge. We become more aware of our shortcomings and ourselves. Becoming insightful is thus central to *Bildung*.

In fact, being insightful and being experienced is the closest we come to a characteristic of a person being fully human. It is therefore relevant to examine further, how Gadamer describes this state of being. The experienced person is not necessarily a knowledgeable person. It is not someone who has accumulated a lot of knowledge and thus knows better than others know. "Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them" (Ibid.: 350). The experienced person is characterized by his openness to new experiences, which he have gained through experience itself. It is thus his approach to the world rather than his knowledge of it that sets him apart.

Being open to new experiences essentially means listening. This especially holds true in human relations. If we want to establish a genuine human bond, we must be open to one another and listen to what the other has to say (Ibid.: 355). Listening means suspending our own beliefs of what the other is saying and accepting that what they say might reveal that our understanding is wrong. We must therefore be willing to give up our own understanding if the opposing argument is closer to the truth. Being open therefore involves a great deal of humility. Humility about our own knowledge and acceptance of other people's equal claim to the truth.

The openness to new experiences that characterizes the experienced person is interlinked with the acknowledgement of human finitude (Ibid.: 351). It involves accepting that we are not masters of our future and that all foresight and plans are uncertain. This excludes the possibility of complete knowledge and any tangible end goal. Instead, we must accept that we are part of an ongoing process, which we can neither think nor plan our way out of (Ibid.: 350).

The priority of the question

The importance of openness towards new experiences reveals another central aspect in Gadamer's philosophy: Questions. How can we have experiences without asking questions? It is only by being open to the possibility that something might be different from what we thought and questioning it that we can have new experiences (Ibid.: 356). To ask such questions requires that we acknowledge that there is something that we do not know. There is obviously no reason to ask questions if we already have all the answers. The radicality of this requirement and hence of the fundamentally open person is that he must acknowledge that he does not know anything (Ibid.: 356). Only by accepting that he holds no true and secure knowledge can he be fundamentally open to new experiences and persistent in his questioning.

We see this in how questions relate to opinions. Opinions have a tendency to propagate themselves and deny any level of ignorance (Ibid.: 359). They are often closely linked with the general opinion and therefore rarely understood by individuals in the manner previously described where relevance to and application by the individual are required. Instead, they are merely accepted as being true. "It is opinions that suppresses questions" (Ibid.: 359). Opinions close in on themselves, hindering any openness to new and contradicting experiences.

It is thus clear that we should always seek out the questions. In fact, it is the only way we can arrive at any sort of knowledge. “[T]he path of all knowledge leads through the question” (Ibid.: 357). To gain knowledge we must disregard any readily available opinions and instead pose every question that arises or presents itself. To ask a question is to bring it into the open (Ibid.: 357). To let the answer be unsettled. Rhetorical and pedagogical questions are not truly questions as the right answer is already decided beforehand. A true question must arise out of a genuine interest and curiosity and must be posed with the intent of gaining new knowledge not simply affirming one’s opinions.

However, that a question must be open does not mean that it is boundless. All true questions have a horizon that narrows the field of possible answers. ”Posing a question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains open” (Ibid.: 357). To pose a question is therefore a delicate act. It has to be posed in such a way that the content and intention of the question is familiar to the one who should answer it, but at the same time it should point to what is still open and unsettled and invite the other to engage in finding a decisive answer.

Answering a question involves arriving at both a positive and a negative judgment. In deciding what is true, we must also decide what is false (Ibid.: 358). It is a process of evaluating contraries and balancing the reasons for and against the different possibilities. Full knowledge, however, is first achieved when all possible counter arguments have been proved wrong (Ibid.: 358). Only then can we claim that we have reached a decisive answer. The difficulty lies in maintaining an openness towards the other possibilities even when we believe to have found the right answer. We need to keep asking questions and accepting that we do not know.

Asking the right questions is not something that we can learn as we can learn a craft. There is no method to asking questions. Instead, we should consider asking questions as an art (Ibid.: 360). This is not to elevate it to an unattainable level, but merely to show that we should give up any ideas of finding a formula or a method for asking the right question. Any effort of such sort would eliminate the openness of the question, as it would confine it prior to it even being asked. The art of asking the right questions is instead something that should be cultivated. It is closely interlinked with Bildung and the disposition of mind that we are exploring.

This art is not one that teaches us how to always win an argument. In fact, one who masters this art might very well end up being proved wrong in a discussion. It is an art that teaches us how to think. “The art of questioning is the art of questioning ever further—i.e., the art of thinking” (Ibid.: 360). Having mastered the art of questioning means having developed an ear for the undecided in every conversation. A sense for knowing what is worth questioning in the specific situation and what is not. By questioning ever further we push ourselves beyond our comfort zone and force ourselves to explore the unknown. It is in these explorations that thinking occurs. As long as we stay within the comforts of what is known we are not thinking but merely reciting. True thinking happens when we are faced with questions that we do not know the answer to. When we start looking for the questions behind the answers instead of merely accumulating answers to questions we do not know. This is why Gadamer writes: “To understand a question is to ask it. To understand meaning is to understand it as an answer to a question” (Ibid.: 368). Only by realizing that all knowledge has been, and always will be, derived through questions can we start exploring the world on our own and seek to understand it.

The question of authority

When working with Gadamer’s philosophy, especially in relation to education, as is the case in this thesis, it is difficult to avoid the subject of authority. His concept of authority has sparked many debates and is by some seen as extremely conservative. I will not engage in these debates, nor will I be the judge on who is right and wrong. Instead, I will briefly outline how I will interpret his concept of authority in the context of this thesis, in the attempt to forestall some of the possible points of critique.

Let us start with Gadamer’s own words on authority:

“[T]he authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one’s own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed but is earned, and must be earned if someone is to lay claim to it” (Ibid.: 281).

There are two important distinctions at play here. The first is between abdication and acknowledgement, and the second is between bestowed and earned authority.

If we start with the latter, the distinction between bestowed and earned authority is for Gadamer essential but also so elementary that he does not even consider bestowed authority as true authority. Anyone who has been bestowed a responsibility or power without having earned it, has not, in the Gadamerian sense, any authority. We are here obviously dealing with a very limited concept of authority, and one that does not align with our everyday use of the word. We are used to saying that people have authority if they hold a certain position and has some power that they can exercise over us. Gadamer, however, does not accept this as being authority; it is merely power. In understanding Gadamer's concept of authority, we must therefore first accept that his use of the word is limited in comparison to the common use of it. We can only speak of authority, in a Gadamerian sense, when a person has earned it.

The other distinction between abdication and acknowledgement serves to explain how anyone could ever earn authority over another person. It is not a matter of forced abdication of reason. We do not grant other's reason priority over our own because we are threatened. We do so because we acknowledge that they have a superior insight into some areas and that we therefore would benefit from taking their advice. That we would come to such a realization, and that it is actually reasonable of us to do so, is due to our own finitude. As mentioned earlier, the fact that we as humans are finite means that our knowledge will always be limited. We do simply not have enough time to question and understand the entirety of the world. A way of circumventing this limiting factor is by talking to other people who have dedicated their time and attention to certain subjects, and thereby have gained substantial insight into those subjects. By doing this we can leapfrog past some otherwise time consuming explorations. It does not relieve us from the task of understanding and making it relevant to ourselves, but it allows us to avoid some of the dead ends that all questioning encounters.

We do not have to accept other people's authority. If we prefer to take the route of questioning ourselves, we are free to do so. However, it might be very reasonable for us to consult with other people or texts written by these people as it can save us a lot of time.

In the context of this thesis is also worth noting that Gadamer himself identified the teacher-pupil relationship as an authoritative form of welfare work (Ibid.: 354). Here authoritative does not have any positive connotations to it. Instead, Gadamer writes that it is: "penetrating all relationships between men as a reflective form of the effort to dominate" (Ibid.: 354). This is a clear acknowledgement of the dominating and damaging effects of this false form of authority.

In short, I will in this thesis work with Gadamer's own distinction and take his concept of authority as something that is only ever applicable when it is earned due to an acknowledgement of knowledge and insight.

We now have a fuller understanding of the concept of Bildung. It is a disposition of mind, which makes us realize and accept our own role in the universality. It is characterized by an openness to new experiences, based on the realization that we will never have complete knowledge. We thus inquire into the world, and through the art of questioning, which entails suspending our prejudices and correcting and refining our fore-meanings, we can achieve a fusion of horizons that leads to an individual application of our newly gained understanding. In our efforts to understand the world, we may draw on the expertise of others but we must never subject ourselves to authoritarian figures and ideas as it will hinder any true understanding.

Chapter 2: Emancipatory Education

Having explored the Gadamerian concept of Bildung I will turn my attention to the French philosopher Jacques Rancière. Rancière's thoughts are relevant to this thesis as they present a possible way of materializing Gadamer's ideas of Bildung in an educational setting. Rancière takes his vantage point in a context burdened with bestowed authority and power. Thus, his perspective can help qualify some of Gadamer's points that are more theoretical when seeking to implement them within the pedagogical sphere that they both recognize is loaded with illegitimate authority.

In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, Rancière tells the story of how the 19th century educator Jacotot discovers a new educational practice based on emancipation, which he labels universal teaching. Rancière uses the story of Jacotot as the main driver in his book, but his own agenda is constantly interwoven in the story. He is interested in promoting emancipation, not only in an educational setting, but also as a way of influencing society as a whole. For the purpose of this thesis I will not pursue the political aspects of Rancière's emancipatory philosophy. Instead, I will limit my focus to the educational consequences this idea has. This is not to deny or disregard the political implications, but a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this thesis.

To examine the idea of universal teaching I will initially describe the existing order that it opposes. I will then look into the philosophical basis for universal teaching, before the content and practice of the educational philosophy will be explored.

The explicative order

In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* Rancière seeks to question the legitimacy of the pedagogical act, which he names explication. Explication is the practice that we usually associate with teaching, namely: "to disengage the simple elements of learning and to reconcile their simplicity in principle with the factual simplicity that characterizes young and ignorant minds" (Rancière, 1991: 3)¹. In other words, in the explicative order the teacher should present the subject field in

¹ Throughout *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* Rancière is switching back and forth between quoting Jacotot and presenting his own analysis without truly establishing a clear distinction. In the following, I will attribute all quotations and analysis to Rancière thereby not going into a textual analysis of who should be credited with this or that quote.

a way that makes it understandable to the students. This involves disassembling the text as a whole and presenting it to the students in smaller and more easily digestible bites, in the efforts of ensuring that the students can follow every step of the argument. This practice is implemented all the way down to the point where words are divided into syllables, and syllables into letters.

Explication is done with the best intentions. It is thought to be the only way of introducing young minds to the world of knowledge. It is believed that the students need a methodological foundation before they can understand any reasoning and knowledge (Ibid.: 3). According to Rancière, however, these good intentions are built on a myth and have no basis in reality. "Before being the act of the pedagogue, explication is the myth of pedagogy, the parable of a world divided into knowing minds and ignorant ones" (Ibid.: 6). What Rancière identifies is that the explicative order implicitly and ungrounded accepts the premise that there is a distinction between intelligent minds and stupid minds.

The myth claims that learning can only take place in the presence of the teacher. In doing so, it disengages the students from the subjects that are to be learned and appoints the teacher as the only one who can reconcile them. This leads to the removal of the students' agency. They are forced to follow the path of the teacher if they wish to break free from the state of ignorance that they have now been placed in (Ibid.: 7).

The problem is that there are no solid arguments for this explicative order. On the contrary, it is based on a tautological reasoning where the failure of the explicative order is attributed, not to the order, but to how it is implemented (Ibid.: 6). When students are having difficulties understanding the teacher's explications, the teacher will seek to refine his explications, but never question the effectiveness of explication as such.

Rancière on the other hand wants to overturn this logic (Ibid.: 6). He wants to break free from the tautological reasoning and restore the students' agency. He finds the justification of such an act partly in the simple fact that babies are very capable of learning their mother tongue without any explication, but simply by observing, imitating, and self-correcting (Ibid.: 5). This is not a biological argument, but rather a cultural analysis. Rancière is not trying to present this as a bulletproof argument. Instead, he sees it as a way of avoiding the tautology of explication, which then allows him to explore an alternative to the established order.

Equality as the basis for emancipation

Rancière's alternative to the explicative order is the idea of intellectual emancipation. It is the idea of empowering all individuals by making them aware of their own intellectual capabilities and dissolving any intellectual hierarchy. Before we can look into how Rancière envisions intellectual emancipation being practiced in an educational setting, we need to better understand the concept as such as well as the philosophical outlook that justifies his educational ideas. We will do this by focusing on the very central aspect of intellectual equality, the task of revealing an intelligence to itself, the desire to understand and be understood, and the concept of truth.

The equality of human intelligence

According to Rancière, the prerequisite for all understanding and communication is the equality of human intelligence (Ibid.: 70). Only because we have the same intelligence, and hence are capable of understanding the same things, can we expect that other people can understand us and that we in turn can understand them. Rancière turns to the poet Racine to exemplify his point: "If Racine knew a mother's heart better than I, he would be wasting his time telling me what he read in it [...]. This great poet presumes the opposite; all his work, all his care, all his revisions, are performed in the hope that everything will be understood by his readers exactly as he understands it himself" (Ibid.: 69). We can only understand a poet's metaphors if we can recognize the experience that the metaphor is signifying. The saying *butterflies in your stomach* only makes sense to us because we recognize it as a fitting description of a sensation we have experienced ourselves.

This holds true not only for metaphors but also for language in general. For what is language other than signs and expressions, that signifies our experiences and thoughts (Ibid.: 70). Like the poem, our ability to read a book hinges on our intelligence being able to proceed in the same way as the author's (Ibid.: 39). Our ability to read a book therefore rejects any distinction between intelligent and stupid minds.

This is not to say all people have the same knowledge and insight. The point Rancière is seeking to make is that there is no predetermined difference between intelligent people and stupid people. That there is no nature giving limitation to what some people can understand and achieve intellectually. There is no justification for dismissing some people as being stupid and

promoting other people as being smart. It is this sort of classification, which he identifies in the explicative order that he wants to eradicate.

Revealing an intelligence to itself

Instead of concluding that people who have greater knowledge than others are, superior Rancière offers an alternative explanation: “There aren’t two sorts of minds. There is inequality in the *manifestations* of intelligence, according to the greater or lesser energy communicated to the intelligence by the will for discovering and combining new relations; but there is no hierarchy in *intellectual capacity*” (Ibid.: 27). When we observe that one person knows more than another it is not due to a natural difference in intellectual capacity. The more knowledgeable person has simply asserted more energy and willpower into the efforts of intellectual exploration. It is hence a difference in manifestation not in capacity.

This initially evens the playing field and allows anyone to become as knowledgeable as the next. However, on closer inspection it simply shifts the locus of intelligence from the intelligence itself to the will. We still recognize that some people are more knowledgeable than others are. Instead of justifying it by reference to a natural intellectual hierarchy, we point to a greater willpower as the reason behind the observed difference.

This obviously begs the question of how to understand this will and its relation to intelligence. Rancière’s defines the will like this: “Will is the power to be moved, to act by its *own* movement, before being an instance of choice” (Ibid.: 54). This is will as the moving force, not just an agency for deciding between available options. This leads Rancière to state that man is a will served by an intelligence (Ibid.: 54). This reverses the traditional understanding of man as being a distinguished being due to his intelligence. Instead, we find the will in charge.

The intelligence is still the faculty that process ideas and experiences, but it is unable to act on its own. Only by force of the will do the intelligence exercise its capacity. It is the will that needs to focus the attention of the intelligence and ensure that it keeps thinking, researching, and analyzing (Ibid.: 55). Distraction and absence is the states that need to be avoided. Laziness leads to intellectual mistakes. The lack of willpower to stay with a subject and maintain focus for as long as it is needed. “Idiocy is not a faculty; it is the absence or the slumber or the relaxation of intelligence” (Ibid.: 55). If the will is not strong enough the intelligence, will relax and fall into a slumber. A slumber that will manifest itself in idiocy.

However, Rancière does not then conclude that the natural hierarchy is to be found in the willpower instead of the intelligence. Instead, he points to the influence of external expectations and requirements. “They [the common people] develop the intelligence that the needs and circumstances of their existence demands of them. There where need ceases, intelligence slumbers” (Ibid.: 51). We only put in the effort of developing our intellectual capacity when we recognize a need and purpose for doing so. If we are constantly being met with low expectations we do not develop our intelligence to its full potential as there is no incentive to make the effort.

The power of the myth of the explicative order now becomes clear. By stating that some students have a lesser intelligence less will be required of them, and in the absence of need their intelligence will in fact become less developed. Whereas the students thought to have a greater intellectual capacity will be introduced to greater challenges and consequently show a greater manifestation of their intelligence. The explicative order thus institutes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The only way to break this prophecy is to reveal an intelligence to itself (Ibid.: 28). We must all become aware of our own capacities and not let ourselves be limited by the expectations set forth by others. The first step is to realize the equality of human intelligence. To see that we are all equally capable of understanding other people and that there thus is no position from where someone can judge one as being superior and another as being inferior. The only thing that distinguishes the “superior” from the “inferior” is the time and effort they have put into exercising and developing their intelligence. If we put in the required effort, we too can become knowledgeable.

For Rancière then, the task of the educator is less to teach the students a certain subject field than to emancipate them, to make them realize that they are equally capable of exercising their intelligence. “Essentially, what an emancipated person can do is be an emancipator: to give, not the key to knowledge, but the consciousness of what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself” (Ibid.: 39). Education thus becomes a matter of cultivating a certain consciousness in the student. Making the student aware of his own abilities and teaching him how to exercise his intelligence.

Wanting to understand and be understood

Still, the task of the educator is not one of introducing the student to this new form of consciousness. Rather it is matter of helping him/her to rediscover it. We are not born with an idea of an intellectual hierarchy. On the contrary, we begin our lives with an unquenchable thirst for understanding the world and we put all our efforts into doing so (Ibid.: 10). It is not until we are introduced to the explicative order that we accept that we have a limited access to the world and that we must follow the route of progress set out by the teachers.

In fact, we cannot refrain from thinking and seeking to understand. It is in our nature to think (Ibid.: 62). It is in our nature to think about the world and try to understand it, just as it is in our nature to want to be understood. The desire to be understood makes us try to communicate our thoughts in language, even though there is no given correlation between thought and language (Ibid.: 62). Our language is made up of approximations. Of words that to some extent can communicate the thoughts and feelings, we have. The discrepancy between thought and language is, however, not to be seen as an obstacle. On the contrary: ““It is because there is no language of languages, that human intelligence employs all its art to making itself understood and to understanding what the neighboring intelligence is signifying” (Ibid.: 62). It is the challenge of communication that makes us determined to make it work. Here again we see the importance of the will. The will forces the intelligence to occupy itself with the task of understanding and being understood.

All this effort is only worthwhile because we know that it is an equal intelligence that is speaking to us and that we therefore know that we are capable of understanding each other if we focus our attention. For Rancière understanding is not a matter of unveiling things or discovering true meaning. Instead, it is to be understood as “the power of translation that makes one speaker confront another” (Ibid.: 63). Translation is the act of putting our thoughts and feelings into words, written or spoken. The meaning becomes apparent in the counter-translation performed by the other person. The act of translating the words back into thoughts, feelings, and experiences. When we succeed in this act of translation and counter-translation, we come to understand each other.

Truth through veracity

By this concept of understanding, it follows that truth is not communicated through language. According to Rancière, truth exists independently from us and does in no way submit to our language (Ibid.: 58). Still, truth is alien to us. “The experience of veracity attaches us to its absent center; it makes us circle around its foyer” (Ibid.: 58). We can indicate truths. We can point to observations and know that this or that exists or has happened. What we cannot is to explain why or adequately put it into words.

Our dealings with the world reveal certain truths and facts that we can observe and acknowledge. By seeing them replicated or replicating them ourselves, we can get closer to an understanding of the cause and effect (Ibid.: 59). However, we can never claim to have fully explained something nor can we claim to have spoken the truth. Truth is gained through veracity (Ibid.:57). Each must take his own path towards the truth. There is no one who has a privileged access to the truth and no two paths are alike. We must therefore never accept another’s recount of his path to the truth. All we can do is explain or own orbit around the truth, our own attempt at approaching it. We can test our own understanding by communicating it to others, but we must not mistake one person’s account of their orbit around the truth as a testament to truth itself.

This is why the explicator is so damaging in the educational setting. Instead of teaching the students how to follow their own path to the truth, he forces them to abandon their path and follow in his footsteps (Ibid.: 59). He believes that his path is the right one, not realizing that there are thousands of different ways to approach the truth. Forcing students to follow his path, a path completely alien to themselves, he reaffirms that they need his guidance, and the students who are now lost come to believe him too. What they fail to recognize is that the only way to truly learn and approach the truth is by following your own path.

Universal teaching

Having identified the explicative order as damaging we still need to explore what should take its place. Rancière points to what is called universal teaching, which main goal is to emancipate. It is an educational practice where the teacher plays a secondary role and the student is placed in the center. To better grasp what universal teaching entails we will look into why it is said to be a

method of will, we will explore the student's task, and finally we will take a closer look at the teacher's role.

A method of will

Universal teaching is in some ways a natural extension to the idea that man is a will served by an intelligence. This privileged position of the will leads to the natural conclusion that what is needed in developing the intelligence is a strong will that can force it to exercise itself on the required subject fields. As we have already seen, this gives rise to the idea of equality and the ideal of education as emancipation.

In short, the grand idea of universal teaching is therefore that one can learn by themselves when they want to, either due to their own desire or due to the constraint of the situation (Ibid.: 12). There is no need for a master explicator. All that is needed to learn is a will to do so.

However, this does not mean that we should discharge the teacher completely. We must recognize that some students do not have the willpower themselves to put in the effort it requires to learn. In such cases the student's intelligence can be subject to the teacher's will, without having the teacher's intelligence intervene in the process at all (Ibid.: 13). When studying, the only intelligence the student should be concerned with is that of the book he is reading.

We see how this separation from the teacher's intelligence allows for emancipation. Unlike the teacher's intelligence, the book does not have an intention beyond the meaning it is trying to communicate. The book cannot give orders nor can it judge the student's interpretation. What the book offers is a totality of meaning that lends itself to the student if he maintains his focus and tirelessly seeks to properly understand it (Ibid.: 23). Where the explicator introduces the student to the subject field at a certain pace, always holding something back, preventing the student from grasping the entirety, the book lays it all out there. The student is not held in limbo; instead, he sees that if he commits himself to it, he can in fact understand the meaning of the book. He has full access to the meaning being communicated, and nothing else is needed.

It is this realization, that the student himself is in charge of what and when to learn that is the epitome of emancipation, and hence of universal teaching. Therefore, a teacher practicing universal teaching will not have to worry about what the student learns: "He will learn what he

wants, nothing maybe. He will know he can learn because the same intelligence is at work in all the productions of the human mind, and a man can always understand another man's words" (Ibid.: 18). The focus of any emancipator should simply be to emancipate. To provide the students with the consciousness of their own capabilities. Neither an emancipator nor an explicator can make a student truly learn something he does not wish to learn. Yet, an emancipated student will be capable of learning what he wants without the assistance of a teacher.

The student's task

Still, the emancipated student must also learn how to learn. It is crucial that the student becomes aware of his own capabilities, but in doing so, he must learn how to utilize his intellectual capacity. According to Rancière underlying principle beneath universal teaching is: "*To learn something and to relate to it all the rest by this principle: all men have equal intelligence*" (Ibid.: 18). In this lies the secret to universal teaching. Since, as we have already established, all men have equal intelligence, we know that all knowledge and meaning are linked by this intelligence. Nothing made by humans can be alien to our intelligence. There is no outside. Our task is to see and create the relations that form the unity of human knowledge.

Whenever we learn something, we must relate it to what we already know. We must create the links that makes it part of our existing understanding of the world and the truth. However, since we all have our own orbits around the truth, since we all have our own meanings and translations, the task of relating new knowledge to the existing is one we must perform individually. The possible connections will always differ from person to person.

This is why universal teaching demands of the student that he is always able to talk about what he learns (Ibid.: 20). He must continually answer a three-part question: "what do you see? what do you think about it? what do you make of it?" (Ibid.: 23). By constantly recounting, reflecting, and applying everything he learns the student is forced to create relations between what he learns and what he already knows. He will only be able to speak proficiently about what he learns, going beyond mere recitation, if he realizes how it taps into the rest of his understanding. If he sees how it affects not only his understanding of the specific subject field, but the entire sum of his knowledge and insight.

To ensure that the student does not simply fall back on his imagination when explaining the relations and effects of what he learns, universal teaching has one rule: “he must be able to show, in the book, the materiality of everything he says” (Ibid.: 20). The student is limited by the book and by the meaning being communicated by it. He must apply his intelligence to grapple with the meaning of the book if he wish to expand his knowledge. If not, he will only be making new connections between existing knowledge.

The ignorant’s questions

It is the task of the emancipating teacher to ensure that the student stays with the book and keeps recounting, reflecting on, and applying what he learns. The teacher does this in part by asserting his will on the students. By making them read and reread the book. However, he also does it by questioning the students (Ibid.: 29). However, he should not question the student in order to instruct. Pedagogical or rhetorical questions will not do. He must question them as equals, with the intention of being instructed by them (Ibid.: 29).

In other words, questioning the students does not amount to a test of whether they have understood correctly. Instead, it is a way for the teacher to ensure that the students have understood, full stop. This form of genuine questioning where you ask to learn not to confirm can only truly be performed by someone who does not know more than the student does (Ibid.: 29). You can only ask genuine questions when you do not know the answer. On the one hand, this challenges the idea of a teacher, as it transforms his expertise into a liability. On the other though, it opens for the possibility of anyone being a teacher. If all that is needed to teach is to ask questions, then science is not needed in teaching (Ibid.: 30). In fact, the ignorant one, the one who does not know, will be a more competent teacher as he can ask questions about anything, only being led by his curiosity and will to understand. To teach, in the practice of universal teaching, is therefore simply to ask questions about what one does not know. A task that requires no expertise, but only a healthy curiosity.

Rancière’s concept of universal teaching is centered on the ideal of agency necessitated by the equality of humans. It is a formative concept that complements the ideal of Bildung in emphasizing the need for students to realize their own capacity and thereby engage themselves in their own exploration of the truth. Rancière recognizes that the authority teachers have been bestowed are damaging for the students’ learning and development as humans. He further

outlines the need for persistence and will in any learning endeavor and identifies repetition and memorization as an important foundation for understanding.

Chapter 3: The Transformative Power of Education

The Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire recognized that education could be a transformative power. He believed that education should build on communication and that the subjects should be relevant and present for the students. In relation to the present thesis, these ideas will complement Rancière's student-centered approach by introducing new reflections on the requirements to the educational content. Freire's philosophy will also serve the purpose of showing how Gadamer's focus on history and horizons can become active forces that promote change and development instead of being conservative.

Freire was a strong advocate of critical pedagogy. With his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, he presented not only a political analysis of the societal order but also a new educational program that could help liberate the oppressed. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is a very politically motivated book. Nonetheless, his educational ideas have gained a following far exceeding the ideological boundaries.

I will briefly explain Freire's political project in order to outline the context before I will examine his concept of problem-posing education.

Freire's political project

In order to engage with Freire's thoughts on pedagogy and education we must first understand the context and intention behind his philosophy. I believe that his ideas have relevance far beyond the limited political sphere in which he positions them. Nonetheless, briefly examining Freire's political project will serve the purpose of opening up for our further exploration as well as providing a more grounded basis from which to understand his ideas.

Freire takes his starting point in what he sees as an unjust societal order, where there is a small class of oppressors and a large class of oppressed (Freire, 2005: 44). This societal order leads to dehumanization of both the oppressors and the oppressed and must therefore be overturned if we are to become more fully human (ibid.: 44). It goes against humans' natural vocation to be

in an oppressor-oppressed relation, as it engenders an unnatural violence in the oppressors, which then lead to the very tangible dehumanization of the oppressed (Ibid.: 44).

What is needed is for the oppressed as well as for the oppressors to become aware of the fact that they themselves maintain this order through accepting and internalizing it (Ibid.: 48).

Especially the oppressed need to regain their agency by realizing their own power to act, challenge and transform the societal order. The challenge is how to make the oppressed conscious of this without simultaneously subjecting them to the beliefs and convictions of the “liberators” (Ibid.: 48).

Freire’s pedagogy is thought to be an answer to this question. An attempt to include the oppressed in the process of becoming conscious by showing them an alternative way of seeing the world and opening up a space for them to regain their agency.

Problem-posing education

The educational model that Freire advocates for is called problem-posing education. The central ideas is to have the educational vantage point within the community and culture that the students are familiar with. By allowing the students to go from the familiar to the foreign in their own pace, they regain agency and avoid becoming subject to an intrusive ideology.

In exploring Freire’s concept of problem-posing education, we will start by outlining the counter-image to this education. Then we will examine the purpose of problem-posing education, and finally we will occupy ourselves with the concepts of thematic universes and limit-situations.

The banking concept of education

Problem-posing education is Freire’s alternative to what he names the banking concept of education. The name reflects a model of education, which has narration at its core. The teacher narrates to the students and demand of them that they memorize the narrated content (Ibid.: 71). This way of practicing education turns the students into containers to be filled by the teacher (Ibid.: 72). The criteria for success is for the teacher to deposit as much content into the students as possible, and for the students to uncritically permit themselves to this process.

There is no communication in this form of education, as that would impede on the process of depositing. There are only dictates that the students must memorize and be ready to repeat when called upon. "This is the "banking" concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits" (Ibid.: 72). The students' agency is reduced to the act of memorizing and repeating. There is no room for individual thoughts or individualized modes of memorizing.

The purpose of problem-posing education

The alternative that Freire offers is meant to overturn this model by promoting individual thought and agency. Problem-posing education places communication in the center and rejects all dictates. The intention is to further consciousness: "It epitomizes the special characteristic of consciousness: being conscious of, not only as intent on objects but as turned in upon itself in a Jasperian "split"—consciousness as consciousness of consciousness" (Ibid.: 79). The task is not so much to reveal objects and connections in the world but rather to make the students conscious of their own consciousness. To make them realize that they too have the capacity to think and that their thoughts and perceptions of the world are part of what constitutes it.

The consciousness of their own agency opens up for a new understanding of the world. Instead of introducing the students to theoretical concepts, they are confronted with concrete and tangible challenges that invites the students to engage (Ibid.: 81). By exposing students to such problems, that are relevant to themselves and their immediate world, they realize that they can respond to those challenges (Ibid.: 81).

Through exploring and engaging in the immediate challenges, the students slowly come to realize that all problems are interrelated (Ibid.: 81). There are therefore no limit to what they can influence. There are no principal difference between problems in their local community and problems on the national level. It is only a matter of scale. Seeing that they have agency in their local community it follows that the same applies for national affairs. By becoming conscious of this, the students gradually come to regard themselves as committed (Ibid.: 81). They realize that they can regain control of their own life and that there are no limits to what they can engage in.

Identifying thematic universes

The key to introducing students to this new way of thinking is, according to Freire, to identify what he labels their thematic universe. A thematic universe is a complex of ideas, values, institutions, and so on that constitute the reality in which we live (Ibid.: 101). Trying to identify thematic universes entails investigating the way the students perceive the world. “The object of the investigation is [...] the thought-language with which men and women refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world” (Ibid.: 96). The concept of thematic universes stems from the realization that we all see and think about the world in different ways. There is no absolute objectivity that we can refer to, when seeking to establish a common ground. However, this does not mean that we are alien to each other. By making the effort of trying to understand the thought-language that is specific to the different communities and individuals, we can gain an understanding of their worldview. Through this understanding, we can enter into a dialogue that can develop into a mutual understanding.

Each thematic universe consists of a complex of “generative themes”. These themes are, “the concrete representation of many of these ideas, values, concepts, and hopes, as well as the obstacles which impede the people's full humanization” (Ibid.: 101). They are the beliefs we hold, the truths we subscribe to, and the traditions we subject ourselves to. Each generative theme has its own logic, often in opposition to other themes. However, they engage in a dialectic relation striving towards plenitude, not uniformity. This contradictory yet coherent complex is what constitutes our perception of reality. It is neither strictly objective nor completely subjective. Instead, it is what forms the social bonds within smaller communities and distinguishes one community from the other.

At the same time, the generative themes interrelate with history. Because we as humans are aware of both our past, present, and future, we develop and transform our own history (Ibid.: 101). We recognize different epochal units that have emerged throughout our history. Epochal units that are distinct yet not confined. They are all part of the historical continuity that allows us to learn from the past and develop into the future (Ibid.: 101). The thematic universes, which forms the starting point for problem-posing education, are the complex of generative themes set within a certain epochal unit.

What Freire recognized was that students become alienated from the subject field that is taught if it does not correspond with their thematic universe. Any education that wishes to foster

dialogue and communication must therefore take its starting point within the present, existential, and concrete situations that the students are familiar with: “Utilizing certain basic contradictions, we must pose this existential, concrete, present situation to the people as a problem which challenges them and requires a response—not just at the intellectual level, but at the level of action” (Ibid.: 96). The contradictions that are found within all thematic universes, between different generative themes can be used to invite students into a discussion. The problem must be concrete and recognizable as this ensures that they all can participate competently. By not posing it as a theoretical problem, there is no room for a bystander to judge right from wrong. Instead, the students can utilize their first-hand experiences to broaden and enrich the discussion. They thereby come to realize that their own perspective holds value and are important in their own rights.

Starting on the level of the students thematic universes are therefore a quintessential first step if the students are to become involved instead of alienated. However, the true value of problem-posing education lies in the following step: helping the students overcome the constraints of their thematic universes and change the reality in which they live.

Overcoming limit-situations

Having become conscious of our own thematic universes we are left in “a dialectical relationship between the determination of limits and [our] own freedom” (Ibid.: 99). We can see that our perception of reality is already determined by the continuity of history, and the generative themes that are present in our societies. Concepts that extends far beyond us. Yet, in becoming aware of the limitations we are met with, we see that they are not given. We realize that they are historical constructs that could be challenged and changed (Ibid.: 99).

Freire names the identified historical constructs that limit us limit-situations (Ibid.: 99). The limit-situations are at the boundaries of our reality. These limiting factors may at first seem central to our existence but at closer inspection, we realize that they have no valuable purpose, but merely exists as constraints on our freedom.

The act of negating and overcoming limit-situations are called limit-acts (Ibid.: 99). They are the fulfillment of the regained agency. A signifier that we have taken responsibility for our own existence and freed ourselves from the determination of limits. Freire quotes Vieira Pinto in saying that: “the "limit-situations" are not "the impassable boundaries where possibilities end,

but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin; they are not "the frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being more" (Ibid.: 99). It is thus in the limit-situations that we find the possibility of agency. Where we can rise above the given and become more fully human. Being human is not about subscribing to the available norms and truths. It is about taking responsibility for your own life and humanity as a whole by challenging the given and thereby contributing to the furthered development of human history.

With Freire, we recognize that education is more than just gaining new understandings and internalizing traditions and ideas. Education is also about agency and challenging social structures and hierarchies. One of his great insights is that in order to develop the students' agency the subjects must be relevant and engaging to them. This shifts the dynamic from students having to understand the teacher's perspective to the teacher having to understand the students' worldview.

Chapter 4: The problem of Socrates

We have now seen how Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire, each with their own perspective, can contribute to the theoretical foundation that shall assist in answering what teaching for practical wisdom entails. Yet, we must be careful not to simply pick and choose from the different philosophies in a way that enhances our own agenda. In an effort to avoid this, I will seek to navigate, and when possible resolve, some of the apparent conflicts among the three thinkers. The aim is to develop a complementary perspective that can help address our investigative question.

Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire all address the issue of how to become fully human. For Gadamer the road goes through *Bildung*, for Rancière it requires emancipation, and for Freire it is a matter of liberation. However, their commonalities seem to end there. Gadamer's hermeneutics with its rehabilitation of authority seems to be in conflict with the Rancièrian backlash against hierarchies and his ideal of emancipation through equality, not to mention Freire's revolutionary project of liberation. These apparent conflicts should not simply be denied or overlooked, but I believe that on closer inspection we can find a strong and fruitful common ground between the three.

Interestingly, both Gadamer and Rancière use Socrates as a central figure of reference, albeit with very different intentions and conclusions. Their divergent interpretations of Socrates can reveal something central about their differences as well as their commonalities. I will therefore analyze three central themes in the Socratic figure from the perspective of Gadamer and Rancière respectively. The three themes are *docta Ignorantia*, the question of "How shall I live?", and the idea of consensus through dialectics. Subsequently, I will explore their shared aversion against method, which will lead us to examine how Freire's vocabulary can help us to engage in the formative processes that Gadamer and Rancière argue for.

Docta Ignorantia

The Socratic *docta ignorantia* has long been thought of as the epitome of knowledge. The learned ignorance, knowing that we do not know anything, is paradoxically the highest level of insight that we can gain as humans. Both Gadamer and Rancière pick up on this ideal of *docta ignorantia*. Yet, they have very different interpretations of the Socratic position. While Gadamer

refers to Socrates as the role model for true questioning and a keen example of the experienced disposition of mind (Gadamer, 2004: 356), Rancière sees him as one of the root causes for the perpetuated inequality in Western societies (Rancière, 1991: 29). These radically different interpretations of Socrates naturally raise some doubts regarding the legitimacy of relating Gadamer and Rancière's philosophy as I have proposed in this thesis. To address these we need to examine the different positions more in depth.

Let us begin by exploring the Gadamerian position. For Gadamer, *docta ignorantia* relates directly to the negativity of experience (Gadamer, 2004: 356). As we saw above, having an experience always entails that something we thought to be true turns out to be false (Ibid.: 347). We gain a new insight that replaces our previously held beliefs. This dynamic, inherent to all experiences, causes the experienced person to be open to new experiences (Ibid.: 350). He realizes that he cannot know which of his currently held beliefs are true and which can be overturned by a new experience. Since there is no telling right beliefs from wrong, he is forced to accept that he cannot be certain about anything. It is this radicality that is expressed in *docta ignorantia*: knowing that you do not know.

Now, Gadamer takes this position to involve a fundamental humility. Since we have no certain knowledge we must be humble (Ibid.: 355). We must not forcefully push our own beliefs and arguments but instead allow others to engage in the conversation as well. After all, they could hold the argument that disproves our current belief. This is why Gadamer emphasizes listening over speaking. Acknowledging that the other could be right requires that we listen to the other's arguments. In doing so, we must seek to suspend our own beliefs and prejudices so that our interlocutor can speak freely and to ensure that our understanding of his argument is not tainted by our preconceived fore-meanings (Ibid.: 357).

In this, we recognize a passivity. The Gadamerian *docta ignorantia* calls us to take a step back. To let others take center stage. If we exercise our will too strongly we run the risk of shutting out the other and muting his argument. To be experienced in the Gadamerian sense is therefore also to be patient. We need to allow the truth to show itself and not forcefully push our opinions through. Our opinions suppress the questions that would otherwise naturally arise themselves. The good questions *occur, arise, or present* themselves (Ibid.: 360). It is not our will but *the thing itself* that causes us to gain new experiences. Our task is to allow it to present itself to us.

So, in the Gadamerian perspective *docta ignorantia* entails a humble passivity that stems from the realization that we must be open and listen in order to have new experiences and thereby gain insight. For Gadamer, Socrates is a prime example of this, as he engages in dialogue with people who at the time were thought to be ignorant.

Rancière on the hand does not equate *docta ignorantia* with humility and passivity. On the contrary, he identifies self-empowerment and willpower as the key aspects of learning and gaining knowledge (Rancière, 1991: 12). As recognized in his saying that man is a will served by an intelligence, there is no room for passivity in the quest for knowledge. Understanding depends on the will forcing the intelligence to work on the subject matter in question. We cannot just lean back and wait for the questions to come to us. Instead, we must engage in the tedious task of repetition (Ibid.: 23). Reading and rereading. Recreating conditions and experiments to re-see what we have observed in order to substantiate our understanding. It is a continuous task, as we can never claim to have arrived at the truth. This is Rancière's *docta ignorantia*. Knowing that we do not know, and exactly therefore tirelessly seeking ever greater understanding.

The Rancièrian *docta ignorantia* leads us to tell others what we have seen (Ibid.: 62). We seek verification of our own experiences and hence it is speaking not listening that have priority. Intelligence is all about seeing, comparing, and verifying. It is an activity being controlled by the active force of the will. There is no room for a passive humility. Our ability to understand depends on our ability to stay focused. Errors occur when we become distracted or lazy (Ibid.: 55). When we start accepting other people's beliefs as the truth without substantiating them ourselves. For Rancière, Socrates is a symbol of the scholar trying to direct the thoughts of the common people (Ibid. 29). In the Rancièrian perspective, the Socratic dialogue leaves very little room for the interlocutor to genuinely participate in the questioning.

This leaves us with two apparently opposing positions. On the one hand, we have Gadamer who calls for humility and passivity. On the other, we have Rancière who calls for self-empowerment and the exercise of will. It is Socrates as the wise and humble philosopher, or as the oppressive scholar who manipulates the people. Still, I will argue that they essentially are saying the same thing.

They both acknowledge that the only honest position that we can take is the one signified by *docta ignorantia*: knowing that we do not know. Acknowledging that we can never claim to have complete and certain knowledge. The difference between them arises from a difference in perspective. They are aiming for the same equilibrium but their scales have tipped in opposite directions. To put it schematically Gadamer is addressing the people that think they are knowledgeable. The people that think they know the truth and have a unique claim to it. For these people, the road to *docta ignorantia* goes through humility. They must realize that they do not have a privileged access to the truth. They must come to regard other people as having an equal claim to the truth. They do not lack self-confidence. On the contrary, they are overly confident. They need to take a step back and start listening to other people.

Rancière, on the other hand, is addressing the people who thinks of themselves as being less intelligent than the scholars are. Their road to *docta ignorantia* goes through self-empowerment. They must come to realize that they too have a claim to the truth. They are fighting against an internalized hierarchy that places them at the bottom. What is needed is a disregard for the hierarchy that they subject themselves to and a belief in their own capabilities (Ibid.: 28). They are being too humble, refraining from engaging in the intellectual endeavors due to a mistaken mistrust in their own capacities. Rancière is trying to show them that the inequality of intelligence, which they believe presents a natural hierarchy, is in fact only a poorly substantiated opinion. The inequality has manifested itself because they have failed to exercise their intelligence (Ibid.: 27). All that is needed to right this wrong is for them to take action and engage in the intellectual exercises.

If Gadamer succeeds in installing humility in his audience, the result will be a person who used to only trust his own judgment, but now knows that others might be right. If Rancière succeeds, the result will be a person who used to only trust others' judgement, but now knows that he too can be right. In essence the same disposition, but arrived at from different starting points.

We see the commonality in their take on questioning, which is central to them both. They agree that questioning requires persistence. We see this in Rancière's insistence on will, attention, and repetition (Ibid.: 23), and in Gadamer defining the art of questioning as the art of questioning ever further (Gadamer, 2004: 360). For both Gadamer and Rancière a true question entails that you do not know the answer beforehand. The question must arise from a genuine interest. This is why *docta ignorantia* is important to them both. Only by knowing that you do not

know can you express genuine interest in something. It is the desire to understand that drives questioning, and this desire stems from ignorance.

So even though Gadamer and Rancière are arguing *from* two different positions, and thus *with* different means, they are essentially arguing *for* the same thing: Docta ignorantia; the acknowledgement that you do not have certain knowledge and therefore must engage in the act of constant questioning.

Answering the fundamental question

The Socratic legacy is not limited to his idea of docta ignorantia. Socrates also posed the one question that has intrigued and occupied philosophers ever since, the question of “How shall I live?” Many answers to this question have been proposed, but none has settled it. The question of “how shall I live” is interesting as the proposed answers and especially the routes taken to arrive at them says a lot about the individual philosophers. This holds true for Gadamer and Rancière as well. They are both, in their own way occupied with the question of how to live, signified by their respective focus on Bildung and emancipation. However, they differ in how to arrive at an answer to the question. Gadamer is in favor of authority in the quest for an answer (Ibid.: 281). Rancière, on the other hand, identifies authority as a corrupting element in any attempt to find an answer (Rancière, 1991: 59). It is a conflict that originates in their respective take on understanding.

Once again, let us start by examining the Gadamerian position. According to Gadamer, understanding is always understanding better (Gadamer, 2004: 347). We recognize this in the negativity of experience. When we understand we better our understanding by getting rid of false beliefs. Consequently, there is a progressive aspect to understanding. We move forward towards a better and more complete understanding of the world and our lives. Even though Gadamer denounces the Hegelian idea of absolute knowledge, he maintains the striving towards it and the idea of progress as inherent to understanding. There is a natural dynamic that propels our understanding forward by resolving conflicts and raising our collective understanding to a new level.

From this progression, the idea of hierarchy follows. Some are more progressed than others are, and hence more knowledgeable than others (Ibid.: 281). Not due to a natural disposition but

simply due to them having walked further along the path of knowledge and thus being more experienced. Since we as humans are finite, we cannot gain complete knowledge of ourselves (Ibid.: 351). Or in the context of the Socratic question, we can never truly know how to live. We are strapped for time in our own lives, and in realizing this, we seek advice from the people we take to be more insightful. We grant them an authority in certain aspects of life based on their accomplishments and perceived insights. This is not done in an act of submission, but rather in the attempt to spend our time wisely. To avoid the known dead-ends and instead venture into the still unknown.

Rancière repudiates this acceptance of hierarchy. For him, the only way to understand is on our own (Rancière, 1991: 59). We each have our individual orbits around the truth, our own paths, and the only viable way is to follow that path. The idea that all understanding is better understanding might hold true on an individual level. However, we cannot simply choose to subscribe to another person's version of the truth and act as if it is our own. Especially not in the interest of saving time. This is just yet another example of the laziness that leads to false beliefs.

The question of how to live our lives, despite its universal nature, is a question that must be answered on an individual basis. Other people's experiences are at best opinions. Opinions based on observations that we must then try to repeat in order to decide whether they are substantiated or not (Ibid.: 56). The idea that knowledge can be accumulated and that we can access this knowledge pool through certain experienced people is to Rancière a dangerous idea that goes against the all-important egalitarian ideal of intellectual endeavor.

We are again faced with two opposing ideas. Gadamer who believes that understanding is a progressive dynamic that advances the total understanding of the universality, and Rancière who believes that understanding is an individual endeavor. They are both seeking to answer Socrates' fundamental question of how to live, but their approaches differ greatly. According to Gadamer, we will gradually inch closer to an answer through the progression of human history, where the question for Rancière constantly poses itself anew as a distinct problem for each individual.

However, on closer inspection their arguments are fairly similar. I do not wish to ignore the obvious difference between Gadamer's Hegelian perspective and Rancière's egalitarian ditto.

Rather, I wish to argue that the effects of these two positions ultimately are the same. The difference only occurs when we apply a greater level of abstraction.

We see this perhaps most prominently in the discussion on authority. First, they both agree that authoritative figures are damaging. They limit and constrain people. This is why Gadamer insists that authority can only be earned not bestowed (Gadamer, 2004: 281). If authority is bestowed it becomes authoritative and hinders the open relation necessary for understanding. Now, Gadamer believes that we can and do grant other people authority on a voluntary basis. It is possible and even beneficial to seek out experienced and knowledgeable people and gain insights from talking to them. Rancière is less optimistic about the possibility of granting a person authority without that relation becoming authoritative. In the Rancièrian terminology, the Gadamerian ideal would require that the student could explore the intelligence of the person of authority but without being influenced by his will (Rancière, 1991: 102). Such a distinction is only possible in a truly equal and open relation, where none of the interlocutors is applying any form of force over the other.

Rancière is not convinced that such a relation is as commonplace as Gadamer would have us believe. He therefore favors a situation where the will and the intelligence are completely separate, as this is the only way to completely avoid the potential authoritative relation (Ibid.: 13). Such a situation he finds in the student's relation to the book. A book is an expression of a human intelligence. Yet, it has no will that it can subject the student to. The will is instead to be found in either the student himself or the teacher. By having the student occupy himself with an intelligence separated from a will, Rancière ensures that the student remains free to understand the meaning in his own way.

It is worth noting that both Gadamer and Rancière emphasize the importance of understanding on our own (Gadamer, 2004: 303; Rancière, 1991: 59). We need to bring ourselves into the process of understanding and apply it to our own context in order for us to fully understand something. This is why we must avoid authoritative figures. They force us to understand as them, forgetting that understanding depends on our ability to individually relate and apply.

It is equally important to notice that Rancière, in arguing for the priority of the book over the person, is not explicitly rejecting the idea of quality, or classics, as Gadamer would call it. He too places great importance on the subject matter that the student occupies himself with. After all, it

is the intelligence of the book that is the sole qualifier of the student's learning. Therefore, Rancière is not downright rejecting the idea of intellectual authority in the idealistic Gadamerian sense. He too believes in learning from other people's intelligence, but it should preferably happen in a relation where the will and intelligence are separate, i.e. the relation between the student and the book. Otherwise, the risk of submission is too high.

As for Rancière's position on the Gadamerian idea of progression, things are less clear. Rancière does operate with the concept of the equal and shared human intelligence (Rancière, 1991: 72). He does believe that we are orbiting around the same truth. Hence, he is not necessarily against the idea of universality that is so central to Gadamer. Still, whether or not we as a collective intelligence is inching closer to the truth or not is probably not a question worth grappling with for Rancière. Any answer to this question can only ever be an opinion. We have no means of substantiating any belief either for or against such an idea. Furthermore, it has little if any effect on our individual approach to understanding our lives. We must individually seek to answer the question "How shall I live?". Whether our attempt at an answer will be of any help to future generations is beyond our knowledge.

Gadamer and Rancière may differ on the abstract notion of whether the human universality is characterized by progress or not, and on whether we can proficiently engage in an open conversation with a person of authority. However, they agree that in trying to answer the fundamental question, or any other question for that matter, we must always involve ourselves, avoid the constraints of authoritative people, and try to engage with the intelligence of other people.

Consensus or dissensus

Probably above all else, Socrates is famous for introducing dialectics. The idea that we through questioning can realize conflicts and get rid of our false beliefs. Central to Socrates' dialectics is the thought that we can agree on what is right and true. This assumption has caused some controversy over the history of Western philosophy, and it is at the center of another apparent conflict between Gadamer and Rancière.

We recognize the Socratic position in Gadamer's idea of truth and consensus. That if we let the "thing itself" speak we can reach agreement (Gadamer, 2004: 357). However, for Rancière the

fundamental state is dissensus rather than consensus (Rancière, 1991: 58). Truth is in no way unifying for Rancière. We are here confronted with yet another dichotomy between Gadamer and Rancière, and yet again, I will argue that there is common ground to be found beneath these apparently opposing positions.

The idea of consensus is central to Gadamer. We clearly recognize this in his concept of the fusion of horizons. The fusion of horizons signifies above all the unifying experience of understanding (Gadamer, 2004: 301). The process of opening up our own particular horizons in order to fuse with the historical universality. Likewise, in discussion with another person, we seek to gain a mutual understanding that supersedes our own individual understandings (Ibid.: 303). In the Gadamerian perspective, we are always looking for consensus and all our attempts at understanding is aimed at finding the shared truth.

Rancière's starting point is that we can never gain consensus (Rancière, 1991: 58). We are left in a constant state of dissensus with other people. We can never make ourselves fully understood. The best we can hope for is an adequate understanding. For Rancière truth can only be felt (Ibid.: 64). It cannot be expressed through language. Whenever we try to communicate our experience of truth, we must part from the truth and seek to translate the experience into language, which then again must undergo a counter-translation on the part of the interlocutor. The incompatibility of truth and language prevents any true consensus.

Still, common to both Gadamer and Rancière is the idea of community. As humans, we are part of a community build on the foundation of our shared condition and intelligence. Being human means that we share certain experiences with others. We can communicate. We can make ourselves understood and verify our experiences through language. Gadamer identifies this community as *Sensus Communis* (Gadamer, 2004: 17). A communal sense that gives the human will its direction towards universality. For Rancière it is exactly this idea of *Sensus Communis* that we have forgotten. At the basis of what it means to be human is a community of equals (Rancière, 1991: 72). A community of equal intelligences. Neither intelligence nor language makes sense without the idea of intellectual equality. In order to communicate we must be able to expect that others can relate to the experience that we are trying to put into words. In order to attempt to share a thought we must be able to expect that others are capable of having a similar thought.

Both Gadamer and Rancière agree that a prerequisite for the idea of humans is community. Furthermore, they both agree that it is in the community that we can become fully human. For Gadamer this is the idea of Bildung (Gadamer, 2004: 13). Raising ourselves from our particularities into the universality. Not to lose ourselves, but in order to realize ourselves. According to Rancière, we must seek to establish a society of equals if we want to become fully human. Any hierarchy or inequality between people constitute unnatural limitations. This does not mean that society as such will be equal. Rather, we must accept an unequal society as long as it is constituted by equal men (Rancière, 1991: 133). It is the feeling of true equality between people, the Sensus Communis, which is important, not the configuration of the societal institutions.

Still, this does not solve the discrepancy between Gadamer's reliance on consensus in understanding and Rancière's belief in dissensus. However, if we turn our attention to the effects of these positions instead of their abstract philosophical origins we see that the conflict is not as great as it might appear. Rancière argues that all humans have a drive to understand and to be understood (Ibid.: 62). In exploring our world, we want to know as much as possible. We therefore enter every conversation with the intention of understanding what the other is saying. We want to decipher the message that he is trying to communicate. Yet, we can never gain a complete understanding of the truth, as truth does not lend itself to language. For Rancière this is not a discouragement. On the contrary, it leads us to invest even more effort and attention in the process of understanding.

The intention behind any attempt at understanding is therefore the same for Gadamer and Rancière. They agree that we always enter into conversation with the intention of reaching an understanding, an agreement. They disagree on whether this agreement ever truly happens. Where Gadamer believes that we can reach consensus by suspending our prejudices, Rancière thinks that we must settle for an approximation of the truth. In praxis, we cannot present any solid proof for either of the positions. Still, Gadamer and Rancière find common ground in the belief that it is only by having the intention of reaching an understanding, by trying to rid ourselves of false beliefs, by acknowledging that we are part of a community that we can become fully human.

Socrates was a misunderstanding

We have seen how Gadamer and Rancière are not as different as it would appear at first glance. They both subscribe to the idea of *docta ignorantia*, they agree on the prerequisites for understanding, and they concur on the importance of *Sensus Communis* in becoming fully human. Still, we have yet to touch upon their shared deep-seated aversion against the glorification of method. To understand what they both revolt against it serves to go back to its roots, which yet again is to be found with Socrates.

In *The Problem of Socrates*, Nietzsche presents a shattering analysis of Socrates and his dialectics. Far from being a universal savior, a philosopher who led his fellow men out of the cave and into the bright and true daylight of reason, Socrates was a necessary evil (Nietzsche, 1889: 10). The Socratic dialectics was a response against a new threat in Athens: The anarchy of the instincts. More people were beginning to experience the internal conflict of instincts. The noble men's authoritative opinions could no longer silence the growing unease amongst the public. Athens was facing its own downfall, a dissolution into anarchy under the mercy of instincts (Ibid.).

Socrates provided a way out. By relying on reason to settle disputes and discomforts, he placed the decision power in a realm that no instinct could infiltrate. Reason plays by its own rules and do not submit to particular interests. That playing strictly by the rules of reason will lead you into absurdity was for Socrates a small sacrifice to make in the face of awaiting anarchy (Ibid.: 12). Socrates succeeded in saving Athens from the anarchy of instincts, but he could not foresee the extensive and damaging influence that his ideas would later have. The uncompromisable reliance on reason, even when it leads to absurd conclusions that go against all our individual experiences and feelings; the renouncing of earthly life in Christianity; the vendetta against instincts in improvement morality. These are all a symptom of the self-deception that we have been living with since Socrates (Ibid.: 11). The self-deception that we are capable of extracting ourselves from our nature. That we can seek refuge in the intellect and from this privileged place, renounce our own instincts. All we succeed in doing when going down these paths is to change the form in which our nature shows itself. We will never rid ourselves of it (Ibid.).

The original sin is not Socrates' introduction of dialectics. It was a necessary evil to prevent anarchy. However, we have later failed to recognize that it was a desperate measure introduced

in a desperate time. This leads Nietzsche to proclaim that Socrates was a misunderstanding. In essence, it is this misunderstanding and its consequences that both Gadamer and Rancière seek to resolve 2,400 years later.

Method and authoritative hierarchies

In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer wants to free the concepts of knowledge and truth from the constraints of modern science and reestablish them as being hermeneutic concepts as well (Gadamer, 2004: xx). He recognizes that knowledge and truth have lost their meaning outside the methodological frameworks of modern science. Yet, we have not lost the hermeneutic truth; we have merely forgotten its meaning and the art of finding it.

The scientific method finds its truths by subjecting objects to scientific investigation and amassing verified knowledge. Hermeneutic truth, on the other hand, is concerned with the experiences that transcend the domain of scientific method, that fails to be verified through methodological means, yet still undeniably communicate truths (Ibid.: xxi). Gadamer's rehabilitation of the humanist tradition through *Bildung*, *Sensus Communis*, *Judgement*, and *Taste* is performed with the intention of regaining the legitimacy of the hermeneutic experience in the face of the ever expanding and dominating scientific method. It is not an attempt to disregard method completely, but by reintroducing *Bildung*, *Sensus Communis*, *Judgement*, and *Taste*, four concepts that refuses to be subjected to the methodology of modern science, he wishes to show the limitations of such method. Gadamer wants to broaden the scope of our experiences of the world to also include the intangible, yet ever so valuable, experiences, feelings, and intuitive insights (Ibid.: xxii).

Similarly, Rancière identifies the focus on method as the main obstacle towards true emancipation. He finds the symptom of this narrow focus in what he terms *men of progress* (Rancière, 1993: 109). These are the men of the enlightenment. The men who believe in constant progress through rigorous scientific methodology. While this approach might advance certain sciences, it simultaneously establishes an authoritative hierarchy, Rancière argues. It is the belief in progress through method that gave birth to the explicative order, and hence it is this belief that is preventing each individual from recognizing his own intelligence.

Emancipation is at its core a matter of revealing that learning is not necessitated by method. Learning is a natural process. This is why the emancipatory approach is called universal

teaching. Rather than introducing a method, learning requires the freeing of the intelligence. What the men of progress, despite all their good intentions, fail to recognize is that all method is built on an idiosyncratic translation of truth (Ibid.: 59). Subscribing to a method therefore equals subscribing to someone else's truth. Yet, no one is in a position to lay such a powerful claim to the truth. As we have seen, we all have our own orbits around the truth, our own path, and our task is to follow that specific path in our own search for the truth. Being emancipated is precisely recognizing the limitations of method and instead depending on our own experiences, feelings, and intuitions.

A discipline of questioning and inquiring

In the works of Gadamer and Rancière, we thus find a shared project of re-establishing truth and knowledge as being independent from method. As Nietzsche demonstrated the error in the blind faith in "rationality at any price" (Nietzsche, 1889: 11), they too expose the absurdity of worshipping the scientific method as our savior. Gadamer and Rancière both argue for rediscovering or returning to our natural experience of the world. They both insist that there is value in the things that we cannot explain. That there are things that we can observe, recognize, and acknowledge as being true, without us ever being able to present a scientific proof for it. The lack of scientific verification is not a problem or something to be overcome. Not being able to adequately account for the truth is a natural and central aspect of being human.

Still, truth is not relative. Just because it does not lend itself to scientific method, it does not follow that anything goes. On the contrary, the truth is ever present (Gadamer, 2004: 470; Rancière, 1991: 58). We are constantly experiencing the truth. It can take on many forms and at times, it is more prevalent than at others, but it is still there. The human task is to allow the truth to show itself in its most pure form and to be open for it when it appears.

We have already seen how Rancière believe that we all have our own orbit around the truth. It follows that it is the same truth that we orbit and hence that we are all dealing with *the truth*. Still, the truth is not readily available to us. We must make an effort to understand the truth. We must explore our own path around the truth through a constant questioning, even though we will never truly grasp it. We recognize the same idea with Gadamer: "The fact that in such knowledge [human science] the knower's own being comes into play certainly shows the limits of method, but not of science. Rather, what the tool of method does not achieve [finding truth] must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring" (Gadamer,

2004: 484). It is in this idea of our relation to the truth that Gadamer and Rancière find common ground. For what is the Rancièrian concept of truth through veracity if not a discipline of questioning and inquiring? I acknowledge that Gadamer and Rancière have different opinions on whether we can reach the truth, but as we saw above, such distinction has little effect on the practical level of trying to understand the world.

What they are both revolting against is the idea that truth needs method. In fact, they both argue that the only way that we can truly seek the truth is by avoiding method (Gadamer, 2004: 484; Rancière, 1991: 59). Methods provide a framework, which we use to support our “truth”. We classify something as being “true” if it lives up to the requirements of the method, and hence the solidity of the “truth” depends solely on the solidity of the method. Gadamer and Rancière are interested in the truth that supports itself. The truth that cannot be brought into question by a faulty method. What they both recognize is that methods are human made and will always be subjected to our intelligence. However, truth does not lend itself to humans and neither does it subject itself to human made methods. Truth exists independent from us, but still we are capable of experiencing it, of feeling it. We can approach the truth through questioning, by letting the truth show itself and make itself be heard - not by subjecting it to a scientific method that is alien to it.

Gadamer’s quarrel with the scientific method stems from his belief that truth is and should be able to support itself (Gadamer, 2004: xx). Any “truth” that needs a methodological framework to stand is not a truth. Similarly, Rancière’s disagreement with the explicative order originates in the explicators’ authoritative claim to the “truth”. They can only uphold their hierarchy as long as they hold the key to “truth”. However, the truth cannot be taken hostage. The truth is its own friend and do not need, nor should it be given, any supervisor (Rancière, 1991: 60).

From being to being more

Gadamer and Rancière re-introduces the individual quest for truth performed amongst equal men. This quest for truth and understanding is the human task that we must all take upon us. It signifies the process of being fully human, the process of *Bildung*, the process of emancipation. It is a process where the “truths” that need support will fall and only the truth that supports itself will remain. However, in the philosophy of Gadamer and Rancière we do not find a vocabulary that can fully explain how to engage in this process. How do we go from a society where scientific method and explication have precedence over *Bildung* and emancipation, to a society

where all is engaged in the process of becoming fully human? How do we enter onto this path? Gadamer never really touches upon this aspect of entering into the process of Bildung. Instead, he is occupied with describing the process as such. Rancière clearly identifies emancipatory education as a way to lead the students onto this path. Yet, when it comes to convincing the learned person, the person who has already internalized the idea of inequality, Rancière believes that only chance can convince him of the merits of equality and emancipation (Rancière, 1991: 133).

Instead of accepting Rancière's perspective and leaving it up to chance, Freire offers an alternative route, which more or less inadvertently incorporates the Gadamerian concept of horizon. To explore this route we must return to his idea of the thematic universe. According to Freire, we all have a thematic universe that constitutes our perception of the world (Freire, 2005: 101). This is much like the Gadamerian concept of having a horizon. The thematic universes consist of generative themes, which in essence are our values and beliefs, but they also hold what Gadamer would call our prejudices (Ibid.). Now, Gadamer recognizes that we must suspend our prejudices in order to understand, an idea that Freire would second, but Freire takes this idea of suspension one step further.

In our generative themes, Freire recognizes that we do not only have individual prejudices that must be suspended. There are also institutionalized and internalized obstacles, which impede our full humanization. Freire calls these obstacles limit-situations (Ibid.: 99). With a Freirian vocabulary, it is these limit-situations that, according to Rancière, prevents the learned men from realizing the benefits of emancipation. However, Freire thinks that we are capable of overcoming the limit-situations. We do not have to wait for chance to set in.

If we become familiar with our generative themes, or in the words of Gadamer, come to understand ourselves, we can identify the obstacles, the limit-situations, from the true values (Ibid.). This is achieved through a critical dialogue where our generative themes are examined, our prejudices suspended, and our held truths are tested to see if they can stand by themselves or if they will collapse. Once we have identified the limit-situations we can overcome them by performing limit-acts (Ibid.). These are essentially acts that renounce the limit-situations by no longer acting in accordance with them. It is through these limit-acts that we can free ourselves from the constraints of the incarnated inequality and move from being to being more (Ibid.).

Freire shows how we can actively seek to enter into the process of Bildung and emancipation by applying the Gadamerian ideas of understanding to the social historical constructs that constitute our world view and hence our society. We do not have to only focus on young students and hope that chance will convince the learned men. We can in fact proactively try to engage all men in the process of becoming fully human. However, it is only by allowing the ideas of Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire to complement each other that we realize this common ground, which not only advances the projects of Bildung and emancipation but also resolves some of the problems that the philosophies encounter on their own.

Chapter 5: Understanding the central dimensions of liberal learning in management education

The philosophical explorations of the ideas of Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire have outlined a framework of what Practical Wisdom understood as Bildung might entail. We have seen that in essence it is a matter of understanding our own place in the universality and acting accordingly. We achieve this understanding through self-examination and a continuing questioning and inquiring into the surrounding world.

With this framework at hand, I will revisit Colby et al.'s four concepts for liberal learning in an effort to answer the question of what teaching for Practical Wisdom in management education entails. I will first explore the three modes of thinking: analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning. The concepts are signifiers of the process of understanding and serve to clarify how this continuing process unfolds. It is important to note that the concepts are interdependent. As a unity, they form the circular process that constitutes understanding. After having explored the three modes of thinking, I will try to weave these readings together under the overarching concept of practical wisdom and examine what teaching for practical wisdom might entail in relation to management education.

The thing itself as praxis

The first mode of thinking identified by Colby et al. is analytical thinking, which they define as: "Analytical Thinking abstracts from particular experience in order to produce formal knowledge that is general in nature and independent of any particular context. It is methodical and consistent, beginning with a particular set of assumptions or categories and proceeding to develop the implications of these concepts through deduction" (Colby et al., 2011: 60). It is a mode of thinking typically linked to mathematics, logic, and economics. Analytical thinking relates to technical mastery and due to its methodical nature, it is often the defining characteristic of academic work (Ibid.: 61).

Colby et al. recognize that analytical thinking is the most basic feature of higher education (Ibid.). However, in linking it specifically to technical mastery and the disciplines of mathematics,

logic, and economics they tend to place it mainly within the natural sciences. Yet, analytical thinking is an essential element in all learning. To understand how, it serves to examine the content of analytical thinking a bit closer.

Analytical thinking is the act of producing formal knowledge. A process that moves from the particular to the general in order to identify the parts that are independent of the context. In praxis, it always starts with an observation. The task is then to strip away the context specific aspects of the observation so that only the general aspects remain. Having identified the general aspects we can begin to compare different observations without being distracted by the particularities of the context. This enables us to identify patterns that through methodical testing can produce formal knowledge. Having produced this formal knowledge we can then deduce logical implications from it, which again will help us understanding future observations.

We recognize this process from the methodical nature of natural science where the continuing testing of hypotheses drives the production of knowledge. However, through the analyses of Gadamer and Rancière's thoughts we have come to see that this process of testing hypotheses is instrumental to all understanding. Understanding is a process of constant refining and correction in order to arrive at the true meaning (Gadamer, 2004: 268). In this way, the underlying intention of the scientific method and the hermeneutic praxis align. In the scientific method, we repeat and replicate experiments to isolate the constant and general aspect. In the hermeneutic praxis, we correct and refine our fore-meaning until it is aligned with the meaning of the text and no longer infected by our own particular prejudices. In both cases, we ideally end up with an understanding that we can communicate to others exactly due to its general nature. Importantly, this is not saying that either guarantees the truth. Rather, they merely operate on the *assumption* that there is a truth, which we through our praxis should seek to arrive at. Both the scientific method and the hermeneutic praxis necessitates the *idea* of a truth. They need the assumption that if we perform the method or praxis well we can arrive at the truth. Not acknowledging this assumption would provide an opening for relativism as there would be nothing to qualify the findings. Yet, neither of them operate with a position where they can claim to have found said truth. The scientific method is always seeking to falsify its findings, thereby recognizing that its "truths" are only preliminary at best. Likewise, the hermeneutic praxis recognizes that the "truth" is determined partially by the individual interpreter and hence always subject to challenges by conflicting "truths". By recognizing that both scientific method and hermeneutic praxis work under the assumption of there being a truth, but neither of them ever

reaching a point where they claim to have uncovered the truth, we see that the concept of truth is important as a guiding principle in our praxis not as an end goal.

In praxis, we seek the truth by maintaining an uncompromising focus on the thing itself, be that a natural phenomenon, a text, or a person. We recognize this in the Rancièrian three-part question: What do you see? What do you think about it? What do you make of it? (Rancière, 1991: 23). In this, we see an insistence on focusing on the thing itself. All three parts of the question are concerned with the things itself in an effort to understand it. Similarly, we recognize it in Gadamer's idea of refining our fore-meanings in accordance with the thing itself (Gadamer, 2004: 269). It is the thing itself, which determines whether our fore-meanings are correct or not. The thing itself binds us and provide boundaries for our understanding. In believing, that we can find a truth in the thing itself we commit ourselves to the ideal of producing formal knowledge, while simultaneously knowing that we will never have complete and true knowledge (Ibid.: 351).

Central to Rancière's three-part question as well as Gadamer's idea of refining fore-meanings is self-engagement. In the case of the three-part question, we have to account for what *we* see, what *we* think about it, and what *we* make of it. Similarly, it is *our* fore-meaning that is being refined according to Gadamer. The aspect of self-engagement highlights the dual nature of analytical thinking. On the one side, we seek to produce formal and objective knowledge. On the other, the exact praxis of doing this requires that we engage our subjective perspectives and ourselves. From Gadamer and Rancière we learn that we cannot observe the thing itself from an objective vantage point. There is no position from where we can neutrally assess the thing itself. Rather, we must accept that our own horizon always influences our understanding (Ibid.: 303). Instead of striving for an objective vantage point, we should actively engage ourselves in the process of understanding. Still, we should do so with rigor, discipline, and determination, as prescribed by Rancière and Gadamer, while maintaining understanding the thing itself as the ultimate goal.

The second part of Colby et al.'s definition of analytical thinking is the concept of deduction. Logically developing the implications of the formal knowledge. We are used to thinking of this process as belonging to mathematics or logic where we develop theorems by creating a chain of accepted truths. However, deduction is also central to the way we use language. As described in chapter 2 (see *Wanting to understand and be understood*) language is in itself an

abstraction. Because truth does not lend itself to language, language signifies a translation of an experience of truth (Rancière, 1991: 58). We use language to translate our own experiences into words so they become understandable for other people. In this way language is essentially a process of going from something concrete, our experiences, to something abstract, the words we use to describe it. This then enables our interlocutor to develop the implications of these concepts by deduction. As we cannot directly explain our experiences through language, we try to isolate the general aspect of our experiences so that our interlocutor will be able to deduct the meaning. We strip away anything too context specific and instead we focus on communicating something that can be understood by another reasonable person. The requirement of our interlocutor is that he can deduct the intended meaning from the communicated words. He must be able to perform a counter-translation, through which he manipulates the words so that they makes sense to him. Manipulating is here not a negative term. As we have seen with Rancière, it merely signifies the acknowledgment that if we accept language at its face value and understand all words and communication literally we will fail in understanding and in making ourselves understood (Ibid.: 62).

This also highlights another paradoxical aspect of analytical thinking. If we succeed in producing formal knowledge that represents the truth, we can only communicate this finding through language, which entails that we make an abstraction from the truth. Even if we individually can arrive at the truth, we will not be able to communicate it objectively. We will have to make a translation of the truth, which will then be subject to a counter-translation by our interlocutor. As Rancière pointed to, the “objective” truth will go through at least two subjective translations when communicated (Ibid.). The process of searching for objectivity is thus always a process. It is a continuing process occupied with the thing itself.

Still, this does not lead to subjectivism. The acknowledgement that strict objectivity is out of our reach does not mean that we can only relate to our own perspective. The realization that we can in fact communicate and make ourselves understood creates a sense of community. The experience that we all have equal access to the thing itself confirms that we are part of a larger community. By insisting on seeking the truth in the thing itself, something that exists independently from us, we accept that the world is not dependent on us and thus we disregard subjectivism. Placing the thing itself at the center of our understanding attention, we also acknowledge that the thing itself sets a boundary for the possible interpretations. The thing itself determines the legitimacy of our understanding. Still, the thing itself is not available to us as a

static object. We can only access the thing itself through a self-engaging praxis. We must actively engage ourselves in the process of understanding the thing itself. It is through the praxis of questioning and inquiring into the thing itself that we produce formal knowledge. Thus, we see that the formal knowledge that comes from analytical thinking has an active nature. The thing itself is only available to us through our praxis. As recognized with Gadamer, any formal knowledge about the thing itself is linked to our praxis (Gadamer, 2004: 307). When we subsequently want to use or communicate the formal knowledge, we must enter into a praxis of understanding. As presented by both Gadamer and Rancière, formal knowledge is thus never available to us as an object (Ibid; Rancière, 1991: 58). We are constantly producing it through our self-engaging praxes within the boundaries presented by the thing itself.

Navigating uncertainty

The second mode of thinking identified by Colby et al. as essential to teaching liberal learning in management education is multiple framing. It is complementary to analytical thinking and defined in this way: “Multiple Framing is the ability to work intellectually with fundamentally different, sometimes mutually incompatible, analytical perspectives. It involves conscious awareness that any particular scheme of Analytical Thinking or intellectual discipline frames experience in particular ways” (Colby et al., 2011: 60). Multiple framing is the awareness of the fact that in order to solve complex problems it is necessary to look at them from several, at times incompatible views.

Multiple framing addresses the fundamental human challenge of navigating uncertainty. We have learned from Gadamer that we will never have complete knowledge (Gadamer, 2004: 351). This entails that we always find ourselves in varying degrees of uncertainty. Nonetheless, we are required to act. In the face of uncertainty we must neither be paralyzed nor seek comfort in half-truths. Instead, we must accept this condition and take responsibility for our own actions, regardless of the fact that we will never have certainty. When Rancière emphasizes the importance of revealing an intelligence to itself (Rancière, 1991: 28) it is not least in order to reestablish agency as the fundamental factor in living a full human life. We must realize that all humans have to navigate uncertainty and that no one has a privileged position. If we blindly accept other people’s truth and beliefs, we give up our agency and allow other people to steer us through our own life. When faced with uncertainty, the minimum requirement is therefore to

accept the challenge of navigating it. If we want to become fully human, we must first claim our own agency and not rely on other people's convictions.

Still, multiple framing requires more of us. We saw in chapter 4 (see *Docta Ignorantia*) that a thoughtful praxis for navigating the world entails that we understand that not only could we be right, but similarly could the other be right. Navigating uncertainty calls for the dual-disposition that on the one hand requires humility to allow for the other's argument, and on the other hand calls for empowerment, so that we stand firm on the value of our own viewpoint. Multiple framing is thus not only a way of accepting other viewpoints as valid. As Rancière forcefully have pointed to, the notion that our own viewpoint potentially can take precedence over others', is equally important (Ibid.: 27). In praxis, this means that rather than focusing on *who* have the strongest argument, we should let the things itself take precedence, as we saw above. Gadamer has shown that what is required of us to do so is a willingness to openly engage in the exploration of the thing itself by evaluating the conflicting viewpoints and allow the strongest argument to prevail (Gadamer, 2004: 358).

We hereby also recognize that multiple framing is not a justification for relativism. It is not enough simply acknowledging that other viewpoints exist. We must also try to resolve the differences and find common ground. Multiple framing is a signifier of the state of dissensus that we are in due to the nature of our language, as Rancière has shown (Rancière, 1991: 62). By also realizing that all understanding ultimately is dependent on an individual application in our particular horizons, as uncovered by Gadamer (Gadamer, 2004: 307), we recognize that there will always be ever so slight discrepancies between our understandings, and hence there will always be different viewpoints. Yet, this only makes the call for seeking consensus even more pertinent. Due to the difficulty of arriving at a shared understanding, we must work even harder not to become distracted or misled by half-truths or mere opinions. The fact that we live in a community and want to communicate with others, despite the difficulties, means that we must put even more effort into finding the truth (Rancière, 1991: 62). Thus, the call of multiple framing in management education is thus not one of relativism but rather of persistence on the truth.

It is also in the mode of thinking that multiple framing signifies that we see the disruptive power of learning, which Freire showed. By realizing that there always are conflicting viewpoints, we recognize that our societal structures and values are historical constructs and not a result of absolute objectivity (Freire, 2005: 81). This opens up the possibility of challenging the status

quo. However, if we truly recognize the ideal behind multiple framing it is not a call for activism but rather a call for dialogue. The concept of multiple framing makes us realize that all viewpoints originates in a certain way of experiencing the world, that are as real and valuable for someone as our own worldview is to ourselves. This is not saying that there is equality among viewpoints. Some are right and some are wrong. What it is saying is that the only way of reaching an agreement is by first trying to understand our interlocutor. Only by understanding the other's worldview, can we enter into a dialogue and challenge the conflicting beliefs (Freire, 2005: 96). If we do not succeed in understanding the other, thereby failing to create a common ground from where a dialogue can grow, we can only resolve conflicts by force. In addition, such praxis would disregard the fundamental insight that we will never have complete knowledge and that we thus cannot be certain of the rightfulness of our own argument. Therefore, a true understanding of multiple framing in management education will lead to conversation as a way of testing our own beliefs and convictions in an attempt to approximate the truth.

Seeking to resolve conflicts through dialogue requires a great deal of subject familiarity. In other words, to reach agreement we need to know what we are talking about. Here, we recognize how closely linked the concepts of multiple framing and analytical thinking actually are. In order to go from the realization that there are incompatible viewpoints to engaging in a fruitful conversation that serves to test the validity of these viewpoints we need to have the subject familiarity associated with analytical thinking. We need to be familiar with the thing itself. If we do not critically assess and evaluate each claim in a conversation, we will not be able to have an actual discussion. The comparison and evaluation of conflicting viewpoints depend on them being elevated to a general level freed from their particular contexts. This is the process, which characterizes analytical thinking. A failure to recognize this close interdependency in management education might lead to relativism. Without comprehensive subject familiarity, it can be difficult to move beyond the apparent incompatibility of the viewpoints. The inability to move beyond this can easily lead to the conclusion that no judgement of validity can be made. However, as we have recognized with Gadamer, if both parties have thorough subject familiarity, they might be able to identify the origin of the conflict, test the validity of the conflicting arguments, and ultimately make a judgement in favor of one of them (Gadamer, 2004: 358).

Multiple framing is a necessary mode of thinking for successfully navigating uncertainty and it thus, as suggested by Colby et al., presents an essential competency in relation to management

education (Colby et al., 2011: 60). Since we will never have complete knowledge of anything, we will always be faced with competing viewpoints that we need to negotiate between. It is neither a process of blindly accepting them nor downright rejecting them. Instead, it requires of us that we test their validity and are willing to abandon our own viewpoint if it is disproved just as we must expect others to do the same.

The formative aspect of learning

The reflective exploration of meaning is the third and final mode of thinking. Colby et al. provides the following definition: “The Reflective Exploration of Meaning encompasses the most self-reflective aspects of learning. It involves the exploration of meaning, value, and commitment. It raises questions such as what difference does a particular understanding or approach to things make to who I am, how I engage the world, and what it is reasonable for me to imagine and hope” (Ibid.). It is the most explicitly formative mode of thinking as it is the only mode that explicitly asks of us to include our own experiences and ourselves. As we have seen above, both analytical thinking and multiple framing involves an element of self-engagement. However, the reflective exploration of meaning distinguishes itself by having self-reflection as the end, where it in the case of the two previous modes is a necessary means to other ends.

The end that the reflective exploration of meaning is aiming for is the formative aspect of becoming fully human, of finding our own place in the world (Ibid.: 65). Still, this does not mean that the reflective exploration of meaning has a privileged position over analytical thinking and multiple framing. All three modes have equal importance in the process of understanding. They must all always be at play. Theoretically discussing these modes of thinking individually is beneficial in grasping the process of understanding, but in praxis, they cannot be separated or dissected. With this in mind, the reflective exploration of meaning signifies the mode of thinking where we explicitly seek to apply the new experience in our existing horizon and try to understand what consequences this new experience will have to our previously held beliefs. It is in this process of application that we face the practical effects of our experiences. We have to come down from the more abstract level that we have entertained in analytical thinking and multiple framing to assess the concrete consequences the experience will have on our future decisions and actions.

The reflective exploration of meaning is often thought of as being central to liberal learning in particular (Ibid.: 65). However, reserving this mode of thinking for liberal arts is hugely underestimating its importance. Just as liberal arts learning needs analytical thinking to develop proper arguments and understandings, natural science learning needs the reflective exploration of meaning to make the subjects relevant and interesting to the students. If learning is to go beyond the development of abstract technical competence and actually fulfill its formative promise, we need to allow for the required self-reflection even in subjects that have an explicit technical and instrumental focus.

This tie in with the Rancièrian concept of revealing an intelligence to itself (Rancière, 1991: 28). The reflective exploration of meaning requires that we are aware of our own intellect and know that we have the power to manifest it. This holds true for natural science and liberal arts alike. In all understanding we need to engage our intellect and thereby ourselves. We cannot separate ourselves from the learning experiences nor can access to the learning experience be denied us if we are to truly understand. The reflective exploration of meaning signifies the importance of individually exploring the meaning and consequences of any experience, not least with relation to management education. As we have learned from Rancière the only way we can learn and understand is by not accepting the stories that we hear from others but instead explore and test them ourselves (Ibid.: 58).

We recognize the need for individual commitment both in Gadamer's concept of horizons (Gadamer, 2004: 301) and in Rancière saying that we all have our own orbits around the truth (Rancière, 1991: 59). They are both expressions of the realization that we all have unique vantage points. Thus, we cannot subscribe to someone else's perspectives. We need to make sense of the world from our own horizon, from our own orbit. Both Gadamer and Rancière agrees that this requires that we get to know ourselves. We must explore our own horizon, the insights, the prejudices, the traditions (Gadamer, 2004: 303). We must become aware of our own capabilities, our role in the world, our intellect (Rancière, 1991: 28). Interestingly, Gadamer and Rancière emphasizes different aspects of the praxis of interacting with other people. Gadamer believes that we should strive for a fusion of horizon (Gadamer, 2004: 306). Through getting to know ourselves we can competently enter into a conversation and seek to achieve agreement with our interlocutor, which will expand both our horizons and change our individual outlook. This process is in essence the same as the three modes of thinking presented by Colby et al. Rancière, on the other hand, maintains that the task of understanding the world is one we

must perform ourselves (Rancière, 1991: 59). He does not believe that we can achieve agreement or any fusion of horizons. Rather, we must accept that our perception of the truth will always differ from the perception of others. Yet, we are still required to know ourselves, and we can still find value in other people's viewpoints that can help us understand the world and change our outlook. The difference between Gadamer and Rancière is that Gadamer believes the transformative aspect of learning ultimately happens in a fusion of horizons, i.e. in a relation to someone else, while Rancière believes that we achieve the transformative aspect individually by inquiring into the world. Still, they both agree that we need agency if we are to unfold the formative potential of understanding.

Consequently, learning can never be an entirely passive activity. Every time we are presented with a new subject or we have a new experience, we need to engage ourselves personally if we are to truly understand it. We must suspend our prejudices, reevaluate our beliefs, and make ourselves open to a possible overturning of our worldview. Of course, we could choose to simply memorize the subject and uncritically store it for later use, but that would not qualify as an actual understanding. To understand something we must apply it to our own context (Gadamer, 2004: 335). One of the great benefits of true understanding is that the application of the experience, the self-reflective element of understanding, connects the experience to a mesh of other experiences, knowledge, and insights. Making it a part of this mesh links it to a variety of different subjects, which can prove valuable in a number of different contexts.

In addition to being the way for us to truly understand the subject we are learning the reflective exploration of meaning is also the way that we become aware of our own place in society. The awareness is two-fold. On the one hand, we see how our own perception of, and being in, the world is linked with all other people. We realize that we can relate and connect to the subjects presented to us and that they can have a profound influence on us. We come to realize that we are part of a universality. On the other hand, we also experience that some of the information and ideas that we encounter is limiting us. We recognize that it goes against our natural tendencies in a way that is constraining us and preventing our formation. These latter instances call us to perform limit-acts so that we can overcome them (Freire, 2005: 99). This is where the Freireian perspective becomes important. Freire shows us that learning is not just a matter of understanding new subjects and internalizing traditions and ideas. It is also about becoming aware of our own place in the world and of our current situation. Through learning, we can start to see the injustice and limiting hierarchies that surrounds us (Freire, 2005: 99). We realize our

full potential. However, this aspect of learning requires that we can listen to ourselves. Identifying limit-situations, the structures that constrain us, entails knowing which structures are natural and which are unnatural. No method can help distinguish them from each other. Instead, we have to rely on our own ability to identify what is valuable and what is not. It is a peculiar capacity that we all have, yet not all chose to act accordingly. Gadamer draws on the same capacity, the same feeling, when he states that we through Bildung can find our own role in the universality (Gadamer, 2004: 13). It is his belief in the power of this capacity that makes him trust that all can find their own role without supervision. Rancière indirectly refers to this capacity when he insists that the most important task of education is to reveal an intelligence to itself (Rancière, 1991: 28). It is because he believes so strongly in our inherent capacity to guide ourselves that he devalues traditional educational insights. In essence, this capacity is an unnamed prerequisite for both Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire.

This feature of the reflective exploration of meaning highlights the one aspect where it significantly differs from the two previous modes of thinking. Both analytical thinking and multiple framing operate based on approximated certainty and communicable insights. They strive for a communal attesting of the truth. The reflective exploration of meaning, on the other hand, carries no such aspirations. On the contrary, the insights gained from this mode of thinking are often based on experiences and feelings that are difficult if not impossible to adequately communicate. This, however, does not devalue them at all. Rancière recognizes this when he says that truth does not lend itself to language (Rancière, 1991: 58). We cannot explain the truth in language we can only feel it. However, if the feeling of truth is undeniable and self-evident. Because of this relation between truth and language, we are not able to communicate our most formative learning experiences. The more formative an experience, the more valuable it has been, and the closer we have gotten to the truth. The closer we have gotten to the truth, the harder will it be to communicate. When dealing with formative experiences there is thus an inverted relation between value and communicability. The formative experiences of the reflective exploration of meaning is valuable exactly because the insights derived from this mode of thinking appear self-evident and are thus linked to the truth, rather than being based on logical abstractions or deductions. They necessitate a change in behavior and outlook, as they have revealed something important about the world and our place in it. The extent to which this change is noticeable obviously vary, but when we engage in this sort of self-reflection we will invariably be changed.

Teaching for practical wisdom

The three modes of thinking are, according to Colby et al., part of the overarching objective for liberal learning, i.e. practical reasoning (2011: 59). The definition of practical reasoning is: “Practical Reasoning represents the capacity to draw on knowledge and intellectual skills to engage concretely with the world. Practical Reasoning allows the individual to go beyond reflection to deliberate and decide on the best course of action within a particular situation” (Ibid.: 60). It is the capacity to express good judgement in every situation. A judgement not only based on technical mastery, but which also consider social, environmental, and ethical aspects. As such, a well-developed capacity for practical reasoning is what we should seek to foster in all personnel and citizens alike (Ibid.: 55).

The epitome of practical reasoning is practical wisdom. It synthesizes the ideal that we as humans should be concerned with matters that goes beyond our immediate self-interest. It builds on the premise that we are part of a larger community, a universality, and that we are living in a reciprocal relation with all members of this community (Ibid.: 68). What we must come to realize is that it is actually in our broader self-interest to serve the community instead of merely serving ourselves. We can, and in fact, we should, learn to act and judge in a way that is in accordance with the greater community that constitutes our world.

Now, the question that we have been grappling with throughout the thesis is what teaching for practical wisdom entails in relation to management education. By re-reading Colby et al.’s three modes of thinking in the light of the analyses of the ideas of Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire we have sketched out a preliminary answer. Taking analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning into account in all learning situations provide the foundation for the development of practical wisdom within the students. This is arguably not saying much, but perhaps it is enough. Let us look more closely at what this actually entails.

First, let us start with what now should be obvious. Analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning are inherent to all learning and understanding. They signify different interdependent aspects of the learning process. In praxis, it is not possible to separate them if we want to gain a full understanding. We cannot allocate analytical thinking to the natural sciences and the reflective exploration of meaning to liberal arts. They are not building blocks that we can move around as long as we make sure that they are all represented

somewhere in the students' education. Rather, they are part of an unbreakable circle that the students must continually follow in every instance of their educational experience. Whether we look to Gadamer's hermeneutical circle (Gadamer, 2004: 268), Rancière's three-part question (Rancière, 1991: 23), or Freire's problem-posing education (Freire, 2005: 81), we see that understanding requires all three modes of thinking. With Gadamer, we recognize the three aspects as a focus on the thing itself (Gadamer, 2004:269), the art of questioning (Ibid.: 360), and the fusion of horizons (Ibid.: 306). In Rancièrian terminology, the requirement of showing the materiality of our thoughts (Rancière, 1991: 20), the translations and counter-translations in language (Ibid.: 62), and the need to reveal an intelligence to itself (Ibid.: 28) characterizes the three aspects. Freire describes the three interdependent aspects of learning as the need for relevant and engaging problems rather than theoretical concepts (Freire, 2005: 81), the concept of conflicting generative themes (Ibid.: 96), and the disruptive force of limit-acts (Ibid.: 99). To all three philosophers, these three aspects of understanding are closely interrelated as defining characteristics of every successful learning situation. Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire place emphasize on different facets of the process, but they are essentially describing the same fundamental phenomenon of understanding. We need to recognize this and acknowledge that all learning situations should allow the students to go through the entire circular process.

Secondly, it entails that analytical thinking is re-established as the basis for all learning. We should not confine the repetitive and methodical nature of analytical thinking to disciplines such as mathematics and logic. The insistence on establishing a solid and formal understanding of a subject is essential to all disciplines. If we are not intricately familiar with a subject we cannot competently engage in any sort of discussion concerning its validity in relation to other subjects, nor can we apply it or make judgements based on it. If students have not been through a process of rigorous analytical thinking, or in other words do not know the exact meaning of the text or subject they are occupied with, they cannot apply it to a concrete context or problem. By neglecting the role of analytical thinking, we run the risk of educating students, which are proficient in reflection and discussion on lofty concepts and ideas but who do not know how to connect and apply their knowledge to a concrete reality. Similarly, by only focusing on analytical thinking we would risk educating students that display technical mastery in their discipline, but fail to recognize its relation to other disciplines and society as a whole.

Thirdly, we should present the consciousness of multiple framing as a necessity for competently navigating the world. Knowing that we will never have complete knowledge we must learn how

to deal with uncertainty. Central to this learning is realizing that we cannot use relativism as a copout. Even when faced with seemingly irresolvable dilemmas or problems we need to make a decision. Equally important, however, is the acknowledgement of conflicting viewpoints. All viewpoints have value for the persons who hold them. The need for making a decision should not lead to skepticism or cynicism. Instead, what is required is to stay in the uncertainty and engage in a respectful deliberation between the opposing viewpoints, weighing all the pros and cons until a decision starts to form. This form of learning can only happen through concrete experiences. If we try to teach students this through abstract cases or experiments, they will not feel the weight that such decisions carry. As the saying goes “Good decisions come from experience, and experience comes from bad decisions”. Yet, for a bad decision to transform into valuable experience there needs to be something at stake. The students need to feel the consequences of their decisions. Therefore, when teaching for multiple framing we should encourage uncertainty and seek to expose students to situations where something is at stake.

Fourthly, all educational content should be relevant to students so they can engage in the reflective exploration of meaning. All understanding and hence all learning requires individual application, characterized by the reflective exploration of meaning. Only when we have applied what we have learned to our own individual context have we truly learned anything. From the different perspectives of Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire, we recognize how the individual application can lead to either a sense of communal consensus, an individual empowerment, or a need for disruption. Gadamer puts emphasis on the communal consensus (Gadamer, 2004: 17). The sense of becoming a part of a community through understanding and internalizing its traditions and ideas. Rancière, on the other hand, values individual empowerment (Rancière, 1991: 39). The realization that we all have the same intelligence and that we are all equally capable. Lastly, Freire focusses on the disruptive power of application (Freire, 2005: 81). Recognizing that social structures and hierarchies can be overturned and that we can fight injustice. All three perspectives are possible outcomes of a learning situation and we should allow students to entertain them all.

The focus, when teaching for practical wisdom, should not be a particular form of application but rather fostering individual application in any form. It is the individual application that enables us to subsequently apply the learning to numerous and varying situations. It is through the individual application that the learning becomes part of our intellectual repertoire, which we can draw upon when navigating the world. A central requirement to engaging in the reflective

exploration of meaning is that the content is relevant to us. This form of reflection is highly individual as it is ultimately concerned with how we perceive ourselves in the light of a new experience. For the students to engage in this sort of reflection they must therefore feel moved and compelled by the educational content. If the students cannot relate to the subject, they will not be able to engage in any reflective exploration on how it affects them. An educator cannot force the reflective exploration of meaning upon a student. It can at most be encouraged and guided. Yet, for any such effort to have effect, the student must personally see the relevance of engaging in such reflection, or even better, he must feel compelled. When teaching for the reflective exploration of meaning we should therefore ensure that the subjects are relevant to the students and that the problems presented to them invite them to engage.

Teaching for practical wisdom in management education thus entails a constant focus on both analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning. It entails re-establishing subject familiarity as the basis for all learning, encouraging uncertainty, exposing students to actual decision making, and ensuring that the subjects are relevant and engaging for the students.

Chapter 6: Perspectives on teaching for practical wisdom in management education

Having outlined what practical wisdom as an ideal for learning entails on a conceptual level it might be worth considering how the ideas could be implemented in an actual teaching environment. I will not present readymade solutions. Rather, I wish to provide some perspectives on the task of teaching for practical wisdom in management education. To provide some examples I will draw on the case *Making him famous: The Kony 2012 campaign to catch Joseph Kony* (Appendix 1 and 2). The case describes the 2012 viral campaign KONY 2012 by Invisible Children. The campaign was centered on a 30 minutes video advertising the capture of Joseph Kony, an Ugandan warlord. The video became the most viewed YouTube video ever gathering over 80.000.000 views in a few weeks. However, the popularity of the video backfired and a wave of criticism followed. The case raises questions about truth-telling, the use of affective facts in communication, public image, among others.

In the following, I will focus on some of the challenges of teaching for practical wisdom in management education and sketch out some of the consequences of this form of teaching by relating it to the case Making him famous.

The role of the teacher

One of the most fundamental differences between our traditional conception of teaching and teaching for practical wisdom, as outlined in the previous chapter, is the role of the teacher. Traditionally the teacher has been considered an intellectual capacity who should pass on his knowledge to the students. In teaching for practical wisdom, this role becomes problematic. Positioning the teacher as an authority figure who holds the key to knowledge institutes an unhealthy hierarchy in the learning environment. This configuration encourages the students to focus on the answers that the teacher is expecting instead of the questions that the subject field is posing. It is a power structure that hinders the students in realizing their own intellectual capacities.

Instead, the teacher should allow the students' intelligences to reveal themselves. The students should become aware of their own capabilities through grappling with the questions that they are presented with and realize that they can find the answers on their own. The teacher should be more concerned with teaching the students how to learn, than with what they learn.

In the case Making him famous (Appendix 1 and 2), we find an example of how this new role of the teacher might materialize in praxis. Firstly, we recognize in the teaching note that no definitive answers are given to the proposed questions (Appendix 2). The questions encourage the students to reflect on the case, rather than test their knowledge of the subject. Still, this does not lead to an unbound discussion where anything goes. The students have before the class-reading read and discussed an essay by Massumi in designated reading groups. The essay provides the theoretical basis for the class discussion and ensures that they all have a shared reference. Yet, the essay does not provide the answers to the discussions. It merely functions as a new perspective, which reveals some new aspects in the case. In order to show the students that their own experiences matter, and hence that they too have an important say, they are encouraged to include their own experiences in the discussion. The students' perspective are thereby given equal value to the teacher's. The teacher's role is to guide the students in their reflection. Not to arrive at a certain end point, but to teach them how they can evaluate and inquire into a subject through reflection. The students need to learn how to distinguish valid and invalid arguments, how much emphasis they can and should place on their own experiences, how they can utilize theoretical perspectives to inquire into a subject. It is the teacher's role to guide them in this practice. To show them how they can gain insights into new subjects and evaluate claims and arguments.

Thereby, the teacher is assigned a new role. Rather than being an intellectual capacity, he becomes a motivator and a facilitator of learning. The teacher's main responsibility becomes ensuring that the students stay on the path of learning. This new role challenges the familiar lecture format, where the teacher disseminates his knowledge to the students. When the teacher's role is redefined as a motivator and facilitator, interaction with the students takes precedence over explication. When teaching for practical wisdom in management education, the case format, where discussion is central, provides a good alternative to the traditional lectures.

The importance of application

Teaching for practical wisdom also calls for an increased inclusion of the students in the learning process. Knowing that an instrumental aspect of understanding is individual application it is necessary to allow time and space for the students' self-reflection. When teaching a subject the objective should never solely be for the students to memorize and recite the information. Not until the students are capable of applying what they have been taught to a different context will the teacher know that they have understood.

First, this requires that all teaching move beyond the mode of analytical thinking. Students should be encouraged to reflect on the subjects, their relevance in different contexts, their validity, and their influence on themselves as a person. Secondly, and perhaps most important, it provides a new perspective on teaching objectives and examination. The teaching objective of a course should be concerned with how the students can apply what they have been taught to different contexts. One way to achieve this can be found in the case Making him famous (Appendix 1 and 2). The case presents a context, the Kony2012 campaign, to which the students are asked to apply their knowledge of social media, public image, affective facts, or truth telling. This is done less to test their knowledge on these subjects, than to test the validity and applicability of the theories and models the students have learned in any of the subject fields. The theories do not have precedence over the case. Rather, the intention is to show the students that all theories are an answer to a specific question. They can thus not explain everything and do not present an objectively true perspective. In trying to apply theories to the case the students develop a more comprehensive understand of the theories, as they realize their strengths and shortcomings. This does not only teach the students a valuable lesson in applying knowledge, it also aids them in applying the theories to new contexts as they become aware of the obstacles involved in doing so.

Examination (if it should occur at all) should not be a matter of reciting a textbook but rather a test on how the students can understand and address a problem using what they have been taught. This is not to say that memorization should be abandoned. On the contrary, we have seen that memorization is crucial in the concept of analytical thinking, which again is necessary for a competent application of what has been taught. Having application as the teaching objective would therefore also entail a strong commitment to subject familiarity, but in addition, it would require a heavy focus on application from both the students and the teacher.

Developing the art of questioning

Central to practical wisdom is questioning. Any teaching that has practical wisdom as its objective must therefore prioritize the question over the answer. This is not to say that formal knowledge should be dismissed. Teaching students useful and proven knowledge is central to them developing practical wisdom. Knowledge is undoubtedly important in qualifying decisions. Rather, prioritizing the question over the answer entails presenting all knowledge as an answer to a question. It entails making the students aware that all knowledge is linked to a question and that no knowledge exists independently from a question. This learning is also important in the light of multiple framing as it highlights why formal knowledge is not absolutely objective.

Another aspect of prioritizing the question is helping students develop the art of questioning. This task is difficult as there is no recipe or method for developing this art. Still, we know that it is strongly linked to conversation and discussion. Central to questioning is the ability to listen and allow the questions to pose themselves. This is an ability that is best developed through practice. The case Making him famous (Ibid.) provides the opportunity for such practice, though, the teaching note does not encourage it sufficiently. The teaching note suggests short in-class discussions among students. However, it would be beneficial to allow for longer discussions, so the students could practice the difficult art of questioning. Instead of having a short 5-7 min group assignment, the students could, in groups, be given different theoretical perspectives that they should discuss in relation to the case. These discussions should be allowed to unfold over at least 30 min. Afterwards, they could present their findings in class, where the validity of their arguments could be challenged, and thereby test if they have put enough effort into the testing of pro's and con's.

Teaching students the art of questioning entails allowing and encouraging students to engage in conversations and discussions on the subjects being taught. The objective of such conversations should not be to arrive at an answer but rather the students should practice staying with the questions and entertaining the uncertainty. This can hardly be achieved through short discussions during lectures. It requires time and focus for the students to engage in such conversations if they are to truly develop the art of questioning.

The call for relevance

The last challenge I will comment on is the call for relevance. Teaching for practical wisdom is ultimately a formative endeavor. It focusses on the students developing a certain disposition towards their life and the world. Achieving this, however, requires that the students feel included in the teaching and compelled to engage. The formative aspect of learning is dependent on the individual student's commitment to engage in self-reflection. This commitment can be fostered if the subject appears relevant to the students and invites them to engage.

The Making him famous case (Ibid.) is built around the very compelling video Kony2012. All students are required to see it before class and have thus personally experienced the emotional character of it. In addition to being heavy in pathos the video directly addresses the youth and speaks to the ideals and identity of the youth. The students are therefore personally engaged in the issue even before class begins. They might not feel persuaded by the message, but even if they dislike the emotional narrative, they will often still feel compelled to react to it. The fact that it is a real life case, with real dilemmas also makes the case feel more engaging and relevant. It becomes apparent that Jason Russel and Invisible Children has to make a decision. Passivity was not an option for them, which also requires of the students that they act. When teaching for practical wisdom in management education it is therefore beneficial to use relevant real life cases and problems instead of abstract or fictional narratives. It engages the students, not only academically but also personally, and compels them to act.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined what teaching for practical wisdom entails in management education. The examination was based on the framework for rethinking undergraduate business education, developed by Colby et al. (2011), which identified the students' development of practical wisdom as a central component in preparing them for the current challenges in the business environment and society. In addition to the overarching concept of practical wisdom, Colby et al. identified analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning as central dimensions in teaching for practical wisdom. Through the philosophical ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Rancière, and Paulo Freire I have sought to qualify and complement Colby et al.'s framework in order to allow for a richer discussion on how we can rethink management education.

The analyses of Gadamer's ideas showed that we could use the concept of *Bildung* as an analog to practical wisdom. We saw that *Bildung* is a disposition of mind, which make us realize and accept our own role in the universality. We recognized that it was characterized by an openness to new experiences, and was practiced through the art of questioning, which entails suspending our prejudices and correcting and refining our fore-meanings. We learned that if we master the art of questioning we could achieve a fusion of horizons, which led to an individual application of knowledge and insights.

The Rancièrian concept of universal teaching introduced the ideal of agency necessitated by the equality of humans. We saw that the formative concept of universal teaching complemented the Gadamerian *Bildung* in emphasizing the need for students to realize their own intellectual capacity. Rancière further highlighted the damaging effects of authoritarian teachers and stressed will, persistence, and memorization as essential to learning.

Through examining the ideas of Freire, we recognized that education could have a transformative power in society. We also learned that in order to develop the students' agency the subjects we teach must be relevant and engaging. We thereby saw that it is the teacher's task to relate to and understand the students' worldview, not the other way around.

In chapter 4, we saw that, despite their apparent differences, Gadamer, Rancière, and Freire could in fact complement each other in a fruitful and productive manner. We recognized that

they shared the formative ideal of learning, albeit they addressed it from different perspectives. We saw how the concept of Bildung was complemented by the ideas of Rancière and Freire, which added a more proactive and inclusive aspect to Bildung.

Finally, we learned that teaching for practical wisdom in management education entailed a constant focus on both analytical thinking, multiple framing, and the reflective exploration of meaning. We saw that it required emphasis on subject familiarity, embracing uncertainty, exposing students to actual decision making, and relevant and engaging subjects. By taking all these aspects into account when teaching management education we can help foster the development of practical wisdom. It entails abandoning the traditional lecture format and placing the students at the center of the learning environment. In its entirety, it may seem like radical suggestions, however, if we want to take the challenges outlined by Colby et al. seriously it does not suffice to introduce small adjustments. Rather, we need to be willing to rethink management education from the ground up. It is the hope that this thesis can help qualify and further the this process.

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