Logics in Project Managers' Practices:

How Managers of Public-Private-Innovation Partnerships Interact and Cope with Their Environment

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Abstract

Innovation, however vaguely the term might appear, has over the last decade or so achieved status as a strong normative societal belief in Denmark. New legislation has resulted in the development of policies and regulations that enable public organizations to initiate focused innovation initiatives funded, at least partly, by the state. A tangible outcome of this is a new organizational construct called Public-Private-Innovation, where public organizations invite private firms to participate in partnerships with the goal of innovating processes or products within the public sector.

For managers, such partnerships constitute highly complex contexts as they not only have to balance the expectations of significantly different partners, but also find themselves in an area of public sector management where rules and regulations are yet to be fully formulated let alone implemented.

Public-Private-Innovation projects hence offer a rich empirical area for this study, having as its purpose to generate knowledge about the dynamic relationships between micro-level actors and their environment. By wielding together The Institutional Logics Perspective with research on the discipline of project management a coherent and unique framework is derived, offering strong analytical couplings between the micro-, meso- and macro-levels.

Having established The Organizational Field of Innovation as overall point of departure for analyses, a practice-oriented approach is employed for the study of managerial practices. It is shown how the young age of the field together with its high number of partakers that represent various, sometimes competing interests and professional backgrounds, result in a very heterogeneous environment. Focusing on what implications this environment have on managers' decision-making and practice creations, it is demonstrated how environmental complexity makes it possible for actors to translate the same concepts and phenomena in radically different ways, causing great horizontal variance in micro-level practices within the same context. Furthermore, this complexity is also proved to result in conspicuous vertical complexity, making incongruence between espoused meso-level practices and actual micro-level practices prevalent. The legitimization of innovation as priority in public governance can from this perspective be observed as directly constitutive of transformations in the institutional environment of public managers and organizations, enabling them to draw on a variety of logics in their interpretations of reality, subsequently having crucial implications for what behaviors are perceived as appropriate and hence how work is approached.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

It has become a widely accepted societal belief today that a number of developed countries face severe economic and social difficulties, if the current standard of welfare is to be maintained. The European Commission has for example stated:

> *"High quality public services are an important feature of the European model. Yet, faced with challenges such as globalisation and demographic ageing, maintaining and improving these public services requires continuous efficiency gains and innovation." (2008:Foreword).*

In recent years these challenges have received much attention in Denmark, e.g. illustrated in an analysis from the think tank Monday Morning on the subject of demographic ageing:

> *"All developed countries face similar challenges to their health care systems [...] Costs increase steadily as populations age and become more prone to chronic diseases. At the same time, quality and availability of treatment are facing growing expectations that health care sectors are struggling to meet. These factors in combination put a tremendous strain on resources and funds - a strain that cannot be sustained." (Monday Morning 2011:preface).*

One of the key aspects in the Danish national strategy for coping with these challenges is the concept of innovation. It is applied to areas as diverse as education, business legislation, and public governance where managers in public organizations face increasing expectations for rethinking tasks and processes. Innovation has become a buzzword in the rhetoric of politicians, interest organizations, public sector managers, academics, and other influential actors[1] participating in debates concerned with the future of the Danish welfare society. One way in which this agenda of innovation has transformed into tangible form is by the emergence of a new organizational construct for collaboration between public sector organizations and private firms. Traditional public-private relations have the characteristics of classic contractual supplier-buyer relations, centered on the delivery of a specified service or product under strict formalistic conditions (e.g. Agency of Business 2009a; DI 2010; FORA

[1] The term 'actor' is here defined in the broadest possible way, including both individuals, organizations, or even nation states.

2010; Nordic Council of Ministers 2011). In contrast the new construct named Public-Private-Innovation (henceforth PPI) focuses on creating innovative new solutions to public sector tasks by bringing private firms and public organizations together in partnerships. Here they are to share information and co-develop new, and thus often unspecified, products, services, etc. (e.g. Agency of Research & Innovation 2008; Central Organization for Public Servants and Employees 2010; Growth Unit Copenhagen 2011).

The belief is that significant economic gains reside in undiscovered potentials for increased efficiency waiting to be redeemed by public sector innovation. Also, by granting private firms access to accumulated experiences and know-how of operational public sector organizations[2], it is hoped that the Danish business community will achieve competitive advantages on export markets, resulting in a new "export-adventure" (e.g. Growth Unit Copenhagen 2011; DI 2011; FORA 2010; Law of Business Development 2005; Ministry of Finance 2010; The Government 2007+2011a).

1.1 Public-Private-Innovation & Public Sector Management

Actors still negotiate over the nature and content of the construct, and no universally agreed-upon definition yet exists. However, one general characteristic is that in PPIs there are most often no a priori contractual specifications as to what product or service the partnership is expected to deliver, nor in what way. Derived, the construct severely challenges traditional coordination mechanisms, making formalistic regulation difficult (Agency of Business 2009a; Agency of Research & Innovation 2008; DI 2010; Ministry of Finance 2010). Considering the comprehensive legislative and procedural regulations that usually guide the behavior of public sector actors, the PPI construct thus seems to differ from usual public sector practices. Traditional public bureaucracy norms of accountability and clear causalities seem to be incompatible with the uncertainty inherent in any innovative effort. Derived, public authorities have difficulties formulating procedures and rules for the use of PPIs, pointing to

[2] An important distinction here is between 'operational organizations' and the rest of the public sector. Operational organizations include organizations with the raison d'être of delivering public goods and services (e.g. nursing homes and hospitals). Other organizations strategize, service ministers, allocate funds, produce regulations, etc. (e.g. regulatory agencies and ministries). PPIs are primarily targeted at operational organizations (Agency of Business 2009a).

the innovative element as impeding traditional rigid bureaucratic control (e.g. Agency of Business 2009a+b+2010a; Ministry of Finance 2005).

Furthermore, despite high expectations, generally positive attitudes of the aforementioned actors, as well as quite favorable legislative and funding conditions, far from all PPIs are successful. Several evaluations have identified barriers that can impede and severely threaten the success of PPIs if they are not handled in appropriate ways (e.g. Agency of Business 2009a; Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2010; DI 2010; Ministry of Finance 2006; Public Welfare Technology Foundation [PWT-Foundation] 2009). Some of the factors mentioned repeatedly as challenging the use of PPIs are of a structural nature. These include lacks of legislation, formal procedures, and practical knowledge, resulting in settings very different from the usually thoroughly regulated public sector. Despite this ambiguous context several PPIs have been undertaken, funded by the same authorities that until now have failed to develop legal and procedural frameworks and evaluation standards.

In sum, high degrees of uncertainty about not only the outcome of projects but also the process of conducting PPIs imply a questionable legitimacy status of the PPI construct in a classic public bureaucracy perspective. The managers of PPIs thus have to balance multiple considerations in their work, both ensuring progress in the specific PPI, while at the same time not compromising the legitimacy of themselves, the owner- and funding organizations, nor the public sector as a whole.

From the above it is clear how the innovation agenda in general, and the PPI construct in specific, represent a highly ambiguous context within a sector that usually endorses stability and certainty. In addition, actors involved in Danish politics and formulations of policy and regulations are still struggling over how to include innovation as priority in public governance and how to define the PPI construct, continuously negotiating over what behaviors are appropriate. All together, this context provides a rich opportunity for observing processes of constructing social reality and for demonstrating how a deeper understanding of such processes can enhance involved actors' basis for decision-making.

1.2 Research Questions

By applying a theoretical perspective consisting of a combination of the Institutional Logics Perspective (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012) and project management theory, this dissertation will therefore investigate the connections between the institutional environment and actors' practice-creation (Lounsbury 2001). Specifically, the Institutional Logics Perspective offers methods to analyze the way in which actors construct realities by drawing on elements from logics, sets of prescriptions for how to interpret and behave, available in their surroundings. Complemented by a detailed framework for examining how project managers translate their work into practice, the overall aim of this study is to deepen our understanding of the relations between actor and environment. Such refined understanding can assist actors involved in both policy formulation and practical PPI work, as it will provide an improved basis for informed decision-making.

This combination of theory does not seem to have been applied earlier, however wielding together insights from these two domains is believed to hold great potential for the understanding of management work and the development of institutional theory.

This dissertation asks:

What implications does the institutional environment have for the decision-making and practice creations of project managers working with PPIs in public operational organizations?

Specifically:

1) *What institutional environment do actors involved with PPIs partake in?*
2) *How does this environment enable individual public project managers in seemingly similar contexts to arrive at significantly different translations of their work?*
3) *What role can institutional complexity be observed to have for actors' practice-creations in relation to PPIs?*

This dissertation's platform for observation is the result of thorough considerations as to what theoretical disciplines to include vis-à-vis exclude. The derived framework is accounted for in the next section.

2. Strategy of Analysis

Below the combination of theory that constitutes this dissertation's platform for observation is accounted for. Firstly are meta-theoretical considerations, followed by elaborations on the institutional logics perspective. Thirdly, a discussion of the theoretical concept of translation vis-à-vis that of diffusion. Finally a typology for analyses of project managers' practices is developed from project management theory.

2.1 Theoretical Foundation

2.1.1 Meta-theoretical Considerations: Social Constructivism

The research questions call for a theoretical framework that recognizes how actors continuously create various social meanings. The institutional logics perspective, with its heritage from institutional theory, has its roots in social constructivism and is believed to be able to honor this call. However, a number of approaches to social constructivism exist, why it is arguably more correct to speak of constructivism*s* (Collin 1998).

This dissertation subscribes to a position of social constructivism as far as social reality goes. To be clear, this particular position is *anti-essentialist* as the concepts of society and individual are conceived of as products of social processes, having no a priori given nature nor essence (Burr 1995:5). It is a*nti-realist* as knowledge and cognition are not thought to be direct reflections of reality but interpretations, i.e. specific perspectives (ibid:6). Furthermore, knowledge is believed to be historically and culturally contingent, not eternal and universal but decisively influenced by the social and cultural contexts in which it appears (ibid:6).

The idea, that the experienced world is dependent on our mind processes, has become one of the most fundamental assumptions in the social sciences today. The central question in sociology hence becomes asking how it is possible that subjective meanings *become* objective facts (Berger & Luckman 1966). In this regard the concept of 'truth' takes on a pivotal role, a concept Habermas (1984 [1972]) has treated extensively and defined as something that will always be a matter of inter-subjective consensus. The cognition-relation is therefore between language and what the language is about (Hartnack 1979).

Recognizing the importance of meaning-making processes when trying to understand social interaction is what binds the theoretical framework of this dissertation together. This framework is presented below.

2.1.2 Analytical Framework

2.1.2.1 New-Institutionalism

In continuation of the above, traditional neo-classical economics do not offer satisfying answers as to how and why actors behave as they do. Especially its focus on formalistic aspects of organization - symbolized by the thinking of Tayloristic factory managers and Weberian bureaucrats - combined with neglecting 'irrational' elements such as politics, emotions, culture, limited attention span, sensemaking processes, incomplete information, etc., is problematic when analyzing social phenomena (e.g. Clegg, Rhodes & Kornberger 2007; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Dyer & Singh 1998; Hoffman 2001; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria 1998; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991; Ravasi & Schultz 2006; Suchman 1995; Vaara, Tienari & Juha 2006). A couple of common examples that illustrate the explanatory problems neo-classical theories face include the phenomena of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977) and non-calculative trusting behavior (Christiansen & Vendelø 2003; Hosmer 1995; Zand 1972). To address the shortcomings of such "under-socialized" theories (Granovetter 1985; Gulati 1998) the new-institutional perspective seeks to integrate sociology as part of organization theory. Incorporating Berger & Luckman's central question mentioned earlier into the study of organizations points to the importance of widely held beliefs when trying to understand behavior. Discarding the neo-classical idea that one single universal rationality, e.g. Homo Economicus, determines behavior, opens the possibility that multiple rationalities can co-exist at the same time and hence *"[...] the invisible hand operates with, at best, a light touch."* (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:157).

A context of multiple rationalities equals an environment characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty for actors as to what cause of action to take when faced with different challenges. In such a context, taken-for-granted norms, myths and beliefs, or institutions, play central roles as they can appear as rational courses of actions. Hence, actors faced with uncertain links between causes and effects can, consciously or not, choose from a variety of institutio-

nalized courses of action based on different rationales. According to new-institutionalists this institutional environment exerts normative and coercive pressures on organizations, and furthermore, organizations faced with uncertainty will have a tendency to imitate similar organizations perceived to be successful, causing mimetic pressures (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977). The result of these pressures is believed to be the diffusion of similar practices between similar organizations causing organizational isomorphism, one example being the diffusion of R&D units in firms (Meyer & Rowan 1977). The primary level of analyses is thus the organizational field, as it is made up of *"those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products."* (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:148).

The concept of legitimacy is central to explain why organizations give in to institutional pressures. Institutionalists believe that if organizations are perceived as legitimate by their environments, all other resources such as labor, raw materials, etc., will be available to them (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). Thus, organizations' status as legitimate becomes central as an alternative way of understanding behavior, and as actors can understand and prioritize differently between institutionalized norms, myths, and beliefs, different perceptions of what is legitimate appear (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995). Defined in accordance with Suchman's comprehensive review of the literature on legitimacy, the concept here means *"[...] a generalized perception or assumption that the action of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions."* (1995:574).

A number of scholars within the institutional line of thought begun criticizing colleagues for attributing too much power to institutions, resulting in structural-deterministic interpretations of environment-actor relationships (e.g. Elsbach & Sutton 1992; Friedland & Alford 1991; Hoffman 2001). Instead, they argued, these relationships are of a dialectical nature, pointing out how institutional change is problematic if lower-level agency is not acknowledged. Despite this instrumental turn some scholars still do not regard explanations for change, e.g. the idea of the "institutional entrepreneur" (DiMaggio 1988), and derived the couplings between micro-, meso-, and macro-levels as satisfactory explained (Friedland &

Alford 1991; Goodrick & Reay 2011; Greenwood, Diáz, Li & Lorente 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury 2011; Thornton et al. 2012).

2.1.2.3 The Institutional Logics Perspective

With point of departure in Friedland & Alford's 1991 text some of these scholars have developed "The Institutional Logics Perspective" (Thornton et al. 2012). Logics are here defined as *"[...] overarching sets of principles that prescribe how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to succeed"* (Greenwood et al. 2011:318), and can thus be seen as resembling the concept of rationality. Instead of viewing institutional conflict as a step on the way to hegemony of one logic (representing the process of isomorphism), this new perspective can be labeled as an agency theory where: *"Some of the most important struggles between groups, organizations, and classes are over the appropriate relationships between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities should be regulated and to which categories of persons they apply."* (Friedland & Alford:256).

When connecting the ideas of inter-subjective truth-creation with an understanding of society as made up of a multitude of competing institutional orders (Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton et al. 2012), opportunities for actors to exert influence on the meaning that ambiguous situations get infused with, appear: *"The principles, practices, and symbols of each institutional order differentially shape how reasoning takes place and how rationality is perceived and experienced."* (Thornton et al. 2012:2). The idea of diffusion looses much of its explanatory power, as *"The process may more resemble institutional war than isomorphic dialogue."* (Hoffman 1999:352).

Several scholars point to the importance of the field-level when analyzing how organizations behave in such an environment. Greenwood et al. for example notice how the institutional complexity that organizations face is *"[...] fundamentally shaped by the structure of the organizational fields within which they are located."* (2011:334). Exposing what logics actors' make use of in relation to PPIs will therefore begin at the field-level. However, it is clear how innovation as concept does not represent any tangible product or service but rather an idea or a belief, and hence how DiMaggio & Powell's (1983) original definition of the organizational field cannot be applied here. An alternative determinant of organizational fields is what symbolic material that actors gather around. Hoffman for example noted how

"A field is not formed around common technologies or common industries, but around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes." (1999:352). Thus, in contrast to earlier assumptions of organizations in the same field sharing basic beliefs and being exposed to similar institutional pressures, *"[...] it is important to distinguish between an organizational field and individual populations within it [...]"* (ibid:352). For example, even though both private firms and public organizations occupy positions in what is here proposed as The Organizational Field of Innovation, it would be a mistake to assume that they share similar norms, myths, and beliefs, and subsequent subscribe to the same logics. In sharp contrast, the organizational field might just be characterized by contending interpretations of reality and subsequent negotiations or even conflicts over the meaning of key issues and concepts. So, for the purpose of this dissertation, an understanding of the field that focuses on symbolic interactions between heterogonous actors is needed. Supplying this, Hoffman defines the field as *"[...] formed around the issues that become important to the interests and objectives of a specific collective of organizations. Issues define what the field is, making links that may not have previously been present. Organizations can make claims about being or not being part of the field, but their membership is defined through social interaction patterns."* (1999:352). It is important here to emphasize how conflicts and negotiations over reality can very well be the primary characteristics of the field. The actors are bound together by shared interests in core topics or concepts, but as they might subscribe to different logics, individual actors, or populations of similar actors, might hold different interpretations of reality. Greenwood et al. support this statement as they observe how *"[...] logics are historically contingent and organizational fields are usually characterized by multiple, often conflicting logics."* (2010:521). Actors and collectives of actors will therefore often arrive at different interpretations of reality, and derived what behaviors are appropriate in what situations. The field is the centre of dialogue and discussion, as well as of disagreements and conflicts.

Considering how a number of public-private collaborative constructs already exist, and have done so since at least 1854 where the concession to construct and operate the Suez Canal was formed (El-Gohary, Osman & El-Diraby 2006), it could be argued that PPI is just another of these constructs and that it would be obvious to categorize it as part of a field that comprises other public-private partnerships. PPIs would indeed exist in such fields as well, however, from empirical observations a field can be observed to have emerged during the past

10 - 15 years with the core topic being an idea of innovation. This idea has permeated the agendas in both national and organizational politics and strategies not only in Denmark but in the Western world in general[3], resulting in a normative climate for innovation (Albury 2005; Hartley 2005; Newman, Raine & Skelcher 2001). Leveraging the influence of the concept of innovation is the emergence of a brad variety of new practices where organizations partake in innovation activities, e.g. by producing innovation-specific legislation, participating in PPIs, hiring innovation professionals, etc. All together, these new practices bear witness to institutional changes that install new logics and reprioritize existing ones.

For the study of such institutional change, Lounsbury & Crumley (2007) propose a research approach that focuses on practice, as it is here that actors' use of different logics becomes visible. Processes of (de)institutionalization can be analyzed by observing practices within a field or organization, particularly how new practices become established and legitimated and how existing practices change or disappear (ibid.). In relation to PPIs and the work of project managers in them, attention to practice becomes especially interesting due to the newness of innovation as priority in public governance and its disputed status as legitimate herein. Establishing novel innovations (e.g. the PPI construct or new project management practices) as taken-for granted does not happen instantly as result of the actions of specific actors, but over time only insofar they achieve widespread attention and support from groups of actors at multiple institutional levels (Goodrick & Reay 2011; Greenwood et al. 2010; Greenwood et al. 2011; Lounsbury & Crumley 2007; Thornton et al. 2012). It is important here to emphasize that such support and attention is not meant in any consensual way. For instance, the emergence of innovation as a societal belief is the result of a number of developments on different levels and actions of a broad array of actors. However, this does not mean that actors agree on the meaning of the concept, the developments, nor the actions. To capture such complexity and multitude, Friedland & Alford emphasize the importance of including different analytical levels, as *"The combination of multiple levels of analysis and contradictory institutional logics prevents a priori functionalist or consensual interpretations."* (1991:256). The present dissertation therefore engages in analyses of both the field-, meso-, and micro-level, and includes several logics that provide conflicting sets of principles for interpretation and action.

[3] As an example, innovation has its own page on OECD's website as one of the topics the organization is working with. Furthermore, public sector innovation is an independent sub-category on this page (Web2).

Specifically, an ideal-type approach will be utilized to assess the institutional complexity of the field by exposing what different logics actors' use. Constructed from observed patterns in data, ideal-types are *"[...] abstractions from reality and represent a pure case in which the relevant features are distinct and unambiguous"* (Goodrick & Reay 2011:378), allowing systematic comparisons of empirical variations. As *"[...] logics are comprised of decomposable component parts that can be recombined in different ways [...]."* (ibid:379-380), identifying what parts or elements they consist of enables cross-level evaluations of micro-, meso-, and macro-level practices.

To be sure, the practices observed at the micro-level of project managers carry witness to the translations those managers have conducted of their work, containing elements of specific understandings of, or perspectives on project management. Thus, by deconstructing managers' practices it is possible to identify what key elements they contain and how they have been translated locally, enabling an analysis of what institutional logics managers have drawn on in their practice creations. This resembles how organizations, here understood as the formal entities shown on organizational charts, will often espouse particular practices, presented in handbooks, guidelines, strategies, etc., that employees are officially expected to comply with. These meso-level practices are the results of organizations' interpretations of their situation and thus carry witness to what logics they draw on. As the logics perspective emphasizes agency on all levels, managers might, consciously or not, subscribe to different interpretations of reality than their organizations, creating practices deviating from the espoused ones. To be sure, the term "organization" is much discussed as to what it actually means, some e.g. observing an organization as defined by the actors that constitute a sum of closely related activities (bottom-up), or conversely by hierarchically decided-upon distinctions between inside and outside (top-down). For this dissertation there is no need to decide on any one of such definitions, as it is the actors' translations of the term that is important. So, if a manager's practice deviates from that prescribed by top-management in the formal organization, e.g. containing elements from logics not included in the organization's (in a top-down sense), those elements have been transpositioned, transferred by the manager into the organization (in a bottom-up sense): *"Transposition refers to when categorical elements of an institutional order migrate or are transferred to a substantive context in which they did not originally exist."* (Thornton et al. 2012:62). Such deviating behavior on the part of managers is in the

logics perspective explained as the result of institutional complexity faced by actors *"whenever they confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics."* (Greenwood et al. 2011:318). Under such conditions, actors can choose between a number of interpretations and behaviors, each corresponding to a certain logic constellation (Goodrick & Reay 2011). If the field is new and/or contains a highly diversified range of actors and professions, the number of available logics is likely to be higher than if the field was mature and rather homogenous (Greenwood et al. 2011).

Assessing the degree of institutional complexity is however not just a question of the number of logics available, the specificity of those logics is another crucial factor because *"[...] when logics are ambiguous and lack specificity, organizations are provided with relatively more discretion in their efforts to alleviate the tensions of complexity."* (ibid:334). Hence, different logics are in some contexts relatively compatible, or can be tailored to be so if their levels of specificity leave room for different interpretations.

Next section will elaborate on the process of translation, as it is vital when analyzing processes of practice-creation.

2.1.3 Local Translations

Whereas the idea of diffusion anticipates the outcome of innovations, for instance new organizational forms, to be isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Friedland & Alford 1991; Meyer & Rowan 1977), the idea of translation opens up the possibility that actors can infuse the same concepts with different meanings, resulting in variation instead (Bergström & Dobers 2000; Callon 1986; Callon 1998; Skærbæk & Tryggestad 2010; Vinnari & Skærbæk working paper; Waldorff 2010). The idea of translation pays specific attention to the transformative element in any social interaction, which in contrast to the diffusion model means that ideas, concepts, innovations, models, etc., cannot travel or be transported without being subjected to at least some degree of transformation (Bergström & Dobers 2000; Callon 1986; Callon 1998; Latour 1986). In this dissertation, the idea of translation is seen as more suitable vis-à-vis that of diffusion, as it emphasizes how differences in actors' cognition can result in different interpretations of the same phenomena. For example, where the diffusion model would simply observe that the idea of structuring work in projects has diffused successfully in a field, looking into processes of translation exposes how actors do not just

adopt the concept of project work, but adapt it and shape it to fit their local context. By connecting to specific institutional logics, the concepts of project work and management get infused with particular meanings that are perceived as legitimate by a specific actor at a specific time. The idea of translation in this way helps unmask processes of both horizontal and vertical interactions as it elucidates how abstract ideas, concepts, norms, values, beliefs, etc., travel between different levels and actors, constantly being translated locally. Attention to translations underlines how (de)institutionalization and (de)legitimization are on-going processes as actors within different contexts interpret ideas differently, constructing a variety of meanings from the same symbolic material, which result in different practices.

2.1.4 Project Management Theory

Providing a well-developed basis from which a fine-grained lens for analyzing project managers' practices can be constructed, the goal with this secondary lens for observation is to expose how different management practices are comprised of translated elements from different schools of thought within the project management discipline. Scholars have identified what can be observed as three such distinct schools of thought or perspectives: an administrative, political, and a network perspective (e.g. Borum & Christiansen 2006; Christiansen 1999). Each perspective is based on different epistemological and ontological assumptions and provides different understandings of the nature of projects, and subsequently different prescriptions as to how they should be managed. Derived, these perspectives resemble both the nature of ideal-types and of logics. Analyzing micro-level practices by comparing empirical findings with these perspectives thus corresponds to the ideal-type approach accounted for earlier, with the important difference that the perspectives on project management are only suitable for analyses of individual managers' work.

Below are first clarifications of how this dissertation understands the theory on project management, followed by introductions to the three perspectives.

Project management as organizing concept is in much popular management literature viewed as a pre-packed and ready-to-implement discipline that, when adopted, enables organizations to make efficient use of it when organizing work. In contrast to this view, project management is in this thesis observed as a project in itself and not as something that is

exogenously given and just passively adopted. When various forms of organizing and organizational constructs meet organizations, they come into existence only through actors' translations - negotiations over the nature and attributes of the socially constructed phenomena in question. Project management as discipline can be observed as an empty concept that is translated locally by the actors who come in contact with it. It is transferred and transported between persons, projects, departments and organizations, continuously being interpreted and reconstructed by actors in different contexts and times. Institutional logics with differing principles for interpretation and behavior are hence crucial variables for the way in which actors end up approaching projects. Institutionalized norms and myths shape peoples' preferences, perceptions, and attitudes towards proposed translations of project management. What is perceived to be desirable, proper and appropriate ways of structuring and working with projects will thus vary depending on what logics actors subscribe to.

Over time particular translations of project management can become institutionalized management practices, given they achieve broad attention and recognition as legitimate from a critical mass of constituents. The three perspectives can from this point of view be understood as originating from such institutionalizations.

From the above, it is clear how the institutional logics perspective and the three perspectives in project management theory share a number of similarities in the approach to their common goal of understanding social behavior. In fact, the perspectives on project management in many ways resemble an empirically driven mini-version of the institutional logics perspective, as it identifies three distinct ideal-type approaches to the discipline of project management that are based on different logic constellations. It is important to underline the different levels of analysis that institutional logics and the project management perspectives adhere to.

In sum, the three perspectives constitute a detailed, multi-angled framework for analyses of project managers' work. The perspectives are introduced below.

2.1.4.1 The Administrative Perspective

Based on a neo-classic world-view this perspective is characterized by a normative belief in projects as rationally structured, progressing according to a linear model of strong

causalities. Projects advance through clearly defined stages, making success a matter of simply putting together the right mix of pre-project analyses, good planning, the right people for the job, competent management, etc. (e.g. Andersen, Grude & Haug 2004; Borum & Christiansen 2006; McDonough 2000; Pinto & Mandel 1990). The simplicity of linear stage models, with the output of projects merely being functions of formalized structures, goals, and plans being properly implemented, is seductive. However, it is clear how such models represent the same problems for understanding inherently social phenomena as do the theories labeled as under-socialized by Granovetter (1985). As Christiansen & Vendelø observed: "*The linear progressive model thus represents the process as a type of 'black box' that can produce the desired result [...] if the right conditions are in place*" (2003:315).

Project management from this perspective therefore in many respects resemble a Weberian view on organization, focused on formal relations as defined by organization charts, conducting risk-analyses and imposing rigid accounting procedures in order to minimize uncertainty. A positivistic meta-theoretical heritage is thus observable, implying how one optimal solution to a specific problem exists, and both the problem and derived solution can be identified through proper analysis.

2.1.4.2 The Political Perspective

Faced with numerous examples of failed administrative managed projects and the inability to explain what goes on inside such black boxes, the political perspective abandons the belief in our ability to reach any one universally applicable optimal way of structuring and managing. The perspective acknowledges that contexts change from project to project as well as during projects and the core task of managers is hence to continuously analyze the context in order to secure support and resources, by building and maintaining coalitions (e.g. Cavaye & Christiansen 1996; Christiansen & Varnes 2008; Christiansen & Vendelø 2003). However, although giving up the illusion of one universal approach to project management, it is still believed that one most appropriate approach exist for each project. The political perspective can hence be observed to replace the goal of optimization with satisficing, and the basis of decision-making becomes the appropriateness of actions (Bentzen, Christiansen & Varnes 2011). It acknowledges how decision makers might weigh pros and cons of different kinds against one another, i.e. arriving at decisions that are sub-optimal from an economic point of

view but satisfy other interests. The perspective can thus explain why firms might consciously risk significant economic losses conducting risky R&D, and how a product's sub-optimal economic return is outweighed by its strategic importance. However, as it is still of a normative nature, managers and observers of projects who subscribe to it will be inclined to label practices that do not correspond to the perspectives' prescriptions as irrational or mysterious.

2.1.4.3 The Network Perspective

Scrapping all instrumental prescriptions, the network perspective adopts a pragmatic approach to the management and study of projects (e.g Borum & Christiansen 2006; Christiansen 1999; Christiansen & Varnes 2007; Christiansen & Vendelø 2003). Viewing projects as emergent, temporary, and fragile networks of actors, attention to idiosyncratic attributes such as social contexts and personal preferences replace the emphasis on specific prescriptions for specific situations (e.g. Akrich, Callon & Latour 2002a+b; Christiansen & Vendelø 2003). This for example means, that no analysis will be able to provide data that is certain enough for long-term planning to make sense - from a planning point of view. However, such planning might make sense from a political point of view, e.g. if key constituents require such planning in order to approve the project (e.g. Bergström & Dobers 2000; Christiansen & Varnes 2007). As in the institutional logics perspective, the idea of translation here replaces that of diffusion, as everything is open for interpretation and negotiation. This underlines how project goals, structures, etc., as well as what tasks, technologies and so on, the manager should engage are not necessarily given in advance despite potential formal statements from higher-level decision-makers. Rather, the manager's primary task becomes the construction of contingent meanings that make sense for the different heterogeneous actors that the manager tries to get interested. Projects are thus dependent on "interessement" as success is thought to be dependent on the successful mobilization of a strong network (e.g. Akrich et al. 2002a+b; Bergström & Dobers 2000). Importantly, due to the contingent world-view the perspective does not offer any normative prescriptions as to how such interessement is achieved, nor for what instruments and technologies that should be applied for managerial purposes. Derived, qua the descriptive pragmatic nature of this perspective, it enables observers to understand otherwise 'mysterious'

events, e.g. project managers allocating time to build networks with actors who, in the administrative world of formalized organization charts and progressive models, do not necessarily have anything to do with regards to the manager's specific project. On the other hand, the same descriptive nature also means that no predefined tools, models, causalities, etc., are offered to practitioners, who are left alone with the task of figuring out what to do and when to do it.

In sum, the perspectives reflect some very different translations of the same concept. In Table 1, inspired by especially Borum & Christiansen (2006), I have constructed a typology of the different perspectives that will be applied in the analyses later.

To be clear, this section has only discussed the inherent contents of the three ideal-type perspectives. No subjective arguments concerning the qualities of any perspective have been put forward, and no considerations regarding the institutional environments of project managers and the management discipline in general have been presented. Hence, it is not suggested that managers are free to pick and choose between perspectives or that they are necessarily even aware of them. On the contrary, former research have shown how managers are influenced by e.g. management fashions (Abrahamson 1996), implying institutional pressures as to what managerial approach is considered best at a certain point in time and space. How project management work ends up being approached locally is dependent on what meanings are constructed by the local actor.

Next are considerations as to what methods were used for gathering data and how the data was subsequently applied in analyses.

2.2 Methods

The reliability of this dissertation is dependent on the quality of the empirical data collected as well as the methods used for analyses. In continuation of the social constructivist position subscribed to, a prerequisite for understanding social phenomena is data that hold information as to how actors infuse events, concepts, etc., with meaning.

	Administrative Perspective	Political Perspective	Network Perspective
Conditions in Focus	Concordance between goals of project and owner organization; clear instructions about methods, procedures, time, quality, budget, etc.	Stakeholders have different interests and control different resources that the project is interested in	Ambiguity and loose couplings between e.g. intentions, plans, and actions; fragile networks between actors
Basic Assumptions	Projects are rationally structured, steerable phenomena; prescribed (formal) structure and stipulated goals govern processes	Projects are dependent on support and resources from stakeholders; interests and power structure govern processes	Projects are temporary, performative relations that create networks; pre-existing & emerging relations govern processes
Key Elements	Unambiguous structures, processes, and plans	Stakeholders, legitimacy, structural (formal) power vs. power bases (resources & skills)	Actors, interessment, spokespersons, motivation and attention
Primary Explanations of Problems	Unsatisfactory preparation and ex-ante analyses; Unclear plans and structure; Actors who do not fit into structure	Resistance from dominant coalition; stakeholders not sufficiently involved or sworn in	Failed interessment; missing spokespersons; weak network ties
Central management technologies			
Decision-making by	Optimization (Homo Economicus)	Negotiation or appropriateness	Problematization, interess-ment, garbage can processes
Planning and Steering	Plans are scripts to be implemented	Plans adjusted to what is possible, continuously negotiated with stakeholders	Plans can travel and are communication devices for suggested future scenarios
Central Tasks for the Manager	Structuring, delegating, and supervising; Ensuring obedience to plans	Identify stakeholders and coalitions and their positions, goals, and interests	Spokesperson who interprets, translates, and presents reality in order to mobilize actors
Management Tools	PERT, Gantt, calculations, formal agreements, structure, steering- & evaluation systems	Stakeholder- and issues management, consensus conferences, negotiations	Interessment, spokespersons, mandatory passages, visions, learning over control

Table 1 - Key Aspects in the Ideal-type Perspectives on Project Management.

For this purpose I collected primarily qualitative data, including interviews, observations, and archival materials, but also some quantitative data was included such as statistics.

The next sections bring specific considerations regarding the gathering and use of data, followed by comments on limitations, alternative ways of approaching the study and finally some remarks on reliability of the findings.

2.2.1 Collecting Data

The collection of data was structured so as to accommodate two essentially different analyses: Firstly, due to their purpose of rendering probable changes that have happened over time, the analyses of developments in the institutional environment and in organizational practices required data from a longer period of time. All data carrying historical accounts, quantitative or qualitative, was considered appropriate for these analyses.

Secondly, with the goal of exposing how individual project managers translated their work, these analyses required data of an in-depth, qualitative kind, provided by interviews, observations and project-specific archival data.

The vast majority of empirical materials are in Danish. Citations were translated with emphasis on essence, as I believe this to be the best way of capturing meaning.

2.2.1.1 Qualitative Data

I collected qualitative data in order to enable analyses of actors' various interpretations and creations of meaning. I used archival data, interviews, and observations.

The archival materials include legislation, regional and municipality strategies, public organizations' procedures regarding innovation, funds' papers of foundation, etc. Furthermore, I gathered published reports from government bodies and regulatory agencies, interest organizations, and other actors relating to societal and public innovation and PPIs. TV and radio broadcasted debates on the topic of modernizing the public sector functioned as background information. This material described different actors' interpretations, translations, attitudes, interests, activities, budgets, etc., related to public sector innovation.

I conducted 8 interviews in the first half of 2012. The main criteria for choice of informants was involvement with PPIs in one way or another, preferably in a managerial role.

During my work it became clear that the two PPIs "[redacted]" and "The Patients' House"[4] offered the best cases for in-depth analyses of micro-level practices due to readily available data and richness of this data. Also, these projects represented a peculiar high degree of variance with respect to managerial practices, therefore considered particularly appropriate for an analysis aiming at demonstrating the complexity of the institutional environment surrounding PPIs. From these PPIs additional data, including strategic and policy documents, funding applications, evaluation reports, charts of the projects' placements in their owner organizations, newsletters, etc. was collected. The other interviews were used as background information.

All interviews[5] were semi-structured[6]. Using this kind of interview facilitated trust as the informants received an interview agenda beforehand (at least five days prior to being interviewed) and hence was familiar with my interests as interviewer. This also helped ensure the relevance of data as the informants' attention was guided by awareness of my area of interest. Furthermore, I was very aware of my own behavior as well as the physical environment during interviews, and with the hope of minimizing exogenous influence on the informants I formulated two conventions that formed the basis for my approach to the interview situation: firstly, the informants chose the locations - assumable settings in which they felt comfortable and safe. Secondly, understanding the interview as a relationship between two people points to the communication process as the primary concern. Inspired by Schein's (2009) four forms of inquiry, my approach was humble and relaxed, focused on creating a situation where the informants felt it was safe to reveal information, anxiety, feelings, etc.

Finally, I carried out 2 observation studies. This was done to get a 'raw' and uncensored glimpse into real-time sense- and decision-making of project managers. The first study was a 7-hour workshop where the public members in a PPI were gathered with the purposes of idea generation, concept development, etc. In my role as observer I kept in the background to

[4] Constructed case descriptions are attached as Appendix A and B respectively. The interviews with the managers of these PPIs have been transcribed and attached as Appendix K and J respectively.

[5] All interviews are available on the enclosed CD (in MP3 format) attached to the back of the front page.

[6] See Appendix C for the interview guide.

minimize my impact on the participators. Clarification and elaborations on my observations was achieved by 'small-talk" with individuals or groups in the breaks and after the event.

The second study was a conference on the topic of *"Measuring the Effects of PPIs"*. This conference lasted almost 9 hours and was made up of 5 individual presentations from consultants, managers, and scholars, with discussions in plenum in between. Here I participated on equal terms as the rest of the attendees and were involved during different activities[7], experiencing first-hand the ongoing translation processes, e.g. when prominent debaters presented different opinions regarding the PPI construct, elaborating on how they thought it should be developed and in what directions.

These observations did not yield any revolutionary insights but was great sources of inspiration and insights into processes of translation in practice.

2.2.1.2 Quantitative Data

I used statistical data in the institutional analyses to render probable a trend of increased attention to the concept of innovation. This data was generated by systematically tracking the development in number of newspaper articles containing the word innovation for each year from 1990 to 2012, using the database Infomedia.

I also collected statistical data from Statistics Denmark, a national database containing very detailed information on variables such as educational levels of the Danish population, what percentages of GNP are constituted by different sectors/industries, etc. This kind of data was used to illustrate the exposed translations articulated by actors.

2.2.3 Applying Data

Below it is accounted for how the gathered data was used.

2.2.3.1 Analyzing the Emergence of an Organizational Field

Compiling the quantitative data from Infomedia showed how actors gradually begun assembling around the concept of innovation. Together with an examination of qualitative

[7] We were for instance asked to brainstorm together in two-man groups and come up with suggestions for ways in which PPIs can be measured and evaluated.

archival data, especially legislation and newspaper articles, it was shown how an organizational field of innovation has emerged. In accordance with the field definition used here it was assumed that the degree of attention paid by the media to a specific topic was a good indicator of general public awareness and interest.

2.3.3.2 Analyzing Project Management Practices

The interviews with actors involved in the two chosen PPIs was analyzed by applying the typology developed from project management theory. Qualitative archival data from these PPIs, such as funding applications, project evaluations and newsletters from the temporary project organizations, etc., was also examined, functioning primarily as background information. Key aspects of managers' practices were identified, providing insights into their individual translations of project management work.

2.2.3.3 Analyzing Institutional Complexity in the Field of Innovation

Combining the findings from the former analyses with qualitative archival data from the organizations owning or funding the analyzed PPIs, e.g. procedures, rules, reports, strategy papers, newsletters, guidelines, etc., pointed to some overall patterns in actors' interpretations and articulations of innovation and PPIs. From this, and inspired by similar work of other researchers, especially Goodrick & Reay (2011) and Thornton et al. (2012), five ideal-type institutional logics was constructed. To be sure, the derived typology presented in Table 6 carries some resemblances to the work of these researchers (e.g. the naming of the ideal-types), but also contains elements unique to this dissertation. Drawing on related earlier work strengthens the reliability of the typology as similar findings have been made in other contexts. In sum, the ideal-types are products of an iterative process where existing theory have been combined in new ways, elaborated upon and put together with empirical data in an abductive kind of analysis.

Deconstructing the managers' translations, cross-referencing their key aspects with the key elements of the ideal-type logics exposed how the managers used elements from different logics in their practice creations. These practices was then compared with the formally espoused ones of the sponsoring organizations that reflected the officially approved interpretations expressed in various guidelines for public governance, best practice evaluations, etc.

2.2.3.4 Analyzing Field Diversity as Supporting Logics' Co-existence

Following this, a broader analysis of field-level qualitative archival data showed how actor diversity in the field supported the existence of multiple and somewhat conflicting field-level logics. Finally it was possible to bring qualified considerations as to the overall complexity of the field.

2.2.4 Reliability of this Study

In addition to the initial precautions mentioned in the above this study has also been subjected to method triangulation (Holstein 1995; Waldorff 2010). The specific method of triangulation used is discussed below, followed by some critical limitations and indicators of this dissertation's quality.

2.2.4.1 Method Triangulation

By combining multiple types of methods and empirical materials, as well as discussing methods and findings with practitioners and researchers engaged in related work, this study has been subjected to method triangulation. This means that phenomena are explored with a combination of different methods and that the data has been interpreted from different views.

Firstly, qualitative methods were supplemented with quantitative. In chapter A of the analysis qualitative archival materials was examined, providing insights into specific actors' sudden preoccupation with the idea of innovation. Statistical analysis of media attention confirmed the exposed pattern of increased attention across more contexts.

Secondly, data of both qualitative and quantitative nature was combined in chapters A and C, comparing actors' translations of different phenomena in archival data and general guidelines with those presented in statistics and economic analyses.

I also applied the method of "informed basic research" (Van de Ven 2007), adopting a detached outside perspective on the social systems under examination, while at the same time seeking feedback and inspiration from practitioners. Such interaction varied from informal conversations with different actors involved in project management and innovation work in general, to direct feedback from informants on particular parts of my work.

Finally, the findings and methods were discussed with a colleague and a scientific researcher, both of whom were engaged in similar work at the time of the study. These discussions were very helpful and helped me to view the material from a number of perspectives.

In the sections above a number of considerations concerning methods for collecting and applying data was discussed, all having decisive implications for the trustworthiness of this dissertation. Despite these elaborate precautions, some limitations should be mentioned.

2.2.4.2 Critical Limitations & Quality Indicators

The limited number of interviews is perhaps this dissertation's primary Achilles heel. It would have contributed to the reliability of this study if I had included accounts from more actors in an attempt to uncover potentially different translations. However, many projects presented as PPIs was found to be of such a small scale that it wouldn't have made much sense to view them as de facto projects - often they merely resembled minor tasks in the work of administrators. In addition, 9 PPI managers asked to participate in this study declined participation. Also, no actors from regulatory agencies, i.e. ministerial agencies, regions, or municipalities were interviewed, despite these organizations importance for field structure. Conversely, engaging in detailed analyses of such actors would have required too much space considering the primary focus being the practices of PPI managers. Yet, these shortcomings were at least partly remedied by the vast amount of qualitative archival data available, including rich case descriptions of former projects. In addition, the quantitative registrations of key characteristics of PPIs in applications and evaluations to funds and authorities pointed to the identified practices as sharing many similarities with those of other managers, leveraging support to my findings.

In continuation of the considerations as to the validity of information gathered from interviews, the informants did not seem very concerned about the controversy of their responses. As the topic of this dissertation is far from being a measurement of project managers' and their organizations' performance, instead investigating how actors interpret and translate abstract concepts into localized meaning, the interviews are believed to be trust-

worthy. However, due to the nature of qualitative data, findings based on such sources can of course never be claimed to apply directly to other contexts or across time and space.

Another critical limitation is to be found in the compilation of statistical information about attention to innovation in the media. Infomedia does not hold copies of newspaper articles from before 1990 and only Berlingske Tidende and Politiken are available from January 1st 1990[8], while coverage of the remaining papers starts at some point hereafter. To remedy this limited historical range of the study I contacted the State and University Library that keeps records of all published material in Denmark. However, their copies of printed media from before the mid-90s are kept in the form of microfilm. I did not include this material as it would have been disproportionately time consuming to analyze.

Lastly, the examined PPIs are so-called test projects, conducted not only to achieve public sector innovation but also to generate knowledge and develop methods for use in future PPIs. Such duality in purposes might have implications for the process of management as the managers, at least formally, have to accommodate both the interests of project owners and funders as well as those of the participants in the PPIs. Derived, it can be argued that analyses of more "pure" PPIs would have yielded other insights, yet no such projects considered to offer a satisfying level of information was available at the time of analysis.

As the perspectives on project management resemble the nature of logics, prescribing how to interpret and work with projects, it was straightforward to make couplings and comparisons between the micro- and meso-level practices and field-level institutional logics. This unique combination of The Institutional Logics Perspective and project management theory has provided very detailed observations of the symbiotic relationships between these levels in the construction of social reality, and is believed to have proved itself as a potent framework for analyses of social interaction, with much potential for further development and application.

Overall, I anticipate the design of this dissertation to provide valuable knowledge.

[8] See Appendix D for a detailed overview of Infomedia's tracking of nation-wide daily newspapers.

3. Findings

The analysis below is structured as follows: chapter A demonstrates how an organizational field centered on the concept of innovation can be observed to have emerged.

Chapter B analyzes the practices of three managers working within this field and key aspects are distilled, showing how these practices result from localized translations of the project management discipline.

In chapter C, five ideal-type institutional logics are presented based on behavioral patterns in the dataset. Cross-referencing the key aspects of the analyzed micro-level practices with part elements of these logics illustrates how the managers have subscribed to different logics in their translations and practice creations. The micro-level practices are then compared to formally espoused meso-level practices, exposing significant variance between espoused and in-use practices.

Finally, chapter D engages in an overall assessment of the complexity of the field, showing how field diversity supports the existence of multiple, somewhat incompatible logics.

A: An Organizational Field of Innovation

When Drucker (1994) analyzed innovation and the concept's emergence as an established discipline, he did so purely focusing on innovation in the context of the private business community. He viewed innovation as a taken-for-granted, common element of private business, justified by the eternal quest for competitive advantages on a free capitalist market.

Drucker's work is widely accepted and constitutes a substantial contribution to the understanding of *"the demystification of innovation"* (1994:13). Yet, since his book (first published in 1985), innovation has been lifted out of its original context of the firm, being transported into a variety of other areas where actors have translated it to fit their local contexts. This transposition becomes tangible when practices change: new organizations appear (e.g. Agency of Research and Innovation), new legislation is produced (e.g. Law of Business Development 2005), new educational programs get established (e.g. cand.merc.mib at CBS), existing organizations develop new departments (e.g. regions and municipalities establishing innovation units) and include new goals in their strategies (e.g. innovation as formal priority in their operations), new competencies come in demand in the labor market (e.g. innovative skills were required in 485 job postings on the two Danish websites of

jobindex.dk and ofir.dk alone[9]) and so on. In sum, innovation has become a core concept constituting a field in which a wide variety of actors partake.

The analysis indentified an astonishing number of field participants. In order to decrease complexity these were divided into the following populations: academic and educational institutions, legislators, regulatory agencies, interest organizations and think tanks, and private firms and operational public organizations. As central actors in the field include legislators and public organizations, the public's attention to and general opinion about the idea of innovation as something of societal importance was crucial for the emergence of this field. Investigating how this field came to be in the first place must therefore depart from the theories, frames, and narratives (Thornton et al. 2012), constructed and articulated by actors, translating innovation into something of societal importance.

In other words: what perceptions of reality have achieved broad acceptance, gradually elevating innovation into a broadly shared societal belief, subsequently mandating radically new practices to appear and existing practices to change?

The answer is perceptions of pressures. Specifically, the accounts of why innovation needs to be a societal priority given in legislation, reports, the press, in statistics, etc., over the last 20 or so years, roughly fall into two translations: The first results in perceived external pressures due to globalization. Here innovation is needed for boosting the competitiveness of Danish private firms that now compete with the entire world. The outsourcing of jobs to low-cost countries is seen as particularly problematic. The second results in perceived internal pressures du to demographic ageing. Here innovation is needed in order to increase public sector efficiency so that an adverse development between tax revenue and expenditures can be avoided. The emergence of the field can hence be observed as preconditioned by articulations of reality that participants in the field construct and so far have succeeded in gaining society-wide attention to and recognition of.

Tracking the emergence of innovation as part of the public agenda yields the interesting finding that its prominent status is a relatively new phenomenon. Only 3.456 articles in all national media combined[10] (newspaper articles, TV- and radiobroadcasts, website blogs, etc.)

[9] Searches conducted on July 5, 2012.

[10] Infomedia.dk.

contained the word "innovation" in the 10 years from 1990 to 1999 - less than one a day. From 2000 to 2009, this number increased seventeen times to 61.192, and in the just 2½ years from 2010 till 31st of May, 2012, 59.048 articles. These numbers indicate a strong trend where attention to innovation as topic in the media has exploded, from almost non-existing in the 1990's to an everyday topic today. However, at least part of this development can arguably be explained by an increase in the number of media, e.g. websites that bring copies of stories from other media. To control for the suggested trend, the number of articles in two national daily newspapers, Berlingske Tidende and Politiken, was isolated as was the total amount of articles in all printed national daily newspapers combined. Figure 1 shows the findings from these two examinations that confirm the trend.



Figure 1 – Articles With the Word "Innovation" in the National Printed Press, 1990 - 2012.

Based on the assumption that media attention can be used as an indicator of general public attention to, or at least awareness about specific topics, it is established that innovation has become a central concept. This is not the result of some sudden society-wide revelation, but rather due to a spreading acceptance of the aforementioned translations. Furthermore, when actors generally thought of as possessing expert knowledge, skills, etc., within certain areas or topics, e.g. professionals, politicians, think tanks and so on, discuss and largely

legitimize these translations they are leveraging the influence of these translations on general public opinion. Thus, when particular theories, frames and narratives become widely accepted across populations of such influential actors, who subsequently reaffirm each other in their world views often through public channels of communications, they achieve status as social facts and will over time gain acceptance in society as a whole.

Below follows an examination of the major populations in the field and how the actors in them partake in both the material and symbolical production of innovation.

Major Populations in the Field

Politicians in Parliament constitute a critical population in the field. They inscribe the innovation agenda in national legislation, thereby defining it as an area of interest for the state. The Innovation Law was the first law to set explicit that innovation needed to be prioritized, the objective being *"[...] to promote the innovation-, research-, and development initiatives in the food, agricultural, and fishing industries in order to meet the demands of competition in the future."* (2000:1). The focus on innovation and knowledge was justified by former laws being outdated as *"focus increasingly is on international competition, product- and market development, quality, environment, ecology, new technology, food safety, consumer interests, etc."* (ibid.). These justifications are more or less identical to those used in the general public debate where actors also present the changing nature of competition as one of the primary reasons why more innovation is necessary. In 2000 Pia Gellerup, former Minister of Business, for example stated: *"Denmark can no longer compete on price alone. The Chinese will always be able to produce cheaper."* (Information 24.11.2000). In its government bill (2001), the new Liberal-Conservative government articulated how it would prioritize the advancement of the nation's knowledge-level: *"The Government will put special emphasis on investments that advance Denmark's status as a modern IT- and knowledge society."*.

In 2003, the Chairman of the Parliament's Science Committee stated how *"The future of Denmark's welfare is to a high extent dependent on whether we can compete internationally, a question that comes down to a high knowledge-level and our ability to transform that knowledge so that we continuously can cultivate new markets."* (Kristeligt Dagblad 09.09.2003). In 2004, the editor of the magazine "Ugebrevet 4" supported this translation of

external pressure: *"During recent months, a number of Danish firms have really begun moving production and jobs to other countries. A development that will accelerate in the coming years."* (Ugebrevet 4 26.01.2004). He further conceived of Danish competitiveness as dependent on parameters such as knowledge: *"For Denmark this means that the development from industrial- to knowledge society will speed up, with everything it entails of changes on the labor market, in the educational system, and of the welfare society as a whole."* (ibid.).

Jumping ahead to 2010, Lene Espersen, former Foreign Minister, and Brian Mikkelsen, former Minister of Economy and Business, underlined that *"Part of the solution [to strengthen competitiveness]must be initiatives within the areas of education, research, and innovation"* (Jyllands-Posten 03.03.2010).

These interpretations of reality are also evident in government report, e.g.: *"The increasing level of globalization means that manpower, firms, investments, and goods are easier moved across borders"* (The Government 2010:12), and under such conditions, *"the competitiveness of Danish firms on global markets are to a large extent dependent on the firms innovation capabilities."* (ibid:21).

Refining the Innovation Law, the political attention to the changing nature of competition materialized with the Law of Business Development, aimed at facilitating the desired development towards a knowledge-based economy: *"§1. The objective with this law is to strengthen the development in the Danish business community by promoting competitiveness and globalization [...]"* (2005 chp. 4). The regional authorities and the Agency of Business was made the primary responsible for turning policy into practice, and in § 9 innovation appears as a distinct area that is to be prioritized: *"The regional councils can [...] co-finance activities for the regional development of business within the areas of 1) innovation, knowledge sharing and knowledge building, 2) implementation of new technology [...]"* (ibid.). Compared to the Innovation Law, Law of Business Development thus contains more detailed prescriptions, providing public authorities with opportunities of engaging directly in innovative initiatives and projects. This is one of the most important pieces of legislation in establishing innovation as legitimate priority in public sector organizations, e.g. forcing all regional authorities to establish "growth forums". These forums' tasks include strategizing about how to boost regional business development and innovative capabilities.

In addition to such tangible consequences of lawmaking, this kind of legislation functions as symbolic material that supports the creation of new practices, as innovation is translated into a demarcated, legitimate and prioritized area of activity. Derived, almost every public authority and organization today has established innovation committees, including Parliament itself (*"The committee for Research, Innovation, and Higher Educations"* web3). Also, the inclusion of innovation into the area of public governance has resulted in networks of actors discussing how to induce it into public policy and organizations' practices. The Nordic Council of Ministers is one example of such a network having been very preoccupied with public sector innovation, e.g. establishing its own research center "Nordic Innovation Center" that produces analyses for the council (e.g. Nordic Innovation Center 2010+2011), and publishing reports such as *"Strategic use of public-private-cooperation in the Nordic region"* (Nordic Council of Ministers 2011) focusing on PPIs.

The impact from the Financial Crisis that started in 2008 seems to have only reinforced the perceptions of pressures, resulting in the installation of a 'crisis mentality' in the general public: *"with blood-red figures on the state budget and debt crisis in Southern Europe, the Danes have replaced the optimistic view on their own and the society's economies with a more gloomy one."* (Berlingske Tidende 07.11.2011). Another article is supportive of this argument: *"The Danes have become far more aware that the country is in the most severe economic crisis we have seen in years. Almost 9 out of 10 Danes estimate that the country is in deep crisis."* (Berlingske Tidende 19.12.2011). And after the 2012 collective bargainings: *"Crisis consciousness. For the second time in a row, the members of LO (Danish labor organization, eds.) accept an agreement resulting in declining real wages."* (Berlingske Tidende 18.04.2012) and so on (also e.g. Arbejderen 14.02. 2012; Kristeligt Dagblad 09.08.2011; Licitation - Byggeriets Dagblad 30.05.2012).

Building on such worries the government is emphasizing the need for reforms of the welfare model: *"Denmark is a rich country, but Danish growth and wealth are under pressure. [...] and if we are not willing to change and renew, Denmark will over time no longer be among the richest countries."* (The Government 2011a:1).

In addition to innovation being celebrated as a means to boost overall competitiveness of Denmark in the face of globalization, actors have also begun articulating innovation as fundamental for coping with the internal pressure from demographic ageing. Public sector

innovation is hence believed to hold great potential for achieving significant increases in public sector efficiency as stated by the Ministry of Finance and Agency of Business: *"The public sector has a huge and unredeemed potential for creating better results through innovation."* (Agency of Business 2009a:6; Ministry of Finance 2005:3). The concern with public expenditures can be understood as a result of the sector's size. A consequence of the universal Scandinavian welfare model[11] is a high level of public sector spending compared to that of other developed countries, and in 2010 such spending reached 29.5 % of GNP (Ministry of Finance 2011a), which in relative numbers translates into the biggest public sector in the world (ibid.).

Already in the 1990's a few actors had begun questioning the sustainability of the Western welfare societies in general: *"In the future it will not be affordable that everybody gets a piece of the pie. It is necessary with fundamental changes in the system to secure the resources needed to provide for the weak without placing a too big burden on the rest of the population."* (Berlingske Tidende 30.11.1993). Yet, such concerns did not seem to gain widespread attention at that time.

However, in 2003 the Government established the Welfare Commission with the objective of analyzing the future of the Danish welfare society. In 2005 this commission published a report entitled *"The future's welfare and the globalization"*. Globalization had thus become so generally accepted as a threat that it characterizes the contents of the entire report. It was among other things stated that *"Overall, globalization can result in an upward pressure on public expenditures and a limitation of revenue sources. Globalization can hence intensify the future financing problem for the public sector."* (2005:10). The second overall translation of pressure also finds its way into the report: *"The primary source of problems for future financing is that the size of the workforce will decrease while more citizens will be detached from the work force. This implies a tendency where public expenditures will grow faster than the revenue, if the current configuration of the welfare society is adhered to."* (ibid:10).

Other actors also pointed to demographics as constituting severe challenges, including the president of the regions' interest organization, Bent Hansen, who stated: *"We have a*

[11] The Social Reform of 1933 unified 55 earlier laws into four: Unemployment Benefits, Accident Insurance, Citizens Insurance, and Public Care, and can thus be observed as the institutionalization of the Welfare State (Statistics Denmark 2009).

demographic challenge on our hands. When the average age [of the population] increases, so does the consumption of medicine, and derived the expenses." (Berlingske Tidende 02.11.2006).

Statistics were supportive of this translation, estimating the group of citizens aging 65+ to make up approximately 25% of the Danish population by the year 2030 compared to about 15% today (Statistics Denmark 2005). The ratio between welfare-financing and welfare-consuming citizens was and still is thus broadly perceived to undergo an unfavorable development.

Occupying key positions between legislators and the rest of society are the regulatory agencies that translate the overall legislation into specific rules, procedures, prescriptions, initiatives and so on. Empirical observations point to such agencies as extremely active in the field, reflected in the vast range of reports on public sector innovation produced by them, e.g. the Agency of Business has published comprehensive reports on the subject (2009a+b; 2010a+b), along with The Agency of Research and Innovation (2008b), Ministry of Finance (2005), Danish Environmental Protection Agency (2010), and the regional authorities (Growth Unit Copenhagen 2011; Central Denmark Region 2010; Northern Region 2011; Southern Region 2010; Zealand Region 2010). Different government bodies can thus be observed as continuously emphasizing innovation as crucial for Danish society - a number of analyses from the Ministry of Economy and Business even use the term of innovation in their headings, e.g. *and "Innovation and Productivity"* (2010) or *"Growth through innovation"* where it is stated how *"Innovation is one of the central sources of growth in both the single firm and for society as a whole."* (2011:2).

As a result of Law of Business Development (2005), each region[12] has formulated their own specific strategies, rules, procedures and initiatives within the field of business development and innovation (e.g. Central Denmark Region 2008; Northern Region 2011; Southern Region 2010; Zealand Region 2011). In these strategies, the regions define what their areas of focus are and what types of initiatives and projects, they concentrate on. The Central Denmark Region for example formulates its strategy as an answer to *"Global*

[12] The official strategy from The Capital Region has not yet been published, it has been announced in the Fall of 2012.

challenges [that] shout out for innovation. The same do the development of public services, the lack of qualified manpower, and the collaboration between public and private organizations." (Central Denmark Region 2008). It is on the basis of these strategies that the regions distribute the majority of public resources allocated to support innovative initiatives. This is primarily done by establishing regional funds (in 2008 the Central Denmark Region established the first fund in the country to support the use of PPIs (ibid.)), or by functioning as gatekeepers to state funds. One example of such a fund is the Public Welfare Technology Foundation (PWT-Foundation), established on mandate from parliament in 2008 having at its disposal 3 billion DKR in the period from 2009 - 2015 (Agreement on the Utilization of Resources from the PWT-Foundation 2008) for the purpose of *"promoting the testing and diffusion of labor-saving technology and new forms of work- and organization in the public sector."* (Ministry of Finance 2010).

Providing seed money like this resembles a kind of more or less active state-aid. Interestingly, no official grand overview exists as to the combined spending of public resources on such funding. However, there is no doubt that the figures are significant; in addition to the 3 billion kroner of the PWT-Foundation, The Globalization Pool alone accounts for 10 billion DKr. at the end of 2012 (Agreement on the Utilization of the Globalization Pool 2006). In one of the only attempts made to get an overview of these support programs, the Agency for Research and Innovation in 2008 found no less than 44 active regional and national funds, accounting for combined spending of 3.7 billion kroner in that year alone. All these different funds and initiatives were termed "*the public system for the advancement of innovation*". Besides administering this system, the regulatory agencies also control the resources allocated to Denmark from EU funds and programs such as The Seventh Framework Programme, structural funds, etc. (Web4).

In all, regulatory agencies are powerful actors in the field, exerting influence by translating abstract national legislation into specific rules, procedures, and guidelines, as well as deciding what projects and initiatives that are supported with seed money.

Educational and academic institutions constitute another major population in the field of innovation, producing much of the ideational and symbolic material representing the concept

of innovation. They define it as an independent, legitimate discipline, infuse it with particular meanings and supply a steady flow of professionals who carry these meanings with them.

Symptomatic for these institutions' participation in the field are the many electives, courses and programs offered from higher educational institutions that treat innovation as a demarcated subject. Harvard for example offers 13 different courses in innovation to its second year MBA students alone (Harvard MBA 2012). Copenhagen Business School (CBS) offers 37 electives in innovation on bachelor and master levels combined and even entire master degrees in innovation, e.g. cand.merc.mib and cand.soc.oie (Web5). Quick visits to the websites of Cambridge, Sloan, MIT, Stanford, London School of Economics and so on, show how all these also provide teachings in the area of innovation. There is hence a strong pattern across academic and educational institutions of innovation having become a privileged discipline of research and teaching within a variety of fields, from business studies to public governance programs.

As the number of graduate students, MBAs, PhDs, professors, etc. who has been taught in this discipline accumulates, a pool of people with similar orientations and dispositions appears, occupying similar positions across populations of organizations. As these individuals begin to define the methods and conditions of their work, professionalization is the result (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Such processes have been witnessed before, e.g. when public relations went from being a taken-for-granted task of ordinary managers to an independent discipline with its own professionals: *"There is the ubiquitous enumeration of characteristics of a profession; beyond, that, there is a sensible discussion of present professional deficiencies. It is to the authors' credit that they speak, of the profession, of public relations as a goal rather than as an accomplished objective."* (Rathmell 1953:329; see also e.g. Bird & Yutzy 1957; Cutlip & Center 1952; Eells 1959; Wheeler 1956).

Two sources of normative influence from such processes of professionalization are particularly prominent. Firstly, specialists in academia produce the cognitive base on which the legitimacy of innovation as independent discipline rests. They develop methods and provide studies, corresponding to what Drucker termed *"the scientification of innovation"* (1994). Actors from this population also partake in the public debate, often being presented as experts, e.g. when Torben Klein, director of the Academy of Technical Sciences and Strategy in 2000 stated: *"It is good that the politicians set the scene for a strategic approach to the*

policy that is to bring Denmark forward towards the goal of comparing with the best in the rapidly developing global, learning economy." (Berlingske Tidende 05.03.2000).

Researchers at these institutions can thus be observed to produce the ideational and symbolic materials that represent specific ideas as to what innovation is. Apart from Drucker (1994), other examples include O'Reilly & Tushman (2004) and Christensen, Kaufman & Shih (2008) who provide advice to managers about how to boost their organizations' innovative capabilities, or Bansi & Tuff (2012) and Edquist (2011) who prescribe how to design and implement innovation management systems.

Through the electives, courses and programs mentioned earlier, teachers at the same institutions are subsequently distributing these symbols to their students, offering interpretations in the form of instructions, prescriptions, etc., as to how it should be transformed into practices. In Denmark, the Danish Technical University even offers a whole MBA degree in innovation management (Web6), and Aarhus University a graduate degree in innovation management (Web7).

Secondly, professional networks and associations that span an increasing number of organizations get established and expand as more professionals enter organizations. According to Netmatch[13] there are more than 30 such networks in Denmark (Web8). Also, the participants at the conference *Measuring the Effects of PPIs* referred to the assembly as an emerging network of people across sectors and organizations, sharing a common interest in public sector innovation (Obs. 2). Other examples include Biopeople, which is Denmark's *"Innovation Network for Health and Life Sciences"* and is run by The Capital Region of Denmark (Web9), and FoodNetwork, which is a network facilitated by The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (Web10). Furthermore, conducting a Google search on the words "innovation association" yields 156,000,000 hits[14]. Finally, besides having been adopted at prestigious universities and business schools, a huge number of private bureaus and schools of a more or less shady nature offer courses in innovation - a Google search on the words "learn innovation" hence yields 211,000,000 results.

Yet another population in the field consists of interest organizations and think tanks. Representing collectives of actors, the primary task of interest organizations is to maximize the political influence of their members. Danish Industry is by far the most active interest

[13] An initiative from The Agency of Research & Innovation facilitating networking between professionals

[14] Searches conducted June 16, 2012.

organization in this particular field, publishing reports such as *"Evaluation of public-private collaboration"* every year (e.g. DI 2010+2011). Representing the private business community, DI presents itself as: "*1) Creating political awareness about the gains of increased public-private collaboration. 2) An active partner in the political process of new legislation in both Denmark and EU. 3) Monitoring that the public purchasers act according to the rules."* (Web11).

As umbrella organization, the Central Organization for Public Servants and Employees (FTF) represents many of the labor organizations of public employees and is for example negotiating salary and work conditions on their behalf[15].

Think tanks such as FORA, CEPOS, the Council for Public Sector Purchasing, Monday Morning, The Economic Council of the Labour Movement (ECLM), Monday Morning, MindLab, etc., work in much the same way. They conduct analyses of social, political, micro- and macro-economic consequences of legislation and public policy from particular ideological standpoints and are very active in the public debate. ECLM hence presents its work as *"Trustworthy analyses of the economy"* followed by the statement that *"ECLM's economic experts and analytical work are frequently cited in the media. At the same time, ECLM functions as sparring partner for the social democrats and labor movement, and is often in dialogue with the civil servants in ministries and organizations."* (Web12).

CEPOS does not officially support any political parties, but presents itself as *"an independent Danish think tank promoting a society based on freedom, responsibility, private initiative and limited government."* (Web13).

FORA is a think tank under the Agency of Business that *"develops innovative analyses and proposals for the business policy agenda. Based on facts we deliver new knowledge to decision makers and draft recommendations for international, national and regional business policy"* (Web14).

Council for Public Sector Purchasing was established in 2008 by the government with the purpose of providing analyses and advice to the government regarding how to improve the competitive element in public sector operations, primarily through public-private collaboration (Web15).

[15] LO (Landsorganisationen i Danmark) has not been forgotten, but is not as active in the field of innovation. Contrary to FTF, LO has for example not published reports and opinions in relation to PPIs.

Monday Morning presents itself as *"Scandinavia's leading independent think tank, the main objective is to enable key decision makers to navigate and operate in an increasingly fragmented and complex society."* (Web16).

MindLab, a cross-ministerial think tank located between the Ministry of Business and Growth, the Ministry of Taxation and the Ministry of Employment, has as purpose to *"[help] key decision-makers and employees view their efforts from the outside-in, to see them from a citizen's perspective."*. (Web17).

By hosting debates, conferences, workshops, etc., and producing analyses and reports that resemble the look and language of the academic system, these actors try to exert the same kind of normative pressures as actors from the academic and educational population (e.g. CEPOS 2011+2012; Council for Public Sector Purchasing 2010a+b+2011; ECLM 2012; FORA 2009; FTF 2010).

Interest organizations and think tanks can achieve status as recognized experts within specific areas, becoming so influential that authorities such as regulatory agencies request their assistance. This was the case when the Danish Environmental Protection Agency requested DI to facilitate the work in the PPI *"The Water Partnership"* initiated by the agency (Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2010). DI was even made responsible for an ex-post report, evaluating the process and outcomes of that PPI, a report that was subsequent published by the agency, carrying its logo and name.

Yet another population consists of private firms and public operational organizations. These organizations are some of the preferred research sites for scientists, and interest organizations and think tanks base much of their work on comparisons between such organizations. Also, these organizations employ many of the graduates, PhDs, etc., produced by universities and business schools, buy knowledge from research institutions and hire their experts on a consulting basis to assist with specific tasks. Derived, they constitute some of the central contexts in which much of the interaction in the field takes place. The PPI construct is a particularly good example of this. PPIs by law need to be initiated by public organizations (Agency of Business 2009a), negotiations and conflicts over the definition of PPIs often take place with point of departure in the practices of such public organizations. Furthermore, actors from all the identified populations are involved in the ongoing processes of infusing it with meaning, defining its characteristics, and mode of operation.

Operational public organizations and private firms also often have their own educational programs that are aimed at developing employees' skills, but indeed also function to influence the way employees think, e.g. by promoting specific cultures and interpretations of different phenomena. Furthermore, CEOs, CFOs, directors, project managers, etc., are often invited to give lectures for students in educational institutions. Also, as identity, including organizational identity, is created in relation to others (Mead 1934; Ravasi & Schultz 2006), these organizations are important constituents for each other's identity.

In sum, the actors in this population occupy a big part of the landscape in the field, both constituting much of the context of other actors, while at the same time being active themselves, exerting significant impact on both individuals' and other organizations' interpretations of reality.

So far, this section has examined the overall composition of the organizational field by identifying the major populations of involved actors as well as their roles in it. Table 2 summarizes the findings (private firms and public operational organizations are implied).

	Legislators	Regulatory Agencies	Academic & Educational Inst.	Interest Organizations & Think Tanks
Excerpts of Actors	Individual MPs; Political Parties in Parliament	Agency of Business; Agency of Innovation & Research; Capital Region; Zealand Region; North Region; Central Region; South Region	Academics; Scientific Journals; Business Schools; Universities; Supplementary Schools; etc.	DI; Central Organization for Public Servants and Employees; Monday Morning; Economic Council for the Labor Movement; CEPOS; FORA; Council for Public Sector Purchasing

Table 2 - Major populations in the Field of Innovation

Chapter Summary

A wide variety of actors have been and still are active in the processes of constructing perceptions of internal and external pressures on the Danish welfare state. Central in these perceptions are arguments of the competitiveness of Danish economy being threatened due to globalization that together with demographic ageing constitute pressures on the financial sustainability of the Danish welfare model. These pressures are then translated into a need for an economy based on knowledge, a belief that has become widely accepted especially among politicians, and therefore trendsetting in lawmaking and public policy formulation. In a knowledge economy innovation is given a key role as the ability to create new products, services, products, etc., is argued to be one of the primary parameters of competitiveness. Furthermore, innovation has become one of the cornerstones in strategies for coping with the pressures on the financial foundation of the welfare state, as innovation in public operational organizations is believed to hold significantly potentials for increases in the sector's efficiency.

Derived, the attention to innovation in ministries and agencies, national legislation, evaluations from the government, in educational and academic institutions, TV, radio, and newspaper debates, in the news in general, etc., has multiplied many times over during recent years.

Following a practice-oriented approach to the study of institutional logics the next section analyzes micro-level practices in this field, enabling an assessment of the institutional environment faced by actors partaking in the field.

B: Project Management Practices in PPIs

In the following the management practices in the PPIs "[redacted]" and "The Patients' House" are analyzed. Each project has its own section where analyses are carried out by utilizing the typology distilled from the project management theory. Appendixes A and B contain case descriptions.

[redacted]

This project had two formal goals formulated by the project owner organization ([redacted]"): the development of a prototype to remedy issues in hospitals' handling of blood samples and test results, and the development, testing, and documentation of methods for use in PPIs in general. Both [redacted] and the primary funder, the Agency of Business, emphasized this second goal as the primary objective:

> *"The purpose with the project is to test simulation as method for user-driven innovation [...]. In addition, it is the aim to assess the gains that user-driven healthcare innovation creates, including the potential for commercial development." (excerpt from the agency's project description, Web18).*

Interestingly, the project manager, [redacted], concentrated his attention on the practical work with developing a prototype, basically leaving the work with the other goal to other people:

> *"I have been very, very focused on the prototype and getting it developed, and then I knew that [redacted], innovation consultant in [redacted], affiliated with [redacted], eds.] was really good at all that with methods and so on, so I left all that to him. There was no reason for me to participate in that." (Int. 8).*

This conviction was also evident in [redacted]'s opinion about the value of the methods-part of the project:

> *"We already knew what the doctors wanted. So we decided that the way to go was to develop some sort of handheld device. [...] I feel a bit of guilt in this regard - there was a lot of effort put into studies of doctors' work and mappings of how they handle test results. [...] but the results of them just didn't matter - we already knew all of it!" (ibid.).*

It is worth noticing that when [redacted] is talking about "we" he refers to himself, a couple of other scientists involved, and the private firm [redacted]. These project participants can hence be observed as constituting the core of the project group in the eyes of [redacted], and he is often juxta-positioning this group with "the others", a group which can include both the overall project organization of [redacted], as well as other partners in the project who were, in

[redacted]'s words, "observers", e.g. [redacted] and [redacted]. Who [redacted] includes in this "the-others"-group seems to vary depending on context.

Not only did [redacted] consider the work with developing, testing, and documenting methods as more or less a waste of time, he also expressed outright that he thought this part of the project to be of a symbolic nature:

> *"So, there is quite a bit of symbolic rhetoric surrounding the project. It says it's user-driven, that we listen to the users - well hell yes we do, and we've been doing that for a long time. But the users don't know what they want [...] Hence, all the energy used on user-studies and so on was a form of documentation of what we already knew. [...] we couldn't really use it for anything.[...] so we can't write a true story of 'then we saw that and that, and it had this and this impact'." (ibid.)*

Also, [redacted] was from the beginning very opposed to the management approach advocated for by the responsible manager of [redacted]:

> *"They [[redacted], eds.] were very focused on aspects of control - that you had to keep track of the hours put in by partners and so on [...]. I simply think all that micro-planning was a waste of time. I disagreed with the management of [redacted], they wanted to micro-plan for the sake of the Agency of Business. I thought it to be absurd to have to report whether time had been spent on meetings, development, transportation, etc. They also wanted us to use special templates for our reports, but I didn't do that [...] it was absurd!" (ibid.).*

In addition to [redacted] exhibiting a quite critical behavior towards the formal project goals, he clearly also translates the task of management very differently from that of his superiors. At some point, these disagreements resulted in the project being de facto split into two parts:

> *"So we agreed that they [[redacted], eds.] got 150.000 DKr. from my budget so they could micro-manage all they wanted. The project manager of [redacted] was very preoccupied with Excel and the like. [Interviewer: So it resembled*

> *something of a pro forma activity in your opinion?] Yes, I think so, it was with the purpose of pleasing the Agency of Business. [...] So, [redacted] were the project manager on what we can call workshops and partner involvement, and I were project manager on the prototype." (ibid.).*

From an external perspective these accounts paints a picture of rather intense conflicts. Again [redacted] is juxta-positioning "them", here all the stakeholders who did not play an active role in the work with the prototype (perhaps because they were not invited?), with "us", here again the prototype group, constructing a reality consisting of different coalitions with opposing, or at least not very complementary interests:

> *"This resembled a crossbreed between pedagogy and development, and we [redacted] and his prototype group, eds.] then said that if we were to have any luck with this we had to concentrate on the prototype. Thus, I perceived this to be my main responsibility, and hence we made a practical division of the work so that [redacted] and [redacted] took care of the rest. [...] An insane amount of resources was spent on managing the management, so I went to the other extreme, I simply wouldn't participate in that kind of steering-steering." (ibid.).*

The strong identification with the small prototype-group and differentiation from [redacted] are also reflected in [redacted]'s answer when I asked him if he used any tools for managing the work with the prototype:

> *"[...] the development consisted of us [the prototype group, eds.], it was us who understood what it was. It didn't take any damn tools, we coordinated by mail." (ibid.).*

It is evident how the practical work with the prototype continuously constitutes the central element in [redacted]'s translations of the project. This is also the case when he elaborates on how the project was evaluated:

> *"Well, we were taught how to make a business plan, and then made one. We were to assess what it would cost to implement the developed solution and how long it would take for it to pay for itself [...]. However, the evaluation has primarily consisted of the demonstrations we have conducted for*

doctors and nurses where we asked if it is something they need. The answer has been an overwhelming 'YES'". (ibid.).

Despite his superior and funders' focus on the methods part, here reflected in the task of working out a business plan, [redacted] does not mention these aspects at all. This constant focus on the prototype is prevalent throughout the interview, and the fact that [redacted] almost exclusively relate to feedback from users regarding the developed prototype when probed about criteria for project evaluation, implies how he justifies both his behavior as manager as well as the outcome of the project almost solely on the basis of the technical advances the prototype-group achieved.

Building on key dimensions from the theory on project management, Table 3 provides an overview of key attributes in [redacted]'s translation of project management in this specific project.

Conditions in Focus	Conflicts of interests and over resources between his and other coalitions
Basic Assumptions	Interests and power structure govern processes
Key Elements	Legitimacy: Formally conditioned power vs. bases of power (especially due to levels of perceived skills and knowledge)
Explanation of Problems	Coalition not strong enough
Central Management Technologies	
Decision-making by	Appropriateness, negotiations
Planning and Steering	Dependent on what is possible (especially due to uncertainty)
Central Tasks for the Manager	Defend the interests of coalition
Management Tools	(Informal) stakeholder analyses, negotiations with identified key actors in relation to resources (including legitimacy) and interests

Table 3 - Key Attributes in [redacted]'s Translation of Project Work.

As [redacted]'s accounts had so much emphasis on the conflicts between him and his superiors I found it worthwhile to investigate these aspects a bit more.

Revisiting my interview with [redacted], the innovation consultant, I noticed the following statement regarding the [redacted] manager:

> *"[...] the big GANNT diagram just doesn't work and the phases that our project manager [the overall responsible* [redacted] *manager, eds.] had defined and were very determined that we went through didn't fit at all with what we were doing. It took way too long and couldn't comprehend the complexity of continuous user-involvement, etc., - you can't really plan these kinds of innovation processes in the way that PRINCE2 and the other rigid models prescribe." (Int. 3).*

Derived, [redacted] does not seem to be the only one who interpreted the work of the overall manager to be unsatisfactory. [redacted] clarified his point of view:

> *"It's not enough to be strong in administration, especially because the goal due to the nature of innovation will shift and change along the way." (ibid.).*

Hence, the manager of [redacted] seems to have subscribed to a rather different interpretation of project management than that of [redacted] and [redacted], where the same key dimensions from the project management theory are translated to mean something radically different. Table 4 provides suggested key attributes of this manager's translation of project management, building on [redacted]'s and [redacted]' accounts.

Conditions in Focus	Formal, administrative management to ensure progress, clear goals and prescriptions for methods, procedures, deadlines, and budgets
Basic Assumptions	[redacted] and subprojects as rationally structured and steerable (in a formalistic causality logic)
Key Elements	Unambiguous structures, plans, and expectations
Explanation of Problems	Bad preparations (ex ante analyses), planning, and methods
Central Management Technologies	
Decision-making by	Optimization (calculations and budgets)
Planning and Steering	Plans are scripts to be implemented
Central Tasks for the Manager	Structure, delegate, and supervise obedience to the plan
Management Tools	Formal agreements, detailed GANTT-charts, ex ante justifications based on analyses, ex post evaluations, different systems for steering and follow-up (e.g. PRINCE2)

Table 4 - Suggested Key Attributes in the [redacted] Manager's Translation of Project Work.

Next section examines the practice of Irene, the project manager of the PPI The Patients' House, followed by a section summarizing and discussing the findings.

The Patients' House

In addition to the project's purpose of supplying OPI-Lab with data on business models for PPIs in general, the objectives of this project when first launched had been formulated centrally in the Capital Region:

> *"To develop an innovative concept on the grounds of the patients and their needs. The patient's independence, equality, and influence will be increased and at the same time the experience of hospitalization will be reduced. The fundamental idea is based on the philosophy of patient empowerment with focus on supporting patients' and their relatives' own resources. The Patients' House hence aim at renewing patient service and the way it is delivered. With the burning platform in the healthcare sector, the target is simultaneously to develop patient service that is 'cheaper and better'." (Web19).*

This formulation is evidently quite vague and does not say much about what the project is expected to deliver. Investigating a presentation brochure produced around six months into the project offers little clarification as it basically just brings the same information as the initial formulations above (the brochure is attached as Appendix E). Even more material presenting the project was published around project start, including what was called a fact sheet containing the following criteria for success:

> *"The criteria for success for the project are among other things the development of a range of concepts for new patient services that are ready for implementation. The new concepts are developed within a paradigm of support of patients who acquire new competencies and skills." (The Patients' House Fact Sheet: 1).*

When admitting my failure of figuring out the purpose of the project to Irene, she replied:

> *"That folder [mentioned above, eds.] was made just around the time I started and people were then discussing the nature of the project and what it was actually about. This shows how hard it is in an organization with 35.000 employees to agree across clinical, para-clinical and administrative functions on what the tangible goal is." (Int. 4).*

So, even though the project had been active for approximately half a year before Irene got involved, no clear idea as to the purpose of the project existed. However, the former project manager had still managed to plan the process:

> *"The former manager had worked out one of those traditional phase plans with what needs to be done, how to implement etc., but all from a perspective of project management." (ibid.).*

Yet, despite all the planning carried out by her predecessor, the plans had not been honored. For example, there were still no partners involved in the project:

> *"When I took over the project there were no partnership contracts, so my challenge was what to do - it's kind of a problem not having any partners six months into a project that is dependent on the partnering aspect!" (ibid.).*

Translating the lack of sense of direction into a major deficiency and as a crucial element impeding the continued work, one of Irene's first actions was to clarify the fundamental objective of the project:

> *"To remedy the lack of tangible goals, we held an innovation camp when I started where firms, clinical personnel, researchers, patients, NGOs, administrative staff, etc., were invited to brainstorm [...]. We ended up identifying three specific resource consuming diagnoses. This dimension of identifying who we are talking about makes it possible to begin calculating some numbers as to value-creation and profitability. When we began examining the reasons why these patient groups consumed disproportionally many resources compared to others we saw that they were hospitalized a lot more. So how could we try and prevent this? We could see how these groups had some specific things in common, e.g. lacks of physical exercise. Another thing was nutrition, many of these patients are*

> *malnourished and dehydrated. [Having] identified two specific areas of importance - training and nutrition - we had a target group: patients with multiple diagnoses with significant effects on the system." (ibid.).*

Irene further mentioned organizational anchoring as an important aspect in her approach:

> *" [...] if you don't make sure that organization-wide support exists and there is a clear understanding of the project organization, it's an uphill battle!" (ibid.).*

Important to emphasize here is the weight Irene put on the aspect of translating the purpose of the project into something that made sense for different parties:

> *"These seemingly simple prerequisites took ten months [from when Irene started, eds.], so an important lesson is to get as concrete as possible as fast as possible. Before these aspects have been taken care of you cannot go out and find partners [...] you can't invite somebody without knowing what you are inviting them to." (ibid.).*

Simultaneously with her efforts to translate the project into something more meaningful than the initial formulations, Irene found herself behind schedule due to the six months that had gone before she arrived, and therefore she discarded the existing plans:

> *"What I wanted to do was to create a plan based on the creation of strong value chains, showing what the firms get out of it - so they will invest in the first place. How do specific activities contribute to both the service concept deliverables and to the development of business models, and derived what should then be the focus of the project group [presents her "Value-Creating Phase Model", eds. See appendix F]." (ibid.).*

The fact that Irene is able to both redefine the project and discard the work done by the former manager, without any apparent objections from neither the steering group nor the strategists in the region who came up with the initial formulations and hired the first manager, implies a rather extensive degree of operational and managerial slack. Confirming this, Irene speculated as to the region's actual involvement and interest in the project:

> *This [OPI-Lab, eds.] might be a national project, but I'm not convinced about how strong a foundation it has in the regions when considering that they are co-owners of the project [Interviewer: What do you base that statement on?] Well, I'm not in dialogue with the region even though they are my sponsors, I only speak with OPI-Lab." (ibid.).*

The way in which Irene presents her relationship with the region resembles the nature of a decoupled organizational unit (e.g. Elsbach & Sutton 1992), and the relation between the manager of OPI-Lab (Susan) and Irene is presented in the following way by Susan:

> *"To begin dictating how experienced project managers are to do their work is risky business, especially when you know that they are already under intense pressure as to deliverables and deadlines. So it's on a completely different level that you are sparring partner. [Interviewer: So you categorize yourself as more of a sparring partner than as a manager?] Yes, because it is actually more that function that is needed." (Int. 2).*

Opposite to the [redacted] project, this implies the opportunity for Irene to do things in ways that might not usually be accepted by the owner organization, an opportunity Irene seems to be exploiting:

> *"When you have been out trying to get in contact with private firms to get them involved some quite standard challenges exist as to get them on board [...]. From all the dialogue I have had with different firms I found that a way to handle some of these barriers was to use a collaboration contract instead of a partnership contract. In practice this means that we constructed these contracts based on the phase plan so that the firms only commit themselves to the project one phase at the time, instead of having to sign a contract implying unknown obligations 2 - 3 years into the future. In this way, the uncertainty for the firms is drastically decreased." (Int. 4).*

Furthermore, Irene uses the phase plan not only for managing and evaluating progress, but also ascribes it with agency:

> *"[...] this model can be viewed as an object of negotiation, which you can bring with you to preliminary meetings and utilize as element in balancing*

> *expectations. [...] in the beginning they [the partners, eds.] didn't get a copy of it because at that time I didn't actually look at it like that, but at the end of phase 2 I evaluated the phase by using it, and that really worked. I distributed the plan for phase 3 at the end of phase 2 as a way of showing process and maintaining motivation." (ibid.).*

This way of utilizing phase plans is particular interesting as it can be observed as yet another way for Irene to activate project members. In her accounts Irene is constantly very centered on this aspect of facilitating partners' involvement in the project in the best way possible. This is also evident in the way she keeps referring to the project as a network that is dependent on actors' interest. Such aspects are also very important to her when she reflects on the process so far:

> *"What really made things accelerate was when we began having our meetings at the firm' locations [Interviewer: so they became the hosts?] Yes. In the beginning we held all the meetings here or in other "neutral" places, and [...] we wondered how we could get them more involved. And then [...] one of the firms asked 'why don't we have our meetings at the hospitals?' This really opened up for a different way of arranging our meetings, and the firms began offering to be hosts themselves. The result was staggering - the firms became so much more involved, motivated for example by proudly presenting who they really are and so on." (ibid.).*

Furthermore, the focus on the partners' interessment is also prevalent when Irene accounts for her role as project manager:

> *My most important task is to ensure progress, and I can only achieve this by having motivated partners [Interviewer: and how do get motivated partners?] By making sure they can see a purpose, that they can see things happen, that the project is moving towards something they are interested in [...]." (ibid.).*

When probed whether she used other tools in addition to her phase plan to manage the project, Irene immediately thought of motivational tools as if it was completely natural to think of these instead of managerial tools such as accounting systems, etc.:

> *"We used different tools and tasks [mentions e.g. role playing on behalf of the partners, eds.] to get the partners involved, the atmosphere was fantastic." (ibid.).*

And asked what aspects of managing a PPI that she thought to be of critical importance the emphasis on the partners' motivation and sensemaking was again predominant:

> *"[...] it is crucial to minimize the amount of administrative work for the firms in a PPI financed with EU money [non-verbally implying how EU funding implies a nightmare of administrative work, eds.]. [...] Attention should also be directed towards the different perceptions of innovation that different partners in a project might have, e.g. what methods you want to use, how you approach the project work and so on. [...] The partners do not necessarily speak the same language and perhaps you have some innovation people included who speak a whole third language. It is important to be aware of the language and culture gap that might exist." (ibid.).*

Finally, the way in which Irene has ended up translating the PPI means that the private firms will not get any sales as a direct result of their participation. Instead, Irene presents another type of outcome for the private partners:

> *"[...] those who invest the time in doing it get "something" - alliances, networks, knowhow, fame, they get something they wouldn't get otherwise - goodwill." (ibid.).*

Table 5 provides an overview of central attributes in Irene's translation of project management in this specific project.

The reliability of these distilled key aspects is supported by an interview with one of the private partners in the project, Jon from the firm Tachista, who among other things stated:

> *"Irene is [...] "hovering above", managing the general things and beneath her the two work groups [training and nutrition, eds.] are to be considered as individual work-groups. [Interviewer: And in those groups it is informal management?] yeah, one person is kind of responsible for each group, calling the meetings and so on, but in practice it is completely informal and*

that functions quite well. [... Interviewer: Okay, so these two then refer back to Irene with progress status and so on?] exactly, and then it is her who put the pieces together. [Interviewer: How often do you meet?] we have ten meetings arranged for the next half year that can be supplemented with 1-on-1 meetings if you have the need. [Interviewer: what about coordination meetings where Irene participates?] I think we have around 5, where both work groups participate. These meetings can contain panel discussions, workshops, discussions, [etc.]." (Int. 6).

Conditions in Focus	Making the project understandable and attractive for stakeholders
Basic Assumptions	The project is a network of performative relations the strength of which is dependent on the successful enrolment of interested actors
Key Elements	Actors and interessment
Explanation of Problems	Failed interessment
Central Management Technologies	
Decision-making by	Problematization, negotiations, interessment
Planning and Steering	Plans are non-human actors that function as mechanisms for interessment and negotiations
Central Tasks for the Manager	Translating the project for different audiences to achieve interessment, facilitate progress by minimizing partners' perceived obstacles
Management Tools	Tools (e.g. the phase plan and role plays) are primarily used to motivate partners, the task of management is to a large extent internalized by partners interested in the project being successful

Table 5 - Key Attributes in Irene's Translation of Project Work.

To get another account of the way Irene uses her phase plan I asked Jon if he had seen it, and if so, how it worked as a steering tool. Jon replied:

"It functions very well, it provides an overview for me as participant and helps me estimate when the project demands too many resources compared to the outcome." (ibid.).

Chapter Summary

Pieced together from the qualitative interviews the preceding sections identified two project managers' distinctively different approaches to the management of two PPIs. Some of the same empirical material pointed to a third distinct approach on behalf of another manager who, unfortunately, it has not been possible to talk with.

The typology developed from project management theory was applied to identify key aspects of each approach, exposing how the managers' practices imply different translations of both the nature of project work as well as different interpretations of their environments. Interestingly, even though it would be too simplifying to argue that they resemble them completely, the key characteristics of the observed practices fit remarkably well with those of the three ideal-type perspectives on project management. Hence, the characteristics of [redacted]'s practice has a high degree of similarity with those of the political perspective, Irene's practice with those of the network perspective, and the suggested practice of the [redacted] manager with those of the administrative perspective.

To be sure, [redacted] in his accounts identifies a number of coalitions with different interests, and are very focused on the conflicts he has had with other groups over both the definition of goals, appropriate methods, and over resources. Furthermore, despite the owner organization's and funder's primary goals being fulfilled, [redacted] presents the outcome of the project as only part-success, frustrated that the developed prototype has stranded due to a decision on regional level to not implement anymore new solutions for the time being. Here, [redacted] articulates a problem that he then explains as resulting from resistance from a stronger coalition with other interests (the IT/purchasing departments in the region).

The manager of [redacted] were presented as wrapped up in administrative management, being very focused on his subordinates adhering to centrally approved procedures and tools for management. Especially peculiar is how both [redacted] and [redacted] provide examples where the [redacted] manager tried to impose specific methods onto the project participants. This is a clear

example of a manager who seems to exclusively consider formal relations and hierarchical positions in his practice.

Opposing this, Irene explicitly presents her work as primarily consisting of network-building. She is not as such involved in the practical work of her project groups functioning more as a spokesperson for the project with the key task of translating its contents for different audiences. Irene can thus be observed as preoccupied with creating interessment by offering different translations of the project to different actors, dependent on their expected interests. Furthermore, when Irene straightforwardly articulates the success of her project as dependent on motivated participants, it corresponds with the network perspective's main explanation of problems being too weak a network.

Both [redacted] and Irene can be observed as constructing a shared vision for their projects to motivate their group members. However, this activity is undertaken on different levels: [redacted] more or less withdraws to his small prototype coalition where the vision of solving a need by creating something new seems to be very motivational. However, at the same time this vision, together with the group's conviction of themselves as superior in terms of knowledge and skills, can be observed as some of the primary reasons for conflicts with other coalitions. Irene constructs a much broader vision, which she pragmatically translates into localized meanings in different contexts dependent on who she is speaking with.

The [redacted] manager on the other hand seems to think of motivation as something that more or less automatically appears, being the product of incentive structures and formal hierarchical relations.

Manifested in practices, the translations carry witness to what logics the managers subscribe to in their constructions of reality. Exposing how they draw in different elements from different understandings of the project management discipline in their work, and how they ascribe such elements with varying meanings, illuminates the way in which they relate to their institutional environment. The findings from this chapter therefore constitute the foundation for the next, which has as its purpose to analyze the institutional complexity of the organizational field of innovation.

C: Institutional Complexity in the Field of Innovation

Guiding actors' processes of constructing different realities and subsequently their creations of different practices are the institutional logics they subscribe to. Together with other empirical materials from the field that reflect actors' subscriptions to logics, the managers' translations point to some overall patterns as to how actors in the field interpret reality. Five ideal-type logics that partly coresponds to those identified by other researchers earlier (e.g. Goodrick & Reay 2011; Thornton et al. 2012) have been constructed from the data. They are presented in Table 6.

Below the micro-level practices are first deconstructed in order to provide insights as to what logics they reflect. Secondly, the congruence between the practices of the project managers and those formally espoused by the organizations formally controlling the projects and/or critical resources needed by them is analyzed. This enables context-specific cross-level comparisons of prevalent logics at the micro- and meso-levels. Thirdly, a broader analysis of the organizational field shows how actor diversity in the field supports the co-existence of multiple logics. Finally an assessment of the overall complexity of the institutional environment becomes possible.

Deconstructing Micro-level Practices

[redacted]'s political translation of his work can be observed as comprised of elements from a number of different logics. A central element in his accounts was the existence of different coalitions, his main task as manager being to defend the interests of his own coalition. This corresponds to a community logic where the dominant norm is membership of a group and the basis for decision-making is the advancement of community interests. In addition, [redacted]'s translation contains elements from a professional logic as his decision-making is also based on the application of the group's professional skills and expert knowledge. Also, the quality of the professionals' crafts is a vital norm in his legitimizing accounts (Suddaby & Greenwood 2005) of his group's work, as he refers to the expertise of the members and their association to specific professions (i.e. the IT- and medico professions). [redacted] also utilizes elements from a state logic, however he does this in a negative way with the purpose of juxta-positioning himself and his group against other actors and coalitions, especially the administrators of [redacted] and the Agency

	State Logic	Capitalist Logic	Scientific Logic	Community Logic	Professional Logic
Overall Objectives	Optimal use of tax payer money; maximization of welfare	Gain competitive advantage; maximization of profits	Increase knowledge-level; develop new & existing scientific knowledge	Secure survival of community	Guard integrity of profession
Sources of Legitimacy	Democratic participation	Market position	Position in international science community	Unity of will; belief in trust and reciprocity	Personal expertise; professional association
Dominant Rationalities	Weberian bureaucracy	Homo Economicus	Scientific integrity	Group membership	Profession's superiority
Dominant Norms	Accountability; causality; transparency; efficiency	Competition; free market; efficiency	Transparency; craftsmanship	Commitment to community values	Quality of craft
Basis of Attention	Status of interest group	Market opportunities	Relational network	Personal investment in group	Status in profession
Basis of Strategy	Increase community good	Increase profits	Increase and/or purify knowledge	Increase status of members and practices	Increase personal and profession reputation
Basis of Decision-making	Legislation	The market	Apply scientific knowledge	Promote community interests	Apply professional skills and expert knowledge

Table 6 - Institutional Logics in the Organizational Field of Innovation.

of Business. Specifically, [redacted] articulates how he beliefs that the overall objective of optimal utilization of taxpayers' money is dependent on avoiding the big overhead expenses implied by the administrative approach to project management preached by these actors. A community logic is also reflected, as it is [redacted]'s personal investment in the group that forms his basis of attention. The basis of [redacted]'s strategy is to increase both community good as well as status of his group and their practices.

The administrative translation of the [redacted] manager is somewhat more simplistic as it can be seen as comprised of elements almost exclusively from a state logic[16]. The goal of optimal use of taxpayer money and subsequent bureaucratic rationality explains his formalistic administrative approach to management. Furthermore, his preoccupation with his employees adhering to specific methods and rigid evaluation- and accounting procedures can be explained as attempts at avoiding uncertainty due to norms of accountability, transparency and causality. These norms subsequently imply the ideal of democratic participation as source of legitimacy for the [redacted] manager's practice. As the Agency of Business is the primary funder and, from a formalistic perspective, also the most powerful actor in the [redacted] project, his basis of attention is the interests of this stakeholder. Furthermore, legislation, rules, guidelines, procedures, etc. from authorities constitute his basis for decision-making, explaining why he insists on procedures regarded as unsuitable by other actors, i.e. the use of rigid planning and extremely detailed accounting and budgeting. This manager's basis of strategy could be to increase community good as prescribed by a state logic. However from the accounts of [redacted] and [redacted] it seem more likely that he is thinking about his personal reputation as a professional public manager, who honors the norms of the state logic. Hence, an element from a professional logic can also be suggested as part of the [redacted] manager's logic.

Irene's translation seems to be the most complex of the three, containing elements from all five logics. In many instances her own translation seems to be dependent on the translations she expects other actors to conduct. This is however not unexpected as the identification of elements from the network perspective on project management as predominant in her translation implies interessment to be the overall guiding principle in her work. It is for example hard to determine any one source of legitimacy that she draws on throughout her accounts. Rather, this seems to change whenever she shifts her focus from one subject or actor to another - towards the Capital Region and OPI-Lab it is based on state and

[16] This can admittedly be due to the fact that only limited second-hand data has been available.

scientific logics, towards the private partners involved she draws on capitalist and professional logics, and towards clinical personnel a mix of community and state logics.

This horizontal multiplicity of elements from different logics is also conspicuous in her presentation of the project as having two equally important objectives; the first being generation of knowledge for OPI-Lab, and the second to contribute to ease the stress on the healthcare sector in the future. The first objective is the result of Irene utilizing a scientific logic in her translation, the second corresponds to a state logic as the higher purpose is to maximize future welfare. This duality of goals was also formally present in the [redacted] project, however, as shown, [redacted] practically disregarded the knowledge generation part, only subscribing to a community logic in his translation of the project goals.

Further complicating the analysis, Irene's constant focus on the strength of the network can be viewed as resulting from a dominant rationality and norms that are based on a belief in different professions' superior capabilities within their fields of expertise, hence elements from a professional logic. Yet, due to her emphasis on interessment, actor recruitment, and motivation, the norms and rationality of a community logic is also noticeable in Irene's accounts. Also, her basis of attention is the status of interest groups, however, whereas the [redacted] manager also used elements from a state logic as basis for attention, his different interpretations of rationality and norms resulted in a translation of the Agency of Business as the all-important stakeholder. Conversely, Irene due to her use of elements from professional and community logics, translates the same dimension into a much more fragmented understanding, where many interest groups hold the same status as they are perceived to be equally important for the project. In accordance with the duality of objectives, Irene's basis of strategy is a hybrid of comprised of elements from state and scientific logics. In much the same way, due to the importance of interessment in her perspective on project management, her decision-making is based on elements from community and professional logics. Yet again, these elements are translated differently by Irene than by [redacted] who was also observed as utilizing elements from these logics in his basis for decision-making.

Table 7 summarizes the deconstructed nature of the managers' individual translations and their components. Next section investigates the degree of congruence between these micro-level logics and those of the primary organizational constituents.

	[redacted]'s Translation	[redacted] Manager's Translation	Irene's Translation
Overall Objectives	Secure survival of community; Optimal use of taxpayer money	Optimal use of taxpayer money	Increase knowledge-level; Maximization of welfare
Sources of Legitimacy	Personal expertise; Professional association	Democratic participation	Depends on interest group
Dominant Rationalities	Profession's superiority	Weberian bureaucracy	Group membership; Profession's superiority
Dominant Norms	Group membership; Quality of craft	Accountability, causality, transparency, efficiency	Quality of craft
Attitudes Toward Uncertainty	Depends on community	Uncertainty should be avoided	Depends on perspective
Basis of Attention	Personal investment in group	Status of interest group	Status of interest group
Basis of Strategy	Increase community good; Increase status of members and practices	Increase personal reputation; (Increase community good)	Increase and/or purify knowledge; Increase community good
Basis of Decision-making	Promote community interests; Apply professional skills and expert knowledge	Legislation; Guidelines and procedures from regulatory agencies	Promote community interests; Apply professional skills and expert knowledge
Represented Logics	State; Community; Professional	State; Professional	State; Capitalist; Scientific; Community; Professional

Table 7 - Elements from Different Logics in the Deconstructed Project Management Practices.

Comparing Micro & Meso levels

Constituting the immediate organizational environment of all three managers are The Capital Region as project owner and The Agency of Business as co-funder of all projects. Qua these organizations' raison d'être as public regulatory agencies their overall objective must be

the maximization of citizens' welfare and the optimal use of taxpayers' money. Derived from these objectives, the norms of causality and efficiency should be crucial. Furthermore, actors who subscribe to elements from a state logic also experience strong demands for accountability as transparency is a prerequisite for legitimacy from a democratic point of view. This is exemplified in materials from The National Audit Office (NAO), which monitors that public organizations and administrations operate in accordance with *"the principles for good public governance"*. NAO can hence be observed as the citizens' watchdog, ensuring that the agents spend tax money appropriately. In a document entitled *"The Concept of Good Public Audit Practice - a Guide"*, NAO states:

> *"It is the responsibility of management to construct suitable administrative systems and appropriate internal controls which, among other things, have as their purposes to ensure good control with the finances and that laws and regulations are respected. [...] This implies the arrangement of an administration including the necessary tools for finance management and accounting systems, [...] so that true (authentic) accounts can be given, documenting that resources have been used in accordance with preconditions, and that the desired effects have been achieved within the given framework." (2008:chp. III).*

Finally, management ought to comply with the principles for good public governance, including openness, accountability, and integrity." (National Audit Office 2008: chp. III).Later in the same guide, information is provided regarding what critical factors state auditors pay special attention to. These include three so-called finance-critical aspects that the audit of an administration can include:

> *"The aspect of thrift: Have goods and services been acquired in a financially appropriate manor with considerations to price, quality, quantity, etc.*
> *The aspect of productivity: Is there an optimal relationship between the use of resources and the returns.*
> *The aspect of efficiency: To what extent have the goals been reached - the effects triggered - that was intended with the use of resources in question." (ibid:chp. IV).*

From the above it can be observed how NAO constitutes a solid base for the state logic, not only preaching it normatively but also having the authority to conduct audits of public organizations, controlling their adherence to the norms and behaviors prescribed by it. For regulatory agencies, a state logic can hence be observed to push for the production of elaborate rules and rigid procedures that minimize, or preferably completely eliminate, uncertainty. Alternatively, they should at least provide legal and procedural frameworks that ensure a high degree of causality and accountability whenever resources are used. However, as the nature of innovation unavoidably means high levels of uncertainty on both outcome and process dimensions compared to standardized work, these norms are hard to comply with for organizations involved in PPIs. This becomes evident when The Agency of Business in their 2009(a) report states:

> *"It should be emphasized that there is no one specific way to organize a PPI. The variation is great in the analyzed cases [this report analyzed 13 PPIs, eds.] and there are examples of both big, well-structured PPI programs, and small locally anchored PPI projects." (Agency of Business 2009a: 10).*

Despite uncertainty as to how public actors are to approach the PPI construct, the earlier presented reports from governments, legislation from parliament, strategies and guidelines from regions, regulations and procedures from national regulatory agencies, evaluations from interest organizations and think tanks, studies from academics, etc., can be observed as exerting strong pressures on public sector organizations and employees, resulting in a normative climate for public sector innovation (see Newman et al. 2001 for an elaboration of this term). When the concept of innovation suddenly appears in settings usually characterized by risk-aversion and accountability, doing so due to translations of macro-economic pressures, it corresponds to the observation of how shifts in societal circumstances can result in the mobilization of new logics or the reprioritization of existing ones within a specific context (Greenwood et al. 2011).

Yet, public managers and organizations are still agents of the public and cannot straightforwardly scrap the democratic source of legitimacy, why they can be observed to struggle to merge components from the state logic with elements from the other available logics. This is the case when The Agency of Business on the one hand imposes

comprehensive demands for project specifications, ex-ante justifications, rigid accounting and budgeting demands, etc., on the projects it funds, while at the same time admitting that the concept of innovation makes it close to impossible to arrive at any one universally applicable set of regulations. As [redacted] formulated it:

> *"That way of doing it [micro-managing projects, eds.] requires a high degree of predictability. What they asked [the [redacted] manager and Agency of Business, eds.] is the same as asking the partners to supply their time recordings up front." (Int. 8).*

[redacted]'s statement corresponds to a central point of critique of a specific PPI in a report published by the Nordic Council of Ministers:

> *"[...] the awarding authorities expected too concrete specifications of what the innovative outcomes would be and how these outcomes would be realized. In innovative processes, the outcome is not always known in advance." (2011:61).*

Taking these observations one step further the Nordic Innovation Centre reported how:

> *"Rules and regulations mostly tend to make procurers risk aversive. [...] Public actors, including procurers, generally don't gain from innovating. Resources saved from innovative solutions are not automatically allowed to be reinvested for the same purposes. [...] It must be legitimate to try new solutions, which include a risk of failure. If that is not acceptable, no one will be the first to try." (2011:2).*

Hence, when the Danish Environmental Protection Agency invited DI to participate in a role as semi-manager in The Water Partnership it is symptomatic for the difficulties public organizations have when trying to cope with the innovation climate. Qua its members' interests, DI stands for a liberal ideology and primarily subscribes to a capitalist logic. This is a well-known fact, making it quite peculiar that the agency included this specific organization in its work as the state and capitalist logics imply some very different interpretations of reality and prescriptions for behavior. However, this was justified by referring to DI's professional skills and expertise within the area of business and innovation, hence utilizing elements from a professional logic. In this case, a regulatory agency can be observed as having legitimized

the work of a lobby organization, including its evaluation of the project that contained recommendations as to how PPIs should be structured in the future.

Considering how all three analyzed projects are formally located within The Capital Region and funded by the Agency of Business makes the high degree of variance in micro-level practices particularly interesting. The projects are connected to the same meso-levels, i.e. that of the region and the Agency of Business, with The Patients' House also connected to the project-organization OPI-Lab. Only formal differences are the small difference in time between the projects and of course the different composition of actors involved. Worth noticing here is that no legislation, regulations, procedures, guidelines, etc., implicating new or significantly altered formal approaches to PPIs or innovation in general have been published since the 2009(a) report from the Agency of Business. Furthermore, the economic conditions have not changed significantly either, and hence the high degree of variation in practices cannot be satisfactory explained by neither societal developments nor specific field-level changes.

Interestingly, the Capital Region has, as noted earlier, not yet published an official strategy for business development and innovation. Although there is no proof, this could arguably be due to the high level of ambiguousness as to how public organizations are to behave so as to accommodate both the need for accountability and the normative pressures for innovation.

Despite the projects being located in the same organization, the above paints a picture of a very complex organizational environment in which the managers are exposed to opposing norms, pressures, and expectations. This is further supported by the Nordic Innovation Center's report:

> *"There is also a tendency in the countries studied [the Nordic countries, eds.] to be quite active on a somewhat abstract policy level, but a bit less active when it comes to specific and detailed programmes and activities directed towards achieving clear and unambiguous objectives or goals" (2011:1).*

Chapter Summary

The constructions of society-wide perceptions of macro-economic developments foster strong pressures for changes, resulting in the transposition of the symbolic element of innovation from its original setting in the private business community into legislative and public sector contexts. However, as the concept of innovation in many respects is incompatible with traditional risk-averse bureaucratic norms, it becomes necessary for actors to make sense of it by drawing on other logics than that of the state. The variation in micro-level practices is hence a direct consequence of institutional complexity. Ambiguity as to what behavior is appropriate makes it possible for managers to translate work and tasks that formally seem rather similar into very different practices.

Derived, the availability of different logics also explains both the behavior of the Environmental Protection Agency in the Water Partnership that from a state logic seems rather irrational, and that of the Agency of Business, formally espousing practices that reflect a state logic while at the same time being deeply involved in PPIs.

Thus, such behavior on the part of regulatory agencies can be understood as originating from discrepancies between espoused and underlying beliefs: as they are dependent on formal legitimacy granted in part by the National Audit Office, they officially have to subscribe to a state logic. However, the innovation climate at the same time requires them to adopt more pragmatic approaches in practice, allowing employees to draw in elements from other logics.

These observations imply how the PPI construct might be utilized by some organizations as a way of decoupling activities that are perceived as necessary but not legitimate. This would also explain why Irene experiences the region as not involved in her project even though they have paid a significant amount of money for it, as well as why the Agency of Business exposed such noticeable variance in organizations' PPI practices in its 2009 report.

In conclusion, incongruence between the practices developed by the managers and the practices espoused by the Capital Region and Agency of Business is significant. From a formal administrative perspective dominated by a state logic, the [redacted] manager is the only rational of the three as he is the only one who insists on the rigid accounting procedures and so on. Conversely, from a solution-oriented perspective grounded in a professional logic, [redacted] is more rational than any of the others as he almost exclusively prioritizes the development of a new tangible technology, that can actually help increase efficiency in

hospitals. Then again, from a pragmatic network perspective where the simultaneous accommodation of several interests is needed, Irene takes the prize.

From an administrative perspective on project management, which is the perspective that most closely resembles the norms and rationality of a state logic, the response to deviating practices would be to replace actors, i.e. the managers, review the incentive structure, terminate the project or other formal actions. However, even though [redacted] experienced controversies due to his practice deviating from the formally espoused translations, neither him nor Irene have experienced any further sanctions in their work. Hence, key constituents, i.e. the [redacted] manager, the [redacted], and the Agency of Business, must have unofficially accepted their practices. Subsequently these actors must also be able to interpret the projects as valuable - implying the use of elements from other logics than that of the state in their interpretations as well. It must therefore be assumed that even though the state logic might officially be recognized as dominant, the multiplicity of logics is not a phenomena limited to the micro-level.

Next chapter analyzes the connection between field diversity and the existence of multiple, somewhat incompatible logics.

D: Multiple Logics Supported by Field Diversity

It has been established in the former how multiple logics coexist in the field of innovation. Elucidating this is the continuous negotiations between not only individual actors but also coalitions of actors as to how the concept of innovation should be interpreted. At the core of these conflicts is the question of how innovation should be approached from a national-legislative angle, and how to incorporate it into public governance practices. Overall these struggles reflect ideological conflicts between collectives of actors who subscribe to different institutional logics.

One example of such differences is the ways in which the PWT-Foundation[17] and DI respectively approach the task of fostering innovation in the public sector. Starting with the foundation:

> *"The PWT-Foundation can support the best ideas from public institutions - either alone or in collaboration with private firms. Common for all projects is that they each must support the employees in solving work tasks easier and more efficient. The public sector can thereby deliver more service for the same money, and release resources to tasks in the direct contact with the citizens." (Agreement on the Utilization of Resources from the PWT-Foundation 2008: 1)*

The objective here is to increase, or at least avoid having to decrease the welfare level by utilizing taxpayer money in an optimal way as only the "best ideas" will be supported, implying the possibility of optimal decision-making. The idea that the state can reduce uncertainty, stemming e.g. globalization and demographic ageing, by implementing initiatives aimed at regulating specific behaviors or steering particular phenomena, implies a belief in clear causalities. Also, by establishing public authorities as gatekeepers, legislators implicitly subscribe to a Weberian rationality in that they trust the public bureaucracy to possess the expertise needed to conduct the analyses and assessments required as basis for making the optimal decisions. In sum, this agreement expresses a translation of innovation heavily influenced by a state logic.

Opposing this, DI draws primarily on elements from professional and capitalist logics, symbolized for example by DI's constant push for more involvement of private firms in solving public sector tasks:

> *"Involving private firms in the handling of public tasks will not only increase the quality and efficiency of the public sector, it can also result in competitive advantages for private firms derived from accumulated knowledge and experiences. The growing global demand for welfare services creates a gigantic export market on which Denmark will possess a natural position of strength. For example, Denmark's exports within welfare*

[17] Passed in Parliament, the Agreement on the Utilization of Resources from the PWT-Foundation reflects the interpretation of a majority of legislators at that point in time.

> *technology and -solutions alone make up 60 billion DKr. However, since year 2000 we have lost market shares in the EU corresponding to 15 billion DKr. It should be a clear political objective to reverse this development." (DI 2010:91).*

Here, in addition to the public sector aspects, a prime objective with public sector innovation is for private firms to gain competitive advantages on the international market. Increased political attention to this goal is legitimized by referring to a declining market share for Danish firms and derived risks of loosing future growth in revenues. The idea that private firms will more or less automatically increase the efficiency and quality of public sector work implies beliefs that private firms are naturally more efficient and effective than public organizations. Also, uncertainty is perceived as a source of business opportunities to be exploited rather than as a threat to be minimized or avoided. Finally, by articulating market shares and international and cross-sector comparisons of e.g. competitiveness and efficiency as indicators of the legitimacy of public policy, DI subscribes to a Smitharian understanding of the market as the basis for decision-making.

A more or less implicit skepticism towards the efficiency of public organizations is often noticeable in translations constructed by field-level actors drawing primarily on elements from a capitalist logic/liberal ideology. Taking this skepticism a step further, CEPOS recently conducted a power-critical analysis of the National Audit Office. Based on arguments from Principal-Agent Theory it was stated that NAO does not have any incentives to actually assess the thrift and productivity aspects in public sector organizations despite this being the raison d'être of the institution in the first place:

> *"The three crucial constituents of NAO are the citizens, the bureaucrats in the public institutions being audited, and the politicians in parliament.*
> *The citizens must be assumed to be interested in getting as much for their tax money as possible, as well as getting the structural problem of public deficit solved. However, [as the coalition of public employees and citizens dependent on social benefits] constitutes a clear majority of the population [this might not be the case], and hence both The Opposition and Government will in practice have a tendency to be reluctant with making the public sector efficient.*

> *The bureaucrats are responsible for their organizations being efficient, thus it will be problematic for them if major inefficiencies are exposed. [Furthermore, gains in efficiency] in the organization in question would likely mean that some of the bureaucrats loose their jobs, [... or] changes in work processes so that obtained rights (breaks, procedures, decision-making competencies, wishes in the planning of working hours, etc.) for employees are lost.*
> *[Lastly,] The development of productivity in the public sector must, due to its nature, be undertaken from a long-term perspective, but the main focus of politicians is naturally on the short term as they have to be re-elected every four years." (CEPOS 2012a:18-21).*

The existence of multiple, often opposing logics in the field is further illustrated when the Legal Advisor to the Danish Government develops a *"Script for Public Private Collaboration for the Development of Welfare Technology in South Denmark Region"*, while a project manager in the Central Denmark Region at the same time discards the possibility of developing such scripts. In the script the legal advisor states:

> *"The principle of economically sound administration must in practice be expected to imply an obligation for the region as funder or outsourcer to make sure that it gets the most for the resources." (The Legal Advisor to the Danish Government 2010:60).*

The advisor goes on to propose two models for PPIs that appear as ready-to-implement solutions for public managers faced with the task of structuring a PPI.

Interviewed by the consulting firm Rambøll's magazine "Imorgen", Marie Louise Thomsen, project manager in PPIs and intelligent public demand in Central Region Denmark, states:

> *"Every partnership has its own character and the hunt for the ultimate model for public-private collaboration is therefore in vain. The public-private relation is exactly a relation, and success is often depend on non-contractual conditions such as trust and chemistry." (Ramboll 2011:15).*

The legal advisor here represents the same kind of administrative perspective as that of the [redacted] manager in the former, as it is believed possible to develop a priori universalistic models, leaving the success of the PPI as dependent on competent implementation. This is hence a translation based primarily on elements from state and professional logics, and is in contrast to Marie Louise Thomsen, who can also be observed to utilize elements from a community logic in her translation.

A scientific logic is also apparent in the field of innovation as used by actors trying to influence the way in which the relationship between public governance and innovation is constructed. Max Rolfstam[18], post.doc at University of Southern Denmark, conducts research in user-driven innovation, public innovation and purchasing, innovation policy, etc., and states in the same Rambøll magazine how:

> *"Public purchasers should understand that their role is to demand intelligent solutions. A few municipalities and regions have understood that they can actually make requirements in the purchasing relation. But overall, it [public innovation, eds.] is an education project for politicians and civil servants to get them to understand that they have the key to more new thinking in the private solutions by being competent purchasers." (ibid: 18).*

The examples of different logics utilized to promote different interpretations of reality and appropriate ways to cope with that reality goes on and on. In its guide, the Growth Unit Copenhagen hence states how it *"[...] has developed a model for PPIs"* (2011:Preface). Despite differentiating it from that of the legal advisor by e.g. having developed it from empirical observations (whereas the legal advisor primarily developed the models from an examination of the legal frameworks), the model still resembles the same overall administrative mindset. Thus, the guide includes an *"ecosystem of solutions"*, checklists to clarify whether one's organization is ready for PPI, prescriptions for risk management, and is generally constructed as a progressive linear phase model.

[18] Max Rolfstam also participated as one of the presenters at the conference *"Measuring the Effects of PPIs"* (Obs. 2).

Chapter Summary

In itself, the number of actors in the field is not a crucial variable when assessing the diversity. Yet, as the actors identified in the field of innovation constitute a mix of many different professions and ideologies, the high number of actors serves to solidify the presence of multiple logics in the field.

Each of the five ideal-type logics constructed from the empirical observations supplies a complete set of prescriptions for how to interpret reality and act within it. However, as have been shown in the above, the field-, meso-, and micro-levels are all characterized by actors combining elements from a number of logics in what can best be described as one big mess. This points to a rather high degree of actor discretion, underlined by the substitution of hardcore procedures and regulation with best practice examples and guidelines from regulatory agencies, as well as the noticeable variance between espoused meso-level practices and observed micro-level practices in public organizations.

Furthermore, as the concept of innovation in itself is rather diffuse due to the inherent uncertainty that characterizes its nature, it is hard for constituents such as the public and the National Audit Office to control for whether organizations obey prescribed behaviors, e.g. those stated in the NAO guide mentioned earlier, in practice. In connection with this, it is interesting how NAO has yet to conduct any audits of PPIs or other innovation-related projects, initiatives, programs, etc.

In sum, the structure of the field, with its combination of several logics that to some extent are in conflict combined with their low degrees of specificity, results in a highly complex institutional environment.

4. Concluding Remarks & Discussions

This dissertation had as its overall purpose to refine our understanding of the relations between actors and their environments. Offering a rich area for studying such interaction, the task of project management in PPIs was chosen as empirical context. The practices of these managers was then analyzed from a unique theoretical framework, derived from a combination of the new "Institutional Logics Perspective" with insights from theory on the discipline of project management. Focused on what implications the institutional environment, specifically the Organizational Field of Innovation, have on these managers' decision-making and practice creations, it was demonstrated how environmental complexity makes it possible for actors to translate the same concepts and phenomena in radically different ways, causing great horizontal variance in micro-level practices within the same context. Furthermore, this complexity was also proved to result in conspicuous vertical complexity, making incongruence between espoused meso-level practices and actual micro-level practices prevalent. The legitimization of innovation as priority in public governance can from this perspective be observed as directly constitutive of transformations in the institutional environment of public managers and organizations, enabling them to draw on a variety of logics in their interpretations of reality, subsequently having crucial implications for what behaviors they perceive as appropriate.

Earlier reports on the PPI construct have by far had the form of rather broad analyses with the purpose of evaluating the overall performance of the concept. These evaluations have often concluded by pointing to some general barriers identified as impeding partnerships' effectiveness as well as actors' willingness to commence PPIs in the first place.

In this study, this contextual complexity has, however, been shown to not only function as a delimiting factor, but also to provide actors with comprehensive managerial discretion as to how both managers and organizations choose to approach the work with PPIs.

Interestingly, this finding can thus be observed as in somewhat opposition to earlier reports on PPIs that have argued especially lacks of "hardcore" legislative and procedural frameworks to be major impediments for the use and spread of the construct. Conversely, it has been shown here how public organizations, even central authorities such as the Capital Region, seemingly unproblematic from a constituency perspective can initiate PPIs, and even

let the managers of them and their project organizations enjoy conspicuous degrees of organizational slack. Combined with the ambiguous nature of the innovation concept, different understandings of the project management discipline, and the ability to draw on different institutional logics, this complexity thus enables managers within similar contexts to create practices that vary greatly, and to some extent even deviate from espoused organizational norms.

In this light, the explanation of why the use of PPIs is still rather limited has to be found elsewhere. One alternative explanation was mentioned in passing by Bente, manager of the PPI *"From Idea to Value"*, during our informal conversation after my observation of one of her workshops (Obs. 1). Bente noted how:

> *"A lot more is possible within the current set of rules than people think. From my point of view, all the talk about legislation and procedures as one of the primary barriers for PPIs is misunderstood. Rather, it is peoples' perceptions of the these circumstances that constitute the barrier, exactly because people tend to more or less just give up due to their beliefs that noting is possible."*

From a logics perspective, another explanation is hence that a majority of public organizations and employees are subscribing to interpretations of reality that celebrate status quo and traditional bureaucratic norms of stability and risk-averseness, making it virtually impossible to think "outside the box". Instead of the cognitive imprisonment reflected by both the eldercare workers at Bente's workshop and some of the evaluations of PPIs, institutional complexity is not necessarily a barrier as it opens up the possibility for actors to conduct translations that fit their specific needs and wishes. Hence, the primary barrier might very well consist in the confined array of behaviors perceived as appropriate by actors due to the logics they subscribe to.

This corresponds partly to what former reports generally has termed as "cultural barriers". However, whereas such labels imply inertia and deeply embedded patterns that can seem almost impossible to change, the logics perspective offers a much more agency-oriented perspective. From the combination with project management theory, it has been exposed how behaviors that on the surface are easily ascribed to such "cultural conditions" (i.e. the managers' different practices), instead can be understood as stemming from different ways of

drawing on logics. Changing behavior might therefore be easier than usually thought of, one means being to confront actors with alternative interpretations of phenomena and challenge existing ones. Supporting this, one of the most interesting observations from the aforementioned workshop was how the eldercare workers and their managers kept referring to legal barriers in a despairing way when they discussed procurement and public purchasing. Compared to Bente's statement, such conflicting accounts of the same phenomena underline how important it is for actors involved in both policy-formulation and PPI management to understand their institutional environment. Understanding how actors' world-views are the results of translated elements from a variety of institutional logics enables a more instrumental approach to the practical work of changing behaviors and designing intelligent policies and regulations that advance the behaviors needed for the PPI construct and innovation in general to become taken-for-granted practices in the public sector.

PPIs force actors to relate to other logics if they are to make sense of the construct and not least have a chance at succeeding in using it in practice. Hence, the introduction of PPI can be seen as a means to transform the public sector into a *"[...] collective actor [that] must be able to react to all fluctuations, it must be in a position to seize all opportunities. Rigid and mechanical models, overly precise task and role definitions, constraining programmes, must all be avoided in order to innovate."* (Akrich et al. 2002a:189). Continuing this line of thought, the inadequacy of traditional management tools and reporting systems is elucidated when actors try to apply them in PPIs, e.g. symbolized in the practice of the [redacted] manager. Building on such experiences it becomes possible for actors to criticize the conviction that public managers should formalize in order to manage complexity and uncertainty (Kapsali 2011). PPIs can in this way facilitate changes in actors' cognitive bases and practices, providing backing and support to managers who has taken on the task of conducting public sector innovation.

Furthermore, the PPI construct can be observed as a non-human proponent for normative changes in public governance as it qua its nature is focused on the output of the relation, i.e. what improvements are achieved. This is in contrast to the vast majority of existing relations between the public and private sectors that traditionally have focused on the input side of the equation, i.e. what activities that are to be conducted according to certain specifications.

This change in focus sheds light on the perhaps primary core issue of public sector innovation in general and the use of PPIs in particular: how do you measure the effects in a

way that accommodates the expectations of principals while at the same time acknowledging the diffuse nature of innovation?

Figure 2, inspired by Stefan Brendstrup's presentation at the conference *Measuring the effects of PPIs*, illustrates the dilemma of evaluating the outcome of innovative efforts. The solid double-line represents the measureable relative impact on the organization from a particular cause. The solid single-line the effect that is directly attributable to a certain cause, and the punctured lines effects that can be argued to stem from the same cause, but are either not considered by the evaluator or lack clear causal connections to a cause and therefore cannot be ascribed to it with satisfactory certainty (at least from a state logic perspective).



Figure 2 - Measuring Effects of Innovation.

The illustration implies several paradoxes for actors heavily influenced by elements from a state logic. Take as an example a politician who has as his basis of attention the status of interest groups, i.e. targeted voters, and dominant norms being causality and accountability. He will have a tendency to emphasize the importance of being able to document effects clearly and quickly so that he can claim recognition for them. If the concern for re-election is substituted for with concerns regarding employee evaluations and performance measurements, a similar scenario can be thought of in relation to public purchasers. Unfortunately, innovative projects and initiatives will seldom yield short-term effects and often the directly observable effects, if any, will only account for part of the story as derived effects can have significant impacts on other dimensions or in other areas that was perhaps not even considered when the effort was initiated. This also means that there is an inherent risk of overlooking the effects of specific innovations, especially if a too narrowly defined

framework for evaluation is applied, as was also discussed in a radio broadcast on the subject of modernizing the public sector (P1 Debat 10.05.2012).

Interestingly, the belief in public innovation as exposed in this paper does not seem to be based on any clear explicit understanding of what innovation as concept actually means, but rather on an underlying belief in progress as such. This resembles the original justification of innovation in the private business community where the never-ending quest for competitive advantage imply an almost religious orientation towards progress and innovation as something inherently good. The PPI construct in itself is by the Agency of Business legitimized by the explicit belief that private firms possess innovative skills that, when put together with the operational know-how of public organizations, can boost the efficiency of the public sector. This justification is vital for the legitimacy of the construct, as the use of taxpayers' money on PPIs would otherwise merely resemble state financing of projects aimed at helping private firms coming up with new ways of generating profits. Yet, there is no substantial evidence that public organizations do not themselves possess the innovative capabilities needed for such innovation; the different reports and evaluations simply state how the institutional environment, especially legal and procedural frameworks and cultural norms, suppresses any incentives for these organizations and their managers to engage in innovation. Such observations can be related to the analysis of the National Audit Office conducted by CEPOS (2012a), as it resembles a fundamental principal-agent problem. Public managers simply do not have the incentives needed for them to deviate from the norms of the Weberian bureaucracy, risking to be labeled as illegitimate. Why engage in innovative efforts with the goal of increasing efficiency when their organizations will most likely not be allowed to keep control of the resources they save, when the future existence of their own and the jobs of colleagues might come into question, or when they risk changes in obtained rights and established practices?

In this context, the articulation of PPIs as legitimate due to the need of private firms' innovative capabilities can be regarded as a constructed myth. Rather, what is really needed is the drive and progress-promoting norms of private firms necessary to remedy the inertia that inappropriate political-, hierarchical-, and incentive structures of the public sector create. Based on this, it could be argued that another way to achieve the same results would be to review these structures, something that might not necessarily be as controversial as it initially

sounds when considering how these structures have existed virtually unchanged for decades, perhaps even centuries. Again, the value of the logics perspective in rendering visible how behavior is dependent on particular uses of logic combinations is proved.

From analyses of the symbiotic relationship between logics and the practices in which they materialize, this dissertation has provided valuable insights into the nestedness of logics, and how not only horizontal but also vertical complexity is a crucial dimension when analyzing social interaction and institutional developments.

5. Reflections

The importance of the heterogeneous institutional context when trying to understand how public project managers translate their work into practices has been thoroughly documented here. However, at least four strings of theory believed to hold much potential for further strengthening the explorative framework developed here have not been incorporated into this dissertation.

Firstly, the wider implications of the innovation climate and invention and use of constructs such as PPIs on public governance constitute an obvious area of research that could have been included. Public sector innovation in itself might be justifiable from a traditional Weberian point of view insofar it can be undertaken with a minimum of risks combined with high gains in efficiency. However, as such innovation is perhaps best labeled as an utopian idea, legislators and public administrators, when utilizing taxpayer to support risky innovation from which private firms profit in one way or another, enter a gray zone where the classical

principal-agent relationship with the public is challenged. As Trailer, Rechner & Hill (2004) underline, private firms' overall objective of profit generation is in opposition to that of the state, as the public must want as much for their tax money as possible.

When politicians and policy makers refrain from reconfiguring the incentive structures for lower-level managers, instead trying to influence their behavior by establishing new couplings to the institutional environment in the hope that they will react as expected to the normative innovation climate, it implies the risk that organizations and managers choose to adapt purely symbolically. Hence, when municipalities and regions establish departments for innovation and hire innovation consultants, it might be actions that serve the sole purpose of window dressing. Such actions might simply resemble decoupled activities without any connection to the core activities of the organizations. This corresponds to Oliver's (1991) avoidance strategy where organizations seek to disguise nonconformity to institutional pressures or to escape them by changing formal goals, practices, and organizational structures so that constituencies, e.g. politicians allocating resources to them, leave them alone.

Furthermore, as Dolfsma, Finch & McMaster remark: *"Introducing elements of a pure market in a "hybrid" context does not necessarily increase welfare, let alone well-being."* (2005:353). Derived, the concept of innovation implies some crucial developments within public governance more broadly that might have comprehensive implications for the very relation between state and citizens. Sørensen (2012) provides an interesting example of an analysis of the changing nature of public-private relations, discussing how the concept of accountability changes when the discipline of public governance does too.

Secondly, this study has not paid much attention to the role of actors' identity in shaping behavior. Organizational theory is increasingly recognizing identity as an important aspect when examining behavior (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2011), and individuals' identity has for decades occupied a central position in social studies on persons' behavior (e.g. Mead 1934). Personal desires to appear as a "good public official", "good civil servant", "competent project manager", "responsible legislator", etc., have thus been proved to be important variables when analyzing individuals' behavior. Similar, identity is believed to be important for organizational behavior, as collectives' ideas of what their organizations ought to represent will likely be very influential on the specific organization is structured and develop. These aspects corresponds somewhat to the earlier mentioned isomorphic tendencies identified by

Meyer & Rowan 1977, however, as also discussed, isomorphism is a way too simplistic view on organizational behavior.

Thirdly, discourse theory would have provided a detailed method of analyzing the interactional struggles between actors implied when translations of core concepts and elements of institutional logics are articulated in attempts to gain support for specific constructions of reality. This would have made it possible to examine in detail the processes of reprioritizing logics and actors' attempts at infusing the core concept of innovation with particular meanings. Without explicitly noticing it, Suddaby & Greenwood (2005) undertake an analysis that seems to correspond well with such an approach.

Lastly, Actor-network Theory was considered included as it enables careful analyses of the role that non-human actors, e.g. accounting devices or innovation management systems, play in shaping social reality. Especially in the analyses of project managers' practices insights of this kind are believed to hold much promise if one were to present ideas or recommendations as to how employing particular kinds of such non-human actors can stimulate managers' behavior. Power (1996) and Skærbæk & Tryggestad (2010) are inspiring examples of how the ANT framework can expose such relations.

6. References

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6.2 Empirical Data

6.2.1 Primary Data

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Int. 2 — Interview (in Danish), Susan Dalum, Project Manager in *"OPI-Lab"*. Region Syddanmark, Forskerparken, Odense, April 11, 2012

Int. 3 — Interview (in Danish), [redacted], Innovation Consultant, affiliated with the PPI "[redacted]", April 19, 2012

Int. 4 — Interview (in Danish), Irene Haagensen, Project Manager in the PPI *"The Patients' House"*, Region Hovedstaden, Hillerød, April 23, 2012

Int. 5 Interview (in Danish), Lars Halgren, Investment Manager in Sundhedsfabrikken, Partner in the PPI "*From Idea to Value*", Roskilde, May 10, 2012

Int. 6 Interview (in Danish), [redacted], Director of the private firm [redacted], partner in the PPI "[redacted], July 13, 2012

Int. 7 Interview (in Danish), Jon Henningsen, Director of the private firm Tachista, partner in the PPI "*The Patients' House*", Hillerød, July 16, 2012

Int. 8 Interview (in Danish), [redacted], Project Manager in the PPI "[redacted], July 16, 2012

Obs. 1 Observations from an idea-workshop in the PPI *"From Idea to Value"*, 13 participants including: Bente R. Thorsen, her assistant, Lars Halgren, president of Sundhedssfabrikken, a project manager from the municipality's innovation unit, the director of the Region's department for elder care, two residential home managers, six employee representatives from two residential homes, Asnæs, March 30, 2012

Obs. 2 Participation in the conference *"Measuring the Effects of PPIs"*, 25 participants, presentations by: Susan Dalum, project manager; Guri Weihe, manager at Ernst & Young and post.doc from DBP at CBS; Jan Dalskov, director of Region Midtjylland's innovation unit; Stefan Brendstrup, partner in LB Analyse and Ph.D in political science; Max Rolfstam, associate professor in innovation at Aalborg University;

Majbritt R. Evald, associate professor in entrepreneurship and relation management at SDU, Odense, April 11, 2012

6.2.2 Secondary Data

6.2.2.1 Various Reports, Legislation, Declarations of Intents, Statistics, etc.

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Jyllands-Posten 03.03.2010, *Et årti vi ikke har råd til at tabe*

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Web3 www.ft.dk (loaded on April 30, 2012)

Web4 www.erhvervsstyrelsen.dk (loaded on May 10, 2012)

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Web7 www.au.dk (loaded on March 20, 2012)

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Web9 www.biopeople.dk (loaded on June 4, 2012)

Web10 www.foodnetwork.dk (loaded on June 4, 2012)

Web11 www.service.di.dk (loaded on May 18, 2012)

Web12	www.ae.dk (loaded on April 27, 2012)
Web13	www.cepos.dk (loaded on June 8, 2012)
Web14	www.foranet.dk (loaded on June 20, 2012)
Web15	www.udbudsraadet.dk (loaded on June 20, 2012)
Web16	www.mm.dk (loaded on June 20, 2012)
Web17	www.mind-lab.dk (loaded on June 20, 2012)
Web18	www.ebst.dk/brugerdreveninnovation.dk/projekter brugerdreveninnovation/0/14/7098900 (loaded on May 15, 2012)
Web19	www.opi-lab.dk/wm381717 (loaded on March 11, 2012)

Appendixes

Appendix A - Case: [redacted]

Initiated in January 2010 and ending two years later, the PPI "[redacted]" was one of three demonstration projects running simultaneously as parts of the umbrella project "[redacted]. The primary objective with [redacted] was to develop methods for working with PPI, more specifically testing an approach where simulation was combined with user-driven innovation. [redacted] received 6 million Dkr in funding from the Agency of Business, and the involved private partners contributed with their time.
[redacted] functioned as overall secretariat for the three demonstration projects, and the overall responsible project manager was located here. Each demonstration project then functioned as individual projects, with their own managers, partners, and objectives.

In [redacted] the goal was to test and document simulation as work-method by utilizing this method on cases of well-documented issues in Danish hospitals' handling of blood samples and test results from these, e.g. overlooked results and lengthy processes from the extraction of the sample to the treatment-responsible doctor receives the test results.
The partnership consisted of the project manager [redacted], innovation consultant [redacted]
The project were allocated appr. 1 million Dkr., plus whatever the private partners contributed with.

The end-result of the project was a prototype mobile device (tablet) that enables clinical personnel to be oriented and check the results of lab-work on blood samples in real-time, thereby eliminating the dependency of stationary work stations and rigid work procedures for clinical personnel. Test groups have been very positive, however the solution has yet to be tested on a broader basis, and implementation has been impeded by the [redacted] having stopped all development projects at this time.

For more information see the Fact Sheet for the PPI "[redacted]" attached as Appendix G, the brochure from [redacted] attached as Appendix H, listen to interviews 3, 6, and 8 on the CD, and visit [redacted]

Appendix B - Case: The Patients' House

Initiated in January 2011 and ending in January 2014, OPI-Lab is a cross-regional/national project with a budget of approximately 50 million DKr. jointly funded by the five Danish regions, Agency of Business, EU funds, private firms, and municipalities. The purpose with OPI-Lab is to generate, collect, systematize, and make readily available, knowledge about how to use the PPI construct. It consists of five PPIs (one in each region) that each have a two-folded objective, being 1) to complete an actual PPI, and 2) to contribute with a priori defined knowledge to the work of OPI-Lab. Hence the five PPIs can be understood as sub-projects, feeding OPI-Lab with knowledge and experiences. OPI-Lab functions as overall secretariat for the five projects, and the project manager, Susan Dalum, is the head responsible manager. Each regional PPI then has its own project manager, reporting to Susan Dalum.

The Patients' House is the Capital Region's project in OPI-Lab, started in January 2011 and ending in January 2013. It has a budget of approximately 6 million DKr. jointly financed by EU's Structural Funds, the Growth Forum of the Capital Region, and the involved private firms. The project's stake in OPI-Lab is to generate knowledge about models for the cooperation aspect in PPIs, and is doing this on the basis of experiences derived from the actual PPI-work. The PPI was from the beginning formally focused on how to enable patients with multi-diagnoses to better handle their health and at the same time decrease their need for hospitalizations and treatments.
At this time (July 2012) the project manager is Irene[19], and the PPI-part of the project consists of 6 firms including NCC and Tachista, and clinical personnel from three hospitals in the region.

As the project is still in effect no final results are available. However, a number of workshops with the involved firms and clinical personnel as well as other practitioners have been conducted.

For more information see the project brochure and fact sheet attached as Appendixes E and I respectively, listen to interviews 2, 4, and 7 on the CD, and visit www.opi-lab.dk and www.centerforsundhedsinnovation.dk.

[19] Irene took over from another manager six months into the project.

Appendix C - Example of Interview Guide

It should be emphasized that the study's focus on actors' interpretations and sensemaking required meant that the informants were given extensive freedom to steer the interviews so as to gain insights into what aspects they perceived to be important. Hence, this interview guide only functioned on a very overall level.

Relevance for Research	Interview Questions
Clarification of the informant's initial understanding of the nature and purpose of the project and its environment This needs to be elaborated on in regards to perception of relations to the environment	1. What actors were involved in *project name*? a. Did this composition have implications for your approach to management? b. Was there any turnover of members during the project? 2. What was the original goal of *project name*? 3. How was the project placed in relation to the owner organization? a. Was there any formal steering of the project from higher levels, e.g. a steering committee? b. What demands were you as manager subordinated to in regards to accounting, status reports, budgets, etc.? c. Was the progress of the project continuously evaluated by the owner organization, e.g. by stop/go stage gates?
Detailed insights into the informant's subjective interpretation of his/her practice creation and translations This needs to be elaborated on in regards to perceived critical challenges in order to ensure	4. How did you organize the project group? a. What was your primary work tasks? b. How did coordination of the project work take place? c. Did this function appropriately and as expected? 5. Did you use any tools for steering, e.g. for management of finance, process, etc.? 6. In your work with this project, what was the most critical challenges?

understanding of the informant's translations of key aspects in practice	a. How did you cope with these? b. Did you use any particular tools for this?
Further probes as to the informant's interpretation of the organizational context	7. At the end of the project was/are there any formal requirements concerning evaluation, effect measurement, etc., imposed from the owner organization, authorities, etc.? a. If so, are there any specific demands for particular contents, e.g. key point indicators, etc.? b. If so, do you personally perceive such contents as relevant and/or providing a true and fair picture of the outcome of *project name*?
Insights into the informant's interpretation and translations of the original goal as well as of the achieved/expected outcome	8. Was the original goal of *project name* fulfilled? a. If not, what was the outcome? b. What initiatives have been taken in order to share the accumulated knowledge and experiences from *project name* with other managers, organizations, authorities, etc.?
Elaboration of the informant's interpretation of the project management discipline and subjective translations of key aspects	9. Are there in your opinion any particular parameters of projects, or criteria for the managing and organizing of them, that are of particular importance for success?
Concluding remarks	10. Are there anything else you would like to add that we haven't touched upon?

All informants were offered anonymity in both the agenda send to them prior to the interviews as well as after the interviews had been conducted.

Appendix D - Source information from Infomedia

KildeListe http://apps.infomedia.dk.esc-web.lib.cbs.dk/kk3E/CheckBoxPopUp.as...

Kode	Kilde	Udgivelsesfrekvens	Arkiv
AKT	Aktuelt		02.01.1996 - 06.04.2001
ARB	Arbejderen	Alle hverdage og lørdag	17.11.2007 -
BMA	Berlingske	Dagligt	01.01.1990 -
BTA	BT	Dagligt	03.12.1990 -
BRS	Borsen	Dagligt	02.01.2006 -
BRW	Borsen Lørdag / Søndag	Lørdag	14.04.2012 -
BRX	Borsen Tillæg		26.04.2012 -
DAT	Dato	Alle hverdage	17.08.2006 - 19.04.2007
EFL	Effektivt Landbrug	Alle hverdage og lørdag	19.12.2007 -
EKS	Ekstra Bladet	Dagligt	02.01.1990 -
INF	Information	Alle hverdage	01.09.1997 -
JYP	Jyllands-Posten	Dagligt	09.01.1996 -
KRD	Kristeligt Dagblad	Alle hverdage	01.06.2001 -
LIC	Licitationen - Byggeriets Dagblad	Alle hverdage	02.04.2007 -
POL	Politiken	Dagligt	01.01.1990 -
WAA	Weekendavisen	Fredag	18.11.1990 -

Luk liste

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Appendix E - Brochure from The Patients' House

Hvad er Patienternes Hus?

Patienternes Hus er et demonstrationsprojekt, der skal udvikle et innovativt koncept drevet på patienternes præmisser og behov. Patienters selvstændighed, ligeværdighed og indflydelse skal fremmes, og samtidig vil oplevelsen af hospitalisering reduceres. Den grundlæggende idé er funderet i tankegangen om patient empowerment med fokus på understøttelse af patienters og pårørendes egne ressourcer. Patienternes Hus styrker således mod at forny patient-service og måden den leveres på. Med den brændende platform i sundheds-sektionen er målet samtidig at udvikle patientservice, som er 'tidligere og bedre'.

Projektet tager afsæt i oplevede patientforhold i sengeafdelinger og ambulatorier på hospitalerne og aktuelle patienthoteller. Projektet skal udvikle et serviskoncept, hvor mennesket sættes i centrum på en måde, så udfordringerne vedrørende krav om optimeret og effektiviseret hospitalsdrift kan håndteres samtidig med bedre patientoplevelser.

Projektbevillingen til Patienternes Hus fra Erhvervs og Byggestyrelsen på 5,8 mio. kr. udgøres af 50% fra Den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling, 25% fra private Velfærdsfonden/Region Hovedstaden.

Patienternes Hus vil skabe...

koncepter for en direkte, tryg og involveret patient i et sundhedsvæsen, der samarbejder med patienter og pårørende og ser dem som aktive og ligeværdige partnere for at opnå effektiv drift med høj sikkerhed og kvalitet.

Patient empowerment gennem:

- understøttelse af patienters kompetencer og ressourcer i forhold til f.eks. dagligdags aktiviteter og genoptræning
- involvering af den aktive og ressource-stærke patient i koncepter for uddannelse og kompetenceudvikling af andre patienter.
- understøttelse af de sundhedsprofessionelle gennem uddannelse og kompetenceudvikling i anskuelsen af patienten som aktiv partner ud fra den enkelte patients muligheder og forudsætninger.
- it-understøttelse og forbedrelse af telemedicinske løsninger.

Perspektiver for Patienternes Hus

Projektets overordnede formål er at skabe 2-3 konkrete serviskoncepter, som kan hjælpe patienter med multidiagnoser til bedre håndtering af deres helbred og nedsætte deres samlede forbrug af hospitalsydelser. Områdevalgspunktet er patienter fra dagkirurgigruppeme prostatakræft, KOL og patienter i dialysebehandling. Patienternes Hus har tre projektspor: Fysiske rammer, kommunikation og rehabilitering.

- Fysiske rammer: lys og lyd, rumindretning, helende arkitektur og arbejdspladsdesign
- Rehabilitering: mental og fysisk træning, smertehåndtering
- Kommunikation: information og oplysning, undervisning, telemedicin og kompetenceudvikling

Patientemes Hus skaber værdi

Projektet fokuserer på udvikling af ydelser, der ikke leveres af de centraliserede hospitaler eller primærsektor.

Projektet tager eksplicit afsæt i tanken om patient empowerment.

Projektet skaber synergi til eksisterende projekter. Projektet har et nationalt perspektiv og gør det muligt, at de services og koncepter, som projektet frembringer, kan anvendes nationalt, med mulighed for internationalt salg. Konkrete prototyper til produkter og koncepter udvikles i tæt dialog med brugerne og testes, så de kan bringes til implementering.

Appendix F - Irene's "Value-creating Phase Plan"



Den værdiskabende faseplan fortsat





Fase 1: Mål afklaring

12 måneder

Fasens formål	**Skabe et godt afsæt for det egentlige udviklingsarbejde**
Fokus i projektet	Afklare mål, definere vision, etablere projektorganisation med deltagende private og offentlige aktører, planlægge projektet
Milepæle	•Informationsmøde •Visions-seminar •Innovations camp I •Konkretisere projektbeskrivelse •Samarbejdsaftaler til private •Planlægning af fase 2 og 3
Virksomheders udbytte	Viden om fremtidige markedsmuligheder - patienters behov og sundhedssektorens interesse for servicekoncepter.
Leverancer i.f.t. service-koncepter	Projektmål og afgrænsninger. Projektspor defineret, projektorganisation etableret. Virksomheder (og offentlige aktører?) afklaret om deres rolle og committed.
Leverancer i.f.t. forretnings-modeller	Fasemodel for OPI-samarbejdet Dokumentation af læring om OPI fra denne fase.

Patienternes Hus

den 29. marts 2012 side 9

Appendix G - Fact Sheet from [redacted]

[Censored]

Appendix H - Brochure from [redacted]

[Censored]

Appendix I - Fact Sheet from The Patients' House

Region Hovedstaden

REGION

Region Hovedstaden
Center for Sundhedsinnovation

Patienternes Hus
Patienternes Hus, www.centerforsundhedsinnovation.dk

Hvad er Patienternes Hus?
Patienternes Hus er et innovationsprojekt mellem offentlige og private aktører, som skal give patienter på Region Hovedstadens hospitaler en bedre oplevelse og bedre mulighed for håndtering af livet med sygdom. Med udgangspunkt i de eksisterende patienthoteller skal Center for Sundhedsinnovation stå for at udvikle et nyt "Patienternes Hus", der skal drives på patienternes præmisser og behov. Gennem brugerdreven innovation vil projektet vise, hvordan en bedre patientservice kan øge værdien for såvel patient som hospital.

Projektet startede i 2011 og afsluttes med udgangen af 2012. Projektet er et af fem delprojekter under "Laboratorium for Offentlig-Privat Innovation" (OPI-lab), et nationalt innovationssamarbejde med Region Syd som tovholder. OPI-lab er et tværregionalt/nationalt projekt financieret af EU's Regionalfond. Af projektbevillingen til Patienternes Hus fra Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet på 5,8 mio. kr. kommer 50% fra Den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling, 25% kommer fra private virksomheder og 25% kommer fra Vækstfonden/Region Hovedstaden.
Læs mere om offentligt og privat innovationssamarbejde på www.opilab.dk

Udgangspunktet for projektet er brugerinvolvering, oplevet brugertilfredshed og medicinsk sikkerhed. Økonomisk skal udnyttelse og optimering af ressourcer være optimal i forhold til kendte patientforløb og serviceydelser, og projektet skal bygge på eksisterende viden, så der skabes synergi i forskellige indsatser. Udover Center for Sundhedsinnovation deltager Rigshospitalets og Herlev Hospitals patienthoteller samt Hillerød Hospital. Center for Sundhedsinnovation er desuden i dialog med en række virksomheder om deltagelse.

Baggrund
Som navnet antyder, fungerer landets patienthoteller netop som hoteller. Det vil sige at patienterne opholder sig på hotellet mellem behandlinger på hospitalet. For nuværende er der ikke muligheder for behandling, genoptræning eller rådgivning på patienthotellet.
Med projektet "Patienternes Hus" vil Center for Sundhedsinnovation indrette patienthotellerne efter patientens behov. Fremtidens patienthoteller skal på denne måde udvikle sig i en retning, så de bliver mere end en seng at sove i.

Mål for projektet
Succeskriterierne for projektet er blandt andet, at der skal udvikles en række koncepter for nye patientservices klar til implementering. De nye koncepter udvikles indenfor et paradigme til støtte af patienter, der erhverver og anvender nye kompetencer og færdigheder.

Center for Sundhedsinnovation

Der skal udvikles modeller for værdiskabende Offentligt-Privat Innovations-samarbejde (OPI), og der skal udvikles et koncept for fremtidens Patienternes Hus samt forslag til de fysiske rammer og indretning.
Samlet set skal Patienternes Hus føre til økonomisk gevinst for de involverede hospitaler.

Perspektiver ved Patienternes Hus
I Patienternes Hus kan man lære at håndtere sine sundhedsproblemer, så man kan indrette sin hverdag efter det. Patienten med den kroniske sygdom kan eksempelvis lære, hvordan det telemedicinske udstyr virker og på den måde få redskaber til at håndtere sin sygdom i sit eget hjem. I Patienternes Hus arbejdes der med sundhedsfremmende indsatser, og der skabes muligheder, så patientens empowerment styrkes. Patienterne kan derved opnå en større oplevelse af kvalitet i sit samlede forløb.

Patientgrupper
Patienter med multisygdom, forstået som patienter med mere end én sygdomsdiagnose. Det kan være patienter med to eller flere kroniske sygdomme eller kræftpatienter med konkurrerende sygdom.

Deltagere i Patienternes Hus
Center for Sundhedsinnovation
Patienthotellet, Herlev Hospital
Patienthotellet, Rigshospitalet
Hillerød hospital

Hvad er Center for Sundhedsinnovation?
Center for Sundhedsinnovation er et videns- og rådgivningscenter under Region Hovedstaden. Center for Sundhedsinnovation er en strategisk satsning, som skal medvirke til at forbedre kvaliteten og effektiviteten i sundhedsvæsenet. Vi er en enhed, der skal hjælpe med at udbygge og udbrede det igangværende arbejde med innovation på regionens hospitaler og enheder. Vores fokus er på medarbejdere og patienter for at sikre, at der innoveres, hvor forbedring og fornyelse er mest tiltrængt. Det er centralt i vores arbejde at inddrage både medarbejdere, patienter, forskningsinstitutioner og erhvervslivet i udviklingsprojekter af produkter, services og organisationsformer for at sikre nytænkning, kvalitet og anvendelighed.
Center for Sundhedsinnovation er financieret af Vækstforum Hovedstaden samt Region Hovedstadens hospitaler.

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Appendix J - Transcription of Interview 4

Interview (in Danish), Irene Haagensen,
Project Manager in the PPI "*The Patients' House*",
Capital Region Denmark, Hillerød, April 23, 2012

[Introduction to what it is I am doing more specifically. Pause in recording as Irene wanted to print a presentation]

We have two deliveries: first of all we are to deliver a case with two to three service concepts, and when you undertake this innovation process of finding these concepts with private partners, it with the hope that it will actually become reality. What we are interested in is what happens in parallel to this process - what business models do you develop to undertake these PPIs? OPI-Lab/Agency of Business are more interested in this knowledge than in the service concepts that this specific project delivers. There has been so many cases with emphasis on the tangible deliverables in PPI, but nobody has done anything to document what approaches that worked and what didn't.
[Interviewer: It's a bit funny, because when I wrote my BA thesis I talked with a guy from the Ministry of Finance to get an idea about how much money is spent on innovation in general. There are so many funds etc. that it is extremely difficult to see through. He's answer was more or less that nobody had an overview of the bigger picture and that no calculations existed which added up all the different initiatives across ministries etc. I found this to be quite peculiar, and it is interesting that OPI-Lab now has been established exactly with the aim of remedying this lack of centralized knowledge]. Yes, all the 5 regions involved in OPI-Lab undertake different PPIs because to know anything you have to try it, but at the same time we all have different deliverables to OPI-Lab in the form of documenting knowledge, and these deliverables are in principle the main objective in all the projects. Central Region Denmark's contribution to this, for instance, is concerning the legal aspects of PPIs. When I started as PM, 6 months into the project, nobody had realized that the knowledge of business models in principal was the main deliverable. There was a PM but that didn't work out, and I was in a situation in my old job where centralizations etc. was about to happen, and I couldn't see myself in a centralized function. This job thus offered some new opportunities that I found interesting. I have worked with IT and Medico for 30 years, so this project is a radically new form

of work, and I have had to start from scratch - thrown out to sea where you're thinking 'where is the nearest shore?' But I find it interesting, I consider my first 6 months here as training in innovation because I have never worked professionally with innovation before. My extensive experience as leader of course implies that I have the fundamental tools necessary, but working specifically with innovation was completely new. During my career I have been involved in a number of initiatives with different NGO's, e.g. The Medico Industry [lobby organization, eds.], and my job as leader of a hospital's IT department meant that I came in contact with both administrative, clinical, and research personnel. The consequence today is, that I have networks within both IT, medico, hospitals, so now it is all about using these contacts in a different way. So that's why I all of a sudden work with PPIs. I will say that when I realized that my primary deliverable, in my opinion, was business models, I actually thought it to be a kind of weird concept. [Irene prints a presentation she has held earlier about models and forms of collaboration, "as it can be nice to show things" eds.] So, business models. The first thing I did back when I started was to think 'so how do you approach this'. I began chewing the words, and all down to earth, business models must be oriented towards value-creation, otherwise there is no reason to start a business at all. So, when it is supposed to be value-creating for public and private partners, and when you have both of these sectors, a third 'partner' for whom value should be created is society as a whole. So business models need to take into account that value needs to be created for all of these stakeholders. Then I looked at what innovation really is... Apart from innovation being a buzz-word at the moment and that every organization with respect for itself has some kind of function regarding innovation, even the Government has a ministry for it. It is peculiar to look at the trend just 12 months back. 12 months ago [before the parliamentary elections, eds.] there was a little innovation here and there, but today everybody speaks about it.

[Interviewer: I will claim the trend to be significantly older, innovation is mentioned in legislation already in 2000 and 2005] but what happened? It didn't materialize! I think it comes down to the diffuse nature of the innovation concept - when is it innovation? when is it research? when is it inventions? when is it what? So, I sad down and began trying to grasp the idea of innovation, and basically took as premise, that innovation must be the answer to some kind of need - somebody wishing something, and thus a demand exists. And when a demand exists, somebody will answer to it, and when you answer this demand in collaboration between public and private partners, some barriers might arise. For me innovation is also a process. You can't just sit down and then we have made innovation. What does it take to innovate? Here I am convinced that some methods and

processes are necessary to support the development of innovation - methods also help one to clarify what it is you have found out - is it a vague idea, or a developed concept which you can begin working more focused on? So, with the PPI construct in mind, innovation is really a matter of understanding each other - the problem is, that understanding each others processes takes time. If you are a private partner, and now you get all the prejudices, then it costs unproductive time = money, to understand these processes, instead of just figuring out what you can sell. From the public side, one think 'how hard can it be? We open our doors, tell you everything we know, and the private firms just need to find the solutions - why should they get paid upfront to do that?'. So finding a need, where you can sit down around a table and agree on a project which can generate value for all the involved stakeholders. But it costs something to go through this realization phase. I had an experience with a firm that participated where the representative kept asking me 'how do you expect our Board to accept that we get involved in a project that involves a loss? you cannot guarantee that we get an order in the end'. No that is completely correct, if you do not have the capacity to cope with that uncertainty then that is how it is - and they are not involved any longer. This goes both ways [public as well as private, eds.]. All this basically comes down to a question of work processes, and mutual respect for each others' time. The former PM had worked out one of those traditional phase plans with what needs to be done, and how to implement etc., but all from a perspective of project management. What I wanted to do was to create a plan which was based on the creation of strong value chains. What do the firms get out of it - so they will invest in the first place, how do activities contribute to the service concept deliverables, to the development of business models, and derived what should then be the focus of the project group, what milestones should we have in the different phases, etc. [presents her "Value-Creating Phase Model" - see Appendix F]. So we ended up saying that we needed a value-creating phase model, where we clarify our goals and figure out what the project contributes with for the different partners. So, what are the goals and needs, etc., and what should we then focus on, what are the milestones and part-deliverables. It is really hard to communicate this, so what I did was to put together a short "sale sheet" for each of the four phases [part of the phase plan, eds.] including time estimates for each phase. When I started on the project it was divided into four phases of 6 months. After having spoken with some different firms I changed this and therefore the first 12 months are goal clarification, then a 3 months idea-generation phase, followed by 3 months of design development, and lastly 6 months of testing and branding towards users. This structuring is due to the firms saying that they are not interested until we know what we want, and then when they start allocating

resources they prefer an intensive process. So basically, when I took over as PM, a lot of things that should have been done were not done, so you can say 'we were behind schedule', or you can redefine it and say 'no, we just need some time'. So that was part one, the other part was to say, that if the firms wanted an intensive process then that was what they should get, so instead of 6 months they got 3 months of design development. So the value chains have been structuring the project all the time. So one of the business models is to sit down, get an overview of the project, and then develop a model based on value - what is it we need to arrive at, what is it about? That is the primary steering tool.

[Interviewer: who defines what is in the plan] In this specific plan, I did [Interviewer elaborates on the question, and asks how Irene think it should be done in future projects, implicit acknowledging her late inauguration as project manager in this specific project, eds.] I don't think you can say either/or. The nature of the project is very important, and this model can be viewed as an object of negotiation, which you can bring with you to preliminary meetings and utilize as element in a balancing of expectations. When you have been out trying to get in contact with private firms to get them involved, some quite standard challenges exist as to get them on board. There are some legal aspects, e.g. spending a lot of time and resources and then failing to receive the order after the invitation to tender, timing aspects - when do we need the resources and how does that fit with the firms' plans, and then of course the whole business case dimension which especially the firms but also the public sector focus on - is it profitable? But all this is already known. What we are trying here is to formalize this PPI in another way. When I took over the project there were no partnership contracts, so my challenge was what to do - it's kind of a problem not to have any partners 6 months into a project that is dependent on the partnering aspect! From all the dialogue I had had with different firms and by giving thought to my newly developed phase plan, I found that a way to handle some of these barriers was to use a collaboration contract instead of a partnership contract. In practice, this means that we constructed these contracts based on the phases so that the firms only commit themselves to the project one phase at the time, instead of having to sign a contract entailing unknown obligations 2 - 3 years into the future. In this way, the uncertainty for the firms are drastically decreased, as they are free to leave between the phases if they perceive the project as heading in a direction they are not interested in. Instead, we can say 'we are in phase 2 where we are going to do idea-generation within the two subjects of physical training and nutrition, do you want to join us?' We will end up with a catalogue of ideas freely available to all, and we expect you to use 100 - 150 man hours. And then we can ask them again in phase 3 and 4. So basically we enter

into the negotiation by saying that we don't know where we will end or with what, or who that can produce it or anything. If the firms then perceive the project to be interesting and holding some potential, they will invest.
[Interviewer asks as to any problems regarding exploitation, e.g. if a partner 'runs off' with all the information] nobody can do that, because when you structure the project in this way using specific methods or tools, everybody knows everything [Interviewer: yes, but lets say you have had 3 partners who participated from day one, can new partners enter the project in later phases?] Yes [Interviewer: so then these new partners will also have access to whatever information was generated in earlier phases] Yes, we make public whatever results we achieve, to avoid the problems of inviting to tender. If those who participated in phase 1 and 2 proceeds to phase 3 and 4 and we don't make our findings public, then we are forced into public tenders. We haven't considered any of the two models for inviting to tender[20] because we from the start have said that the project ends with the development of the service concepts, we are not going to produce anything. The reason for this is, that when we have some ideas [Irene gives an example with one of the ideas, eds.], and we make them publicly available, if then there is somebody 'out there' who picks it up and thinks 'hey, I can do this', why not let him? That would be great.
In sum, what we are trying is to see if it is at all possible to conduct a PPI by using this kind of formalized contracts, and we still of course require the partners to deliver resources to the project if they commit to different phases. And then, for me personally, all this also comes down to a game of words - we need to call different things by their right name. Why should you use the term 'partnership contract' in regards to the private firms, when the project really is a partnership between AoB, OPI-Lab, and two hospitals [Irene here uses an example from another PPI, eds.], where the firms are invited to participate somewhere in the process of the project. Phase 1 here is called goal clarification, it was something completely different when I first started on the project, but what I learned in phase 1 is that anchoring the project internally in the organization is really, really important. If you just say "we want to think of something new" there might be a couple of persons who think it sounds interesting, but if you don't make sure that organization-wide support exists and there is a clear understanding of the project organization, it's an uphill battle! This [OPI-Lab, eds.] might be a national project, but I'm not convinced about how strong a foundation it has in the

[20] The Legal Advisor to the Danish Government (2010) has developed two kinds of procedures for inviting to tender in a PPI context. For details on the type of tender called "functional tendering", see Council for Public Sector Purchasing (2010b).

regions when considering that they are co-owners of the project and projects [the different sub-PPIs in OPI-Lab, e.g. The Patient's House, eds. Interviewer here asks what Irene is basing her statement on] Well, I'm not in dialogue with the region even though they are my sponsors, I only speak with OPI-Lab.

Concerning phase one it can be really tough to agree on the goals of a project in an organization as big as the region, especially when the goals are meant to be based on the identification of needs. So for instance, somebody might say "here's a need" and a project gets established, but then when it meets reality, somebody else might totally discard the sole purpose of the project. As an example you can see how the initial description of this project started from the idea of a patient hotel, but then questions about the future needs for this kind of service began emerging. [Interviewer: Yes, I must admit that when I read some of the information material about The Patient's House, I took myself in wondering what the project was actually about, it was really diffuse] That folder [some of the information just referred to by the interviewer, eds.] was made just around the time I started and people were then discussing the nature of the project and what it was actually about. This shows how hard it is in an organization with 35.000 employees to agree across clinical, para-clinical and administrative functions, on what the tangible goal is. The initial focus on hotels is not suitable because they will decrease in number in the future due to a continuous decline in the amount of time patients are hospitalized. We have, in Denmark, the shortest average hospitalizations in Europe. The development in medicine implies that over time the number of treatments available increases, and thus the total patient mass will increase. Derived, something has to happen. One development we see coming is that patients will be sent home the same day as they receive treatment.

So to remedy this lack of tangible goal, we held an innovation camp when I started, where firms, clinical personnel, researchers, patients, NGOs, administrative staff, etc. was invited to brainstorm on how the Danish hospitals can cope with this increase in future demand of health services. We ended up identifying three specific diagnoses that are very resource consuming. This dimension of identifying who we are talking about makes it possible to begin calculating some numbers as to value-creation and profitability. When we then began examining the reasons for why these patient groups had a much bigger resource consumption than others, we saw that they were hospitalized a lot more. So how could we try and prevent this? We could see how some specific things were common for these groups, e.g. a lack of physical exercise both at the hospital but also at home. Another thing was nutrition, a lot of these patients are malnourished and dehydrated, especially in relation to what their diagnoses imply that they actually should be ingesting. The result of phase 1

then was, that we had identified two specific areas of importance, training and nutrition, and we had a target group, patients with multiple diagnoses, which had a significant effect on the system. So, from a project management perspective it is fundamental that the project organization is in place and properly anchored and that the purpose of the project should be to meet a need that is relevant. These seemingly simple prerequisites took ten months, so an important lesson is to get as concrete as possible as fast as possible. Before these aspects have been taken care of, you cannot go out and find partners - if you don't know where you want to go, you can't invite anybody to come with you. If you don't know all these things, the private partners are not interested.
[Interviewer: so the needs governing PPIs should be clarified before the private firms are invited?] Yes, banally you can't invite somebody without knowing what you are inviting them to. The cause as to why you want to undertake a project is thus really important to be clear about. An important difference to be aware of when inviting firms are their size relative to each other. I'm not saying it can't be done, but you have to be aware that e.g. one-man firms and big corporations will often assume different roles in a project. Who does the firm send? The corporation will not send the VP of development, but a salesperson, because that is what they are interested in - sales. The entrepreneur will participate himself and he is by nature a developer. So you need to be aware what composition of partners you want - have explicit considerations as to what are the advantages and disadvantages of the approach one choose. So you should not just invite everyone, you should be selective. Also: Do you want competing or complementary firms? Competing firms will definitely be more reluctant as to sharing information, whereas the chances of complementary firms achieving knowledge sharing, new alliances and participation in networks are better. Again, you have to consider what your goal is.
What we also discovered during the creation of the network was that the usual sale speeches when you are trying to motivate firms, e.g. "get a new network" etc., doesn't really work. What really made things accelerate was when we began having our meetings at the firm' locations [Interviewer: so they became the hosts?] Yes. In the beginning we held all the meetings here or in other "neutral" places, and there were some absence and drop-outs, etc., so we wondered how we could get them more involved. And then there was a problem with one of the meeting locations once, and one of the firms asked "why don't we have our meetings at the hospitals?". This really opened up for a different way of arranging our meetings, and the firms began offering to be hosts. The result was staggering, the firms became so much more involved, motivated for example by proudly presenting who they really are and so on. Furthermore, it is crucial to minimize the amount of administrative

work for the firms and in a PPI financed with EU money ... [Irene silently implies how EU funding means a nightmare of administrative work, eds.]. Also, it's important to continuously focus on the project goals, otherwise you can quickly end up pursuing other "interesting" things. This is to avoid confusion among the project partners as well as uncertainty as to the goals etc. Attention should also be directed towards the different perceptions of innovation as concept that different partners in a project might have, e.g. what methods do you want to use, how do you approach the project work and so on. So you should do yourself the favour of telling up front what definitions of concepts are used [Irene gives an example with radically different understandings of the prototyping approach to innovation, eds.] The partners, especially the public and private ones do not necessarily speak the same language, and perhaps you have some innovation people included who speak a whole third language. It is important to be aware of the language and culture gap that might exist.
[Interviewer: So what is your primary role as PM?]: My most important task is to ensure progress, and I can only achieve this by having motivated partners [Interviewer: and how do get motivated partners?] By making sure they can see a purpose, that they can see things happen, that the project is moving towards something they are interested in, increased market share, size, or something else. Again it's a matter of keeping focus. One of the things that has been quite peculiar to experience is how the firms began whimpering when they got what they had asked for - the intense process with short phases. So apparently different perception as to the nature of an intense process also exists, and therefore the importance of balancing expectations cannot be over-emphasized. In retrospect I should perhaps have been a bit more critical as to what they meant when they said something, for example by probing them in more detail, and thereby also getting them to consider whether they are really aware about the consequences of what they are asking for. We held some meetings at hospitals where the firms were confronted with the end-users, the patients, and that was something they really enjoyed. We used different tools and tasks [Irene mentions e.g. role playing on behalf of the partners, eds.] to get the partners involved, the atmosphere was fantastic. Perhaps they have regular meetings with hospital personnel, but it's definitely not every day they are allowed to walk around on a hospital ward and talk with people and so on [Irene mentions one specific setting where the project group spent 9 hrs. at a hospital, eds.]. Another important thing is that when you get some piece of information it needs to be quickly distributed to the partners [Irene mentions pictures from a workshop at a hospital, eds.]. Also, when you start working on a new phase, it should build on what you've learned in the preceding one, so that you don't start from scratch all the time [Irene mentions two "travel descriptions" as end-products of phase two, eds.] and then when we start the

next phase, we will use these descriptions to guide the work in the new phase. And again it's important to keep focusing on the task of developing something new, and not to think in terms of sales or what can be done. [Interviewer: so how do you avoid that?] Well, by more or less directly saying that the project is not about sales [Irene laughs, eds.]. It's a question about progress, and building on the accumulated knowledge. In phase 3 when we started, we made it clear what we had to achieve and so on, and the partners have also seen the phase model. The phase model was made in September [Interviewer: and used actively?] yes, well, in the beginning they didn't get a copy of it because at that time I didn't actually look at it like that, but at the end of phase 2 I evaluated the phase by using it, and that really worked. I distributed the model for phase 3 at the end of phase 2 as a way of showing the process and maintaining the motivation.

[Interviewer: It's interesting how you have been able to get firms to participate even though you from the beginning have said that they are not going to sell anything.] Well, the collaboration contract ends exactly when it becomes criminal, you can sit down and have idea-generation, networking, work out requirement specifications, and so on and publish it, but those who invest the time in doing it get "something" - alliances, networks, knowhow, fame, they get something they wouldn't get otherwise - goodwill.

Appendix K - Transcription of Interview 8

Interview (in Danish), [redacted],
Project Manager in the PPI "[redacted]
[redacted], July 16, 2012

[Smalltalk about coffee, cell phones, and other irrelevant stuff, eds.]

[Interviewer: So, I would like to have your perspective on the project, the management of it and so on] It was [redacted] that was the overall manager of this project, they wish to investigate the opportunities of having a function that continuously tests and develops healthcare technology with the users. To do this they establish a project to test this idea over the course of two years. And the purpose with this was to clarify whether it would be a good idea, and if so, how to do it, and what the focus should be. The region then allocates a couple of million kroner, and the Agency of Business 6 million, so all of a sudden you have a project of 8 million. But before this "all of a sudden" - when you had the two million and decided to go for the 6, a range of partners were contacted that were thought able to contribute with answering the overall question of the project. So we need some firms and some IT scientists. And who to choose then? One like [redacted] [himself, eds.] who were at that time senior scientist, in the meantime I became a professor, at [redacted] and had also done some work in IT. Then they talked to me about that, and I don't know when the idea of using the concept of simulation as main focus so as to differentiate the project from all the other places where usability studies and user-driven innovation was used came about, I don't know where that idea came from, it is probably the, who mentioned it. So simulation is something we have had a lot to do with. Both in the trivial shape of user-scenarios where you put the user in front of a prototype or drafts or alpha versions, its a known method, and also when you use simulation within aeronautics and medicine and it happens so that at [redacted] there is something called [redacted] which is actually one of the biggest in Europe with almost 7000 simulations a year, and I have worked with these people for a long time, both within studies of safety cultures and safety behavior but also within simulations particularly anaesthesia simulation, so we said that we could participate and was

able to contribute with some ideas within this area. Then an application was written and there was this peculiar misunderstanding where the application and the project description said that an umbrella project [[redacted], henceforth: [redacted], eds.] was to investigate this overall concept, whether it would be a good idea to have such a [redacted], or is it something it could be recommended to the region to have in the longer term, and if so, how should it be arranged - specifically should it be one with its own facilities, or should it be mobile so it could be moved around at the hospitals. This was the overall part and to clarify this, three test projects was establish so one could say that these kinds of projects was what could be undertaken. But when at the same time, you so to speak have to boot yourself up, there is a lot of process management and self-observation which imply of course that the whole thing become a bit inefficient. Cause now you have some projects, but at the same time these projects had to demonstrate some methods and you had to make sure that the involved parties also learned about methods, design methods, test methods, user-involvement methods, you had to make sure of this and document this. It becomes a bit messy the way I tell the story, let us just return.. So the application is written and we start with some delay in December 2010 and then we go. And I had in advance written a project specification for this part with simulation and I had originate perceived it to have something to do with speech technology because we had some knowledge about this already and had worked a lot with it, but then someone couldn't hear properly in the phone, so it was written as tele-medicine instead and wasn't corrected so it became named as tele-medicine, speech-technology was actually excluded. And as this was examples it wasn't that important what it was. Then some partners was involved, [redacted], and so on, and some firms, so it had to be something that suited their needs, the hospitals' users' needs, and what we thought to be interesting and new and what the firms involved thought themselves as able to contribute with. Some of the firms was [redacted] and [redacted], they are so big that they can do anything, and then there was the speech technology firm [redacted] that had made something about emergency boards at [redacted] [hospital, eds.]. So, in the project itself quite a bit of time is spent on talking about methods for user-involvement [Interviewer: is it you who do that?] no, no, no, I had no big role in that, that was the umbrella project [[redacted], eds.] that made sure of that, we just contributed with examples, and at this time at the beginning we hadn't quite decided on which kind of tele-technology to work with. But this is quite soon clarified as one of the very active hospital partners, [redacted], mentions that they have problems with blood test samples fall into holes, when a patient is transferred from one section to another or when a patient is released, an important test result can

arrive which is not seen by anybody before it is very, very late, or not seen by anybody before they repeat the test, and then says "Holy Moses, we already knew this two months ago, this is not good". And I have been very preoccupied with unintended events, I know a lot about analyses of such events within the healthcare sector, so within a few months we said "this is it" we will make a feasibility study, a prototype, as to how you can support the on-duty doctors' need for fast, mobile access to test results, be alarmed and accept them. At the same time we say what is really their needs? [[redacted] talks about how to structure the interview to make it short as he can go on and on about this, and the other test projects, eds.]. We also formulated another purpose, which was to show how the workload for the doctors on duty would be significantly reduced if they were given a much easier overview of what was waiting for them. Today they spend a lot of time on this. It should be mentioned, that we didn't know that one and a half years later there is an accreditation of the hospitals in the region, and actually one or two of the hospitals flunk exactly en the subject blood sample results because they are not capable of handling them, very thought-provoking, but at the same time the [redacted] almost come down with tetanus now, they are now saying that they don't want to initiate anymore minor projects, but wants one big multi-billion project that once and for all solves all the problems. So you actually shut down all the minor projects, and you won't conduct anymore feasibility studies. So it became clear for us, of course a few months had went by, what we wanted to do. And at the same time you had to try all these different methods so there was a lot of lectures from people about user-involvement methods, so we illustrated and used some methods to figure out what the doctors' needs was. There was a certain drawback from this because some of us were perhaps not so good at teaching others how to use these methods as we were more interested in making the prototype [Interviewer: did that include you?] yes, I will say that one point of self-criticism for [redacted] and I and a couple of the doctors were simply focused on making this prototype and we already know all these methods, so, people are welcome to watch, and we will also tell them about what we are doing, but this is what it is about. Others, and we also believed that we knew what the doctors' need was, it should be mentioned that as we were two seniors who made interviews of on-duty doctors [in-audible] after having interviewed three doctors we agreed that we already knew what the problem was, and there was no reason to keep interviewing - we already knew the problem in advance! But how to solve it, that had something to do with a handheld device [Interviewer: and how did you arrive at that?] because it needs to be mobile, unless it was Minority Report where they could just look and get information, it had to be a concrete device we just called it a coat-pocket device, it was something like that, so we did not at all decide

how it should be, but the test results needed to arrive at such a device, and very importantly: others needed to be able to see that the results had been seen [by the doctors, eds.]. [[redacted] talks about some statement from a commission that supported this emphasis on the feedback aspect, eds.]. Today it functions like this: a doctor sees a patient, prescribe some tests, they are commissioned by him or a secretary to the lab, that sends up a laboratory technician, or do it themselves, a blood test is taken and certain values are to be measured. Then it is taken physically, transported down and then the results comes back [Interviewer: all on paper?] yes, well actually it comes out of a printer at the section, its quite fragile. [[redacted] talks about some old IT system that governs these processes, and some persons he knows eds.]. So we knew what direction to go, but at the same time we owned it to the project to demonstrate for all the participants who might be interested in it how we could do it this way or that way and so on. I feel a bit of guilt in this regard - there was a lot of effort put into studies of doctors' work and mappings of how they handle test results today. A number of interviews and observations was carried out, but the results of them, and that is what is perhaps a bit discouraging, just didn't matter - we already knew all of it! None of it came to have a concrete impact. So, there is quite a bit of symbolic rhetoric surrounding the project. It says it's user-driven, that we listen to the users - well hell yes we do, and we've been doing that for a long time. But first of all, the users themselves don't know how they want it, but there are a lot of naive people, especially people who come from other disciplines and haven't been involved in the IT development, they think it is the user who is to say what they need. But the fewest of these doctor-users know how a Smartphone can present results from a Legacy system, and those few who know it have some clever idea about how it should be, so we wanted to wait with the users' inputs as to how it should look until we had some drafts. [Interviewer: yes I guess that is part of the simulation?] yes, so we took the simulation very seriously, we actually made a simulation in contrast to eehh, yes we have made a real electronic simulation but haven't used it that much as we later figured out that we could actually just do it on cardboard, but it was very useful for ourselves so as to clarify the functions and their interdependencies. So what I am saying is, that all the energy used on user-studies and so on was a form of documentation of what we already knew. But that is also, sometimes you have to document. But this was kind of episodic, what we actually wanted was a sober estimate of how much time doctors today use on tracking test results they are waiting for, how much time do they use on calling the secretary, and how much time does she then use, how much time do they use on looking for the result and put it together with something else, it is stuff like this that really have an impact. We still do not really have anything on this.

[Interviewer: if I understand you correctly the project is now in progress and you were with, you called yourself the seniors, and another part of the project group is doing something else?]
yes that was the umbrella group. They were interested in the methods about how to get the user-needs and user-suggestions included, and we were, it was completely scientific, I mean, we worked together there are just some differences as to how you spend your energy. I will say, [redacted], for example, did an excellent job regarding the documentation, but we couldn't really use it for anything. It didn't have any impact on what was actually designed so we can't write a true story of 'then we saw that and that, and it had this and this impact'. Because, as with many other things, you reach some sort of insight into what is the wishes or needs of the user, can be comfortableness and so on, but when you have this understanding which accumulates gradually, it is about coming up with some suggestions as to how you can solve it. Because asking the user ' do you like this, or this, or this, or this' doesn't help much. So what I am saying is, that the project as it progressed had to make some duties; we will test these methods because we promised to, but in the real world, if one were to do such a project, we would use exactly those methods that fitted this, not necessarily use a representative range of methods, but we had to demonstrate a such a representative range of methods that not necessarily would have come to play a vital role in the decisions that was to be made. [[redacted] mentions some different things that was done but didn't come to play a big role, eds.]. This was only a demonstration project, meaning that the hospitals and the region had not said they would use it for anything, they just wanted to see how it could be done. It was all on the basis of 'as is', 'we are pretending', so that means that the effort needed in order to make a complete function and work specification of how the section should be organized if the prototype was to be implemented, was not done. We knew it would be completely impossible to implement it in only one section. If a prototype like this is to be realized as an actual function in a hospital it will not be profitable unless the developmental costs are spread out over more hospitals. It is like, you cannot make a relatively expensive, complex function for only one airplane, you have to make it for a fleet. So, these fine methods are really good for a fleet, but way too expensive for one airplane, ferry, whatever. So if you make some kind of manning tool, which is relatively complex, what will it take for the company to adopt it? Well, now we have just been given this one ferry, this one hospital, so nobody really feel like going into details with how all that was to fall into place. So it was kind of unsatisfying to make this kind of demonstration prototypes. On the other hand, we did it with the expectation that if we ended up with a good prototype which the users said 'this is what we need' about, the region would say 'that is a good idea, let's test it at two hospitals'. But then we were

overtaken by this regional decision of not supporting anymore prototype projects and instead wait for one complete IT solution. [[redacted] talks about some considerations of technical nature as to the prototype, and we take a coffee break, eds.].

[Interviewer: for me it sounds a lot like you have participated in the actual work, and not in an overall managerial role?] No, those aspects I actually left to [redacted], what we did was what new criteria are there [to the prototype, eds.], what are we going to o in order to get the right inputs to that. So I have been very, very focused on the prototype and getting it developed, and then I knew that [redacted] was really good at all that with methods and so on, so I left all that to him. I knew what they were doing and what the results was, but there was no reason for me to participate in that. I also said from the beginning that I wasn't that interested in all those things like keeping track of the partners' time recordings and so on, there was a lot of those kinds of things. I wanted to do it like a real EU-project - you have to do this and this, you have these resources available, distribute them yourself, instead of doing micro-planning and so on [implicitly referring to risk-analyses, eds.]. They [[redacted], eds.] were very focused on aspects of control - that you had to keep track of the hours put in by partners and so on. There was a lot of things they wanted you to control, you know, micro-planning. I preferred to leave it to the partners themselves. I simply think all that micro-planning was a waste of time. I disagreed with the management of [redacted], they wanted to micro-plan for the sake of the Agency of Business. I thought it to be absurd to have to report whether time had been spent on meetings, development, transportation, etc. I said I wasn't going to do that. They also wanted us to use special templates for our reports, but I didn't do that - this is a fight I'm prepared to take. And then I was allowed to do it my way. [[redacted] talks about a similar example in another project he is involved in, eds.].

[Interviewer clarifies some formal aspects of the project. [redacted] mentions some partners that merely functioned as observers, and some details about methods for testing of the prototype. [redacted] also shows me an online demonstration of the developed prototype, and when [redacted] looks through his documents, searching for something he wants to show me, he finds a presentation he has held at a recent conference, and quickly goes through it. [redacted] at some point in all this mentions how proud he actually is of the prototype, eds.].

[Interviewer: Returning to your management practice - when you were so involved in the work at micro-level, did you use any steering tools to ensure that you kept to the plan and honored the deadlines?] the macro-deadline was just that we had to be able to show the results at a given time, so okay, at that time we have to have something done, so we could more or less just plot in

meetings as we went along. But, it was close to impossible to make a plan for this that was more detailed than 'in four months we have a conference', because the clinical personnel was almost impossible to get a hold of, we had to book them four months in advance. So it was very ad-hoc, so what we did was to plot in meetings, Doodle was the biggest, first we asked the clinical personnel when they were available, we came with some suggestions, and if they were able to participate at those times that was agreed - 'six weeks from now at 12 o'clock' and so on. So that is one of the very big difficulties with these kinds of projects, that is the time of these persons. So, around those points where these people could participate we undertook the development. This consisted of ourselves and [redacted], it was us who understood what it was. It didn't take any damn tools, we coordinated by mail. [Interviewer: so for me it doesn't sound like your role was particularly formal, more on equal terms as the others?] yes, well apart from the fact that it was us who were responsible for the prototype being developed with help from the others. [[redacted] says something about [redacted] being in charge at some point, eds.]. [Interviewer: so there was no requirements from the region or the Agency of Business qua their funding as to something you had to do, like use of reporting tools, etc.?] There was a requirement that we had some micro-management of the level called demonstrations and workshops, but that is what I am saying that was a bit independent from the prototype. So we agreed that they [[redacted], eds.] got 150.000 DKr. from my budget so they could micro-manage all they wanted. So [redacted], that poor thing, and the project manager was very preoccupied with Excel and the like, and I didn't think he knew much of what it all was about, what the need was, so he exercised around in that. So we agreed that they would get 150.000 of a million so they could micro-manage all they wanted. [Interviewer: So it resembled something of a pro forma activity in your opinion?] Yes, I think so, it was with the purpose of pleasing the Agency of Business. But there was more than pro-forma in it. some very good workshops was arranged where the methods was demonstrated and a lot of people were involved, but they had no impact on how the prototype ended up looking like. Not in our section. Because we knew what we wanted to do. So it was actually [redacted] who were the project manager on what we can call workshops and partner involvement, and I were project manager on the prototype. So it was divided that way. I wrote what we wanted to do, and [redacted] then wrote the coordinately regarding methods. [Interviewer: For me it sounds like these workshops with user- and partner-involvement was something that should perhaps have been used in the project but qua your perception of yourselves as knowing what was needed, they became background activities?] yes and that is a point of self-criticism. It was some of a cross-

breed project because that is a kind of pedagogy project and that is something else [[redacted] mentions a trip the managers went on in the beginning of the project, eds.]
[Interviewer: who wrote the newsletters for instance?] [redacted] did, and they are a lot better at that. you can say that perhaps there has been a bit of a misunderstanding, I have seen my role more as, okay, what are the recommendations to the region, and how can you best make such a prototype, and here I have thought that the primary method for doing this was the simulation, whereas if the other ones don't play a role, well hell, then we just have to do it. That is what I am saying, it was a bit pretended because we had decided on what to do and then go out and interview all these people again at this time.... well I wasn't against it I could understand the need for doing it, but I didn't see it as that important. And something else was who participated. From time to time it was different groups. [redacted] had some doctors, and then somebody from [redacted] with him, to see how he interviewed the doctors about their daily work. But there is no link between this information and the development of the prototype. And what I am saying is, that us who developed the prototype listened to it, but I cannot with the best intentions see that any usable information came out of it. [[redacted] mentions that a lot of time was used on investigating how the old IT system could be combined with the prototype, eds.]. There was no cumulative documentation of what this meant for the prototype. That is probably my fault, we should probably have made some kind of log where people could note that they had been at this meeting with these and these, what impact does it have for our prototype. We didn't get this done, I think I would do this if I were to do it over. But by the way, if I were to do it again I would probably divide it in another way. Us who worked with the prototype are used to make actual prototypes for a given purpose, not to engage in pedagogy. This resembled a crossbreed between pedagogy and development, and we then said, that if we were to have any luck with this, we had to concentrate on the prototype. Thus, I perceived this to be my main responsibility, and hence we made a practical division of the work so that [redacted] and [redacted] took care of the rest. So that was how it was. [Interviewer: what about formal criteria for effect measurement and so on, from the region, the Agency of Business, [redacted], or someone else?] we made a business plan which has come out quite detailed, it was actually an okay exercise. We were taught how to make a business plan, and then we made one. We were to assess what it would cost to implement the developed solution in one hospital, and how long it would take for it to pay for itself and we then did this the best way possible. The big gain was the estimate, which I have taken from an external doctor, that you would reduce the number of episodes where test results are overlooked, and thereby on average save a certain amount of days of hospitalization, that was the big gain. And,

then the un-quantifiable aspects such as reductions of suffering and so forth. The purely economic resulted in a business plan based on external estimates, and included suggestions as to the price of purchasing phones, etc. [Interviewer: so that was the evaluation?] yes, however, the evaluation has primarily consisted of the demonstrations we have conducted for doctors and nurses, where we have asked if it is something they need. Here, the answer has been an overwhelming 'YES", because it would safe a lot of unnecessary time consumption. So evaluation has consisted in minutes from these demonstrations, we hadn't asked people to use it and please say something nice about, there was also some who didn't understand it. [Interviewer: it's peculiar that you were asked to do this and then decide that it wasn't wanted.] well, the project was prolonged and then after two years we heard that the region didn't want more prototypes. They are not sure it is compatible with their future systems so they could just as well wait a couple of years, they believe they are able to implement it in around 2015, but that is something completely different. [Interviewer: one of the things I have thought a lot about in relation to PPIs is that a local project manager like you accumulate a lot of knowledge - how is that knowledge shared with other people who are in that same position now for instance?] we have written about it, been interviewed in Ingeniøren, and now we will make sure, this has also been published in a small article internationally. We want to make sure that these results are not forgotten so they can be exploited, because there are the same issues other places in Denmark. We want to say that we actually have a solution. [redacted] is also prepared to do this in collaboration with others. So if somebody else will take it further it will be the best. [redacted] mentions some alternatives, but says they don't exists, eds.]

[Interviewer: my last question: are there any, in your opinion, particular parameters regarding the management and organizing that are crucial for the success of such a project?] yes, now we are starting a new OPAL project where I think we are doing it the right way. I think it is very important that users and researchers meet first and figure out what issue it is that will be treated, before the firms are included. If the firms are included too early it will be too influenced by their interests. [Interviewer: so the needs analysis should be done before the firms enter?] yes, and the needs analysis can be very random. What need is identified can be quite random, e.g. what subjects municipalities think to be interesting. It should be something where the shoe pinches. [redacted] gives some examples of how to figure out what area to focus on, eds.]. When you have that you include the firms. If you started with the firm you use a ridiculous amount of time on negotiation over what they can contribute with, here [redacted] is a really good example of how it should be, honestly saying if they have the competencies needed for a specific project, and if not then refer us

to somebody else, whereas other firms are often like 'no, I can't deliver a car, but I have a motorcycle instead?', sometimes its a bit like that, they really want to sell that. I believe it is important to do it in the right order. [Interviewer: and you're not a big fan of steering tools and so on?] well yes, but they need to fit the project. That's why, the PRINCE2 for example, I think it is absurd to begin doing micro-steering in this kind of project.. we are also involved in a lot of EU projects where [inaudible, eds.]. We agree on some tasks for the partners, and then it is the partners' responsibility to make ends meet. It is absurd to say that you want a detail level of hours used during weeks and so on. Here, [in [redacted], eds.] we had somebody who were simply not experienced in having many partners, so they used a hell of a lot of time on forcing them to say how much time, on a weekly basis, they spent on transportation, project, meetings, some months in advance, and that was especially absurd here because the partners were so strong! They just say, that if there are not enough hours, they will just finance more hours themselves. [redacted] are totally indifferent about the number of hours they use. Under all circumstances they put in more hours. It is not like having a plumber or having a house build, this way of doing it requires a high degree of predictability, what they asked is the same as asking the partners to supply their time recordings up front. I think that is a terribly stupid way of doing it, and I believe I talk with some experience [[redacted] talks about some other projects he is involved in, eds.]. Here they expected us to make micro-planning on an absurd level, it was ridiculous. We needed to state whether it was demo, partner, or whatever. So that we had some fall outs over. So when you ask me how such projects should be approached, it should be done in the same way as successful EU projects. You have some lumps you are responsible for, and then you need to have it done within that month. For this you have a nice GANTT chart, the same way you normally run this kind of project, but without the micro-management. It must be left to the partner to move resources between the tasks. If the partner then uses some kind of micro-management for himself - that's fine. But I will say months are the level of detail which is appropriate. Beginning to discuss whether I need 8 or 30 hours for something is ridiculous. [[redacted] gives some details about how he usually works, eds.]. In this project it was not needed as we were not more than three partners who so to speak had to get things done, and then some others who had to comment on it, so a maximum of five partners, and it was one partner who developed it. Another thing was that we outsourced some of it to some student workers who coded it, this also complicated things a little [[redacted] goes into some details about the use of student workers here, and again mentions aspects of how it was coordinating with the clinical personnel eds.].

[Interviewer: what about criteria for budgets and the like, did you have to hand in accounts and so on?] yes yes, they wanted it every month. [partly inaudible, [redacted] mentions a lot of details about the way he had to report to [redacted], he gets very steamed up and among other things mentions how he also phoned the Ministry as he didn't believe it could be so rigid. In sum, he express how he found himself battling the [redacted] management and entire central administration on these subjects, eds.].

An insane amount of resources was spent on managing the management, so I went to the other extreme, I simply wouldn't participate in that kind of steering-steering. That was probably also why I occupied myself with the prototype, that's the meat. And it is kind of needless and distracting. But I will still say that there have been a lot of really good workshops regarding those methods where I have not participated as anything else than a common participant. They were really good. But it is hard to do a project where you both have to make something of value, and demonstrate how you do it. It is kind of like teaching where you have a case, but at the same time constructs the case. It is like PhD's or dissertations, where they have to describe the method in order to show that they understand it, but when they write an article to a journal that kind of stuff is not included. Because it is not interesting in a journal to read whether the writer has understood the methods, I assume they have. It is the same kind of difference as when a student has to demonstrate his competency and what is the competency - it is used on a case. Here we have had the same duality, having to do with the project. It is perhaps quite useful to talk to you about this, I have actually not realized this until during the process, if I had been more aware of this at the beginning I would probably have been able to do a bit better - not regarding the conflict over the micro-management, that is just a war that needs to be done, I don't know, somebody believes this is the right way to do it - it's not. [[redacted] gives some examples of why detail-planning is not useful, eds.].