

# COLLABORATION IN THE ENERGYSECTOR

## - A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

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## Executive summary

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Formålet med denne afhandling har været at opnå forståelse for, hvordan organisatoriske aktører skaber mening i forhandlingsprocesser, med henblik på en dybere forståelse af forhandling som redskab i samarbejdsprocesser. Udgangspunktet for afhandlingen har været at organisatoriske aktører nødvendigvis må forbinde sig med andre ressourcestærke og indflydelsesrige aktører, for at have adgang til relevante ressourcer og anvende disse optimalt. Organisatoriske aktører præsenteres i proces-perspektiv, hvor samarbejde forstår komplekst, uforudsigeligt og i konstant forandring, modsat et mere traditionelt management perspektiv, der ser organisationer som stabile og relativt lukkede enheder. At forbinde sig til andre aktører og skabe relationer er en kompleks proces karakteriseret ved gentagne forhandlinger, og afhandlingen forsøger at afdække aktørernes meningsdannelse i denne kompleksitet. Der er foretaget tre kvalitative interviews med aktører fra den danske energi sektor, som udgør afhandlingens empiriske grundlag.

Forhandling præsenteres i afhandlingen som et redskab til at få indflydelse på baggrund af grundig forberedelse, hvilket betyder, at aktørerne arbejder åbent med deres underliggende interesser og mål, og på baggrund af fælles ressourcer forsøger at nå til det bedst mulige resultat. Aktørernes anerkendelse af, at enhver beslutning indeholder elementer af forhandling, skal hjælpe til at beslutninger ikke bliver tilfældige, baseret på gammel vane eller fører samarbejdsprocessen i uhensigtsmæssige retninger.

Afhandlingen har tre hovedkonklusioner. Den første er, at respondenterne har en god forståelse af, at organisationer skabes gennem relationer til andre aktører, og at respondenterne i høj grad forsøger at forbinde sig med relevante aktører igennem netværk og andre sociale aktiviteter. Den anden konklusion er, at respondenterne kun i en indledende fase accepterer samarbejde som en uforudsigelig og kompleks proces. Herefter ligger de op til, at samarbejde skal systematiseres og styres som projekter med klare retningslinjer for in- og output. Den tredje konklusion er, at respondenterne ikke oplever det som komplekst at samarbejde med andre aktører, og at de har løsninger parat til at håndtere eventuelle udfordringer. Disse konklusioner ligger op til, at respondenterne er udmærkede til at forhandle og forbinde sig med relevante aktører, men afhandlingen stiller spørgsmålstege ved, om forberedelsen til samarbejde har været grundig nok, og om aktørerne fortsat vil være i stand til at fastholde de etablerede forbindelser.





## Chapter 1 - Opening

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### **Integrative negotiation – the establishment of connections**

This thesis is about negotiation and connections in the setting of collaboration between organizational actors and entities. Actors and entities hint to anything that can be delimited and recognized in order to be talked about, and entities are what they are through the way they relate to others making every organization a unique product of circumstances and a unique producer of circumstances in turn(Hernes 2008: xix). The point is that which entities to focus on when understanding processes depend on their influence and not on size or scope. The understanding of negotiation in this thesis goes beyond the traditional table situation of distributive bargaining (Lewicki et al. 2007:61), and directs attention to negotiation as processes of establishing connections to other entities. It is the assumption that if organizational actors perceived negotiation as a continuous element of organizational practice, proper negotiation in processes could facilitate appropriate spending of resources and more successful collaboration between entities, since fewer requirements and necessities would be lost in translation of interests. Negotiation is a vital tool of influence in any interaction between organizational actors (Thompson 2005:2), and therefore interesting in relation to any managerial process, but seldom taken seriously as an on-going strategic process in strategic management literature (Ertel 1999:59). From this thesis' point of view negotiation is a hidden feature of the strategic management literature (Porter 1985, Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Williamson 1991, Barney 1991, Gulati 1998 Das and Teng 2000, Hennart 2006), which is not devoted any particular interest, even though management students are taught to systemize and plan everything else and place everything in separate and manageable boxes. A central motivation of this thesis is why negotiation and the construction of relationships is a subject left for management students to study in real life situations after graduation, rather than a theoretical subject placed centrally in the curriculum.

In order to collaborate, organizational actors need to build trust, establish some sort of connection, understand each other's interests, and most importantly communicate properly about interests and goals, - a process known as integrative negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1999:11). Integrative negotiation is the idea generation and exploitation of suitable solutions for a given context and at best, proper negotiation will secure advantageous processes collaboration and well spent resources (Lewicki et al. 2007:59). Negotiation in this form has a central element of innovation, since every new interaction takes place in a specific context, with specific resources and





interests. This indicates that all collaboration is a management innovation, a form of organizing never seen before, to which every element is negotiated on a continuous basis, before actions can happen (Birkenshaw et al. 2008: 831). For any innovation to be actual, collaborations are perpetually in search of allies who will make it stronger and stronger (Akrich et al 2002:203). Negotiation is decision making, but following the integrative mindset, it is also about justifying strategy and action, and about influence to direct processes of organizing in favourable directions, which is why negotiation theory and the practice of negotiation should not be neglected as a subject. Negotiation theory can supply managers with tools for defining interests, identifying new options and systematically establishing trust and relationships - not leaving too much to circumstances, old procedures and chance (Ertel 1999:55).

## Cases from the Energy Sector

This thesis is based on empirical data from three qualitative interviews, conducted with respondents from the Energy sector. Each interview has been transformed into a case and together they present a collective case study (Stake 1994:37). Since the focus of the thesis is to facilitate the understanding of negotiation and collaboration, the goal is not to gain better understanding of the energy sector, making the empiric field of study of secondary interests (Stake 1994:237). The analytical focus of the study is to describe how the respondents make sense of their work with collaboration. The three cases have been selected from the Danish Energy sector, since the nature of this field has made collaboration and negotiation inevitable for years. The energy sector is characterized by a multitude of entities, including national and international energy producers, suppliers, distributors and buyers, and regulations from governments and international trade organizations. Other entities with significant influence is a demand for security of supply, and a complex and diverse technology converting energy inputs into energy services. Ultimately, all these different entities of the energy market are interdependent and need to collaborate, since they cannot act without each other. Still, they have different interests, ambitions, positions and capabilities, illustrating the complexity of collaboration. Nevertheless, it is exactly the characteristics of energy technologies, the complexity of the production and supply, its enormous economic and political value, the problematic side effects, and the multitude of actors, which have forced this sector to collaborate across organizational spaces, emphasizing the field as appropriate for the study of collaboration and negotiation.





## The necessity of collaboration

Generations of managers have been brought up with theories in management schools about strategy as a planned process rather than emergent, and organizations have for a long time been presented as closed and stable machines who was competing with other seemingly stable organizations (Daft 2004:256). These perceptions are challenged when organizations are forced to break down traditional understanding of organizational boundaries in order to network, ally, collaborate and look at other organizations as potential partners rather than competitors in the battle for resources and innovation (Weick 2001:79). Organizational structures need to be separated from the idea of monolithic entities, since these structures need neither distinctive forms nor identities and are constituted by often multiple actors. Organizational entities exist outside and inside organizations, making the organization emergent, unfinished, manifold and negotiable (Hernes 2004:10).

The term collaboration refers to all kinds of interactions between organizational entities and inter-organizational formations emerging from connections and network (Todeva and Knoke 2005:124), since it is the interaction that is of interest and not the form. In management literature collaboration is presented as a rapid and flexible way to access complementary resources and skills residing in other companies, and is a significant instrument for achieving sustainable competitive advantage (Dyer et al. 2001:37). An organization's critical resources can span organizational boundaries, and may even be embedded in inter-organizational actions and processes (Dyer and Singh 1998:661). This increases the pressure on organizational actors to be both better at exploring existing resources and exploiting new opportunities, making them dependent on connections to other organizational entities and new technologies (Hernes 2004:11). The catch is that organizations may lose control over production, capacity, processes, deadlines, trademark or brand by connecting with entities outside their traditional space. Furthermore, the management of interdependent relationships where trust is a crucial factor for its survival represent a separate but substantial challenge (Nooteboom 2007:36). The process of collaborating is continually negotiations concerned with gaining access to resources while creating a relationship with room for structure and protection (Mønsted 2007:21). It is not an easy task and in reality it is only some collaborations that are truly successful, while many do not deliver anticipated benefits, and some are a waste of resources and fail completely (Hansson et al.2009:42). In its ideal form, collaboration is a possibility-creating machine, used as an accelerator for the development of collaborating entities. However, the fragile nature of collaboration driven by an unknown future,





stresses the importance of designing collaborations such that they are capable of bridging the heterogeneous logics of communication (Andersen 2008:147). Research has shown that failure to reach integrative solutions in collaborations is likely to be linked to the failure to clearly communicate the actors' true interests and failure to be perceptive to the interests of all counterparts (Lewicki et al. 2007:60).

## The complexity of collaboration

The process of collaboration is complex due to several characteristics of the phenomenon, since all collaborations are new, with different sizes, scopes and purposes (Hennart 2006:1622) and situated in what could be called contextual time. Contextual time refers to an understanding of each entity and each interaction to be situated in a specific context at a specific time, having specific interests and specific resources. Contexts connect to each other – at least sometimes. Sometimes evolvement is internally, sometimes it transgresses organizational boundaries. Organizations consist of many contexts, some of which they control and others which they do not (Hernes 2004:44). Context and environment are active entities in the continuous emergence of organizations, situations and connections, indicating that at each moment in time a unique context set the agenda (Nohria 1992:7). The new contexts are typically not completely different from the previous ones, but still small fluctuations in entities facilitate modifications and cause change.

Management literature has accepted that collaboration as a phenomenon is an organizational hybrid, blending hierarchical and market elements, and that they encompass both short-term project-based and long-term equity-based collaborations between actors with varying degrees of vertical integration and interdependence (Todeva and Knoke 2005:127). However, it is more difficult to find acknowledgement of the inherent unstable nature of collaborations, demanding a great deal of attention and effort to create and maintain a temporary stability (Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004:63). Collaborating actors therefore are not only faced with the challenge of balancing risk-reducing managerial decision making and innovative-oriented interests, but also the challenge of identifying and managing the contextual time of the collaboration and the connections it calls for.

## Sensemaking in a tangled and fluid world

This thesis uses a process view to understand organizations, thus subscribing to an ontological view of the world as fluid and tangled, consisting of processes always in becoming (Hernes 2008:30). It signifies that the entities of the energy sector are not





perceived as stable, nor is the structure of the sector stable. Hence, this description provides a somewhat chaotic image, with many entities floating around as the wind blows. However, the process of becoming is not random; processes are accomplishments from dispositions from the actual contexts and organizations take place in a fluid and tangled world. What is perceived as an organization is a temporary stability of connections. From the process view follows that novelty and order in the world arises from connections between entities that produce new patterns, which represent a form of temporary stability (Hernes 2008:77). It is the perception of the thesis that the notion of a fluid world, and the acceptance of trust, interests, influence and connections as unstable entities, stresses the need to be aware that these entities will be continuously re-negotiated into new forms of temporary stability.

According to sensemaking theory actors are not likely to express themselves about the complexity of their actions and they make sense of them through experience to control them and create order, in the attempt to justify actions and make them look rational (Weick et al. 2005:410). Weick (2001) writes that actors cannot fathom the complexity of the world they engage in, so they enact a reality which makes sense to them, and sensemaking is an attempt to produce stability amidst continuing change. At first glance, sensemaking may have touch of arbitrariness, since actors base their actions on what seems rational to the context, however, this rationality is affected by presuppositions, expectations and beliefs (Weick 2001:28). Sensemaking acts as dispositions for negotiation and thereby affects the content of acceptable solutions to be negotiated, and what actions to be justified (Weick 2001:13). Justifications are one of many forms by which organizational actors define themselves into existence, making justifications socially acceptable reasons actors give themselves to act, which by definition is irrevocable (Weick 2001:78). In the perspective of process theory organizational actors live in a fluid and tangled world, and when facing non-linear dynamics, actors' capacity for handling it is overwhelmed, but their sensemaking apparatuses convince them that it is not fluid and tangled (Hernes 2008:29).

## The research question

The thesis goes beyond the traditional strategic management understanding of organizations as operating in relatively stable environments and something to be talked about through rational models, planning and control (Hennart 2006:1627), and perceives the phenomenon of organizing as processes and systems interacting in complex forms of causality. Since processes are non-linear and since the complex





form of causality leads some entities to have more influence than others, complex connections between cause and effect that cannot be predicted (Stacey 2000:8). This thesis seeks to understand the multitude of minor negotiations, which actors of collaboration in the Energy sector perform to direct their work towards success. The interesting issue is how actors make sense of the inherently unpredictable situation of collaboration, when they negotiate, connect and collaborate across borders. Do they identify the processes of negotiation that needs to be prepared properly in opposition to strategic management literature, or do they interact with other entities on ad hoc basis and retrospectively make sense of their actions as if it was all according to plan? This leads to the research question of the thesis;

How do organizational actors in the Energy sector negotiate and make sense of the complexity related to continuous collaboration?

## Outline of the thesis

Chapter 1; motivation and introduction to the field of study

Chapter 2a+b; covers the scientific considerations and limitations of the thesis. It provides an overview of the thesis, i.e. the initial theoretical considerations before the interviews was conducted, and the impact of the interviews leading to changes in the overall theoretical aim of the study. It describes the collection of data, the level of investigation together with an introduction to the cases. One of the chapter's most important functions is to introduce the reader to the world of process theory, with special reference to Tor Hernes.

Chapter 3; seeks to frame the organizational context that organizational actors find themselves in at the present time. It argues that the search for appropriate resources has always been an imperative task of organizational actors, but that the game has changed with horizontal value chains, new types of products, technologies and demands. The key message is that organizations have become more interdependent and from that follows a need to connect and collaborate successfully; implicitly arguing the need for taking negotiation seriously as a management task at all levels. Finally, the chapter introduces management innovation as an understanding of collaboration able to handle the unpredictable.





Chapter 4; presents the reader to the understanding of integrative negotiation as the thesis seeks to promote it. It is argued that preparation is a vital part of any interaction between entities, and that negotiations during implementations of agreements are as important as negotiating agreements in the first place. Power-connections and influence are highlighted as crucial to consider and in some ways seek, together with an understanding of the role trust and control plays in relationships. The reader is introduced to the theory of Integrative Negotiation through 4 core elements. These elements are presented to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the detailed complexity of negotiation, but do not form the basis for the case analysis.

Chapters 3 and 4 have been written to provide the reader with an understanding of why organizational actors form connections and why collaboration. Negotiation is presented as a tool for influence - but beyond control, contributing with ways of handling collaborations from practice to management theory, while acknowledging that organizations consist of non-rational actors, with strong potential for making processes work.

Chapter 5; comprises the analysis of the thesis, containing the three cases, presented as stories and divided into separate parts. Case 1 is about Wave Star Energy focuses on preparations for future negotiations in order to enter the market. Case 2 is about The Department for Energy and Climate Partnerships at DONG Energy focuses on the justifications, meaning the negotiation of making sense both internally and externally to the organization. Case 3 is about The Department of Products and Partnership Concepts at DONG Energy focusing on the establishment of trust and connections as continuous negotiations between partners. Each case presentation concludes with a summarization of the most interesting findings.

Chapter 6; presents the overall conclusions and some implications of the thesis.





## **Chapter 2a - Method and theoretical approach**

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### **A qualitative study at the human actor level**

The methodological approach of research that forms the basis of this study is qualitative, with the purpose of understanding how actors in the Energy sector make sense of collaboration as a complex entity. The aim is to understand what the actors in the organizations are reflecting on, which issues they negotiate, and how they approach working with actors in other organizations as they participate in collaborations and the process of organizing (Åkerberg 1998:6). It is therefore relevant to ask questions about the experience of the actors forming the organization, their perception of collaboration and trust, and how they justify actions and the power struggles. The questions must be asked in a qualitative manner, where the respondent actors have the possibility of describing their experiences, emotions, hopes, norms, values, ideas, rationality and disappointments – all of which add up to be the sums of the organized entity. Organizations cannot be understood without the historical and contemporary experiences of the actors who comprise those (Webb 2006:6).

Voices within network theory have discussed to what extent inter-organizational connections are contingent upon connections among the human actors, or whether other more structural entities could be contributing as well (Powell and Grodal 2005:61). The capacity of investigation for this thesis is the human actor level, understanding collaboration as emerging from a dependent and ongoing interpersonal connection. However, pointing to the argument that even though the organization as an entity cannot trust, it can inspire and influence trust through leadership, collective experience, structure, history, and brand-value (Nooteboom 2006:247). Similarly, non-human actors such as technology, space, time and existing connections can influence connections as well. Hence, the ontological understanding of the thesis implies that relationship between entities stems both from organizational and actor level. The point to realize is that human actors are indispensable for establishing connections and networks, but they do not escape unchanged themselves (Hernes 2008:65).

### **The becoming of the thesis**

The original motivation of the thesis was deductionist, inspired by the strategic management literature's focus on the high number of failed alliances and





collaborations (Dyer et al. 2001:48). It was the expectation that practitioners of collaborations would not be able to see the entire picture of collaboration in terms of negotiation, sensemaking and common interests, and that a protectionist attitude to collaboration could hold some of the answers to failed collaborations. Since strategic management literature to a large extent lacks negotiation theory as an element of management practice, and to large extent only talks of protectionism on the one side and trust on the other, the presumption was that the respondents would not have any vocabulary for the process of negotiation and only perform interaction as distributive bargaining. It was the hypothesis that the lack of understanding negotiation as an integrative process of reaching a win/win situation, identifying each other's interests and establishing trust, would prohibit open and earnest engagement in collaboration. This presumption was rejected by the respondents.

The empirical findings showed that the respondents were very well aware of the multitude of factors influencing collaboration, and that some factors were more influential than others. However, the respondents did not express that they perceived collaboration and the activities involved as complex, indicating that no paradoxes was perceived in the action – except for acknowledgements of some uncertainty. In addition, they were able to articulate situations of networking, and acknowledge the role of connections and used connecting to relevant entities to justify actions. However, the interviews gave the impression that collaboration between organizational entities was enacted ad hoc and based on intuition and coincidence, rather than a well-planned strategy, even though the actions in retrospect by the respondents was presented as planned. That made it relevant to investigate how respondents made sense of the complexity involved in working with other organizational entities of collaboration and how they would negotiate connections and the content of collaboration. The case studies are then used to delineate the seemingly straight forward approach of the cases, in connection to the obviously difficult task of collaborating across organizational borders. The complexity of collaboration is therefore an analytical construction of this study.

## Collection of data

The collection of data was designed as open interview situations (Andersen 2006:167) with representatives from Wave Star Energy and DONG Energy. The contacts were initiated over telephone, with an immediately positive response from The CEO of Wave Star. Three departments in DONG Energy were approached by telephone, and only after several calls and negotiations about duration of the





interview and amount of resources spend, they accepted to give an interview, which in the end resulted in two contacts. The three interviews were conducted January–February 2009 during visits at the respective organizations.

## The interviews

The aim of the interview sessions was to gain in-depth understanding of a respondent's momentarily life world, meaning their perception of their own work and the inter-organizational actions they were representing, at the present time of the interview. This makes it relevant to come closer to how the respondents enact and justify from undefined space and time, by drawing lines, establishing categories and coining new labels for reality (Weick 1995:31).

The interviews were carried out as openly as possible in order to let the respondents talk about the issues they found important and relevant to the wording of the questions asked. Dialogue was the working tool of the interview, but was not meant to affect the respondent more than it evidently will when respondents are asked to reflect upon common day practice, since the mere reflection to an answer is likely to be formed by sensemaking. Specific words were used for the questions, as collaboration, connections, network and negotiation, without explanation to seek out what the respondent thought of the concept. The three interviews were meant to be carried out in the middle of the writing process of the thesis, but since the main hypothesis was rejected, they came to be the initial part of the thesis, thus transforming it into an inductive study.

Interview guides was created specifically for each interview, to remind the interviewer of the particular issues of interest, but were not used for structuring in the actual situation of interviewing. These can be found together with the interviews on the enclosed CD. All interviews were recorded and have a length of 1-2 hours. The interviews have been transcribed into text in Danish and quotes used in the thesis have been translated into English during the process of writing

Interview 1 and 2 was attended by Research Assistant at CBS Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche.

### ***Case 1: Wave Star Energy***

The first object of study is Wave Star Energy (Wave Star), an entrepreneurial wave energy company founded in Denmark by the CEO in 2004, with the ambition to become the first company to sell a commercial wave machine. The company is located in the basement of the CEO's private house stressing the entrepreneurial





story of a company, which at the time of investigation had 20 employees and was working on a 500 kWh machine priced at DKK 500 million. The target group for Wave Star Energy is utility companies and energy developers in large industrial countries and islands in the oceans. Wave Star Energy is supported by the Clausen family from Danfoss with Jørgen Mads Clausen as Chairman. The story of Wave Star is one of an actor making strategic decisions about which entities to connect his product to, for it to grow stronger in a competitive environment where the entry ticket is high. The process of preparing for negotiations at Wave Star provides the opportunity to study how an organization incorporates connections and technology in order to achieve a specific position for future negotiations, and how the complexity of collaboration is made sense of as small tasks on the way to commercialization.

### ***Case 2: The department of Energy and Climate Partnerships at DONG Energy***

The second object of study is the department of Energy and Climate Partnerships at DONG Energy. DONG Energy is a Northern Europe energy group and the business is based on procuring, producing, distributing, trading and selling energy and related products. An Energy and Climate partnership focuses on reducing energy and resource consumption across industries, the business community, municipalities and organizations. The core task for the Partnership's Manager is to establish contact with organizations and use DONG Energy's experience within energy consulting to reduce the partner's energy consumption. The savings are utilized by the partner to buy renewable energy from DONG Energy and the partnerships contribute to the commercial basis for the expansion of for instance wind farms. The interview provides the opportunity to study negotiations on several levels. Internally, the department's task is to create, discover and sell new forms of collaboration between departments, and make them work together in new ways. Externally, the task is to sell energy products and CSR-activities, justified by partnerships. The case is interesting because the product that is sold, i.e. the partnership, relies heavily on how the partnerships are made sense of and thereby on how real the interdependence between the parties is perceived. Even though the Partnership Manager works hard to create a specific need, it is still an ongoing negotiation about priorities.

### ***Case 3: The department of Products and Partnership Concepts at DONG Energy***

The third object subject of study is the department of Products and Partnership Concepts at DONG Energy. This department focuses on establishing partnerships with German City Gas Plants in order to sell gas, marketing of energy products in regional markets, consulting and the development of joint projects, such as planning, financing and construction of new access lines. The City Gas Plants represent a new





market for DONG Energy, and DONG Energy represents an alternative to the existing distributors of gas on the market. This case provides an opportunity to study how difficult it can be to choose the appropriate entry strategy to a new market, and in addition, how complex it is to infiltrate an existing network, creating connections and combining with the relevant entities at the right moment. The rather simple case of selling gas becomes extremely complex in the scene of interdependent German City Gas Plants.

The DONG Energy cases are handled as two separate organizing units. In some instances the respondents of the three cases refer to each other and will be used to tell the story of another case.

### **The case study as method**

The cases are specific and chosen because something specifically can be learned from these particularly cases, and in the form of cases they appear to be within a certain context (Stake 1994:236) The purpose of the case study is particularization, not generalization. The particular case is chosen to get to know it well, not to know how it is different from others, but what it does (Stake 1994:238). The qualitative case study of this thesis is collective designed with the purpose of representation (Stake 1994:237). It is not a study of a collective, but an instrumental study extended to several cases. The overall aim is thematic answers to the question of how actors make sense of collaboration. It is the different situations of collaboration that is of interest within the same industry. The cases will be discussed in connection to each other, but the aim is for the analysis to be one unity, in order to evaluate how negotiations take place within collaborations in the Energy industry, which issues are brought into light, and if there is a dominant theme, what can be learned from it (Stake 1994:241).

### **Limitations and possibilities of the study**

The knowledge that this thesis produces is to be seen as one observation of practice in three organizations at a specific time and in a specific context, not *the* practice. The answers are produced within a context which itself is an effect of organized processes, making the answers organized units of knowledge claims. With this acknowledgement it is clear that by focusing on the minor details of respondents work, none of the cases has been studied to find “ways to do it” and will not be presented as success stories or failures, but as snapshots of practice. Studying





practice of collaboration might not produce any answers, but the content of the study is hopefully still able to induce the development of better practices.

The use of theory is application-oriented, since the thesis has no ambition to test theory to falsify or verify it; hence no systematic critique of the theory is performed. The applied theory is focused on sharpening the case-analysis and used as analytical tool. The presentation of theory in chapter 3 and 4 is not a distinct model for analysis, but aimed at providing the reader with knowledge and ideas to understand the interpretation of the cases. It is the perception of the thesis that human sensemaking is too complex to catch in one frame. It is the answers of the respondents that guide the analysis.





## Chapter 2b - Type of research

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### The process lies in the arrow

Even though organizational theorists have always been interested in organizational processes, they have often had difficulties in conceptualizing processes as such. One reason for this might be found in the predominant ontological stance in the Western science according to which the world in general are consisting of things, such as positions, rules, strategies, identity, culture and performance (Hernes 2008:90). Consequently, process is understood as the movement from one set of things to another, but the movement as such is not appropriately grasped (Chia 1999:209). Tsoukas and Chia (2002) identify the paradox that a conceptual framework for making sense of change cannot deal with change per se, change in a stage model remains vague and unaccounted, since change is what goes on between the positions (Tsoukas and Chia 2002:571). Many organizational models have been drawn, describing how to get from one position to another, typically illustrated by box A and box B joined by an arrow. To be specific about the *location* of process, process lies in the arrow, and not in the box.

Processes are driven by decisions and actions and are made in the middle of uncertainty where there is no guarantee for shape of the next box (Akrich et.al 2002:194). Nevertheless, what the box is made of must be answered in terms of available resources at a specific time (Weick 2001:9).

### A tangled theory

Less mainstream organizational theorists have pointed towards an alternative ontological stance; which has process as its starting point and things as secondary conceptual abstractions, and takes on what can be called a process view of the world. This thesis is heavily inspired by the book by Tor Hernes: *Understanding organizations as a process – theory for a tangled world*, in its ontological and epistemological point of view. Hernes (2008) have attempted to create a meeting between selected process theorists, Whitehead, James, Latour, Weick and Luhmann, which Hernes argues contribute to a process view on organizations (Hernes 2008:130). The process view represent an understanding about the world of people, organizations and technology, and opens a Pandora's Box of a fluid and complex world while concurrently providing frameworks for navigating in this world (Hernes 2008: xiii). Hernes' work on process view is used in this thesis as one theory of





process thinking. Process theory implies that the act of organizing describes attempts at creating order, direction or stability in a fluid world forever in the state of becoming without ever ending. This has the following ontological consequence; “*that the world exists as flows in which entities are in a state of becoming rather than as a final state of being*” (Hernes 2008:128). The epistemological consequence is; “*That actors intervene in the world of flows equipped with their understandings of how it works, and equipped with models of how to bring about some order, either by continuing doing what they are doing already or by attempting to stabilize the world that surrounds them into some intended pattern. The pattern is never fully achieved, but without the idea that some pattern will be achieved, nothing is likely to take place*” (Hernes 2008:128).

A process view implies that chaos, formlessness, nothingness, ambiguity, surprise and otherness are the fundamental nature of things. Order, form, pattern, identity, predictability and organization are abstractions from an undifferentiated flux. It is thus organization that is the exception, and hence what requires study and clarification, not change (Chia 2002:866). From this perspective organization is not a thing, but a generic social technology for arresting, fixing, stabilizing and regularizing what would otherwise be a wild and hence unlivable world. Organizations acts against the immanent forces of change by institutionalizing social habits, patterns of behavior so that it becomes possible for actors to communicate with each other and to develop practical norms that govern the stance of human beings towards each another and towards their environment (Chia 2002:867).

## The potentiality of the process view

By privileging stability, order and routine the traditional instrumental view on organizations, suffers several limitations (Hernes 2002:2). Looking at collaboration only in concrete entities enlightens contracts, marketing campaigns, production and products. However, this is not all that constitutes collaboration, since negotiations between organizational entities, connections, underlying interests, forms of trust, and forms of control and supporting functions for innovation, evidently is part of collaboration as well. In this sense the process view is presented as enabling a fuller understanding of organizational realities, acknowledging the emerging aspect – meaning the becoming of it and the understanding that the act of organizing is fluid or smaller contemporary arrangements between larger entities, as collaborations and networks (Mønsted 2007:26). By focusing on what moves the becoming of organizations, more appropriate foci of organizational studies are offered (Chia





2002:863). Exploring processes are of considerable importance to understanding the dynamics of becoming and can permit the careful assessment of non-linear processes (Tsoukas and Chia 2002:568), driven by connections between entities, which are continuously negotiated (Åkerberg 1998:2). Within the frame of this thesis the process view allows access to the complexity of collaboration, which actors make sense of and negotiate in order to fulfill their interests.

Hernes (2008) distinguishes between on the one hand, actor's direct, intuitive experience of the fluid and complex world as constituted of vanishing events and on the other hand, actor's simplifying cognitive abstractions of this experience into stable things (Hernes 2008:32) which is a description of sensemaking. However, instead of treating these abstractions as misperceptions of reality it is shown that they have an important function in enabling us to act within what would otherwise be an intractable realism (Mønsted 2007:16). Furthermore, Hernes (2008) inverts the approach to stability and change; in a world of continual change it is stability, not change, that is in need of explanation. The thesis therefore looks into how stability is created when it asks how actors make sense of collaboration, or put differently, it is not a study of change, but the emergence of a temporary stability. Stabilization is explained as a result of connecting the vanishing events into iterative patterns, for example into organizations (Hernes 2008:57). To comprehend how stability emerges from something essentially unstable involves understanding of how something becomes. Hernes (2008) explains that when free floating entities have the success of connecting and form a sort of temporary stability, it is *not* because of the substance, as the superior skill of a technology, but rather the way the technology is related to other entities, as for example capital. The explanation of the mystery of becoming is relational, hinting that through various connections with various entities, an unstable technology might become dominant and perceived as stable for a period of time (Hernes 2008:xix). Following this point the analytical focus of the thesis is relational.

## The theoretical field – on the boundary

The thesis draws upon strategic management theory, organizational theory, negotiation theory, sensemaking theory, network analysis and Actor-Network theory as the list of references reflects. The choice of theory is made on the basis on the analytical construction of the thesis, collaboration as a process in becoming through negotiation and sensemaking. This construction cannot be captured by one theory at one level, as the respondents of the cases intuitively express themselves within several fields of theory in their sensemaking of actions. They can be said to subscribe





to strategic management arguments about entry strategies, price-reductions, contract descriptions and competitor analysis, but also to network and process theory when they describe how they make connections with potential partners, how trust is built and how connections must be nursed. Finally, they talk a little about negotiation, in case 3 more than in the first two, which to some extent confirms the theory about negotiation as the hidden feature of management theory, since it is not part of their vocabulary. Ertel (1999) suggests that the reason for the step-motherly treatment of negotiation may be that actors of management perceive skills of negotiation and networking as special talent some actors have and others do not, that every negotiation is unique, and therefore not suitable for the normative cosmos of management theory (Ertel 1999:57).





## Chapter 3 - Organizational context

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### Introduction

Whether it is the perception about organizations as stable entities with clearly defined borders and markets as relatively predictable that has changed, and that they in reality always have been rather unpredictable, - or if it is really true that organizations of today are characterized by turbulence, high pace and unpredictable changes, it is true that today organizations are being handled, talked about, analysed and structured in less traditional ways. The changing nature of business environment opens up for interaction beyond organizational spaces, and the apparent need for complementary competencies, increasing benchmarking and keeping up with fast changes in the global economy. Organizations become networked to be competitive in today's business environment (Nohria 1992:1) which may be interpreted as if they connect with relevant entities of the future. It is widely accepted that it is impossible for one organization to stand alone, and that new possibilities emerge through novel and creative combinations of entities interacting (Mønsted 2003:96), why collaboration is a necessity. The actions that follows from this perception is crucial for reality, as W.I. Thomas' theorem says "*It is not whether or not the interpretation is correct, if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences*". If the perceptions of organizational interdependence change, so do the acting on it and this might be one reason for collaboration and partnerships becoming management fashions of the time (Birkenshaw et al. 2008: 831).

### Beyond opportunism

A theory of this thesis is that the spirit of Porter (1985), Williamson (1991) and Hennart (2006) accentuating protectionism, bargaining power and market dominance through control or even better, 'annihilation' of competitors, might not be the only way to acquire the necessary resources, i.e. people, money, technology, connections, experience and thereby growth and survival. In management literature collaborations, partnerships and strategic alliances have traditionally been described in terms of transaction and cost explanations, emphasizing contractual, ownership and monitoring issues, without taking into account which informal safeguards, as trust, connections, actions, reputation and experience that inevitably also are part of working together (Singh 2003:259, Mønsted 2003:76). Powell and Grodal (2005) suggest that organizations to some extent are unaware of how many formal activities





are actually derived from informal connections (Powell and Grodal 2005:71) which is also a key subject of this thesis.

## Sourcing

Basically, the act of organizing is about the fight for and protection of resources. Even though this use of language subscribe to competitive hard-ball rhetoric established in the transaction cost economics literature, it emphasizes what is at stake. Organizations live from their various resources and establish structures to ensure the supply of resources to be relatively stable and secure in order to plan and make strategies for future activities, whether it is labour, machines, raw material, knowledge, space, connections or service that they construct their products or services from (Jacobides and Billinger 2006:252). The vertical structure of organizations has changed and many large organizations have realized that it is not as profitable to produce everything in-house to secure the value chain (Powell and Grodal 2005: 57); it is more profitable to make the back-office activities somebody's front-office activity (Jacobides and Billinger 2006:260).

Sourcing is one reason for organizational actors to compete, and especially technology development over the past decades has completely changed the conditions for sourcing, making the transfer of resources from one organization to another more smooth, cheaper and faster (Burgelman and Grove 2007:970). However, sourcing is also the reason for organizational actors to connect and create relationships built on trust and mutual interests rather than control and fear (Hernes 2008:58). In order to be successful and generate competitive advantages, collaborators should move the relationship away from the attributes of market relationship (Dyer and Singh 1998:662) and redefine their relationship to customers, suppliers and competitors into collaborative relationships, connecting the entities into networks (Nohria 1992:2).

Since Prahalad and Hamel's article from 1990 on Core Competencies, sourcing has increasingly been about organizational actors identifying their core competencies and making proper contextual analysis of where to find other core competences to fulfil their interests. The idea of core competencies is based on a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries involving many levels and people (Prahalad and Hamel 1990:89). The key challenge of an organizational strategy therefore is to determine which links of the value chain are to be centralized and which links to be decentralized in order to yield better economic performance in the context of globalization and the network economy (Sturgeon 2002:452). Besides the





horizontal approach to sourcing, Burgelman and Grove (2007) suggest that actors develop non-linear understanding of strategy for corporate longevity (Burgelman and Grove 2007:978) and one way to acquire the resources for this is through inter-organizational relationship and collaboration (Powell and Grodal 2005: 69). How the network acts, can be exemplified by the idea of structural holes (Burt 1992), where one actor is the link between other actors, which can require information and resources through this connection faster than if there were no networks (Nohria 1992:8). Following this line of thought, the management of the decentralized value chain becomes the management of connections. Organizational interaction is significantly appropriate when it comes to exposing organizations to new ideas, enabling fast access to resources and enhances the transfer of knowledge. The collaboration is established when the connections gets stronger and specific interests are at stake, which cannot be achieved alone (Powell and Grodal 2005:79). It intensifies the argument for networking and collaborating, in an effort to establish channels and pipelines for resources and impulses when markets evolve and challenges occur (Weick 2001:54). Additionally, it is important to distinguish the relationship from the other interests, evaluating if the collaboration is satisfying, and avoid escalating commitment if the effort is not corresponding to the outcome (Daft 2007:472).

## **Trust and control interrelating**

Processes of globalization have led to increasing flexibility of labor connections and virtual organizational forms, hence cross-organizational interaction have become looser and more difficult to monitor (Powell and Grodal 2005:59). Collaboration is the situation where organizations loose the power related to being independent, but gain power through collaboration in forms of knowledge, market shares and resources of different kinds. At best, collaboration is a path to build capacity for continuous growth. The situation of interdependence make organizations vulnerable in the sense of being exposed to opportunism, which demands alternative forms of formal and informal mechanisms to control and structure the output (Williamson 1991:291). It has been a widespread discussion in management literature, just how inclined organizations are to behave opportunistically and how to handle it (Carson et al. 2006:1059). In transaction cost economics and agency theory lay a lack of trust in the good intentions of other entities, why formal contracts are favoured. Contracts are effective for curbing opportunistic behaviour and establishing control over partner organizations (Nooteboom 2006:258). However, it is argued that actors can never have the appropriate trust under such circumstances of distrust (Nooteboom





2006:259), and furthermore that many types of collaboration issues cannot be captured sufficiently in a contract (Vlaar et al.2007:316). Hierarchical relationships that used to dominate the framing of work connections have been substituted by lateral relationships and collaboration, increasing the need for the trust-mechanism to function and leading to academic interest. After scholarly concentration for decades had been on control, competitive advantage and bargaining power as governance mechanisms, trust became recognized during the 90'ies as a central mechanism in the coordination of expectations, interactions, and behaviours within organizational connections (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007:392). Trust has undoubtedly become one of the key concepts in the analysis of cross-organizational interaction and in many cases trust is presented as some kind of solution or the organizing principle for doing business (Dyer and Singh 1998, McEvily et al.2003). However, it would be wrong to assume that trust is a panacea to all problems in contemporary organizational connections. Trust can be harmful if it encourages actors to suspend their judgement of others, and trust can create an opportunity for betrayal (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007: 392). By now, it is a common understanding that trust, control and risk are interlinked concepts in alliance management, enabling effective functioning of actors, teams, and organizations and are essential features of organizational life (Vlaar et al. 2007:42). Although the trust-based mode of governance might be risky, it may be the only option leveraging the resources that are critical to competitive advantage (Mønsted 2007:17).

This thesis subscribe to the notion that trust and control enable effective functioning of actors, organizations and collaborations acting as substitutes when necessary (Nooteboom 2006:247, Mønsted 2007:17) and it is the underlying assumption that organisations are just as inclined to trust as to distrust (Lewicki et al. 1998). In the end, the degree of formalization should match the nature of the task and the context, since it is important to remember that trust and control are not static phenomena. During relationship, actors may update their expectations and introduce changes regarding the trust, management and control mechanisms they have adopted (Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema 2007:400).

## Management innovation

Even though many organizations seek to implement structures to systemize innovation, innovation in its definition looks nothing like a linear process, but resembles a coupling process (Akrich et al. 2002:189, Van de Ven et al.1999:23). Hernes' (2008) theory of tangled organizations and entities combine very well with





this point about innovation as a coupling process between entities. Some couplings will come to act as a stabilizing effect between entities, in the midst of the uncontrollable non-linear probabilities. However, it should be noted that the couplings are not made with just any kind of entity, but with the ones in the range of the existing web of connections. The combination of human actors, context and time involves unpredictability about the destination of process and emphasizes the need for management that can handle fluctuations and uncertainty. In a dramatic tone of voice, Weick (1996) refers to this process (i.e. management of innovation) as preparing for fires (Weick 1996:143), whereas Van de Ven (1986) in a less dramatic tone describes it as embracing uncertainty as an embedded feature of management practice (Van de Ven 1986:605).

It is the understanding of this thesis that any new collaboration implicitly involves elements of management innovation, since the entities participating in the collaboration, as partners, contexts, interests, skills, technology, goals, agents, connections, sensemaking and values, never before have been in exactly such a constellation. It is therefore the argument that any new combination of entities has the ability to evolve in unpredictable ways that calls for organizational innovation (Powell and Grodal 2005:56), which evidently calls for the negotiation over which entities to connect, which to dominate and which interests to follow. Birkenshaw et al. (2008) focus heavily on human action in their article about management innovation. They posit that it is the specific action of human entities that lead to the emergence of management innovation, and in that sense management innovation becomes "*a way of capturing the potentially critical role of human agency in the process*" (Birkenshaw et al. 2008: 826). The process view would stipulate that human actors are indispensable for the becoming of connections, but emphasize that they do not escape unchanged themselves (Hernes 2008:65). One example could be the current changes in the climate, which play a critical role in the becoming of tomorrow's business environment and global politics. Sometimes human actors might see their own actions as too important, which clouds the fact that actor's performance in the process of saving the earth is actually a re-action to a changing environment, or a re-action to the development of technology having problematic side-effects. In the becoming of management this study stays open to the influence of any kind of entity that influence processes and calls for management innovation.

This thesis also subscribes to the notion that innovative elements, indicating continuous negotiation, in the management of collaboration, are crucial features of successful long-term collaboration. To be specific about what is meant by





innovation; the thesis focuses on the operational level where management innovation is identified as new management practises, processes, structures and techniques (Birkenshaw et al. 2008:828). In addition, it is also important to be clear about what is being innovated. In connection to collaboration in the three cases, it is not the big overall ideas of management or the ideology of the organization that is being challenged, but the management practice at the operational level where new procedures need to be established and new skills and interests of the collaborating party should be incorporated into existing procedures and new contexts. When connections emerge and collaboration change it may result in new practices or unexpected results, which in turn may ultimately de-stabilize the interests of the organizational actors. This illustrates how collaboration management is much more than routines and standard procedures, and stresses the importance of management innovation. Management innovation sheds light on the uncertain but potentiality filled organizing situation, as a continuous process which must be evaluated in terms of appropriateness to further organizational interests.

## Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has highlighted that the traditional understanding of organizations is heavily challenged when more organizational actors interact and form connections. The big black box of organizations is divided into smaller units, where the elements of trust and relationship might prove more effective than control systems implemented from top, hence making the interpretation of the situation as dynamic and open become real in its consequences. The emerging perceptions of organizations have enlightened the relevance of connections and collaborations on sourcing and negotiation and the need for continuous management innovation. Even though the investment is high, it is acknowledged that the advantages of collaboration is even higher and continue to grow with mutual trust and interests. Following this notion, sourcing of today's business is the management of connections, in order to access their contextual time. It is furthermore the understanding of the thesis that this notion frames the perception of respondents in their work related to sourcing, understood as negotiations, connections and collaboration.


In a fluid and tangled world where uncertainty stands out, building relationship for collaboration can be justified as handling risk and creating order through structured interdependency and thus secure survival (Vlaar et al. 2007:413). But the horizontal value chain does complicate things and influence the circumstances for sourcing,





producing and inventing. When connections and collaboration are built through preparations, meetings, negotiations and promises they have the potential to become particularly valuable if successful, but are also a considerable loss if it does not lead to anything. However, the essence of connecting with organizational actors for the purpose of some sort of sourcing is that it is based on potentiality with the aim of actuality.

Having longer visions for connections is a decision of managers in search of resources. This entails working with many different factors of uncertainty, and as it will be highlighted in the analysis, it forces actors to make interpretations and make sense of actions and create a sense of certainty, even though it is beyond the control of actors (Mønsted 2007:17).





## Chapter 4 - Negotiation as influence, but beyond control

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### Introduction

To continuously construct and negotiate relationships is a natural part of organizational life (Åkerberg 1998:1). In this thesis, negotiation is a crucial element of collaboration processes. It takes place at meetings, in all types of communications, dividing assignments, assigning resources, newer-prioritization and goal setting. Negotiation is therefore one of the tools through which actors innovate processes when they face new challenges for the organization. Closely related to negotiation is the object of trust, since it may facilitates open communication and helps negotiating the more difficult details of collaboration, as will be touched upon later in this chapter. Effective negotiation is crucial for a successful collaboration, and since it only takes one misunderstanding to convert the hard built trust and feeling of “we” into an “us versus them”, it is worth trying to foster positive spirals of trust (Vlaar et al. 2007:411). Ross (2006) gives this definition of the concept; *Negotiation is the sum of all the ways in which actors convey information about what they want, what they desire and what they expect from other people – as well as how they receive information about other people’s wants, desires, and expectations* (Ross 2006:5). Negotiation can be perceived as limited to talking, listening and bargaining, but negotiation between actors is also behavior in non-verbal forms. Not fulfilling a deadline or not answering mails can be a tactic to signal some kind of unsatisfied need that the actor wants fulfilled to participate on full scale – or that the proposed collaboration is not important, thus trying to alter the power balance (Ross 2006:8). Actors on every level has to negotiate within their own level, as well with other levels, about priorities, interests, deliverables, commitments, assignments, deadlines, prices and standards. The establishment of the collaboration itself is a negotiation concerning which formal and informal governance-mechanisms to structure it (Vlaar et al. 2007:413).

### Preparation for continuous implementation and justification


Negotiation is one of the few functions in modern organization that has resisted the trend towards standardizing processes and streamlining work. While actors of organizations have reengineered customer service, manufacturing, management and R&D, they have to some extent allowed negotiation to remain in the realm of actors (Ertel 1999:56). Each negotiation is viewed as a separate event, and the outcome depends on the negotiating actor’s personal judgment, timing and experience. Ertel





(1999) argues that it is a mistake to hinge solely on the negotiator's skills, even though negotiating actors may benefit from the notion that every negotiation is unique, since it isolates them from interference and criticism (Ertel 1999:56). Ertel (1999) advocates that organizations should turn negotiation into a corporate capability, and make it as prepared and supported a function as any other function (Ertel 1999:57). The type of preparation that is relevant differs from context to context, but almost always it is about deciding what is important, setting expectations, defining goals and thinking about how to approach other actors – and last, having enough information to know when to walk away (Lewicki et al. 2007:93). Thompson (2005) writes that most actors agree that preparation is relationship building, information gathering and information using, and that it is important, but that they do not prepare for it in an effective fashion. Faulty preparation is not due to lack of motivation; rather it has its roots in actor's faulty perceptions of negotiation as a one-time situation of distributing bargaining (Thompson 2005:13). The mindset stemming from distributive bargaining, i.e. a fixed-pie perception is devastating for future connections and collaborations. In the light of the process view, nothing is closed with a handshake, and any decision has to be backed by continuous actions based on preparation in order reach a temporary stability. If actors of collaboration perceives the contract as the conclusion, and see themselves as solely responsible for getting to a certain point, they are likely to behave differently than actors who make sense of the agreement as the beginning and see it as their role to ensure that actors involved actually realize the value they intended to create (Ertel 2004:62). It is the experience from the implementation process and not the agreement itself, which determines the success of the collaboration (Ertel 2004:64). Furthermore, the satisfaction of the outcome of collaboration may depend on the negotiating process more than the momentary outcome – typically a contract or a promise. If one actor feels bullied or tricked into the deal, they are likely only to participate half-heartedly (Thompson 2005:56).

As it will be illustrated by the cases, one central part of preparation is the justification of interests and the implicit negotiation about which path to follow to make them become real. In the exploration of other actor's interests, organizational actors have the possibility to figure out what motivates them and what would seem logical to them. In a sensemaking perspective, part of the preparing process of negotiation is to establish justifications to become part of the mental infrastructure that articulates and gives substance to the organization. The interaction becomes defined by the recurrent justifications that actors adopt to express and interpret organizational action (Weick 2001:78). This illustrates how proper and qualified





preparation is a strategic advantage to gain influence in situations of connecting and building relationships.

## **Power and influence in a process perspective**

The issue of power and influence is relevant to this thesis, in the sense that power to influence a process of connecting entities in a favorable direction is management in its essence. The reason to emphasize that negotiation is power, is to make clear that even though this thesis presents negotiation as a tool for connections and collaboration, it is a tool of influence to make sure that processes does not evolve into random patterns (Hernes 2008: xviii). The sensemaking involved in the process of influence typically focuses around those actions which has the strongest commitment, indicating how established patterns can be hard to change (Weick 2001:26).

Negotiation abilities are valuable in an unpredictable world, because it is a tool to establish a desirable temporary stability and together with sensemaking, negotiation becomes a sort of facilitator of processes. It is a powerful driver, because it through sensemaking enacts foundations for defining and justifying the situation. Negotiation is a communication strategy that sets the tone and the agenda; it directs the attention towards specific goals and not toward others, and it enacts processes of organization therefore becoming organizing for the becoming of collaborations.

In order to exist in a world becoming, with implicit generic ambiguity, actors produce their own reality, and this reality becomes a temporary certainty for organizations, illustrating the power of enactment through sensemaking and negotiation. Relationships serve as pathway for information flow, which not only facilitate the exchange of information and interests, but enable the production of trust and facilitate managing of the connection (Nohria 1992:9). The activity of connecting is closely related to power, negotiation and influence, since actor's considerations on strategy and action are constructed to increase their power and to be able to pursue their own interests in the ongoing negotiations about the outcome. The coupling of certain values makes events connect to one another into temporarily structured patterns of what is perceived by actors as a stable reality, illustrating that the effects of power are tangled up in rhythms and routines of everyday life (Hernes 2008:109). Power from a process perspective cannot be boiled down to static parameters of knowledge and roles. Power is based on connections, and since the power of a powerful entity is constituted externally it is not something that is personally possessed or anchored within the individual actor, but is externally





constituted by the surrounding connections and actions, hence making power fragile to the change of connections (Haugaard 1997:31). The process view is occupied with questions about how events and actors connect to become a relatively stable (powerful) phenomenon, incorporating chance and unforeseen consequences, hinting that to graph the substance of power it is necessary to integrate as many variables and combinations of variables as possible.

In the process of negotiation, sensemaking is used to create order and understanding of a situation, and sensemaking is one of the strongest forces in making a certain reality become accepted by actors, making it a power to set the agenda of other actor's agenda (Hernes 2008:117). In the understanding of this thesis, sensemaking is setting the scene for negotiation and negotiation then concerns skills that is able to create value (win-win), claim value (sustain business) and build trust (for long term sustainability) (Thompson 2005:2).

## **Establishing trust and building connections**

The previous sections have highlighted the importance of preparation and power in the sense of influence. However, in the face of unknown conditions, unintended consequences, existing zones of uncertainty, and the prevailing dialectic of control, social interaction requires some trust (Mønsted 2003:75). Without trust, cross organizational collaboration and negotiation would otherwise be pervaded by very high levels of uncertainty, causing actors to continually question the motives and competencies of their partners (Vlaar et al. 2007: 414). Trust is an expression of confidence in another actor which is essential to any relationship (Thompson 2005:125).

It has been suggested that organizational actors fail to prepare decently for negotiations and that the possibilities of collaboration is not fully explored in today's conduct of management, in terms of options and utilization of resources. It is important to realize that the lack of exploration is not only in terms of economic profit, but also in terms of connections. Thompson (2005) writes that organizational actors in the end care about feelings, meaning the feelings about instrumental outcomes, the feelings about the process, the feelings about themselves and the feelings about their relationship, indicating that economic outcomes not necessarily is correlated with the psychological outcome (Thompson 2005:124). The psychological aspect of trust is not within the domain of this thesis, but it illustrates that it is not possible to negotiate certain aspects such as trust, respect and connections in regular sense. However, as it will be illustrated in the analysis, trust





depends on communication. Communication needs to facilitate actor's understanding of and to some extent ability to predict the interests and motives of other actors, in order not to get exploited. In addition small actions as answering fast to messages and being consistent in the interests in somebody's problems is also communication which facilitates trust. Even though trust is difficult to prepare for, some preparation can be done to send trustworthy signals through open communication, heavy investments and a clear coordination function. The argument is, as will be illustrated in the following section about integrative negotiation, that social outcomes of organizational interactions, such as goodwill, trust, reputation, honor and respect are as important as economic outcomes (Thompson 2005:149).

## **Integrative negotiation**

Integrative negotiation theory is about sitting on the same side of the table looking at the matter together and having a open and prepared conversation about how different interests can be aligned. It is the idea of working together for the mutual benefit, and it is a process of defining goals and engaging in a process that permits both parties to maximize their objectives (Thompson 2005:90). The integrative approach to negotiation was developed in the early 80'ies. It emphasizes the development of win/win solutions while protecting oneself against actors of opportunistic behaviour and stands in opposition to distributive negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1999). The distributive negotiation is a bargaining approach, associated with winning a zero-sum game in which the winner gets the most of a fixed pie, instead of focusing on what the actors could create together and thereby expand the pie (Lewicki et al. 2007:28). The success related to distributive negotiation is implicitly measured by how much is gained compared to other actor, which might be appropriate when negotiating for a car, but not for collaborations between entities designed for common utility (Lewicki et al. 2007:35). The purpose of integrative negotiation is not to leave any resources on the table, meaning that all creative options are exploited. In most negotiations the creative exploration of options happens together with a process of relationship building, but it is not a necessity for the negotiation to be successful. Typically this is done by bringing other issues into the context, making side-deals, and openly discussing the possibilities of interactions with resources that the present actors bring to the collaboration (Thompson 2005:70).

Integrative negotiation is about a specific mindset, seeking to expand possibilities through creativity, dialogue, discussion and trust. It is imperative to this thesis that the perception of negotiation leaves the table situation, since integrative negotiation





is a way to work in general that can be used in all processes of collaboration, and not only when two representing parties are sitting face to face negotiating about a contract. Integrative negotiation is based on four key points; 1: Separate the people from the problem, 2: Focus on interests, not positions, 3: Invent options for mutual gains and 4: When possible, use objective criteria. These points will not be used as a model for analysis of the cases, but is an introduction to understanding negotiation as a continuous process.

There will be normative elements in the way the theory is presented, which is not appropriate in a process perspective where the context may always change interests and needs, and processes of negotiation are less linear than presented in the theory. Still, the elements of the theory are valuable for understanding the detailed processes of negotiation, since integrative negotiation is about management innovation, trust, connections, the organizing process, justifying and making sense of situations.

### ***1: Separating the people from the problem***

The emotional side of negotiation can be either helpful or disastrous. Very often actors become entangled with substantive issues under consideration and instead of attacking the problem actors attack each other (Fisher and Ury 1999:19). Once actors feel attacked or threatened their energy naturally goes to defending themselves, and not solving the problem. The key is to focus on the problem not on the actors and thereby to avoid personalizing the negotiation and making it into a contest (Fisher and Ury 1999:22). Trying to understand the situation of the other actor is useful when it comes to conflicts, since it is differences in perceptions that generate the problem. Actors tend to make sense of a mass of detailed information by choosing facts confirming their existing knowledge (Weick 2001:27). For that reason, it can be beneficial for actors to imagine how the world looks from the others actor's point of view, and not to assume that they share the same problems/ fears/ hopes as them. It is important to discuss other perceptions than their own and make proposals consistent with the other actor's values (Fisher and Ury 1999:29). It is the argument of integrative negotiation that putting oneself in the other actor's shoe, communication will be much more productive for the outcome of the negotiation.

When collaborating, the preparation done by each participant, and the reputation of each actor, will affect how they approach each other, which is why it is difficult completely to separate the people from the problem. One should also note that while it is important to separate the people from the problem during actual negotiations, it is beneficial to belong to the appropriate networks and to be on good terms prior to the negotiation. It is strategically important to build relationships before you need





them and to stay in contact with the industry. Entities with many connections to their surrounding world are likely to be better at exchanging information and resolving conflicts, which is a necessity for successful collaboration (Powell and Grodal 2005:60). Even though long-term relationship is important, Thompson (2005) emphasizes that it does not guarantee a win/win situation. Rather it indicates that parties could have an easier time reaching their joint goals (Thompson 2005:75).

## ***2: Focus on interests, not positions***

Actors typically have several separate interests at the time they begin to consider collaboration. However, when the actual negotiations begin, many actors will be inclined to talk about specific knowledge they would like to attain or a prize they want. Parties tend to think and talk about positions since the goal is to agree on a position (Fisher and Ury 1999:41). When positions are stated, attacked, and then defended, each actor figuratively begins to draw a line they will not cross, and this line creates a win/lose scenario in which someone has to lose. Negotiation then becomes a war of wills, with concessions being seen as a loss of face.

The key for actors is to focus on the interests behind their positions and separate their goals from their egos. As seen above, it is not enough to focus only on internal interests - actors must also try to identify the interests of the other actor and attempt to satisfy these as well. The fascinating part about interests is that behind opposed positions may lay compatible interests. Hence, actors need to find a common path bearing in mind that usually several positions are available that satisfy the interests of all actors (Lewicki, et al. 2007:64). Mutual analysis of the interest of actors is the central aspect here, since actors spend a lot of time exploring and making sense of what the other side wants – in contrast to what they say they want (Ross 2006:3). In most collaboration there will be more than one type of interests, concerning goals, procedures, deadlines or ethical considerations that can be substantive, procedural, principal or connectional. This underlines the importance of preparation and getting to know each other before entering into an expensive and demanding collaboration. Actors can then get the feeling that values, hopes, culture and goals may be compatible – not necessarily to unite completely, but to prevent that diversity divides the parties instead of serving as an inspiration. It is important to try to understand the other side when focussing on interests, but also to be understood. It requires empathic listening to truly understand the other actor's perspectives and interests. What is really important to understand is that interests are what motivates actors and that satisfied needs do not motivate, while unsatisfied needs do (Fisher and Ury 1999:43). This argument supports Powell and Grodal (2005) statement about





participation in alliances, saying that “*the effect of participation in technical committees decreases when firms already have established prior alliances, suggesting that the effect of informal ties is more catalytic when firms do not already have established alliance partners*” (Powell and Grodal 2005:72). Interests can emerge and evolve, like positions on issues can, hinting at the importance of attentiveness to fluctuations in one’s own interests and the interests of the other side (Lewicki et al. 2007:67). The contextual time of coincidences, market failures, unexpected actions, unexpected consequences and new demands will affect the aim of the collaboration.

### **3: Invent options for mutual gain**

Once actors involved in an interaction have identified their interests, they can explore options for mutual gain, which is not easy since negotiations may be stressful and inhibit creativity and free exchange of ideas. Fisher and Ury (1999) writes about collaborative brainstorming in which actors work together to solve an issue in a way that lead to a win/win scenario. The key to brainstorming is to separate inventing from deciding, and create space for ideas and solutions to float and feed of other ideas and generate new ideas (Fisher and Ury 1999:63). This process is very often not performed, hence, actors fail to reach a better agreement for both sides and end up leaving money on the table. To be creative is not only to think out of the box and look for original and useful ideas, but also to define the box that normally constrains creative thinking. Fisher and Ury (1999) identify four major obstacles that inhibit the flow of abundant options: (1) Premature judgement; (2) Searching for the single answer; (3) Assuming a fixed pie; and (4) Thinking that solving their problem is their problem. These obstacles constrain ideas, because actors do not sense a need for them, and because actors often think that they already have the right answers to any dispute (Fisher and Ury 1999:59). The ability to think creatively is affected by the actor’s mental model of collaborating and negotiating. In order to overcome the four major obstacles actors must take on an integrative mindset. To invent options is sometimes also expressed as expanding the pie, as opposed to the fixed-pie perception, and is the creative part of negotiation where actors can juggle with more than one issue and add resources that do not necessarily belong to the particular case, but is within the capacity of the organization. It makes it easier to slice the pie, when it has been enlarged by creative and insightful problem-solving strategies (Thompson 2005:174).

Opportunities for win/win situations are often overlooked because actors become too fixated on satisfying their own needs and not on the opportunities to satisfy the other





actors' needs. The key detail is to look for mutual gain and identify shared interests (Fisher and Ury 1999:73). Still, organizations and their actors must remember that their partner's satisfaction must be a by-product of the organizations own successful and satisfying negotiation (Ross 2006:4).

#### ***4: When possible use objective criteria***

Most established industries and professions have developed standards and rules to help deal with common areas of dispute. Actors rely on laws, regulations and official price-setting, and Fisher and Ury (1999) suggest that actors should, whenever possible insist on using external, objective criteria for agreement and to solve disagreements (Fisher and Ury 1999:84). For R&D collaborations, these are especially true for the protection of knowledge rights, since misunderstandings and direct exploitation can be extremely expensive if agreements are broken. It is also one of the factors that make collaborations very difficult, because it can be a challenge to agree upon which criteria are objective and relevant for the particular collaboration.

## **Chapter Conclusions**

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the reader to negotiation as a creative act of exploring possibilities among connecting entities, and not as something that needs to be won. It has been highlighted that negotiation is a tool of influence and that negotiation sometimes comes in the form of power to push a process in one specific direction. Negotiation is part of the process to connect with the relevant entities in a field, which actors wish to enter or affect. The chance for successfully influence processes is closely related to the amount of preparation invested. It is furthermore suggested that organizational actors should focus more on the implementation process of an agreement than the agreement itself, since it is the positive continuous interaction that produces satisfying results in the end (Ertel 2004:64). This means that the negotiation has continued during the emergence of the connection or collaboration and adapt to any new contexts that might occur. This suggests that the entire process of making a collaboration work and feeding the lessons experienced back into the negotiation process should be tightly integrated. The experiences from the previous context of negotiation should become part of the continuous preparation and justification, which organizational actors perform and which enable them to define what they may expect in the future (Hernes 2008:107).

It is accepted that uncertainty and unpredictability erode connections, which is why actors should invest in connections, how abstract these may seem, to enable trust and





to foster collaboration. Integrative negotiation theory may act as a short list in this process, not necessarily having all the answers, but paving the way for a certain mentality of being trustworthy and not trustful, when actors connect, negotiate and collaborate a strong basis for profiting is formed. Integrative negotiation is a slightly structured way to build trust and relationships, which cannot be planned for, but at least be prepared for in some aspects. Nevertheless, as it will be illustrated in the following chapter actors of negotiations seldom subscribe to only one mindset, but to several in order to make sense of the fluid and tangled world they are situated within.





## Chapter 5 - Analysis: The stories of collaboration

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### Introduction

Telling a story is a devise to emphasize a certain point without necessarily describing all there is to an event or entity (Stake 1994:239). Collaborating in a fluid setting is a tangled construct and many different stories from different actors could be told about its form and becoming (Hernes 2008:4). The stories told in this analysis about collaboration, is drawn from the particular cases, and chosen as the ones that stand out, following the respondent's attempts to make sense of his work in a flow of negotiations to reach temporary stability. The idea is to demonstrate the complexity of collaboration and for the reader to sense how interrelated the processes of connecting entities are when elements as trust, interests, strategy, justification, motivation, interdependence and commitment all have to be present for the collaboration to function. The stories are as a rule told about themes that have influenced the process of collaboration, and in which the storytelling of the respondent has reached a stable position for them to be talked about and to make a difference.

The answers are part of a storytelling made sense of by the respondents. Not necessarily to twist reality, but in order to be understood and maybe to some extent for the researcher to sympathize with and even be impressed by the actions of the actors in the organizations. With this note it is indicated that there might be less rationality in the stories than meets the eye (Weick 2001:34). Nevertheless, the analysis stays true to the explanations of the respondents, since they are in their actualization through the language, part of the becoming of the collaboration.

It is important to remember that from a process perspective temporary stability, not change, is to be explained (Hernes 2008:58). It can be a puzzling thought at first glance because it implies that any innovation is not explained from a state of stability that was shaken or changed, and then afterwards reached some state of equilibrium, as a typical Change Management explanation would present it. Temporary stability in a tangled flow of entities happens when entities connect and establish something new that is more stable than fluid. Stability is a human construct for understanding what the world consist of at a given time (Hernes 2008:29). Large and old entities, whether it is an organization, the construction of a railroad or traditions tend to be perceived as facts in themselves, and this confers upon them as a time limited stabilizing force. Therefore, although these entities are continuously in the making,





they are treated as readymade entities with certain characteristics (Hernes 2008:77). It outlines the power of connecting, since strong connections form the world perceived by actors, even though it is only a temporary stabilized entity.

Process theory suggests that even though an innovation is regarded to have a high degree of stability, it is still an actualization of connections into stability (Hernes 2008:41). For the game of connecting, in the midst of a sea of flows, sensemaking is the tool human actors have for simplifying cognitive abstractions of experience into stable things. Studying sensemaking is a study of organizing processes, which implies attempts at creating and justifying a meaningful and predictable order in a tangled world (Hernes 2008:44), in this case within the domain of collaboration in the Energy sector.

*"It is impossible to work alone in the Energy field. First there are political processes setting a framework, there is a substantial set of subsidies which promotes sustainable energy. Hence, there is a connection to the political field that drives it all. Energy is a commodity you cannot load on a truck and drive to a certain destination. Energy has to enter the established network somehow. There are rules of the game in the energy business about how the electricity gets to the socket. There are rules of the game that everyone has to follow, no matter how the energy was produced, whether it is sustainable or a power plant placed somewhere in a municipality that produces both electricity and heat, there are some game rules you need to obey" (Interview 3:1)*

The cases are chosen as best practice examples at a stage where they are, at least in their own sensemaking, successful and the future looks bright. The following analysis is critical to their explanations, with the purpose of understanding the rationality behind their actions. The main focus of the analysis is to point to situations where the respondents in an attempt to understand their own actions try to make sense of the complexity and the uncertain becoming of collaborations. Furthermore the analysis seeks to demonstrate how sensemaking and negotiation are intertwined in the emergence of collaboration. The cases will have separate conclusions and the overall findings of analysis will be outlined in the following chapter.

### **Case 1: Wave Star Energy - Stories about preparing for negotiation and collaboration.**

The following stories are based upon one interview with the CEO of Wave Star Energy (Wave Star) January 23<sup>rd</sup> 2009.

A crucial element of connecting, negotiating and collaborating is the initiation of actions purposed to move potential customers, investors or partners in a specific





direction. There are different paths to gain influence but as it has been presented in chapter 4, serious preparation is likely to be part of them all. A start-up company such as Wave Star needs to have its interests aligned with key individuals in the network in order to become connected to the desired network. (Hernes 2008:73). The CEO claims that worldwide investments in wave power until now adds up to DKK 3-4 billion on tests and facilities but that no one has succeeded until now.

*"I founded Wave Star Energy October 1<sup>st</sup> 2003 with the single purpose of commercializing wave energy. The goal was to create a break through similar to the one we all know from wind power"* (Interview 1:1).

### ***The story about the creation of an investor***

The CEO is aware of the importance of signals. Every type of communication stemming from him is loaded with signals designed to negotiate in the sense of persuasion. He is a salesman and proudly defines himself as an entrepreneur in the classical understanding. He knows that the fact that the company with 20 employees is located in his home basement produces certain signals, and this was used as part of the negotiation process with investors. The location itself becomes a factor, when it tells a story about the entrepreneur.

*"It means a lot, due to the amount of money saved compared to renting offices, and that means something in the start-up phase...The thing is to keep the expenses low, to be capable of that is a good signal to an investor"* (Interview 1:2)".

Furthermore, he stresses that it takes a certain mentality to perform the kind of entrepreneurial work he does, where it is necessary to keep expenses down and focus on the goal. Energy development is an expensive industry, and the CEO knew from the beginning that he needed an investor, even though he had some resources from the sale of his first company. He explains how he has a lot of experience with investors from his previous company, and expresses that he has a good sense for how the money-market functions. Due to bad experience with venture capitalists, which he designates as greedy, he knew he wanted a private investor.

*"When you build a company like Wave Star, a private investor is crucial, especially in the field of sustainable energy because the amount of money it takes is huge. This is also one of the reasons why wave energy has not come to market yet. Besides all the practical aspects, you need to master the entry ticket, which is very expensive and it takes a very high level of technical expertise to get started"* (Interview 1:7).

The CEO emphasizes the importance of having a clear plan to present to potential investors, again to act as justification for a serious and potentially advantageous





investment. Furthermore, the CEO advocates that any entrepreneur should choose his investor and not the opposite way around.

*“What it is really important when you need an investor is that you must pick the investors. You cannot be in some kind of economic trouble where others choose you” (Interview 1:8).*

As an example of how he approaches the negotiation situation with an investor, he stresses that all questions from investors must be answered in an easy language with a clear logic so that the entrepreneur signals credibility and trustworthiness. Weick (2001) refers to this technique as a facade of rationality to convince the audience that this is sound management strategy (Weick 2001:35). It is part of the preparation for negotiation to make sense of the other side’s sense of rationality, which is not a given (Thompson 2005:153).

Wave Star has been fortunate to have the Danfoss brothers as its primary investors, and the former CEO of Danfoss, Jørgen Mads Clausen as their chairman of the board. At the time of the interview they had invested approximately DKK 130 million of their private funds into the company, out of a total of DKK223 million (Interview 1:11). There is no doubt that it is a privileged situation for a start-up company, since the employees can concentrate on developing solutions and not on where the money for next pay check should come from. In his description of how the connection got established, the Wave Star CEO makes it sound like he beforehand chose the Danfoss brothers as investors and expected them to agree to participate. Whether the linearity in this story is true and not just retrospective sensemaking is difficult to judge. It is not clear whether other investors were considered or had rejected him; it nevertheless was a successful plan. He does not express anything about networks or previous connections, from which trust and respect could have been built, and to the question on how the contact to Jørgen Mads Clausen got established the CEO answers;

*“It was clear to me that I would like a private investor for this type of start-up - so I arranged a meeting” (Interview 1:8).*

How and what he did to arrange the meeting was not part of his answer. However, in an interview to the Danish Magazine Vedvarende Energi og Miljø, does Jørgen Mads Clausen tell that the wife of the CEO of Wave Star is sister to one of Mr. Clausen’s brothers. He explains how he did not believe in Wave Energy in the first place, but that the CEO for year’s kept working on him (<http://energi-miljo.dk/arkiv-pdf/x2-anmeldelser/3-07-s8-2.pdf>). The thing to focus on is the element of action where no paradox is perceived by the CEO. He seems to behave to his own unique framework,






very adaptive to the situation, making sense of the inherently unpredictable, which could have made him anxious and fearful of failure. However, his experience unconsciously enables him to accept the lack of foresight and control without total chaos (Stacey 1996:48-49). Furthermore, it is an illustration of how powerful he is in affecting what the company becomes, since he uses his power to resolve ambiguity and uncertainty (Weick 2001:47).

In his preparation of the contact, it is likely that he has considered the interests in sustainable energy that Jørgen Mads Clausen already had and that Jørgen Mads Clausen on his own body had experienced what sustainable energy did to Danfoss. Danfoss experienced how Vestas in 15 years passed Danfoss in market value, even though Danfoss had 60 years of experience. The CEO of Wave Star chose an investor with an in-depth understanding of both business and the technology, believing that his wave technology would be adequately convincing. Furthermore, the CEO's reputation and his network connections may have connection made a difference in the establishment of trust and common understanding, but that is pure speculation from the side of the interviewer. The CEO says nothing of that kind. He makes sense of the beneficial connection between him and the investors as good chemistry and aligned technical understanding.

*"It was a great meeting. It was a Saturday morning on Als. I went there and met with the three brothers. I brought a slide presentation and we ran things through and had a lively discussion about the technology – and I had a business plan about how to get from this level to the commercial level. After two hours of talking and discussing, Jørgen Mads Clausen said 'Okay – and so what?' And then I asked if they were interested in participating – for example with 10 million – in order for them to get accustomed with the company. Then he looked to his brothers and said 'What about you – are you in – because I am definitely in'. And then they were in as well, and it took two hours". (Interview 1:8).*

From a sensemaking perspective this story illustrates that the CEO's sensemaking occurs in the midst of potentiality filled event and is driven by the resulting consequences (Weick et al. 2005:410). There may have been hundreds of small actions leading to this event, from which he may or may not identify certain consequences, but he makes sense of his ambiguous actions to make his world more orderly. Another point is that in his story about how he managed to secure an investor, he also negotiates with the skeptics of his technology and with the interviewer, since it sends very strong signals about the trustworthiness and reliability of Wave Star for the Danfoss brothers to invest in it.





### ***The story about lobbyism and networking***

*“We are dependent on extra high Feed-In-Tariffs, and that is where the political aspect comes in. It is the political risk that is important. But since I founded the company the fantastic thing has happened that the price on electricity has increased to 40-50 øre pr. kWh and a commercial sustainable energy price is about 50-70 øre pr. kWh” (Interview 1:10).*

The success of Wave Star, according to the CEO, depends on extra high Feed-In-Tariffs (a high kWh price), which is a political issue that does not necessarily affect whether the technology will work in full scale. That is why the quote demonstrates a solid belief in his technology. For the same reason, it has been of great importance for him to get in contact with a range of Danish politicians. In Denmark, he explains, it is easy to meet with the politicians and the CEO has almost met with every one of the energy spokesmen in the Danish Parliament. In the light of the process theory, the CEO by acting approaches something that may become, in the process of connecting influential entities to his project (Hernes 2008:31).

*“It is lobbyism and it is indeed necessary. In my previous work I have not worked with politicians, but in my work with Wave Star I very early realized that if we were going to move, we would need to bring the politicians along. That is why I hired a media counselor who was going to help me arrange a meeting in the Parliament - one party at the time” (Interview 1:4).*

Several times during the interview, the CEO stresses the importance of the wave machine being tangible. A model has been set up in Nissum Bredning. It is anchored to a bridge, which makes it possible to walk out and on to the machine and inspect it – unlike more free floating competitors. When the machine was to be opened, the CEO had asked former Minister of economic and business affairs, Bent Bentsen to inaugurate it. The CEO recounts that he met the Minister at a private hunting party and asked if he wanted to do it.

*“We would not be able to get any attention from the politicians if they were not able to get out on that machine and stand on it” (Interview 1:4).*

It is an example of low practical communication of a highly technological system to investors and politicians. It illustrates what sustainable energy looks like in the politicians' minds - and is a part of the negotiation process (Thompson 2005:77). The task is to establish a connection to the perception of established forms of sustainable energy like wind power, bio fuel and solar cells in the actor's mental model of sustainable energy.

Wave Star has a well-established relationship to The Danish Export Council, through which they seek information about future customers and markets. At the time of the interview the company has used half a million DKK. on making surveys of countries





with natural wave resources, approximately DKK 50.000 per country. The goal is to gain knowledge about the Governments' views on wave energy, and whether it will be likely to adequately subsidize wave energy during the start-up phase with proper Feed-In-Tariffs. Furthermore, the Energy companies in the investigated countries are analyzed to identify the optimal customer in every country (Interview 1:5). The money is, according to the CEO, well spent, and is preferable to a situation where he would be travelling around the world establishing contacts and hence not be able to run the company on a day to day basis.

In addition, even though he does not say it, The Danish Export Council has connections that the CEO does not, making the membership a connection to other connections. His sensemaking again puts him in a situation of control from a clear choice of how to prioritize. It is a distinct calculation of how to spend scarce resources and which signals to send, since it seems to be a quite superior strategy to connect with the network of The Danish Export Council. As an example, it was clear from one survey that the Swedish energy company Vattenfall would be the one to approach in Sweden, when Wave Star has a full-scale model to sell and the CEO says that they have established a good collaboration with the company, without going into details about the content. When constructing the connection to Vattenfall, it was not the CEO of Wave Star who initiated the contact, but the Danish ambassador in Sweden who is a connection of The Danish Export Council.

On the question whether the CEO uses networking strategically he answers:

*"I do that very intentionally and I am very much aware on how I spend my time. I am not going to sit in some kind of Executive-network with all kinds of different executives; I have no use for that. What I use networking for is to create sales contacts, export potential and recruitment" (Interview 1:9).*

The connection to The Danish Export Council is another example of the CEO making his company become. Contact is negotiated with influential entities in the area of potential network of the company, and this contact seeks to, in the language of Weick, make actors in this network to bracket off parts of their world (Hernes 2008:133). When bracketing off parts of the world, actors are enacting a reality in the sense that it excludes possible selections from a tangled world where many explanations are possible (Hernes 2008:134) like the CEO of Wave Star seeks to do.

### ***The story about bringing technology to market***

The technical arguments about the wave machines superiority weighs heavily in the story about Wave Star. The CEO is absolutely convinced that he holds the winner technology. He has a list over the technical details and components that make the





Wave Star machine different from the competitors'. The list is strong communication for negotiating with potential stakeholders, because it acts as linear and easy to comprehend facts, at least in the interview situation, and probably also when communicating with potential collaborators or investors. What is crucial to remember when evaluating these facts is that it is he himself, the CEO of Wave Star who has defined this universal list of obstacles and problems of exploring wave power, which might make it easier to construct a model that overcomes and solve these problems. Again the CEO is enacting a reality, through bracketing, making sense of the obstacles to wave energy commercialization, by articulating a new order to be the common vocabulary for communicating and negotiating the future of wave energy.

The visual appearance of the wave machine has been worked heavily on, since the CEO acknowledges that industrial design makes a difference. The model is designed by CBD (Danish design and Architecture Company) and is nominated for participation in several international design competitions, which again creates attention and connects Wave Star with entities that they otherwise would not have been connected to.

*"When you put something out in the ocean it should not visually pollute – it must look good"* (Interview 1:11).

The CEO is also stressing that the construction of the machine has to be neutral to its environment. For that reason only used biodegradable oils and no toxic paint have been used during the construction.

*"There is no point in making sustainable energy, if you on the same time are polluting. That is also a requirement from our customers"* (Interview 1:3).

The connection to the Energy Companies, which the CEO designates future customers, is very important and they have been part of the development process from early on. The collaboration with the Energy Companies has no formal bindings, as far as the CEO sees it, since the informal ties are created by the common understanding of future value potential.

*"We have an ideal collaboration with DONG Energy, they have really seen the potential in us and in the things we are doing. They provide technicians – for free – to help us. And of course it works both ways. They learn something about wave power, which they know nothing about, and we learn something about how our future customers think"* (Interview 1:5).

It is difficult to grasp how the connection between Wave Star and DONG Energy is constructed, but it seems that there is no contract and no money involved, only close





dialogue, both with the department of R&D and the Energy and Climate Partnership Department. However, the Partnership Manager from DONG Energy's Energy and Climate Partnerships, describes it as one of his roles to think about how to raise capital for Wave Star (Interview 2:13).

*"We are a part of Wave Star – or we are probably just standing on the sideline. I have been involved in a way where I may look for funding for Wave Star from our customers, if Wave Star should experience financial trouble. Hence, our customers can support the development of Danish industry and we get to exchange experiences with Wave Star" (Interview 2:13).*

Irrespective of the level of trust, certain levels of coordination and control are necessary to confer a degree of certainty and stability on the collaboration (Vlaar et al. 2007:415). It is therefore likely that DONG Energy and Wave Star have spent some time up-front making sure that the responsibility and commitment for their connection was clearly spelled out. This is done to secure investments, resources, IPR and technology, even though they have a high-trusting relationship. Nevertheless, they do not reveal anything about it. They present their collaboration as a loosely coupled construct based on mutual interests, with conflict or opposite interests as completely absent.

The Wave Star machine has been created as a fully scalable machine. There are two reasons for this: 1) The machine is very expensive to test, which makes it attractive to gradually increase its size so every successful model can be doubled. During that process, experience and knowledge is created as the CEO points out. 2) If a new company has invested all their capital in one big commercial model, they might not dare to test it fully out of a fear for a crash, which could be detrimental to the entire company.

*"It is far cheaper to run small models. Our first model had the price of DKK 2.5 million and the model in Nissum Bredning (1:10) cost DKK15 million and we are now constructing a 500 kWh machine (1:2) at a price of DKK 150 million. This indicates that if you have not generated any experience when you build the DKK 100 million Version, the risk of failure is far greater" (Interview 1:3).*

The big Energy companies are interested in large machines, since they are in many ways easier to sustain, especially in the ocean, where it is necessary to sail around the machinery in large waves. The CEO says that DONG Energy, Vattenfall and E.On want large models that can produce large quantities (Interview 1:2). This means that with a sales oriented approach, the scalability of the model is vital. He refers to the wind power industry where the mills are still getting larger and larger. Every time the size of the wave machine is up-scaled it produces 11 times more energy, while the





expenses only increase by 8 fold. The CEO expects that Wave Star will sell 100-200 500 kWh machines, before they can begin to produce in full scale.

*“Our business model is to establish local production, because we have noticed, that this subject has massive attention in all countries, whether it is Spain, Portugal or Great Britain. Our strong patenting makes it possible to create flexible business models, in comparison to the wind industry, where they for every new customer must go out and build all the factories themselves, which is very expensive”* (Interview 1:10).

The future market for Wave Star is the Energy Companies located near the great seas, meaning the North Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean and all the Island communities.

The possibility for local production is a strong negotiation point for the Wave Star technology to be selected among competitors. The argument aligns with more customer interests than green energy, as for example the interests in job creation. This expands the possible benefits of the collaboration. In a negotiation process it is attractive to politicians to invest in technology that provides jobs to their voters and at best creates an industry. It is a good illustration of negotiation not being a 1-4 step process akin to the presentation of as integrative negotiation by Fisher and Ury (1999). A product can be positioned to provide options for mutual gain, even before any connection is established.

### ***Case conclusions***

In the interpretation of this thesis, the interview with CEO of Wave Star was permeated with a facade of rationality in the storytelling about the becoming of Wave Star. It seems like every decision that has been taken within the frame of the organizations has been without any doubt. The moment the CEO is convinced about the outcome of a process, the reasons for that seems obvious, and he cannot imagine any other outcome (Weick 2001:37). The CEO knows that it is critical to have the right connections and belong to the appropriate networks and be on good terms prior to the negotiation. Hence making this case a story about preparations for negotiations by connecting in advance to an actual need, and being in close contact with the industry. The CEO is sourcing at an abstract level.

There are no paradoxes in the process of building Wave Star as perceived by the CEO, enabling him to handle any possible anxiety rather than defending against it, which is essential when working with an unpredictable future (Stacey 1996:49). The complexity of connecting with other entities, the difficulties in defining interests and enacting the environment, which is some of the premises for this thesis, are not, at





least in retrospective, particular complex to the CEO of Wave Star. The complexity is perceived as a situation that must be handled, and the CEO never seems to be intimidated by the fluid nature of his project, simply because he stabilizes it by making sense of every event as part of a plan (Hernes 2008:29). The present uncertainty in the development of renewables is made sense of to gain influence (Weick 2001:47). If the CEO succeeds in making wave energy commercial it will not be a coincidence or luck in the mind of the CEO, but as a result of hard work and strategic connecting to relevant entities from the beginning. The way the CEO has been working to commercialize wave energy is a good illustration of the point from chapter 4, that it is unsatisfied needs that motivate in his appeal to future customers, not satisfied ones. The preparation performed by the CEO has to a large degree been a quest of negotiation to stabilize something essentially unstable as the process theory puts it. For example, he organizes the obstacles of commercialization to provide investing actors with sets of cognitive categories and a typology of actions (Weick et al. 2005) and makes the potentiality become actually. The future does not come about through a plan, and it is not a result from change. It is a result of choices, actions, decisions, actor's influencing each other again and again, allowing movement and connecting to unforeseen entities in the process of becoming (Hernes 2008:134). Still, this is not the way the CEO of Wave star makes sense of his organization.

At the interview, the CEO was confronted with the fact, that when searching the web for information about wave energy, Wave Star did not stand out as leading in the world. In fact the company was not even mentioned on Wikipedia even though the site has a comprehensive overview of the technology and the competitors. To this, the CEO replied that it had to be a mistake and changed the subject. The same happened when asked about, how come Siemens in their 20 year scenario for the power supply does not include wave energy. He replies that Siemens is behind on their development of wave energy and again changes the subject (Interview 1:2). On the comment that the success of wave energy is situated in contextual times, the oil price and powerful connections between entities that suddenly follow new lines that the ones forecasted, the CEO answers:

*“My gut feeling on this project has from day one been excellent and by now I have been working on it for 5 years – and it is still here” (Interview 1:11).*

On the question if there have been any down periods during the 5 year period of Wave Star he says:





*"No – is has been absolutely crazy. When I look back and see what progress we have accomplished – I have to pinch my arm" (Interview 1:11).*

These statement relates well to the understanding of sensemaking as organizing for framing reality by imposing unambiguous interpretations on ambiguous signals (Hernes 2008:121).

According to the plan, presented at the interview, Wave Star is going to sell the first wave power machine in January 2010 and in 2012 the CEO expects break even (Interview 1:11). Wave Star is building on an ambitious vision of an enthusiastic man. Since the foundation of the company in 2003, the CEO has sold his vision to the world in a promise about being the next wind power adventure, even though at the present time it is no more than a construct for dreams of technological supremacy. The question is now how long you can promise without results? The Kings of Europe did support the Alchemists for a long period, but not forever. The CEO is promising a business impact within a year and it is going to be interesting to follow.

## **Case 2: The Department of Energy- and Climate Partnerships at DONG Energy - Stories about the justification of partnerships**

The following stories are based upon one interview with the Partnership Manager of the Department, January 28<sup>th</sup> 2009.

The focus of this case is negotiation in the form of justification, meaning how the Partnership Manager makes sense of partnerships. Actions mean whatever justifications become attached to them (Weick 2001:189), making the sensemaking of actions crucial to any entity with a special purpose. The Energy- and Climate Partnerships in DONG Energy is a consequence of the increased focus on climate changes and can be interpreted both as a CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) initiative for organizational climate strategies and as an initiative for creating a market for DONG Energy's products.

*"The idea is that we make our partners look attractive to their customers and that is what we collaborate about. We get there through our common vision" (Interview 2:6).*

### ***The story about Common Vision***

The Common Vision between organizations is the basis of a partnership. The idea is to collaborate crosswise within DONG Energy's energy and climate competencies, which involves creative combinations of existing technology and investments in new technology. In the brochure about Climate Partnership, organizations are invited to





become part of the Climate challenge. On the front page it says that “*A Climate Partnership is a reciprocal binding collaboration about realizing a common climate vision*” (*Own translation*). DONG Energy provides energy consultants and support on communicating the initiatives to the world and organizations are offered an effective management tool for a long-term climate vision, to reduce their spending on energy and their CO2 emissions, to make a difference for Denmark and the climate and to gain a greener image, receive higher loyalty from employees and customers – all to be mirrored on the bottom line.

*“We have a network within the field of sustainable energy where we seek to raise capital from our customers and partners, to projects within renewable energy and to look for new business models. When establishing a Windmill farm we are very interested for them to calculate some additional small amount into their investment calculi, since it makes it a lot easier to move the projects and allow us to give better offers on windmill projects. It can also make it easier succeed with demonstration projects, which often bring great losses due to the purpose of testing. It is easier to succeed with a project like that if somebody wants to profile themselves on supporting it” (Interview 2:7).*

The Partnership Manager’s role is to look for options and facilitate a connection between entities. This connection can be between the shells from Cocoa Beans, which is a waste product from a Chocolate Factory, and the Power Plant, who can burn it as a simple mono-fragment.

*“The positive thing is that we, most of the time, have a good argument for them to perform waste management in Power, who is the one that runs the Power plants, and therefore why they should talk to us. If we can say that we have a municipality which is interested in analyzing the streams of waste with the intention of getting rid of their fuels, we can procure fuels for Power – and then they would like to talk to us”.*

The Partnership Manager justifies the need of his department’s existence by aligning with the interests of other departments, since the Energy and Climate partnerships is a management innovation, deriving some skepticism from the existing human and non-human actors internally in the organization. The task is to create knowledge about his department internally at DONG Energy, negotiating the right to work across departments and make the engineers from the Department of Power use to the creative ideas from Department of Sales and Distribution. He describes it as knocking on the door and asking what the engineer is doing. He needs to motivate and sense interest, and have initiated several internal networks, in connection to R&D and Power, in order to create connections between entities with no previous connections. It is internal negotiation creating connections and networks which demonstrates how R&D may benefit from the connections Sales and Distribution has to the market, in order to sell their solutions.





### **The story about motivation and commitment**

The challenging part of collaboration, according to the Partnership Manager, is anchoring the deal in the organization. The collaboration is only real from the actions of its actors (Hernes 2008:70), hence describing the fragile character of the loosely coupled Energy- and Climate Partnerships, only guided by a framework agreement, where exit is easy if motivation vanishes. For the same reason the Partnership Manager is focused on the level of anchoring, since he describes how justification of the collaboration depends on the commitment from powerful actors in his organization.

*"The challenging part is foremost the establishment of the deal, and to get there we need to get it anchored as high in the organization as possible. If we cannot achieve that, the customer might not accomplish the necessary investment in energy savings, and then we need to negotiate all the way to the top. Sometimes it is easy because Anders Eldrup (CEO of DONG Energy) already has spoken to the CEO and then that is it" (Interview 2:3).*

The quote illustrates that the Partnership Manager finds it easier to create commitment if the initiative for partnership comes from the top management. Top management engagement signals commitment to the actors of the partnering company about commitment to spend resources on the project. Commitment acts as justification and trustworthiness for the actors of the other organization. The Partnership Manager uses the word anchor, which refers to the matter of the parties feeling ownership, but is to some extent a static notion. To be static, hints that the deal stays the same in the minds of the actors, as it was on the day entering collaboration. From a process view this is not possible, since stability lies in small, short segments (Weick 2001:41) and the notion of static entities involves the risk of not continuing to develop the relationship or the potential outcome that serves as underlying foundations for collaboration.

With a reference to Latour, Hernes 2008 explains that connections do not consist of stable nodes and links, but of connections that shape actors recursively. Connections are formed and a contract is signed to obtain a stabilized system that serves some purpose, as a goal specified in a contract. This is also the intention of the Partnership Manager, but should not be perceived as constant, rather a potentiality. In a process view, purpose is not to be understood as a stable set of goals (Hernes 2008:28), since purpose emerges in the fluctuations of events and negotiations as do actors and connections. However, in this case, the Partnership Manager articulates sharp goals for his Partnerships, as energy reduction and investment in sustainable energy. How the goals are to be reached could be an emerging answer, since there are several possibilities for connecting entities in the structure of the Partnerships Manager's





work, but it is difficult to judge how openly he listens to the developments of the collaboration. DONG Energy can offer several alternatives to energy reduction and CSR-activities, but it seems like these two interests are the only interests that he imagines the partner to have.

*"We draw on all the competences of DONG Energy, compared to earlier on where we were just interested in working with the technical side of energy, we now have the possibility of taking a partner who can either buy the product or act as co-owner" (Interview 2:4)*

However, interests may change and so do motivation. On the one hand, he connects existing entities in new formations and on the other hand he wants to run the collaboration as a project with deadlines, reports and specific deliverables maybe blurring the sight to new images of energy reduction and investment in sustainable energy, and also to the sensibility of fluctuations in the other side's interests and capabilities. Forgetting to listen to each other can affect the motivation between the collaborating parties and thereby the stability of the anchored deal, with forgetting the coordinating functions of formalization (Vlaar et. al.2007:409).

It is worth noticing that the Partnership Manager almost hints that climate partnership is not justifying by its own substance, but negotiations must be supplemented by top management engagement to be interesting as a product for other entities to spend resources on.

*"It is perceived as important when you bring the CEO" (Interview 2:11)*

In situations where the deal is not already pre-negotiated by a handshake at the top level, things may be different. Since it can be difficult to calculate the exact economic advantage of a climate partnership, signals of commitment becomes crucial, and sensemaking is instead created over longer periods of negotiation in forms of well-planned actions and communication. Commitment stems from continuous motivation for participating in the collaboration, not just one meeting over coffee (Thompson 2005:129).

The Partnership Manager tells the story of a passionate employee, who contacted the Partnership Manager with green ambitions on the behalf of his organization. The employee did not initially have the support of his organization, and the potential value creation for the organization therefore had to be communicated more explicitly. The employee did not have the power to direct decisions and anchor the deal, but he had knowledge about the motivational structure of the organization, which is influential knowledge in a situation of negotiation.





*“We had a dialogue with this person, because he knows the organization, and then we try to supplement him with what he needs to carry on. If it is a matter of cost, we will make a forecast for their energy saving potential and the cost of buying and investing in sustainable energy. We will give them some numbers to relate to” (Interview 2:3).*

The crucial part here is the information the Partnership Manager gets from the employee, because that information, together with his intuition, makes it possible to initiate negotiation with something in the interest of the organization and its employees, in order for them to enter collaboration in this specific context. The Partnership Manager may have presumptions about motivations, but he does not know for a fact what type of persuasion or logical arguments that establishes the required trust for the customer to enter into collaboration. The point is that if personal connections, a previous history or some sort of connection that creates reliability are missing, and then the initiation of collaboration is much more complicated. It will need to be supplemented by a long period of negotiations, sensemaking and trustworthy signals in order to establish motivation and commitment.

### ***The story about governing the partnership***

*“This is about running the partnerships – and that is a new thing. We have spent the last year establishing the partnerships and getting them structured. Now it is time to structure the running (...). The partnerships will be run as a project with a professional management tool with milestones and monthly reports (...). And I guess that is how all reasonable projects are run” (Interview 2:10).*

The Partnership Manager describes how the existing Energy and Climate partnerships are run like projects with project management tools as reporting, milestones and contracts. The contract is a framework agreement without sanctions, but with a project organization that, according to the Partnership Manager, can handle conflict through dialogue. A conflict is typically that a partner is not prioritizing the energy savings, which is regarded as a breach of contract.

*“We have the possibility of reacting through the project organization that we construct, and we have a partnership group, which consist of the directors. Typically it will be something that is solved on director level, meaning that if you have one grumpy buyer somewhere in the organization that is responsible for energy and not willing to pay, we take it to our director. And if it cannot be solved at that level, the partnership must be terminated. We cannot force our customers to do something. It should be done on the basis of a reasonable decision” (Interview 2:5).*

As part of the effort to make sense of the climate partnerships, the Partnership Manager several times during the interview refers to reason or rationality, when he justifies his actions, a certain structure or the need for partnerships. The partnership, in opposition to a traditional seller/buyer connection, is justified because it contains





something more, namely the trust to reveal information. In some instances it seems like the form of the partnerships never transcends the logic of the Partnership Manager, as a constant, hence reproducing the overall logic of DONG Energy (Hernes 2008:125), indicating that DONG Energy and the Partnership Manager are the ones defining the partnership. It is alignment of the other party's interests, more than it is alignment of interests between the two.

*"We have experienced opposition, and in such a case we use the project organization. I have had a director put his foot down. After that we make up again and reestablish a good tone of voice with good arguments for why a partnership works like this and that is why it makes good sense to do this and this" (Interview 2:11).*

The Partnership Manager emphasizes that the physical proximity is an important factor of a collaboration based on trust, which is a way to strengthen the informal ties, when the formal ties are relatively absent. The argument is that information richness tends to increase with the extent of face-to-face interaction (Weick 2001:10).

*"I have been quite a lot in Fredericia and the physical aspect means a lot – especially in the beginning. When we established contact to Fredericia, we made a workshop where everybody got to meet each other, the responsible people for purchases and the responsible people for wastewater treatment plant, got to meet the energy advisors. People got to see each other and worked together for an entire day so that there was something to continue on" (Interview 2:12).*

This 'something to continue on', besides the goal and the physical structures, is the tools for management innovation, since a close relationship allows for new procedures and openness. The Partnership Manager makes sense of the difficult connectional part of collaboration by knowing something about his partner, since he knows that it is the entities of interaction that must be managed in a favorable way for the becoming of the collaboration. At such an event, the Partnership Manager acquires the tools for the continuous negotiation of collaboration, meaning the other actor's interests and motivation, and it is expressed that sensibility and proximity is critical to get this kind of information. Even though the Partnership Manager formulates partnerships in terms of project management and rationality, he still enacts what it requires to build important informal ties of collaboration.

*"We make sure to get acquainted with our partners and establish a good dialogue. I am very well acquainted with the partnerships I coordinate, and when you have this confidence based relationship, they also reveal some things – and that is what we use. Trust means a lot, because we know who to call, when and what we can say to them. If there is some kind of problem somewhere in the collaboration, it is nice to know how to approach it. Some needs to get things directly whereas others*





*need to hear it in another way and it is in such situation you need to know the person" (Interview 2:11).*

This statement illustrates how important the informal structures and types of connection are in collaboration, since it does not say in a contract in what tone of voice information should be delivered, nevertheless it is part of the negotiating situation not to provoke or hurt the other party, and make sure the relationship sustains difficult situations. To get a sense of **these things** is equal to getting a sense of what motivates and interests the other side and to consider how they would react in certain situations, which is integrated negotiation preparation in its essence (Fisher and Ury 1999). Put differently, proximity is an example of enacting relationship and trust, made sense of as something concrete that can be used. It hints that the Partnership Manager acknowledges proximity and trust to be important, even though he still thinks of collaboration as a project, where he can plan for commitment and trust through events and contacts on a regular basis. The two quotes illustrates how difficult it is to articulate and make sense of inter-connectional constructs as trust, interests, motivation and proximity, leaving the articulation with pictures of something and **some things**.

### ***The story about interdependence***

The basic idea in the Climate Partnerships is to use the energy savings as the engine in the partnership and thereby create financial room to fund sustainable energy solutions. A company is not expected to enter partnerships for philanthropist reasons, but for sourcing and the potential value creation. Value may be created either by making money, saving money or through a CSR-related motivation, which in some instances end up being the same. DONG Energy has several interests to satisfy through Climate Partnerships, since the company is obliged by the Danish Government to reduce their emission of greenhouse gasses, and furthermore identify companies that can help them build a market for green energy. It is extremely important for the Partnership Manager to emphasize that a climate partnership is not a one-sided sale where DONG Energy makes the profit and the partner gets a climate-friendly seal. DONG Energy provides the service of their expertise in energy savings for free and they provide free marketing assistance to help the partner communicate its new green profile to different stakeholders, and according to the Partnership Manager the CSR-effect is as good as value for money. It is not a possibility for the partners to lower their energy consumption and then use the savings as they prefer. The savings must be used for a green buying strategy amongst DONG Energy's products (Interview 2:4).





*"We cannot make it break-even from the beginning, because it takes investments to earn energy savings, but over time, we will prove a positive present value of entering the partnership. And that is without calculating on the reputational effect it for selling products".*

The Partnership Manager underlines the value of positive publicity and the possibility for potential partners to profile themselves in new ways and agree that CSR is one of the central reasons for entering into a partnership (Interview 2:4). He justifies the business impact perspective by saying:

*"Indirectly it becomes an economic motivation, if the companies cannot sell their products, because they do not have a strategy in the field" (Interview 2:4).*

It is worth noticing, that the argument about *branding* oneself with the positive attitude of another entity with whom you collaborate, is the same argument that the CEO of Wave Star uses for DONG Energy to be interested in his wave energy project;

*"DONG gets some positive publicity from the collaboration with Wave Star, opposite the amount of the negative media coverage they get. There is always someone claiming that DONG is abusing their position and sets the agenda for the consumers (Interview 1:6).*

In both cases, it is a discursive strategy for enacting the interdependence between the parties, calling upon a necessity in the collaboration that forms the basis of commitment.

### ***Case Conclusions***

The Partnership Manager justifies his actions within the frame that he understands and controls, meaning that he orders his project with a clear goal and strategy. At the same time he is aware that collaboration and cross-organizational interactions depend on commitment and trust why he therefore seeks to plan for these elements, to become present in the relationships. Within his frame of reference there is no contradiction between project management and having a close relationship with his partner, and in some cases he is probably right.

It was hinted in the case that climate partnerships are not self motivating, but have to be justified as prestige projects anchored at the highest level, which is an interpretation of this thesis. Nevertheless, if correct, it might limit the possibilities of inventing options for thinking partnerships (Fisher and Ury 1999:63).

*"I believe that partnerships are the future, compared to an ordinary deal situation of sale where you only meet once a year to negotiate the contract and then you are gone again" (Interview 2:11).*





One of the challenges in this case, which the Partnership Manager never formulates when justifying his actions, is that the financial effect of CSR is questionable. The value creation is simply difficult to predict. In his articulation about partnership, he acts like this challenge does not exist; he only stresses the need for top management commitment. Nevertheless, CSR investment can be regarded as an uncertain investment, especially to companies of less economic strength than Novozymes, who plays the role of DONG Energy's Energy and Climate Partnership prime partner. It indicates that the interdependency between organizations is questionable and that some organizations might feel they have an alternative for their branding strategy to connecting with an Energy and Climate Partnership. The question is whether the Partnership Manager is capable of really understanding the interests of his partners and succeeds in justifying actions. Nevertheless, if the preparation is not good enough, the commitment is likely to fade out and change the connection with partners. Without acknowledging the ambiguity which actors in the world live in, he might not be able to gain the appropriate trust and connection on long term basis (Chia 2003:864). A process theory interpretation would predict that the needs of the partnership will fluctuate, without the Partnership Manager noticing it because he is not focused on the process, but on the next milestone (Hernes 2008:58). This illustrates an important point: Since the Partnership Manager is successful in his work so far, there might be a contradiction in the way he expresses himself and the way he acts in the flux of ever-emerging entities. He makes sense of collaboration within the frame he knows, but negotiates and acts as it is appropriate to the context, with the intention to systemize the process as soon as possible.

What the Partnership Manager sees is within his world of focus, a subjective world made available to him through his own selection (Weick 2001:57). To this thesis it seems questionable that the Partnership Manager sees no need for DONG Energy to invest in renewables as part of their CSR, as he justifies it is of their partners, which could be interpreted as DONG Energy having their back covered by offering Energy and Climate Partnerships to other organizations.

*“The disadvantage with the quota system is that you have a goal for how much sustainable energy to be produced, and then it can be difficult for a company to feel that they are doing something extraordinary. Because the windmill would have been built anyway – it is not an additional windmill, and that is actually something we struggle with. What we offer is that if we can be supported by our customers, then we are capable of establishing the wind power a little earlier than it otherwise would have been, or you can wait until 2020 and then it is all coming up there” (Interview 2:9).*

Without investors, DONG Energy will wait until 2020, which is the deadline for DONG to have reduced their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, before they put up the required





renewable energy sources. The Partnership Manager expresses no paradox in other organizations investing in a CSR profile, and DONG Energy being the facilitator and he expresses no need for DONG Energy to invest in renewable energy before they are obliged to in 2020.

### **Case 3: The department of Products and partnership concepts, DONG Energy - Stories about negotiating trust**

The following stories are based on one interview with the Partnership Supervisor of the Department, February 13<sup>th</sup> 2009.

This case is characterized by its high degree of complexity, both in its illustration of trust as the absolute essential entity of collaboration in a competitive but traditional market, and in the story of an entry strategy that was not suitable for creating trust and entering the market. The German energy market is a highly competitive market with organizational giants as E.On, Vattenfall and ABB, and smaller City Gas Plants, which are old and proud organizations. The transmission net is rather rigid and requires collaboration between the entities in the field, making the sale of gas relational. Connections are resource demanding in both their construction and their maintenance, but they are the key to selling gas in the German Market.

*"It is extremely loaded with negotiations and that is also why you consider each other a partner, even though you just buy gas. It is because the negotiations that lead to a deal is so long that it takes a good amount of trust to get there" (Interview 3:10).*

#### ***The story about the City Gas Plants***

Germany has 720 City gas plants which supply 80 million inhabitants. Before the liberalization of the energy market in Europe, the gas market in Germany used to be dominated by four large suppliers of energy. The liberalization means that the plants are under serious pressure from regulators, affecting how much profit they can make of their monopoly on distribution service to the end users, which previously has been their cash cow. The City Gas Plants have a diverse structure and thereby diverse interests, since they can be both the supplier of power, gas and water. They may have the responsibility of sewerage, public transportation, public swimming pools and graveyards all together in one organization. They are organizations with traditions, positions, and important workplaces - in the words of the Partnership Supervisor they are small City Kings.

*"Many of the City Gas Plants want to be self-contained. Since they are owned by the Municipalities and want to be the master of their own house, it is important for them that the citizens of the area have*





*security of supply. They do not wish to be owned by others. There should be no large Multinational companies that buy them. They want to remain independent” (Interview 3:5).*

The Partnership Supervisor wants to be the alternative supplier to the City Gas Plants. He wants to offer them a partnership where more than gas crosses borders, but also knowledge, network, marketing products and new collaborative solutions for selling gas based on flexibility.

### ***The story about the entry strategy***

During the interview, the theme entry strategy to the German Market comes up twice, which in its essence is a sourcing strategy for connections to future customers. In retrospect the Partnership Supervisor gives two stories, which are not necessarily conflicting, but show two different sources of justification for action. In 2005, DONG Energy established the department for Products and Partnerships, which has succeeded in building partnerships in Denmark. The department therefore wanted to copy the model for their German entry strategy. The Partnership Supervisor and the department spent 4-5 months trying to create a partnership model on the basis of different books on the subject of Partnerships and their experience. This working pattern is rational, assuming that they are in control and act from an understanding of cause and effect (Hernes 2008:63).

*“When we made this model we actually thought we could make partnerships with it. Off course we had a database containing all these City Gas Plants with names of directors, mayors, political background and ownership – all factors to decide whether this was a potential partner. Then we could establish contact and start processing them, invite them to all sorts of things and it would analytically be right by the book – and it has no chance for succeeding” (Interview 3:6).*

According to integrative negotiation theory (Fisher and Ury 1999) the Partnership Supervisor and his group was on the right track in the sense of proper preparation, investigating potential partners, their interests and their history, trying to figure out how to approach them. But, in this case, these preparations was not the right preparation for this type of partner, since the information found was only useful for some preliminary communication to find out who to approach – not how. Referring to the epistemological understanding of this thesis, this is an example of how actors intervene in the world of flows equipped with understanding of how things work, and equipped with models of how to bring about some order (Hernes 2008:129). These old and proud organizations could not be approached with a smile and a proposition about partnership; since they had no experience with DONG Energy there was no trust to build on.





The Partnership Supervisor experienced that it mattered how the City Gas Plants heard about DONG Energy. It was not enough to advertise in the local newspaper, since the people of the City Gas Plant would find it weird that an unknown energy supplier suddenly had an ad in their newspaper and might feel threatened. This illustrates how his common understanding of strategic marketing communication was cancelled and that he had to do something else.

*"We realized that to run it top-down in our region was not a good way. The German director that we hired, who had experience in this field, said that it was not at all the way things were run. He said that we needed to go in with some Key Account Managers, with some contacts, and then process them from the human side to build trust. In the beginning it was all about creating a network" (Interview 3:7).*

The Key Account Managers are located in Germany, working for DONG Energy's German sales company, which is an integrated part of DONG Energy. Previously, they have been employed by City Gas Plants or suppliers to the City Gas Plants, signifying that they came with a network. The key account manager's network has the potential of turning into more or less stable connections, from which trust can be built and negotiations begin. When considering collaborations many activities and choices are involved, and because continuous adjustments, rather than few irreversible actions, are involved, the act of organizing may resemble that of experimentation (Hernes 2008:63).

*"There is only this way, which is extremely driven by the Key Account Manager, his approach to it, his network and his ability to follow the leads that appear. Sometimes he might use very much time on a customer, which we know we are not going to get, because he is owned by another supplier that in the end will dump the price. We know that the customer use us to lower the price from his existing supplier, but we do it anyway. If we do it well, then they might know someone else, someone on the board, who is also on the board of other City Gas Plants, and then they might use us. You try to work your way into it." (Interview 3:10).*

For the second story about entry strategy the Partnership Supervisor was asked directly about how the first partnerships model was constructed. First, he starts to tell about the books about Partnering, but then changes his mind and begins to tell the story about a case that his director, the director of DONG Energy's Sale activities, got inspired from. He tells the story of the case very detailed and at the end he declares that this case became the inspiration for their partnership model (Interview 3:2). Whether it is true that the inspiration came in such a linear way as it is described, or if it is retrospective sensemaking of a rather messy period of experimentation, is difficult to say. Nevertheless, the story of Erste Group Bank AG in Austria is a strong business case, which serves as basis for commitment and





justifies DONG Energy following a plan that previously had succeeded in doing what DONG Energy was about to. For top-managers and investors it justifies the seemingly uncertain approach of founding a new business on the personal network of a few Key Account Managers that used to work for competitors of the company. Through justification the organization of the German DONG Energy department is thought into existence (Weick 2001:78) and creates the commitment that lays as foundation for actions. When actors use justification, like a reference to Erste Bank, as a facade of rationality to make important decisions about goals, planning and analysis, it is not because they necessarily are good and work, but because the actors who are to supply the resources believe that such practices work and indicate sound management (Weick 2001:35).

### ***The story about connecting***

The network of the City Gas Plants is not easy to grasp and based on history and traditions as well as fierce competition. The Partnership Supervisor sees the complexity as a game, where suppliers and buyers are playing each other and technology, demand, context and time set the frame – hence, he is sensemaking through rationalization. The process allows for choices to be made while remaining open to the possibility that the outcome will not be as expected (Hernes 2008:64). However, this is how the Partnership Supervisor makes sense of the uncertain situation, when he justifies spent resources. He argues that if the negotiations fall and no deal is made, it is still important to have participated in the game, since contracts are typically renegotiated after a couple of years, and he is probably right.

It is kind of network marketing, where the important thing is to be seen and show your availability on the market, and be part of the customers evoked set. It is about preparation for future negotiation, translated into a very long range strategy of processing customers, and according to the Partnership Supervisor it is the only way to get in.

*“You never just go in and sell a partnership. With our Danish mentality, we thought that we were to begin with the advanced products – but no – we had to start with the simple things and see what happened. We sell the basic products first and then the next elements are added. Before we have shown our value as a supplier we are not given a chance” (Interview 3:12).*

The department for Partnerships and Products learned early on in their work that network and personal connections was the way to sell gas to the City Gas Plants. With a reference to Actor-Network theory this illustrates how actors only exist through their connection to other actors (Hernes 2008:65). They experienced that one





way to justify actions and establish trust, was through openness and accessibility of the relevant directors in the field, which the industry had not been accustomed to.

*"They meet the openness in trade fairs. We have just participated in one called e-World where one of our initiatives was a dialogue-corner, to which we invited our customers to talk to our directors. We had our own director, the director of Wind and our new director at a power plant in Greifswald there. It means that the responsible individuals are there – you can just go and talk to them" (Interview 3:4).*

Making the relevant actors available to any potential customer sends signals about commitment and earnest investment in the project. The Partnership Supervisor explains how it is crucial that the customers experience trust in every action from DONG Energy and emphasizes the importance of proximity. He attends the Key Account managers visiting the customers, presenting products and solutions. He arranges social events and is the face of Denmark signaling that the mother company cares about the small things that are important to potential partners. He also prepares larger events where several partners are invited and to some extent prepare what the agenda for the meeting is going to be. The meetings are managed in a combination of informal control structures, trying to manage situation in a favorable direction, and openness, allowing the partners to express their hopes, fears, wishes and visions for the future (Interview 3:4). All these actions are designed to align the interests of DONG Energy and the City Gas Plants, be part of network and make new ones become.

Being a small organization among large organizations has forced DONG Energy to enlarge the networks and personal connections, since they can always be underbid by competitors who want them out of the market. The negotiation DONG Energy has with the City Gas Plants is to justify that they are capable of more than a good price, and that demands physical presence. The fairs and the events function as preparations to future negotiations. When a representative from a City Gas Plant approaches a representative from Partnerships and Products at a fair, some form of connection is established. The Partnership Supervisor emphasizes that part of his strategy is to see any connection as customers right away and begin processing them. It is not enough to bid on a tender, the tender needs to be supplemented by calls and visits by the Key Account Manager, showing commitment, and telling them face to face that in the long run other things than price matters. The position as the middle-man between two potentially partnering organizations is rather complex, where two sets of interests need to be aligned. The Key Account Manager has to make sense of how the parties make sense, which sounds complex, but is routine in organizational life (Weick et. al. 2005:413). The successful outcome of a visit or an event is that DONG





Energy is invited to bid on a tender from the City Gas Plant. This next quote illustrates the continuous actions of aligning interests that altogether make the collaboration become, and also why it can be difficult to predict.

*"It is a good example on the personal relationship – let's come down and talk about it – talk about what you want, what we want, how we present ourselves and what is your need – that is the first meeting. Then comes the tender and we bid on it. If we are lucky to get among the three cheapest – and that is what they evaluate upon – we might get invited to another meeting. At that meeting we might ask if there is anything other than gas we could provide and about how we could do this and that. Then they might choose us, even though we do not have the cheapest offer, or we might lower the price a bit more for the first year. The offer is one thing but the actual negotiations are something different. At that point we might do something else according to the customer. Maybe we extend the contract – there are many possibilities" (Interview 3:13).*

In his description of the negotiations, the Partnership supervisor has a process view on the outcome, and he acknowledges the uncertainty by emphasizing the possibility of being considered or chosen. He is aware that many factors are at play at these negotiations and that collaboration become, it is not agreed upon from one day to another, it is a process. Trust has to be built up, interests have to be declared and aligned and commitments have to be shown, and it is on a continuous basis. To the question about the importance of proximity, he replies that it means everything. The partners of DONG Energy expect to get individual treatment and attention. Accordingly, their customer surveys identify these parameters as excellent.

The Partnership Supervisor agrees that sensitivity to a large extent is running a partnership and defines whether it is to continue or to end. The Partnership Supervisor is open to the fact that things have happened without him being in control and he seems to be aware that his work with the City Gas Plant is an ongoing process that is dependent on many factors as well as coincidence.

*"One of our sales men knows – I actually do not know through what connection – but he knows the director. That part of the contact is either an extreme coincidence or really good work, where the personal connection is worked on and the thing that does that you get through and talk to him" (Interview 3:8).*

### ***The story about mutual interests***

*"They have what we want, which is the customers and the sale. If they leave us, we do not sell any gas. If a City Gas Plant leaves us, it is like losing 30.000 end-users. And you just try going home to Denmark and market yourself to 30.000 end-users – that is not funny" (Interview 3: 11).*

The partnership approach to the German market is good, as far as the Partnership Supervisor tells, because it fits the context, the history and the emotional state of the actors, but it might not be suitable for other entry strategies in other contexts.





*"It is very easy to have a common vision with the City Gas Plants, because we need to get into Germany and they need gas and would like to secure themselves an alternative to Russian gas. We are going to be there for a long time and so are they. Naturally we have a long-term vision for a long-range, stable collaboration, which ensure them to be independent. If they are going to be independent, our price needs to be in a way so that they can make profit on it" (Interview 3:6).*

The partnership model for collaboration with DONG Energy allows the City Gas Plants to stay independent in terms of decisions and strategy even though they by nature are dependent on a supplier, and for some of them it offers an alternative compared to working with the big organizations in the field. Even though this type of partnerships has a formal contract, there is no doubt that the interdependence is real, the Gas Plants need flexible gas solutions and DONG Energy needs access to end users and the interdependence, serves as an informal governance structure.

Many organizations focus too explicitly on formal, contractual linkages, and neglect the myriad of informal ties that connect organizations (Powell and Grodal 2005:70), but the Partnership Supervisor is aware that the success of formal affiliations may depend on the strengths of informal ties. The Partnership Supervisor gives the impression that the Partnership model for collaboration is new to the City Gas Plants, since they traditionally have changed supplier based on the lowest bid. The Partnership model is more than price and questions whether long-term collaboration can be built on price. Several times, the Partnership Supervisor refers to the fact that the City Gas Plants are motivated by price and nothing else, and then, maybe after long negotiations they will consider other cross-border activities. This is interesting in relation to Ertel (1999), pointing to the paradox that many organizations give discounts to difficult customers to improve the relationship, and in the same action they teach their customers the art of blackmailing. The customers keep on being difficult if it pays off and leaves the deal if they do not get what they are used to (Ertel 1999:59). In some ways, the Partnership Supervisor is confusing the price on gas with the relationship between actors, because he fears that if he does not give a low price he might destroy the possibility of a partnership, and it leaves him open to manipulation from the other side (Ertel 1999:59). Interestingly, it is a clash between the sensemaking of the market and the sensemaking of the network, which emphasizes that even though the Partnership Supervisor advocates relationships to be the way to do things, he does not believe that he can let go or escape the logic of the market.

*"And then suddenly it gets tough, when the price of the supplier is not good anymore and the contract is to be renegotiated, as it is obvious that initially a good price was given. It is not that you do not*





*want to give a good price the second time, but the price is hardly as flexible as the first time. That poses the question of how to get to the next level of partnership" (Interview 3:4).*

The Partnership Supervisor acknowledges the challenge in taking the partnership beyond the first phase of initial discount. He offers the customers some bait and hopes for the customers to be satisfied and not to shop around, to create loyalty. Clearly Ertel (1999) would disagree, even though the partnerships have developed into collaboration on more than gas, it is an inappropriate way to enter a unity supposed to be build on trust.

Price is always part of negotiations for a sale, but the risk that rises from the focus on price is to stay on the bargaining level of negotiation and not take it to the integrative, focusing on positions and not on interests. However, it seems like one of the Partnership Supervisors major tasks is to expand the pie of the collaboration by optimizing the portfolio of solutions. He is making other competencies of DONG Energy as stock options and flexible contracts for buying gas available to the partnership. Moving relationship to the integrative level is about communication and revealing interests, but also about realizing that in a fluid world, novelty and order arise from connections that produce new patterns which represent a form of stabilization (Hernes 2008:76). This is preferable when looking for new ways to collaborate, new solutions and markets. As the following statement illustrate that it is possible to separate the inventing from the deciding for mutual gain.

*"We have found a buyer, but we cannot deliver in his area. Therefore, we suggest a pipe line from another position, where DONG Energy has gas and the market to us is more liquid and competitive. We make a deal with them where we establish this long pipe and help them with the entire transition of meters and burners, making it a long-term delivery deal, which secures us a large sale many years ahead" (Interview 3:8).*

### ***The story about planned commitment***

The Partnership Supervisor thinks of trust as something actors of interest in collaboration express through their communication and behavior, and then ‘the products act as the proof’, as he expresses it. He explains that trust has to be delivered in every single transaction of collaboration, because it is part of the overall negotiation for collaboration. It means that his employees in every instance must behave in a trustable manner that indicates that DONG Energy is reliable and fulfill their promises. They must have good experiences with DONG Energy, since things are only connected through experience. Since structure consists of codes of communication (Hernes 2008:94) this can be interpreted as structuring for trust. In the present structure of the partnerships in Germany, trust is closely connected to the





Key Account Manager and his network. However, the Key Account Managers work in teams of two and both act as contact persons, to lower the risk of losing customers, if one Key Account Manager for some reason leaves the organization.

The Key Account Manager is not a partner but he represents a partner. The Partnership Manager explains that the work they perform is too complex for one actor to be partner and stresses that it is only an organization that can be a partner. With this argument he tries to take away the absolute dependency on the Key Account Managers, but nevertheless it is a risk that partners leave the partnership if their personal connection to the organization leaves DONG Energy. To the Partnership Supervisor trust is related to a combination of human factors and a supportable structure in the form of a well functioning organization, but do acknowledge the vulnerability in a business model relying on connections between representatives of organizations. The structure of the organization becomes supporting for the overall feeling of trust and reliability in the collaboration, which serves as an argument for the structure as signifying entity to be part of the collaboration. The structure of communication, delivery, promises is recognized as an entity of matter, brought into being through processes and influence the entire collaboration (Hernes 2008:30).

*"Trust is created between humans and only through humans, and is backed by transactions. But for the humans to gain trust they also need a well functioning organization behind them – especially in the Energy Business. One example is that we are a producer, we have our own gas, which is an underlying security, because we do not need to go out and buy it"* (Interview 3:3).

DONG Energy differs from many of its competitors by being small and flexible because they have their own supply of gas, and especially the flexibility makes them attractive for the City Gas Plants and make the partnership model relevant, since it is possible to create a common vision with the City Gas Plants. The common vision is made comprehensible as a soft part of the contract, hinting that if anything unforeseen happens the partner can come and talk and the parties will sort out the problem. If a City Gas plant has accepted to buy a minimum quota of gas for one year and the winter is warm, the Partnership Supervisor explains that it makes no sense for the Partnership Supervisor to force the partner to pay just because they have signed a contract. Instead they rearrange the contract to see if the plant can buy the quota next year or make some other solution. Because the contract is oriented towards collaboration, the sale of gas is considered a partnership. It is flexibility and acknowledgement of the context for selling energy as unpredictable, making the soft contracts a negotiation tool for handling the future in a very competitive market.





*"It is all about signaling that we approach the deal in a partnership way. It is not absolute that we build the partnership on something definite" (Interview 3:11).*

### ***The story about the future***

DONG Energy has wide plans of expansion in a near future, and without revealing any details others than they are busy, the Partnership Supervisor tells that they will have to systemize their information and their partnerships.

*"In our next wave, after an intro-period of a couple of years, we need to systemize more. Otherwise it will manually become too heavy remembering it all. We must maintain the close contact and the flexibility with the customers, and that is going to be an art" (Interview 3:14).*

The Partnership Supervisor hints that the partnership with some of the smaller City Gas Plants has not been as good a business as expected and that their business model might need some small adjustments in the direction of larger organizations, since it is resource demanding to have many small partnerships. This direction points towards what he designates as a more systematic and professional fashion, hence it is not only Key Account Manager 1, 2 and 3 it all relies on. In a Weick perspective this involves the risk of changing the open, flexible structure that has been a success, because one of the ironies of successful organizational design is that its effectiveness makes redesign and learning more difficult (Weick 2001:81).

The Partnership Supervisor has so far been the manager of continuous redesign, requiring flexibility and openness, which systemization in worst case can diminish. The challenge for the Partnership Supervisor is not to mute challenges and possibilities in the name of effective operation, but to maintain the ability for creativity and learning that is the foundation of management innovation. Connections are contingent as they are reproduced and renegotiated between entities. Since the world is fluid, connections that have reached a form of stability will change (Hernes 2008:66). The future will reveal whether the Partnership Supervisor and his department master the art of stabilizing the fluid for meaningful connections.

### ***Case conclusions***

Negotiation and networking with the purpose of trust is the underlying theme in this case, which among many things illustrate how complex the social processes of interaction are. The collaborations are tangled relationships of human and physical factors which shape each other in constant interaction (Hernes 2008:34). The description of processes is very present in the case and opposite the two previous cases, collaborations is not described as entirely linear, but as a web of activities in





which the functional part of the collaboration is renewed and adjusted (Hernes 2008:63).

*“To these City Gas Plants trust is extremely important. It is so important that it is here you begin to work. First you say that you have some good prices and that we are dreadfully flexible – and that sounds okay. Then you work with trust – and you spend a long long time on that – to build the trust-factor. Then suddenly there comes a contract and you deliver and you say ‘that went okay – do we have something that points to the future?’” (Interview 3:12).*

The difficulties of describing the actual process of negotiation and networking, which both management and negotiation literature seem to suffer from, stands out in this case, since negotiation probably is far more complex from the outside, and far more multifaceted to articulate, than to the Key Account Manager in the middle of a flux of potentiality, who has a subjective framework to make sense of the mess with. The Key Account Managers and the Partnership Supervisor make sense of the situation by creating an intuitive a pattern of action, since nothing would be likely to take place if they did not (Hernes 2008:128). Hence, it seems more difficult to describe the process than to process it. Nevertheless, it is important not to leave the social interaction of organizations to some black boxes of intuition and talent, but maintain that negotiation requires careful preparation, as aligning interests, connecting with relevant entities and continuing to do so, changing practice to context and structuring the communication and thereby putting the negotiation infrastructure in place (Ertel 1999:64).

The relationships described in this case are moved away from the attributes of market relationship (Dyer and Singh 1998:662) and DONG Energy has redefined their connection to customers, suppliers and competitors into collaborative connections, connecting the entities into networks (Nohria 1992:2). Furthermore, the Partnership Supervisor has tried to understand the other side, but also to be understood by the other side. It requires empathic listening to understand the other actor's frame of reference (Fisher and Ury 1999:43). The Partnership Supervisor was open to new solutions, due to the justifying experience of the German Director, listening to environment and his intuition about this strategy of inside networking. He sat aside some of his previous experience with partnerships to enable management innovation, a situation of organizing that is never tidy or predictable.





## Chapter 6 - Conclusions and implications

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The purpose of this thesis has been to understand how organizational actors make sense of negotiation, with the purpose of gaining further understanding of the role of this important tool in the process of collaboration. The premise has been that organizational actors need to connect to and collaborate with other actors and entities to gain access to relevant resources and apply these in an optimal fashion. This is a highly complex process, characterized by a constant state of negotiation. It has been argued throughout this thesis that negotiation is present in every interaction between actors and that the content of these negotiations is guided by actor's sensemaking. This chapter is divided into; a summary of the theoretical framework presented, three overall conclusions derived from applying the theory to the three cases in the Energy sector and finally, the some implications of the conclusions.

### The theoretical framework presented

Process theory presents collaborating as complex, unpredictable and continuous, in opposition to traditional management theory, which is focused on planning, strategy, rational decision making and a normative account of organizations. The present thesis describes a process analysis of how organizational actors approach collaborating with continuous change as a premise rather than taking on the traditional perception of change as a necessary evil that is problematic.

It is suggested in Chapter 3 that sourcing and securing resources in a broad perspective is the critical task of management, and that changed market circumstances have changed this task. Organizational actors need to handle interdependency of other actors and the constant need of connecting with the contextual time of the organization. The task of managing the continuous connection processes have been termed management innovation, which is the constant bundling and un-bundling of resources in unforeseen patterns. Accepting that management innovation is part of organizational sourcing includes the acknowledgement of uncertainty and experimentation. Management innovation allows actors to be open to new circumstances emerging from new connections, new interests and new contexts.

In Chapter 4 it is presented that one way to guide and control the process of management innovation in the form of collaborating is through well-prepared integrative negotiations. Negotiation is presented as a tool for gaining influence and as an essential part of sourcing and management innovation in the continuous process of directing collaborations towards success. The process of directing





collaboration is understood as connecting with relevant entities, such as money, technology, knowledge, political influence, trust and actors with other connections, which can bring the process to some state of temporary stability. The temporary stability is the situations where connecting entities have succeeded in inventing or building a kind of entity or product that satisfy a need in time. However, the entity or product will need to emerge with the flux of connecting entities that surrounds it, in order to keep on being successful.

### Three overall conclusions

The cases have been outlined to show the respondent's sensemaking of a multitude of influencing entities in collaboration, as the negotiation about which direction to follow, which entities to attach to the project and which stories to derive from these actions. Three overall conclusions can be drawn from the analysis representing all three cases.

**Conclusion #1** derived from the thesis is that the respondents recognize that organizational becoming is a relational process. It is of interest to understand how the respondents perceive the amount of complexity and uncertainty associated with collaborating, i.e. how they express the continued act of negotiation. Throughout the cases, it is clear that negotiations are indeed an integral part of the collaboration process, and that associated complexities are handled very straightforward as challenges rather than as paralyzing obstacles. The respondents are well aware of the need for connecting and networking, and in most instances perform it well. However, it is only the Partnership Supervisor from Case 3 that articulates actions of connecting as negotiation, and it is a common characteristic of the interviews that the term network is only used when directly asked about it. Actions of connecting are apparently difficult to articulate and to some extent it seems like relationships between actors were established on an ad hoc basis - and based on intuition and existing network, rather than a well-planned strategy. Nevertheless, it is not the way the respondents express it. Consequences are by the respondents in retrospect outlined as clearly planned and prepared for, as the CEO of Wave Star in his story about getting an investor. However, he does not explain how the connection was established in the first place.

This questions how well prepared the respondents were in their attempt to connect with attractive entities and it questions the outcome of the processes of collaboration. The risk of not preparing properly is that connections are not made with relevant entities, but only to well-known ones because it is safe and convenient. This





enhances the risk of collaborating entities not articulating interests properly and therefore working with different perceptions of goals, priorities and deadlines. The lack of articulation concerning negotiation in the respondent's answers, confirm that there may be room for new perceptions on negotiation in management situations to identify mutual and beneficial interests on a continuous basis.

**Conclusion #2** is that respondent's exhibit momentary acceptance of uncertainty. Uncertainty is accepted in the first phases of collaboration as a circumstance; in line with an entrepreneurial acceptance of risk as a premise for new adventures. Later on, attempts are made to limit this uncertainty as much as possible, in order to be able to plan and control the process in the future. In the respondents' articulation of collaborating, the continuous processes of negotiation disappears from the language and relationships become formed for good and negotiations settled. The respondents accept that collaborating initially is complex, but forget that it keeps on being complex. Retrospectively, they construct rational arguments and linear plans to present to their executives even though there are elements in their answers acknowledging that the system is not rational. The Partnership Manager from case 2 describes how the partnerships have undergone a process of experimentation, which obviously is not the way to run a project in his interpretation. What he might fail to see in retrospect is that the experiments, the false starts and the corrections enabled him to learn and improve in the first place (Weick 2001:38). Both respondents from DONG Energy may expose themselves to the risk of forgetting the false starts and the corrections in future partnerships. They both express a need for further structuring of relationships and systemization, and maybe forgetting the unpredictable connections that brought them so far (Chia 2002:866). The respondents apply a facade of rationality to their negotiations, thus trying to justify the non-controllable aspects of actors interacting, stressing interdependence and planned social events as way to secure the behavior of other actors. This is most likely true, but it is hard to predict. However, as one implication of the thesis will highlight, sensemaking is also what makes it possible for actors to act. One implication of a momentary acceptance of uncertainty may be that organizational actors perceive negotiations to be finished by the signing of a contract, which can be said to be a fundamental flaw in the understanding of collaboration.

**Conclusion #3** is that respondents in general do not perceive any paradoxes in collaborating. The lack of perceived paradoxes relates to how the actors seek to stabilize the rather unstable and dynamic hybrid situation of collaborating, and in general the cases confirm the theory of sensemaking (Weick et al. 2005:410). To the





CEO of Wave Star the outcome of his actions seems so obvious that he cannot imagine any other. His answer indicates that he understands trust and interdependency as stable, anchored to his superior product. Furthermore, he gives the impression that the negotiation of the connections with entities as an establishing event, not the continuation of the relationship. The Partnership Manager from case 2 makes sense of his own actions through expressions of control and rationality, and any conflicts are resolved through dialogue between two rational partners. The Partnership Supervisor from case 3 differs in his explanations since he has been forced to change his initial strategy, and he describes collaborating with partners as unpredictable. In order to take advantage of the City Gas Plants as allies, who were more powerful than expected, it was clear that a redefinition of collaborating had to be accepted.

According to the respondents, which entities to connect with are determined by distinct analysis and networking. The process of collaboration is governed by trust and interdependency and less by contracts and control. The relationship between actors are negotiated through actions on both sides on an ongoing basis – at least until a contract is signed. Their perception is that if any problems occur, they know how to handle them. In general, the respondents prepare and analyze in their attempt to connect with other entities, and make considerations with regard to the other side's interests. Furthermore, they seek to make themselves attractive on the basis of that analysis. The confidence they express is a product of their sensemaking, enabling them to negotiate, connect and collaborate in their contextual time.

## Implications

The momentary acceptance of uncertainty by the respondents demonstrates that collaborating actors act within different rationalities, namely between a decision making oriented regime and a network oriented regime. The emergent, non-linear character of collaborating confronts interacting actors with challenges that point beyond the traditional mode of decision-making (Hansson et al. 2009:18). In the interviews the respondents seek to express themselves in linear patterns, making sense of their actions within a frame of reason. However, especially case 3 reveals that actions have been taken on a here-and-now basis, where the respondent had to adapt to the emerging context, showing how actors negotiate and justify process direction as it suits the situation. The argument of this thesis is that respondents need to remember the importance of connecting and the maintenance of relationship, and not only focus on reports and results as control mechanisms for further collaboration.





Additionally, it is suggested that better preparation will facilitate better adaptation in processes of continuous negotiations.

Organizational entities rely on the sensemaking activities of their actors, who continually renegotiate the meanings of organizational processes and goals through practical actions (Webb 2006:31). Meanings emerge and become re-negotiated as current projects and goals evolve. The important point is that sensemaking is an activity in which many possible meanings may need to be synthesized, because many different projects are under way at the time of reflection (Weick 1995:27). This means that thanks to sensemaking, actors are capable of transcending borders of different rationalities, in order to trust and control partners in the same situations. *"Similar to a puzzle picture, you can only see one of the pictures at a time, (e.g., the young woman in fur, or the old witch with the scarf around her head) but the other picture exists all the time, though it only creates meaning when focused"* (Mønsted 2007:23). Retrospective sensemaking allows actors to structure and re-create what actors perceive as reality on a continuous basis, since several possible meanings may become synthesized in the negotiation about meaning, and about which picture to stand out. Cross-disciplinary thinking is the basis of negotiation in order to make the world work.

In a process view, changes are not accomplished from one day to another, they are emergent accomplishments and illustrate how flows of connected ideas, actions and outcomes perpetually interact and change in action (Tsoukas and Chia 2002:568). The cases offer small peephole into the world of connecting, through negotiation and directed by sensemaking, revealing the potentiality of connecting entities, but also the brittleness. The cases illustrate a lack of appropriate language for the processes involved in collaborating. The respondents possess a language for planning and justifying, but miss a language for action, failure and uncertainty, i.e. a language capable of articulating what happens between "the boxes" of temporary stability, in the processes of connecting with other actors. It is the suggestion of this thesis that collaborating might benefit from a language capturing processes of relationship and interaction. This language would be able to acknowledge the important role of continuous negotiations and the inherent instability of collaborating. A more appropriate language for managing processes of collaborating towards successful outcomes would be in terms of management innovation, as a process of directing the hybrid of collaborating into temporally stabilizing connections of entities. But the direction should not be set towards any kind of stabilized connection, as one of the main points of this thesis, but for the one looking most successful and where





resources are best spent. If actors prepare properly, negotiation is the influence tool for directing processes and connecting entities into justified bundles of meaning. In this process, negotiation is about creativity and sensibility to the contextual time, being open to new possibilities and seeing them, identifying the interests of others and of oneself – and enabling the collaboration to serve these interests in an optimal fashion. Negotiation is indeed a discipline of action, in a tangled process of re-action and pro-action.





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
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## **Interview med CSB, Partnership Manager ved DONG Energy afdeling Sales and Distribution d. 28 januar 2009.**

**Lokation: DONG Energys hovedkontor i Gentofte, Nesa allé 1**

**Interviewere: Nikolaj Tofte Brenneche og Christine Thalsgård Henriques**

Indledende fortæller CSB at han i november 2008 deltog i en partnerskabskonference ved CBS, og fandt det interessant at Partnerskaber, som tidligere var en del af organisationsteorien, nu har fået sit eget felt.

*Christine fortæller kort om sit studie og speciale, hvilket får CSB til at sige;*

”Jeg tror det er meget tilfældigt hvordan partnerskaber rent faktisk opstår – også selvom det er nogle meget vigtige partnerskaber. Vi (CSBs afdeling) laver en type partnerskaber, men vi laver også andre strategiske alliance” (00:03:45)

Han nævner samarbejdet med Better Place og elbilen som en strategisk alliance DONG som energiselskab har en interesse i, og han nævner Epicon, der er deres andengenerations bioethanolanlæg, som er skabt i samarbejde med flere andre virksomheder(00:04.25).

”DONG har en lang tradition for at samarbejde med andre olieproducenter ude i Nordsøen, hvilket er en anden type kontrakter man laver der, men det er i principippet også en stærk alliance der skal til at drive sådan et felt, med en meget kompleks teknologi” (00:04:45)

”Når vi etablerer vindmølleparkere der er et leverandørforhold der nok er tættere end hvis det blot er en enkelt komponent man får ind, og når det er investeringer i milliardklassen er det også tit at man har en medinvestor inde, som vi har i projektet London Array, hvor E.On er ved at trække sig, hvilket stiller de andre partnere i en vanskelig situation – så der skal man selvfølgelig vælge sine samarbejdspartnere med omhu”(00:05:19) ”Det er hele tiden et spørgsmål om hvor meget indflydelse man vil have på et projekt” (00:05:24)

DONG har ikke en samlet afdeling, som kigger på tværs gennem hele DONG, og beskæftiger sig med strategiske alliance, men har mange forskellige typer af alliance og den afdeling som CSB sidder i, beskæftiger sig mest med kundeforhold.

*På spørgsmålet om hvad termen klima-partnerskab refererer til, om det er forskning i vedvarende energi eller optimering af eksisterende kunders energiforbrug;*

”Nej, vi koncentrerer os bredt om at få etableret en fælles vision for vores partnere, hvor vi analyserer hvad de har behov for og hvilke virkemidler vi har i DONG som vi kan bringe i spil. Hvis vi finder ud af, gennem dialogen, at vores partnere har en eller anden indtægt eller noget teknologi som vi kan bringe i spil, så har vi en tæt kontakt til vores R&D afdeling, og så er det noget med at knytte nogen kontakter der” (00:07:00).

”I og med vi er ude og snakke med virksomhederne får vi også nogle kontaktpersoner som vi kan bringe ind i huset. Og internt fra vores R&D afdeling får vi også nogle tip om virksomheder vi bør følge op på” (00:07:19)

*På spørgsmålet om hvem der tager den første kontakt;*

”Det er meget forskelligt. Kontakterne kan komme på mange måder. Enten at vi er opsøgende

fordi vi læser om en virksomhed der har gang i et eller andet, som vi synes lyder interessant, og derfor gerne vil høre om der er mulighed for bygge noget på eller få andre ting i spil. Det kan også være Anders Eldrup (DONG Energys direktør. red) der har været ude og snakke med en anden direktør og tænker at der må være noget i det her område, uden nødvendigvis at vide hvad. Så tager vi kontakt med de relevante personer i virksomheden og prøver at få afdækket mulighederne for at lave et samarbejde” (00:08:03)

*På spørgsmål til hvad der forstås ved en kunde;*

”Novo Nordisk er vores første klima-partner, og de er en kunde, fordi vi ikke har en eller anden fælles teknologi vi samarbejder om. Det kan godt være at som arbejdet skrider frem så kan vi udvikle noget genialt til medicinalindustrien, men betalingsforholdet går fra Novo til DONG” (00:09:16).

Det første klimapartnerskab som DONG etablerede var med Novo i maj 2007 allerede inden DONG havde udviklet en afdeling der tog sig af det. Det var det partnerskab der inspirerede dem til at lave selve afdelingen. Det var Novo der henvendte sig til DONG, ca. på samme tidspunkt som selskabet var ved at blive etableret (som en fusion mellem 6 andre selskaber. red), så der var ikke en kommunikation på tværs gennem selskabet som der er i dag. Novo var interesseret i hvordan de kunne bygge vindmøller og reducere deres elforbrug.

Novo havde indgået et partnerskab med WWF som partnersaver og de havde sat sig for at reducere deres energiforbrug, og derfor skulle de finde ud af hvordan de kunne konvertere noget af deres energiforbrug til vedvarende energi (00:10:52).

”Det var svært at finde ud af hvordan de skulle gå ind i sådan et forhold, skulle de være medejere af en vindmøllepark eller skulle de eller hvordan skulle konstellationen være” (00:11:04).

Chefen for forretningsudvikling og en person fra Novo fandt så på modellen, at man kunne benytte de penge man sparede på energibesparelserne til at investere i vedvarende energi – eksempelvis ved at bygge en vindmølle park.

”Den park er ved at blive etableret nu, men på daværende tidspunkt da man indgik samarbejdet, var det ikke helt besluttet fordi økonomien i projektet ikke så, så lovende ud. Men Novo sagde ja til at være med til at bygge den – og selvom man selvfølgelig ikke kan sige at parken aldrig var blevet etableret, så har det været med til at hjælpe beslutningerne på vej” (00:12:01).

*På kommentaren om at partnerskabet derved bliver gensidigt i ydelse;*

”Vi bidrager med energirådgivere der går ude hos Novo Nordisk, som ikke er timeaflønnede, og de indrapporterer de energibesparelser som de finder derude. Som netselskab, som DONG også er, har vi en forpligtelse til at reducere vores energiforbrug i forhold til Kyoto-aftalen (i Danmark under Energispareaftalen.red), og det er en måde at realisere det”

”Dong skal spare 144 kWh på et år, hvilket svarer til forbruget i Københavns lufthavn og andre netselskaber skal spare lidt mindre”

På spørgsmålet om hvad der sker hvis DONG ikke lever op til aftalen, mener CSB at de vil blive straffet på en eller anden måde, men ved ikke lige hvordan. Netselskaberne handler disse besparelser imellem sig, og nogen netselskaber køber bare besparelserne fordi de ikke har en rådgivningsafdeling som kan hjælpe dem med det. (00:13:42) Forpligtelsen ligger hos

netselskabet og så må de selv finde ud af hvordan det bliver gennemført

”Derfor hjælper Novo os, i og med de giver os adgang til nogle ret store produktionsfaciliteter kan vi realisere nogle besparelser som så hjælper os med at overholde aftalen. Og vi hjælper Novo med at reducere deres energiforbrug med 10 % over en 10-årig periode inklusiv vækst” (00:14:20).

”Det ser ud som om målet bliver nået allerede i år, og det viser at det betyder noget at man får nogle folk ud der alene kan fokusere på energibesparelser og at de så arbejder tæt sammen med dem der kender produktionsprocesserne. For Novo har nogle rigtige dygtige folk, men de har hele tiden tænkt på at optimere deres produktion af insulinpinde og haft et mindre fokus på energibesparelser” (00:15:10).

”Det at vi arbejder ud fra en fælles vision og har nogle klare mål, det gør at vi, altså DONG og Novo arbejder i samme retning. Og det er ikke altid man ser det. Hos Novo samarbejder man med hele organisationen, hvorimod man andre steder kan komme ud på et produktionsite og blive modarbejdet. Det er ikke tilfældet hos Novo” (00:15:39)

*På opfordringen til at uddybe de udfordrende elementer i et klimapartnerskab;*

”De udfordrende elementer er først og fremmest etableringen af aftalen og der er vi nødt til at få den forankret så højt i organisationen som muligt. Hvis vi ikke kan det vil kunden ikke nødvendigvis gennemføre de investeringer i energibesparelser som skal til, og så vi skal have forhandlet os vej hele vejen til toppen. Andre gange er det let fordi Anders Eldrup allerede har talt med direktøren og så er det ligesom det”(00:16:22)

”Nogen gange sidder man med en ildsjæl i en virksomhed, som ikke har mulighed for at træffe de væsentlige beslutninger, og så skal vi finde ud af sammen med vedkommende hvordan han får sendt budskabet videre op gennem organisationen” (00:16:42).

”Vi er i dialog med denne person, for han kender organisationen, så vi forsøger at give ham hvad han har brug for til at komme videre. Hvis det eksempelvis er et økonomisk spørgsmål, så laver vi et forecast på hvad der skal til af investeringer, med det kendskab vi har til energibesparelsespotentialet, altså hvad for energibesparelser man kan forvente, og hvad kan man forvente af omkostninger til at købe vedvarende energi eller etablere noget vedvarende energi. Vi stiller alle tallene op så de har noget at træffe beslutninger ud fra” (00:17:24)

”Vores grundide er at bruge energibesparelserne som motoren i et partnerskab, fordi det skaber et økonomisk råderum der kan finansiere det næste. Vi kan ikke få det til at gå lige op fra start af, fordi der skal en investering til for at opnå energibesparelser, men over tid vil vi påvise at der er en positiv nutidsværdi ved at gå ind i det her. Og det er uden at regne ind hvilken omdømme effekt det får for at afsætte produkter” (00:17:56)

CSB påpeger at Novo Nordisk gennem deres samarbejde har fået en del positiv medieomtale og mulighed for at profilere sig anderledes end ellers.

*På kommentaren om at Novo Nordisk er en særlig virksomhed med et særligt overskud hvad det angår Corporate communication;*

”Vi har en kommunikationsafdeling i DONG som, efter at vi har fået erfaring med det, når vi

indgår en aftale hjælper vores partnere til at komme ud med et budskab omkring hvad det er de gør, og ikke mindst sørger for at det budskab som de sender, er identisk med det budskab som vores vi sender”(00:18:58).

”Vi bruger også det her til at brande DONG på – og det skal vi også gøre” (00:19:12)

*På spørgsmålet om hvad CSB fornemmer, er den primære motivation hos virksomhederne til at søge og indgå samarbejde;*

”Mange gange er det CSR, for har virksomhederne ikke allerede en CSR afdeling kan de godt blive presset af deres kunder til at vise at de gør noget” (00:19:42)

CSB nævner en emballage virksomhed som han snart skal besøge, der mærker efterspørgslen meget markant, specielt fordi mange af deres kunder er fra England, hvor CSB mener at de er et skridt længere fremme på CSR fronten end vi er i Danmark (00:19:58). England er speciel på den måde at de har en meget stor velgørenhedstradition og der en tendens til at supermarkederne går foran i klimakampen og stiller krav til deres leverandører. Og det stiller krav til emballagen (00:21:18). CSB fortæller yderligere at i England, mod Danmarks 20 %, er det kun 5 % af energi produktionen der kommer fra vedvarende energi, og det er måske med til at forbrugerne stiller ekstra høje krav til producenter – også for at kunne lægge et politisk pres.

”Det bliver indirekte en økonomisk motivation, hvis virksomhederne ikke kan afsætte deres produkter, fordi de ikke har en strategi på området” (00:21:53)

”Til dem der bare siger at de skal have skabt et økonomisk råderum som de kan investere i deres egen forretning, der laver vi et klimapartnerskab, hvor vi går ind med vores energirådgivere og finder besparelserne og vores salgsafdeling hjælper dem med en indkøbsstrategi i forhold til deres energi indkøb og optimere det” (00:22:18).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan partnerskabet stadfæstes;*

”Et klimapartnerskab består af en rammeaftale, hvor vi finder ud af hvad der er vores fælles vision og hvad for konkrete mål vi skal nå og hvornår skal de nås. Hvad er det for virkemidler vi skal bruge for at nå de mål (00:23:07)? Det er typisk noget energirådgivning, det kan være deres affaldsstrømme, det er noget nyt der blevet åbnet for med det nye affaldsdirektiv, at vi kan medforbrænde affald på vores kraftværker og derved fortrænge den fossile del af brændslerne. Vi kan kigge på deres transport, hvor vi har elbiler, vi kan kigge på biogas og lave en meget ren form for naturgas der i sig selv er CO<sub>2</sub> neutral (00:23:45). Vi kan kigge på forskellige former for vedvarende energi som solceller, solfangere og i principippet også etableringen af vedvarende energi, hvor de kan købe sig ind i en vindmøllepark”

”Vi kan kigge på opvarmning med geotermisk varmt vand, der har vi i dag to anlæg. Der kan eksempelvis være kommuner der ligger gunstigt i forhold til det og kan være interesseret i at lave sådan et anlæg og det kan vi hjælpe med.” (00:24:24)

”I principippet trækker vi på alle de kompetencer der er rundt omkring i DONG, hvor man tidligere bare var interesseret i at arbejde med den tekniske og DONG selv investerede i energi, så har vi nu mulighed for at tage en partner med ind der enten kan aftage produktet eller gå med som ejere” (00:24:50).

*På spørgsmål til om CO2 kvoter spiller nogen rolle;*

CSB siger at det er lidt ved siden af, fordi DONG har en selvstændig afdeling der handler med kvoter. Han fortæller at DONG aftager ca. en tredjedel af Danmarks CO2 kvoter, og at det at udlede et tons CO2 koster ca. 200 kr. – men nøjes med at sige at DONG udleder er stor mængde! DONG får tildelt en række kvoter, som indirekte er et tilskud, for de kunne sælge det videre hvis de lod være med at producere. Det gør de så ikke med han ligger ikke skjul på at det er et vist spil om man skal bruge sine kvoter, eller dem dyrt videre og købe andre billigt. Derfor er de også meget opmærksomhed på projekter der frigør CO2 kvoter, der så kan bruges andetsteds. Det er kun de største produktionsvirksomheder der er omfattet af CO2 kvoter (00:26:50).

*På spørgsmål om hvad der sker hvis DONG's partner ikke lever op til deres forpligtelser;*

”Vi laver en rammeaftale – der vel er en form for hensigtserklæring hvor der ikke er nogen sanktionsmuligheder – men under rammeaftalen ligger en række helt konkret aftale omkring energirådgivning, som er forskellig fra virksomheder til kommuner. Hvis det er en kommune er vi nødt til at tage en timebetaling, af hensyn til deres udbudspligt, men vi betaler så også for de besparelser som vi henter hos kommunerne, så de får en gevinst tilbage” (00:29:05).

”Når vi arbejder med virksomheder, har vi mulighed for at indberette de besparelser som vi kan påpege – og det er selvfølgelig et problem hvis vi har fundet en masse steder i virksomheden hvor de kan spare og de så alligevel ikke vil prioritere det og det kan så blive et brud i forhold til partnerskabet – for så fungere det ikke” (00:29:33)

*På spørgsmålet om hvad der så sker:*

”Vi har muligheden for at reagere gennem den projektorganisation vi sætter op, og der har vi en partnerskabsgruppe der består af direktørerne. Det vil typisk være noget der løses på direktionsniveau, så hvis der sidder en sur indkøber et eller andet sted, måske en energi ansvarlig der ikke synes der er budget til det, så vender vi det en tur med direktøren. Og hvis det så ikke kan løses på direktionsniveau, så må det afsluttes. Vi kan ikke tvinge vores kunder til noget. Det skulle gerne gøres ud fra at det er en fornuftig beslutning” (00:30:30).

”Hvis det er sådan at der opstår en konflikt af en eller anden art, bliver den løst fordi vi har en organisation til det, og hvis det er sådan er der ude i verden sker noget at kunden pludselig ændre fokus så må man jo stoppe samarbejdet i god ro og orden eller lade det være hvilende. Det hele bliver faktisk løst meget smidigt gennem den dialog der er” (00:31:02).

*På kommentaren om at betydningen af at have opbakning fra direktørerne er afgørende;*

CSB siger at det er afgørende og at hans afdeling har god opbakning hele vejen op til direktør Anders Eldrup (00:21:30). Hvis noget går helt galt trækker de på ham, men normalt er det koncerndirektøren for Sales & Distribution der bruges i sådanne sammenhænge (00:31:42).

”Anders Eldrup har tit nævnt partnerskaberne som en måde DONG skal realisere den langsigtede strategi, i og med at vi et stykke ud i fremtiden skal levere CO2 frit strøm og energi. Og det er netop det samarbejde med at reducere energiforbruget og også bidrage til den vedvarende energi vi skal have etableret” (00:32:10).

CSB fortæller om Rex-certificater – der skal sikre at man ikke dobbeltsælger produktionen fra en

vedvarende energi. Han siger det er den smidigste måde at formidle vedvarende energi når man har et velfungerende distributionsnet som Danmark har (00:35:05).

*På spørgsmålet om DONG har partnerskaber med virksomheder der ikke har DONG som energileverandør;*

CSB fortæller at eksempelvis Vattenfall, som også leverer strøm til det danske marked, sælger strøm til et handelsselskab der formidler strømmen videre til slut-kunderne. DONG er anderledes på den måde at de både er et produktionsselskab og et handelsselskab. Han fortæller at de ikke har oplevet at der er nogen der har lavet en lignende aftale med Vattenfall, men han har oplevet nogen der havde en aftale med et andet elskab. Hvis der indgås et partnerskab med en virksomhed af denne art forestiller han sig at de sandsynligvis vil skifte udbyder til DONG, hvilket selvfølgelig vil være positivt for DONG, men han understreger at det ikke er et krav (00:36:15).

”Men i forhold til kommunikation, at de køber strøm på vores møller, men så har et andet handelsselskab, så er det jo os der sælger dem strøm, hvordan kan det hænge sammen – så skal man ud at forklare det. Men det kan sagtens hænge sammen, for det er jo ligegyldigt hvem der handler papiret” (00:36:44).

DONG har i dag 13 klimapartnerskaber, bestående af 5 kommuner og 8 større virksomheder. CSB nævner Novo Nordisk, Novozymes og KMD.

”Vi har KMD inde, som er et IT selskab, de vil gerne bruge det i forhold til deres kunder. Hvis man outsourcer serverdrift til dem, så får man i princippet ren IT, i og med de allerede har tænkt på det for deres kunder” (00:37:41)

”Vi har flere boligselskaber inde, hvor de i mange tilfælde har et lidt blakket ry, fordi der sker meget kriminalitet ude i deres områder, så vil de gerne profilere sig på en anden måde og derved tiltrække nye lejere og gøre det attraktivt for dem der bor der i forvejen, så det er ikke kun er dårlige historier der fortælles” (00:38:02)

”Tanken er at vi skal ud og gøre vores partnere attraktive for deres kunder, og det er det vi samarbejder om. Vejen dertil er gennem vores fælles vision” (00:38:25).

*På spørgsmålet om det er en del af DONGs eksisterende netværk de gør til deres klimapartnere;*

”Med de kommuner vi har inde i dag, der er det nogen vi har haft et godt samarbejde med i forvejen, men nu har vi jo kun eksisteret i et år og konceptet skal også udvikles og modnes. Dem vi er i dialog med lige er nogen der ikke nødvendigvis er en samarbejdskommune i dag” (00:38:57).

”Mange af de kommuner vi er i kontakt med i dag er nogen der har hørt om vores selskaber og vores afdeling, i gennem nogle af de af temadage og workshops der er rundt omkring om klima og energi, hvor vores idefolk har været ude” (00:39:16).

CSB fortæller at det typisk er sådan at deres ide-folk fornemmer en vis interesse fra en kommune, hvilket de fortæller til CSBs afdeling, og så kontakter Partnerskabsafdelingen kommunen for nærmere at analysere denne interesse. Ofte er en kommune meget hooked på elbiler eller lign. og så prøver CSB og hans medarbejdere at løfte den interesse op på et klima-niveau med flere

forskellige energi-optimerende tiltag (00:39:53).

*På kommentaren om, at det et samarbejde mellem forskellige afdelinger i DONG;*

”Man kan sige at det i principippet er på kryds og tværs i hele DONG. Det har taget noget tid at skabe kendskab til vores afdeling, og det er også noget selskabet skulle vænne sig til, at der kommer nogen fra Sales & Distribution og snakker med Power – fordi vi banker på hos ingeniøren for at høre hvad han har gang i” (00:40:30)

”Det positive er at vi som regel kan komme med et godt argument for hvorfor de skal affaldshåndtere i Power, som der dem der driver kraftværkerne, og derved for at de skal snakke med os. Hvis vi kan sige at vi har en kommune der er meget interesseret i at få analyseret affaldsstrømme i kommunen med henblik på at komme af med deres brændsler, så skaffer vi i principippet brændsler til Power, og så vi de gerne snakke med os” (00:41:07).

”Det er hele tiden noget med at skabe forskellige incitamenter rundt omkring, og det er faktisk lykkedes. Vi deltager i forskellige interne netværk, både i forhold til R&D og Power. Vi udveksler ideer på kryds og tværs og ser på elementer hvor der ikke umiddelbart er sammenhæng, og tænker over det en gang til” (00:41:57).

”Vi har et netværk inden for vedvarende energi hvor vi ser på hvordan vi skaffer kapital fra vores kunder og partnere, til projekter inden for vedvarende energi, hvilke modeller kan man sætte op for det. Det vi er meget interesserede i når vi skal etablerer en vindmøllepark er, hvis de kan regne et par ekstra øre ind i deres investeringskalkule, så kan det flytte projekter og vi kan give et bedre bud på vindmølleprojekter. Det kan også gøre det lettere at få demonstrationsprojekter igennem, som tit giver et stort underskud fordi formålet blot er at teste, så kan det være lettere at få igennem hvis nogen har lyst til at profilere sig på at de støtter sådan et projekt med midler” (00:42:47).

*På kommentaren om at dette billede afviser fordommen om DONG som den store energiproducent der egentlig bare producerer energi fra olie og gas, men har en lille bitte klima-afdeling som ikke nødvendigvis er en del af det store billede;*

”Det er jo det vi traditionelt har gjort og det er også det vi kommer til at gøre en periode endnu, men vi har et klart mål om at den energi vi producere skal være på den bedst mulige måde. Betingelserne for at producere CO2-fri energi i Danmark er ikke tilstede, for vi har ikke vandkraft og der er truffet beslutning om i Danmark at vi ikke vil have atomkraft, som jo er en ren form for energi med et uheldigt spildprodukt. Derfor er kul en forudsætning for en energiproduktion i Danmark” (00:44:01)

”Når kul så er forudsætningen har vi så i mange år arbejdet på at gøre det på den allerbedste måde, og vi har de mest effektive kraftværker i verden. I forhold til at producere el har vi en høj udnyttelsesgrad, men når du samtidig bruger spildvarmen, så får du en virkningsprocent der ligger på 94 %, som normalt ville ligge på 40 %. Så vi er nået rigtig langt, men vi skal ud hvor vi kan undgå at udlede CO2 og det kan vi kun vi at fyre med biomasse, herunder affald, halm, træ, vi skal fokusere på rørgrensning, hvilket er meget komplekst og dyrt, og så arbejder vi selvfølgelig med at reducere energiforbruget – så der er et klart mål for hvor vi skal hen” (00:45:30).

*På spørgsmålet om han oplever nogen prioritets-konflikter i organisationen omkring vedvarende energi og den modningsproces der skal til;*

CSB nikker genkendende til at det er modningsproces af organisationen og siger; ”Prioriteten hos dem der henter olie og gas ud i Nordsøen er at gøre det så effektivt så muligt, få tømt felterne så effektivt - og det synes jeg også de skal have lov til. Alternativet er, at vi går ud og køber olie og gas et andet sted, eksempelvis fra Rusland med de udfordringer der er der, eller som er en kapitaltilførsel til Saudi Arabien eller andre steder, hvor pengene måske er bedre placeret i Danmark” (00:46:38).

”Det er nok på kraftværkerne at den største omstilling skal ske, i forhold til folks tankesæt, de har været vant til at kul er det eneste rigtige, og man kan sige at det er de så også blevet rigtige gode til. Tidligere hørte man meget om ødelagte vandløb og syrreregn, det var tilbage i firserne hvor man havde SO<sub>4</sub> der blev udledt med røgen, og der har man fundet ud af at rense røgen for 99 % af de partikler. Nu står vi så med CO<sub>2</sub>, der også er en gasart, som vi skal finde ud at indkapsle på en eller anden måde. Så selvom de mener at kul er det brændsel der er bedst egnet til produktion af energi så må de også tænke nyt. Men vi kommer ikke udenom at vi skal bruge kul mange år fremover (00:48:02).

*På kommentaren om at DONG også investerer i kulkraftværker;*

”Det lyder så grint at man investerer i kulkraftværker, men realiteterne er at vi er de bedste til at drive dem, og derved fortrænger vi nogle af de kraftværker med en virkningsprocent på omkring 30-40 % og erstatter dem med værker med der har en virkningsgrad på 70 %, så har vi trods alt gavnet miljøet” (00:48:45)

CSB ved godt at det selvfølgelig lyder bedre at fortælle at DONG har været med til at bygge 70 % af offshore vindmølleparkerne i verden, men mener at det andet også høre med til historien. Han fortæller at de er ved at bygge verdens største offshore vindmøllepark ved Horns Rev II og mener at hvis der er noget DONG er verdensmester i så er det det, og nævner at forudsætningerne i Danmark på området har været gunstige (00:49:29).

”Vindmølleproduktionen i Danmark har haft nogle særlige vilkår i en periode, og det har været meget naturligt at det har været det vi kastede os over” (00:49:49)

”Jeg mener godt vi kan stå inde for at lave klimaaftaler på trods af at vi har kulkraftværker” (00:50:00).

*På spørgsmålet om udfordringerne i at ændre kultur og tankegang;*

”Det er en naturlig udvikling, men selvfølgelig er det en udfordring hvis man altid har arbejdet med kul, og man mener kul er det eneste rigtige, så står man over for at skulle omstille sig. I hvert fald når man skal forklare hvad det er DONG laver” (00:51:04).

*På spørgsmålet om hvor meget de møder skepsis over for klima-krisen og CO<sub>2</sub> frygten fra virksomheder og kommuner;*

”Det er ved at være i et meget beskedent omfang. De fleste har erkendt at CO<sub>2</sub> og klima-debatten har en berettigelse og at vi her i den sidste generation har udledt ekstremt meget CO<sub>2</sub> i forhold til hvad der er i naturen. Vi skal ikke ud og forsøre hvorvidt vi skal reducere CO<sub>2</sub>” (00:52:01)

”Der har været noget debat om hvorfor energibesparelser er godt, fordi det er blevet sagt, at vi

alligevel har et kvotesystem, så hvis nogen sparer bliver det bare udledt et andet sted, og det er sådan set også rigtig. Men når vi nu skal reducere vores CO2 udslip, så er det jo vigtigt at der er nogen der gør det for at det ikke bliver rigtig dyrt” (00:52:32).

CSB fortæller at energiens brancheorganisation i Danmark, Dansk Energi, har været ude at sige noget i den retning, og der har DONG været nødt til at gå i dialog dem lidt, fordi budskabet bliver misforstået, fordi folk tolker det til at det ikke kan betale sig at spare på energien. Han forklarer at det er beskedent hvor mange der egentlig forstår kvotesystemet (00:53:07). CSB synes kvotesystemet er godt for markedsudviklingen, men påpeger at udfordringen er at få sat det rigtige antal kvoter, der må ikke være for få eller for mange. Han mener det er den eneste måde vi kan reducere CO2 udslippet med 20 % i 2020(00:54:05).

”Ulempen ved kvote systemet og det at man har et mål for hvor meget vedvarende energi man vil have, så kan det være svært for en virksomhed at sige, at nu gør de noget ekstraordinært, fordi den vindmølle ville være kommet op alligevel, det er ikke en additionel vindmølle, og det er faktisk noget af det vi kæmper lidt med. Der siger vi så at hvis vi kan få et bidrag fra vores kunde, så kan vi etablere vindkraften lidt tidligere end den ellers ville være blevet, eller kan man vente til 2020 og så kommer det hele op der”  
( 00:54:55).

*På spørgsmålet omkring kommunikationen mellem partnerne;*

”Når vi etablerer et klimapartnerskab, det foregår i den afdeling jeg sidder i, Strategiske partnerskaber og jeg har en titel af partnerskabsmanager – og dvs. at jeg styrer en række partnerskaber. Det gør vi ved at vi etablerer en partnerskabsgruppe, der består af direktøren fra begge selskaber, der er yderligere en styrergruppe med nogen der er beslutningsdygtige i forhold til dagligdags ting, hvis der er nogle mindre konflikter der skal løses, så klarer vi den der (00:56:02)”.

Det er også styregruppen der planlægger møder i partnerskabsgruppen og holder møder omkring de ting man har sat i gang, at de kører som formuftigt, men også om man har identificeret nogen yderligere samarbejdsmuligheder. I alle vores partnerskaber har vi en intension om at vi skal udvikle partnerskabet, så når det kører godt med hensyn til at realisere energibesparelser og de andre projekter de er i stand, så prøver vi at finde ud af hvordan vi kan komme videre med samarbejdet, så det ikke bare er et kortere forløb på en 3-4 år, så vil vi gerne have det er en vedvarende proces der bliver sat i gang” (00:56:48)

”Under styregruppen er der en projektkoordinator fra hver part. Det er vores (Strategiske Partnerskaber. red) arbejde at koordinere direkte med en fra vores partner. For eksempel i Fredericia Kommune, der sidder den tekniske direktør i styregruppen, men han er meget svær at få fat i og det fungerer ikke rigtig. De har derfor en projektkoordinator som vi har en hotline til (00:57:27).

”I sidste uge da vi købte os ind i Litium Balance, et lille selskab der laver batteristylesystemer, der havde vi et projekt hvor vi kunne søge midler fra Energistyrelsen til Elbiler, så var det bare at ringe til vores direkte kontakt og sige, ’nu har vi det her – er I interesserede?’ og der fandt vi så ud af hvad de skulle bruge og inden for en uge havde vi hvor mange biler de skulle bruge og vi havde også fået sendt ansøgningen” (00:58:00).

*På spørgsmålet om hvem der står for at tage kontakt;*

Jeg kontakter dem hvis jeg finder ud af at der noget vi skal reagere på og de kontakter mig hvis der er noget” (00:58:20).

*På spørgsmålet om der er nogen afrapporteringsaftaler;*

”Det handler jo om at drive partnerskaberne og det er en nyere ting. Vi har brugt det sidste år på at få etableret partnerskaberne og få en struktur på, og nu skal vi så i gang med det at få struktur på at drive dem” (00:58:56).

”Partnerskaberne vil blive drevet som et projekt med et professionelt projektstyringsværktøj med milestones og månedlige rapporteringer osv. Det er af hensyn til situationen hvor byrådet kommer og spørger hvordan det går, så er det noget materiale at fremlægge. Der skal ligge en rapport, og så kan vi også få synliggjort hvis vi mangler en leverance fra kunden. I stedet for at der opstår en dårlig forbindelse fordi vi skal ud og presse kunden, kan vi sige at det var det her der var aftalen. Og sådan kører alle fornuftigt drevet projekter vel!” (00:59:43).

*På spørgsmålet om at der altså bliver etableret en form for kontrolmekanisme;*

”Ja – og ellers har vi kørt med de her styregruppemøder hvor problemer er blevet vendt der, men nu har vi fået nogle værktøjer som skal implementeres, hvor vi laver den her månedlige afrapportering. Det prøver i hvert fald i starten, det kan også være det er en kvartalsmæssig frekvens vi skal have, det må vi prøve os frem med” (01:00:11).

”Når vi har energirådgivere ude er der noget at rapportere hele tiden, men der kan være andre typer projekter. Hvis tager Fredericia igen, der kigger vi på deres rensningsanlæg, med hensyn til optimering af deres energiforbrug men også med hensyn til den produktion af biogas der er derude, den kigger vi på så der bliver produceret mere biogas og så vil vi gerne opgradere den biogas til naturgas kvalitet og så er det meningen at deres bybusser skal køre på den gas” (01:00:58)

”Det er et projekt hvor tingene sker lidt i ryk, vi har selvfølgelig nogle milestones vi skal nå, altså hvornår skal tilbuddet med bybusserne være klar, hvor ligger konsulentrapporterne klar og det giver ikke mening at lave en månedlig rapportering på det. Vi prøver at gøre tingene fleksibelt og ikke bare for at lave det, og det hele forgår i god dialog med vores partner – det er ikke en hyldevare vi nødvendigvis sælger” (01:02:58).

”Som vi får etableret nogle flere partnerskaber, får vi også nogle flere erfaringer som vi kan trække på” (01:03:07)

*På spørgsmålet om niveauet for tillid og niveauet for kontrol;*

”Når vi har en delaftale om noget, så er der et kontraktligt forhold der binder, og så sørger vi for at hvis vi mangler en rapportering, oplysninger eller en leverance, så bliver det synliggjort i en rapport.”

*På spørgsmålet om kontraktens funktion og sanktionsmuligheder eller bøder;*

”Nej – vi har ikke aftalt bøder. Det er for at få folk i organisationen til at reagere vi har den, for

selv om vi laver en aftale og den er placeret højt i organisationen, så sidder der en mand længere nede i afdelingen, som skal effektuere det vi er blevet enige om. Hvis han ikke er enig, eller hvis han ikke leverer, kan det få hele partnerskabet til at slingre, så det er en måde at følge op på hele vejen ned gennem organisationen, sådan så vi får de leverancer der skal til og ikke står til et møde med direktørerne og skal forklare hvorfor vi ikke fik det vi skulle. Derved er det ikke os der skal bortforklare noget og den anden part vil sige at der aldrig blev spurt osv.” (01:04:40)

”Det handler om at kunne pege på hvor det er der er en konflikt, og man kan reagere på det tidligt i stedet for at det kun er en gang i kvartalet at der bliver snakket sammen” (01:04:58).

*På kommentaren om at det vel også er en gardering imod modarbejdelse;*

”Vi har været utsat for modarbejdelse, og der bruger vi projektorganisationen. Der har jeg haft en direktør til at slå i bordet hos en partner. Derefter retter vi selvfølgelig ind for at genoprette den gode tone og med gode argumenter for at et partnerskab hænger sådan og sådan sammen og derfor giver det god mening at gøre sådan og sådan” (01:05:32).

Der bliver snakket lidt om performance management systemer i relation til at få medarbejderne til at prioritere partnerskaber og CSB fortæller at Novo har været meget fremme i skoene mht. til det, men understreger også at det langtfra er alle der har det commitment hele vejen rundt som Novo har (01:06:48).

*På spørgsmålet om de laver en kulturanalyse af deres kommende partnere;*

”Vi laver ikke en egentlig kulturanalyse, men vi sørger for at få et godt kendskab til vores partnere fordi vi har en god dialog med dem. De partnere jeg koordinerer, dem kender jeg godt og man har fået det her fortrolige forhold, hvor de også afslører nogle ting og det er det vi bruger” (01:07:52)

”Tilliden betyder meget, fordi vi ved hvem vi kan ringe til og hvornår og hvad vi kan sige til dem. Hvis der et problem et eller andet sted i samarbejdet er det rart at vide hvordan man kan sige det til vedkommende. Der er nogen der vil have tingene direkte og der er nogen hvor vi er nødt til at sige det på en anden måde, der skal man kende personen” (01:08:25).

”Det jeg synes vi får afsløret er hvis der for eksempel er en indkøbschef der modarbejder, så kan jeg ringe til min kontakt person, der så kan fortælle at denne person måske hele tiden har været imod. På den måde får jeg noget intern historik, som jeg ellers ikke ville have adgang til, som ofte giver mening og gør det nemmere at få tingene løst” (01:08:52).

*På den begejstrede kommentar om hvor værdifuld den slags viden er;*

”Netop, og min opgave internt i DONG består i at kommunikere det ud til dem der kører de forskellige projekter, at grunden til at det og det ikke er blevet gjort, er fordi sådan og sådan. Det er også derfor at jeg tror partnerskaber er vejen frem, frem for sådan en død helt almindelig salgssituation hvor man kun ses en gang om året for at forhandle kontrakter og så er man ude af døren igen” (01:09:35).

CSB tilføjer;

”Og det bliver betragtet som vigtigt når man har direktøren med” (01:09:42)

*På spørgsmålet om betydningen af fysisk nærhed i partnerskabsrelationen;*

”Jeg har været en hel del i Fredericia, og det fysiske betyder rigtig meget – specielt i starten. Og nu er der kommet en ny koordinator, som er blevet inviteret herover for at møde de forskellige personer inden for energirådgivning, inden for biogas programmet og inden for medarbejder rådgivning, for at der bliver sat ansigt på de forskellige” (01:10:30).

”Da vi etablerede kontrakten med Fredericia, der lavede vi en workshop hvor alle mødte hinanden, den indkøbsansvarlige, den ansvarlige for rensningsanlægget mødte energirådgiverne osv. osv. Folk fik set hinanden og arbejdede sammen om noget fordi vi havde en hel dag og så vi de noget at arbejde videre med” (01:11:02).

*På kommentaren om at det må koste en masse penge;*

”Det gør det selvfølgelig også, men det er også derfor at relationen gerne skulle være langvarig. Hvis det kun var en kontrakt med en løbetid på et år, så skulle vi ikke gøre det, men i og med de gerne vil samarbejde om opgradering af biogas til naturgas, hvilket også er et nyt strategisk område for os, så kan vi afsætte flere ressourcer til partnerskabet” (01:11:29).

CSB fortæller at en yderligere bonus var at Fredericia kommune tidligere var kunde hos Trefor energiforsyning, så som en ekstra bonus har DONG fået en ny kunde.

”Hvis vi skal engagere en større gruppe herfra, så skal det være ret sikkert at vi får aftalen. For det er klart at vi ikke kan bruge for mange ressourcer på det hvis det er usikkert. Vi kan ikke betragte hele DONG som en leveranceorganisation til Partnerskaber. Det er os der skal skabe incitamenterne hos de enkelte afdelinger”

*På kommentaren om at Partnerskabsafdelingen således, er en slags grænsefænomen i DONG mellem eksterne kunder og interne afdelinger der skal forhandle på begge sider;*

”Der er hele tiden forhandlinger og på den måde skaber vi interne allianceer. Det er det vi har brugt tid på i forskellige interne netværk, hvorigenmed vi fået synliggjort at R&D har nogle projekter de ikke ved hvordan de får på markedet. Derfor kan de gå igennem os og ser om de kan bruge vores kunder til at få nogle ting i gang” (01:13:08).

Afdelingen for strategiske partnerskaber har som mål at have 30 partnerskaber ved udgangen af 2009.

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan salget af en konkret ide til en anden afdeling foregår;*

”Den foregår ved at vi spotter nogle muligheder, som også er en gevinst for afdelingen i DONG. Vi har eksempelvis talt med TOMS chokolade, angående et af deres restprodukter som er kakaobønneskaller. Det er et monofragment, dvs. et ensartet stykke affald, som vi kan forbrænde på vores kraftværker. Det er klart at dem fra kraftværkerne lige skal vænne sig til at vi ringer, fordi det er helt nyt, men når det er noget de kan bruge er det fint nok. Det er væsentligt at have noget konkret til dem” (01:14:54)

CSB fortæller at det mest besværlige i forhold til at samarbejde internt er afregningen mellem selvstændige afdelinger, men det er ikke et problem i forhold til kunderne. Når bare de får

betalingsstrømmen til at flyde til DONG, så finder de nok ud af det interne. Det har et SAP som de forsøger at koordinere interne betalinger med. (01:16:13).

*På spørgsmålet om DONG tænker i at koordinere partnerskaber i områder/regioner;*

CSB fortæller at de har indgået et samarbejde med Kalundborg Kommune, hvor de har Asnæsværket og hvor både Novo Nordisk og Novozymes har produktionsfaciliteter – og der forsøger DONG at koordinere mellem partnerne for at optimere de forskelliges interesser. Det er yderligere DONGs ambition gennem Kalundborg Kommune at få et samarbejde med de omkringliggende kommuner, for dem har Kalundborg allerede et godt samarbejde med. (01:17:45).

”Vi begynder at have en kritisk masse af partnerskaber, vi kan begynde at trække nogle streger mellem de enkelte partnere. Vi skal eksempelvis til at udvikle et medarbejder program, hvor vi har tre dogme-kommuner (fra Dogme2000, hvor 8 kommuner arbejder sammen om nogle grønne initiativer. red) inde, og der vil vi bruge det at de allerede har et samarbejde til at lave et program der kan lanceres alle tre steder. Vi kommer med platformen og de bringer noget erfaring om hvad der virker for dem. Ved at vi leverer til tre kommuner sænker det omkostningerne, så det er en måde at kigge på tværs i partnerskaberne” (01:18:48).

CSB bekræfter at der er tanker i retning af at tænke på tværs mellem partnere og fortæller at de har overvejet at lave egentlige netværk for klimapartnere. Da DONG 26. januar 2009 åbnede Innovationscenteret, var klimapartnerne også inviteret med, så de kunne høre hvad Anders Eldrup havde at sige fra DONGs perspektiv, hvad fødevareministeren og formanden for Klimakommisionen havde at sige, og om hvad der bliver gjort inden for R&D.

”Ideen er at skabe god grobund for samarbejde på kryds og tværs, som er baseret på vores kompetencer inden for energi. Det er energi og klima der er omdrejningspunktet” (01:20:36).

”Der er mange der laver partnerskabsaftaler rundt omkring, hvor man kan diskutere om det ikke bare er en almindelig handelsaftale” (01:21:05).

CSB fortæller at de har gjort et stort arbejde internt i DONG for at blive kendt, og at det i høj grad er lykkedes, så Strategiske Partnerskaber bliver spurgt til råds om hvad der sker ude i kommunerne. Hvis der skal sættes vindmøller op et sted, er det smart at vide om DONG har relationer på det pågældende sted i forvejen (01:22:45). Den stærke interne kommunikation mener CSB er en konkurrencefordel i en organisation, og minder om at så stor er DONG heller ikke i forhold til nogen af deres konkurrenter. Han understegør at de afdelingerne imellem gør meget ud af at mødes (01:23:52).

*På spørgsmålet om samarbejdet med Wave Star er en generel model for udviklingsprojekter;*

”Nej vi har mange modeller. Vi er med i Wave Star, eller vi er nok mest med ved at være lidt på sidelinjen. Jeg har været involveret på den måde at hvis jeg kan skaffe kapital fra nogen kunder, når der bliver pengemangel i Wave Star, så kan vores kunder være med til at støtte udviklingen af dansk teknologi. Vi får så muligheden for at få noget erfaringsudveksling med Wave Star og det er den måde vi er med” (01:25:25).

*På spørgsmålet om der er en gensidig forpligtelse mellem Strategiske Partnerskaber i DONG og Wave Star;*

”Indtil videre har jeg kun skulle tænke over at skaffe kapital, men der er en tæt dialog mellem ham fra Wave Star (Per Resen. red) og vores afdeling”

”Vi har også en hel afdeling der sidder med VE, vedvarende Energi, og der er der en der sidder med bølgekraft og det er ham der har kontakten til Wave Star. Den afdeling sidder også og kigger på demonstrationsprojekter til udviklings af nye fundaments-typer til vindmøller, hvor man blandt andet har et samarbejde med Siemens ude ved Avedøre Holme, med henblik på at få noget erfaring med drift og vedligeholdelse af møllerne” (01:26:20).

CSB fortæller videre at DONG ved Frederikshavn overvejes det at sætte 6 forskellige typer vindmøller op på 6 forskellige fundamenter og om andre projekter som DONG er med i (01:27:30). DONG arbejder med en såkaldt tragt for udviklingsprojekter, hvor der i dag ligger 200 projekter, som både kan være en ekstern der har fået en god ide eller interne projekter.

*På kommentaren om at det selvfølgelig er en nødvendighed at have nye produkter på vej;*

”Det er nødvendigt for hele tiden at kunne levere noget nyt, så det ikke bare er energirådgivning og det at kunne købe certifikater fra en vindmøllepark, den bliver hurtigt for tynd” (01:29:26).

**Interview med LW, Supervisor ved DONG Energys afdeling for Products and Partnership Concepts 13. februar 2009**

**Location: DONG Energys kontor i Hørsholm, Agern Alle 24-26**

**Interviewer: Christine Thalsgård Henriques**

Indledende vil LW gerne høre om hvad interviewet skal bruges til. Christine fortæller om fokus for hendes speciale og om valget af energiområdet og DONG Energy som case (00:03:22).

”Det er et okay valg af område, for det er faktisk umuligt at arbejde alene på energiområdet. For det første er der noget politik som sætter nogle rammebetegnelser, og der er en god del af subsidier i støtteordninger og ting som fremmer vedvarende energi – altså en kobling til det politiske gennem det, og som driver det hele. Energi en commodity som du ikke kan putte på en lastbil og så kører den et eller andet sted hen (00:04:15). Du skal have energien ind i det etablerede netværk på en eller anden måde. Der er nogle spilleregler i energibranchen omkring hvordan strømmen kommer frem til stikkontakten. Der er nogle spilleregler som alle skal overholde, uanset hvordan energien er blevet produceret, om det er vedvarende, eller det er et kraft/varmeværk der står et eller andet sted ude i en kommune der laver både strøm og varme, så er der nogle spilleregler man skal overholde” (00:04:51)

”Når man har en teknologileverandør som Wave Star, der kan noget omkring deres bølger, eller en teknologileverandør som Vestas, de kan noget omkring deres møller. Men det at få strømmen ind på nettet, det kræver en transformator station der kan levere og styre, og der er nogle ting der gør at du kan du ikke selv gennemske som teknologileverandør, det har du brug for en partner til - og der kommer DONG jo så fra den anden side og vil gerne have den grønne strøm” (00:05:29)

”Du er tvunget ud i at samarbejde. Så kan man diskutere, hvor det tvungne samarbejde er - og hvor det frivillige/alliancen er?” (00:05:45).

LW er uddannet på landbohøjskolen, som cand.scient.agro – en blanding af økonomi og jordbrugsvidenskabelige forhold inden for økonomi og politik. Han tog en del fag på Handelshøjskolen i København. Efter at have været i konsulentbranchen kom han til DONG Energy i 2003. Her var han først i den afdeling der i dag er blevet til energinet.dk. Det er dem der ejer højspændingsnettet og transmissionsnettet til gas – altså de store energimotorveje der transporterer energi rundt i Danmark. De er et transportselskab der sælger transportydelser. På grund af liberaliseringen af energimarkedet skulle de to selskaber unbundles, hvilket LW var med til på gasområdet.

”I 2005 kom jeg tilbage til DONG Energy, hvor vi startede en ny afdeling op der hed Produkter og Partnerskaber, som er den afdeling jeg er i nu. Her starter vi med at bruge de første 4-5 måneder på at lave en partnerskabsmodel for det tyske marked. Vi er lige startet i Tyskland på det tidspunkt med et nyt salgselskab og kan se at partnerskaber er vejen frem for os på det tyske marked” (00:08:51).

*På spørgsmålet om hvorfor;*

”Fordi vi har partnerskaber med nogle danske distributionsselskaber og kunne se at det var en god måde at lave nogle gode forbindelser med sine kunder, der er et langvarigt forhold, et forpligtende samarbejde til det bedste for begge parter - forhåbentlig” (00:09:18)

LW havde en direktør (Kurt Bligaard Petersen. red) der så partnerskaber som DONGs entry-strategi på det tyske marked. DONG Energy havde på det tidspunkt valgt at satse på de tyske

Statsværker (Byens værk. red) som kunde segment. Det kan sammenlignes med HNG i Københavnsområdet, som er Hovedstadens Naturgasselskab, ejet af kommunerne, men som står for al naturgasdistribution. Der hvor gas-transmissionsledningerne holder op, der går det ind i nogle gasdistributionsledninger, som er nogle mindre rør med mindre tryk og det ender i sidste ende hos kunderne. Kunderne hos KNG køber gas hos KNG, men KNG køber gassen af DONG Energy. Det er et godt partnerskab man har, for via KNG sælger DONG Energy gas til KNGs kunder som er rigtig mange og det er en stor del af DONG Energys samlede gasafsætning (00:10:23)

”Der findes 720 Statsværker i Tyskland og bor 80 mio. mennesker, så det er nogle helt andre størrelsesforhold end i Danmark, at begynde og sælge retail til herr und frau Schmidt og opbygge en kunde portefølje, det er en stor, stor opgave. Derfor ønskede DONG Energy at sælge til de tyske forbrugere gennem Statsværkerne” (00:11:09).

Før liberaliseringen købte tyskerne gas fra 4 store tyske gasleverandører, E.On, RWE og nogle andre, som har DONG Energys rolle på det tyske marked

”Lige såvel som liberaliseringen har tvunget DONG Energy til at klare en konkurrence situation, så har den også tvunget Tyskland til at klare en konkurrencесituations på energimarkedet. Det betyder at vi er den stygge monopolvirksomhed i Danmark, men vi er den lille nye i Tyskland, som er spændende, fleksibel, hurtig og billig” (00:12:15).

”Vi valgte en partnerskabsstrategi for at komme ind på det tyske marked, fordi vi havde haft stor succes med at opbygge partnerskaber i Danmark, og den model ville vi prøve at kopiere til Tyskland” (00:12:35).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan denne model var opbygget eller tænkt:*

LW starter med at sige at de læste nogle forskellige bøger, men fortæller så at hans direktør, Kurt Bligaard Petersen, havde været til en konference hvor han havde mødt en bankdirektør fra Ersted bank i Østrig, hvis organisation havde en interessant historie, om at gå fra mange små sparekasser til en samlet organisation. LW fortæller længe om dette eksempel hvor små sparekasser går sammen for at blive en stor stærk organisation, som hans direktør var meget inspireret af (00:14:29).

”Erste Bank gik ud til alle de andre mindre sparekasser og sagde; for det første får I alle vores kunder i jeres område og til gengæld går i med i løst sammenkobling af banker som gik ind under samme brand, nemlig Erste Bank Group. Først havde man 27 forskellige logoer i forskellige farver, som dernæst blev til færre og færre der lignede hinanden og til sidst konsoliderede man så man kun havde et brand og logo (00:15:10). På den måde blev en koncern af mange små opbygget, blandt andet ved at lave en central IT opbygning, så data kunne flyde frit for bedre at kunne håndtere nye kunder, services, risici osv. Det endte med alle disse banker sluttede sig sammen under Erste Bank Group partnerskabet” (00:15:58)

”Det var en god case som min direktør var inspireret af og vi var nede og besøge den i Østrig og fik en indføring i deres case. Det blev udgangspunktet at lave den type partnerskabsmodel og prøve at oversætte casen til vores virksomhed og de kunder vi har – eller gerne ville have – for på det tidspunkt havde vi kun en enkelt og skulle bygge det op derfra” (00:16:50).

”For at koge det helt ned er der tre elementer som ethvert partnerskab skal have; Business impact, Trust and Common Vision. Business impact er eksempelvis at vi tjener penge, altså at man kan tjene flere penge på at gøre det her, end man kan ved at gøre det selv, eller man kan spare nogle penge der gør man har en bedre bundlinje. Det kan også være at det sikre ens overlevelse, fordi

man ikke kan selv. Så Business impact er penge eller andre faktorer, afhængig af branche kan det være et teknologiskifte, og Business impact skal der være. Hvis jeg køber noget af dig så jeg det fordi den vare du har, har den værdi som jeg vil give dig – det er også Business impact – så det foregår i enhver handel” (00:18:26)

”Trust handler om at have tillid til sin leverandør, tør man sige at man har et problem eller fortælle om noget man ikke kan finde ud af. Tør man bede om hjælp. Det er næste niveau. Men det gør man jo hver eneste gang man går ind i en butik og skal købe noget spørger man sig selv om man tør købe varen og man afvejer hvor meget tillid man har til den enkelte vare og selve butikken” (00:19:05)

”Tillid skal være på ekstremt højt niveau når man indgår et partnerskab, for der skal man åbne bøgerne noget mere, du skal fortælle om dine faktiske udfordringer, for at du kan få nogen til at hjælpe dig med det” (00:19:21).

*På spørgsmålet om det betyder, at tillid for DONG Energy går på produktet end på virksomhedens opførsel;*

”Helt klart på opførslen – produkterne er beviset. Er regningen rigtig – for hvis du ikke engang kan finde ud af at lave en regning så kan du nok ikke finde ud af særlig meget. Tilliden skal leveres i hver eneste transaktion du laver, men jo mere tillid du har dets flere fejl kan du få lov at lave fordi man har den grundlæggende tillid til hinanden. Men det handler allermest om at folk opfører sig tillidsvækkende. At vi har nogle folk som opfører sig ordentligt og som er tillidsvækkende, gennemfører det de siger, er troværdige og ikke løber fra aftalerne” (00:20:17)

”Tillid bliver skabt gennem mennesker og kun gennem mennesker og bliver bakket op af transaktioner. Men for at menneskene får den tillid skal de også have en velfungerende organisation i ryggen – især i energibranchen. For eksempel er det, at vi er producent, at vi selv har gas, en grundlæggende sikkerhed – for så skal vi ikke ud og købe den” (00:20:48)

LW understegner at han udelukkende taler om gas – for det er det han ved noget om.

”Når vi er producent, så har vi gas – hvad mange af de andre leverandører ikke har. De skal ud og købe det fra gang til gang og pludselig lukker russerne ned via Ukraine og så står man der hvis man bare er traider. Men hvis man har sin egen gas, der kommer ind via nogle andre rør, så har man noget tillid” (00:21:21)

*På spørgsmålet om tillid er knyttet til personer eller organisationer og om LW har nogen erfaringer med ansatte med stor tilknyttet tillid fra kunder der har forladt DONG Energy;*

”Det har vi heldigvis ikke prøvet med en direkte opsigelse, men det kommer vel nok på et tidspunkt, men vi har ikke haft nogen opsigelser af vores Key Account Managers. Vi har få, men rigtig, rigtig dygtige Key Account Managers i Tyskland. En af dem var dansk og han er så hjemme i Danmark igen nu – men det var en planlagt proces. Der kom den nye Key Account Manager ind og afløste ham og havde en overleveringsforretning med ham over 3-4 måneder, så det var ikke noget problem” (00:22:37).

”Det er helt sikkert at vi lider et knæk hvis vi mister en af de gode folk – det kræver en decideret indsats. Men tilliden ligger også i den måde vi gør tingene på, den er ikke hooked op på den enkelte, de kan sagtens subsidierer hinanden og vores folk arbejder til i teams, hvor de tager ud til kunden to og to – så vi (DONG Energy. red) ikke er helt sårbar, selvom en del af tilliden ligger på den enkelte person” (00:23:10)

”Men kunderne oplever tilliden hele vejen rundt når de møder os. Jeg indgår som den danske partner relationship manager, så jeg møder dem (kunderne. red) også tit, enten ude hos dem selv sammen med Key Account Manageren, hvis vi skal præsentere et nyt produkt eller hvis vi skal have et møde, eller et socialt arrangement som vi ofte har, så tager jeg med rundt og er den danske repræsentant. Jeg forbereder eksempelvis vores sommermøde, hvor vores direktør Kurt Bligaard Petersen kommer, og forbereder hvad der skal snakkes om, så på den måde møder de åbenheden” (00:23:58).

”De møder åbenheden på messer, eksempelvis har vi lige været på en som hedder E-World, og her har et af vores tiltag i år været at have et Dialog-Corner, hvor vi inviterede vores kunder til at komme og snakke med de forskellige direktører. Der havde vi vores egen direktør med, direktøren for vind og vores nye direktør for et kraftværk i Gerisvald som vi planlægger at bygge. Det betyder at de ansvarlige står der – og du kan bare gå hen og snakke med dem, der er ingen forbehold” (00:24:36).

*På spørgsmålet om kunderne benytter sig af muligheden for at tale med direktører;*

”Ja det gør de – det vil de meget gerne, og de opfatter os som ekstremt åbne. Vi gør meget ud af at kommunikere at det er manden selv der kommer, det er ikke Anders Eldrup (CEO i DONG Energy. red) for han er for langt væk fra det, men det er de folk der betyder noget for lige præcis det de spørger os om, de står dernede og tager den direkte dialog med kunderne. Og det er at leve sit partnerskab, så kunderne oplever det (tilliden. red) hele vejen rundt” (00:25:00).

*På kommentaren om, at strukturen af organisationen dermed kan signalere tillid;*

”Helt klart – det ligger i din kommunikation. Men det er da klart at hvis en af vores folk går til en konkurrent, så har han en kæmpe fordel i forhold til at gaffle nogle kunder med sig. Selvfølgelig er der nogle konkurrence kausuler, men vi er da udsat for risikoen (00:25:36)”.

”Men den Key Account Manager der skifter job skal jo sælge en ny virksomhed og stadig være tillidsvækkende, og hvis de ikke har samme måde at gøre tingene på, skal han præsentere sig som noget andet, han er jo ikke partner, han er repræsentant, hvorimod partneren består i et helt selskab og ikke kun den enkelte. Det er simpelthen for komplekst det vi laver, til at en mand kan være partner, det fungerer ikke. Det er kun en organisation der kan være en partner på denne her måde” (00:26:11).

”Det der karakterisere et partnerskab, eller en alliance, er at det er mere og mere forpligtende du har brug for. Du har brug for en kompleks ydelse, du har brug for mere end bare den der cykel du køber, hvor du jo ikke er partner med din cykelforhandler. Det er så simpelt et produkt at det køber du bare, men hvis du er producent af en computer hvor du ikke selv laver alle delene, så er du afhængig af, at når du laver en ny model, så kommer der også en ny chip. Du kan godt købe standardvare, men hvis du vil have noget der er teknologiførende, så skal du være sikker på kvaliteten og timingen – og så er det pludselig en kompleks ydelse” (00:27:28)

”På den måde er det ikke en person der kan være partner, der er nødt til at være en organisation bagved” (00:28:03).

*LW fortæller videre om modellen;*

”Til sidst er der Common vision, og det er fordi, at hvis sådan et partnerskab skal være ved, udover de to første år, som er hvedebrødsdagene hvor det hele er sjovt og godt fordi vi har fundet en fælles retning og vi tjener nogle penge på det, så skal der være Common vision. For så bliver det lige pludselig hårdt, når leverandørens pris ikke er så god mere og når kontrakten skal

genforhandles, for det er klart, at der blevet givet en god pris til at starte med. Man vil også gerne give en god pris anden gang, men det kan godt være at den er knap så fleksibel som sidste gang. Så spørgsmålet er hvordan man kommer til næste niveau af partnerskabet” (00:28:48).

*På spørgsmålet om en lavere pris bliver brugt som lokkemad til at indgå samarbejder;*

”Det tror jeg alle gør, det kan være mængderabat, eller introduktionsrabat” (00:29:10).

LW forklarer med Sonofon som eksempel hvordan selskabet tilbyder en telefon til en krone til et relativt billigt abonnement, ikke for at tjene på kunderne i første omgang, men i håbet om at kunderne er tilfredse med servicen og derfor ikke shopper videre. Man forsøger at lave loyalitetskoncepter (00:29:56).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan man laver loyalitetskoncepter med gas;*

”Jamen spørgsmålet er jo hvorfor de bliver hos os? Og det er jo fordi, på lang sigt er en fælles vision, som man ikke har med et telefon-selskab, løsningen. For de tyske Statsværker der handler det om at, for hvert af de 720 værker på det tyske marked, er markedet blevet liberaliseret 1.oktober 2008, og værkerne sat under kraftig regulering for mange penge de må tjene på deres netdrift, som har været deres guldkalv, for at få prisen for forbrugerne ned og det udfordrer dem. Værkerne sidder på et lokalt monopol hvor der kun er ét distributionsselskab” (00:31:05).

LW begrunder monopolet i at det er dyrt og besværligt at lave flere net. Man graver kun et sæt ledninger og rør ned, men man tvinger ejerne til at give adgang til andre (00:31:26). Han forklarer at de små lokale monopolier som Statsværkerne er, er utsat for et voldsomt pres på indtjening, og at deres kundebase, som forhen var fuldstændig sikker, den er nu åben for konkurrence, hvilket betyder at der kommer nye leverandører til (00:32:28).

”Mange af Statsværkerne vil gerne være selvstændige, fordi de er ejet af kommunerne og de vil gerne være herre i eget hus, er det vigtigt for dem at borgerne i deres område har forsyningssikkerhed. Men de ønsker ikke at være ejet af nogle andre, der skal ikke være store multinationale selskaber der køber dem. De vil gerne bevare en uafhængighed” (00:32:54).

LW fortæller at Statsværkerne er sammensatte i deres struktur, de sælger ofte både el og gas, de sælger vand og kan stå for kloakering, busser, svømmehaller og kirkegårde – alt muligt blandet sammen i et forsyningsselskab. Derfor vil de gerne bevare selvstændighed – for alt dette skal ikke ejes af et udenlandsk selskab. Værkerne har altså et grundlæggende ønske om at være selvstændige og det er lidt tilsvarende Erste bank casen med flere små bykonger, der gerne vil blive med at være konger, og derfor godt kan samarbejde lidt med naboen, men passer meget godt på sine kunder(00:34:02).

”Fordi vi ikke sælger til slutkunder er det let at have en fælles vision med DONG Energy, vi truer dem ikke fra deres kundeside. Vi har ikke så mange andre interesser end at sælge gas. Vi har nogle enkelte industrikunder, men de er så store at de ikke er en målgruppe for Statsværkerne. Men det er klart at hvis en af vores industrikunde ligger i et Statsværks område, så er det det svært for os at få Statsværket som kunde, fordi vi har taget en af deres store kunder. Men der satser vi på Statsværkerne og vi tager ingen husholdningskunder, det har vi slet ikke apparat til” (00:34:48).

*På spørgsmålet om hvor mange Statsværker DONG Energy leverer til nu;*

LW svarer at det ikke er officielt, men siger at DONG Energy leverer til et stærkt stigende antal Statsværker (00:35:03).

”Det er meget let at have en fælles vision med dem (Statsværkerne. red) fordi vi har brug for at komme ind i Tyskland og de har brug for noget gas og vil gerne sikre sig en alternativ vej frem for russer-gas. Vi vil være der i lang tid og de vil være der i lang tid. Vi har helt naturligt en langsigtet vision om et langsigtet, stabilt samarbejde som sikrer at de kan blive ved med at være uafhængige. Hvis de skal blive ved med at være uafhængige, så skal vores pris også være på en måde så de kan tjene på det (00:35:50).

”Det er indkøbsprisen der er interessant for dem, den kan de ligge en lille marge til og sælge det til deres kunder, men de kan ikke gøre mere og har ingen mulighed for at optimere. Derfor skal vi optimere i vores samlede portefølje af hele vores salg, der kan vi optimere vores gas-indkøb og vores anvendelse af lager. Det kan vi optimere i en stor portefølje og give dem en lav pris. Vi prøver selvfølgelig også at profitoptimere, og det ved de også godt, men hvis vi sætter prisen så højt at de ikke tjener penge og mister kunder, så mister vi også kunder” (00:36:36).

LW fortæller at de Statsværker som er DONG Energys kunder i det nordlige Tyskland er de Statsværker det vokser mest, blandt andet fordi det nordtyske område er langt fremme i konkurrencen (00:36:57).

”Mange af Statsværkerne vokser rigtig meget og det er en god case for os at komme ud med, der siger at vi understøtter Statsværker i vækst, og stiller nogle priser, nogle værktøjer og nogle kontraktmæssige forhold til rådighed som gør det muligt at vokse” (00:37:14).

”Hvis de kommer og beder om ekstra mængder, så skal vi nok være der med de ekstra mængder. Og det bliver der lagt mærke til, for det er ikke bare sådan at komme med ekstra mængder på fleksible vilkår, det er ret svært i gasbranchen” (00:37:40)

LW siger at gasleveringen er ret teknisk så det vil han ikke gå nærmere ind i, men understegger at deres støtte til Statsværkerne bliver lagt mærke til, og at DONG Energy derfor har en Common vision med Statsværkerne (00:37:53).

#### *På opfordringen til at fortælle om de bløde faktorer i partnerskabet;*

”Vi troede egentlig, da vi lavede denne her partnerskabsmodel, at nu kunne vi lave partnerskaber. Vi havde selvfølgelig en database over alle de her Statsværker, hvor vi havde navne på direktører og borgmestre, partifarve og ejerskab – en masse faktorer der kunne afgøre om det kunne være en mulig partner. Så kunne man tage fat i dem og begynde at bearbejde dem, inviterer dem til alt muligt og køre derudaf analytisk og fint – og det holder ikke en meter” (00:38:49).

”Det holder kun i forhold til noget indledende kommunikation, der kan man godt arbejde strategisk og målrettet med hvem man godt kunne tænke sig at samarbejde med, men du kan ikke skrive et brev hvor der står ’Dav – Vi hedder DONG Energy og vi vil gerne lave en strategisk alliance med jer’. For der har du ikke noget Trust, for de kender ikke DONG Energy, de har aldrig set en person derfra og de ved ikke hvad det går ud på, så det er fuldstændig umuligt at bygge det op derfra” (00:39:22).

”Du skal starte anderledes, selvom man godt kan bruge det til at finde ud af hvilket geografisk område man skal starte i, hvordan man marketings strategisk vil gøre det an, man annoncere i et fagtidsskrift eller i den lokale avis, men de vil jo undre sig. Hvorfor er der lige pludselig en annonce for DONG Energy i vores amtsblad, det vil de synes er mytisk. Det er vigtigt at de hører om ad den rigtige vej” (00:39:55).

”Hvem er det vi skal have fat i, det er borgmesteren, det er indkøbschefen på Statsværket, det er jo ikke Herr und Frau Schmidt, de køber der gas af Statsværket og det skal de blive ved med” (00:40:10).

”At køre det top-down, fandt vi ud af for vores område, ikke var nogen god vej frem. Den tyske direktør som vi ansatte, som havde erfaring fra dette område, han sagde, at det slet ikke var den måde det foregik på. Han sagde, at vi skulle ind med nogle Key Account Managers, der har nogle kontakter og så skulle vi bearbejde dem fra menneskesiden for at opbygge tillid” (00:40:35).

”Det handlede i starten om at tage fat i dem vi kendte og skaffe sig et netværk” (00:40:40)

*På spørgsmålet om hvor disse Key Account managers fysisk arbejder fra;*

LW fortæller at deres Key Account managers sidder i Tyskland i DONG Energys tyske salgsselskab, som er en integreret del af DONG Energy. De har tidligere været ansat i branchen, nogle har været hos Statsværker og andre kommer fra leverandører til Statsværker. De har et netværk med og det var det netværk de tog fat i til at starte med (00:41:14).

”De brugte de netværk de havde med først, og så arbejder Statsværkerne utrolig meget sammen. Det har nogle arbejdsgemainshaften hvor de udveksler informationer på kryds og tværs. Det er statsværkernes Rosery Club, hvor de mødes indenfor branchen og snakker om deres drift, deres udfordringer, deres indkøbsforhold – og de kan lide at fortælle om hvor godt de gør det – og så blører de sig lidt internt. Nogen gange har de også nogle enkinds gemeinshaften (indkøbsfællesskab), hvor de simpelthen køber ind sammen eller laver et fælles udbud så de kan få fælles mængderabat til at starte med – og derefter splitter man det så op og går i individuelle forhandlinger med de enkelte Statsværker. De er nemlig ikke så tæt på hinanden at de ønsker at fortælle de andre præcis hvilken pris de indkøber til” (00:42:31).

På den måde, fortæller LW, kan man ende med at lave én aftale til at starte med, men ende med at have fire kunder. Han fortæller også at det er lidt af et spil. Måske bliver det til noget, måske ikke, men i alle tilfælde kommer kontrakterne typisk til genforhandling i løbet af nogle år, og så man være med igen (00:42:55)

”Hvis tilbuddet faldt til jorden, eller de valgte en anden leverandør, så gik der måske to år og så kom de tilbage. Det kan betyde noget for fremtidige forhandlinger, fordi de måske syntes vi havde en god og åben måde at køre tingene på, det at blive nr. 2 er selvfølgelig ærgerligt, men det gør bare at man bliver husket til næste gang” (00:43:12).

”Man skal sælge nogle basale produkter til dem. Først skal man sælge noget helt simpelt som du kan købe alle steder, altså gas i en eller anden mængde fuldstændig hjernedødt leveret et bestemt sted. Det er ikke svært, du kan skrive regningen på forhånd, der er ingen binding i det. Det starter man så med og så har man mulighed for at følge op på denne her kontrakt, man sender en regning en gang om måneden og man har flere kommunikationsveje. Så hører man måske om når han (Statsværket. red) skal købe resten af hans mængde, som svinger hele tiden – hvilket er meget sværere at levere og meget dyrere at købe – så sender han nok også det tilbud til DONG Energy så vi kan give et tilbud på det salg” (00:44:26).

”Det er en måde at komme ind. Man starter simpelt og så bygger man stille op ved at vise at vi måske er lidt anderledes, vi inviterer dem måske til Danmark, og hvis de er store, arrangerer vi måske et møde med en eller anden direktør, eller vi tager dem med på Avedøre værket så de kan se, at det ser rent og fint ud og at vi faktisk godt kan finde ud af sådan noget. Og så opbygger man stille og roligt tillid og man begynder at snakke om hvor er det vi skal hen og hvor er det I skal

hen, og hvad laver i. Og ja, så lyder det jo egentlig meget godt det her – og er prisen så i orden. Derfra går man lige pludselig i benhårde prisforhandlinger” (00:45:05).

LW fortæller om deres bedste eksempel på hvordan et partnerskab bliver til. Han tegner et kort over Nord- og Østtyskland og viser hvor der handles med LG-gas (Gas med lav brændværdi, ikke så mange kilojoule pr. kubikmeter) og hvor der handles med HG-gas (Gas med høj brændværdi). I området hvor der handles med LG-gas kommer DONG Energy i snak med en kunde, selvom DONG Energy kun sælger gas i et område med HG-gas. Forbindelsen opstår igennem en medarbejder der kender direktøren.

”En af vores sælgere han kender – og jeg faktisk ikke af hvilken vej – men han kender direktøren. Lige præcis den del af kontakten, det er enten ekstremt tilfældigt eller enormt godt arbejde, hvor man graver sig frem til den personlige relation der gør at man kommer ind og snakker med ham” (00:46:49).

Direktøren har det problem at hans Statsværk ligger i et LG-gas område, men han vil gerne have HG-gas, da det er fremtiden og LG-gas er dyrere pga. manglende konkurrence. Derudover er det dyrt og besværligt at skifte til HG-gas. LG-gas bliver kun produceret i Tyskland og Holland og der bliver aldrig fundet nye felter, hvorfor produktionen er for nedadgående. Al gas fra Rusland og Nordsøen er HG-gas (00:48:36).

”Vores sælger kommer i kontakt med dem, og taler med dem om hvad deres problemer egentlig er og har mange møder med dem hvor de snakker, snakker, snakker om alt muligt, men vi kunne ikke levere LG-gas til dem, for vi har ingen LG-gas og ingen position i området. De snakker videre og snakker længe og så snakker de simpelthen om at bygge et nyt rør til at få noget gas ind i deres by. Og det der ville være mest oplagt er at bygge et rør fra her til her, men der har DONG Energy ingen position, så vi kan ikke sælge gas der” (00:49:27).

”Så vi har et problem, for vi har fundet en der gerne vil købe, men vi kan ikke levere der hvor han leverer til sine kunder. Derfor foreslår vi et rør fra en anden position, hvor DONG Energy har gas, og hvor markedet for os er mere likvidt og konkurrencedygtigt” (00:49:45).

LW forklarer på sin tegning at det kun handler om 16km. rør, men at det er en investering på 10 mio. Euro, hvilket er meget for en by (00:49:59).

”Vi indgår en aftale med dem, hvor vi hjælper dem med at etablere det her rør og hjælper dem med hele omstillingen af deres målere og brændere og så er der en langsigtet leverancaftale, som sikrer os en stor afsætning over de næste mange år” (00:50:24).

”Vi har en rigtig god relation til dem, fordi vi har en Common vision, vi har en kontrakt der går rigtig mange år, vi har en hensigtserklæring om at bevare vores samarbejde. Vi har en stor del Trust, fordi vi faktisk stod ved det vi sagde, vi gav dem en konkurrencedygtig pris, vi har endda reduceret og genforhandlet prisen da det generelle prisniveau faldt. De skal jo ikke straffes fordi vi har lavet en lang aftale. Vi kunne bare sidde og tjene gode penge, men når vi kan se den generelle pris falder, så går vi også ind og reforhandler prisen. Vi havde faktisk den første reforhandling inden vi nogensinde begyndte at leve” (00:51:08).

*På spørgsmålet om kontraktens form og juridiske binding:*

”Normalt er de helt faste, denne her er dog så lang at det ikke er juridisk muligt at lave så lang en kontrakt, andet end hvis der ligger en genforhandlingsklausul” (00:51:49).

”Men der hvor det bløde kommer ind og der hvor det bliver interessant i forhold til partnerskaber er altid i bilaget til kontrakten. I dette tilfælde står der at vi som punkt 1 etablerer en samarbejdsgruppe med at studere den kommersielle anvendelse af et lager. Det er sådan en blød ydelse, hvor vi godt ved at de har et lager, som det er svært at få værdi ud af – og de kan heller ikke selv få værdi ud af det. Derfor har vi lavet en arbejdsgruppe der studerer hvordan man kan gøre det. Der står også en blød formulering om, at hvis de generelle vilkår de ændrer sig, så er der en generel mulighed for med x antal måneders varsel at indtræde i nye forhandlinger, så der er en generel åben klausul, som faktisk er ret uhørt i det tyske marked” (00:52:36).

”Der er en åbenhed fra starten der siger at vi skal snakke om det. Vi vil hellere have I kommer og snakker om det end at I render til nogen andre. Så vi er altid utsat for mange forhandlinger, men det betyder også at vi har en god relation til kunderne” (00:52:53).

*På spørgsmålet om de har en løbende evaluering;*

”Vi ser selvfølgelig hele tiden på priserne og hvad vi tjener på de enkelte kunder”

*På spørgsmålet om der er en løbende evaluering af partnerskabet;*

”Vi styrer det ikke, vi ved godt hvad for nogen partnere der er de gode, og så mange har vi heller ikke, vi kan godt overskue det og har ikke brug for et stort IT-system til at evaluere hele tiden” (00:53:30).

”Det er en relativ blød opfølgning vi laver af vores partnere, men ikke mere blød end vi har sagt farvel en partner, der blev så aktiv at vi ikke kunne følge dem mere, og ikke ville følge dem mere, fordi han ville så mange ting som vi ikke ville. Han havde nogle prismæssige ambitioner som vi ikke kunne honorere, så der faldt vores Common Vision væk og Trust led måske også lidt undervejs” (00:54:24).

”Tallene på alle tre faktorer, ikke at vi har sådan en lille monitor der står og måler, men tallene på alle tre faktorer de daledede stille og roligt” (00:54:37).

*På spørgsmålet om det mere er en fornemmelse af partneren der driver partnerskabet;*

”Det er meget en fornemmelse, og på et eller andet tidspunkt siger man, nej nu er det nok, nu stopper det, og så må de få præsenteret hvad vi vil, vi går ikke længere end det og ellers må samarbejdet ophøre” (00:54:54).

”Den pågældende valgte ikke kun at have os som leverandør, vi er stadig leverandør, men han har valgt en anden model. Det er fordi han mener han kan få mere Business impact ved at gøre det på en anden måde. Det faldt uden for vores model og det var rigtig sund proces at prøve at vælge en fra” (00:55:21).

LW gentager at det handler meget om de bløde faktorer og peger på tegningen fra før og siger at den sag om røret jo i høj grad handlede om held.

”Vi har efterfølgende snakket med flere som har bemærket denne her situation, som vi selvfølgelig ikke har undladt at gøre opmærksom på i vores kommunikationsmateriale” (00:55:38).

”Vi bruger det selvfølgelig som cases og gode eksempler når vi er på messe, og folk kan godt huske denne her sag. Det er rygtedes i markedet, imellem de her indkøbsfællesskaber og alle de her samarbejder mellem Statsværkerne. Det rygtes at DONG Energy de gjorde sådan der og det er jo den allerbedste markedsføring vi kan få” (00:56:09).

*På spørgsmålet om at selvom han ikke bruger ordet networking, om det så ikke er det de gør;*

”Det gør vi i høj grad – og vi prøver at formalisere det en lille smule. Der findes mange etablerede netværk og der prøver vi så at være med. Vi prøver også at etablere nogen netværk omkring os selv, som eksempelvis marketinggrupper imellem de her Statsværker, hvor det kun er fåtallet der konkurrerer med hinanden, fordi de ikke sælger i hinandens område. Man hugger kunder fra regionale forsyningsselskaber, ikke så meget fra hinanden som de kender og har et godt forhold til” (00:57:11).

”Fordi de ser hinanden som samarbejdspartnere, og ikke som konkurrenter, så laver vi en marketingsgruppe, hvor vi fortæller om hvordan man kan drive effektiv marketing, hvordan vi gør det i Danmark, kommer med nye ideer og gode produkter. Derefter er det primært dem selv der skal sætte sig ned og snakke” (00:57:35).

”Der er mange af dem der har nogle muligheder med lager de har, og det prøver vi også at lave en arbejdsgruppe omkring, diskutere det og på forskellige måder skabe lidt networking for dem og ellers deltage i de netværk de har” (00:57:55).

På kommentaren om, at networking bliver endnu vigtigere end normalt, med erfaringen om at man ikke kan komme ind på markedet oppefra;

”Der er kun den anden vej, som er ekstremt meget drevet af den enkelte Key Account Manager, hans tilgang til det og hans netværk og hans evne til at forfølge de leads der er. Nogen gange bruger de rigtig meget tid på en kunde som vi godt ved at ham får vi ikke, fordi han er ejet af en anden leverandør, som vi ved vil dumpe prisen i sidste ende. Vi ved godt at han bruger os til at få prisen fra hans nuværende leverandør ned, men vi gør det fordi, at hvis vi gør det godt, så han måske kender nogen andre, der sidder nogen i hans bestyrelse, som også sidder i bestyrelsen for andre Statsværker, og så man måske kunne bruge os der. Man prøver på den måde at arbejde sig ind i det” (00:59:01).

”Det er ekstremt forhandlingstungt og derfor opfatter man sig engang imellem som partner, bare fordi man køber gas, men det er fordi at forhandlingerne frem til at man rent faktisk får denne her aftale på plads den er så langvarig og kræver en god del Trust til hinanden” (00:59:28).

”Der hvor vi også prøver at få Common vision ind er ved at have en blød åbning i kontrakten, og hvis det ikke står i kontrakten, så ved de det godt, vi får sagt at de bare skal komme til os, så vi kan snakke om det. Hvis det nu bliver en varm vinter, og de ikke sælger al den gas de havde forventet og derfor har sagt ja til at aftage, som en del af en minimumskvote. Ifølge kontrakten kan vi sige at de skal betale for det de har skrevet under på, vi kan gå i retten og vi vinder – hver gang. Men det er ikke særlig smart, for det har vi ikke noget ud af, så vi siger, at hvis sådan noget sker, så kom og så snakker vi om det og kigger vi på det og ser på om de kan købe mængden året efter eller hvad vi kan gøre” (01:00:35).

*På kommentaren om, at det er det der er det centrale ved partnerskabet;*

”Ja – og derfor opfatter mange Statsværker det som om de har et partnerskab med os bare når de køber gas, fordi at vejen hen til at få kontrakten var samarbejdsorienteret. Og ordet Partnerschaftlig bliver også brugt flittigt i hele processen” (01:01:00).

*På kommentaren om, at DONG Energys tyske hjemmeside er den eneste der har partnerskaber på forsiden;*

”Ja men det er simpelthen fordi det er vores model og vores indgang til det tyske marked, så vi bruger ordet partnerschaftlig mange gange – og det handler om at signalere at vi går til det på en partnerskabsagtig måde. Det er ikke absolut at vi bygger et partnerskab baseret på noget bestemt” (01:01:26).

LW fortæller igen om eksemplet med røret der blev bygget og hvordan det partnerskab centrerede sig om noget fysisk, og om hvordan folkene fra DONG Energy var nede og cykle langs ruten fordi den her partner var så stolt over det. Der blev sparket lidt dæk og følt en fælles vision (01:01:52).

”Med mange af de andre har vi ikke noget fysisk eller noget andet end gas at have et partnerskab på, men bare måden vi gør tingene på opfatter de som et partnerskab og det prøver vi også at leve ud så godt som muligt” (01:02:05).

*På kommentaren om, at det næsten lyder som om et partnerskab handler om følelse;*

”I mine øjne handler det meget om følelse og indlevelse” (01:02:22).

*På spørgsmålet om der har været nogen eksempler på at DONG Energy har købt noget af en partner og regnskabsforholdet er gået den anden vej;*

”Ja, det har vi, vi har kigget på flere ting men vi har ikke rigtig realiseret noget der går den anden vej endnu, men vi har diskuteret flere gange om vi eksempelvis kunne få noget værdi ud af deres lager. Der har også været forslag fra det lokale kraft/varmeværk, om vi evt. kunne købe noget strøm, der er forskellige muligheder”

*På spørgsmålet om det er systematiseret;*

”Nej”

*På kommentaren om at noget teori præsenterer partnerskaber som en situation hvor transaktioner af viden, penge, arbejdskraft går frem og tilbage og ikke kun er køb og salg;*

”Jeg mener bestemt også at der er mere end køb og salg, i det jeg mener er de rigtige partnerskaber. Vi har mange kunder og en del af de kunder opfatter sig som partnere, men i vores kernepartnerskaber er der altid mere end bare køb og salg. Det er dem med en marketingsarbejdsgruppe, det er vores lagre, det er, at vi har hjulpet dem med forskellige udfordringer, det kan være de har været angrebet af en konkurrent og at vi så har hjulpet dem, vi har også et enkelt Statsværk som vi har tegnet sponsorat af, hvilket er usædvanligt, men der får vi jo eksponeret vores logo. Så jeg synes vi har mange typer af samarbejde, for der er altid mere i det end bare gas og el, men ydelser DONG Energy køber af deres partnere er der ikke så meget af” (01:04:57).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan styrkeforholdet mellem de forskellige Statsværker og DONG Energy er?*

”Det er meget lige, for de har jo det vi gerne vil have, hvilket er kunderne og slaget. Hvis de går fra os, så har vi ikke solgt noget gas. Hvis et Statsværk går, svarer det til at miste 30.000 kunder. Og prøv lige at gå hjem i Danmark og markedsfør dig over for 30.000 kunder – det er ikke sjov. Gå til Holland hvor vi også er aktive med en retail-business som sælger til Hr. og fru Holland og markedsfør til 30.000 kunder – det er ikke sjovt. Så de har det vi gerne vil have og det ved de godt” (01:05:53).

”Det vi får den anden vej er kunder. Vi kan med en meget lille organisation sælger lige så meget gas som en stor organisation i Holland eller i Danmark. Det er en helt anden måde at gøre det på, og vi tjener selvfølgelig ikke den margen som ligger til sidst i ledet, men vi har heller ikke omkostninger ved det. Vi har ikke et callcenter med 200 mand der kan tage imod opkald omkring hvorfor regningen ikke er kommet. Det er ekstrem business-to-business” (01:06:34).

*På spørgsmålet om betydningen af det lige styrkeforhold for opbyggelsen af tillid;*

”Stor betydning, især med de lidt større kunder. Med de helt små kunder er det ikke et lige styrkeforholdet og det ved kunderne også godt, men der kan de godt lide os fordi vi er venlige mennesker og faktisk har en model der også virker for de små, det er de meget imponeret over at vi gør. Mange af de helt små føler sig overset af deres gamle leverandør som E.On. de føler sig overset af deres gamle relationer og der kommer vi ind som en lille bitte bitte spiller. Det kan godt være at vi er store i Danmark og vi er 5 mio. mennesker, men i sammenligning med de 4 store i Tyskland er vi nul og niks. Så derfor er vi bare små og fleksible og attraktive” (01:07:35).

*På spørgsmålet om der er forskellige kulturer at tage hensyn til i samarbejdet med Tyskland;*

”Nu har vi tyske Key Account Managers, det er bevidst og vi kan ikke gøre det uden, og så har vi som regel en dansker dernede i et par år ad gangen. Det er godt at have en der nede som bliver oplært og får det hele ind under huden” (01:08:15).

”Nu har vi startet selskabet op fra starten af, så vores medarbejdere er vokset op i en DONG Energy kultur, så jeg synes ikke der er nogen forskelle. Selvfølgelig gør vi tingene på forskellige måder, og det er klart at os der har arbejdet længst med det tyske marked, vi forstår bedst hvordan kunderne reagere – og Statsværkerne er helt sikkert nogle andre typer partnere end vi har i Danmark, det er nogle andre parametre der betyder noget. Forhandlingskulturen er helt sikkert anderledes, der skal laves mange flere indledende manøvre og snik snak om alt muligt, der skal rigtig meget snik snak til i det her segment. Der er rigtig meget føle hinanden på hårene for at lære hinanden at kende” (01:09:29).

”Man går aldrig ind og bare sælger et partnerskab. Med vores danske mentalitet troede vi, at vi skulle ind og starte med det avancerede, men nej, vi skal starte med det helt simple og lade det tage den tid det tager. Vi tager de basale produkter først, og så kommer det andet bagefter og før vi har bevist vores værd som leverandør, får vi ikke et ben til jorden” (01:09:54).

”Så skal der besøges nogle folk, der skal snakkes lidt og laves nogle præsentationer og forhandles frem og tilbage om alt muligt og så lige pludselig – så sker der noget og det kan være svært at vide hvornår det sker. Danskere er meget mere målrettet og har ikke tid til den slags, men det skal du altså have tid til, for det er her, det er lige præcis her at man arbejder med Trust. Trust for de her Statsværker er ekstremt vigtigt, det er faktisk så vigtigt at det er der man starter med at arbejde. Først siger man selvfølgelig at vi har nogle gode priser og vi er vældig fleksible – og det lyder så okay, men så er der herfra at du arbejder med Trust – og det bruger du lang lang tid på – at bearbejde Trust-faktoren. Og så kommer der lige pludselig en kontrakt og så leverer du på den og så siger du, jamen – det gik egentlig meget godt, har vi noget der peger længere frem. Det er kun sjældent at man kommer fra Business impact til Common Vision – det går næsten altid over Trust” (01:11:00).

”Common vision er det der kommer sidst – og det er også det sværeste. Men Trust betyder meget mere i Tyskland end det betyder i Danmark” (01:11:21).

”Jeg troede det ville være mere ligesom i Danmark, men der er stor forskel - i hvert fald i det her segment. Det er kommunalt ejet – det skal man ikke tage fejl af. Vi sælger til kommunalt ejede

virksomheder og det gör at det har et offentligt præg. Jeg ved ikke hvordan det er for andre virksomheder, men for vores segment er det i hvert fald ekstremt vigtigt” (01:12:20).

*På spørgsmålet om hvor lang tid det tager at lure hvordan en virksomhed skal angribes;*

”Det er meget forskelligt, nogen bager vi på i både 2 og 3 år. Vi bearbejder dem fra mange sider – og med nogen går det ekstremt hurtigt, hvis de står med et umiddelbart behov og vi kan svare på det med det samme, så er den i vinkel” (01:12:58).

”Vi, jeg og en tysk Key Account Manager, mødte nogen i onsdags (til en messe. red), en direktør fra et Statsværk, som kender os igennem en fra hans bestyrelse, som også sidder i en bestyrelse for et andet Statsværk som vi leverer til. Vi spørger selvfølgelig til hvor han havde hørt om os fra og han siger sådan og sådan og min Key Account Manager trævler lige sit indre netværk op inde i hovedet, og så ved han nøjagtig hvorfor direktøren kommer til os og hvem det er han refererer til”(01:13:30).

”Han og en anden direktør fra et nærliggende Statsværk henvender sig til os på messen i vores stand. Men vi kan ikke stå på sådan en messe og have en ordentlig forhandling, og det ønsker de heller ikke, så vi runder samtalen lidt af og spørger om de ikke vil have et møde, så kommer det frem at de skal til at lave et udbud inden de næste 4 uger og der vil de gerne have os med” (01:14:03).

”Vi siger, at det vil vi selvfølgelig meget gerne være med i, men vi vil også meget gerne komme ned og besøge jer. De kommer egentlig bare og siger – vi sender jer et udbud. Men det er ikke godt nok, det dur ikke for os. Vi vil ikke bare være en af dem der laver et tilbud, og nu kender vi en i bestyrelsen - så det der er ekstremt vigtigt lige nu, er at vores Key Account Manager han kommer ned og besøger dem inden for de næste 4 uger. Han skal have lavet et møde med dem og komme ned og præsentere DONG Energy og fortælle hvad vi er for en. Fordi det kan godt være at vores pris den ligger lige lidt for højt, for vi er ikke så store og vi kan ikke give så store rabatter som de andre kan, det kan vi bare ikke. Det har vi prøvet mange gange hvor vi går ind med en pris og bliver smadret fuldstændig af de store, som bare siger at DONG Energy skal bare ikke ind her” (01:14:50).

”Der er det så, at vi skal forklare, at vi kan alt muligt andet end bare at komme med en god pris. Vi kan ikke komme med den bedste pris, det har vi ikke penge nok til. Og det kræver fysisk tilstedeværelse, Key Account Managerens succes kriterie er at komme ned og besøge dem. Hvis han ikke ringer til dem i dag, så ringer han til dem i morgen og spørger om et møde, og så kommer vi ned og præsentere hvem vi er og hvordan vi gør tingene. Og så glæder jeg mig til at se det udbud der kommer og vi sender et tilbud med en pris, men de skal bare vide at der er nogle andre ting der betyder noget på lang sigt (01:15:30).

”Det er et godt eksempel på den personlige relation, lad os komme ned og snakke om det, snakke om hvad I vil, hvad vi vil, hvordan vi præsenterer os, hvad er jeres behov – det er første møde. Så kommer udbuddet og vi byder på det, og hvis vi er heldige og komme blandt de tre billigste, og det er *det* de evaluere på, så kan vi eventuelt komme ned og have et møde mere, hvor vi så snakker om, om der måske er nogle andre ting end bare gas vi kunne snakke, om hvordan vi kunne også gøre sådan og sådan. Så kan det være de vælger os, selvom vi ikke har det billigste tilbud, eller det kan være vi vælger skrue prisen lidt mere ned, måske det første år. En ting er tilbuddet, men når der kommer forhandling ind i billedet, så gør vi noget andet, alt efter hvad kunden siger. Måske laver vi kontrakten længere, der er mange muligheder”

”Det er et godt eksempel på at vi ser ham ser som kunde med det samme. Vi kunne også bare have sagt – ja send os bare udbuddet og farvel. Men det dur ikke, for det er ikke det han har brug for, han har brug for noget mere – mener vi” (01:16:45).

*På kommentaren om, at det lyder som om at proximity er altafgørende i opbyggelse af et partnerskab og på spørgsmålet om det også gælder for det etablerede partnerskab;*

”Det betyder alt. Når partnerskabet er etableret forventer vores kunder at få en individuel behandling. Det er fremhævet i vores kundeundersøgelser at de får en individuel behandling og sætter pris på det. Vi kunne sagtens gøre mere for at systematisere den information vi sender til kunderne, men taget vores størrelse på det tyske marked i betragtning, er det ikke der vi har sat ind i første omgang. Lige nu kører vi det personligt og individuelt, men når vi får flere kunder er vi nødt til at systematisere det lidt. Det er noget af det vi begynder at se på nu. For vores næste bølge, efter en intro-periode på nogle år, det er at systematisere, ellers bliver det for tungt rent manuelt at huske det hele. Men vi skal stadigvæk bevare kontakten og fleksibiliteten til kunderne og det er lidt en kunst” (01:18:15).

*På et afsluttende spørgsmål om fremtidsvisionen;*

”Vi bliver aldrig lige så store som de fire store, det kan vi ikke”.

*På spørgsmålet om de udmeldte ekspansionsstrategier;*

”Det er noget vi ikke snakker om, men de er enorme vores vækstambitioner. Hele vores forretningsmodel, og det gælder for hele DONG Energy, bliver vendt på hovedet lige nu, og mange af investeringerne sker i udlandet. Men de er enorme og vi skal gerne vokse til dobbelt størrelse i vores afdeling i Tyskland, inden for en meget overskuelig årrække – så vi har rigtig travlt. Men vi holder fast i den samme model, for det har givet gode resultater. Måske skal den justeres lidt i forhold til at gå efter de større virksomheder, for det kræver meget at have mange små partnerskaber, og nogen af tingene skal systematiseres for at få mere effektivitet ind i kundehåndteringen, så vi også fremstår mere professionelle udadtil. Så det skal ikke kun være Key Account Manager 1,2 og 3 det hele afhænger af, men at der er noget bedre support på det – så det er det vi arbejder med internt” (00:19:59).

”Det hele bliver mere og mere åbent når de forskellige markeder bliver slæt sammen. Det betyder at vi har fysisk adgang og kan komme igennem til nye kunder. Men grunden til at vi ikke sælger i Sydtyskland, det er ikke fordi vi ikke vil, det er fordi vi ikke kan få gassen igennem de enkelte net derved. Du kan ikke få kapacitet til at transportere igennem de rør der er” (01:20:35).

LW illustrerer det med, at der er x antal togskinner og hvis alle to togvogne er udsolgt, så er der ikke mere plads. Men nu kører der et rullebånd i stedet for, og der kan alle hoppe på. Man skal købe teknisk kapacitet til at transportere sin gas og hvis alt er booket kan man ikke købe noget.

”Der bliver åbnet op for nogle af de flaskehalse som har været. Og nogle af de flaskehalse har været rent kommercielle eller administrative, men andre gange handler det om rent fysiske begrænsninger på vores meget gas der kan flyde gennem et bestemt rør” (01:21:35).

*På spørgsmålet om det også er et forhandlingsspil;*

”Nej – det er EU regulering og tysk regulering, der går ind og kigger på de her ting, og får nedlagt de her markedsområder og får dem lagt sammen. Man ser på det som et badekar i stedet for en samling af rør, det er nogle tekniske handelsændringer der forsvinder– så der ligger et godt marked og venter på os” (01:22:53)

## **Interview guide til Interview med CEO for Wave Star Energy**

### **Erkendelsestema: om respondenten og virksomheden som den ser ud netop i dag:**

- Først må du gerne fortælle hvad du hedder, hvad din uddannelsesbaggrund er og hvad du laver hos Wave Star?
- Hvad er Wave Star for et firma, hvad producerer I, hvor mange ansatte?
- Hvad er Wave Stars mål og hvordan vil I opnå dem?
- Hvad er de største udfordringer som Wave Star står over for lige nu?

### **Erkendelsestema: Wave Stars partnerskaber og samarbejde med andre virksomheder:**

- Arbejder I alene eller har I nogen samarbejdspartnere? Hvordan startede samarbejdet?
- Hvordan definerer du en partner/ et samarbejde?
- Har I arbejdet sammen før? Hvilken rolle spiller tillid.
- Er I nogensinde bange for at jeres ideer bliver stjålet?
- Hvordan foregår jeres kommunikation med partnere i dagligdagen – hvem taler med hvem?
- Hvordan foregår samarbejdet, hvor udføres arbejdet fysisk, er der fysisk interaktion mellem partnerne, hvornår, hvor ofte osv.
- Er der nogen der styrer dette samarbejde og hvordan? Hvordan er styrkeforholdet mellem aktørerne? Hvordan er den administrative struktur.
- Ved en konference holdt af eksportrådet kaldet Born Global i maj 2008 var du gæstetaler omkring valget af den rigtige partner og skulle berøre følgende, som jeg meget gerne ville høre hvad du sagde. Oplægget lød: At finde den rigtige partner kan være afgørende for succes. Men hvordan finder man den rigtige? Hvilken type skal man lede efter? Hvilke krav skal man stille? Er der noget galt med at vælge ham, man tilfældigt møder på flyet? Eller hvad med den, der selv henvender sig? Hvornår er der grund til jubel eller skepsis?

### **Erkendelsestema: Per Resens personlige refleksioner over det at samarbejde med en anden organisation**

- Forholder du dig til at der er et styrkeforhold imellem jeres samarbejdspartnere og Wave Star? Forskelle i viden og informationer, i kapital, i status, i sociale relationer.

- Ville du kunne beskrive interesserne I samarbejdet på begge sider? Er der nogen interesser der er komplementære og er der nogen der er i konflikt.
- Hvordan ser du forhandlingen af et samarbejde? Hvordan se du den gerne bekræftet?
- Hvilken rolle spiller personlige relationer? Hvilken rolle spiller netværk? Hvordan forde du dit netværk.
- Hvordan tror du Wave Star bliver opfattet af konkurrenter og samarbejdspartnere?
- Ser du dine egne overtalelsesevner som et arbejdsredskab?
- Hvor ofte evaluere du jeres partnerskaber? Hvordan og på hvilken måde

**Erkendelsestema: Hvad er de væsentligste strukturer og aktører for Wave Star**

- Er der nogen strukturer uden for Wave Star som I er afhængige af for jeres overlevelse (Finanskrisen)?
- Er der nogen specifikke aktører uden for Wave Star som I er afhængige af for jeres overlevelse?
- Hvordan påvirker den afhængighed jeres arbejde?
- Er der nogen organisationer eller personer som du gerne ville samarbejde med på længere sigt? Hvordan forbereder du dette?
- Er der elementer af dit arbejde der er påvirket af usikkerhed? Hvordan forholder du dig til det?
- Der er jo mange firmaer der arbejder med bølgeenergi – hvordan legitimerer du over for en investor eller en politiker at det lige netop er Wave Star der skal have opmærksomhed?
- Er det dig der står for denne legitimering eller hvem har kontakterne?

**Erkendelsestema: Hvem og hvad er nødvendige samarbejds-enheder**

- Hvornår forventer du at I sælger de første kommercielle bølgearanlæg? Til hvem, har I kontakt, aftaler etc.
- Hvordan skal energien fra jeres maskine komme ud til forbrugerens køleskab? Hvilke opsamlingspunkter/distributionskanaler vil I benytte jer af, hvordan vil I etablerer kontakt med dem.
- Kan man sige at bølgeenergi er lidt malplaceret i forhold til det etablerede distributionsnet?

- Tror du det politiske incitament til at investere i bæredygtig energi vil blive mindre under finanskrisen?
- Hvordan påvirker den såkaldte Finanskrisen Wave Star? (Politisk, Økonomisk, Offentlig opmærksomhed, faldende oliepriser)
- Hvornår i dit arbejde ville du sige at du forhandler? Hvornår ser du dig selv i en forhandlingssituasjon?
- Du er flere steder citeret for at Wave Star har udenlandske kontakter der er interesseret i jeres model. Hvordan er denne kontakt blevet etableret? Hvordan følges der op for at bevare interessen?

### **Erkendelsestema: Wave Stars konkurrence situation**

- Hvordan ser du jeres konkurrenter i Danmark - og globalt. Ifølge Wikipedia og flere artikler er der lignende udviklingsprojekter der er længere fremme end de danske?
- Er der nogen sammenslutninger i den danske energi-industri, mellem mennesker eller institutioner som gør det svært/nemt for Wave Star at lave sit arbejde?
- Et firma som Siemens har i deres 20 års fremtids-scenarior for alternativ energi ikke bølgeenergi med, men derimod tidevands-energi og andre former – hvorfor tror du det er tilfældet?

## **Interviewguide: Partnership Manager, DONG Energy, Energy and Climate Partnerships**

- Hvad er DONG's motivation i klimapartnerskaber
- Den Energispareaftale som DONG har forpligtet sig på med at hente 144 mio. kWh om året – hvad sker der hvis I ikke lever op til den?
- Hvad er DONG's interesse i at den offentlige og private sektor foretager energirigtige indkøb?
- Hvad er de udfordrende elementer i klima-partnerskaber?
- Hvad for typer af kontrakter laver I med jeres partnere?
- Hvordan forhandles disse kontrakter på plads og hvad forpligter partnerne sig typisk til? Er partnerne forpligtede på at indkøbe vedvarende energi hos jer?
- Hvad er DONG's forpligtelse og hvad er virksomhedens? Hvad sker der hvis en af partner ikke lever op til forpligtelsen.
- Har I oplevet at I måtte stoppe et samarbejde? Hvorfor?
- Hvem er velegnede som partnere for jer og hvordan foregår den første kontakt – er det jer eller virksomheder/kommuner der tager kontakt?
- Består jeres hovedopgave i at modne markedet til vedvarende energi eller i at fremme forskningen på området?
- Hvordan står denne afdeling i forhold til energi-produktionen i resten af DONG's arbejde?
- Når I kalder jeres samarbejder med virksomheder og kommuner for partnerskaber, hvad er det så jeres partnere skal levere tilbage til jer? Hvad er jeres betingelse for at hjælpe virksomhederne med at blive mere grønne?
- Hvor meget betyder netværk i jeres arbejde – er jeres nuværende klimapartnerskaber indgået med kendte eller ukendte partnere?
- Hvad er det der er "win" for DONG? Er der en forventning om at I sammen med partnerne skaber nye energiløsninger, eller er det mere en færdig pakke som DONG leverer?
- I udviklingen af bæredygtig energi ved vi at I samarbejder og yder bistand til Wave Star Energy. Hvad er dette for et samarbejde og hvad er de gensidige forpligtelser. Hvad er DONG's interesse?
- Hvad forstår I ved en win-win situation.
- På samme måde som Amerikanske stater I vest har etableret noget de kalder **Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to control carbon emissions**, kunne man så forestille sig at DONG skabte forbindelse mellem virksomheder i samme region/område, så virksomheder og kommuner kunne erfarringsudveksle?
- Hvad er dit indtryk af virksomhedernes interesser, handler det om CSR eller om at spare penge (eller om at gøre noget for miljøet)?
- Christian - Du sagde i telefonen at I laver opsøgende arbejde i forhold til potentielle partnere. Hvad er det for kriterier I kigger efter og hvordan tager I den første kontakt?
- Når I stiller en business case op for kunden – hvad er så de typiske elementer?
- Hvad forstår I ved en win-win situation?
- Hvor ofte kommunikerer I med jeres partnere, hvem tager kontakt og hvor formaliseret er denne kontakt.

- Oplever I at kulturelle forskelligheder gør det udfordrende at kommunikere med partnere.
- Som partnerskabet udvikles over tid, er der så løbende en evaluering om det går godt, eller handler det om at nå et bestemt fastsat mål. Hvad sker der når ydre omstændigheder ændre omstændighederne for kontrakten – eksempelvis at olie-prisen falder drastisk.
- Er der nogen kontrakt der kan holde partnerne til ilden – eller er det i princippet en frivillig ordning som DONG faciliterer?
- Hvad betyder nærhed/fysisk tilstedeværelse fra jeres side for de reelle ændringer i virksomhedernes omgang med energi?

## **Interviewguide med Supervisor i Dong Energy i afdelingen for Products and Partnership concepts 13. februar 2009**

- Du må gerne fortælle hvad din uddannelse er og hvor længe du har været hos DONG Energy?
- Med en titel af Supervisor, hvad laver du så til daglig?
- Du fortalte at afdelingen blev etableret i 2005 – var der nogen speciel årsag til det?
- Du fortalte i telefonen, at I til at begynde med da I startede afdelingen forsøgte at lave en model over partnerskaber, men at det ikke kunne lade sig gøre. Vil du fortælle om hvorfor?
- Hvilke elementer havde i forestillet jer en model skulle indeholde?
- Er der elementer i et samarbejde/ en businesscase som altid er til stede?
- Er der nogen elementer der er vigtigere end andre?
- Hvad er forskellen mellem en kunde og en partner?
- Er der nogen form for produkt-viden eller produkter der går fra jeres partnere, eller går regningen i kroner og øre udelukkende fra DONG til dem?
- Samarbejder i med andre virksomheder for at kunne leverer jeres produkter til Statsværkerne? Og hvordan er relationen, afhængigheden her?
- Du fortalte at de fleste samarbejder starter med personlige relationer, vil du uddybe det – og hvem er relationerne imellem, hvad er deres karakter, hvornår etableres de og hvor?
- Du fortalte yderligere betydningen af de bløde faktorer for at et partnerskab kommer i stand – vil du uddybe hvad du mener med bløde faktorer.
- Når du taler om personlige relationer er det så typisk mellem kontaktpersoner, mellem lederne eller på direktørniveau?
- Hvad betyder tillid i jeres arbejde med Statsværkerne i Tyskland, hvor starter den, hvem har den til hvem og hvad kunne evt. svække den?
- Du sagde også i telefonen at det sværreste faktisk var at komme til at sidde i forhandlingssituationen – hvorfor det?
- Hvordan, hvornår og hvor foregår forhandlingssituationen typisk?
- Finder I selv potentielle partnere eller kontakter de jer. Hvem tager de kontakt til – eller hvem tager I den første kontakt til?
- Hvad er de væsentligste interesser som Statsværkerne har i DONG?

- Hvor meget betyder netværk og deltager I aktivt i arrangementer der ligger op til networking?
- Hvor meget arbejde ville du sige I bruger på at pleje partnerskabsrelationer.
- Som partnerskabet udvikles over tid, er der så løbende en evaluering om det går godt, eller handler det mest om at nå et bestemt fastsat mål. Hvad sker der når ydre omstændigheder ændrer omstændighederne for kontrakten – eksempelvis at energi-priserne falder drastisk.
- Hvordan vedligeholder I en relation/ et partnerskab?
- Hvad betyder geografisk forskel/ nærhed for et partnerskab?
- Når partnerskabet er aftalt, hvordan bliver det så stadfæstet?
- Bliver der lavet en kontrakt – og hvad bliver den kontrakt brugt til? Hvem tager initiativ til den og hvem formulerer den.
- Hvilke typer af kontrakter har I lavet med jeres partnere?
- Hvordan bliver jeres partnerskaber styret, hvem har ledelsen, hvem bestemmer hvornår der skal rapporteres?
- Hvordan ser du styrkeforholdet mellem DONG og jeres partnere – er der nogen der ikke kan undvære den anden?
- Du sagde at I forsøgte at sætte jer grundigt ind i kundens interesser – sætter I også kunden ind i jeres interesser.
- På hjemmesiden skriver i meget om kundens fleksibilitet – hvorfor er det så vigtigt?
- Hvorfor tror du at det partnerskaber mellem virksomheder er blevet så populære – og hvad mener du er et succesfuldt partnerskab?
- Hvad er udfordringerne ved de partnerskaber I laver – hvordan tackler I dem?
- Har du oplevet at kunderne havde urealistiske forventninger til hvad DONG kunne levere.
- Er der nogen kulturelle udfordringer/ fordomme der skal overvindes i samarbejdet med tyske virksomheder?
- Hvad er DONGs position i Tyskland – og hvem er konkurrenterne
- Hvad er jeres væsentligste konkurrenceparametre – er det mere service en pris.
- Hvad ville du sige adskilte DONG fra konkurrenterne i forhold til de tyske statsværker, er det overlegen teknologi, er det overlegent image, er det overlegen pris eller overlegen service?

- Oplever I at kulturelle forskelligheder gør det udfordrende at kommunikere og samarbejde med partnere?

## **Interview med PRS direktør i Wave Star Energy 23. januar 2009**

**Lokation: Maglemosevej 61, Wave Star Energys lokaler**

**Interviewere: Nikolaj Tofte Brenneche og Christine Thalsgård Henriques**

PRS er maskiningeniør fra DTU. Han startede sin første virksomhed den dag han blev færdig på DTU hjemme på sit værelse. PRS kalder sig selv en seriøs entreprenør type. Hans første virksomhed var en såkaldt Greenfield virksomhed, inden for et felt hvor der ikke fandtes nogen egentlig ekspertise i Danmark på det tidspunkt. Det var en meget hård fødsel, men det lykkedes. I den forbindelse har han arbejdet i næsten 20 år med undervandsteknologi, hvilket er noget med at bygge udstyr der kan fungere i vand og på meget dybt vand – og allervigtigst fungere driftspålideligt og godt.

Det er meget den erfaring han bruger i sit arbejde i dag.

"Jeg har startet Wave Star Energi 1. oktober 2003 med det eneste formål at kommercialisere bølgekraft. Altså skabe et gennembrud på linje med det vi alle sammen kender fra vindkraft" (01.44)

(02.03) "Det er tilbage til 1999 – som var et ransagelsens år – der tog jeg en beslutning om at jeg fremover kun ville arbejde med rent vand, teknologi eller vedvarende energi. Jeg fandt ud af at det egentlig var ligegyldigt hvad jeg arbejdede med af nye teknologier, så skulle jeg nok finde en eller anden måde at lave en forretning ud af det. Så alt fokus blev sat ind i det område."

I 2001 fik han for alvor øje på bølgekraft og stillede sig selv spørgsmålet hvorfor der ikke var nogen der havde haft succes med idéen. På verdensplan er der de sidste 30-40 år brændt et sted mellem 3,5-5 mia. kr. af på test og placere anlæg i verden, det har tiltrukket de bedste hjerner i verden, men der er ingen der lykkedes (03.20). Det tiltalte ham – fordi han vidste potentialet var der og så satte han sig for at finde ud af hvad der var de reelle problemer der skulle løses. Det gravede han sig så ned i et par år på hobbyplan (03.54), imens han var beskæftiget andetsteds.

Han begynder at tage med på konferencer og møde mennesker der beskæftiger sig med bølgekraft og undrede sig over at ingen rigtig beskæftiger sig med, at én maskine til at udvinde bølgekraft kunne være bedre til at kommercialisere bølgekraft end andre. Han søgte en vinderteknologi.

Det var et internationalt miljø der var teknisk interesserende mere end de var kommersielt interesserede.

"Jeg finder ud af hvis jeg nogensinde skal beskæftige mig med bølgekraft så er det det den kommersielle indgangsvinkel, der skal frem i lyset. Da der ikke er nogen der kan fortælle mig hvordan, begyndte jeg at opstille en tjeck-liste over de helt fundationale egenskaber jeg ville mene der skulle til hvis det skulle lykkes" (05.34)

1. Systemerne skal stormsikres uden at det belaster anlægget væsentligt
2. Man skal bygge anlægget baseret på kendte komponenter og kendte teknologier. Da det er både svært, tidskrævende og dyrt at konstruere komponenter der kan fungere i vand, er risikoen hvis man konstruerer nye komponenter for aldrig at nå frem til et kommersielt produkt, alt for stor.
3. (08.23) Så få komponenter skal i vand som muligt – det er langt billigere at udvikle og langt mindre risikofyldt.
4. Benchmark mod vindenergi – ikke med bølgekraftanlægs-konkurrenter. Skal bølgekraft være rentabelt skal det være på linje eller billigere end offshore vind (09.40).

(9.36) Ideen med synergieffekt mellem vind og bølgekraft kom ret hurtigt fordi bølger og energi har forskudt tidsramme.

”Vedvarende energi kommer når det kommer, og der er det rart at have nogle energiformer der kan supplere hinanden tidsmæssigt. Og så er der det, at på sigt er det en stor fordel, når man har en vindfarm ude i havet også at ligge en bølgefarm derude også, du kan have de samme kabler til land, de samme service folk, de samme tilladelser - så det hele går op i en højere enhed. Det tror jeg bliver fremtiden at have disse kæmpemæssige anlæg” (10.38)

*På spørgsmålet om, hvorfor mon Siemens ikke har bølgekraft med i deres fremtids-scenarie;*

PRS fortæller han at de har et underselskab der beskæftiger sig med bølgekraft. Men den model der arbejdes med har for lav en ydelse, den kan ikke matche vind. I samme sætning vender han tilbage til sin liste over væsentlige faktorer for en bølgemodel(12.00)

5. Et godt bølgekraftkoncept er et der skal skaleres. Det betyder at man kan starte med små maskiner og så langsomt bygge større og større. Det begrundes med måde som Wave Stars kunder, Dong, Vattenfall, og E.On tænker på (12.30). De vil have store enheder der virkelig kan leve noget. Vi starter små og bevæger os op i større og større modeller og det er ud fra en markedspræcis betragtning utrolig vigtigt at teknologien kan forstørres (13.27)

*Fra (14.00-16.40) – Beskrivelse af Wave Star Energy's arbejde siden 2004, på spørgsmålet om hvor langt de er fra at have en kommersiel model.*

*(18.00) – Nikolaj ankommer*

(20.00) – Wave Star Energy modellen har nu passeret 2,5 års drifts-tid og overlevet 15 storme og det er en utrolig vigtig milestone. Det er helt afgørende i forhold til de få konkurrenter der reelt er på verdensplan, for de har alt, alt for lidt drifts-tid ude i havet. Deres største konkurrent, Irske Palermis, er mest en konkurrent fordi de har fået tilført et beløb på 500 mio. Kr. Men da Palermis efter 2,5 års forsinkelse endelig fik sat deres model i havet, måtte de efter 2 uger, efter hvad PRS er blevet fortalt, tage den ind igen. ”Det dur bare ikke (21.00)” Det her med at have noget der faktisk kan fungerer i havet er fuldstændig afgørende.

*(21.40) – PRS henter sin computer for at vise en power-point præsentation.*

(23.20) PRS startede sin første virksomhed hjemme på sit værelse og Wave Star Energy blev startet i hans private kælder.

”Det betyder faktisk vanvittig meget, for når jeg gør op hvor mange penge jeg sparar ved ikke at skulle ud at investere i lokaler er det rigtig meget, og det betyder noget når man starter op. Lige nu er der 14 arbejdspladser i kælderen og vi kan ikke være flere, så vi kigger efter en anden lokation. Men det er jo til en helt anden husleje (24.30)”.

”Det handler om at holde omkostningerne nede og det er også et godt signal til investorer at man kan det. Selvom når det nu er familien Clausen der er investor i Wave Star er det måske ikke kun positivt, og de synes faktisk at det her med at det foregik i kælderen, det var lige under lavmålet (25.10)”.

Men det er en fordel at kunne holde omkostningerne nede, specielt i starten hvor man sidder meget alene, der er det en fordel at have en speciel mentalitet der kan sige – ”jeg har et mål og der skal vi hen”.

Wave star Energy er en udpræget udviklingsvirksomhed, ikke en forskningsvirksomhed (26:15). De udvikler produkter uden at det er grundforskning. Og ikke en produktionsvirksomhed, for selvom de producerer maskinerne til tests så gør de det med underleverandører fra hele verden.

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan det kunne være at Wave Star Energy ikke er nævnt på Wikipedia som en af de førende bølgekraft virksomheder;*

PRS mener at det er en fejl uden at uddybe det nærmere.

(29:20) PRS viser power point og gentager sine 5 punkter. Han uddyber scaleringsprincippet som en videns og erfaringsopbygning, der er meget vigtig og som kendes fra vindmøller. De virksomheder der startede med de store modeller mislykkedes alle, og derfor er det så vigtigt at gå forsigtigt frem – specielt når det er kommercialisering der er målet. Ikke mindst af hensyn til investorer, for det koster mange penge at sætte sådan en maskine op og hvis den havarerer, er omkostningerne uoverskuelige. Der kan også være en frygt for at turde teste maskinen rigtigt

(33:00) Det er langt billigere at køre med små modeller. Han nævner at den første model kostede 2,5 mio. Kr. at bygge. Modellen i Nissum Bredning er en 5,5 kWh (1:10), kostede 15 mio. Kr. og de er nu ved at bygge en 500 kWh maskine (1:2) til 150 mio. Kr.

”Det betyder at hvis du ikke har en erfaringsopbygning når du laver modellen til 100 mio. Kr. så er chancen for at der går noget galt langt større”

”Det som gennemsyrer hele vores arbejde, er den der fuldstændig kontrollerede måde at arbejde på, trin for trin” (34:04).

De store energiselskaber vil gerne have store maskiner. Det er på mange måder lettere at vedligeholde, specielt i havet, hvor man skal sejle rundt med både mellem maskiner i store bølger – det holder ikke med små maskiner. 500 kWh modellen er den mindste model som Wave Star kan lave hvor det nogenlunde løber rundt økonomisk (36:20).

5,5 kWh modellen – leverer strøm til ca. 2 husstande

500 kWh modellen – leverer strøm til ca. 500 husstande (36:50).

(37:25) Pr. kWh de producerer skal de kunne sammenligne sig med vindmølle-industrien. Men det er sådan, ifølge PRS, at

”Når vi sammenligner os med de andre bølgeenergi koncepter, der ligger de i ydelse, hvis man tager en 500 kWh Wave Star maskine og placerer den i havet med en 500 kWh maskine af de andre maskiner i de samme bølger, så producerer vi 3-5 gange mere. Det er bare ikke kendt i markedet endnu. Det bliver det fra næste år (2010.red) af når vi er parat til at levere maskinerne (37:55)”.

*Flere slides.*

Prove-and-track record er det vigtigste for læringen. Hvis man ikke tester i havet lærer man ikke nok. Dernæst er væsentligt at anlæggene er miljø-neutrale i havet. Der bruges kun biologiske nedbrydelige materiale, der bruges ikke giftig maling til konstruktionen osv.

”Det har ikke mening, efter min mening, at lave vedvarende energi, hvis man samtidig forurener. Det er et klart krav også fra vores kunder” (39:15)

Forudsætningen for alt hvad de laver er en meget stærk patentering, for i bund og grund er det de laver meget simpelt. Patentering er en forudsætning for at PRS ville gå ind i projektet (40:00).

(40:30) PRS fortæller om de tekniske detaljer ved Wave Star maskinen og de forskellige elementer der gør den anderledes end konkurrenternes.

1: Den står på pæle i vandet – er ikke flydende

2: Meget få dele og kun dem der ikke er kostbare er i vand.

3: Den er ikke orienteret mod bølgerne, men med og det giver jævn strøm og ikke huller i strømmen

4: Den er stormsikret ved at pælene automatisk løfter maskinen op af vandet under en storm, og de kan løfte til den usandsynligt høje bølge som er 80% af vanddybden, hvis bølgen bliver højere bryder de.

5: Maskinen er besøgsvenlig med dæk og rækkeværk. Maskinen i Nissum Bredning ligger ud for en bro og det gør den besøgsvenlig modsat flydende anlæg. (eksempel på en lavpraktisk formidling til investorer og politikere af et komplekst teknologisk system, gør det muligt at opleve maskinen)

(46.05)"Vi ville overhovedet ikke kunne få noget gennemslag hos politikerne hvis de ikke kunne komme ud og stå på den der maskine"

Eksempelvis oplevede PRS, at daværende Økonomi- og Erhvervsminister Bent Bentsen, efter at have besøgt maskinen, ringede til PRS for lige at få detaljerne igen, så han bruge det som eksempel til en pakke han skulle have vedtaget omkring vedvarende energi. Så noget, mener PRS, var ikke sket hvis han ikke kunne besøge maskine (46.50)

PRS inviterede Bent Bentsen. De mødtes lidt af omveje til en privat jagt hvor PRS simpelthen fortalte ham at de stod over for åbningen af maskinen og spurgte om han ikke havde lyst til at påtage sig det (47:15).

"I praksis er det, i Danmark, ikke det store problem at møde politikere. Her for nylig var jeg i Paris til den Energitekniske udstilling og der mødte jeg Connie Hedegård (Energi og Klimaminister.red) og jeg har stort hilst på alle de energi-tekniske ordførere i folketingset og det er også en del af strategien. Men nu oplever vi faktisk at det er dem der ringer til os" (48:00)

Før jul havde energipolitisk ordfører fra Venstre, Inger Støjberg, ringet og spurgt om hun ikke måtte se anlægget når hun skulle på en tur rundt i landet. Og hun havde været meget imponeret over hvor langt de var, hun troede at bølgekraft det var sådan noget nogle nørder gik og rodede med og ikke rigtig kunne få ud af flækken!!! Det havde været en meget god oplevelse for PRS, at hun havde været der og så hvordan de hele fungerede, og det betyder meget understreger PRS (48:42)

Også sådan en som Lars Christian Lilleholt fra Venstre, som har forstand på energi og selv kommer fra kraftværksindustrien, har været ude og han forstod også godt principperne. (49:00)

(39:40) PRS forklarer det fantastiske i at politikere er meget lige ud af landvejen, fordi politikere lever af informationer og de skal ud og se noget. På spørgsmålet om han bruger politikernes interesse bevidst svarer han at han bruger det meget bevidst og svarer ja til at det er lobbyisme.

"Det er lobbyisme og det er helt nødvendigt. I mit tidlige arbejde har jeg aldrig arbejdet med politikere, men i arbejdet med Wave Star gik det meget hurtigt op for mig at hvis vi skulle frem,

så skulle vi have politikerne med. Så jeg fik fat i en medierådgiver, som havde været studentermedhjælp inde i Folketinget. Det han skulle hjælpe mig med, var fast hver måned, at sætte et møde op i Folketinget hvor vi tog et parti af gangen” (50:32)

”Det første års tid mødte jeg op og gik rundt derinde på gangene og syntes ikke der skete et klap. Men det kan jeg se at det gør der nu, så tingene skal bare modnes, og nu sker der virkelig noget” (51:29)

*På spørgsmålet ”Hvor meget ser du dig selv som sælger?” svarer han*

”Enhver iværksætter der ikke kan sælge, han har ikke en chance. Det der er sagen er at enhver iværksætteropgave som denne her er en form for blækspruttestilling, hvor du skal kunne lidt af det hele” (52:02)

*På spørgsmålet om hvilke former for partnerskaber Wave Star indgår i svarer han*

”Vi har tre målgrupper. Den ene er det vi kalder politikere og lægmænd. Så går vi målrettet efter rekruttering – at vi skal rekruttere dygtige medarbejdere og en målgruppe der hedder underleverandører og samarbejdspartnere. Lige nu er vi eksempelvis i gang med at lave en ny hjemmeside, som simpelthen skal være super, for det har lidt været noget forfærdeligt noget” (53:22).

Den 1. december 2008 passerede virksomheden 20 ansatte (54:20). PRS har blandt andet fået en personlig assistent og virksomheden har fået en grafisk designer og en HR-ansvarlig (55:15). Hjemmesiden skal dyrkes meget i år, ikke mindst i forbindelse med klima-topmødet.

*Tilbage til partnerskaber...*

Wave Star er meget rettet mod dygtige underleverandører, som kan noget specielt og er specielt konkurrencedygtige, og individer der har en eller anden viden der kan være interessant for dem. Derudover er der relationen til Energi-selskaberne, som han benævner som deres fremtidige kunder, og de inddrages meget tidligt i virksomhedens udviklingsarbejde.

(55:56)”Vi har et forbilledligt samarbejde med Dong Energy, de har virkelig set lyset i det vi går og laver og de stiller teknikere til rådighed – gratis – for at hjælpe os. Og det går selvfølgelig begge veje. De lærer noget om bølgekraft som de ikke ved noget om og vi lærer noget om hvordan vores fremtidige kunder tænker” (56:22)

Det er vigtigt for Wave Star, at deres maskiner bliver de første driftspålidelige bølgeenergimaskiner i verden, og det er et langt sejt træk, men det er det de satser på.

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan samarbejdet med DONG Energy startede svarer PRS at han tog kontakt til dem og så startede det sådan.*

”På verdensplan har vi i øjeblikket en meget stærk profiling igennem Danmarks Eksportråd, og der har man de her eksportrådgivere som sidder i alle mulige forskellige lande. Det gode ved Danmark Eksportråd er at der er blevet bruger betaling og det betyder at vi kan forlange noget af dem. Vi bruger dem til at finde vores fremtidige kunder. Det sidste halvanden års tid har jeg haft en kampagne i gang der går på at udnævne hvilke lande, specielt i Europa, som er interessante fordi de har naturlige bølgeressourcer. Den første undersøgelse går på, hvad er Regeringens (i det pågældende land. red) syn på bølgekraft, vil man subsidiere bølgekraft nok i en opstartsfasen med nogle ordentlige Feed-In-Tariffer – altså en forhøjet kWh pris (58:10), hvordan med

elektricitetsselskaberne – hvem er vores bedste første kunde i et nyt land – den kunde der danner skole for alle de andre”.

Wave Star har startet de undersøgelser for at være sikker på det ikke er tilfældigt hvem de kommer i kontakt med. Da undersøgelsen blev lavet i Sverige var resultatet at det klart var Vattenfall som de skulle samarbejde med, og dem har de haft en rigtig godt samarbejde med siden. Men her var det dog ikke PRS selv der tog kontakt, men kontakten skete igennem Eksporrådet, og det var den danske ambassadør i Stockholm der tog den første kontakt (58:55).

Angående konkurrenter i andre lande i risikoen for at lande favoriserer deres egne virksomheder, ser PRS ikke nogen fare, da han måned for måned bliver bestyrket i at Wave Star har vindteknologien på bølgekraft området (59:34).

Portugal har været forgangsland på bølgekraft-området, fordi de indførte forhøjede Feed-In-Tariffer på et tidligt tidspunkt. På regeringsniveau har man konstateret, at der er mangel på energi, at de skal importere alt for meget, derfor har de en national interesse i at få en national industri på energi området og det kunne for Portugals vedkommende passende være bølgekraft med al den kyststrækning(01:00:15). Portugal var det første land som Wave Star undersøgte.

Det der er sket nu er at den danske ambassadør i Portugal, som PRS har mødt til et netværksmøde i udenrigsministeriet for et par år tilbage (01:01:00), han synes at Wave Star er et ualmindelig spændende projekt, så han er, på politisk niveau, i gang med at fremme Wave Stars interesser.

”Det er et fantastisk match, for på den måde både at køre på politisk niveau og ved hårdt salg, ved at finde det energiselskab der virkelig vil være fremme i skoene” (01:01:41)

På spørgsmålet om hvad Wave Star skal leve til de energiselskaber som de indgår aftaler med, svarer PRS med henvisning til DONG, at det skal ses mere langsigtet, for selskaberne vil i første omgang bare gerne se en virksomhed have succes med det her, så dertil stiller de deres assistance til rådighed for at Wave Star kan gøre deres maskiner driftspålidelige. Det er deres primære interesse(01:02:23). Dernæst vil de gerne have en Wave Star maskine ud på Horns Rev II, som ejes og drives af DONG, når Wave Star mener de er klar (01:02:31). DONG er, ifølge PRS, helt overbeviste om at bølgekraft bliver lige så vigtig som vindkraft er. Der er en tillid til at det som DONG investerer i Wave Star nok skal komme igen og samarbejdet er ikke bundet af nogen kontrakt (01:02:52).

PRS fremhæver at DONG får noget positiv omtale pga. Samarbejdet med Wave Star modsat den ellers megen negative omtale de ellers har i pressen.

”Der er hele tiden et eller andet hvor det insinueres at DONG Energy misbruger deres position og trækker et eller andet ned over ørerne på forbrugerne (01:03:34)”.

*Med reference til PRSs oplæg ved Eksporrådets Born Global konference i maj 2008, blev der spurgt til hvordan man vælger partner og om det kan være tilfældigt hvem man samarbejder med, hvilket PRS afviser på det kraftigste (01:04:07).*

Teknisk forklarer PRS at bølgemaskinen er meget nem at koble på det eksisterende net med et elkabel der fører ind til transformer stationen og bliver det sendt ud igennem elnettet (01:05:10). Elnettet er ejet af energinet.dk.

En af de væsentligste grunde til at man lavede energinet.dk, som er ejet af Staten var problematikkerne ved, at det er energiselskaberne der ejer mellemspændings- og højspændingsdistributionsnettet, som det stadig er i en del lande. I disse lande kan et selskab

blokere for at et andet kan levere vindenergi til forbrugerne fordi de ikke vil have det ind over deres eget net (01:06:00). Med energinet.dk kan enhver med en vindmølle i baghaven sælge sin energi til det statsejede elnet. I mange lande er det noget værre rod som der skal ryddes op i lovgivningsmæssigt (01:06:25).

PRS ser et fragmenteret elnet som den første udfordring for vedvarende energi, men fremhæver at for Wave Star har det været en fordel ikke at være first-movers på området, for det har vindmølle-industrien været. Det er vindkraft som har skabt det behov som Wave Star også har, som er et fælles elnet (01:06:58).

Vindkraft har på mange måder banet vejen for nye energiformer, for den industri mødte stor modstand af eksperter der ikke troede på ideen, men som blev overrasket. Den møder PRS stort set ikke, der er ikke nogen der afviser at bølgekraft kunne blive til noget stort (01:07:30).

”Vindkraft har banet vejen, det som ingen troede på det var muligt. Risøs eksperter sagde at det kun i bedste fald kunne dække 1-2 % af Danmarks elforbrug og i dag dækker det 17 %. Det er utrolig farligt at sige den slags fordi det bremser udviklingen. Der er ingen i dag der ved deres sansers fulde frem ville sige, at det der med bølgekraft, det bliver ikke til noget. Nej de siger – lad os se at få det i gang” (01:08:01).

*På spørgsmålet om hvilken indflydelse en faldende oliepris kan have på Wave Star;*

PRS afviser, at det kan have nogen, fordi det kun er midlertidigt og fremhæver at der er andre væsentlige grunde til at satse på vedvarende energi. Først er der uafhængighed af slyngelstater og hvis man tager det helt brede helikopter perspektiv på, og forestillede sig et samfund der var 100 % baseret på vedvarende energi, så mener PRS at alle krige i verden ville forsvinde (01:09:41).

”En anden væsentlig ting ved et vedvarende energisystem, er at man kender sin energipris 20 år ud i fremtiden og det er ikke et argument jeg har hørt endnu i pressen, men det er en utrolig vigtig ting. Det eneste vi ved nu er prisen går op (01:10:28)”

Dernæst spør PRS, at vedvarende energi bliver et af de vigtigste vækstområder de næste 20-25 år og vil være en hel ny revolution på industriområdet (01:11:19). Store kendte virksomheder som Siemens, der har arbejdet med traditionel energi, har kun haft små vækstrater på 3-4 %, imens dem der arbejder med vedvarende energi har haft vækstrater på 10-15-25 %. Vel at mærke i milliardindustrier, hvor det ellers ikke synes muligt at opleve vækst i den størrelse (01:11:58).

”Det gælder om for os at være tidligt med, hvis man ikke er tidligt med, som med vindmølleområdet hvor man ikke lige starter en ny vindmøllevirksomhed. Adgangsbilletten er blevet så dyr, så det er en kæmpe udfordring at nå dertil. Industripotentialet, i kraft af de højteknologiske arbejdspladser, skal skabes nu” (01:12:35)

Det koster noget i øjeblikket at være med, i Feed-Inn-Tariffer og den slags, men på længere sigt (15 år) vil de nye energikilder blive kommercielle og så mener PRS at vi har al den energi vi skal bruge de næste 1000 år (01:13:16).

Når man bygger en virksomhed op som Wave Star, er en investor ufattelig vigtig, specielt inden for vedvarende energi fordi det er så mange penge der skal til (01:14:25). Det er også en af grundene til at bølgeenergi ikke er blevet til noget endnu. Udover alle de praktiske ting der skal til er indstigningsbilletten meget dyr og det kræver et meget højt teknisk niveau for at komme i gang (01:14:48).

"Fordi jeg har banket aktiviteter op siden jeg var 23 år, det har været min hobby og min levevej og jeg kun har været ansat knap 2 år af min karriere og det imellem salget af min virksomhed og inden jeg skulle i gang med noget andet, har jeg haft meget berøring med investorer, så jeg har en meget god fornemmelse af hvordan fungerer hele det her pengemarked" (01:15:27)

"Da jeg startede Wave Star kunne jeg finansiere tingene selv i en opstartsfas, og mine erfaringer med venture-kapital var helt af pommeren til – eller den var dårlig. Venturefolk vil gerne bryste sig af det ene og det andet, men de kommer bare med penge og så er de grådige " (01:16:10)

*På spørgsmålet om han kan nævne nogle eksempler på dårlige erfaringer;*

PRS mener at det vigtigste man skal gøre i en opstartsfas, når man får de første penge, er at få en høj værdiansættelse på sin virksomhed. Han understegør at man skal kæmpe for det og fortæller at det er den fejl de fleste begår.

"Jeg ser det jævnligt og hører om det. Så har Vækstfonden været ude og proppe 2 mio. i en virksomhed til en opstart hvor de lige får 40 % af aktierne – og sådan noget skal man aldrig rode sig ud i som opstart" (01:16:50).

For at få en så høj værdiansættelse som mulig, både for hans egen skyld og for fremtidige investorer, laver PRS en så simpel forretningsplan som mulig, der viser hvordan man kommer herfra ud til det kommersielle marked – der skal være en plan. Den skal være så gennemarbejdet at andre der læser den siger "det her – det logik" (01:17:23).

"Når nogen investerer i en virksomhed så kigger de på direktøren. Hvis de ikke har tillid til direktøren så kommer der aldrig en krone i kassen. Og det må vi se i øjnene at det er sådan det fungerer"

"En investor kan jo stille alle mulige spørgsmål og der er det klart at det er helt nødvendigt når du er iværksætter at du ved noget om det, du kan forklare tingene og du har en klar plan som er logik for høns (01:18:02)".

En god kemi spiller selvfølgelig også ind.

"Men det det virkelig handler om når du skal have investorer ind, er at det er dig der skal vælge investorer. Du skal ikke være i sådan en økonomisk knibe at det er andre der vælger dig. Og der vil jeg altid se på kemien, er det nogen der opfører sig ordentligt i andre sager osv." (01:18:44).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan kontakten til Jørgen Mads Clausen blev etableret;*

"Det stod mig klart at jeg gerne ville have en privat investor til denne type opstart, så jeg fik sat et møde i stand med ham (Jørgen Mads Clausen. red)" (01:19:18).

"Det var et fantastisk møde. Det var en lørdag formiddag på Als. Jeg tager dernen og møder de tre brødre (Peter, Henrik og Jørgen Clausen. red), jeg har en slide-præsentation med og så gennemgår vi tingene og vi havde en livlig diskussion omkring teknik, og jeg havde en forretningsplan om hvordan vi kommer herfra og derud til kommersielt niveau. Efter 2 timers snak og livlig diskussion siger Jørgen Clausen 'Nå – og hva' så'. Så spurgte jeg om de var interesseret i at deltage – fx med 10 mio. kr. i Wave Star sådan så de kunne lære virksomheden lidt bedre at kende. Så kiggede han (Jørgen Clausen. red) over på brødrerne og sagde ' Hvad med jer – er I med – for jeg er i hvert fald med?' - så var de også med og det tog 2 timer" (01:20:41).

Da selve aftalen kom i stand indskød brødrrene Clausen 16 mio. De penge dækkede udgifterne til drift af Wave Star inklusiv konstruktionen og igangsættelsen af modellen i Nissum Bredning. Et

halvt år før modellen var færdig, havde PRS ved et bestyrelsesmøde luftet at der snart skulle ske en ny værdiansættelse, og der var de ret hurtige blevet enige om prisen skulle være (01:21:35).

”Det har været en fantastisk konstruktion. Det er klart at når sådan en som Jørgen Clausen han er så fokuseret på vedvarende energi er det fordi han på egen krop har oplevet hvad det har betydet for Danfoss. Han har kunnet se at det er der alle markederne er. De har oplevet hvordan Vestas på 15 år passerede Danfoss i markedsværdi, og de havde været i gang i 60 år. Sådan nogle ting gør på direktionsniveau indtryk. De kan se vækstraterne” (01:22:19).

*På spørgsmålet om vigtigheden af investorers tekniske forståelse;*

”Det er rigtig godt at forhandle med nogen der både forstår det forretningsmæssige og det tekniske, det er en meget stærk kombination” (01:22:50).

”Når man sælger til nogen der ikke har den tekniske viden skal de have alle mulige eksperter til at udtale sig og er afhængige af det. Jeg ville aldrig, hvis jeg sad med en kæmpe såk penge, investere i en virksomhed som jeg ikke selv forstod” (01:23:30).

”Hvis du forhandler med en topdirektør i et eller andet firma og topdirektøren er mere finansmand end han er teknisk orienteret. Så skal han have alle mulige eksperter til at udtale sig og så begynder der at gå alt for meget bureaucrati i den. Der er ikke en mavefornemmelse der siger at det her er rigtigt, så derfor sidder en masse eksperter og analyserer og så kan der skabes alle mulige forviklinger” (01:24:18)

”Jeg tror mange vigtige beslutninger rummer et vist element af noget intuitivt” (01:24:26)  
”Selvfølgelig bruger alle al den logik de har lært, til at sige hvordan tingene skal være og så er der elementet af noget intuitivt der siger ’Sig mig engang – er det her nu rigtigt at gøre?’” (01:24:46).

PRS mener det er en fordel at være intuitiv fordi det tillader en at tage hurtige beslutninger, i stedet for at skulle have eksperter indover og så bliver det ikke til noget (01:25:33). Indlevelse er vigtigt – og det er det der blandt andet har været styrken ved at arbejde med familien Clausen – og der mener han at der har været et element af noget intuitivt (01:25:58).

*Nikolaj og Christine forsøger ihærdigt at få PRS til at sige noget om markedsføringsværdien af at have Clausen-brødrene som sponsor mht. kontakter, presse, status osv., men han bider ikke rigtig på udover at nikke* (01:27:00).

PRS fortæller om episode hvor Jørgen Clausen skulle præsentere Danfoss ved en konference i Hannover, hvor han havde 8 slides om Danfoss og 12 om Wave Star. Det synes PRS er sjovt (01:27:27).

*På spørgsmålet om sin egen rolle for Wave Star;*

”Det der er min rolle i det her er at bygge tingene op, jeg skulle blive 50 før det gik op for mig at det jeg laver, laver jeg fordi det er sjovt, en hobby, som jeg oven i købet kan leve af. Og jeg har fundet ud af at der er ikke ret mange der har de evner, at kunne tage ny teknologi og så lave en virksomhed ud af det” (01:28:37)”Det er min specialitet, hvilket ikke er noget jeg har tænkt over undervejs, men med tiden har jeg fundet ud af det er min metier” (01:28:30).

*På spørgsmålet om hvor bevidst han bruger netværk;*

"Det gör jeg meget bevidst og jeg er også meget bevidst om hvad jeg bruger tid på. Jeg skal ikke ind i et eller andet VL-netværk og sidde der med alle mulige andre direktører, det kan jeg ikke bruge til et klap" (01:29:20).

"Det som jeg bruger netværk til er at skabe salgskontakter, eksportmuligheder og til at rekrutterer medarbejdere" (01:29:30).

*På spørgsmålet om de har lignende samarbejder som med DONG og Vattenfall;*

PRS svarer at det stort set er i gang i alle de andre lande. Han fortæller at ca. hver anden måned dukker der et nyt land op, der synes at Wave Star er spændende, og han modtager mails fra forskellige virksomheder der er interesseret. Interessen udefra har gjort at Wave Star systematisk sætter sig ind i hvert land for at se hvem det er de skal samarbejde med.

"Vi bruger i øjeblikket omkring en halv million kr. på at lave de der undersøgelser igennem eksporrådet, det er måske 50.000 kr. pr land, men det er utrolig veludgivede penge. Det sparer mig for en masse tid, for ellers kunne jeg ligge og rejse hele jorden rundt og ville ikke have tid til at drive virksomheden" (01:31:26).

*På spørgsmålet om fremtiden foranlediges PRS til at vise flere slides.*

*På spørgsmålet om hvad der kunne bremse Wave Stars succes;*

"Vi er afhængige af at vi får ekstra høje afregningspriser og det er der hvor det politiske kommer ind igen. Det er den politiske risiko der betyder noget. Men siden jeg startede virksomheden er der sket det fantastiske at elprisen har bevæget sig op på en 40-50 øre og en kommercial vedvarende energipris, den ligger omkring 50-70 øre pr. kWh" (01:33:36).

Yderligere fremhæver PRS at globaliseringen har medført at han får henvendelser fra hele verden hvor lande har problemer med at producere energi. De er meget interesserede i om Wave Star kan producere lokalt og det kan de faktisk godt – det er en del af strategien. Planen er, at de store maskiner kan laves lokalt, for lande vil jo gerne have lokal industri, og så kommer Wave Star med den hydrauliske indmad og styremaskinen - og så har man et højteknologisk produkt (01:34:20).

*På spørgsmålet om hvordan han ser fremtiden for vedvarende energi;*

PRS er overbevist om at man skal se det meget bredt, fra biobrændstoffer til vind, varmepumper, sol der laver el og sol der laver varme, geotermiskeboringer og bølgekraft. Han viser en model over hvor prisen for de forskellige energiformer ligger nu. Han regner med at bølgekraft vil være kommersielt om 12-15 år. Han understreger igen det kæmpe markedspotentiale for vedvarende energi (01:36:39). Wave Stars kommende marked er elektricitetsselskaber der ligger ud til de store have, altså Nordsøen, Atlanterhavet, Stillehavet, det Indiske Ocean og alle øsamfundene.

(01:37:13)"Vores forretningsmodel er at sætte lokal produktion op, fordi det kan vi se, at der politisk er enorm interesse om i stort set alle lande, om det så er Portugal, Spanien, England... Vores stærke patentering muliggør at vi kan køre med fleksible forretningsmodeller, sammenholdt med det de gør i vindindustrien, hvor de hver gang skal ud og bygge alle fabrikkerne selv, hvilket er meget kapitaltungt"(01:37:40).

PRS er overbevist om Wave Star har vindteknologien inden for Bølgeenergi, og fremhæver vigtigheden af at gå langsomt men sikkert frem i arbejdet mod kommercialisering. De første 3 år var han ene mand i virksomheden og nu har de passeret 20 ansatte (01:38:39). Han fortæller, at de

er lige tyndt nok bemandet, men det er ud fra principippet om at i en opstartsvirksomhed skal folk virkelig knokle, ellers får man ikke den rigtige stemning frem i virksomheden (01:38:59). Der skal være en pionerånd – og ingen af medarbejderne mangler udfordringer, dem har de rigelig af. Mange af de ansatte kommer med en interesse i vedvarende energi, men også fordi de kommer fra halvkedelige jobs hvor der ikke foregår noget (01:39:45).

PRS fortæller videre om en ny testmodel til bølgeafprøvning ved Hanstholm, den bliver bygget på et værft i Polen og vil være klar i juli måned. Den skal åbnes i løbet af efteråret hvor der bliver en masse festivitas med politikere og EU-mennesker ”Den skal ikke få for lidt” (01:40:47).

”Vi har arbejdet meget med det industrielle design på 500 kWh'en, for den skal være et flot ikon i havet” (01:41:30)

Den er designet af CPD – Christian Bjørn Design (Stor tegnestue i København, med en prominent historie af priser og succes, at dømme ud fra hjemmesiden – har ikke været billigt. red). Modellen er indstillet til at deltage i flere større internationale designkonkurrencer (01:42:18). Pælene som maskinen sidder på er ca. 15 meter høje.

”Når du ligger noget ude i havet må det ikke visuelt forurene – det skal se flot ud” (01:42:28)

PRS fortæller om økonomien i Wave Star;

Wave Star projektet har kostet 30 mio. Euro (223 mio.kr. red) i investeringer fra start til 2009, De er kommet fra tilskud af forskellig art, men hovedparten kommer fra private investeringer som er små 140 mio. Kr. Disse kommer hovedsageligt fra brødrene Clausen.

*På kommentaren om, at det har været en utrolig privilegeret situation at have en sådan privat investor;*

PRS tilkendegiver at være enig, men fremhæver at Wave Star også har leveret varen (01:44:03). Til næste år (2010) skal de yderligere investere 10 mio. Euro og derefter forventer de at sælge den første maskine (01:44:20). I 2012 håber han, at de rammer et rent 0 alt efter hvor hurtigt tingene går.

*På kommentaren om at udviklingen også er begivenhedsafhængig siger han;*

”Min mavefornemmelse med det her projekt har fra dag 1 været helt i top og nu har jeg snart arbejdet med det her i 5 år, og det er den stadig” (01:44:52).

*På spørgsmålet om han har oplevet nogen nedture med projektet svarer han:*

”Nej – det har simpelthen kørt helt vildt. Når jeg hvert år kigger tilbage og ser på hvad vi har lavet af fremskridt – så skal jeg lige knibe mig selv i armen. Og det kan medarbejderne også se” (01:45:34).

Tak for det

