Business as Usual?

Understanding the Legitimation of Two Public-Private Partnerships for Agricultural Value Chain Development in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

Although legitimacy is recognized as a critical condition for the stability and effectiveness of transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs), surprisingly few studies have investigated *how* they come to be perceived as legitimate. This paper aims to address this research gap by analyzing two PPPs for agricultural value chain development in Tanzania: the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). By twinning commercial and development goals, the partnerships aim to significantly improve agricultural production and reduce poverty. However, to achieve their goals, they would have to become accepted as a legitimate alternative to government policy in a context characterized by low levels of social trust, general mistrust of the private sector, and a strong historical bias towards socialist agricultural policies.

This paper empirically analyzes the process through which the partnerships were constructed as legitimate governance mechanisms for sustainable, agricultural development in Tanzania. It combines insights from sociological analyses of organizational legitimacy with a constructivist perspective to argue that legitimacy arise from a process of *legitimation*. Moreover, this paper contends that it is possible to legitimate a PPP through *legitimation strategies*. To better understand this dynamic and strategic process, this paper deductively develops a conceptual overview of legitimation strategies, which is integrated into an analytical model of legitimation processes in transnational PPPs.

Applying this model to the case, the paper finds that the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships were legitimated in the interaction between norms and the strategies pursued by the 'PPP entrepreneurs' and the PPP itself. Through discourse, stakeholder management, and institutionalization, these actors were able to strategically construct the two partnerships as legitimate. However, the paper also shows that strategies did not always have the intended legitimating effect *across* geographical levels and stakeholder groups. It also finds that some legitimation strategies in turn opened the PPP up to pressures that sought to transform the PPP or its objectives.

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All errors in this thesis are my own.

Oslo, December 2013

Christina Ramberg Ek

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures

ABBREVIATIONS

BRN	*Big Results Now* initiative
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
EC	SAGCOT Executive Committee
IB	SAGCOT Investment Blueprint
KK	*Kilimo Kwanza* initiative
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnerships for Africa's Development
New Alliance	G8 New Alliance for Nutrition and Food Security
New Vision	World Economic Forum's New Vision for Agriculture
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PPP	Public Private Partnership
SAGCOT	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
TAGT	Tanzania Agricultural Growth Trust
TAP	Tanzania Agricultural Partnership
TFI	Tanzanian Fertilizer Initiative
WEF	World Economic Forum
URT	The United Republic of Tanzania

1   INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a significant rise in the number of transnational public-private partnerships (PPP) (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 452). Because PPPs include both state and non-state actors in the provision of public goods and political steering, they are seen as a *hybrid, networked* form of governance (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009; Bäckstrand 2006, Torfing et al 2012). As such, PPPs do not a priori enjoy legitimate authority. Rather, legitimacy is the key mechanism by which partnerships become accepted as a relevant alternative to government policy (Glasbergen 2007, 14). Still, the existing literature on the legitimacy of transnational PPPs has largely overlooked the central question of *how* transnational PPPs come to be perceived as a legitimate alternative to government policy.

This paper aims to answer this question, and argues that the legitimacy of transnational PPPs emerges from the process of *legitimation*: a social relationship between the actor claiming legitimacy and the audience accepting that legitimacy claim (Black 2008; Quack 2010; Bernstein 2011; Steffek 2009). Moreover, it argues that transnational PPPs can construct and manage their own legitimacy through *legitimation strategies* (Suchman 1995; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). By focusing on the strategies that aim to legitimate the PPP, it is able to show not only how the PPP responds to the different expectations it faces (cf. Black 2008), but also how the strategies pursued can influence perceptions of the PPP's legitimacy (cf. Quack 2010; Raines 2003). This is important because legitimacy is recognized as a key mechanism for a PPP's effectiveness (Glasbergen 2007; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008; Bernstein and Cashore 2007).

Studying legitimation strategies and processes in *transnational* PPPs is particularly interesting, because "their mandates are uncertain, and it is not clear on whose behalf they purport to act and to whom accountability should be owed" (Black 2008, 413). The multitude of geographies and interests involved in a PPP suggests that it will face very different expectations and legitimacy criteria from its various stakeholders. For instance, there might be a tension between what is considered appropriate behaviour by the private sector partners and by local civil society organisations (CSOs) (cf. Black 2008, 153). The implication is that selecting what stakeholders and success criteria that are most relevant for the PPP is a critical but contentious process (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 466).

To understand the processes and strategies through which a PPP's legitimacy is constructed, this paper analyzes two PPPs for agricultural value chain development in Tanzania: the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). TAP and SAGCOT are complex, multi-level PPPs: they involve actors from all societal sectors (public and private sector, donors, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) and span several levels from the local farming community in Tanzania, via district and national authorities, to the international level. Unlike other partnerships and certification schemes, these PPPs would target challenges along the whole agricultural value chain to promote private sector growth and investments, and facilitate the participation of smallholder farmers. By twinning commercial and development goals, the partnerships aim to significantly improve agricultural production and reduce poverty. SAGCOT alone aims to bring 350,000 hectares of land under profitable production and triple the area's agricultural output by 2030 (SAGCOT 2011a, 7). The partnerships are said to bring "business as **un**usual" to Tanzanian agriculture.

There are both theoretical and case-specific reasons why it is relevant to study how the two PPPs for agricultural development in Tanzania come to be seen as legitimate. Theoretically, it is important to understand how legitimacy comes about because it "enhances both the stability and the comprehensibility of organizational activities" (Suchman 1995, 574). Legitimacy contributes to the effectiveness and efficiency of the PPP because people are more likely to comply with and supply resources to organizations that appear desirable and appropriate (Suchman 1995, 574; Hurd 1999).

Tanzania's historical background and the state of agriculture also point to the relevance of the research topic. First, the country's institutional and historical context suggests that any partnership – and particularly a *private sector-led* PPP – would have to legitimate itself as an alternative to government policy. There is a considerable bias towards the public sector in agricultural services, and the sector is still transitioning after decades of centrally planned interventions and policies (Wolter 2008, 17; cf. Ngowi 2006). It is also recognized that there is a great deal of mistrust between the public and the private sector (Dijk and Pfisterer 2009). Second, the partnerships under study aim to address Tanzania's persistent productivity and food security issues (Wolter 2008, 29). Thus, the task of understanding how the PPPs can manage their legitimacy – and in turn their effectiveness – is not only a case for academics,

but can also be of interest to decision-makers and practitioners.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

This research was inspired by a gap in the literature on the legitimacy of PPPs. Most studies on the legitimacy of transnational PPPs have sought to evaluate their democratic legitimacy (e.g. Bexell and Mörth 2010; Bäckstrand 2006; 2010; Börzel and Risse 2005; Dingwerth 2005; Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). Not only does this assume that certain normative standards of legitimacy are universally applicable, but it also treats legitimacy as a static attribute of the PPP. This study combines insights from sociological analyses of organizational legitimacy with a constructivist perspective on PPPs to argue that legitimacy is constructed through a *dynamic* and *strategic* process. Doing so, it contributes to an emergent strand of the hybrid governance literature focused on the process of *legitimation* (Bernstein 2004; 2011; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Quack 2010; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Steffek 2009). However, most of these works study private governance schemes aimed at regulation or standard-setting, and there are to my knowledge very few, if any, studies on legitimation of development PPPs. This paper applies insights from the literature on legitimation in private, regulatory schemes to multi-stakeholder partnerships for development.

The research was guided by the following research question:

How did the legitimation strategies pursued by TAP and SAGCOT, and the partnerships' entrepreneurs, influence perceptions of the PPPs' legitimacy among their stakeholders?

This research question can be further divided into three subquestions:

1. *Who constructed the TAP and the SAGCOT as legitimate governance mechanisms for agricultural development in Tanzania?*

2. *What legitimation strategies were pursued to legitimate the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships?*

3. *In what way did the pursued legitimation strategies influence the perceptions of the PPPs' legitimacy among their stakeholders?*

These questions will be addressed in turn below, and their logic serves as the analytical

structure for the rest of the paper.

1.2 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS

This paper focuses on the legitimation of two public-private partnerships for development of agricultural value chains in Tanzania. It does not aim to generally explain the legitimation process of all development PPPs or PPPs in general, but aims to understand how legitimation strategies in this particular case influenced legitimacy perceptions of the two partnerships. Furthermore, the paper does not provide an appraisal of the partnerships' effectiveness, nor does it assess the *causal* link between legitimation strategies and legitimacy perceptions. As a last note on scope, this study focuses on the legitimation of the PPPs *as such*, and does not consider the secondary partnerships and alliances that are facilitated by or result from the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships.

1.3 THESIS OUTLINE

To answer the research questions, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the paper's research strategy, including its philosophical assumptions and the choice of research methods. Chapter 3 gives a brief review of the background and relevant literature, and defines public-private partnerships. Chapter 4 deductively develops an analytical framework of legitimation strategies and dynamics in development PPPs. Chapter 5 gives a historical outline of the case to be analyzed: *private sector-led PPPs for value chain development in Tanzania*. The main events are summarized in *Table 3: Case timeline*. Chapter 6 applies the theoretical framework from chapter 4, and provides a thorough examination of the two partnerships, and the legitimation dynamics within and between them. The last chapter (chapter 7) concludes.

2   RESEARCH STRATEGY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of the philosophical and methodological framework applied in this thesis. It outlines the paper's research strategy[1], and will show that this paper falls within the qualitative tradition (see Bryman 2008, 366). Section 2.1 summarizes the philosophical foundation for this paper, and argues that a study on legitimation implicates constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. The following section 2.2 considers the methodological choices made during the research process, and discusses the embedded case study design, data collection and data analysis. Finally, the section provides a few remarks on the validity and reliability of this study.

2.1   PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This paper applies a *constructivist*[2] approach to study the legitimacy of public-private partnerships for development. Within Neuman (2011)'s typology of approaches to social science research, constructivism is placed within the interpretative or hermeneutical understanding of science[3]. According to this approach, meaningful human action cannot be apprehended without interpretation, that is, by understanding the meaning given to it (Guzzini 2000, 161). The following outlines the ontological and epistemological considerations applied in this paper.

2.1.1   Ontology

Ontology "concerns the issue of what exists, or the fundamental nature of reality" (Neuman 2011, 91). It relates to the question whether there is a reality external to social actors, that is, whether the world exists independently of actors' knowledge and interpretations of it (Bryman 2008, 18; Neuman 2011, 92). Constructivism emphasizes the social construction of reality: "people intentionally create social reality with their purposeful actions of interacting as social beings […] Social reality is largely what people perceive it to be; it exists as people experience it and assign meaning to it" (Neuman 2011, 102). This is fundamentally different

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[1] Defined as the general orientation to the conduct of social research (Bryman 2008, 22)

[2] I apply 'constructivism' as in International Relations (IR) theory. It can have many labels and conceptualizations, for instance conventional and critical constructivism (Hopf 1998). While this paper could be labelled conventional constructivist, I do not see this as crucial for this paper's purpose.

[3] The other two approaches in his typology are positivism and critical theory (Neuman 2011)

from the positivist approach, which view reality as external to actors, and therefore "waiting to be discovered" by observers (Neuman 2011, 102).

This paper seeks to understand PPPs as a part of social reality, which from a constructivist standpoint consists of people living within and interacting with overlapping social groupings (ethnic, cultural, national, etc), which create structures of meaning through their interactions (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 6). Later in the paper I apply the concept of *social structure* to refer to those meanings that have become stable over time (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 8). For instance, norms about PPPs and agricultural development make up a "frame of reference" against which actors compare and understand new phenomena. At the same time, my framework presupposes that actors can pursue different strategies to construct the PPP as legitimate, meaning that their actions have the possibility to redefine and challenge the structures of meaning. In constructivist scholarship, this dynamic is referred to as the mutual constitution of structures and agents (Klotz and Lynch 2007; Hopf 1998).

2.1.2 Epistemology

Epistemology "concerns the questions of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline"(Bryman 2008, 13). It includes "what we need to do to produce knowledge and what scientific knowledge looks like once we have produced it"(Neuman 2011, 93). This paper is epistemologically interpretivist because it focuses on legitimacy, which is a generalized perception that an entity is desirable or appropriate (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy is both *intersubjective* and *socially constructed*: "it reflects a congruence between the behaviors of the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group; thus, legitimacy is dependent on a collective audience, yet independent of particular observers" (Suchman 1995, 574). Recognizing that shared meanings vary across time and space (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 9), the paper makes these "historically evolving schemes of thought, perception and action" a research agenda on its own (Guzzini 2000, 169). This is closely connected to the ontological level because legitimacy is seen as a shared structure of meaning (Searle 2005, 6).

Later in the paper I develop an analytical model for understanding legitimation processes in partnerships. As this model describes a general pattern of partnership processes, this paper leans towards the positivist end of the constructivist spectrum. Although I do not seek to

uncover law-like processes that are valid for all partnerships, I do aspire to understand legitimacy dynamics in PPPs in a way that *could* be applied to other partnerships in other social contexts, and thus explain the social phenomena in general terms (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 14).

2.2 METHODOLOGY

Methodology can be understood in contrast to the concept of *method*: "while methods are just ways of obtaining data, methodology is about how methods are used to resolve epistemological and theoretical issues" (Bray 2008:299). The overall methodology applied in this paper is the case study. A case is "a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and analysed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events" (Vennesson 2008, 226).Yin argues that case study research is a comprehensive research strategy (Yin 1994, 13). It covers empirical investigation, as well as development and evaluation of theoretical explanations (Vennesson 2008, 226). The following considers the components of the case study as research design: subchapter 2.2.1 presents the case and the units of analysis. The following chapter 2.2.2 explains how primary and secondary data was collected, and chapter 2.2.3 outlines how that data was analyzed. Lastly, chapter 2.2.4 discusses the implications of the methodological choices for the study's reliability and validity.

2.2.1 Case Selection

Case selection includes deciding on the number of units of analysis, distinguishing between case topic and case context, and determining the time specific boundaries that define the beginning and end of the case (Yin 1994, 24). Out of the universe of 'possible cases' of PPPs for sustainable development (cf. Klotz 2008, 46), I chose to look at PPPs for agricultural value chain development in Tanzania. This single case study would include two units of analysis: the Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). In terms of the time period studied, my analysis is limited to the period starting in 2004 when TAP was initiated, until the time of data collection in 2013. The case study's analytical levels are illustrated in figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Levels of analysis

By studying a single case with more than one unit of analysis, this paper applies an *embedded case study design* (Yin 1994, 41). This design was chosen for three reasons. First, a single case study allows for in-depth understanding of the context and the perspectives of the relevant actors, and represented a good fit with the concept of legitimacy and the related constructivist ontology. Second, I would argue that the Tanzanian context represents a *unique case*. Tanzania was the first country in which the key players behind TAP and SAGCOT first implemented their strategic partnership for agricultural value chain development. Tanzania is also unique because of its socialist history and the state's historical dominance in agricultural policies, which makes the Tanzanian context particularly interesting for studying legitimation of PPPs as a new form of agricultural intervention. Lastly, I chose to focus on a single country out of consideration for the time and resources available for the current research. Yin points out that although a multiple-case study design is often considered more compelling, it can "require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student"(Yin 1994, 45).

A major pitfall associated with the embedded case study design is when the study "focuses only on the subunit level and fails to return to the larger unit of analysis" (Yin 1994, 44). In the current research, this would happen if the analysis were to fail to discuss TAP and SAGCOT in the context of the overarching case of PPPs for value chain development in Tanzania. For analytical reasons, this paper analyzes TAP and SAGOT separately. However, section 6.3 aims to specifically address this concern by focusing on the interrelation between the partnerships and to discuss the two within the overarching case. Furthermore, the

discussion of the analysis (section 6.4) and conclusion aim to ensure that the case study findings are abstracted to the theoretical level.

2.2.2 Data Collection

Data was collected through desktop research, interviews, and a "field" visit to Tanzania from August 20th until September 10th 2013. More specifically, I first surveyed organizational records, policy documents, and other secondary material to get an overview of the concept to be studied, to determine key actors and to establish a sequence of events. The documents were also considered for the discourse analysis[4]. Second, I conducted 14 semi-structured interviews, of which 12 were conducted in person and two via skype. The interviewees included representatives from all the involved 'sectors' in the PPPs[5]; donors (3), consultants (2), companies (2), CSOs (3), and PPP staff (3). The identity of one of the interviewees has been kept anonymous upon the request of the interviewee. Five of the interviews[6] were kept in Norwegian due to our shared native language. Where cited in the text, I have translated these interviews into English as literally as possible to avoid misinterpretation.

A general interview guide was made on the basis of the analytical model and the research question (see appendix 9.7). The guide was adapted to each interview in order to enhance the quality of the interview data (cf. Berry 2002, 681). This was particularly important as interviewees had played different parts in the TAP and SAGCOT PPPs, and adapting the interview guides to their roles was beneficial to get different perspectives of the same process. Where possible, I recorded and transcribed the interviews. However, several of the interviews declined my request to record the interview. Realizing that this compromises the quality of the interview data considerably, I was careful to take extensive notes (including bodily expressions and intonations where relevant) and wrote these out immediately after the interview. I have also been particularly careful when referring to these interviews, and I have not cited them unless I was certain of their phrasing. One the one hand, this could be seen as a critical issue for the quality of the interview data. On the other hand, respecting the interviewee's wishes maintained their goodwill and allowed them to speak more freely about sensitive issues, thus potentially enhancing the quality of data.

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[4] For a full list of documents reviewed, see appendix 9.9
[5] The number of interviews from each group is indicated in parentheses
[6] This regards the interviews with Øystein Botillen, Petter Hveem, Odd Arnesen, Ragnhild Maatla Salomonsen and Pål Øystein Stormorken.

Interviewee sampling was initially conducted on the basis of official documents such as partnership documents and web pages. However, it became clear during the interviewing process that there were some interviewees who would be more relevant than others, including some who were not listed in the official documents. Hence, the interviewee sampling over time made use of the snowball sampling method (Bryman 2008, 459). Because the interviewees were chosen not through random sampling but from the position they occupy, I applied the technique of *elite interviewing* (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Leech 2002; Berry 2002). Elite interviewing was apt for my purposes, since it is useful to establish what a certain set of people think and help reconstruct an event or establish the decisions and actions that lay behind the event (Tansey 2007, 766). Questions were kept semi-structured and open-ended, which allowed me to probe the interviewees. However, this approach also poses methodological problems (see 2.2.4). For instance, my research was dependent upon access to those elites, and some actors did not find time to participate in my study despite several requests (e.g. AgDevCo, one of the key consultants to SAGCOT). The data collection is also very dependent upon the memory of the interviewee and his/hers presentation of events.

2.2.3 Case Analysis

There is no one way to approach the data analysis step within case studies, and Yin (1994, 25) argues that this has been one of the least developed components of case study research design. This is related to the fact that, epistemologically, case studies are not linked to one particular research paradigm, but range from the most positivist to the most interpretivist (Vennesson 2008, 225–226). This paper can be called an *interpretive case study* since it uses "theoretical frameworks to provide an explanation of particular cases, which can lead as well to an evaluation and refinement of theories" (Vennesson 2008, 227). The collected data was analyzed through pattern-matching (Yin 1994:106), meaning that a theoretical "pattern" was derived from the literature and organized into an analytical model, which was then used to guide the coding of the collected case data. The model was compared to the empirical data in order to substantiate or modify its propositions, and due consideration was given to 'outlier' observations in order to avoid bias towards the analytical model.

In addition to the data gathered through interviews, I conducted a discourse analysis of the relevant documents, news articles and speeches concerning or related to the case partnerships. *Discourse* can be defined as "construction of meaning through written or linguistic

communication" (Foucault in Simmerl 2011, 5). Although there is no mainstream definition of discourse in the social sciences (Pedersen 2009), *discourse analysis* is used to describe "the representation of ideas (how agents say what they are thinking of doing) and the discursive interactions through which actors generate and communicate ideas (to whom they say it) within given institutional contexts (where and when they say it)" (Schmidt 2008, 306). Discourse analysis is a fruitful approach for my purpose because it emphasizes how "discourse serves not just to express one set of actors' strategic interests or normative values but also to persuade others of the necessity and/or appropriateness of a given course of action"(Schmidt 2008, 312).

2.2.4   Remarks on Validity and Reliability

The concepts of validity and reliability are commonly applied to establish the quality of empirical social research (Yin 1994, 33). In general terms, validity refers to the extent to which the study measures what it intends to measure (see Yin 1994, 33). As shown in the research question (1.1), this paper aims to study the strategies that were pursued to legitimate the two case PPPs, and the strategies' influence on the legitimacy perceptions of the PPP by primary and secondary stakeholders. From this, two key concepts stand out: legitimation strategies and legitimacy perceptions. Both derive from this paper's assumption that legitimacy is created in a dialectical process between the actors claiming legitimacy and those accepting the legitimacy claims (see Black 2008; Bernstein 2011). Thus, it is in essence a communicative process that can be studied through justificatory discourse (Steffek 2009; Black 2008; Suchman 1995).

The operational measure for *legitimation strategy* is derived from Suchman (1995) who argue that legitimation strategies "involve complex mixtures of concrete organizational change and persuasive organizational communication" (Suchman 1995:587). This paper focuses on the strategies pursued by the "PPP entrepreneurs" and, once established, by the PPP. Also the *legitimacy perceptions* of the PPP by primary and secondary stakeholders can be studied indirectly through their actions and discourses, as done by Schouten and Glasbergen (2011). Primary stakeholders (partners) can express their acceptance by endorsing or supplying resources to the PPP. Secondary stakeholders' perceptions can be expressed through public discourse or actions (Steffek 2009; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Relevant sources may be CSO campaigns or reports from stakeholder consultation meetings. While I recognize that

these may be imperfect measures of legitimacy, it has been noted that the literature "remain[s] divided as to the best ways to measure what is inherently an abstract concept" (Raines 2003, 57). Finally, my theoretical framework supposes that all actors interact with the 'social structure', which is defined as already institutionalized norms. These can be found in declarations, principles and treaties specific to the governance issue, or in "broadly accepted norms of global environmental, labor and human rights governance" (Bernstein 2011:25).

To further enhance the validity of the research, I made use of *data triangulation*: "information from multiple sources but aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon" (Yin 1994, 92). Triangulation helped ensure the validity of the research in two main ways. First, triangulating data helped me crosscheck facts, and thus substantiate or disprove preliminary findings. I paid particular attention to including a wide range of sources in order to avoid bias in selecting only those sources that confirm prior expectations (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 20). Interviews also proved useful to confirm and verify the information given in official documents and web pages. Second, using multiple sources of interview data was useful to bring out the differences in the interviewees' perspectives. Where possible, I asked the interviewees to comment on findings from other interviews in order to better bring out points of contention and unity.

Moreover, I would argue that my visit to Tanzania improved the overall quality of the research by expanding my understanding and knowledge of the country, as well as improving the quality of the interview data. A great number of the interviews conducted would not have been available to me via phone or email, and personal interviews made the interviewing process more natural and allowed me to gauge of the interviewee's bodily expressions to better understand his or her meaning.

Many of the potential validity issues in this paper relates to the use of semi-structured, elite interviewing, which greatly relies on the prior knowledge and skills of the interviewer. I was sensitive to the fact that this could create bias in my collection of data. First, data collection may have improved during later interviews when I had gained a deeper understanding of the issue and events. It made it easier to know when to probe and when to question his or her version of events. However, the analytical model helped ensure consistency between the interviews, and geared the interviewing towards filling these empirical gaps (cf. Berry 2002). Second, I am aware that my background or the personal chemistry during the interview could

influence what arguments I considered more authoritative (see Berry 2002). In my case this is also related to the issue of cultural differences, or oppositely, that my shared cultural and linguistic background with the Norwegian interviewees can have influenced my data collection. Finally, a common issue in elite interviewing is that of power imbalances. This was perhaps exacerbated in my case because I am a student and an inexperienced researcher. However, most interviewees were middle-level management or consultants, which might have made power imbalances less prominent.

Reliability refers to the extent to which the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results (Yin 1994, 33). From a social constructivist standpoint, reliability is inherently difficult to establish because contextual factors make it difficult to truly replicate the study (Bryman 2008, 458). Still, one can speak of a reliable case study as one in which errors and biases are minimized through careful documentation of research procedures and transparency throughout the research process (Yin 1994, 36-37). This paper ensures transparency through citation, enclosing interview guides and main empirical findings, and listing the documents and data sources surveyed[7]. Data triangulation may also have enhanced reliability because I was able to cross-check my interpretation with the work of other researchers (e.g. Byiers 2013; Kaarhus et al. 2010; Kaarhus 2011; Jenkins 2012; Norad 2013; Hebebrand 2011).

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[7] See appendices 9.6 - 9.9

3   UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT AND BASIC CONCEPTS

Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992, partnership "has been promoted by large numbers of corporations, governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations as the most effective way of working towards the achievement of sustainable development" (Rein et al. 2005, 1). Against this background it has been argued that there is an emergent international aid consensus about the desirability of PPPs (Lund-Thomsen 2009; Kaul 2006).

3.1   PPPs FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

In terms of the academic literature on PPPs for agricultural development, there are a few contributions on research and development (R&D) in agricultural partnerships (Hartwich, Gonzalez, and Vieira 2005; Boland and Phillips 2012) and on the strategic dimension of agribusiness engaging with stakeholders in partnerships (Dentoni, Hospes, and Ross 2012). Others investigate global or transnational initiatives (e.g. Kaan and Liese 2011; Holt-Giménez 2008) or locally-initiated, agricultural PPPs (Rein et al. 2005; Rein and Stott 2009). Most of the literature, however, is concerned with partnerships targeting commodity-specific agricultural value chains (e.g. Bitzer and Glasbergen 2013; Gibbon, Ponte, and Lazaro 2010; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Here, the main focus is on implementing sustainability standards as a means to upgrading and improving the livelihood of producers.

Although providing useful insights to the current topic, this paper will take a slightly different perspective than the literature on agricultural production standards. To begin with, my focus is on the processes and strategies that aim to legitimate TAP and SAGCOT as governance mechanisms, that is, as means to steer agricultural development. I do not aspire to understand the governance implications of the two partnerships within the relevant value chains. A second difference is that although certification schemes may be present in TAP and SAGCOT, they do not officially promote a specific production standard[8]. Lastly, the TAP and SAGCOT partnerships are arguably aimed at a broader *economic* development rather than

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[8] One could argue that it promotes a standard for production based on the use of agro-chemicals, as opposed to an organic standard. However, TAP and SAGCOT also include partnerships working with farming techniques that are similar to organic standards (e.g. conservation agriculture) and thus they do not represent clear-cut cases of any one standard.

solely *agricultural* development. Among other things, this is due to the large share of agriculture of the Tanzanian economy, as well as the focus on issues not related to agriculture per se (e.g. credit schemes).

3.2 CONCEPTUALIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Despite the development consensus about the desirability of PPPs, the academic literature on the topic is a lacking conceptual clarity and methodological rigorousness (Lund-Thomsen 2009). It has also been argued that little is known about the actual consequences of PPPs for development (Lund-Thomsen 2009; Gregoratti 2011). Conceptually, there is a wide range of theoretical approaches to partnerships, as well as partnership terms and definitions: cross-sector partnerships, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and public-private partnerships. However, all definitions share the assumption that working together allow for achieving some form of added value that could not have been achieved by any one of the partners acting alone (Glasbergen, Biermann, and Mol 2007; Rein et al. 2005). The argument of collaborative advantage also assumes that each of the parties can "connect its own interest with the common (i.e. public) objective of the partnership" (Glasbergen 2007, 11).

According to Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan (2009, 453), partnership definitions comprise three criteria: actors, goals, and the sharing of risk and responsibility. Partnership actors can come from two or more societal spheres (state, market and civil society) (Glasbergen 2007; Bexell and Mörth 2010, 6). This includes partnerships that involve only private actors, as exemplified in research on non-state regulatory partnerships (e.g. Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Mena and Palazzo 2012), business-NGO partnerships (Seitanidi and Crane 2009) and transnational civil society movements (Keck and Sikkink 1999). However, this paper will concern itself with a partnership that involve government actors, and therefore will be closer to the definition of a (multi-stakeholder) public-private partnership, "a formally agreed cooperative venture between public and private actors aiming at the provision of public goods" (Bexell and Mörth 2010, 6; Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 455; Börzel and Risse 2005, 198). In a multi-stakeholder PPP, partners can come from the local, national and international level, or from a combination of these (Hodge and Greve 2007:3). Thus, one can speak of *global* PPPs (e.g. Buse and Walt 2000) and *transnational* PPPs (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). I will use the latter term to acknowledge the fact that not all governance

regimes beyond the nation-state are necessarily global in reach (Quack 2010, 5).

Partnership goals are the second defining criteria. Most studies argue that PPPs aim at the provision of collective goods (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 454), conceived of in broad terms, such as sustainable development (Bäckstrand 2006; Bexell and Mörth 2010; Tennyson and Wilde 2000) or in terms of their function such as rule and standard setting, or service provision (Börzel and Risse 2005; Kaul 2006; Steets 2004; Reinecke and Deng 2000). The sharing of risks and responsibility is the third criterion for partnership definition. A partnership is thus distinguished from a contractual relationship, which shifts responsibility and risk from one party to another (Rein et al. 2005; Hodge and Greve 2011). A related point to sharing of risk and responsibilities is the non-hierarchical and voluntaristic relationship between the partners (cf. Glasbergen, Biermann, and Mol 2007; Steets 2004).

I argue that institutionalization can be added as a fourth defining criteria for PPPs. *Institutionalization* refers to the extent to which the interactions between the partners are embedded in implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, also called a regime (Krasner 1982, 186). A PPP requires a minimum of institutionalization of the partners' interaction (cf. Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 455), and becomes more institutionalized when the rules and procedures defining actors' responsibilities are explicit and comprehensive.

4   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will outline the theoretical framework to be applied in the subsequent analysis. It proposes an analytical model for understanding the legitimation of public-private partnerships for development. The first section (4.1) explains why it is relevant to study legitimacy in the context of PPPs. Section 4.2 argues for a *legitimation* approach, because it draws attention to the *dynamic* and *strategic* process through which legitimacy is generated. The following subchapter (4.3) go on to outline specific legitimation strategies, focusing on stakeholder management, institutionalization, and discourse. Lastly, section 4.4 groups the strategies into an analytical model for understanding the process of legitimation in a development PPP, including the feedback effects within and across the partnership phases.

4.1   PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FROM A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

This paper will discuss PPPs as *governance mechanisms*, that is, means through which a collectivity strategically manages the process of change towards sustainability (Glasbergen 2007, 12). To do so, it defines governance according to the IR literature, in which governance is about "conducting the public's business: the constellation of authoritative rules, institutions and practices by means of which any collectivity manages its affairs" (Ruggie 2004, 504). Thus, a PPP is a particular institutional form through which actors can solve complex problems (Schäferhoff et al 2009:456).

As a strategic tool, PPPs denote a type of steering that is distinct from the hierarchical steering associated with the formal state and government. By including non-state actors in political steering, PPPs represent a hybrid, networked form of governance (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 453; Bäckstrand 2006). Torfing et al. (2012, 14–15) emphasize three characteristics about this form of steering. First, the policymaking is based on dynamic exchange and feedback loops. Second, it involves a great deal of interdependencies among the actors. Lastly, "common objectives are formulated and achieved in and through negotiated interaction among a plurality of actors" (Torfing et al. 2012, 15).

Taking a governance perspective on development partnerships shows why it is important to study legitimacy in the context of PPPs. First, a PPP include both state and non-state actors in

the provision of public goods, in this case sustainable agricultural development. Legitimacy is the key mechanism by which partnerships become accepted as a relevant alternative to government policy (Glasbergen 2007, 14). The importance of legitimacy is also derived from the nature of steering in a PPP: as there is no one actor with power to sanction actions, rule compliance can be achieved through legitimacy: "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed" (Hurd 1999, 381). Moreover, legitimacy enhances the stability of the organization because people are "most likely to supply resources to organizations that appear desirable, proper, or appropriate" (Suchman 1995, 574). In sum, a PPP need legitimacy because it contributes its stability and effectiveness (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, 1891).

4.2 LEGITIMACY OR LEGITIMATION? TOWARDS A PROCEDURAL APPROACH

An institution's legitimacy is usually approached from a normative or a sociological point of view (Keohane 2011, 99; Hurrelmann, Schneider, and Steffek 2007). Most normative studies analyze the democratic legitimacy of governance institutions (Bexell and Mörth 2010; Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009; Keohane 2011; Börzel and Risse 2005). These studies are normative in that they evaluate a given institution against norms, values and principles of liberal democracy such as accountability, transparency, inclusion and deliberation (Bäckstrand 2010, 148). From a sociological perspective, on the other hand, one asks whether the governance institution is *believed* to have the right to rule; legitimacy is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman 1995, 574). This is different from the normative perspective in that it does not a priori assume bases of legitimacy, but empirically investigate the reasons why a community accepts the institution as legitimate (Bernstein 2011, 20). This paper falls within the latter tradition as it empirically studies legitimation strategies and processes, and do not evaluate the PPPs according to pre-defined standards of legitimacy.

Within the sociological tradition there is an emergent strand of research focusing on the *process of legitimation* (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Steffek 2009; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Quack 2010; Bernstein 2004; 2011). While legitimacy refers to the statist fact that a legitimacy claim by an actor is generally accepted, legitimation refers to a dynamic

social relationship between the actor claiming legitimacy and the "audience" accepting the legitimacy claim (Black 2008; Quack 2010; Bernstein 2011). Thus, legitimacy as *attribute* could be seen as the outcome of a process of legitimation (Steffek 2009, 314).

My aim is to study this interactive process of legitimation, focusing on actors' *strategies* to establish a PPP as a legitimate governance mechanism. The argument builds upon two key assumptions: that it is possible to manage or construct legitimacy through *strategic action*, and that those strategies interact with the structure of norms. In terms of the first, this paper is inspired by Suchman (1995)'s seminal study on organizational legitimacy, in which he outlines strategies to build, maintain, and repair an organization's legitimacy. Legitimation strategies involve "complex mixtures of concrete organizational change and persuasive organizational communication" (Suchman 1995, 587). Others have made similar arguments within the literature on private governance. Schouten and Glasbergen (2011) recently studied how legitimacy emerges in private governance initiatives. Although they don't use the term legitimation strategy specifically, they implicitly refer to strategies when they outline ways in which private governance initiatives can improve their legitimacy by adopting already legitimate rules and standards, or when they argue that stakeholders can create support for the initiative through justificatory discourse (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, 1892). The studies summarized by Quack (2010, 12) also find that transnational governance schemes make use of rhetorical legitimation. Black (2008) similarly argues that regulators can construct legitimacy through communication.

Regarding the second assumption about strategies' interaction with the normative structure, my argument builds upon several strands of research (Suchman 1995; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Bernstein 2004; 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Their common argument is that norms, or the *social structure, "*define appropriate and inappropriate courses of action, legitimate and delegitimate institutional forms, and create a context in which cost-benefit analysis occurs" (Bernstein 2011, 25). It provides a basis for appropriateness "that make the purposes, goals, or rationale of an institution understandable and justifiable to the relevant audience in society" (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 352). The social structure therefore has a conditioning effect on legitimation strategies, as actions "take place within the standards of "appropriateness" defined by prior norms" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). This is not to say that political strategies are predetermined by the norms and values of a given society, or

that norms exist independently of political action. Rather, the process of legitimation is defined by "the interaction of social structure with the dynamics of choice" (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 352). This dynamic is explicated in more detail in section 4.4 below, where I develop an analytical model for understanding the legitimation process of development PPPs.

4.3 LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES

Based on the literature and the legitimation definition presented above, I will discuss legitimation strategies along three dimensions: discourse, stakeholder management, and institutionalization. The strategies and their proposed legitimating effect are summarized in Table 1 on the following page and discussed in more detail below. Before continuing, it is important to clarify two points. First, the question of *agency*: who execute legitimation strategies? Others have pointed out the role of one or a few key organisations in formulating and setting up a multi-stakeholder partnership (Roloff 2008, 316; Tennyson and Wilde 2000). This paper calls these actors "PPP entrepreneurs"[9]: actors who promote, frame, and persuade other actors to consider a PPP for a particular issue (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). When the PPP has been created as a separate organisation, it is assumed that the PPP itself executes legitimation strategies.

Second, the 'legitimating effect' mentioned in the conceptual overview should be seen as *theoretical propositions* about the strategies' potential effect. As an empirical study of legitimacy, this paper agrees with Black (2008, 144): "legitimacy is rooted in the acceptance of that organization by others, and more particularly in the reasons for that acceptance". Suchman (1995) outline three broad reasons why a PPP is considered legitimate. The first is pragmatic legitimacy, when the immediate stakeholders consider the PPP legitimate because it benefits them, or "because they see it as being responsive to their larger interests" (Suchman 1995, 578). The second is moral legitimacy, when stakeholders evaluate the PPP to be "the right thing to do" (Suchman 1995, 579). Potential normative sources of legitimacy include "democratic procedures; legal (formal) standing or adherence; knowledge/expertise, moral standing; and efficiency/goal achievement" (Bexell and Mörth 2010, 12). Bull and

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[9] It is assumed that entrepreneurs must posit some form of organizational platform to promote an issue or PPP solution. They can be governments, business actors, or CSOs, but also individuals working within such organizations positing the relevant expertise and information (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 899; Tennyson and Wilde 2000).

Table 1: Conceptual overview of legitimation strategies

STRATEGY	DESCRIPTION	LEGITIMATING EFFECT
Discursive strategies		
Framing - Align with or distance from existing initiatives and norms	How the issue is framed and communicated in relation to existing norms and initiatives	*Conforming / Aligning:* Borrows legitimacy from established norms and initiatives *Distancing:* Draw from novelty as a source of legitimacy
Stakeholder management strategies		
Defining primary stakeholders - Choosing partners from their expertise or moral standing	Selecting what actors to include as partners	Indirectly legitimated through partners, or conforms to normative expectations (expertise, efficiency, moral standing)
Involving stakeholders - Primary / secondary stakeholders	Including stakeholders in the decision-making structures of the partnership	Conforms to pragmatic and/or moral expectations: commitment and ownership, knowledge, legality, democratic procedures
Institutionalization strategies		
PPP form	Mimicking the PPP form; multi-stakeholder, multi-sector collaboration	Conforms to normative expectations about PPPs
Governance structure and procedures - PPP organisation - Transparency / Accountability	Describes the procedures and rules applied by the PPP, including whether a separate organization is set up to facilitate and provide administrative support	Conforms to pragmatic and/or moral expectations: control, efficiency, democratic procedures, legality

McNeill argue that novelty can be added as a source of legitimacy in development assistance, a field in which "there is a continual search for new ideas and new approaches" (Bull and McNeill 2010, 108). The third reason for acceptance concerns 'cognitive legitimacy': "the organization is accepted as necessary or inevitable" (Black 2008, 144).

The concept of legitimacy used in this study includes perceptions of legitimacy that arise from all three sources. It recognizes the potential overlap between the different reasons, for instance when moral claims about "the right thing to do" are based in self-interest (Suchman 1995:579). It also takes into account that "different people's perceptions of whether an organization is legitimate are not necessarily based on the same types of evaluations" (Black 2008, 145). In contrast to other sociological studies on legitimacy (e.g. Raines 2003), my primary aim is not to analyze the reasons why SAGCOT is perceived to be legitimate. Rather, I seek to understand how legitimation strategies have influenced legitimacy perceptions among the PPP's stakeholders, whatever the reason for that perception. However, the different legitimacy reasons may help understand the legitimation strategies' influence, and therefore it is relevant for my purpose here. Still, where these reasons are referred to in the analysis, they should be considered indications and not conclusions about the actors' motivations.

4.3.1 Discursive strategies

PPPs can be legitimated through discourse (Steffek 2009; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Black 2008). As a strategy, discursive legitimation strategy would include communication about the necessity and appropriateness of the PPP, its form, policy objectives, and/or outcomes (Schmidt 2008, 310; Steffek 2009). It builds on the assumption that "'reasoning' or 'giving reasons' becomes paramount in the communicative process that legitimates political institutions" (Steffek 2009, 315). Discursive strategies have inherent link to stakeholder management, as actors can select which audiences to address in their communication.

Discursive legitimation strategies would make use of *framing*, that is, the 'strategic construction' of new ways of talking about and understanding an issue (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). Framing provide "a singular interpretation of a particular situation and then indicate appropriate behavior for that context" (Payne 2001, 39). Suchman (1995) envision discursive strategies along a continuum from conforming to more manipulative

strategies. Towards the conformist end, strategies "are efforts to embed new structures and practices in networks of other already legitimate institutions" (Suchman 1995, 588). This can be related to what has been called the 'resonance hypothesis', which argues that the more new ideas resonate or are compatible with the pre-existing norms and values, the more influence it will have (Risse 2002, 270–271). Black (2008, 147) also mentions that regulators can seek to link themselves to other organizations in "systems of mutual legitimacy enhancement". In a more manipulative form, discursive strategies would pre-emptively intervene to establish the legitimacy of the organization by "actively promulgate new explanations of social reality" (Suchman 1995, 591). Thus, discursive legitimation strategies may also be intentionally "inappropriate" to challenge existing standards (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897).

4.3.2 Stakeholder management strategies

I define stakeholders within multi-stakeholder networks as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the solution of the problem addressed by the network" (Roloff 2008, 314). Besides the partners themselves, development PPPs include a wide range of stakeholders, including the beneficiaries of the partnership activities, the initiating organisations, external donors, and project staff (Tennyson and Wilde 2000, 21). This paper distinguishes between the PPP's primary stakeholders with a direct role in the organisation or its implementation (e.g. partners, beneficiaries), and secondary stakeholders that have a more indirect role in granting legitimacy (e.g. CSOs, wider society) (cf. Cashore 2002, 511). Although secondary stakeholders have a more indirect role than primary stakeholders, the PPP may still be reliant on their acceptance to be able to implement its objectives (Black 2008, 147).

PPPs can be legitimated indirectly by "linking themselves to other organizations which are perceived to be legitimate by those whose legitimacy claims they want to meet" (Black 2008, 147). Thus, defining and managing the membership of the organization can be a legitimation strategy. While selectively bringing in members can enhance the PPP's legitimacy, Black (2008, 148) also notes that it can expose the PPP to demands from a wider range of actors, or the member's legitimacy may not be 'transferrable' to the setting of the PPP.

As a second legitimation strategy through stakeholder management, Suchman (1995, 587) suggests that the PPP can include stakeholders in decision-making procedures. Inclusion can

enhance perceptions of legitimacy by facilitating stakeholders' ownership and control over decisions. It can also enhance norm-based legitimacy perceptions when it is considered "morally right" to let stakeholders (e.g. beneficiaries and secondary stakeholders) have input in decision-making procedures. The two reasons might also overlap (cf. Raines 2003). Given this paper's focus on *transnational* PPPs, one can envision a continuum between top-down and bottom-up approaches to stakeholder inclusion. The former would focus on international partners and include local stakeholders at a later stage in the partnership process (e.g. in implementation or evaluation). At the other end, a bottom-up strategy would include local, primary stakeholders in the early stages of a partnership (e.g. PPP design).

However, it could be argued that legitimating the PPP through stakeholder management is difficult given the multitude of geographies, interests and incoherent groups represented in transnational, multi-stakeholder PPPs. At the very basic level, this concerns the difficulty of defining relevant stakeholders in transnational governance (Bernstein 2011; Black 2008). Studies have also found that these processes in PPPs are "contentious steps that are often based on elusive processes and arbitrary choices" (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 466). Black (2008, 153) also notes that a partnership might face conflicting demands with regards to stakeholder inclusion: while partners may demand limited, expertise-based membership, secondary stakeholders may see broader stakeholder inclusion as prerequisite for the partnership's legitimacy. She hypothesizes that what stakeholder demands are met by a regulator depends upon factors such as its dependence on the stakeholder group, that group's ability to coerce the regulator, and the congruence between the legitimacy demand and the regulator's discourse (Black 2008, 156).

4.3.3 Institutionalization strategies

Including institutionalization as a legitimation strategy is based on the assumption that creating (or mimicking) a certain institutional form or promoting organizational change can have a legitimating effect (see Suchman 1995; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). There are two particular aspects of this argument: first, the institutional form of the organization is considered appropriate *per se*, and second, the organization is legitimated through the rules and procedures it applies. Regarding the first, it could be argued that the PPP form itself has a powerful legitimating effect. This is related to the view that multi-stakeholder partnerships are "win-win solutions that can increase the democratic credentials of global governance, while

simultaneously strengthening environmental performance" (Bäckstrand 2010, 146). Some scholars have argued that the partnership model for development has become the "normal" way of delivering development (Bull and McNeill 2010) and that PPPs are widely sanctioned by international organizations and states "as legitimate and pragmatic practices" (Gregoratti 2010, 194). In this view, "the normative content of these ideas has served as a powerful legitimising force in the face of profound governance gaps"(Gregoratti 2012, 533).

Secondly, the PPP can be legitimated through its governance structures, rules and procedures. Several empirical findings confirm that empirical perceptions of legitimacy correspond with normative standards associated with democratic legitimacy (Quack 2010; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008; Beisheim and Kaan 2010). Koppell (in Schouten and Glasbergen 2011:1892) argue that there is increasingly universal acceptance of norms relating to Western democratic practices: representation, participation, neutrality, and procedural regularity. Democratically legitimate rules and procedures exist when "those who are affected by a decision have input in the decision-making process. The interests of affected stakeholders should be represented in decision-making, and the affected actors should have the opportunity to hold decision-makers accountable" (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009, 465). Thus, strategies to legitimate the PPP through a institutionalization strategy may focus on establishing procedures or rules for one or several of these aspects: a neutral PPP organization, beneficiaries' input in decision-making, representation of the beneficiaries' interests, and the establishment of accountability mechanisms. The latter may simply take the form of ensuring transparency in the PPP's procedures or through reporting practices, but it can also institutionalize accountability relationships in the PPP governance structure (cf. Black 2008).

The legitimating effect arise either from the evaluation that the rules and procedures are normatively "right", or through the function they perform. For instance, a neutral PPP organization plays into legal norms, but also legitimates the partnership because it facilitates social learning among the partners, and helps ensure efficiency through administrative support. Beneficiaries' input into decision-making is based on the assumption that "more participation by affected groups will generate more effective collective problem solving" (Bäckstrand 2006, 294-295). Beneficiaries' participation in procedures is also said to legitimate the PPP because it helps actors "accept the final decision as the best possible

compromise; it creates ownership for the result and increases its perceived legitimacy" (Beisheim and Kaan 2010, 125). Beisheim and Dingwerth (2008, 15) argue that stakeholders – even those external to the process itself – "may also accept a rule that results from a transparent and accountable process".

4.4 ANALYTICAL MODEL OF LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES IN DEVELOPMENT PPPs

The following process model is based on the assumption that partnerships go through comparable stages (Roloff 2008; Van Tulder and Pfisterer 2008; Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Roloff (2008)'s life cycle model of multi-stakeholder networks distinguishes between seven "life phases": initiation, three distinct deliberation phases, two action phases, and a final institutionalization or extinction phase. From the firm management perspective, Human and Provan (2000) identified five phases of legitimacy building in networks of firms; pre-network organizational field, network formation, early growth, emerging legitimacy, and sustainment or demise. Also writing on legitimacy building, Bernstein and Cashore (2007) specifically address three phases through which a private regime can gain moral legitimacy: initiation, widespread support, and legitimacy. Building upon these strands of research, I have developed a model for understanding legitimation processes in PPPs for development, as shown in table 2 below. Distinguishing between the three phases "initiation", "setting up the PPP", and "implementation", it provides a simpler conceptual framework than Roloff (2008) and Human and Provan (2008). However, much of the overall logic remains intact. For instance, it could be argued that Roloff (2008)'s deliberation phase corresponds with my phases I-II, and what she calls 'Action' (phase 5-6) is equivalent to my implementation phase. Moreover, I have deliberately chosen not to include legitimacy as a determinant of the phases (cf. Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Human and Provan 2000). How legitimacy perceptions relate to the different phases is rather discussed in section 4.4.4 on legitimation dynamics.

Three caveats are in order. First, it is important to note that the model is not meant to predict the timing or precise content of the strategies to legitimate the PPP, but serve as an analytical framework to understand legitimation processes. Secondly, the model does not presuppose that the evolution of the PPP follows the outlined sequence of phases. Lastly, it follows Bernstein and Cashore (2007) in arguing that strategic action at all stages takes place against the backdrop of the social structure. The remaining part of this section will outline some

propositions for dynamics and strategies relevant for each stage.

Table 2: Analytical model of legitimation strategies in development PPPs

	Phase I: *Initiation*	*Phase II:* *Setting up the PPP*	*Phase III:* *Implementation*
Discourse	Strategic social construction	Justification of PPP design	Justification of PPP
Stakeholder management	Institutional entrepreneurs	Primary / Secondary stakeholders	Expanding stakeholder scope
Institution-alization	Embedding within or distancing from existing institutions	Institutional innovation - Governance structures and procedures	Institutional evolution - Governance structures and procedures

4.4.1   Phase I: Initiation

Including an initiation phase recognizes that PPPs are not the only institutional solution to problems, and that actors may choose other forms if they see them as more appropriate. Because the PPP does not yet exist at this stage, institutionalization strategies would presumably take the form of embedding or distancing the issue or solution within existing institutions. Discourse is arguably the most dominant legitimation strategy at this stage, and will likely focus on the 'strategic construction' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) of the issue at hand. This early process is important as it outlines the content of common activities and "create[s] a basic understanding and common belief related to what [the actors] are trying to govern" (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, 1893).

4.4.2   Phase II: Setting up the PPP

While the first initiation phase would focus on the idea of a partnership (e.g. the issue framing and the partnership's purpose) the second phase would focus on setting up and designing the PPP institution. As outlined above, the key strategies at this stage involve aspects of institutional design. Discursive strategies would be less prominent than in the previous stage,

but nevertheless key in justifying the design choices made. In terms of stakeholder management strategies, the PPP entrepreneurs would have to decide on the range of stakeholders that would be involved in the PPP design phase. In one end, the process would focus on the stakeholders involved from the initiation phase, or a small group of committed and convinced partners. At the other end of the spectrum, the design process would include a full range of stakeholders.

4.4.3   Phase III: Implementation

The third stage in the process model describes the evolution of the partnership after its initial set-up. Theoretically, the partnership does not have to expand focus or evolve significantly from the second phase; it could keep the initial partners and the original rules and procedures. Empirically, however, there seems to be evidence that transnational PPPs evolve over time (Bull and McNeill 2010; Raines 2003; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). First, PPPs can evolve by expanding the partnership scope to include more actors. In terms of stakeholder management, the partnership would involve more actors in the PPP by expanding membership or increase the scope of stakeholders involved and addressed by the partnership. As an institutionalization strategy, inclusiveness would for instance seek to establish consultative processes or accountability mechanisms for secondary stakeholders. Discursively, it could also take the form of addressing new stakeholder audiences to inform and justify the PPP. Second, PPPs can evolve from more or less informal interaction into more formalized rules and procedures. For instance, Bull and McNeill (2010) find that larger PPPs for sustainable development "that were initially launched as lean, flexible entities became increasingly bureaucratized due to large project portfolios and demands for democratic participation, transparency, and accountability" (Bull and McNeill 2010, 111).

4.4.   LEGITIMATION DYNAMICS IN DEVELOPMENT PPPS

How do strategies and perceptions of legitimacy relate to the analytical model's three stages, and what is the legitimation dynamic across and within the stages? The following outlines a few propositions to these questions. The dynamics are shown as arrows in the model below.

Figure 2: Legitimation processes in development PPPs

Regarding the initiation phase, perceptions of legitimacy relate to the relevant issue or actors. These "pre-existing" perceptions may condition the need for legitimation strategies. For instance, strategies to legitimate a PPP would be facilitated if the issue in question is considered morally legitimate, or if existing norms favour the PPP form. The characteristics of the actors involved also plays into the need for legitimation of the PPP; if they are viewed as legitimate and authoritative on the issue in question, their views are likely to become prominent and diffuse (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 906). Oppositely, controversial actors may need to spend more resources to persuade others about the legitimacy of their ideas and initiatives.

Only a limited form of legitimacy is a condition for the partnership to move from phase I to phase II; the partnership idea must be accepted by a few entrepreneurs and partners to become institutionalized, but not all stakeholders. It can be assumed that all actors conduct a cost-benefit calculation of their participation in the partnership (cf. Roloff 2008, 319). Although this seems like a pure rationalist argument, it is constructivist in the sense that prevailing norms can redefine what is considered a strategic interest (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). For instance, it has been noted that strengthened awareness on CSR within management has made it more difficult to disentangle firms' strategic and norm-driven behaviour (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 361). In other words, the PPP can be considered legitimate at this stage for both pragmatic and normative reasons (cf. Suchman 1995). It is also possible that partners choose to abandon the PPP during phase II, or choose to go back to the initiation phase to engage other actors. This dynamic between the initiation phase and phase II is depicted by the first, bidirectional arrow in figure 1.

It is assumed that all partnerships move into phase III, unless the partners abandon the partnership and do not sign any form of document. Thus, legitimacy beyond that of the first phase is not a requirement for reaching phase III, also because limited legitimacy during the first phases can be addressed by strategies during phase III. Nonetheless, it could be argued that legitimation strategies during phase I-II may have a bearing upon the partnership implementation during phase III, insofar as the legitimation strategies do not fit with the stakeholders' expectations during the implementation phase (Quack 2010, 13). For instance, if local beneficiaries have not been included during the previous phases, their lack of ownership or acceptance might affect the PPP implementation (cf. Beisheim and Kaan 2010; Raines 2003). This is shown by the arrow that points from phase II to phase III in figure 1.

Moreover, there is a potential feedback effect from implementation to the PPP design, which would be the case if the PPP design were modified after implementation has started. This feedback loop is shown as the bidirectional arrow between phase II and III. For instance, Roloff (2008, 321-322) argue that networks tend to alternate between design and implementation: some "will reconsider the problem definition after evaluating the outcome of their implementation phase, and consequently adjust the proposed solution, before venturing into another implementation phase". Bringing in new stakeholders during implementation can also change the PPP design and objectives because "new stakeholders will add their views of the problem and a new problem analysis may require the inclusion of new actors" (Roloff 2008, 320). Furthermore, rules and procedures can become more binding or be revised over time (Roloff 2008, 321). A few recent studies on governance schemes have found a similar effect. Overdevest (2010) argue that both internal and external pressures for more transparency and accountability led to the ratcheting up of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) standard after its initial set-up. Similarly, Beisheim and Kaan (2010, 130) find that the 4C[10] changed during implementation from participatory governance structures to representation through membership.

During the third phase, it is assumed that at least some partners and beneficiaries must consider the PPP legitimate for the partnership to implement its objectives, because any development partnership is dependent upon beneficiaries' involvement on the ground to create impact. However, it does not necessarily mean that the PPP is *generally* accepted as

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[10] The Common Code for the Coffee Community

legitimate, although that is a possibility. In that case, the partnership would have been able to join the actors' different perspectives into a common vision and mobilize support from a larger group of stakeholders also outside the partnership's immediate audience (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). It is also possible that the support to a PPP could wane and become fragmented over time, which could be translated into a proliferation of competing partnerships or governance approaches (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, 359).

The PPP can also itself become a source of legitimacy, especially for the partners (cf. Dacin, Oliver, and Roy 2007). Because a PPP was defined above as a regime, this argument is related to the well-known proposition about a regime's feedback mechanism (see Krasner 1982). For this paper, it means that the PPP may influence the normative structures and actors that gave rise to the PPP in the first place. For instance, a successful PPP implementation can lead to more partnerships within the same issue or reinforce norms about the desirability of PPPs as governance mechanism. Implementation failure or fragmentation of the support to the PPP might oppositely weaken the perception of PPPs as a desirable governance mechanism. The feedback effect is illustrated by the long arrow going from phase III to phase I in figure 1.

4.5   SECTION SUMMARY

This chapter argued that partnerships for sustainable development can be seen as governance mechanisms by which actors seek to steer societal development. It then argued for a procedural approach to legitimacy focused on *legitimation*, and went on to outline the relevant legitimation strategies: discourse, stakeholder management, and institutionalization. Finally, the strategies were grouped in an analytical model for understanding legitimation processes. This model proposed three stages for partnership evolution and outlined a few propositions for the dynamic between strategies and legitimacy perceptions across the phases. In the following section, this model and its propositions will be applied to the TAP and SAGCOT partnerships for sustainable agricultural development in Tanzania.

5 CASE PRESENTATION

This chapter presents the case of agricultural value chain partnerships in Tanzania. It includes a brief background on agriculture and agricultural policies in Tanzania, which aims to present the context in which the TAP and SAGCOT partnerships emerged. The second subsection (5.2) outlines the historical evolution of the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships for agricultural value chain partnerships in Tanzania.

5.1 BACKGROUND: AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN TANZANIA

The Tanzanian economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, and 77,5% of Tanzanians have agriculture as their main livelihood (URT 2009). Despite an average GDP growth rate of 6,8% from 2008-2010, the agricultural sector average growth for the same period was only 4% (URT 2009). It is recognized that Tanzanian agriculture is performing below its potential: only 11% of total arable land is under cultivation and food crop productivity has been very low (Wolter 2008, 14). The low productivity together with poor marketing and transport infrastructure have led to persistent food security problems (Wolter 2008, 29). While there are some commercial agribusinesses, smallholder farmers account for most of the country's food production (URT 2009). However, these farmers mostly produce for subsistence purposes, and rely on rain-fed agriculture (URT 2009, Wolter 2008, 14). Only 15% of Tanzanians farmers use modern agricultural inputs (Wolter 2008, 14), and fertilizer use is estimated at an average of 9 kg per hectare (compared to the average use in Africa at 13 kg per hectare) (Vedeld and Kengera 2006, 5-6).

The Tanzanian Government has sought to address these challenges in a series of development strategies, with the overarching strategy being the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA I&II) covering the period 2005-2015. In 2010, Tanzania signed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)[11], which sought to increase African governments' investments in agriculture to at least 10% of national budgets (Cooksey 2013). This led to the development of the Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP) in 2011. However, the government's major instrument for

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[11] CAADP is a program of the AU's New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

achieving agricultural growth and poverty reduction is the Agricultural Sector Development Plan (ASDP) completed in 2006 (Wolter 2008, 22).

Tanzanian agricultural services have traditionally been state-driven and centrally planned. However, recent policies have increased the focus on the private sector as an engine for agricultural growth. For instance, the ASDP opened up for "a greater focus on efficiency and profitability of sector investments and the involvement of the private sector" (Wolter 2008, 22). The government also adopted the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative[12] in 2009 to support local agribusiness. In 2012, the Tanzanian government signed a framework agreement with the G8 through the 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' (New Alliance). Under this agreement, the Tanzanian government committed to ensure tax incentives for the private sector, as well as seed and input policies that "encourage greater private sector participation" (G8 2012, annex 1). While including the private sector in agricultural development constitutes a considerable shift in Tanzanian policies, it has been argued that the policies still privilege state-led activities because of the weak capacity of the Tanzanian private sector and the policies' limited funding for private sector development (Cooksey 2013, 13).

5.2 PRIVATE SECTOR-LED AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN PARTNERSHIPS IN TANZANIA

While there are many partnerships targeting agricultural value chains in Tanzania, this paper will delimit itself to value chain partnerships that focus on the *private sector* as a means to enhance food security and value chain efficiency. Moreover, it will focus on two multi-stakeholder partnerships that have been initiated by private sector actors: the Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Looking at the TAP and SAGCOT as a case aims to shed light on *how* such a private sector-led partnership come to be accepted as a legitimate tool for agricultural development in Tanzania. The following outlines the historical emergence and evolution of TAP and SAGCOT as private sector-led partnerships for development of agricultural value chains in Tanzania.

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[12] The KK was originally formulated by the Tanzanian National Business Council (Cooksey 2013, 10)

Table 3: Case timeline

2004	Tanzanian government contacts Yara to build a fertilizer buffer stock Yara establishes Tanzania country office, contacts the Norwegian Embassy
2006	MoU signed between Yara International, Norad, Norfund, Rabobank Group, the Tanzanian government, and Rockefeller Foundation (May) MoU partnership presented at NEPAD's Africa Fertilizer Summit (June) Fertilizer supply chain study by Prorustica (May – August) **Tanzania Fertilizer Initiative (August)** TFI presented at the Oslo Fertilizer Summit (August / September)
2006 – 2007	**Fast Track Pilot projects** in 5 districts (December – July)
2007	**Tanzania Agricultural Partnership** CIP processes
2008	**Growth Corridor concept introduced** by Yara at the Business Call to Action meeting (May) and the FAO Food Crisis Summit (June) **National roll-out of TAP (October)**
2009	**Meeting on Growth Corridors in Dar es Salaam (October)** Kilimo Kwanza adopted in government policy
2010	**SAGCOT concept note developed** **Launched by pres. Kikwete at WEF in Dar es Salaam (May)** **Kilimo Kwanza Executive Committeeformed (May)** **Investment Blueprint process (May – January)**
2011	**SAGCOT Investment Blueprint presented at WEF in Davos (January)** **SAGCOT centre established under Tanzanian law (May)** **SAGCOT centre funding impasse**, receives emergency funding from Norwegian embassy (Fall) **Greenprint process starts (October)** End of first funding term TAP I (2008-2011)
2012	**Stakeholder consultation rounds** SAGCOT Greenprint draft (August) Yara invests in fertilizer terminal in Dar es Salaam under SAGCOT (August) Feedback process for SAGCOT Greenprint (August – November)
2013	TAP II project proposal Unilever signs investment MoU with TZ gov under SAGCOT (August)

Sources: Jenkins (2012), Scherr et al (2013), Yara (2007), Norad (2013), TAP (2013), Interviews

TAP originates back to 2004, when the Tanzanian government contacted Yara[13] to discuss the affordability and accessibility of fertilizer in the country (TAP 2013). Yara approached the Norwegian embassy in Dar es Salaam, who directed the responsibility to Norad and Norfund. Together with the Rockefeller Foundation[14] and Rabobank, a Dutch agribusiness bank, they signed a MoU in May 2006 (Yara 2007, 90). Yara got in touch with the consultancy firm Prorustica and commissioned a study on fertilizer buffer stock throughout the Tanzanian mainland. Prorustica developed a program concept for a PPP to support the development of a fertilizer value chain in Tanzania, called the Tanzanian Fertilizer Initiative (TFI). The TFI was presented at the Oslo Conference for a Green Revolution in Africa in August 2006, a conference organized by Yara and funded by the other TFI partners.

The TFI started implementation through the Fast Track Project in five districts[15]. During implementation the focus changed from *fertilizer* value chains to commodity-specific agricultural value chains, with maize and rice as the first two commodities (Interview Guyver 2013). The scope was also broadened from fertilizer availability to other inputs (e.g. seeds), access to credit, and farmer skills (TAP 2013).

With this shift the TFI became the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP). TAP would aim to increase accessibility and affordability of agricultural inputs, improve market output linkages for farmers, increase productivity and stimulate private sector investment in agriculture (TAP 2013). To this end they would offer training to farmers and work to improve their access to market information and credit (TAP 2013). TAP would also coordinate and facilitate local and district-level partnerships between its partners[16] or other actors. In 2007, TAP introduced the Commodity Investment Plan (CIP) process as a tool to facilitate local partnerships. A CIP is a commodity-specific investment plan made by public and private sector actors working through a district PPP. In 2008, Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda announced a national roll-out plan for TAP, and by the end of 2009 TAP was running activities in 25 districts, also in the SAGCOT region (TAP 2013; Norad 2013).

Also in 2008, Yara presented the idea of a regional "Agricultural Growth Corridor' to

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[13] Yara is a global producer of fertilizer and chemicals, headquartered in Norway and with the Norwegian state as the biggest shareholder.

[14] The Rockefeller Foundation was not a partner to the partnership when it was set up in 2006(Prorustica 2006)

[15] Songea Rural, Mbeya Rural, Mbirali, Mufundi and Kilombero (Yara 2007:91)

[16] For a full list of TAP partners and regions, see appendix 9.1

catalyze agricultural and infrastructural investments and to make input value chains more efficient. The concept was first introduced at the UN General Assembly Private Sector Forum in September 2008, and later at the FAO Food Crisis Summit in June (Jenkins 2012; Yara 2008). Yara hosted a separate roundtable on the topic during the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos in January 2009 (Yara 2008). During this meeting the governments of Mozambique and Tanzania expressed their interest, and started domestic processes looking at the possibility of implementing national growth corridor projects.

In the discussion on an agricultural growth corridor in Tanzania, Yara summoned its TAP partners[17] and the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Tanzanian Investment Centre (SAGCOT 2010, 3). At a meeting at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam in October 2009 these actors decided to develop a growth corridor in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. The new initiative was called Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and after president Kikwete's sanctioning it would be the first project of *Kilimo Kwanza* (Jenkins 2012, 15). A preliminary Concept Note would be funded by the Norwegian Embassy, and developed by the TAP management team assisted by the consultancies Prorustica, AgDevCo, and InfraCo[18](SAGCOT 2010, 3).

President Kikwete presented the Concept Note at the WEF in Dar es Salaam in 2010, and it was decided that a detailed investment plan – an Investment Blueprint (IB) – would be developed for the WEF in 2011 (Jenkins 2012, 16). After about four weeks, twenty partners had committed to participate in a SAGCOT Executive Committee (EC) that would oversee the IB process. The EC was co-chaired by Unilever and the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, and included the Tanzanian Prime Minister's office, ACT, the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI), the Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association (TASGA), Yara, AGRA, USAID, and the Irish Embassy (Jenkins 2012; SAGCOT 2011a). The IB was developed by Prorustica and AgDevCo over a period of eight months and signed off by the EC partners (Interview Guyver 2013). According to the IB, TAP and SAGCOT would be established under a new legal entity called the Tanzania Agricultural Growth Trust (TAGT)[19].

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[17] The TAP management, Norfund, the Tanzanian government and the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam (SAGCOT 2010, 3)
[18] AgDevCo and InfraCo developed the Concept Note for the agricultural growth corridor of Beira, Mozambique. While in the Concept note, InfraCo is not credited in the IB.
[19] See appendix 9.4

This broader institutional framework would provide a platform for "other Agricultural Growth Corridors (ACG), and perhaps similar initiatives in fisheries and forestry to be developed in the future" (SAGCOT 2011b, 3).

Donors had "indicated a willingness" to provide funding for a secretariat and a SAGCOT investment fund (SAGCOT 2011a, 40). At the WEF in January 2011, USAID, the WB, and the Tanzanian government announced commitments of several million dollars (Jenkins 2012, 17). However, while the Secretariat was established in May 2011, it was still not funded by the end of the year. In the end, the Secretariat received emergency funding from the Norwegian Embassy through TAP, and later also from the Tanzanian government (Interview Magila 2013, Interview Hveem 2013). TAP also provided the SAGCOT Secretariat with administrative backstopping (Interview Magila 2013, Interview Hveem 2013). Apart from Yara's USD20 million investment in a fertilizer terminal in the port of Dar es Salaam in January 2011, there have been very few investments under SAGCOT to date and many critical issues remain challenging[20] (UNDP 2012, 65; Byiers 2013, 16). Still, when the G8 launched its new initiative 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition" (New Alliance)[21] in 2012, the framework agreement stated: "Tanzania is a showcase for public-private partnership in agricultural growth, exemplified by the development of its Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT)" (G8 2012, 2).

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[20] To my knowledge, there are two MoUs under SAGCOT; one between the Government of Tanzania and Unilever as of August 2013, and another signed in September 2012 by the EU, DFID and USAID to upgrade a road in the SAGCOT region (SAGCOT 2013; Embassy of the United States in Dar es Salaam 2013)
[21] Signatories are the G8 countries and Ehtiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania. Later added: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique (USAID 2013)

6   ANALYSIS

This section will apply the theoretical framework outlined above to the case of two PPPs for agricultural value chain development in Tanzania; the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The subsequent sections will seek to understand how, why, and to what extent the PPPs are perceived as legitimate mechanisms for agricultural development in Tanzania. To this end, the chapter will proceed in four steps. First, it will clarify what actors have been the principals behind the legitimation strategies (subchapter 6.1). Second, it will analyze what strategies have been pursued to legitimate TAP and SAGCOT (subchapter 6.2). As a third step, the analysis will investigate how the pursued legitimation strategies influenced perceptions of the two PPPs' legitimacy (subchapter 6.3). The chapter ends with a discussion about the findings (subchapter 6.4), paying particular attention to the theoretical implications of the case.

6.1   WHOSE LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES?

As explained in the theoretical framework above, this paper analyzes the strategies that aim to establish the general view that a PPP is legitimate. It was assumed that the legitimacy of a PPP is generated in the interaction between actors' strategies and the social structure in the given issue area (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Before moving on to discuss the legitimation strategies pursued to legitimate the agricultural value chain partnerships in Tanzania, this subchapter will answer the crucial question of agency: *whose* legitimation strategies are we talking about?

The analytical model applied in this paper assumed that there are a few key "institutional entrepreneurs" who initiate the PPP and frame the PPP issue. This is supported by the empirical data: key drivers behind the idea of a partnership for general agricultural value chain development in Tanzania were Yara, Norad, Norfund and the consultancies Prorustica, Korongo, and AgDevCo. One interviewee described the beginning of TAP as follows: "we were a trio [Norad, Yara, Norfund] who tried thinking out of the box, because this wasn't application-based, here we have a strategic partnership" (Interview Arnesen 2013). While these "entrepreneurs" surely have institutional platforms, it is not to say that their views are

necessarily representative of their institution. Perhaps with the exception of Yara, the data indicates that there were mostly individuals or fractions of organisations that supported the project. For instance, Yara singled out Norad's Odd Arnesen as having played "a key role in developing the partnership model" (Yara 2007, 91). Moreover, interviews emphasized the then Tanzanian Prime Minister for Agriculture, Peniel Lyimo, as a critical supporter within the Tanzanian government (Interview Lewis 2013)[22].

After the first set-up of the PPPs, it is assumed that the various legitimation strategies are pursued by the PPP 'itself'. Before TAP and SAGCOT had a management structure, this function was performed by the consultancies responding to legitimacy demands towards the PPP. For instance, the SAGCOT IB was developed by the consultancies AgDevCo and Prorustica, but adjusted according to the EC partners' wishes (Interview Guyver 2013).

6.2   WHAT LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES WERE PURSUED?

This subchapter will outline the strategies employed to legitimate the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships. It follows the conceptualization of strategies presented in Table 1 above, and discusses discursive strategies, stakeholder management strategies, and institutionalization strategies, as well as their evolution over time (see Table 2).

6.2.1 Discursive strategies

As explained above, a discursive strategy include communication about the necessity and appropriateness of the PPP, its form and policy objectives. The analysis below shows that strategies combined conforming and distancing elements to strengthen the discourse on agricultural value chain partnerships. In other words, the partnerships tapped into established norms and concepts while at the same time framing the partnerships as *new* solutions, presenting them as more effective than traditional approaches. It also shows the role of key entrepreneurs in shaping the discourse and the framing of the solution.

6.2.1.1   TAP

In the first conceptualization of a fertilizer value chain partnership (Prorustica 2006), it is justified as an alternative to inefficient and ineffective government policies:

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[22] Note that the TZ government was not formally a partner to TAP in the early stages in 2006

"It has become increasingly clear that new, additional ways for accelerating agricultural growth must be developed. Commercially-led Public/Private Partnerships, such as the program proposed in this paper, is an attempt to move quickly ahead with a new approach that will have a rapid and sustainable impact for Tanzanian farmers." (Prorustica 2006, 3-4).

Thus, the value chain partnership is presented as a *new, alternative* approach to governmental policies: "Former strategies have often not delivered the expected results across the continent. New strategies are needed. TAP is part of this new Approach" (TAP 2013). It is presented as innovative in two ways: in the twinning of commercial and developmental goals, and in the "unusually holistic approach" that would take the whole value chain into account (Prorustica 2006, 9). The partnership is explicitly distanced from traditional development approaches by calling it "Business as un-usual" (Prorustica 2006, 8). According Yara's Vice President at the time, this kind of development is pragmatic and action-oriented, "driven by people who see a potential of something to gain, of value creation – developmentally or materially – as opposed to a typical donor-funded project where the first year goes to research and only then a project emerges" (Cartridge cited in Yara 2007, 91).

While TAP was framed as a *new* and *alternative* approach, it is simultaneously *conforming* in the sense that TAP is aligned with established norms and initiatives. First, TAP is linked to the Tanzanian government's policies such as ASDP and the National Fertiliser Strategy (Prorustica 2006, 8). Second, TAP is framed in accordance with the general rhetoric on PPPs. The partnership form is justified by references to the partners' complementary skills and expertise (Prorustica 2006; Enger 2008; Yara 2007, 90-91). A partnership is better able to include a wide range of stakeholders than top-down donor projects: "This is the correct development. This is a model to test the entire value chain and this requires a variety of players. So many different stakeholders lead to a much wider dialogue" (Cartridge cited in Yara 2007, 91).

The entrepreneurs also created an institutional platform to promote and discuss TAP's approach; the Oslo Conference for a Green Revolution in Africa. The 'Oslo summit' was first organized in the autumn of 2006 with the participation of international actors, donors, and government officials, and specifically focused on PPPs as means to create a "Green Revolution" in Africa (Yara 2007). The summit can be seen as a legitimation tool because it strengthened the perception that TAP was a legitimate governance mechanism, and the PPP

entrepreneurs (in particular Yara) were able to proactively shape the understanding of the TAP project and its purpose.

6.2.1.2 SAGCOT

According to the first SAGCOT concept document, the Agricultural Growth Corridor approach include four particular aspects:

> "[Firstly, it] involves developing clusters of commercial farms and agribusiness in areas where there is high agricultural potential and access to backbone infrastructure. Secondly, it describes a Nucleus Commercial Farm and Outgrower model, a type of commercial farm design that ensures there are strong and direct benefits for smallholder farmers. Thirdly, it shows how targeted government and donor support, in particular new financing mechanisms, can mobilise private funding to support these types of investments. Fourthly, it underlines the importance of a supportive business environment" (SAGCOT 2010, 1)

These four features are justified by arguing that they have been present in "all countries where modern agriculture has been successful – from Western Europe and the United States to Brazil and Vietnam" (SAGCOT 2010, 4). The "Agricultural Growth Corridor" model proposed by SAGCOT is justified as a solution to a situation in which the private sector is reluctant to invest because of poor infrastructure and lack of supportive business environment, and the government is "unlikely to commit significant public resources to developing infrastructure in rural areas where there is only limited commercial farming activity and hence low demand for services" (SAGCOT 2010, 3–4).

The growth corridor concept was framed to "fit" with the existing normative environment calling for poverty reduction and smallholder integration, PPPs, and an enabling environment. SAGCOT is also linked to governmental policies, like the Kilimo Kwanza policy: "SAGCOT will help Kilimo Kwanza move from concept to reality" (SAGCOT 2011a, 15). The IB stipulates that SAGCOT will provide support to the ASDP, and will over time become part of the CAADP compact for Tanzania (SAGCOT 2011a, 15).

SAGCOT's discourse combines features from historical growth corridors in the region with a "new" solution; socially responsible investments and smallholder-focused outgrower schemes. On the one hand, a corridor approach is not new in Tanzania, and according to Byiers the idea that growth corridors may solve a range of development challenges "has a long running resonance" (Byiers 2013, 7). At the same time, the agricultural growth corridor

concept was "new" in the *framing* of these elements into one approach. The growth corridors were presented as the solution to the situation marked by uncoordinated efforts and the shared feeling that "something had to be done" (cf. Jenkins 2012).

As SAGCOT was modelled on the experience of TAP (SAGCOT 2011c, 5), the two share the core emphasis on the PPP form and on "business unusual". While also geared towards smallholders and poverty reduction, SAGCOT is more explicit on the focus on commercial agriculture. The IB states that investments will be primarily based on commercial considerations:

> "This does not mean that other interests such as rural poverty reduction and food security are excluded, but the primary objective of the choices will be commercial. The decision-making process used by SAGCOT will therefore not use traditional government or donor criteria, or a usual participatory process. This is different. It is business as unusual" (SAGCOT 2011c, 3)

Similar to how TAP was discussed and promoted at the Oslo Conference for a Green Revolution in Africa in 2006, SAGCOT was linked to several international platforms and initiatives. By 2010, the 'Oslo Fertilizer Summits' organized by the TAP partners had evolved into the African Green Revolution Forum (African Green Revolution Forum 2013). Furthermore, SAGCOT was linked to the Grow Africa platform[23] when it was established in 2011. These platforms could be seen as an discursive strategy as they provide a forum in which SAGCOT's approach can be discussed and promoted, potentially having a socializing effect that influence the perception of SAGCOT as a legitimate governance mechanism.

6.2.2   Stakeholder management strategies

It is recalled that stakeholder management strategies include *defining* the PPP's primary stakeholders (partners) and the process of *involving* stakeholders in the PPP. The following shows that both TAP and SAGCOT were initiated as inclusive "coalitions of the willing", but nevertheless consisted mostly of international actors. However, while TAP quickly shifted towards bottom-up approaches, SAGCOT had more difficulties including local stakeholders.

6.2.2.1   TAP

In the very beginning of the fertilizer partnership, the primary stakeholders remained the

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[23] Grow Africa was convened by the African Union, NEPAD and the World Economic Forum

"entrepreneurs" Yara, Norad and Norfund, supported by the consultancy Prorustica and the Rabobank group. The Concept Paper from 2006 is clearly developed for these partners, with the intention of bringing in more partners – especially the Tanzanian government – at a later point (Prorustica 2006). The choice of partners was based primarily on expertise (Prorustica 2006, Interview Arnesen 2013, Interview Guyver 2013). However, as the partnership implementation began, the choice of other partners seems to have been pragmatic: "[the TFI] developed as an informal coalition of *interested and willing* partners" (TAP 2013, emphasis added).

The first design phase of the partnership was marked by a top-down, even international approach; Prorustica developed the Concept Paper for the partners, and the partnership idea was presented at the NEPAD African Fertilizer Summit in Abuja in May 2006, and at the 'Oslo Summit' in September the same year. However, there was a shift to include bottom-up strategies after the first conceptualization: there were field visits and meetings were held with key decision makers at the national level, including governmental representatives, private sector actors and indirect representatives for farmers and the private sector (Interview Magila 2013). These efforts included potential partners, farmers, and CSOs. The Commodity Investment Plan (CIP) process introduced by TAP in 2007 confirms the shift to a bottom-up approach: actors would discuss which commodity to prioritize in their area, identify key challenges in the value chain, and decide crucial interventions and investments to be made the following two-three years.

6.2.2.2 SAGCOT

There was a clear focus on *international, high-level* stakeholders in Yara's early efforts to legitimate the growth corridor model. As outlined above, Yara first presented the concept at international summits organized by the UN and the FAO, and discussed during the African Green Revolution Forum summits (Jenkins 2012; Yara 2008; Interview Botillen 2013). The WEF was a particularly key arena: Yara hosted a separate roundtable on the growth corridors during the WEF meeting in Davos in 2009, and the SAGCOT Concept Note was developed specifically for the WEF meeting in Dar es Salaam in May 2010 (SAGCOT 2010, Jenkins 2012, 12; Yara 2008). SAGCOT's legitimation strategies were also high-level in a second sense: SAGCOT was endorsed by the president of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, and he held presentations on SAGCOT during the WEF meetings in 2010 and 2011. Perhaps most

importantly, the Executive Committee that was to oversee the development of a detailed investment plan for SAGCOT was formed at this WEF meeting.

In terms of partners, SAGCOT evolved as a "coalition of the willing", taking in anyone who expressed interest[24] (Interview Baarn 2013). Although originated at the WEF, the SAGCOT also included local stakeholders from Tanzania. For instance, the EC consisted not only of international organisations, donors and MNCs[25] but also included the Tanzanian associations ACT, the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI), and the Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association (TASGA) (SAGCOT 2011a). Two of the consultants to the process described the design phase as inclusive (Interview Lewis 2013, Interview Magila 2013). However, some interviewees questioned whether SAGCOT in fact took in "anyone who expressed interest". One suggested that local organizations were selected as partners because they were seen as legitimate by the government, and another could not explain why the different associations were included and not others.

Regarding secondary stakeholders, there was no representative from civil society in the SAGOCT EC. One interviewee called this lack of civil society involvement 'a critical weakness' of the SAGCOT model. Two interviewees suggested that some organizations were excluded because they were perceived as 'activists' and not 'pro-business'. Another also indicated that several organizations were invited to join, but refused to be involved in the EC because they didn't want to sit in the same room as Unilever and Yara (Interview Lewis 2013). This indicates that the lack of CSO representatives may also be due to their unwillingness as much as the result of a deliberate stakeholder selection.

Still, my research revealed that efforts to increase the inclusiveness and transparency of the SAGCOT process were co-opted by one of the SAGCOT partners. The incident in question concerns a pre-qualification committee that was set up to oversee the selection of the first site offered to investors. According to one interviewee, the committee was put together in a very transparent and participatory manner, and members represented different sectors and interests.

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[24] The EC was supplemented by a technical committee consisting of lower-level representatives from the organisations.
[25] The EC was co-chaired by Unilever and the government of Tanzania, and included Yara, the Tanzanian Prime Minister's Office, AGRA, USAID and the Irish Embassy. It was supported by Norfund, the Norwegian Embassy, AGRA, USAID, Diageo, Dupont, Monsanto, General Mills, SAB Miller, Syngenta, Standard Bank, the National Finance Bank, FAO, and the WEF (SAGCOT 2011a; Jenkins 2012).

The day before the first committee meeting, the Tanzanian Investment Centre cancelled the committee and re-appointed its own staff to oversee the process (Interview Anonymous 2013).

As SAGCOT moved into the implementation phase, stakeholder strategies became more selective of partners: SAGCOT went from an "all-inclusive partnership" to selective engagement of investment-ready actors, sorted according to an "investment pipeline". At the same time, focus was shifted from the existing partners' top level to the lower levels. For instance, consultations rounds from mid-2012 included ministries, local and district-level authorities and businesses (Government of Tanzania 2012, 37).

With regards to secondary stakeholders, SAGCOT's strategies shifted in 2012 to become more inclusive towards CSOs and other organizations. This mostly took the form of consultation rounds and workshops in relation to the process of developing an environmental assessment of the SAGCOT project (see Government of Tanzania 2012; Milder et al. 2013; Buck and Milder 2012). These rounds included CSOs, umbrella organizations, research institutions, and local communities (Government of Tanzania 2012; Buck and Milder 2012).

6.2.3 Institutionalization strategies

Institutionalization strategies were described above as adopting certain organizational designs, rules and procedures to legitimate the PPP. The following will outline the design features of TAP and SAGCOT. It finds that both partnerships emphasize the PPP form, neutrality, and minimal rules and procedures. However, the level of partnership formalization is greater in SAGCOT than in TAP.

6.2.3.1 TAP

For TAP the first institutionalization was the "Program Concept and Process Paper" from 2006. It shows that the entrepreneurs' legitimation strategies were focused on ensuring effectiveness (outcome) rather than fair procedures per se: participation, accountability mechanisms and efficient process management seem important to the extent that it contributes to effectiveness; "it will be important that the structure is independent, yet responsive to the needs of the programme: accountable, yet not excessively burdened with administration" (Prorustica 2006, 14). To ensure effectiveness, institutional structures would be kept "simple

and transparent" (Prorustica 2006, 14) and formalities were to be included only "when necessary and productive" (Yara 2007, 91). One interviewee noted that reducing formalities to critical issue areas only was seen as necessary in order to bring the government and the private sector together (Interview Magila 2013).

The program concept document proposes a separate PPP organisation ("a Program Management Unit"), but does not prescribe any one institutional design (Prorustica 2006, 14). The PPP organisation would have to be "capable of responding to the varied concerns of a range of participants" (Prorustica 2006, 15). To this end, it was important for all three entrepreneurs to make the TFI management as neutral and non-aligned as possible (Interview Lewis 2013, Interview Guyver 2013). The TFI implementation was in the beginning led by two consultancies (Yara 2007, 91). However, after a short while, the TFI was institutionalized as a separate unit under the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT).

6.2.3.2 SAGCOT

The first institutionalization of SAGCOT was the Executive Committee formed at the WEF in 2010. Developed for and signed off by the partners, the SAGCOT Investment Blueprint can be said to be a form of a partnership agreement. In these documents, the SAGCOT Partnership is envisioned as an output-oriented organisation: "an informal partnership with no official regulations appears to be the most realistic institutional arrangement for SAGCOT at this initial stage" (SAGCOT 2011c, 4). Nonetheless, there is a high level of formalization of the partnership agreement. The IB provides a detailed account of the partnership functions and governance structures. The IB also suggests that the Partnership Principles mentioned above will be formalized in a written tripartite agreement between all partners (SAGCOT 2011a, 39) The IB adopts TAP's notion of a non-aligned, private sector-led organisation to inspire trust among the partners (SAGCOT 2011a, 39). The Secretariat would "provide a professional and institutionally-neutral platform for SAGCOT planning, coordination and facilitation" (SAGCOT 2011a, 40). Independent legal status was seen as important to ensure the Secretariat's impartiality, and it would be established under a new trust created under Tanzanian law (SAGCOT 2011c, 15).

6.3   LEGITIMATION DYNAMICS

Having outlined what strategies were employed to legitimate TAP and SAGCOT, this subchapter aims to analyze how those strategies influenced primary and secondary stakeholders' perception of the PPPs' legitimacy. The following analysis will be structured according to the analytical model presented above in section 4.4. The analysis follows the historical evolution of the case, and thus considers TAP and SAGCOT in turn. The legitimacy dynamics will be analyzed within both partnerships in four steps, illustrated in figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Legitimation processes in development PPPs: Analytical steps

The first step will look at the extent to which the social structure legitimated the PPPs during the initiation phase, and how those norms are related to perceptions of legitimacy among the PPP entrepreneurs that led to the setting up of the PPP. This dynamic is illustrated by arrow number one in figure 3. Because both partnerships were institutionalized, I will not consider the opposite dynamic (arrow from phase II to phase I), described in figure 2 above. The second step will analyze the influence[26] of legitimation strategies during phase I – II upon legitimacy perceptions during implementation. This is shown as arrow number 2 going from phase II to phase III in figure 3. The third step will investigate the theoretical proposition that there is a possible feedback loop from implementation to the design phase (arrow 3 in figure 3). The fourth step will consider whether the PPP has become a source of legitimacy in itself, and thus influencing the social structure and the strategic interests that gave rise to the PPP in the first place.

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26 It is important to note that the aim is not to *causally explain* the strategies' legitimating influence, nor is it the aim of this study to map all stakeholders' perception of TAP and SAGCOT. This would also be impossible with the present interview sampling. Thus, the findings below should be considered indications on the strategies' effects from this insider perspective rather than an objective measurement of their influence.

6.3.1 TAP

6.3.1.1 Phase I – II: Initiation and design

First and foremost, it was clear from the discourse analysis and the interviews that norms about the desirability of PPPs as an institutional form have played a major part in enabling the TAP to emerge *as a PPP*. Where the program document mentions the PPP form, it largely follows the general rhetoric on PPPs as win-win solutions that draw on each partner's expertise and builds trust among equals. In addition, no interviewee questioned the use of the PPP form. One of the key entrepreneurs behind TAP said: "As a point of departure, this is what one has to do. *I can see no other way of doing it*" (Interview Arnesen 2013, emphasis added). Another common theme was the recognition that both the public and private sector have critical parts to play if agricultural growth is to be achieved. The Strategy Manager at Yara justified the partnership approach by saying: "It is crucial to have the support of governments […] One also has to think smartly and creatively about how one can make use of commercial actors with a will to invest" (Interview Botillen 2013). Three TAP interviewees also noted that a partnership approach is particularly appropriate in the Tanzanian context because it would provide better coordination and coherence between the many of development projects in the country.

In addition to norms about PPPs, TAP was legitimated through two powerful normative discourses. First, broader norms for corporate behaviour associated with the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda increasingly encouraged business to engage in the progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and develop inclusive business models to this end. Second, the increased focus on food security by various institutions and international summits called for increased investments in agriculture and larger commitments to agricultural production and trade[27].

While these broad, international norms helped legitimate TAP, the conditions for private sector-led agricultural interventions were quite different locally: Tanzania's agricultural policies at the time were heavily biased in favour of the state. Moreover, the government didn't sign a country-specific CAADP compact until 2010 (Cooksey 2013). One interviewee

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[27] E.g. the MDGs, the CAADP (2003), UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for a African Green Revolution in 2004, the Aid for Trade Agenda (2005), the FAO Food Crisis Summit declaration (FAO 2008) and an influential FAO report from 2006 (FAO 2006)

pointed out that the Tanzanian government at the time had spent years developing agricultural policies together with donors, but largely forgotten about the private sector (Interview Arnesen 2013). On the one hand, this suggests that the private sector-led partnership approach would not be legitimated *by default* in Tanzania. On the other hand, one could argue that the Tanzanian context matter less to understand the *first institutionalization of TAP* because all of the TAP initiators were foreigners and represented organisations that were present on the international arena. Therefore, it seems likely that their perceptions about the legitimacy of PPPs and corporate responsibilities were shaped more by international norms rather than the Tanzanian context, which would help understand why TAP was first established.

Furthermore, TAP supports the proposition that a few "PPP entrepreneurs" promote, frame, and persuade others about the PPP solution. Yara holds a key position, as it was the one contacted by the Tanzanian government and then solicited support from the other partners. It was indicated by one interviewee that this might also have been a legitimation strategy on Yara's part, in the sense that collaborating with other (governmental) actors in the field it could tap into their expertise and enhance its own legitimacy within this new role: "It's clear that Yara couldn't do this alone, and they had also been seen as a player[28], so they would very much like to have someone look at this issue together with them" (Interview Arnesen 2013).

Two other "PPP entrepreneurs" that seem to have been key were the consultancy firms Prorustica and Korongo. The latter's CEO said: "We [the consultancies] were able to do what we did because there was a vacuum. *No one had a better idea*" (Interview Lewis 2013, emphasis added). After some initial studies, the consultancy Prorustica *reframed* the problem of inefficient fertilizer access as a problem of inefficient value chains, and shifted focus from a buffer stock to a PPP as the appropriate means through which such problems could be addressed. Prorustica founder and CEO noted: "it was very clear to us that it wasn't a buffer stock that was needed, it was more a supply chain for fertilizer to reach out to smallholders" (Interview Guyver 2013). He said the new formulation was shaped by Prorustica's past experience with agricultural value chains in Eastern Europe and Vietnam (Interview Guyver 2013).

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[28] The original word used by Arnesen is "aktør", implying an actor that possesses a particular role or agenda, e.g. a political player

6.3.1.1.1 Legitimacy perceptions in phase I-II

The small group of partners who initially set up the TAP and the Fast Track projects clearly considered TAP to be a legitimate governance mechanism for agricultural development in Tanzania. I would argue that TAP was established because its approach fit the partners' pragmatic *and* normative legitimacy expectations. It is clear that all partners saw a potential to increase their operations through TAP, thus playing into pragmatic legitimacy. For instance, the low levels of fertilizer use in Tanzania represented a considerable business opportunity for Yara. However, the partnership form and the twinning of development and commercial goals reflect normative changes, and their influence is evident from the discourse. According to the Yara CEO at the time, being a 'global corporate citizen' is a key driver behind Yara's engagement: "Yara's growth partnership approach is in line with our commitment to develop a strong base for African agriculture and our pledge to support the Millennium Development Goals" (Enger 2008).

However, perceptions of legitimacy might not have been equally strong throughout the partnership organizations. For instance, Norad's Odd Arnesen noted that the TAP project had some critics within Norad and the Norwegian embassy (Interview Arnesen 2013). The first report assessing the Fast Track projects also outline several 'donor concerns' and states: "It is quite clear that the fertilizer subsidy and FTI will not solve Tanzania's development challenges!" (Vedeld and Kengera 2006, 26). This indicates that the legitimacy of TAP/TFI in the second phase was limited to that of the partners, and perhaps even limited to the personal commitment of the key entrepreneurs.

6.3.1.2 Phase III: Implementation

This section aims to analyze the influence of legitimation strategies upon legitimacy perceptions during its implementation. Above it was found that the first set-up of TAP (then TFI) had minimal formalities and was led by the consultancies Prorustica and Korongo. TFI was first implemented with the Fast Track projects in five districts from 2006 to 2007.

The empirical evidence suggests that the TFI's focus on a *private sector-led,* partnership approach was met with scepticism at the Tanzanian level. The TAP concept document also notes: "the current mindset – especially among some senior civil servants – is not always supportive of private sector development. An additional constraint is that some policymakers

do not have faith in the efficacy of the private sector" (Prorustica 2006, 44). Two TAP interviewees confirmed that considerable efforts were made to persuade actors about the appropriateness of the TAP approach.

Against this background, interviewees highlighted the Fast Track projects and the CIP processes as particularly key for legitimating TAP to a larger audience. In terms of the Fast Track projects, they reinforced belief in the output-oriented model of "business as unusual", lending credence to the partners' rhetoric. In addition, they had an important demonstration effect for participant organisations and for farmers. As noted by TAP Manager Mark Magila, more people were attracted to the project when they saw that participant farmers' yields increased (Interview Magila 2013). Such a demonstration effect is particularly important in Tanzania, where the high number of development projects over the years has caused a "fatigue" among farmers (Interview Lyimo 2013, Interview Salomonsen 2013, Interview Lewis 2013).

Regarding the CIP processes, the interviewees noted four ways in which those processes helped legitimate TAP. First, the workshop environment brought the partners together, provided transparency and facilitated communication, which induced increased trust (Interview Guyver 2013, Interview Lyimo 2013). Trust was seen as an important element to legitimate the minimal formalities in "business as unusual" (Interview Magila 2013). Second, the CIP training sessions increased farmers' knowledge and understanding of value chains and the functioning of markets, introducing a new way of thinking about agriculture (Interview Guyver 2013). It also facilitated information to district authorities about challenges in the field (Interview Salomonsen 2013). Third, the inclusiveness of the CIP process created ownership for the plans at the local level: "we didn't own them, TAP didn't own them, they were owned by the participants themselves" (Interview Guyver 2013). Finally, the process clarified the individual actors' roles and responsibilities in the CIP plan (Interview Guyver 2013). It "became like a calling card for the individual players" (Interview Guyver 2013). The CIP plans also introduce accountability mechanisms through a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system (TAP n.d.).

In other words, the CIP process legitimated TAP by introducing the value chain concept and justified its approach to local partners and beneficiaries. At the same time, the process

legitimated the local PPP by creating awareness and ownership, which in turn could facilitate effectiveness. The local partnerships were also legitimated through inclusive procedures, which ensured local stakeholders' input on the PPP objectives and design.

However, it was recognized that TAP's legitimation strategies were only successful to a limited extent, and only within certain regions (Interview Lewis 2013, Interview Magila 2013, Interview Arnesen 2013). For instance, three interviewees said the success of the CIP processes was very dependent on the personal commitment of the district counsellors. One interviewee noted the discrepancy between the TAP partners' belief in the PPP approach, and the local perceptions: "[Maybe] it was a little naïve to think that one could go in and make everyone see the light at the same time […] It has been quite a lot more challenging than one initially thought. That everyone would align to the vision." (Interview Arnesen 2013). First and foremost, it was difficult to legitimate the partnership form. Government officials were reluctant to discuss policy 'as equals', rather than taking the historically more common approach of 'command and control'. Two interviewees also noted that many organisations saw the common approach as a threat to their own business model and funding channels (Interview Arnesen 2013, Interview Lewis 2013). Second, interviewees perceived it as challenging to legitimate the private sector focus, and especially the involvement of MNCs, who are commonly perceived as "predators" looking to exploit farmers (Interview Magila 2013, Interview Lyimo 2013).

These points suggest that what might be considered legitimate by some actors, may not be perceived as equally legitimate by others. The implication is that legitimation strategies will have a different effect according to the fit with the audience's legitimacy criteria. For TAP, this is illustrated by the strategy to embed TAP within the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT), an agricultural lobby organization. First, there were very different visions among the TAP entrepreneurs relating to the level of institutionalization necessary and the organisational form the PPP would take. While Yara highlighted the Fast Track projects' loose form as a way to ensure maximum efficiency (Yara 2007, 91), a Norad-commissioned report assessing the Fast Track projects states:

> "There is a conspicuous lack of organizational structure at the base of this PPP and FTI [Fast Track Initiative], and at present it seems that the only coordinating force is a private consultancy firm. […] one should consider options for a firmer and more long term programme and not least organisational structure. The present system seems un-

necessary loose and uncommitted for the involved parties"(Vedeld and Kengera 2006, ix)

Whereas the consultancies involved envisioned a "small, temporary structure" that could later be incorporated (Prorustica 2006, 14), Norad insisted on embedding the new organization into existing, local structures: "it was very important for us to get a connection to Tanzanian local sector, if there are some organizations there, they are the ones who should possess ownership" (Interview Arnesen 2013). Thus, the TFI partnership was established as a subunit of ACT.

While Norad's Odd Arnesen recognized that it might slow processes down and compromise efficiency, he viewed local ownership as legitimate in its own right: "I think we don't have an alternative. It has to be built by Tanzanians. They have to build their capacity on this, there is no shortcut. We have tried that before and it hasn't worked" (Interview Arnesen 2013). Another interviewee noted that TAP would have been more flexible and more in line with its principles if it had been independent, and suggested that ACT was chosen due to 'fashionable' development ideas about indigenous ownership rather than out of consideration for TAP's success (Interview Anonymous 2013). There were also very different perspectives among the interviewees on the legitimating effect of TAP's association with ACT on the perception of TAP among farmers. On the one hand, two interviewees said the association with ACT was a key strength for TAP insofar as they can show to policy changes that benefit farmers. The TAP Manager, Mark Magila, put it succinctly: "TAP gains legitimacy from collaborating with ACT" (Interview Magila 2013).

On the other hand, it was noted that ACT's relationship with the government affects the perception of TAP among farmers and the local private sector as a neutral facilitator and as a promoter of private sector development. Regarding the first, one of the architects behind the TAP design said they took a massive risk by bringing in ACT when trying to make TAP an honest broker (Interview Lewis 2013). Another interviewee remarked that ACT limits TAP's potential because ACT itself "is just too closely linked to the government. It cannot move freely" (Interview Anonymous 2013). In terms of representativeness, it was questioned whether an organisation mostly consisting of former cooperative or governmental employees is the best to champion commercial agribusiness development. Two interviewees also pointed out that while ACT promotes itself as working for the whole agricultural sector, it doesn't do away with the internal conflicts of interest that are present also *within* the agricultural sector.

However, it was remarked that these issues arise out of the generally fragmented state of the Tanzanian private sector, and ACT is but part of an evolution towards a stronger private sector (Interview Arnesen 2013).

6.3.1.2.1   Legitimacy perceptions in phase III

Summing up, it seems clear that there is no *generalized* perception of TAP as a legitimate governance mechanism, and there are several points of contention about its approach and design. However, it does seem to be considered legitimate within certain geographical areas and by certain actors. First and foremost, this is evidenced in the high number of organisations that joined the Fast Track initiative (Yara 2007, 91; TAP 2013) and the scaling up of these projects from 5 districts to 25 districts by 2009 (Norad 2013). In 2010, about 50 organizations were involved with TAP (Kaarhus et al 2010, 43). The pending proposal for a second funding term (TAP II 2013-2017) envisions scaling TAP even further to cover 50 districts (Norad 2013, 180). According to a recent external evaluation of TAP, several other donors have shown interest in the CIP process and the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture has instructed all districts to design their plans according to this approach (Norad 2013, 181).

6.3.1.3   Feedback loop between implementation and design

The analytical model proposes that there would be a feedback loop between the implementation and design phase, meaning that the PPP design could be modified after implementation to satisfy different legitimacy demands. With TAP, there seems to have been two such feedback loops. The first happened when Norad insisted on establishing a separate partnership organisation, with the result that TFI was embedded within ACT. As was shown above, local ownership and institution building was crucial for Norad's Odd Arnesen, and the TFI's institutional set-up changed to accommodate this legitimacy demand.

The second feedback loop resulting from the implementation occurred when TFI's objectives were redefined and expanded to fit the challenges at the local level: "it was clearly recognized by the partners that although the access to reasonable priced fertiliser was a major element to agricultural growth, other inputs (in particular quality seeds), improved skills and access to affordable credit were also important" (TAP 2013). Focus was shifted from challenges related to fertilizer use and diffusion towards a focus on commodity-specific agricultural value chains, with maize and rice as the first two commodities (Interview Guyver 2013). This can

have a legitimating effect on the PPP because the partners and beneficiaries perceive the PPP as more relevant and appropriate, and because it can enhance the PPP's output legitimacy through more effective interventions.

6.3.1.4   *TAP as a source of legitimacy*

Given its upscale and successes, I would argue that TAP became a *source of legitimacy* for the more general concept of a partnership approach for agricultural value chain development. This effect was described in the theoretical framework as a feedback loop between the PPP implementation (phase III) and initiation (phase I). The feedback loop goes back to initiation phase because it changes the conditions for a similar approach to be adopted elsewhere. My analysis shows that there was such a feedback effect involved in TAP as for instance Yara and Prorustica, the key entrepreneurs behind TAP's initiation and design, started projects in Malawi and Ghana based on the TAP experience (Enger 2008; Guyver and MacCarthy 2011). One could also argue that TAP's successes became a source of legitimacy for the partners themselves. This is perhaps particularly true for Prorustica, whose own business model is largely built upon that of TAP (Prorustica 2013), and Yara, who portrays that kind of partnership as a cornerstone of its strategy (Yara International 2011; Yara 2008; Enger 2008).

Furthermore, my research shows that TAP was used as a source of legitimacy for SAGCOT. That is, TAP served to legitimate the new growth corridor concept by showing impact and demonstrating the potential of a PPP and value chain approach. Yara, the key initiator behind both partnerships, presents SAGCOT as the "logical" step to scale the TAP partnership to a national or multi-country level (Enger 2008). Two interviewees involved in both partnerships explicitly confirmed this link between TAP and SAGCOT. Recent research also recognize that TAP "formed the basis for the SAGCOT initiative" (Byiers 2013, 16; see also Jenkins 2012). It was also alluded to by another interviewee: "when the big train came with corridors and Clinton was there, and it's presented at the WEF. All the big players talked about it, USAID, everyone. Who was driving this? It was TAP" (Interview Arnesen 2013).

Recognizing the link between the two partnerships leads to a puzzle: given the will to scale TAP's approach and its recognition as a (relatively) legitimate and impactful partnership, why was SAGCOT established with a model and design so different from TAP? I will show the part of the answer lies in the legitimation strategies pursued during SAGCOT's initiation

phase. First, however, the analysis will turn to the legitimation of SAGCOT, which unfolded in parallel with TAP's implementation.

6.3.2 SAGCOT

6.3.2.1 Phase I – II: Initiation and design

Like TAP, SAGCOT was legitimated by discourses about PPPs, CSR, and food security. However, the social structure seems to have been even more enabling for SAGCOT than for TAP, both internationally and locally. First of all, Tanzanian policies had strengthened the focus on the role of the private sector since the establishment of TAP in 2006, most notably in the adoption of the KK policy in 2009. Second, the global food crisis in 2008 had strengthened the international attention to food security and agriculture. Four interviewees explicitly mentioned the overlap between those norms and soaring food prices as the reason for TAP and SAGCOT's emergence. A recent Harvard case study on SAGCOT argues there was a *consensus* by 2008-2009 among the Tanzanian government, local and international business, and the donor community about the disappointing results in agricultural development, and that a more holistic approach and more private investments were needed (Jenkins 2012, 14).

Another reason why SAGCOT faced a more enabling environment is the argument presented above on TAP as a source of legitimacy. TAP influenced the initiation environment for SAGCOT by legitimating this form of governance mechanism. The IB also explicitly mentions that SAGCOT in part will be modelled upon the design and best practices from TAP (SAGCOT 2011a; 2011b). Moreover, TAP could be said to have socialized the partners about the legitimacy of the partnership approach and the common objectives. Although the empirical data does not allow for an absolute conclusion on socialization within TAP, it seems fair to argue that the socialization effect was at least present given the considerable continuity between the TAP and the SAGCOT partners.

Against this enabling background, Yara strategically constructed the concept of 'agricultural growth corridors' together with the consultancy firms AgDevCo and Prorustica (cf. Jenkins 2012, 14). Yara had led the promotion of the general agricultural growth corridor concept since 2008. According to the interviewed Yara representative, the concept of agricultural growth corridors – and SAGCOT – was born out of this strategic commitment already in 2006

(Interview Botillen 2013). AgDevCo was first hired by Yara to implement this model in Mozambique, and later brought into the SAGCOT process due to their experience with the Beira corridor. Much of the design rationale for SAGCOT can be found in an article by AgDevCo's founder and chairman, Keith Palmer, which argues that public funds should be invested in agricultural infrastructure to reduce barriers of entry and lever-in large amounts of private capital (Palmer 2010). My analysis finds that AgDevCo played a critical role in adding the emphasis on greenfield investments and outgrower schemes to SAGCOT (cf. Jenkins 2012, 17). One interviewee remarked:

> "one can think of value chain, growth corridors in many ways, and they came in with their own model that was based on outgrower schemes that they had developed as their business model. So to a great extent it was one company that was able to present its own model" (Interview Arnesen 2013).

As shown above, the legitimation strategies pursued by Yara during SAGCOT's initiation had a particular international focus and linked SAGCOT to a wide range of intergovernmental and private initiatives. Through this strategy, SAGCOT became seen as the means through which different national and international agendas could be realized. The SAGCOT Deputy CEO explained SAGCOT as "the coming together" of international and national commitments, such as the MDGs, the KK, the L'Aquila declaration, the WEF's New Vision for Agriculture initiative, and AGRA. One interviewee said: "the corridor initiatives, they caught many people's attention. And they were seen as a unifying issue" (Interview Botillen 2013). The representative from the Norwegian Embassy remarked: "There are many forces pulling in the same direction" (Interview Hveem 2013).

Recent research has presented similar findings. Jenkins (2012, 14) implies that SAGCOT would provide an opportunity for donors and the business community to implement their commitments from L'Aquila and in the WEF's New Vision initiative. She also mentions that SAGCOT could enable president Kikwete to demonstrate results for the Kilimo Kwanza program. Byiers finds that president Kikwete and the WEF had a mutual interest in linking up to SAGCOT: "President Kikwete is understandably pleased to be able to showcase his country through this initiative and establish a legacy in Tanzania, it is also suggested that the World Economic Forum embraces the initiative partly to justify its own relevance as an actor in Africa and the developing world" (Byiers 2013, 15). These arguments suggest that there is

a blending of pragmatic and normative legitimacy evaluations at the basis of SAGCOT commitments.

I argue that, one the one hand, Yara's legitimation strategy to link SAGCOT to other high-level initiatives and agendas enhanced the legitimacy of the SAGCOT partnership idea. On the other hand, this strategy opened up for different and more legitimacy demands. Thus, SAGCOT had to conform to these partners' agendas and expectations. Part of these demands was a wish to engage in a *new* initiative: "we need a new commitment [to agriculture], that's one thing, but we also need some new initiatives. Then SAGCOT came out of this" (Interview Hveem 2013). One of the TAP consultants remarked: "Why didn't we just expand TAP? But I think particularly with the private sector they wanted in a way to redevelop, or start with a clean slate. To say that we want to be part of something, but we want it to be new, we want to be part of the design process. That's why SAGCOT was formed" (Interview Guyver 2013). Four of the TAP interviewees expressed a sense of disappointment that TAP got lost in this search for new initiatives. One of them said: "the monster that was coming over the hill was SAGCOT. And that, in the early days of SAGCOT it tended to swamp what TAP was doing, and as you probably know, the donors they love to move on to the next thing. That was the next big thing" (Interview Guyver 2013).

6.3.2.1.1   Legitimacy perceptions in phase I – II

It should be clear from the historical outline above that SAGCOT got considerable attention and support shortly after its launch at the WEF in 2010. According to one interviewee central to this meeting, "there was *a growing realization* that SAGCOT could be the means to implement the Kilimo Kwanza and international policy commitments" (Interview Baarn 2013, emphasis added). It indicates that legitimation strategies up until this point had been successful in constructing SAGCOT as a legitimate means to create agricultural development in Tanzania, at least at the international level. This is also supported by the financial commitments to the initiative, as well as the number of actors expressing interest in SAGCOT. Three interviewees remarked the EC partners' considerable commitment to the project during the Investment Blueprint phase, and one said she received hand-written notes from top executives discussing every page of the IB.

The empirical data suggests that two strategies were particularly legitimating for SAGCOT.

The first concerns the discursive strategy of combining well-known features and innovative framing: "it got high political traction. It got very sexy" (Interview Arnesen 2013). Second, the support from President Kikwete and SAGCOT's link to KK had a legitimating effect among the international partners, and particularly donors, because it gave the impression that SAGCOT was in line with Tanzanian priorities and policies. This is a recognized norm in development assistance (Estrup 2009). Two interviewees said the "home-grown" character of the KK attracted international attention and anticipation.

However, two modifications can be made at this point. First, although a considerable number of actors joined the SAGCOT EC during the WEF in 2010, this is not to say that all of these immediately considered SAGCOT to be legitimate. Some had to be convinced to join. This seems to be the case with Unilever, which was directly appealed to by president Kikwete during a plenary session at the WEF (Interview Baarn 2013), and with USAID, which only came on board when Yara's Vice-President convinced the Head of USAID (Interview Lewis 2013, see also Cooksey 2013:17).

Second, the interview data also show that there was disagreement between AgDevCo and the consultants and actors involved in TAP about SAGCOT's emphasis on greenfield investments and outgrower schemes. One interviewee said that, in his opinion, the emphasis on greenfield investments gave investors a false impression of the availability of land in Tanzania. Noting the uncertain availability of land, another interviewee called AgDevCo's solution technically very good, but "politically naïve" (Interview Lewis 2013). This interviewee also questioned the appropriateness of outgrower schemes as the main tool to include small-scale farmers because of the very low level of trust between farmers and traders in Tanzania. Norad's representative questioned whether the current capacity of Tanzanian smallholders is sufficient to participate in outgrower schemes. He noted: "one can say that one should rather have looked for other models or alternatives" (Interview Arnesen 2013).

However, acknowledging the singular role played by AgDevCo in promoting this particular solution does not argue that AgDevCo was the only actor who considered this design appropriate. After all, the EC partners oversaw the IB process and ultimately accepted the SAGCOT design. One could perhaps argue, like Kaarhus (2011) implicitly does, that AgDevCo's model of public support to private investments represented a particularly good fit

with the MNC's pragmatic legitimacy expectations. Yara's Strategy Manager also linked the SAGCOT model to MNC's wish to ensure control throughout their value chain (Interview Botillen 2013). However, it should also be noted the interviewees that were sceptical of outgrower schemes also recognized their potential, but did not consider this choice to be the most effective. Thus, this question seems too complex to reach an either-or conclusion about legitimacy perceptions of this design aspect.

6.3.2.2   Phase III: Implementation

The analytical model proposed that the stakeholder scope of the legitimation strategies would have to be expanded during the third phase in order to implement the partnership objectives. It was shown above that SAGCOT's legitimation strategies were focused on the partners during the first two phases, and that they predominantly addressed international and high-level stakeholders. This section will analyze to what extent these strategies had any influence on legitimacy perceptions during the implementation phase. It argues that the strategies that were successful in legitimating SAGCOT to the international and high-level partners seem to have had a very different legitimating effect at the local level.

First and foremost, the implication from the strategies' high-level, international focus was that there was very limited awareness about SAGCOT at the local level, among farmers and local businesses alike (Government of Tanzania 2012, 49; Byiers 2013, 23; UNDP 2012). One consultant working for TAP and SAGCOT on the ground said that if he were to ask farmers about SAGCOT, they wouldn't know what it is: "Is it an animal?" (Interview Lyimo 2013). This also seemed to be the case for government officials beyond that of the top political leadership. A recent report notes that Kikwete's involvement led to "little sense of "ownership" even within the government institutions" (Byiers 2013, 15). Two interviewees to this study said the government itself realized this lack of awareness and started devising a communication strategy. However, it was suggested that this strategy was poorly implemented to the effect that farmers had heard about SAGCOT, but did not know its exact form and content (Interview Anonymous 2013).

The lack of awareness or *limited* knowledge about SAGCOT caused scepticism among farmers, as well as local and international CSOs. During local sensitization meetings about SAGCOT, farmers were particularly worried that they would lose their land to big investors

(Government of Tanzania 2012, 49). Fears about land grab were strengthened with SAGCOT's emphasis on greenfield investments. TAP Manager Magila similarly noted that MNCs might have gotten an overly positive image of available land, whereas almost no land in Tanzania is free to purchase. Another interviewee pointed out that although it is very clear from the documents that SAGCOT is not about land grabbing, it was difficult to explain to people why land-intensive investments would not require large-scale acquisition of land. A public note from the Tanzanian Prime Minister's Office recognizes that SAGCOT is perceived as a "threat to residents' interests", and calls for increased transparency on land governance issues (Prime Minister's Office 2013).

CSOs were mostly sceptical of SAGCOT due to the presence of MNCs on the EC. In spring 2013, twenty African civil society organisations (CSOs) circulated a letter of protest, stating that PPPs for investment in African agriculture serve as instruments for MNCs like Yara, Monsanto and Syngenta to secure profits and consolidate their power (Civil Society in Africa 2013). The SAGCOT Deputy CEO called the resistance from CSOs a "backlash" for SAGCOT (Interview Baarn 2013). However, three interviewees expressed frustration that the claims about land grabbing and MNC dominance seem based on suspicions and ideology, without recognition for the actual content of SAGCOT policies. One interviewee noted that SAGCOT's association with the WEF and the international presence in the EC might have overshadowed the original focus on smallholders and the local private sector in addition to international agribusiness.

Strong political support for SAGCOT was another strategy that had different legitimating effects on the international and the local level. Interviewees suggested that while president Kikwete's backing of SAGCOT was positive at the international level, it was negative on the local level because SAGCOT became to be seen as "very political" (Interview Lewis 2013, Interview Lyimo 2013). SAGCOT was perceived as "just another" political project in which great promises are made but nothing happens (Interview Anonymous 2013). Most interviewees pointed out that there is massive 'disenchantment' among farmers when it comes to political initiatives, and there is not much faith that the political leadership will create development for farmers. This mentality remained unchallenged with SAGCOT, especially when information meetings for secondary stakeholders were held as traditional political meetings (Interview Anonymous 2013). The perception of SAGCOT as "too political"

(Interview Lyimo 2013) was also reinforced once SAGCOT became associated with the government's KK policy. The only remark in the notes from a sensitization meeting in Kilombero in 2012 reads: "SAGCOT seems to be a political agenda, because the 10 pillars of *KILIMO KWANZA* will be implemented through SAGCOT" (SAGCOT 2012). Similarly, one of the interviewed consultants said that his Tanzanian friends wouldn't speak to him if he were to talk about SAGCOT (Interview Lewis 2013).

6.3.2.2.1   Legitimacy perceptions in phase III

As SAGCOT moved into the implementation phase in 2011, the interview data suggests that the high-level commitment to SAGCOT became fragmented. This questions its legitimacy even at the international level. A common theme in the interviews was that SAGCOT's slow pace of implementation caused impatience among the partners, public and private sector alike. Two interviewees related the Tanzanian government's new initiative, Big Results Now (BRN), to SAGCOT's lack of implementation. Two of the SAGCOT partners and EC members, Yara and Syngenta, have joined another initiative called the Last Mile Alliance.

The fragmentation in commitment is also evidenced in the considerable discrepancy between the investment and funding pledges made by the partners, and the actual sums committed to SAGCOT at the moment. Especially the consultants expressed a sense of disappointment that the partners had not lived up to their pledges in the Investment Blueprint. According to another consultant, the SAGCOT Deputy CEO is "having problems with trying to keep them [the partners] aligned and fulfil the wishes of the Investment Blueprint, which they all endorsed years ago" (Interview Guyver 2013). Together with Yara's representative in Tanzania, they expressed the view that SAGCOT had come to be "business as usual" rather than the intended "business as **un**usual". One of them summarized SAGCOT's current state: "[the SAGCOT secretariat] is still not funded. It's still going through some fairly bad birthing pains, and it's being very much directed by government and donors. The private sector is sort of standing aback at the moment and watching this slow car crash happening" (Interview Guyver 2013).

Interestingly, by Yara's own Country Manager in Tanzania also questioned SAGCOT's legitimacy. He said he believes more in company-driven initiatives like the Last Mile Alliance initiative (Interview Stormorken 2013). He went on to admit that "I don't get

involved in the SAGCOT part, I don't spend any time on it" (Interview Stormorken 2013). Moreover, he dismissed the choice of outgrower schemes as "political correctness", questioning whether the present level of farmer capacity and access to inputs in Tanzania is sufficient for a successful outgrower model (Interview Stormorken 2013). This suggests that strategies to legitimate SAGCOT would have needed to include not only the local level in Tanzania, but also the local branch *within* Yara.

However, it seems that SAGCOT still retains some legitimacy among the partners. One interviewee noted that while it seemed critical for a while, "one has come so far that it won't collapse" (Interview Hveem 2013). This was also conceded by one of the consultants: "I think the private sector is still on board. I think there tends to be a bit of eye rolling once they hear the SAGCOT name, but there is still buy-in and a wish that SAGCOT will get off the ground" (Interview Guyver 2013). Demonstrating this is also the very recent announcement of Unilever's investment in tea production (SAGCOT 2013), and in more concrete funding pledges from donors (UNDP 2013; DFID 2013).

6.3.2.3 *Phase III – II: Feedback loop between implementation and design*

This section analyzes to what extent SAGCOT's legitimation strategies were changed after its implementation, and finds that there were two feedback loops with SAGCOT. First, while the design process had been (or at least tried to be) inclusive and open to anyone interested, the SAGCOT centre later became more selective in the inclusion of stakeholders. The SAGCOT Deputy CEO justified the change as a tool to ensure partners' commitment: "it is crucial to distinguish those who only want to be associated with the SAGCOT name without committing any resources. We have to be very strict, and only allow membership to those who follow the partnership principles and are willing to commit resources" (Interview Baarn 2013). In terms of secondary stakeholders, the SAGCOT representatives were very clear on the importance of selecting those who understand 'private sector principles' and align with SAGCOT's vision of modernized farming (Interview Baarn 2013, Interview Kirenga 2013). Both expressed frustration that CSOs are often caught in an "activist mode", and Ms. Baarn argued that this could in fact be detrimental to agricultural development because it shies investors away (Interview Baarn 2013). They also indicated that the centre would engage in more targeted communication with farmers and other stakeholders in the future so as to distance itself from traditional, governmental communication (Interview Baarn 2013).

Second, the SAGCOT centre introduced ways for local and secondary stakeholders to provide input to SAGCOT through the Greenprint process. While the IB specifically denounced participatory exercises as part of investment decisions, the Green Growth Leaders workshop convened local stakeholders from three SAGCOT clusters to "clarify priorities, issues, challenges and opportunities in these Clusters" (Buck and Milder 2012). The Greenprint process also introduced a review mechanism by which CSOs and other organisations could provide feedback on the SAGCOT Greenprint draft. The Greenprint process coincided with several rounds of stakeholder consultations in relation to the environmental and social assessment of SAGCOT for the World Bank loan (see Government of Tanzania 2013).

The Greenprint process was as a legitimation strategy in that it was introduced to raise awareness and legitimate SAGCOT to local beneficiaries and secondary stakeholders. A representative from the Norwegian Embassy, the key initiator of the Greenprint process, noted: "there is little awareness out in the field as to what [SAGCOT] is about. So mainly [the Greenprint] workshop was about raising awareness, also in terms of people feeling that they are part of the process" (Interview Hveeem 2013). Twenty CSOs provided feedback on the Greenprint draft, in which they commended the SAGCOT team for including a green growth perspective and for ensuring CSO feedback (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2012). The workshop also included representatives from organizations that had refused to participate in the SAGCOT IB process (see Buck and Milder 2012).

However, the Greenprint process seems to have opened up for pressures to redesign other aspects of SAGCOT's governance structures and procedures. For instance, several workshop participants suggested that smallholder input into decision-making processes be built into the institutional structure (Buck and Milder 2012, 24). The CSO feedback also emphasized that decisions should be subject to review by all stakeholders and overseen by an independent, multi-stakeholder body (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2012). Similarly, the Norwegian Embassy representative envisioned that the group working with the Greenprint ("Green Reference Group") could become a mechanism for accountability to smallholder farmers (Interview Hveem 2013).

6.2.3.4 SAGCOT as a source of legitimacy

While it seems clear that SAGCOT does not enjoy undisputed legitimacy, it could be argued that SAGCOT can serve as a source of legitimacy for similar initiatives *at the international level*. For instance, there are considerable links between SAGCOT and other organisations promoting a 'Green Revolution' in Africa, such as AGRA (who also participated in the SAGCOT EC), African Green Revolution Forum, and Grow Africa. According to the SAGCOT Deputy CEO, the latter is about how one can create more SAGCOT approaches across Africa (Interview Baarn 2013). SAGCOT has also been integrated into and promoted by other policy initiatives, most notably the WEF's New Vision for Agriculture, USAID's Feed the Future, and the G8's high-profile New Alliance initiative launched in 2012. The New Alliance framework agreement with Tanzania made SAGCOT its priority area. Besides the G8 countries and the Tanzania government, funding intentions under this agreement came from 20 Tanzanian and international companies (G8 2012, Cooksey 2013, 19).

While SAGCOT can derive legitimacy from these organisations, it is possible to argue that these organisations too can enhance their legitimacy by being associated with SAGCOT. One interviewee indicated that the G8's endorsement of SAGCOT came as a bit of a surprise (Interview Baarn 2013). It suggests that the link to the New Alliance was not an intended strategy on SAGCOT's part, but perhaps an effort by G8 to legitimate their new initiative by linking it to the already established SAGCOT. However, this could influence perceptions about SAGCOT as a legitimate governance mechanism. The New Alliance has received widespread criticism, saying that it gives MNCs unprecedented access to African markets at the expense of smallholder farmers (e.g. Paul and Steinbrecher 2013; War on Want 2012; Civil Society in Africa 2013). The policy reforms pledged under the New Alliance framework have also generated fears about land grab (Cooksey 2013, 19). Thus, SAGCOT's close association with the New Alliance initiative could sustain the scepticisms about SAGCOT, and make legitimation towards the local farmers and CSOs more difficult.

6.4 DISCUSSION

Thus far, this chapter has analyzed the strategies employed to legitimate the TAP and the SAGCOT, and discussed how those legitimation strategies have influenced legitimacy perceptions among the PPPs' primary and secondary stakeholders over the partnerships' phases. This section will dig deeper into a few elements from the analysis.

6.4.1 Legitimating a transnational PPP – a 'level game'

The analysis above shows that the PPPs and their entrepreneurs had to address a multitude of geographies and interests in order to legitimate the partnerships. No less than four levels were relevant in the legitimation of TAP and SAGCOT: the district and national level in Tanzania, the international level, and the PPP partners' home country. There might be several tensions across these levels, but one that seems particularly important in the present case is the dynamic between the district/local level in Tanzania, and the international and/or national partner context.

The analysis exposes an interesting difference between the two partnerships' strategies across the different levels. Although TAP was a top-down project in the very beginning, it quickly shifted focus from the international to the Tanzanian level through rapid implementation and local design processes. Oppositely, SAGCOT's focus remained at the international level until a complete partnership design was ready in the IB. Although rhetorically advocating for fast results and "business as **un**usual", SAGCOT became 'just another' political project coming from the top – exactly what Yara's Vice President Arne Cartridge in 2007 denounced as "a typical donor-funded project where the first year goes to research and only then a project emerges" (Cartridge cited in Yara 2007, 91). One interviewee working on the ground in the SAGCOT districts said: "SAGCOT is a big thing coming from the top. We need action today" (Interview Lyimo 2013).

Thus, *sequencing* – the order in which levels are addressed – may be added as a characteristic of strategies to legitimate transnational PPPs. Three of the interviewees involved in TAP specifically highlighted the legitimating effect of starting at the district level. One interviewee referenced feedback from other partners: "that TAP has started at the district level and established a PPP there, i.e. a common understanding about this among the government and

the private sector out there and organized CIPs, that is probably the right way to proceed"
(Interview Arnesen 2013).

6.4.2 Legitimation processes

The analytical model proposed that legitimation strategies during the initiation stage would be
conditioned by the "pre-existing" perceptions of the legitimacy in relation to the PPP
entrepreneurs, the PPP form, and the issue in question. Whereas the objectives of the PPPs
were considered legitimate, the legitimation challenge for the PPP entrepreneurs was to
convince stakeholders about the appropriateness of a PPP approach to meet those objectives,
and explain why they were the right actors to govern (cf. Schouten and Glasbergen 2011).
The analysis finds a considerable difference between the international and the Tanzanian level
with respect to the need for legitimation strategies.

At the international level, norms about CSR, PPPs, public spending for agriculture, and food
security facilitated legitimacy perceptions. Yara and the other TAP entrepreneurs seem to
have been seen as legitimate from their expertise. However, I would argue that there was still
a need to build the partnership's legitimacy because the actors would seek legitimacy for a
new role (Black 2008, 145). This is particularly true of Yara, who would have to legitimate its
role as a development agent. In the Tanzanian context, on the other hand, both the PPP
approach and the partnerships' private sector focus would have to be legitimated, given the
considerable mistrust and bias against the private sector. These conditions also increased the
need to legitimate Yara's role in the partnership, and it was noted by one interviewee that a
partnership approach was one way in which scepticism against Yara's agenda in Tanzania
could be deflected. Thus, by associating itself with the Norwegian public authorities and later
with the Tanzanian government, Yara was able to derive legitimacy in its new role. At the
same time, it was indicated that the public donors were also able to derive legitimacy from the
private sector's involvement because it distanced the partnership from the many previous
donor projects in the country.

The analytical model further proposed that the PPPs would move to phase II if the partnership
idea and form correspond with the actors' legitimacy expectations. Although not the main
focus of this paper, the discursive legitimation strategies pursued by Yara during the two
partnerships' initiation phases represent an overlap between normative and pragmatic

legitimacy (Black 2008, 146). Thus, the case indicates that norms can redefine what actors perceive to be in their strategic interest (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, the analysis finds that legitimation itself may well be part of the actors' strategic calculations: it was noted how president Kikwete, the WEF, and the private sector partners saw SAGCOT as an opportunity to enhance their own legitimacy towards new or existing audiences.

SAGCOT also represent a deviation from the proposed theoretical framework, which assumed that if a partnership document was signed, the partnership would move into implementation. Rather, SAGCOT experienced an impasse after the SAGCOT centre was established in May 2011. During this period, SAGCOT faced conflicting legitimacy demands from its partners concerning the extent and form of the procedures that SAGCOT would apply in its work. On the one hand, three interviewees noted that donors insisted on extensive funding procedures because this conformed to their demands of a legitimate process. On the other hand, the insistence on procedures weakened other partners' perception of SAGCOT as legitimate because it abandoned the core principle of "business as **un**usual" – quick results and minimum procedures. One interviewee dismissed SAGCOT because it "has to go through all the procedures" (Interview Lyimo 2013), and three said they had lost faith in SAGCOT as a truly transformative partnership. This is what Black (2008, 153) describes as a 'legitimacy dilemma'.

This legitimacy dilemma is interesting because it arose *after* the partners had endorsed a common document during the partnership's second phase. One of the SAGCOT consultants said: "Lofty objectives and shared commitments stay at the conference floor" (Interview Lewis 2013). It shows that although a partnership agreement is signed and many organizations commit to the initiative, it does not automatically lead to the partnership's implementation. However, I would still argue that the phase distinction in the analytical model could be useful, because it describes the purpose of the partnership at each stage rather than *prescribing* a certain outcome.

TAP, on the other hand, managed to move quickly into implementation and largely legitimated its approach through its results. Three TAP interviewees underlined the legitimating effect of starting small and building the project and the PPP from there. In one interviewee's opinion, this is critical because there is a powerful legitimating effect once other actors see the results and realize the potential of the PPP – the other way around, he said, high

expectations could more easily lead to disappointment (Interview Magila 2013). There is also a practical side to this point, as noted by another interviewee: "to start doing something in SAGCOT, you had to have some land issue cleared out and you had to make border management assistance, so some very big things came into play with SAGCOT" (Interview Anonymous 2013). To some extent, this confirms the observation made by Roloff (2008, 319): "a successful multi-stakeholder network will review its problem definition, the proposed solution and the implementation steps and ameliorate its performance in the course of time. Thus, an unspectacular beginning may be outweighed by good achievements in the long run".

The analysis highlights another aspect of this argument about 'starting small': bringing in more stakeholders into partnership processes may open up for new or different legitimacy expectations towards the PPP (Roloff 2008, 320; Black 2008, 148). With TAP, stakeholder scope was first expanded during the start of the Fast Track projects, when the partnership design and its principles were already established. The change from fertilizer to a focus on commodities did not change the underlying principles of the partnership. SAGCOT, on the other hand, were already subject to a range of expectations during its design phase. One interviewee expressed his personal opinion that SAGCOT took a risk by bringing in what he called "the big sharks" during this phase, because they would like to influence the process (Interview Magila 2013).

The analysis showed that although SAGCOT was presented as the logical step to scale TAP to the national level (Enger 2008), the different stakeholder scope during SAGCOT's initiation and design opened up for pressures to create a *new* initiative. Moreover, the consultation rounds during the Greenprint process also opened SAGCOT up to demands for further review procedures. This corresponds with other findings, which suggest that legitimation strategies may in turn transform the PPP or its procedures (Black 2008, 151; Quack 2010, 13). However, the analysis also indicates that not all pressures may have such transformative potential. An example is the SAGCOT leadership's refusal to include stakeholders that do not want to introduce modern farming techniques in Tanzania. It supports Black (2008, 156)'s hypothesis that a regulator might ignore legitimacy demands from one group of stakeholders if those claims are inconsistent with the organization's aims and views.

Lastly, the analytical model proposed that the PPP could become a source of legitimacy for the partners (Dacin, Oliver, and Roy 2007). The analysis finds that especially the PPP entrepreneurs may derive legitimacy from the partnerships, as their strategy and/or business model are closely tied to that of the partnerships. However, the study also shows that the partnerships became a source of legitimacy for other initiatives and programs: TAP for the similar programs in Ghana and Malawi, as well as SAGCOT, which in turn were highlighted by the G8's New Alliance. The study also supports the argument that governance schemes, such as the TAP and the SAGCOT, may be legitimated in "systems of mutual legitimacy enhancement" (Black 2008, 147). My findings indicate that linking up to other initiatives may result in enhanced legitimacy, but it can also impair legitimacy perceptions. Also, the PPP can be "used" by other initiatives, as when the G8 gave preference to SAGCOT under its New Alliance initiative.

6.4.2   The importance of social and political context

The analysis shows that what legitimation strategies were realized was dependent upon the social and political context. For instance, the consultants and PPP entrepreneurs in both PPPs highlighted their intention to include a broad range of stakeholders. This was difficult, however, because of the fragmented state or limited capacity of the other stakeholders like the local private sector. One interviewee said: "one didn't have a very strong private sector, there wasn't any fertilizer association. Who would be our partner from the private sector?" (Interview Arnesen 2013). One can of course also question the intent to include local and secondary stakeholders in the first place. Especially with SAGCOT, it is debatable whether local stakeholders had any "real" opportunity to participate in the design process when deliberations were based at the WEF. This point recognizes the unequal participation in transnational PPPs (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009; Findlay-Brooks, Visser, and Wright 2010; Buse and Harmer 2004). It also relates to Black (2008, 156)'s hypotheses that a regulator is more likely to respond to legitimacy demands from stakeholders it is dependent upon, or who has the capacity and means to hold the PPP accountable to legitimacy demands. SAGCOT's funding impasse is another case in point. It was noted above that while SAGCOT intended to legitimate itself by quickly move on with implementation, the main donors demanded detailed, five-year plans and comprehensive impact assessments as part of their legitimacy demands. SAGCOT's dependence upon these donors' funding can explain why the SAGCOT conformed to these partners' demands over others.

7   CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to understand the strategies and processes through which transnational PPPs for development come to be perceived as legitimate. Studying the Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership (TAP) and the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor Partnership of Tanzania (SAGCOT) as two private sector-led PPPs for agricultural value chains in Tanzania, the paper asked:

How did the legitimation strategies pursued by TAP and SAGCOT, and the partnerships' entrepreneurs, influence perceptions of the PPPs' legitimacy among their stakeholders?

The paper argued for a constructivist analysis of legitimation, which takes into account both the ways in which legitimacy can be constructed and managed through strategic action, as well as the ways in which those strategies interact with the relevant normative structures (cf. Suchman 1995; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). The following summarizes the main findings from the analysis, before a discussion on the findings' contribution to the literature follows. Lastly, this concluding chapter aims to put the present study in perspective and outlines a few promising avenues for future research.

7.1   KEY FINDINGS

First, this paper finds a key role for a few "PPP entrepreneurs" who promote, frame, and socialize the PPP idea and concept (cf. Roloff 2008, 316; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). During the partnerships' first phases, the fertilizer producer Yara and a few consultancy firms were found to have played a critical role (cf. Jenkins 2012). Once the partnerships were set up, the PPP organizations also legitimated themselves through actions and communication. This answers the first sub-question of this thesis, which asked: *Who constructed the TAP and the SAGCOT as legitimate governance mechanisms for agricultural development in Tanzania?* While the analysis found that the PPPs became legitimate by 'social construction', it also recognized the influence from norms in legitimating the two partnerships. In particular, it found that international norms describing appropriate roles and actions for the public and private partners influenced perceptions of the PPPs' legitimacy (Ruggie 2004; Bernstein and Cashore 2007).

Second, the study shows that the PPPs were legitimated through discourse, stakeholder management, and institutionalization – conceptualized as *legitimation strategies* (Suchman 1995; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Thus, it answers the second sub-question asked by this paper: *What legitimation strategies were pursued to legitimate the TAP and the SAGCOT partnerships?* Through discursive strategies the two partnerships were linked to prominent norms about the desirability of PPPs, poverty reduction, and agricultural investments. They were also linked to other initiatives and programs, especially (inter)governmental ones like CAADP and Kilimo Kwanza. At the same time, the two PPPs were legitimated in opposition to established practices: whereas other efforts had failed, TAP and SAGCOT would provide "business as **un**usual". Similar was found with institutionalization strategies, which largely reflected norms about PPPs and Western democratic practices. At the same time, the insistence on minimal formalities presented a break with these norms. Regarding stakeholder management strategies, the analysis finds that the process of defining and involving stakeholders in the two PPPs was complex, contentious, and to some extent arbitrary (cf. Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). Some of the stakeholder choices were deliberate strategies to select only those environments that would consider the PPP legitimate (cf. Suchman 1995). Other stakeholder management strategies were 'forced' by the political and social context, and the partnerships were presented as "coalitions of the willing".

Third, this paper answers the last sub-question: *In what way did the pursued legitimation strategies influence the perceptions of the PPPs' legitimacy among their stakeholders?* To begin with, the study finds that legitimation strategies pursued by the PPP entrepreneurs during the initiation phase constructed the partnerships as a legitimate governance mechanism for agricultural value chain development in Tanzania, at least among the initial partners. Although the two partnerships emerged in an enabling environment, my findings show that the partnership idea and program content are attributable to the PPP entrepreneurs' legitimation strategies (cf. Jenkins 2012). The analysis also found that the PPPs' legitimation strategies were initially biased towards international or Western norms and actors, which in some respects made legitimation at the local level more difficult. However, the TAP became accepted over time by a wide range of local primary and secondary stakeholders through a strategic combination of demonstration effects and inclusive procedures. The paper also argued that TAP became a source of legitimacy for similar initiatives and for SAGCOT. The latter's legitimation strategies had decidedly a more international and high-level focus than

TAP. While having a legitimating effect at the international level, the analysis showed that these strategies created more scepticism towards SAGCOT among local beneficiaries and secondary stakeholders. With no implementation to show for and more bureaucratized procedures, perceptions of legitimacy became more fragmented also among SAGCOT's partners – SAGCOT became "business as usual".

Lastly, the study finds that legitimation strategies may have a transformative potential on the PPP in turn (cf. Black 2008; Quack 2010). Especially including new stakeholders opened up for pressures to redefine the PPP objectives or change its procedures (cf. Roloff 2008). Together with the points above, this finding suggests that PPP entrepreneurs and managers should be diligent about their choice of legitimation strategies, and stay cognizant of the strategies' implications for the acceptance of the PPP across and within the partnership's operational levels.

7.2   RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS

In what way do these findings contribute to the existing literature on transnational PPPs and legitimation of hybrid governance? First, it contributes to the emergent literature on legitimation of hybrid governance systems by applying the concept of legitimation to transnational PPPs for development. Whereas other studies have focused on initiatives at the international level, this paper provides an empirical account of legitimation in a Tanzanian context, as well as on the legitimation dynamics across the different levels involved in a transnational PPP. In addition, the analytical model developed for this paper and the finding that a few actors can promote and frame a governance solution can be instructive for future research.

With regards to the literature on transnational PPPs, this paper can help theory development on the strategic actions through which PPPs can construct and manage their legitimacy (cf. Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, Suchman 1995). Whereas the 'traditional' literature on legitimacy in transnational PPPs mostly assesses the PPPs' normative legitimacy, this paper is able to empirically show *how* a PPP is constructed as legitimate. In arguing that TAP and SAGCOT emerged in the interaction between actors' strategies and the social structure, this paper can also provide a constructivist argument for understanding why PPPs emerge, a

73

research gap identified by Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan (2009, 456).

7.3   IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Although providing useful insights, the scope and empirical data in this study is limited and should be supplemented with additional research. To begin with, it would be fruitful to complement this paper's insider perspective with an empirical analysis of stakeholders' legitimacy perceptions. This would provide a deeper understanding of the reasons why the PPPs were perceived as legitimate and strengthen the empirical foundation for understanding the influence of legitimation strategies, which this paper can only indicate through secondary perceptions and documents. For more positivist analyses, process tracing (Vennesson 2008; Bennett and George 2005) could provide a useful approach to analyze legitimacy perceptions over time and determine strategies' influence on perceptions. Alternatively, a quantitative analysis could conduct a survey of legitimacy perceptions among various stakeholder groups, where the respondents would be asked to evaluate different aspects of the PPP. Survey data could allow for a comparison of legitimacy perceptions and the reasons for that acceptance among various stakeholder groups.

Furthermore, the findings above suggested that contextual factors had a conditioning effect on legitimation strategies. Future studies could provide a deeper analysis of what and how social and political factors influence the viability and influence of legitimation strategies. Studying legitimation strategies and processes in a different country context or in another issue area could provide some basis for comparison, either through a multiple case study or by applying the analytical and conceptual framework to another context. As an example, this study's findings on SAGCOT could be put in context with a study on legitimation strategies in the Beira corridor, and the TAP could be compared to the similar value chain partnerships in Ghana and Malawi.

Finally, this study only implicitly addressed power issues, which do nevertheless seem important for a deeper understanding of legitimation processes. For instance, within a group of PPP entrepreneurs, who has the power to define and select what strategies to pursue? To what extent are power relations important to explain why some stakeholders are included and not others? These and similar questions could be addressed through a critical framework, or

other relevant perspectives that could contribute to a more profound understanding of *how, for what,* and *for whom* development PPPs come to be perceived as legitimate.

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# 9 APPENDICES

9.1 FULL LIST OF TAP PARTNERS AND REGIONS

Partners associated with TAP	
Donors	Norwegian MFA Norad, EU
Private sector actors	Chapa Meli, Minjingu Mines, Krishna Seeds, Bytrade, Monsanto, NMB
NGOs (CSOs, consultancies etc)	Njombe Agricultural Develoment Organisation (NADO), Tanzania Grass-Root Oriented Development (TAGRODE), INCOMET, MVIWAMO, HomeVeg, FarmAfrica, Karatu Develoment Organisation (KDA), FIPS-Africa, RUDI, CNFA/TAGMARK, TRACE, CSDI, BCS, EDC, Korongo, MatchMaker

TAP Regions and districts	
Region	*District*
Rukwa	Sumbawanga Rural, Mpanda
Mbeya	Mbeya, Mbarali, Kyela, Mbozi
Ruvuma	Songea Rural, Namtumbo
Iringa	Iringa, Kilolo, Mufindi, Njombe
Morogoro	Morogoro, Kilombero, Mvomero
Pwani	Kibaha, Kisarawe
Tanga	Muheza, Kilindi
Kilimanjaro	Moshi
Arusha	Meru, Monduli, Karatu
Manyara	Kiteto, Babati

Source: TAP (2013)

9.2 OVERVIEW OF THE CIP PROCESS

Source: (TAP n.d.)

9.3 MAP OF THE SAGCOT REGION

Source: SAGCOT (2011)

9.4   SAGCOT SECRETARIAT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Source: SAGCOT (2011b, 16)

9.5   LIST OF SAGCOT PARTNERS

Kilimo Kwanza Growth Corridors Executive Committee

- Government of Tanzania
- Unilever
- Yara International
- Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT)
- Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)
- Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI)
- Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Irish Embassy –Tanzania

Kilimo Kwanza Growth Corridors (other) partners

- Diageo
- DuPont
- General Mills
- Monsanto
- SAB Miller
- Syngenta
- Standard Bank (Stanbic)
- National Microfinance Bank
- Norfund
- Norwegian Embassy – Tanzania
- Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- The World Economic Forum

SAGCOT Technical Team

- AgDevCo (co-lead)
- Centre for Sustainable Development Initiatives (CSDI)
- Korongo
- Logistics Consulting Group
- Prorustica (co-lead)
- Tanzania Agricultural Partnership

Source: SAGCOT (2011a)

9.6   LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviewee name	Organization	Title	Place and date for interview
Anonymous	-	-	Skype, 10.10.2013
Arnesen, Odd	Norad	Senior Adviser	Oslo, 08.19.2013
Baarn, Jennifer	SAGCOT centre	Deputy CEO	Dar es Salaam, 08.29.2013
Botillen, Øystein	Yara International	Manager Global Initiatives Strategy and Business Development	Oslo, 05.06.2013
Guyver, Patrick	Prorustica	Founder and CEO	Skype, 07.31.2013
Hobgood, Thomas	USAID	Senior Agriculture Policy Adviser	Dar es Salaam, 08.22.2013
Hveem, Petter	Royal Norwegian Embassy to Tanzania		Dar es Salaam, 08.23.2013
Kirenga, Geoffrey	SAGCOT centre	CEO	Dar es Salaam, 09.04.2013
Lewis, Jeffrey	Korongo Ltd	Founder and CEO	Dar es Salaam, 09.03.2013
Lyimo, Abel	Rural Urban Development Initiatives (RUDI)	CEO	Dar es Salaam, 09.04.2013
Magila, Mark	TAP	National Coordinator and Manager	Dar es Salaam, 09.07.2013
Salomonsen, Ragnhild Maatla	Royal Norwegian Society for Development	Regional Representative	Dar es Salaam, 09.02.2013
Shah, Abdullah	International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	Head of Tanzania Office	Dar es Salaam, 09.04.2013
Stormorken, Pål Øystein	Yara Tanzania	Country Manager	Dar es Salaam, 08.25.2013

9.7 INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following interview guides represent a general guide used in the interviews. Because interviews were kept semi-structured, and because interviewees had very different roles in the TAP and SAGCOT processes, interview guides were adapted to each interview.

Interview guide, TAP

Introduction

1. What has been your role in the TAP process?
2. In your opinion, why is TAP an appropriate approach to agricultural development in Tanzania?

Initiation

3. Could you tell me about the process that established the Fertilizer Partnership in 2006?
4. How was TAP and the value chain approach received by various stakeholders?
   a. How did you enlist support?

Setting up the PPP

5. What were the main considerations when you set up TAP?
   a. Why the decision to build upon an existing organization?
   b. Norad wanted a local organization and Tanzanian ownership. What are your thoughts on this?
6. TAP is meant to be "Business as unusual". What is your interpretation of this?

Implementation and perceived legitimacy

7. TAP emphasized early implementation. How do you see this as affecting the perceived success of TAP?
8. What was the function of the CIP processes?
   a. What stakeholders were involved, and how/why?
9. Do you think TAP has been important for the establishment of SAGCOT?
   b. SAGCOT is partly modelled on the TAP model. What was changed and why?
2. How would you describe the perception of TAP today?
10. In your opinion, what have been the main success factors for TAP?
11. What are the key success factors for TAP II?

Interview guide, SAGCOT

Introduction

1   What has been your role in the TAP process?
2   In your opinion, why is SAGCOT an appropriate approach to agricultural development in Tanzania?

Initiation

1. What did you do to enlist support for the agricultural growth corridor concept?
2. SAGCOT has had strong support from president Kikwete. What has this meant for SAGCOT?
3. How would you describe the Investment Blueprint process?

      a. How was the Executive Committee formed, and what were the criteria for membership?

      b. What civil society organisations and farmers' associations were consulted or included in SAGCOT, and why?

Setting up the PPP

4. SAGCOT was partly designed on the TAP model, in what way?
      a. What was changed, and why?
5. SAGCOT is said to be "Business as unusual". What is your interpretation of this?
2. What were your main concerns in developing the Investment Blueprint (IB)?
      a. The Concept note and the IB emphasize development through hub and outgrower schemes. Why was this type of intervention highlighted?
6. The SAGCOT IB states that "usual participatory methods" or donor criteria will not be considered in the investment decisions. Why was this important?
      b. Do you see any advantages and/or disadvantages with this approach?

Implementation and perceived legitimacy

7. Why was the Greenprint process started, and what was its function?
8. How would you describe the reactions to SAGCOT among farmers and farmer organisations?
9. There has been some scepticism towards SAGCOT from civil society organisations and others who fear that SAGCOT will lead to large-scale land acquisitions and will not, in the end, benefit farmers. Do you see such criticism as relevant for the success of SAGCOT, and if so, how?
10. What are the key success factors for SAGCOT going forward:
      c. To sustain partners' commitment?
      d. To ensure support among farmers and associations at the local level?

9.8 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW DATA

TAP

Initiation (phase I)	• Realization that a fertilizer buffer stock was not the solution, one had to look at the whole value chain and the related business environment. • TAP would ensure better coordination and continuity of projects. Need for "extraordinary" measures to scale up activities • Key players: Yara in particular, Norwegian Embassy, agriculture PMO Peniel Lyimo, Norad, Norfund ○ "We were a trio that tried thinking out of the box" • The government was not used to sitting down as equals, and it was difficult to change this mindset. Still, they did not resist TAP • Factors that influenced the interest in TAP: food shortage, food security, AU CAADP, search for new markets • National-level meetings with decision-makers • "All parties were clear on the point that we had to decouple it from Yara and Norwegian interests, from selling the most Yara fertilizer to looking at value chains where everyone will benefit, everyone is interested in getting the market to work and compete in the market. We want to move away from

	the special deals"
Perceptions of legitimacy (phase I-II)	• At first people were sceptical of the new concept. TAP was the first to put these ideas into practice. • Uptake in regions dependent on their development level and personal commitment. • Bias against TAP because of socialist tradition and mistrust towards MNCs
Setting up the PPP (phase II)	• Formalities only where needed the most to induce trust • Commercially-minded but very transparent and open • Facilitation, Neutral, non-aligned organisation was important, not owned by any one actor • Focused on a few, high-performing areas • Different ideas from the consultants and Norad, but decided upon a local entity. TAP was established within ACT with 3-4 employees, now grown to 8 people ○ A lot of people at ACT have a background from the state and the cooperative sector. Still a strong socialist influence in Tanzania

Implementation / Evolution (phase III)	• "I think the thing TAP has been able to do is to be able to show that this is the landscape, this is what we have to deal with"
	• Demonstration effect is important: early demonstration and new innovations attracted more farmers.
	    ○ Coming up with constant innovations is important to sustain farmers' support and commitment, and incentivize the partners to continue to work together.
	• Importance of CIP:
	    ○ "CIPs was essentially the bedrock of the TAP[…]The initial CIPs had their successes, but they were still some issues around them, but still they made good progress with them"
	    ○ The CIP process brought the different actors together, made them make choices together and let them make their own decisions, uptake dependent upon individuals
	    ○ Creating local ownership, very useful planning tool for district authorities because it showed financing needs. Became calling card to describe different responsibilities
	    ○ "CIPs are probably the right way to proceed, and then rather build from there. Because it is very fragmented this input market"
	    ○ "If you want a project to work, you have to go down to the local level".

Perceptions of legitimacy (phase III)	• People realized that it would be easier to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure rational use of resources if efforts are coordinated through a partnership • "There is a lot of scepticism towards TAP, really, but if you look at the budgets and how large that country is, you don't need much knowledge to say, how much can you expect from TAP? But there are a lot of people who are sceptical"

SAGCOT	
Initiation (phase I)	• International agenda, Davos conferences, WEF, G8 • Oslo conferences: "caught a lot of attention and were appreciated by many", later African Green Revoulution forum • Key players: Developed and promoted by Yara and consultancies, Peniel Lyimo noted as "extraordinary" – promoted the value chain concept ○ Yara as "a private sector actor at the very centre of a global, pan-African dialogue about challenges associated with food security and agriculture" • Shift with spending for agriculture, food security, population growth, AU CAADP, Kilimo Kwanza ("something is happening in Tanzania") – many forces pulling in the same direction • Need for new initiatives • "No one had a better idea"
Perceptions of legitimacy (phase I-II)	• Outgrower schemes will only benefit 5-10% of Tanzanian farmers, not enough in itself • Both private and public actors are needed to bring about transformation in Tanzanian agriculture • "It makes sense, somehow" • Seen as a risky project

Setting up the PPP (phase II)	• Outgrower model
	    ○ Beira model being exported to SAGCOT
	    ○ "It could focus on different types of agriculture that need very little land, but it focused on sugar and rice and life stock, and all of it needs a lot of land. By the end of the day, it came back to be all about land just because of the crops they decided to work with. Because they needed to have some big plots to offer to attract investors."
	    ○ Political correctness, recognizable model
	    ○ "Naïve" to the Tanzanian environment, demands cultural shift
	• International standards to make it easier to attract international financing and investments
	• Stakeholders
	    ○ the MVIWATA is often perceived as an activist organization with an agenda that isn't very pro-business. CSOs: Dogmatic passion, creating noise that can be detrimental. Weak organizations hinder inclusion.
	    ○ Several rounds of consultation in SAGCOT, invited all CSOs, some refused
	    ○ This lack of civil society involvement is a weakness of the SAGCOT model
	    ○ "Coalition of the willing"
	    ○ Private sector is presented as the main partner, but private sector at all levels (local, regional, multinational)
	• "Business as unusual"
	    ○ "Depends on who you ask"
	    ○ It is very clear that SAGCOT is guided by private sector principles and

	not donor or government principles ○ Neutral and independent, try to be as transparent as possible • "It is a top-down project. SAGCOT is being geared towards investors"

Implementation / Evolution
 	
(phase III)
	• Lack of awareness point to need for communication strategy, established technical committee that traveled around to inform about SAGCOT
	• Accusations about land grabbing – "backlash" for SAGCOT
	• Technical and elaborate solution that was difficult to communicate
	   ○ "to start doing something in SAGCOT you had to do some land issue cleared out and you had to make border management assistance so some very big things came into play with SAGCOT"
	   ○ Very technical solution
	• Stakeholders
	   ○ More selective membership, developed a pipeline of the most committed
	   ○ Something is lacking in these projects, and it is probably who to select whom to speak to. How to select the right people to speak to, and at the right time
	   ○ Pre-qualification committee: TIC cancelling the multi-stakeholder committee
	   ○ Everyone would agree at the steering committee meetings, but it would get challenging as you move down to the local level because it is not clear who should be informed and who should be targeted
	• Development partners take time to fund the centre because they have to follow their own procedures
	• Greenprint process:
	   ○ raising awareness, creating ownership, possible accountability and grievance mechanism, involving stakeholders
	   ○ "The most important is probably not the document, it is the more the process"
	   ○ The Norwegian Embassy is trying to embed SAGCOT firmer within a Green Growth perspective

Perceptions of legitimacy
 	
(phase III)
	• Frustration about the slow pace of implementation, but still commitment
	• Little awareness in the districts:
	   ○ "SAGCOT is a big thing coming from the top. We need action today" "Farmers want to go to heaven today".
	   ○ Farmers are "fatigués", unreceptive of new ideas
	• Activists claiming land grabbing, but no evidence. Frustration by the PPP partners
	• "business as usual, not business as **un**usual"
	• "Yara will not be a locomotive for implementation, to put it that way"
	• "Shared commitment isn't worth the paper it is written on"
	• "I don't know if we will make some change with SAGCOT"
	• "SAGCOT has been kidnapped by the government"

9.9   LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED FOR THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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9.10 LIST OF EVENTS ATTENDED

"Utviklingsmandag: Fra sult til matsikkerhet". Litteraturhuset, Oslo, Norway. June 10th 2013

Civil society consultation meeting with the Norwegian ambassador to Tanzania, Ingunn Klepsvik. Norad, Oslo, Norway. August 16th 2013