Controversies in Open Innovation

- Opening up the 'Black Hole' of the Urban Cross-Divisional Competence Project

ABSTRACT

Through a constructivist approach, this thesis serves to illuminate and describe the rise and fall of an open innovation project in order to describe what happens when an innovation attempt collapse, disappear of fail in living up to its purpose. Thus, this thesis focuses on the negotiations of organizational struggles that emerge as controversies to hinder innovation.

Taking a point of departure in the Actor-Network Theory and by adopting the insights from 'A Sociology of Translation' as presented by Latour and Callon, the innovation project emerges in this thesis as a construction around which a network of actors is connected. The innovation project serves to construct a new organizational competence and to do this, the actor network needs to stabilize a particular meaning in the network by translating the identity, will and power of all relevant and needed actors. The actors must, thus, be displaced to become aligned with an obligatory passage point that serves the purpose of building the competence into the organization. However, the translations of actors are confronted by controversies that attempt to displace the obligatory passage points and thus the innovation attempts.

In the analysis, four central episodes are identified that each represents a different construction of an obligatory passage point and the key actor to be aligned to it. In the first episode, the innovation project is centered on the construction of the Urban Group which is to secure innovation success. Controversies emerge that challenge the Urban Group's network and as a second episode is observed as a result of the Urban Group's negotiations of the controversies. Thus, the analysis identifies in total four episodes in which a central actor is translated and displaced towards an obligatory passage point. As a result, these translations and displacement attempts prompt new controversies to emerge that challenge the constructed network and the network thus seeks the negotiation of these controversies to secure its position of power. Innovation, from this perspective becomes a question of translating the wills and powerS of actors in order to stabilize a certain meaning in an innovation project network.

This thesis then serves to illuminate the intrinsic nature of these innovation network controversies by adopting an understanding of innovations as social constructions whose constituting nature must be understood and managed in order to achieve innovative success.

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1. THE BEGINNING OF THE STORY OF INNOVATION

It all started with a conversation between a CEO and a former City Director of the Copenhagen Municipality. The conversation was just like any other conversation that CEOs have with people of influence and opinion. Like any other conversation, it involved discussion, the sharing of meanings and generation of ideas and it inspired the CEO to start the development of a new competence.

In this thesis, I wish to tell a story based on the generation of ideas and development of competences. My story cannot be compared to a traditional and normative analysis of a given context with the purpose of giving advice retrospectively. Rather, my story is like a fairy tail that involves heroes, villains, obstacles, fearfulness, missions, goals and rewards. The story I wish to tell is a story of innovation, knowledge, organizational development, power structures and -struggles, relations between organizational structures and core competences and the difficult task of negotiating and dealing with controversies.

But let us return to the story again. The conversation takes place in the Danish head office of an international engineering consultancy corporation, BCMG[1], in the beginning of 2008. The CEO of the Danish organization and the former Director of The Technical and Environmental Administration in the Copenhagen Municipality, are discussing the prospects for BCMG. With the experience from her previous job in the Copenhagen Municipality, the former Director has significant insights into a broad array of aspects that are significant to a city. The CEO is keen to understand how her organization can improve its services in relation to any type of operation within a city's limits that can be developed on the basis of the pre-existing core competences in BCMG.

As it is the case at this time in the story of BCMG, all operations of the organization are organized in relation to what type of core competence the operation falls into. The organization of an operation thus generally falls into one out of the six core competence divisions that function as the kernel of BCMG operations. Rooted in the core competence, a project team is established from the core competence division that is to ensure the successful outcome of any operation related to the core competence. In this manner, the core competence becomes the organizing force behind any typical operation.

The former Director takes this structuring divisional core competence nature of operations in BCMG as starting point for arguing that, although BCMG is highly skilled and qualified to assist with traditional operations in a city, BCMG could benefit from developing a new organizational competence that can bridge all relevant competences in one. The former Director finds that there is an ever-increasing demand for consultancy services in relation to urban development[2] engineering projects in cities that can leverage and

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[1] This is a fictive abbreviation I have chosen to anonymize the corporation in question. See also under 3.7.2

[2] For an understanding of the term 'urban development, see under 1.1

combine any relevant competence into one unifying, bridging competence (Interviewee C). Figure 1 illustrates this new Urban Development competence that is to leverage and combine internal resources from every competence division and further, to leverage external resources, thus building a single interdivisional, interorganizational competence that considers both internally possessed and externally available resources.

The CEO is pleased with the outcome of the conversation and thus inspired, the CEO sets the organizational wheels in motion towards making urban development a new BCMG competence. But how does a CEO set the organizational wheels in motion? How can the organization utilize its divisional competences and simultaneously leverage externally available resources in the development of a new approach to urban development operations? And how should the competence development be approached and structured in the perspective of organizational innovation processes?

Figure 1: Urban Development as an interdivisional open innovation competence in BCMG

These questions seem important to answer in order to gain a better understanding of the processes, structures and practices of these types of innovation projects. As such, the story I am about to tell deals with the high seas of innovation as I intend to offer a differentiated insight into organizational innovation processes.

1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Innovation

In recent times, a substantial amount of research has introduced, analyzed and discussed the significance of knowledge in relation to innovation. Tsoukas (1996) offers a perspective of the organization as a distributed knowledge system that is facing the problem that no single agent can fully specify in advance what kind of knowledge that is going to be relevant at any given time. Hence, the task for the organization is to enable interactions between actors of knowledge that will lead to innovation. Innovation thus becomes an issue of combining relevant knowledge. Orlikowski (2002) focus on the internal processes of knowledge management and highlights the essential role of knowing in practice how to organize innovation operations. He sees

'knowing' as a social accomplishment constituted and reconstituted through practice as actors engage in the world. The sharing of 'knowing how' is vital for the ability to innovate because it is grounded in the everyday practice of organizational members. The notion of 'knowing' is also used by Cook and Brown (1999) who takes the explicit and tacit forms of knowledge and expands this understanding to develop practices that makes use of knowledge in a new, innovative and more productive way. Cook and Brown view innovations as a 'generative dance' between the knowledge possessed by actors and applying this knowledge in practice. Innovation becomes a question of building an organizational infrastructure that allows for the interplay between knowledge and knowing how to make use of this knowledge in the innovative practice. Kreiner (2002) follows this as he focus on developing an organizational structure that will allow for the mobilization of knowledge rather than relying simply on managerial control and the sharing of knowledge between individuals. As such, the mobilization of knowledge is to lead towards innovation and the organizational structure becomes the starting point for the innovation efforts of the organization.

Leonard-Barton (1992) adopts a different perspective to organizational knowledge as she takes the notion of organizational competences to discuss the role and interaction of core competences in innovation. She argues that core competences are institutionalized knowledge sets that have become a taken-for-granted reality of the organization (Leonard-Barton 1992). Inherent in these institutionalized knowledge sets hides the paradoxical situation that core competences both enable and inhibit innovation. Leonard-Barton opens up the notion of core competence and argues that core competences should be understood as double-sided coins, consisting of a core capability and a core rigidity side. As a consequence, when an innovation project is based, structured an organized in relation to an organizational core competence, this very same competence simultaneously enable and hinder it (Leonard-Barton). This signifies that the core rigidities act as an inhibiting force in innovation projects *"…that are deliberately designed to create new, nontraditional capabilities…"* (Leonard-Barton 1992: 118) and Leonard-Barton therefore argues that core competences have a dysfunctional flip-side that hinder innovation. In this perspective on innovative performance, innovations based on core competences are exposed to the institutionalized knowledge sets that make out the organizational core competence and the rigidities of competences may emerge as dysfunctional inhibitors in innovation projects. This understanding of the double-sided nature of competences offers intriguing insights that are important for illuminating the innovation of the urban development competence in BCMG where the dark side of competences – the rigidities – inhibits the making of this new competence.

The new urban development competence that the CEO wants to make a part of the portfolio of BCMG is to become an innovation project that require the leveraging of both internal and external sources of knowledge (as illustrated in Figure 1). Thus, my study of an innovation project falls in line with innovation scholars such as Foss et al (in press) who argue that organizations must tap into the knowledge of users and customers in order to improve their innovativeness and the internal organization must be designed to support this. Foss et al focus on the need for an organizational structure that takes an open and external approach to knowledge that resides outside the organization.

Chesbrough (2003, 2006) has adopted a more normative approach as he describes the need for organizations to start opening up their internal R&D processes, thus allowing for internalization as well as externalization of knowledge. In Chesbrough's understanding, organizations must adopt an open innovation approach for the simple reason that in the external environment of an organization, an infinitive amount of knowledge exist that must be considered when an organization is to decide what knowledge should be combined in its innovation efforts. Thus, Chesbrough argues that because it is impossible for organizations to retain all vital knowledge internally, organizational structures should be constructed to support the leveraging of external knowledge. Additionally, the internal hoarding of knowledge should be altered to focus on externalizing internal knowledge and un-used ideas because, his argument goes, organizations cannot expect that its knowledge and ideas can be retained inside its boundaries. The un-used knowledge and ideas should be externalized in order to profit from, rather than letting them seep out of the organizational boundaries. Chesbrough thus argues that the biggest obstacles to combining knowledge in order to innovate are the leveraging of external knowledge resources. I will follow this open innovation discussion further in Chapter 2.

In this manner, gaining an insight into the relation between the double-sided nature of competences and the need for structuring innovation operations that enhance the leveraging of external sources of knowledge becomes an intriguing object for investigation that can contribute to illuminate the impact of dysfunctional flip-side of competences and the obstacles for leveraging external sources of knowledge. Thus, this investigation will further be able to contribute to Argyres (1996) who discusses the relation between the organizational structure and the innovation strategy of an organization.

Argyres argues, from a transaction-cost perspective[3], that the higher the divisionalization of an organization is, the more costly it is for that organization to transfer knowledge across divisional boundaries because of uncertainties inherent in the development of an interrelated competence that require different organizational competence divisions to assist in the development process (Argyres 1996). Argyres identifies the uncertainties to be related to disagreements over the direction of the development process where the divisions may haggle and stall the development process, attempting to direct the process to where they prefer (ibid). Thus, a higher divisionalization of an organization leads towards a competence-deepening innovation strategy (Argyres 1996) because exploiting already-present knowledge within the boundaries of one division is less costly than if the division has to bargain with other divisions over the direction of the new competence. Conversely, a competence-broadening innovation strategy which aims at exploring new competences through inter-competence cooperation is related to lesser divisionalization of an organization because the fewer divisional boundaries, the lesser knowledge transfer across divisional boundaries is needed (ibid). In his perspective, the higher degree of interdivisional knowledge transfer needed in an innovation project, the less favorable it is to have a high degree of divisionalization. In this manner, Argyres points to the organizational structure as an influence on the innovation strategy.

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[3] Argyres takes a transaction-cost perspective where the transfer of knowledge involves a cost for the sender in terms of i.e. risks, uncertainty, reciprocity, power etc. (Argyres 1996)

As a result of the above discussion of the relationship between organizational structure, innovation strategy and obstacles to innovative performance, there seem to be a misalignment between understanding the obstacles to innovative performance in open innovation projects that require an interdivisional and an external leverage of knowledge resources. Thus, it is the objective of this thesis to illuminate these relations by scrutinizing the open innovation struggles in an organization.

This will be done by adopting a constructivist approach to understanding how objects in the world come into being. In this manner, I will follow Christiansen and Varnes (2007) who has adopted a network process perspective to understand organizational action and management. The perspective they present focus on the creation of strong networks through translations and interessements of human and non-human actors. These strong networks are then able to present themselves as 'facts' that bring forward a certain meaning that other organizational actions are build on. From this constructivist network perspective, knowledge, competences and innovations can be understood as constructions that build on the translations and interessements of actors into strong and stabile networks. Thus, the network process perspective understanding of the nature of knowledge, competence and innovations radically differs from the abovementioned approaches. In the Christiansen and Varnes perspective these 'facts' become a question of micro-level decisions over how networks of facts are stabilized by a number of actors through their participation in strong networks (Christiansen and Varnes 2007).

I intend to bring forward the insights from Leonard-Barton (double-sided nature of competences), Chesbrough (open innovation), Argyres (transaction costs of interdivisional sharing of knowledge) and Christensen and Varnes (constructivist understanding of object in the world) to contrast the different perspectives they offer and to illuminate the nature of open innovation struggles in an organization. The discussion of these theoretical contributions directs me toward discussing the problem arena that this thesis is contributing to.

1.1. Problem Arena

To understand the processes behind the development of 'anything', an insight into the dark and hidden processes that ascribe meaning to this 'thing' seem beneficiary. Behind a concept, a vision, a product, a new insight, knowledge, competence or any other type of innovation, lay hidden processes that together make up that 'something', what we understand it to be and how it was invented. I wish to develop an understanding of these defining processes that are involved in creating and defining innovation attempts of a new competence in an organization. Furthermore, I which to understand what happens when the attempt collapse, disappear of fail in living up to its purpose. The case I am to present takes an open and external approach to innovation where innovation cannot be described as a solely intra-organizational process.
Hence, it is the underlying innovation processes and the struggles that emerge along the way that I want to gain a deeper understanding of by telling the story of the urban development competence innovation project.

I wish to underline here that it is not my ambition to try and define the 'true' understanding of the to-be-developed urban development competence nor is it my purpose to point fingers at individuals that took part in the new competence project process. Rather, I wish to describe the how the struggles of making urban development a new organizational competence emerge and evolve and to show how this new competence can be understood as a network construction process that takes place through the progressive development of new social relationships. As such, my story will show the simultaneous construction of knowledge about urban development and the construction of a network of relations between different actors who play a significant part in the construction of meaning. And finally, the story will show how urban development becomes the centre for controversy where its meaning and function is questioned, disputed and abandoned by the actors that was defined to play an active part in its construction.

1.2. Problem Statement

Based on the above problem arena the thesis seeks to answer the following.

How does BCMG struggle in setting up an open innovation project exemplified by the Urban Development competence?

In order to answer my problem statement, I have raised four sub-questions that will help me in structuring my analysis and that together will give me the insight needed to give a full-fetching answer. Firstly, I raise the theoretical question of:

- What does an open and external approach to innovation signify for the structuring and organizing of an innovation project?

Secondly, I raise the empirical questions of:
- How is urban development progressively constructed and what critical episodes can be identified?
- How does urban development become a centre of controversy in the critical episodes?
- How are the controversies progressively dealt with throughout the critical episodes?

These sub-questions will be answered progressively throughout the entire analysis and summarized in the Discussion, Conclusion and Implication chapter.

1.3. Definitions

I find it useful here to briefly comment on the choices of wording and spelling I have used. In this thesis, 'urban development' is used to frame the general technical approach used by any actor that is involved in operations with relation to developing a city in a sustainable fashion. Thus, 'urban development' represents the approach to operations in a city upon which the CEO and the Director identified the possibilities for the organization to strengthen its profile. As a contrast, 'Urban Development' will become the term for framing the BCMG-specific competence that the CEO wants to include into the organization's portfolio.

The contrasting difference is one of specification and contextualization. 'urban development' thus refer to the general term used when describing the approach to developing a city in a sustainable fashion. Contrasting this is 'Urban Development' which is the concrete, specific and organizational-context-dependent competence that is to be developed and defined throughout an innovation process and which is the object of this thesis.

Additionally, in my empirical material, a multiplicity of terminologies exists that frames the development of a city where the sustainable approach is not mentioned. Examples include 'city planning', 'city development', 'urban planning', etc. As a way of approaching this complexity, I have attempted to make sense of the multiplicity by translating directly from Danish to English wherever it has been possible to also transfer what I understand the meaning of the English terminology to signify.

1.4. Motivation

After the initial introduction, I would like to briefly comment on my motivation for writing this thesis. I find that strategic management, innovation, organizational or cultural change initiatives are all difficult issues that every organization faces from time to time. Many stories have been told of the grand successes in the fine art of remodeling an organization that has run astray. Likewise, many stories of the failures of change initiatives have likewise been told, the do-not-do-it-like-they-did stories. Therefore, I believe that by gaining an insight into the dark, fragile and hidden processes that make out the nature of a concept, a cultural aspect, a technology, a strategy or any other form of innovation, organizations can gain a better understanding of how to predict, handle or maybe even avoid controversies that these innovations might be influenced by.

I offer in this thesis, like a doctor performing an arthroscopy, an insight into the deep internal processes that are the foundations of an organization, its concepts and values. Through this insight, I argue that Managers and CEOs will be able to take a step back from a situation of controversy and by understanding the underlying logic of these, act strategically towards its resolution. Thus, I believe that this thesis will offer an insightful and therefore useful understanding of the logic behind concepts, innovations, competences, controversies and organizations.

1.5. *Project Design*

Chapter 2 introduces innovation, and more specifically, open innovation as the domain of the thesis. I introduce the notion of open innovation as an approach that focuses equally on the internal and external paths toward innovative performance. Further, the role of knowledge in an open innovation approach is discussed and terminating the chapter is a discussion of the distinction between an un-used and a used idea.

Chapter 3 presents my approach to theory of science. Firstly, I present the epistemological approach to creating meaning in the world with the understanding that meaning is ascribed through network relations. Secondly, the Actor Network Theory is presented as the theoretical perspective that I will use in my analysis and 'A Sociology of Translation' is presented as the theoretical apparatus that will allow me to describe and observe how translations take place in the struggles over ascribing meaning.

Chapter 4 presents the analysis of four episodes by describing the continuous organizational struggles that emerge in the making of the Urban Development competence in BCMG. Through a translation analysis, I open up the dark hole of the struggles and I show how BCMG is its own worst enemy when it comes to turning urban development into a new organizational competence.

Chapter 5 presents my empirical findings and discusses these in relation to the abovementioned theoretical insights and I terminate with a final conclusion.

2. OPEN INNOVATION

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter I wish to present the concept of open innovation that will become the theoretical domain to which the below analysis of the organizational struggles to making urban development a new competence relate to. This chapter will introduce the argument that innovation processes must be opened and externalized as a way of gaining access to new and vital knowledge residing outside the organization in order to extend the organization's knowledge base. As contrast to the open approach stands the closed innovation approach which takes that innovation processes should be retained internally from initial idea to implementation of a new product or service.

I have based this chapter primarily on two books by Henry Chesbrough (2003, 2006) who can be argued to be one of the leading theorists and scholars within the field of innovation, and in particular, in regards to open innovation.

This chapter begins with an argumentation for a shift from closed innovation to open innovation which serves to contextualize the open innovation approach and the implications that follow. Following is a discussion of the role of knowledge in open innovation and the managerial implications derived from the shift of approach. Finally, I will discuss how the notion organizational ideas as basis for innovation can be understood in the framework of open innovation

But I start this chapter by describing the shift of approach to innovation, away from the closed and towards the open innovation approach.

2.2. From Closed to Open Innovation

There is little doubt over the importance that innovation plays in developing an organization and sustaining its growth in the competitive environment that organizations are finding themselves in. The issue is, however, according to Chesbrough (2003) that the usual internal practices for managing the innovation processes within organizations don't seem to be working anymore. A number of paradoxes seem to illustrate that organizations are struggling in their efforts to innovate and conduct research. Among other, Chesbrough points out that internal industrial research is less effective despite an abundance of ideas; that long-term financed projects that has been abandoned by an organization, later turn into very successful product platforms for other organizations; and that organizations struggle to find and explore growth opportunities even though external capital is available.

These paradoxes call for a change in attitudes towards the innovation processes in the organizations. They cannot sit idle by, watching new start-up companies advancing on their domains, trying to push them out of the market. The organizations must act and, according to Chesbrough, the solution for them is to adapt an open innovation approach. Chesbrough concludes that organizations are undergoing a paradigm shift; away from closed innovation and towards open innovation (2003).

2.3. Closed Innovation

According to Chesbrough, the world is undergoing a fundamental change in approach to innovation. In the mindset of the closed innovation approach, *"successful innovation requires control"* (ibid.) and companies must, in this approach, control the entire innovation process - from generation of own ideas, through R&D stages, to the successful implementation of the innovation in markets. When Chesbrough talks of control over the innovation process, he is in particular referring to the knowledge that resides in the organization. In the closed approach to innovation, knowledge is to be protected and kept within the closed boundaries of the organization.

In the light of this approach, organizations can rely only on themselves for developing successful innovations and must therefore regard the entire innovation process as deep vertical integration within the organization. The old mantra 'if you want something done right, you've got to do it yourself' is what seems to apply as Chesbrough notices.

The organization becomes, in this closed approach, a closed unit with boundaries that serve to protect ideas, knowledge, products, intellectual capital and competences from seeping out into the surrounding environment. All ideas within the organization are introduced through a process whereby it is managed in accordance with the organization's R&D processes. As an example, Chesbrough describes the innovation process funnel as a typical example of such a process. All new ideas in an organization are introduced into a selection process funnel whereby only the ideas with a large profit margin and those that fit the business strategy of the organization are progressed down through the internal funnel to be sent to market through internal market channels. All other ideas are filtered out throughout the process and killed, regardless of the time, effort and resources spent on their development. The funnel is made up of strong organizational boundaries, designed to secure the inside knowledge in seeping out and preventing external knowledge from entering. This approach to innovation implicates that no knowledge flows into the organization and the organization is therefore dependent on internal successes throughout the entire R&D supply chain.

Chesbrough argues that the logic of closed innovation approach has been eroded by new trends in society that has disrupted this once very successful process for innovation and that this erosion brings about a need for changing the approach to the innovation processes in organizations. The erosion is caused due to factors such as the growing mobility of experienced and skilled people, the amount of highly educated graduates and the seeping of knowledge out of the knowledge divisions of the major corporations despite their efforts to

cover the leaks (2003). Combined with increased possibility of raising capital from private venture companies which has increased the ability to start up a company, this has allowed knowledge to spread out of the organizations and into all areas of the organizations' external environments.

Therefore, these trends bring about a need to change the approach of the innovation process as strictly internal. Knowledge and ideas have started to seep out of the organizations and the organizations risk loosing unused knowledge to the competent and knowledgeable scientist who can set up a start-up company based on his research and develop the unused knowledge into competing new competences that could become a competitor of the birth-organization (ibid.)

As Chesbrough puts it then *"this presence of this outside path broke the virtuous circle. The company that originally funded the breakthrough did not profit from its investment in the R&D that led to the breakthrough."* (Chesbrough 2003: xxiv). Hence, the closed innovation approach becomes unsustainable in the battle over securing continuous profits. It is in situations like these that the new approach of open innovation has emerged.

2.4. Open Innovation

As the name suggests, this approach emphasizes an open approach to the innovation processes. In the words of Chesbrough then *"open innovation is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively."* (Chesbrough 2006: 1).

Where the closed innovation approach viewed the entire idea generation, R&D supply chain and path to market as a closed internal process with strong organizational boundaries to protect knowledge from entering and escaping, the open innovation position takes a different approach. Here, an organization must be able to introduce knowledge from external sources and combine it with the internally possessed knowledge and the R&D processes of the organization whilst simultaneously allowing internal knowledge to be externalized (Chesbrough 2003).
Additionally, organizations must be aware that there is more than one way to implement an innovation or to bring it to market. In the open innovation approach, organizations should continue to utilize their internally developed paths to market whilst combining these with alternative external paths even though that at the given time might not seem to fit the overall business strategy of the organization.

As it was the case in the closed innovation approach, if an R&D project was not able to achieve fit with the business strategy of an organization for whatever reason, the project would be killed regardless of the resources already spent on its development - the so-called false positive approach that serve the purpose of minimizing costs of developing an unfavorable innovation that does not fit the business strategy (Chesbrough 2003). Paradoxically, when organizations strive to manage the R&D process as to avoid this

false positive error, they do in fact increase the risk of producing the so-called false negative error. This error signifies a previously discarded innovation project that turns out to be very profitable when resurrected and taken to market by another actor. Thus, the birth-organization does not benefit from the resources it spent on the development of this now successful innovation (ibid).

Chesbrough has adapted the abovementioned innovation process funnel from the closed approach and adjusted it to the open innovation approach where the abovementioned closed organizational boundaries have been perforated, thus illustrating that knowledge is seeping in and out of the organization. This has the implication that the false negatives that before were killed by the organization only to reappear as a profitable technology outside the organization, is in the open innovation approach consciously externalized thus ensuring the organization a profit from otherwise lost knowledge and competences (Chesbrough 2003).

A false negative could originate as a radical new idea of how to solve a problem in a completely new way using the latest technology but because of the radical nature, the idea cannot be understood and conceptualized in terms of the pre-existing organizational business mode and ends up being killed in the project funnel. If, however, this idea is licensed out of the organization to a partner, the idea may be developed into a new technology in this manner bring back a profit from the license arrangement.

Chesbrough sums it up as a dilemma for organizations. He states that:

"Firms should seek to minimize false positives but at the same time must incorporate processes to manage false negatives in order to appropriate additional value from them and identify potential new markets and business models from them." (2006: 9).

The founding logic behind the open innovation approach is that it is impossible to develop and store all knowledge internally. In reality, there is an inexhaustible quantity of knowledge that resides outside the organization and the key challenge is to leverage the external knowledge as resources in the core innovation process. It is the leveraging processes behind an open innovation process with the aim of developing a new competence that is the object for analysis in this thesis.

The role of knowledge in open innovation is discussed in more detail in the following section.

2.5. The Role of Knowledge in Open Innovation

Knowledge plays a vital role in an innovation process, regardless of the approach to the process itself. However, knowledge plays very different roles in the two innovation approaches and the changing role of knowledge suggests some very different organizing principles for research and innovation (Chesbrough 2003).

In the closed innovation approach, knowledge is the organization's most valuable resource and should be fiercely protected, no matter where the knowledge resides. Through new combinations of the existing internal knowledge in an organization, innovation and R&D are conducted. This carries that the internal procedures in an organization are aimed at limiting the knowledge from seeping out of the organization. However, as I have argued above, the knowledge monopolies of the major corporations have been broken up and distributed. Knowledge has been widely distributed between organizations, customers, suppliers, universities, national labs, industry consortia and start-up firms especially due to the increased mobility of highly skilled individuals (Chesbrough 2003).

In the open innovation approach, external knowledge plays an equally important role to that of internal knowledge in the closed innovation approach (Chesbrough 2006). Open innovation assumes that useful knowledge is widely distributed internally as well as externally and that even the most capable innovative organizations must identify, connect to and leverage external knowledge resources as a core process in innovation operations (ibid). The logic of open innovation is *"based on a landscape of abundant knowledge which must be used readily if it is to provide value to the company that created it."* (Chesbrough 2003: xxv).

In order for organizations to leverage this distributed landscape of knowledge, a restructuring of the organizational innovation process is necessary that allows for a redefinition of the importance of knowledge (Chesbrough 2003). Organizations need to develop mechanisms that allow the internal innovation processes to access external sources of knowledge and combine the two into technologies and services. The logic behind this is that organizations should not spend resources on reinventing the wheel. Instead, by strategically leveraging knowledge successfully, internally as well as externally, organizations should fill the gaps in their own knowledge networks which will then lead towards sustaining the overall profit (Chesbrough 2006). Thus, the challenge that every organization faces when adopting an open approach is *"the internal resistance to external innovations and technologies within the company."* (Chesbrough 2006: 23).

The organizations face internal resistance towards the leveraging of external knowledge recourses. Once (or if) this resistance is overcome, the new external knowledge will be absorbed and put to use through the internal leveraging knowledge processes. From the point of view of Chesbrough, organizations will need to structure innovation processes with a focus on limiting resistance towards the external knowledge rather than limiting the resistance towards internal knowledge.

To summarize, so far I have argued for the need to open up the organizational boundaries to allow a flow of knowledge in and out of the organization. This should benefit the innovation potentials of organizations as they gain access to a more extensive body of knowledge. Further, I argue, based on the argumentation of Chesbrough, that the leveraging of external knowledge will prove significantly more challenging than the internal leveraging of knowledge resources. Once the knowledge has entered, it will be combined with the internal knowledge to produce innovations.

2.6.   The Used and the Un-used Ideas of an Organization

From the discussion of the open innovation approach and the role of knowledge follows that this approach is a dual process. The aim is to open up the organizational boundaries to allow knowledge seep into as well as out of the organization in order for an innovation idea to become materialized or completed. Thus, I would like to discuss the notion of ideas in relation to open innovation.

Chesbrough argues that an organization must overcome the tendency to hoard and hide un-used ideas internally because they are a waste of resources; demoralizing for the staff that created them; they congest the innovation funnel; externalizing them might bring back knowledge of the market; and there is a chance that these ideas might find another way out of the organization (Chesbrough 2006). As such, in the open innovation framework, organizations should seek the externalization of these ideas since un-used ideas carry different organizational risks.

Chesbrough states that the generation of un-used ideas can be explained by a loosely coupled relation between a research department and the business model of an organization. Along the same lines, a different cause for un-used ideas can be that an organization measures productivity of employees or departments based on the number of ideas generated. This measurement mechanism leads to an increasing generation of ideas with a lesser regard of the fit to the business model (ibid). Further, Chesbrough argue that a budgetary disconnection between a R&D unit and the organizations business unit could also be a reason for ideas not being used. Due to different budget mechanisms between the two, a situation could occur where the R&D unit is decoupled from the business unit through the insertion of a buffer between the R&D unit and the business unit where project can be shelved until the business unit is ready to invest in the project's further application within the organization (ibid). This allows for a stockpiling of un-used ideas that are placed on hold in the buffer as the neither the R&D Manager nor the business unit Manager is interested in the idea or can't see the potential of it.

From the argumentation of Chesbrough, an organization can have a great deal of un-used ideas stockpiled and it should seek to externalize the ideas that it doesn't use since the stockpiling of un-used ideas carries risks. However, Chesbrough points to a number of obstacles for the externalization of ideas. E.g. he identifies that organizations can posses a bias towards their own business model that makes the organization believe that if it can't make use of the idea, then nobody can. However, a potential developer might see the nature of the idea as potentially beneficial for his differentiated business model (ibid). Additionally, Chesbrough finds the 'not invented here' syndrome to affect the externalization of un-used ideas. This syndrome signifies an understanding that 'if we don't make use of the idea, then nobody should'. This strategy takes a defensive stand towards external competition by hoarding ideas that will prevent competitors from getting a taste. In this manner, Chesbrough highlights a number of external barriers to overcome for the externalization of an un-used idea.

From my description of the open innovation approach, I have observed how the development of an idea should seek to leverage internal and external knowledge resources. But what if the leveraging and development process cannot be argued to be a solely internal process in an organization? Then, the un-used idea will have to be (to a more-or-less degree) externalized in order to share it with e.g. an external partner with the implication of organizational obstacles to this externalization. There seems to be a need for a micro-level understanding of these leveraging processes and the obstacles involved.

Additionally, the distinction between an un-used and a used idea raise questions of how the progressive development from un-used to used can be described.

In order to illuminate these considerations, I will in the subsequent section introduce an epistemological approach for observing how objects in the world are ascribed meaning and secondly, adopt a micro-level perspective for describing the creation of meaning through network relations. After I have presented this constructivist and epistemological understanding, I will return to the un-used / used distinction and further, I will discuss the discrepancies that exist between the open innovation approach to innovation and the epistemological understanding of meaning in the world.

Since my case for analysis is the struggles over the innovation processes of a competence in an engineering consultancy corporation, I found the below quotation intriguing.

"Innovation processes in service industries have been argued to have special characteristics because of the intangibility of most services and the importance of clients' participation in producing the service." (Leiponen 2006: 239)

It is my intention now to develop a perspective that will allow me to observe, analyze and comment on this intangibility that seem to be an inherent part of knowledge, competence or innovation.

3. ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

In the following chapter, I wish to present the analytical strategy that is to provide the theoretical foundation for answering how BCMG struggle in setting up an open innovation project exemplified by the Urban Development competence. This chapter starts with an introduction to the term 'analytical strategy' followed by an introduction to the theory of science that will present my understanding of society and thus cast the foundation for this thesis. Hereafter follows a presentation of Latour and Callon's ANT analysis that present 'A Sociology of Translation' as the main analytical apparatus of the thesis. Hereafter, I will discuss the open innovation approach and the notion of the used/un-used idea in relation to the theoretical insights from ANT. Hereafter follows a discussion of my ability to draw insightful conclusions based on the theoretical perspectives I have presented. Finally, I present my empirical data and method of analysis.

3.1. Epistemological Approach

The choice of using 'analytical strategy' as heading of this chapter is deliberate as I use it to show my approach to the theory of science. Rather than following an ontological approach to science, I choose to follow the epistemological approach of observing society as it appears before my eyes. By choosing to follow to this approach, I follow Niels Å. Andersen, Professor at the Institute of Management, Politics and Philosophy at Copenhagen Business School, who argues that a new form of questioning society has emerged:

"…a form of questioning that not only question actions within a field but also question the way the field asks, question the emergence of the categories, the problems, the problematics, the arguments, the thematics and the interests." (Andersen 1999: 12)[4].

This change of questioning contains a move from an ontologically oriented approach to science to an epistemologically oriented approach to science. Through an ontological approach, objects are observed with the purpose of producing a true understanding of what that object is. As such, the methodological questions focus on the rules of procedures that must be applied to create a scientific understanding. Hence, the truism of the observed object is not questioned but rather, it is produced (Andersen 1999).

Instead, Andersen argues that an epistemological approach should be adopted that focus on the ways and through which analytical strategies it is possible to achieve an insight that is different from the already given understanding (ibid). As such, this approach operates with an empty ontology. There is no predefined place from where meaning emerges. Everything is essentially empty and only through meaning being ascribed to it can an object be defined. It is thus the task of the sociologist to observe how these empty objects are given a

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[4] All Danish quotations are translated by me as correctly as I am capable of

meaning through the ascriptions of meaning by others. Andersen talks of shifting from first-order-observations of what society is to second-order observations of the positions from where observers observe society.

"Epistemology focuses precisely on observing how the world comes into existence since individuals, organizations or systems observe the surrounding world through certain perspectives that make the world, in the broadest term, appear in certain ways..." (Andersen 1999: 14).

These second-order observations are results of constructs by the sociologist himself. In order for the sociologist to describe from which perspective others observe the world, he needs to construct others observations as objects for own observation (Andersen 1999). Therefore, the term 'analytical strategy' is adopted to borderline the fact that the sociologists construct a strategy for analysis that consists of selection and de-selection of perspectives.

Andersen concludes that *"to design an analytical strategy concerns the shaping of a particular perspective that makes it possible for the surrounding world to appear as consisting of others observations."* (Andersen 1999: 151).

Hence, when I am constructing my analytical strategy, I must be aware of the fact that I could have constructed my analysis differently and as a researcher, I therefore play a fundamental part in what conclusions can be drawn from the empirical data. I will follow up on this point below under 3.6.
Further, I am aware that the choices I make in the following sections as I construct the perspective through which I intend to observe the world are not finite. Rather, the analytical strategy is significant for the conclusions that I am able to make. Based on these considerations of observing the world through second-order-observations, I will, in the following section, present the theory of science upon which this thesis is build.

3.2. Theory of Science

I have chosen to follow the theoretical perspective of Actor Network Theory (ANT) which will allow me to observe the world as consisting of others ascriptions of meanings to objects. ANT was formulated in the 1980ies by the French philosopher, Bruno Latour, the French engineer and sociologist, Michael Callon and the British sociologist, John Law and ANT became through the 1990ies an established and well-proved analytical strategy (Jensen 2005). This following section will present the ANT analysis as a theory of science that takes as an empirical problem, how society is constructed through relations between entities in different situations.

Firstly, I find it necessary to explain the move towards an epistemological approach to the world, upon which Callon, Latour and Law have developed ANT. This move can be ascribed to Thomas Kuhn who, in the book

'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' (1962) breaks with the status of natural sciences as unequivocal facts of nature (Jensen 2005). Kuhn questions this status by arguing that natural science does not recognize nature as it is but rather, that the understanding of nature is governed by certain social and cognitive schemas or paradigms that frames what can be observed and which questions can be proposed (ibid). Kuhn points out that sociological paradigms affect and are involved in the core of scientific processes and, as a consequence, the so-called 'facts of nature' can be questioned (ibid).

Following Kuhn's line of thinking, a series of studies by different sociologists were conducted with the intention of investigating the influence of these sociological paradigms on the scientific works being conducted in different research facilities. Resulting from these studies was a revolutionary picture of how new insights and discoveries by the natural scientists in research facilities were not to be perceived as unequivocal 'facts of nature', i.e. true pictures of how nature is, but rather, these discoveries were depictured as consequences of very complex negotiation processes by the sociologists (ibid).

In the well-known book, Laboratory Life, Bruno Latour and the British sociologist, Steven Woolgar, study the very complex negotiation processes between as different entities as rats, chemicals, test tubes, existing literature, scientists etc. in order to describe how scientific discoveries are made. In their work, they depict the research facility as a factory that transforms material entities into inscriptions through complex translation processes. As a consequence, new scientific insights can no longer be argued to be a fact of nature. Rather, scientific insights appear as networks of relations between entities. The focus, thus, shifts to be on how the relations between the different entities in the research facility create, define, adjust and dissolve scientific objects (Houborg 2006).

3.3.   A Relational Understanding of the World

In Laboratory Life, Latour and Woolgar base their research on a set of theoretical insights that will, in turn, form the theoretical foundation for the formulation of ANT. Their inspiration for this new approach to observing the world as networks of relations between entities originates primarily from two different theoretical understandings.

 Firstly, Latour and Woolgar were inspired by the American pragmatism - and particularly ethnomethodology - where analysis of how order, or more precisely the arrangement of entities, is created out of disorder through local negotiation processes (Jensen 2005). From this, Latour and Woolgar takes forward the insight that the object for analysis is the ordering of entities in a relational network that is constructed through negotiation processes.

Secondly, the concept of semiotics of materiality, as presented by Foucault, is applied, expanded and absorbed into the founding principle of the ANT understanding of the world. Foucault has prior to this, expanded the concept of semiotics from a purely linguistic understanding where all meaning is created through relations between linguistic elements, to semiotics of materiality that also incorporates sociality, materiality and technology. John Law has commented on this expansion by stating that:

"Actor-network theory may be understood as a semiotics of materiality. It takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all materials – and not simply those that are linguistic." (Law 1999, 4)

ANT adopts and implements the semiotic point of relativity on all types of discourses, linguistic as well as non-linguistic and as such, ANT operates with a relational perspective of a network that can consist of any type of entity (technology, a theory, a disease) when the entity takes shape and acquire properties as a result of the relations to other entities in a network. (Jensen 2005). Thus, these entities are not solely of a linguistic character and the field that the discursive practice is ascribed to is thus not only a linguistic field. Hence, the main difference worth noticing is that a discursive practice, from the understanding of semiotics of materiality, does not solely relate to linguistic phenomenons. Rather, it relates to a multiplicity of subjects, objects and meanings where a discourse is ascribed materialism. As Jensen states then *"the assertion of ANT is that no object has an essence inherent in itself. An object is defined in totality by the relations to other objects in the network."* (Jensen 2005: 188)

Through the perspective of ANT, the world appears as heterogeneous networks that are constituted through a complex mix of relations between entities (Jensen 2005). By using ANT as an analytical strategy, new insights can be gained into how scientific 'facts', concepts or technologies are constituted. Thus, ANT focuses on analyzing scientific-technological projects where numerous stakeholders, participants, users, components, structures etc. partake in a network that fight for the 'constitutive power' to determine how an object in question is defined. This power to define an object results from complex and continuous negotiation processes. The winner of the battle over ascribing and securing meaning is the network that is able to stabilize a set of relations through association of the largest set of linked together elements (Callon and Latour 1981).

In the following, I will conceptualize the understandings of the network and the actor concepts that in the ANT perspective differ significantly from the 'normal' sociological understanding and can be observed as the kernel for the ANT.

3.3.1. Network

Jensen (2005) differentiates ANT from any other theory of networks. He states that:

"Like any other theory of networks, ANT analyzes entities and relations. But the ANT-distinctive theory of entities (the so-called actors) and the relations of ANT (the so-called translations) give a particular conceptualization of a network that is different from any other theory of networks which again offers a unique analytical strategy." (Jensen 2005: 188)

Networks, in the ANT understanding, are open. They are based on the semiotic point of relativity, taken from ethnomethodology and semiotics of materialism, and implemented on all types of discourses, linguistic as well as non-linguistic. Hence, ANT operates with a relational network perspective that can consist of any type of entity (technology, a theory, a disease) when the entity takes shape and acquire properties as a result of the relations to other entities in the network. (Jensen 2005). Further, there is no premise that outlines the size of the network; no particular type of stability is needed nor is there no premise that networks consist of one type of relations. On the contrary, ANT deals with heterogeneous networks, i.e. networks that persist of many different types of relations and as such, are open in the most radical understanding (ibid).

This focus on relations between entities from the human and non-human worlds has been termed 'generalized symmetry'. The concept of general symmetry functions as a mechanism that makes it possible to describe networks of relations between entities from the human and the non-human worlds (Houborg 2006). Houborg states that:

"The relations being analyzed are, thus, not solely of 'social' character and thus, 'the social' is not viewed as something that primarily is created or manifested through social interaction and social structures but as a multitude of interactions between many different kinds of 'things' of human or non-human, discursive or non-discursive characters." (Houborg 2006: 156).

Following from this is that social order consists of networks of relations between 'things', or in ANT vocabulary, 'entities' or 'actors'. Hence, the actors play a vital role in the network since it is the networks of relations between them that define the roles, identities and functions of the actors. Therefore, the following section will focus on conceptualizing the ANT understanding of the actor.

3.3.2.   Actor

ANT is a theory of networks that focus especially on the definition of actors and formation of relations between them. The actor concept is of a relational character because the actor is defined through its relations to other entities in the network. Based on the logic of general symmetry, ANT operates with a semiotic actor concept where the actor is defined not from what it is but from what it does (Jensen 2006). Thus, the central element is how agency is distributed in the actor network. Houborg point this out when he comment on how actors are found. He states that:

"…actors are found by studying how different roles are distributed among the different actors/entities (human beings, animals, spirits, tools, natural objects, emotions, thoughts) that take part in the story." (Houborg 2006: 157).

And Jensen contributes by stating that *"a semiotic actor is that which can be ascribed agency which literally can be anything"* (Jensen 2005: 189).

This definition of an actor as a position in a network to which agency is ascribed follows the epistemological approach to the world since there is no core inherent in the actor definition from where agency flows (Jensen 2005). An actor, in ANT understanding, is a semiotic definition, i.e., something that acts or something to which agency is ascribed by others.

The concept of the semiotic actor allows for analyses of stories – also called 'actor worlds'. An 'actor world' is a story that connects all actors to one another; it defines their identities, roles and mutual relations (Houborg 2006). Latour argues, according to Houborg, that when an entity appears in an actor world it is to be considered as a mediator. A mediator does not have a meaning in itself but is ascribed meaning through the relations it is involved in. As a mediator of meaning, an actor in a network speaks on the behalf of other entities that participate in the constituting network of the actor itself. When agency is ascribed to the actor by its constituting network, the actor is defined in terms of identity, role and function. Hence, the actor becomes a spokesman on behalf of its network by borrowing power from its entities to speak on their behalf. This constituting network that ascribes power to a spokesman is what ANT has termed a black box. As Jensen argues:

"Actors are networks that from a given perspective have reached a level of stability and thus appear as a black box, i.e. a defined entity that react predictably to certain inputs but whose inner mechanisms are invisible to the observer." (Jensen 2005, 189).

The social order of a black box surrounding an actor is a fragile construct and it is a constant battle to secure the continuous stability of the black box through enrollment into and exclusion of entities from the network that makes out the actor black box. Latour points out that to build a black box, two things are needed. Firstly, it is necessary to enroll others and secondly, it is necessary to control them so that what they borrow and spread out remains more or less the same (Latour 1987). As Latour puts it, then a black box *"turn a gathering of forces into a whole that then may be used to control the behavior of the enrolled groups."* (Latour 1987: 131).

This gathering of forces is ascribed to a spokesman that can be viewed as the centre of power in the network since the actor has emerged from the network as the winner. Latour states that:

"The spokespersons able to talk on behalf of new and invisible actors are now the linchpins on which the balance of power rests…" (Latour 1987: 127).

Therefore, from the perspective of ANT, in order to understand how a spokesman emerges, we need to study the relations that make it possible for the spokesperson to speak on behalf of its black-box network. Only then is it possible to understand the power relations that the network is build on. Latour agues that power *"…is something that has to be obtained by enrolling many actors..."* (Latour 1986: 271). Following

Latour, an analysis of an object in the world needs to focus on how actors are enrolled in a network and as I have mentioned previously, how a spokesman is ascribed meaning through complex negotiation processes with other actors.

In the following, I wish to describe how these spokesmen can be observed to be relational network constructions build by enrolled entities through a series of translations.

3.4. A Sociology of Translation

The purpose of a translations analysis is to describe the relations of an actor-network in order to identify i.e. which techniques are used to hold entities in place; how an actor is ascribed power; how certain entities are recruited as allies in a network over others; how some networks achieve higher levels of stability than other that collapse. In general terms, ANT deals with the question of how some entities become spokesmen on behalf of others (Jensen 2005).

"By translation, we understand all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion, and violence, thanks to which an actor or force takes… authority to speak or act on behalf of another actor or force." (Callon and Latour 1981: 279).

Callon (1986) has conducted an ANT analysis in which he uses the notion of translation to analyze how three scientists become spokesmen of a network through a translation of the identities, roles and interests of scallops, fishermen and a scientific community. Through their translations of entities, the scientists achieve a position of power since they have won the right to define the other entities in their network and thus they are able to speak on behalf of their constituting entities in the network. In Callon's own words, translation is:

"…the mechanism by which the social and natural worlds progressively take form. The result is a situation in which certain entities control others. Understanding what sociologists generally call power relationships mean describing the way in which actors are defined, associated, and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances." (Callon 1986: 225)

By the notion of translation, the processes through which an actor acquires the strength to speak on behalf of its constituting entities in an actor network can be described and as such, a description of the power attributions through which the actor is ascribed the right to speak on behalf of others emerges.

To exemplify, then a watch can be described as a spokesman that is constructed through a set of complex relations between science, technology, materials and human conceptualization of time. The watch stands out as a stabile, trustworthy and powerful actor. The watch can exert power over me by telling me that I have to hurry up if I do not want to be late for my train. In this way, the watch can control my actions.

However, the power of the watch can be broken. Let us imagine that one of the constituting entities that make up the network of the watch fails (i.e. a dead battery; mechanical failure; the change of daily hours to 25, how unlikely this might seem), then the watch fails in performing its function of showing me the correct time, and if this occurs, the constituting network collapse and the before quite powerful watch is devaluated to an untrustworthy, corrupted and useless shell that have no influence or control over my actions. The network collapse because the watch fails in keeping its entities locked in place.

As the example of the watch goes to illustrate, the stability of a network is never given, no matter how strong and stable they might appear. Jensen refers to that the winners of the networks are standing on feet of clay (Jensen 2005). He concludes that *"every time an entity make out the result of a process of translation and in that way increases in strength, some form of diversion, exploitation or abuse takes place that makes the captured position fragile."* (Jensen 2005: 191). The world is a battleground where the social order must be won and won again (ibid).

Returning to Callon's study of the scientists, he identifies four moments that mark the progression of a series of translations that serve to stabilize a certain meaning in a network (Callon 1986). Callon firstly identifies a prime actor through which he examines the development of the *"simultaneous production of knowledge and construction of a network in which social and natural entities mutually control who they are and what they want."* (Callon 1986: 208ff). In the following, I will outline the four moments of translation that Callon has identified.

3.4.1. First Moment of Translation – Problematization

First moment in the translation process is for the researcher to identify which actor is the primum movens of the story he wishes to tell. Callon's study follows three scientists in their quest for addressing the rapid decline of the supply of scallops in a bay in France. The three scientists formulate questions that, from their experience of a Japanese experiment, seem to be the focal point for solving the declining supply of scallops. Besides these questions that are raised in scientific papers and articles, the scientists further determine a set of actors, their identities, interests and functions. Hence, the scientists outline who they perceive as important actors to the problem of the declining supply of scallops and they define why each of the actors must be interested in the formulated questions that the scientists raise which, if resolved, should solve the depletion problem of scallops in the bay.

Callon terms this double movement of raising questions that will answer the problem and simultaneously defining actors that play a part in the problem of declining supply of scallops, for 'problematization' (Callon 1986).

According to Callon, the scientists establish this problematization in such a way as to establish themselves an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships that they are building between the identified actors and by doing do, the scientists makes themselves indispensable to the network.

Callon argues that each actor that has been identified in the problematization has a free choice. Either to accept the integration into the problematization or to refuse it by defining the identity, the goals, projects, orientations, motivations, or interests in a different manner (ibid). Additionally, Callon stresses the important observation that the scientists include themselves into the problematization by also identifying who they are and what they want.

If the scientists are successful in their problematization, a relation will be established by the tree scientists where a single question is enough to involve a series of actors by establishing their identities and the relations among them.

3.4.1.1. Obligatory Passage Point

The scientists raise a single question that becomes a point that all actors must want to connect to in order to achieve their own individually defined goals. This point, Callon terms Obligatory Passage Point (OPP). The OPP is constructed by the three scientists in a way that connects all the actors involved in the problematization to the scientists' single question.

In his study, Callon points to the fact that the actors are fettered. They cannot reach their individual goal by themselves because they are confronted with a series of obstacles to achieve these. Therefore, the actors face a choice. Either they accept the problematization put forward by the three scientists and thereby shifting the actor away from its original goal towards wanting to solve the scientists' question or the actor refuse the problematization and face the troubles of still not achieving what it desires. The actors must recognize that entering in an alliance to resolve the scientists' problematization can benefit each of them (Callon 1986). Hence, Callon concludes that:

"…the problematization possesses certain dynamic properties; it indicates the movement and detours that must be accepted as well as the alliances that needs to be forged… For… [the] *actors the alternative is clear; either one changes direction or one recognizes the need to study and obtain results...*[to answer the problematization]. [hence] *the problematization describes a system of alliances, or associations, between entities, thereby defining the identity and what they 'want'."* (Callon 1986: 211)

It is important here to mention that the problematization cannot be described as a 'fact' that must be answered in order to solve all the problems for the actors. The problematization and the OPP are constructs created by the three scientists and can be described as a hunch or a hypothesis proposed by the three scientists on how the problem of the declining scallops is resolved. This problematization can be challenged, adapted or refused at a later stage (Jensen 2005) which is also to be the case in Callon's study.

3.4.2. Second Mode of Translation – Interessement

So far, the identity of the defined actors (role, goals, functions, interests) exists only as a hypothesis, proposed by the scientists in scientific papers. The identities have yet to be tested in reality. Hence, the scene is set of a series of trials of strengths whose outcome will determine the solidity of the scientists' problematizations (Callon 1986).

It is important at this point to clarify that my description of the moments in a translation process should not be understood to be a static process but rather, it is an ongoing process in which negotiations between entities are continuous. As such, the problematization as proposed by the scientists will never be fully closed. It can always be refused.

This negotiation process starts by the interessement of the actors included in the problematization. The interests of the actors involved in the problematization are effects of interessement which Callon defines as *"the group of actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilize the other actors it defines through its problematizations."* (Callon 1986: 212). Hence, the scientists try to join forces with the actors and establish an alliance between them all. Latour comments on interessement by adding that *"translating interests means at once offering new interpretations of these interests and channeling people in different directions."* (Latour 1987: 117).

As I have noted above, then the problematization can never be 'true'. There will always be competing definitions from outside the alliance of the actors involved. Interessement should be understood in this sense. In the understanding of the word 'inter-esse', Callon talks of being interposed between 'something'. And this 'something' is the competing problematizations to the scientists' problematization. From this follows that by interesting others, the scientists build devices that will cut of the ties of the interested actors to other competing problematizations that wish to define the identities of the actors in different manners (Callon 1986).

The three scientists try, through interessement devices, to cut all connections between the actors to other competing problematizations. The properties and identities of the actors are consolidated and/or redefined during the process of interessement and as such, the actors are a result of the associations that link them to the scientists (ibid). Interessement devices are strategies or mechanisms that extend and materialize the problematization put in place to secure the interessement of the actors. These devices can take the shape of physical things, strategies, brute force, seduction or simple solicitation. The types of devices are unlimited. Anything goes as Callon puts is (ibid).

The scientists divert the actors away from their original interest and towards the OPP through the problematization, interessement and with the assistance of interessement devices. The interessement helps corner the actors, since in order for the actors to achieve their goals they must divert towards and pass

through the OPP, constructed by the scientists. And if the scientists successfully divert all the actors, they will accomplish their mission of interesting actors in their problematization and their OPP, i.e. the rapid decline of supply of scallops in the bay. Hence, if this interessement is successful it *"confirms (more or less completely) the validity of the problematizations and the alliances it implies."* (Callon 1986: 215).

However, no matter how powerful an interessement device is, success is not granted. It does not automatically lead to alliances. Therefore, the next moment of translation is to enroll the interested actors into an alliance.

3.4.3.   Third Moment of Translation – Enrollment

Enrollment should be understood as a long row of translations that transform the initial interessements of the actors into actual participation in order to ensure the stability of the newly-constructed network. Enrollment signifies a broad array of techniques that make actors fulfill a particular role. In the words of Callon, enrollment *"…designates the device by which a set of interrelated roles is defined and attributed to actors who accept them. To describe enrollment is thus to describe the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength, and tricks that accompany the interessements and enable them to succeed."* (Callon 1986: 216). Callon talks of negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that is used by the three researchers in order to secure the success of the interessements that they have put up.

In order to exemplify, allow me to return for a moment to the example of the watch above that did not show me the correct time. When I purchased the watch, I was enrolled in an intricate network of relations, constructed by the manufacturer of the watch. The watch thus stands out as a spokesman resting on a black box of complex sets of relations between different entities in a network. The manufacturer of the watch has constructed an actor-network that is hidden from my view in the black box. Through a problematization of me as a consumer (my identity) that doesn't want to be late (my interest), the manufacturer have interested me in their watch. Since I chose to purchase their watch over another type or brand, some sort of interessement device has been put in place (i.e. through marketing material, economic rationale, technical performance) to entice me into buying that particular watch. And as I choose to purchase their watch, I am enrolled into the manufacturer's actor network.

Similarly to my enrollment, the manufacturer has enrolled a number of different technical components, each with a problematization that defines identity, function and interest. To take, as an example, the interest of the battery, then it is far from similar to my interest of not wanting to be late. Rather, the interest of the battery could be to provide power to a circuit. And the interest of the glass in the watch – not similar to mine or the battery – could be to be transparent, thereby reflecting 'reality' underneath the glass whilst protecting against water and filth. As such, all the entities of the watch are problematized, interested and enrolled and the complex sets of relations between the entities in the network of the watch are, as mentioned, hidden in a black box that I have no insight into since I posses only very limited technical or mechanical knowledge of how the complex relations of the components of the watch are established. Furthermore, the technical

components have been interested through the interessement devices put in place by the manufacturer through the physical violence of placing them tightly together in the casing of the watch. The only way for the manufacturer to keep all the entities enrolled in the network is by diverting them away from their original interests and towards the OPP of the manufacturer. Together, the watch as a network of relations betweeb technical components and me are diverted through an OPP that answers the question – What is the correct time now?

This enrollment that is constructed by the manufactures creates a favorable balance of power where the watch becomes a spokesman on behalf of the network and can thus control all actions – including mine. I am, together with the entities of the watch, enrolled in the alliance that focuses on what the correct time is now. As such, the watch becomes a powerful spokesman that can control action.

However, as I previously mentioned, this stable network of the watch can be corrupted if one of the entities in the network becomes diverted from the OPP of showing the correct time. Say, for instance, that the battery of the watch suddenly refuses, for whatever reason, the identity and purpose it is offered in its problematization and stops submitting power to a circuit. By diverting away from its problematization, the battery corrupts the entire network upon which the watch rests. When the mechanical components of the watch stops working as a result of the lack of power, the glass is also diverted from the OPP of showing the correct time, to again only being transparent and protective and I am diverted from the OPP of the correct time, to *How am I going to get to work on time?' The entire network breaks down due to the breakout from the problematization by one actor in the network. Similarly, the network breaks down the second my interest in the correct time is diverted towards finding the right time in Australia. Then, due to the time difference, the watch – as a network build around showing the correct time at present – breaks down and becomes a useless unit that I have no use for (until at least I learn what the time difference between Denmark and Australia is).

This example goes to show the extremely complex set of translations and negotiations that the manufacturer of the watch is involved in with technical components, science, human needs and demands etc. Hence, it is the manufacturer's job to negotiate all the obstacles of enrollment of the actors in order to secure the success of the network he is constructing.

Callon shows, in his study, how the scallops are enrolled through negotiations with currents in the ocean, the larvae, the predators of the larvae etc. Callon argues that there are many different ways of enrollment like physical violence, seduction, transaction, consent. As the example of the watch goes to show, the definitions and distributions of roles are a result of multilateral negotiations during which the identity of the actors is determined and tested (Callon 1986).

This leads me toward the question of who speaks in the name of the entities in the network? Who represents whom? These are crucial questions to answer if the scientists' project is to succeed (ibid). These questions focus on the relationship between the spokesman and the entities that ascribe meaning and power through

their relations to the spokesman. Callon terms this issue mobilization and it is the fourth and final mode of translation.

3.4.4. Fourth Mode of Translation – Mobilization

The watch represents the capacity of the manufacturer to negotiate the interessements of all the entities that play a part in the watch. One of the important actors is the people that are going to purchase the watch. Through the development phase, a market segment is selected and the manufacturer negotiates the interessement of the market segment through a handful of individuals that represents all the uncountable others that are included in the segment. A few individuals have been interested in the name of the masses they represent (or at least claim to represent) and the selected representatives stand out and raise their voices on behalf of the masses. The real question to answer now is whether the masses will follow their representatives. This is how mobilization is to be understood. The securing of a coupling between the spokesman and the masses for which is spoken (Jensen 2005). In my example of the watch, the ultimate spokesman can be said to be the watch. The watch manages, through a progressive enrollment of the aforementioned actors, to create a chain of intermediaries *"who render the…propositions credible and indisputable by forming alliances and acting as a unit of force."* (Callon 1986: 220).

The mobilization process is one of displacement. To mobilize is to displace as Callon puts it. In the beginning of the construction of the watch, the battery, glass, the market segment representatives and me as a customer (including all other entities that make out the black box of the watch) are all widely distributed. At the end when I purchase the watch, the watch defines who the entities are and what they want. In the words of Callon, who has very elegantly put it:

"Through the designation of the successive spokesmen and the settlement of a series of equivalences, all these actors are first displaced and then reassembled at a certain time at a particular time. This mobilization or concentration has a definite physical reality which is materialized through a series of displacements." (Callon 1986: 221).

Through a translation analysis, I am able to observe that the groups of entities in whose name the spokesmen speak are elusive, hidden from view in a black box (Callon 1986). The constitution of an ultimate spokesman is not to be seen as a beginning of a process. Rather it is a final result of a complex series of negotiations between entities. The success of the watch as a spokesman depends completely on the solidity of all the actors who negotiate their representativity and their identity with the masses that they represent. As I have already shown, the network, however stabile it might seem, can never be understood as rock solid. There exists an inherent risk of a breakdown of the constellation due to entities in the constellation breaking free from the enrollment into the network. The entities are offered a way out of the network by a different problematization and when they abandon the constellation, it falls to the ground like a house of cards. Therefore "*in order to grow we must enroll other wills by translating what they want and by reifying this*

translation in such a way that none of them can desire anything else any longer." (Callon and Latour 1981: 296)

I have now described, through the four moments of translation how objects in the world can be observed as results of negotiations about the representativity of the spokesmen. If consensus is achieved, the margins for maneuver of each entity in the black box of an object will be tightly delimited (Callon 1986). Hence, a constraining network of relations – an actor-network – has been established through the described moments of translations that were initiated by a set of problematizations with hypothesis on identity, roles and goals of different to-be enrolled entities (ibid). As such, ANT and 'A Sociology of Translation' operate with heterogenic networks, constructed by a coupling of many different entities. As a consequence, an object cannot be viewed as the determinant of development nor can it be viewed as a social construction. (Jensen 2005). Rather it is a result of numerous specific and varied connections – a network of mobilized actors.

Having now described how objects are ascribed a meaning in the ANT perspective, I would like to return to the previous discussion of open innovation in order to distinguish the two different perspectives on approach to observing objects in the world.

3.5. Open Innovation in the ANT Perspective

With the ANT-understanding of how objects in the world become objects of meaning, I wish firstly to contrast the open innovation approach to the ANT understanding. Secondly, I intend to put into perspective, the Chesbrough distinction of the un-used/used organizational idea and to comment on the process of moving from 'un-used' to 'used'. Finally, I wish to briefly touch upon how the notion of competences can be understood when adopting the ANT understanding of the world.

Open innovation and ANT take significantly distinct approaches to understanding objects in the world. In the epistemological perspective that ANT represents, no object exist with an inherent, predefined truth, meaning or understanding. The meaning of an object is ascribed through the relations that it is involved in and because these relations fluctuate, so does the meaning of the object. As such, every object (e.g. an organization) should be observed as inherently empty where the meaning and understanding of 'organization' is up for discussion. It is debatable, negotiable and thus instable and fluctuating. By adopting this epistemological relational network understanding of objects as inherently empty shells to which meaning freely flows where no restraining borders for network size or structure exist and where focus is directed towards relations between actors in networks, it would be ambiguous to describe innovation in terms of openness or closed-ness, internal or external, inside or outside an organization. Ambiguous because the open innovation perspective places the organizational border between the internal and external environment as 'fact' or point of anchorage for observing innovation. This border of the organization is taken as an unequivocal fact of an organization when describing innovation which goes against the epistemological understanding of objects in the world to which I adhere. In the ANT perspective, I direct attention to the

social fabrication of tasks, structures, technologies, competences and knowledge by the actors who participate in the construction of these elements. This signifies that discussing innovation in terms of open or closed breaks with the epistemological approach.

The ANT perspective that I have developed can also help me to dig deeper into the distinction used/un-used ideas that I have described previously. By disregarding Chesbrough's observation of externalizing un-used ideas to focus on how the idea is framed as un-used, I can gain an insight into the innovation processes that is involved in developing an un-used idea to a used idea. From an ANT perspective, the used idea can be understood to consist of a stabilized network of relations. The un-used idea (e.g. an idea of a new competence) becomes a used idea when a stabile actor network is constructed that ascribe a certain meaning and a position of power to the competence. At first, the idea exists as a less stabilized network to which some actors are enrolled. However, in order for the idea to become used, it must grow and ensure a further stabilization by enrolling and mobilizing of all significant actors that will allow for the un-used idea to become used. The stabilization and the growth of the un-used actor network are achieved by translating the wills and powers of actors through the above-described four moments of translations. When a network achieves the enrollment of all significant actors to the un-used idea's OPP and locks all the significant actors into position and mobilizes the masses that the actors represent, the meaning inherent in the un-used idea will be displaced from un-used towards used. It is through the progressive translations of wills and powers of actors that the un-used idea can travel from a position of un-used towards a position of used. In this perspective, innovation deals with the development of un-used ideas to become used ideas. And the processes for this and the ideas themselves are 'nothing more' than more-or-less stabilized actor network relations.

By adopting the network approach for understanding the creation of meaning, I follow the same constructionist approach as Christiansen and Varnes (2007) who, as I described in the introduction, argue that knowledge is created through the construction of strong networks that are able to present themselves as 'facts' in the organization that bring forward a certain meaning to be utilized by other organizational actions (e.g. innovation).

The ANT perspective can also be applied to Leonard-Barton's discussion of core competences. Competences become in this perspective spokesmen that are constituted on black-box networks of actors. This black box is hidden out of view in the everyday practices that make use of competences and a competence becomes, as Leonard-Barton articulated, a taken-for-granted reality. The intrinsic nature of core competences is not questioned in the everyday normal work practices and the competence becomes a spokesman that allows an organizational action to mobilize its constituting network. By enrolling this taken-for-granted reality in an organizational action, the flip-side of competences – the core rigidities - are also enrolled and mobilized. These rigidities bring forward controversies and as such, these controversies can be understood as a dark hole of organizational operations.

3.6. Concluding Ability

Based on the theoretical presentations and discussions above, I would now like to briefly comment on my ability to draw conclusions. As I mentioned in the section about the epistemological approach to viewing objects in the world, meaning is ascribed through a network of relations between actors. Thus, the focus for my analysis of the innovation struggles in BCMG will not consider innovation, knowledge, actors, or any other objects in terms of internal/external, open/closed, but in terms of network relations between actors based on their observations of the reality in which they participate. When they observe the world as internal/external, it is observations that they build on their understanding of how the reality in which they participate is. The relational understanding of objects in the world and the sociology of translation allow me to translate others' observations into relations and networks that potentially can bring forward a new understanding of innovation process struggles in an organization.

It will not be my objective to answer questions of why the 'to-be-enrolled' actors participate in the development of the Urban Development competence or to cast light on the 'right' definition of the to-be-developed competence. Instead, I intend to tell a story of how a desire for a new competence becomes the centre controversies. This story will illuminate how different actors are introduced into the story, the attempts of enrollment, fixation in the network and the breaking loose of actors from their network ties. Thus, I will be able to explain how the desire for a new competence becomes a centre for the creation of a network, how the network emerges and evolves and how it is corrupted due to the unsuccessful negotiation of controversies.

Finally, I need to clarify that the objective of this thesis is not to give a finite and true understanding of the rise and fall of the innovation of a new organizational competence. Through my epistemological approach to the world, production of insight does not focus on producing one true understanding. Through the choices I have made in my analytical strategy, I am constructing the object for my analysis. Thus, I play a pivotal part in constructing what I am trying to observe. I am also aware of that through selecting my empirical data, I am constructing the observations that I identify in my analysis. Thus, my conclusions are contingent on my observations of the empirical material. Hence, it is not only the actors that are privileged as the constructors of realty. As a researcher, I enter into collaboration with the actors where I, by describing what unfolds, participate in construction a new reality (Houborg 2006). The choice of problem arena is strictly connected to the analytical strategy that I have chosen and I am scientifically obliged to reflect over the limitations that my choices carry with them in terms of my ability to draw conclusions.

3.7. Delimitations and Empirical Considerations

3.7.1. Empirical Data

My empirical material spans across a time period of one year and eight months. The earliest that I have been able to retrace documents relating to the introduction of urban development as a new competence in BCMG, is to March, 2008. This fits with what I learned through interviews, that the CEO of BCMG has her conversation with the former Director (as described in the introduction) in the beginning of 2008.

The reason for this vagueness of the precise time of the CEO conversation is that I, during my empirical works, experienced significant resistance towards my research. I was from the start introduced to the individuals assigned to assist in the Urban Development competence project and I took part in an Urban Development meeting. However, after a couple of interviews were conducted with some of the individuals involved in the introduction of the urban development, I was refused by a senior level manager to conduct further research, arguing that the strategic significance of the new competence was not something to be disclosed. As such, the door was slammed in my face. After a substantial period with no access, a member of the executive board who had learned of the situation promised me full insight into the Urban Development competence operations. However, at this point in time, I had already reacted to the situation by redefined the objective of the thesis and time did not allow for further in-depth studies. Further, the slamming of the door only inspired me further to understand what was at stake and why promises of discretion and anonymity on my part not were sufficient for carrying on with my study. I was successful in conduction a couple more interviews with central individuals out of their goodwill toward me but no senior-level managers were available to me.

Due to the lack of access, I changed my focus from my planned approach of observing meetings and interaction among key individuals and I redeveloped my analytical strategy in a manner that would allow me to make use of the already collected material in a different manner than I originally had planned. The interviews I had managed to conduct were at this point insufficient to draw significant conclusions upon but fortunately, I stumbled upon the folder with materials related to the competence project was saved and I managed to tap this vital source for information. I was able to acquire meeting minutes, various business plans, strategic papers, various memos, various power points, intranet articles etc.
The written documents that I collected represent the time period from 26th march, 2008 until 19th October, 2009. I have based the specific date of the specific documents on the last date the documents (as computer files) were saved which is significant for which episode in the innovation progress of the Urban Development competence that the individual document can represent.

The interviews mentioned above were conducted during August 2009 with six key individuals who are identified to have played a role in the innovation processes in other interviews and in the collected materials. Due to the lack of access to conduct empirical work, I have guaranteed the interviewees full anonymity and

therefore, the interviewees are referred to as Interviewee A, Interviewee B, Interviewee C, Interviewee J, Interviewee M and Interviewee S (the letters represent simply the order in which the interviewees are introduced as actors in the first interview I conducted). This anonymization has helped, I believe, to get the interviewees to speak more freely about the operations that they have been involved in.

Due to the necessary change of analytical strategy described earlier, I collected the abovementioned documents after the interviews were conducted and I was therefore not in a position to direct questions based on the information from the documents. Actually, 'collection' of data is not a precise terming in the context of ANT. Data is not collected but it is generated through practices that involve many different actors, including me as a researcher and the researched. Data is generated through a translation that shape 'things' differently and make them actors in the realization of my story (Houborg PowerPoint). An example could be the interviews that I conducted. Here, oral representations of the actors' observations are translated into an audio file through the black box of a dictaphone. The audio file is then translated through the black box of transcription to a written document. Hence, the data are results of translation processes and must be understood as my own constructions of reality.

What is essential here for me to state is that I am open to the stories that the interviews contain (Houborg 2006) and I have attempted to construct my empirical data to the best of my ability. The first parts of the interviews are fully transcribed and the second part is not. The reason for this is the change analytical strategy described earlier where I was previously intended to identify metaphors, figurative language etc. used by my interviewees. The objective now is to tell the story of the struggles that occurred during the innovation process and as such, I have listened to the interviews and transcribed central elements that assist me in telling the story most precisely.

My empirical data material thus consists of a mixture of interviews and documents that all tell a part of the story of the Urban Development competence which Houborg argues is a perfectly acceptable approach to conduct an ANT analysis upon. *"It is, of cause, also possible to ground one's analysis on data material generated through combinations of different kinds of methods* [interview, documentary material, participatory observation]" (Houborg 2006: 166).

3.7.2. Method

The interviews I conducted were all based on an interview guide with the purpose of semi-structuring the interview as proposed by Steiner Kvale (1996). By using an interview guide, I have framed the topic for the interview that would allow me to acquire information that is relevant for me while simultaneously allowing the interviewees to take control of the topic in question and to guide me into unknown territory that could potentially benefit my analysis with new insights. As I have mentioned above, the empirical data I acquire through my interviews are constructs in which I play a part (Kvale 1996).

In terms of the carrying out my analysis, I have found inspiration on how to approach my empirical data from different sources. Firstly, I adhere to the 'Rules of Method' as presented by Latour (1987). In order to determine the objectivity of the urban development competence process, I will observe the innovation process as transformations in the hands of others rather than looking after an intrinsic quality in the competence or process itself (Latour 1987). In order to observe the settlement of a controversy, I will observe the symmetrical efforts of enrolling human and non-human resources towards its resolution (ibid). Furthermore, I have found inspiration in the descriptive and narrative approach to conducting an analysis in the way that Callon conduct his study of the before-mentioned scientists and scallops. Just like Callon, I have chosen to follow my empirical data which tells the story of urban progressively.

I will open my analysis by mapping the situation that I am about to describe by observing how the new competence idea of the CEO becomes an OPP construction around which human and non-human entities are to be enrolled in a network and thus how the actors are constituted to play a part in the innovation process of urban development competence. Through observing how the OPP of the CEO becomes the constitutional foundation of a network of relations between different actors, I can now start describing the relations among these actors. By combining the actors with others and by specifying the characteristics of the relations among them, I will able to determine the most significant actors that are observed to be significant for the resolution of the CEO's OPP. Thus, instances of controversies appear from the founding nature of the CEO's OPP and the problematization of the situation. A black box is created as a result of the CEO's OPP and the output of this black box is controversies.

I will unfold, describe and convey the story of controversies as results of turning urban development into a organizational competence. I will draw up a frontline where battles are fought of the right to ascribe meaning to the situation.

As will become apparent in my analysis, the attempts at turning urban development into a competence lead to four different mobilization attempts from the beginning of 2008 until the autumn of 2009. I will describe how each mobilization can be observed as a particular episode in which a constituted network attempts to enroll and mobilize different actors to solve an OPP. Each time, the dark hole of controversy brings the mobilization attempt to fail by constructing competing displacements that divert the to-be-mobilized actors away from the OPP. The intended network collapse and build on the rubble of the previous network, a new one arises and a new mobilization is attempted with a new interessement and enrollment of actors. Thus, the urban development competence changes meaning throughout the progressive mobilization and displacement attempts because the controversies force the actors to reconstruct the defining network anew.

4. THE BLACK HOLE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Based on my analytical strategy and theoretical discussion, it is my intention to answer:

How does BCMG struggle in setting up an open innovation project exemplified by the Urban Development competence?

As such, I will in my analysis of the innovation process of turning urban development into an organizational competence focus on the struggles that BCMG face and describe the negotiation of these struggles or controversies.

The analysis is constructed around four central episodes that I will argue can be observed to unfold in my empirical material. I have identified central documents that represent these four different episodes in my empirical material.

First episode is centered on:

- The construction of an OPP that can be identified as a constituting force for the construction of a network - the Urban Group.

Second episode is centered on:

- The 'project' as an actor is translated by the Urban Group as necessary to enroll in order to ensure that the OPP from the first episode is resolved.

The third episode (summarized in the discussion) is centered on:

- Displacement of the previous Urban Group through the attempts at enrolling the 'Client' as an actor to in order to resolve the OPP.

An initiation of a possible fourth episode (summarized in the discussion):

- A displacement of the previous enrollment attempts can be observed and some of the controversies from previous episodes are directly articulated. I argue that this displacement could be the beginning of a fourth episode, still with the same original OPP from episode one.

These four episodes will function as the structure for my analysis. My description of how the OPP from episode one is translated will be the progressive focus through each episode. This allows me to describe the construction of actor networks and the controversies the different networks face as they attempt to negotiate the controversies that arise from the progressive innovation process. As I initiate my analysis, I will start by observing how the initial idea of the CEO of making urban development a competence is translated to become an OPP upon which the Urban Group emerges. Thus, I will describe firstly, the construction of the Urban Group.

4.1. The First Episode - the Urban Group

The first episode will see the construction of the Urban Group that is constructed by a translation of the CEO's wish to make urban development an organizational competence. Firstly, I will describe how an OPP of the CEO constitutes the Urban Group's construction. Then, I will discuss the interessement of an Urban Group Manager. Hereafter, I will describe and discuss how BCMG competences become a centre for controversy and how the following attempts of negotiating this controversy leads to another controversy over definitions. Again, this controversy is negotiated with an attempt to displace the 'old ways' of working in BCMG. B ut firstly, let's turn the attention to the construction of the OPP by the CEO.

4.1.1. The Obligatory Passage Point of the CEO

The very first document that represents the beginning of my empirical material, titled URBAN DEVELOPMENT (UD, 26/3, 2008), can be observed to function as a problematization of the introduction of the urban development competence into BCMG. This document establishes the relation between itself and the Board of Directors of BCMG in the first line in the introduction. It states that *"the Board of Directors of BCMG has decided to expand the portfolio competences with services related to urban development/city development."* (UD).

In these very first lines, the document defines who the primum movens of making Urban Development a competence are and thus place urban development into the organizational context. The power relations of this to-be-constructed competence are constituted as a result of the translation of the will of the Management, represented by the CEO, who wants the competence introduced into the organizational portfolio. The document becomes a representation of the will of the CEO who is responsible for setting the organizational wheels in motion. However, the document does not reveal how this translation has occurred. All that I can observe is that the CEO has translated her original idea to become the will of the board of Directors. She has created an OPP to which the CEO has interested different actors (i.e. the other board members) that will assist in the resolution of it. I will argue that the OPP of the CEO is: We must expand the portfolio competence to include urban development.

The 'we' part in the OPP can be argued to be the problematization of the entire organization as an actor. However, how the organization resolves the OPP is not described. Thus, let's turn the attention to how the CEO's OPP becomes a question of interesting organizational actors to participate.

4.1.2. Interessement of the Urban Group Manager

In one of my interviews I learned that *"the initiative* [the OPP] *ended up in BYG[5]… they took the lead and PF[6] made an Urban Group with participants from the entire organization."* (Interviewee A) and in another interview, I was told that *"a number of cross-competence initiatives were stared… and the most memorable is the Urban Group… which was to be rooted in one place. BYG was given Urban…"* (Interviewee S).

The OPP of the CEO is translated by the interviewees as being a 'cross-competence initiative' and being a group that 'ended up' in the BYG competence division with a Manager in charge of gathering the group. Thus, the Urban Group is observed to be a cross-competence group that span across every divisional competence of BCMG, rooted in the BYG competence division.

I hypothesize that the CEO has managed, previous to the start of my empirical data, to create a problematization that displaced the interests, goals and identity of the Director of the BYG competence division and the appointed Manager of the Urban Group to become aligned with the problematization and OPP of the CEO. The devices to interest the BYG Director and the Manager in the problematization and OPP could have been many but due to lack of documentation, I will not be able to explain this in further detail. However, in one of my interviews, I learned that substantial resources and delegative power was made available to the Urban Group. Interviewee S told me that *"the group was controlled or managed by BYG who had been given substantial resources and mandate to employ people to help construct it."* (Interviewee S)

Thus, my claim will be that the BYG Director became interested in the OPP because of the resources and the delegation of mandate that followed. I argue that allocation of resources and delegation of mandate to employ staff has served as interessement of the BYG Director to the OPP of the CEO. There could be other interessements involved but my empirical material does not reveal any other. After the initial enrollment of BYG, the BYG Director mobilizes a Manager who constructs a group to take charge of the OPP. Through the translations of wills, interests and goals, a network between the CEO, the BYG Director, the Manager and his to-be constructed Urban Group has been built.

Through the BYG Director's and the Manager's interessement in the network, a set of interessement devices are imposed on them that serve to stabilize the newly established interessement of them to the OPP of the CEO. Through the enrollment of organizational control mechanisms such as a budget control, economic measurement instruments etc., the CEO mobilizes the organization as an actor and makes use of the organizational devices in order to lock the interest of the enrolled actors in her OPP and her constructed network. These devices can be seen as such because they force the Manager to do certain things in certain

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[5] BYG is the building core competence division of BCMG. See figure 1 in the introduction

[6] A Manager in the Project Management Department (PM) in the BYG division

ways. The Manager no longer has free roam to do what he pleases. Rather, he is kept in place and diverted towards the CEO's OPP through the organizational devices put in place. If the interessement devices fail their purpose, i.e. it the Manager fails to live up to the control mechanisms by overspending his budget or not reaching his targets, the Manager breaks loose from the network and the CEO's OPP is corrupted. Following that, it the Manager fails in living up to the interessement devices, he could be facing consequences for his diversion away from them. Thus, the Urban Group Manager, and the network he now represents, is locked into position between the CEO's OPP and the interessement devices.

With this locking of interests, the Urban Group manager becomes the spokesman of the small network of the Urban Group. Through translations, he is ascribed the right to speak on behalf of the network based on the relations that he is enrolled in. With this position follows a mandate to enroll more actors into the Urban Group network with the overarching goal of answering the OPP: We must expand the portfolio competence to include urban development.

4.1.3. Controversy over Competences

The construction process of the Urban Group network above is a result of the observations of two interviewees, supported by the UD document. However, according to a third interviewee, the construction of the network did not run as smoothly as it might appear from the above description. Rather, the interviewee observes that the construction of the network should rather be viewed as a result of the fact that somebody in the Transportation division *"could not get his finger out"* (Interviewee J). Instead, the resolution of the CEO's OPP *"…was snatched by the Director of BYG, much to the dissatisfaction of the Transportation division employees"* (ibid).

The reason why the individual 'could not get his finger out' remains unsaid and it would be speculations on my part to argue why it was so because, as previously mentioned, I do not have materials that cover the initiation of the Urban Group. But the way Interviewee J observes the situation then the Transportation Director could have lacked the interessement to be displaced towards the OPP and thus, did not want to be enrolled in the Urban Group network. This passing over of the Transportation division left, according to Interviewee J, the employees *"…pouting because they have the competences, and they work everyday with urban planning and they found it a bit weird* [that] *why on earth, it* [the Urban Group] *ended up in BYG because what does* [BYG] *have to do with urban development?"* (Interviewee J).

The physical placement of the Urban Group in BYG - the enrollment of the BYG division over the Transportation division into the CEO's construction - is translated by Interviewee J to be a source for 'pouting' among the employees, who in Interviewee J's perspective, work with urban development-related competences on a day-to-day basis. Supporting this observation is interviewee M who told me that Transportation *"…has worked with Urban and city planning long before this company even defined something that was called Urban."* (Interviewee M)

As such, Interviewee M and Interviewee J represent different translations of the construction of the Urban Group network than the translations of Interviewee S and Interviewee A. They view the construction as a passing over of the Transportation division, the division in which the competences related to 'Urban' and city planning reside which, additionally, they have done for a very long time. Thus, a contrasting translation is offered to give meaning to the construction of the Urban Group.

The Urban Group is thus constructed on an inherent controversy between two competence divisions in BCMG. The responsibility for developing urban development – the CEO's OPP - is placed in BYG rather than in Transportation that otherwise has, according to Interviewee M and interviewee J, competences related to urban development and has been working with Urban for more than 25 years (Interviewee M).

My argument for competence controversy, is further supported by Interviewee B, who explains that *"I find it a bit iffy, calling it* [the Urban Group] *Urban. It might be a bit misleading because a lot of what people are working on over in Transportation, they would also claim to be Urban. And what we are working on, we also claim to be Urban. So I believe that there exist, to a large extent, a confusion of concepts."*

Thus, it appears that an inherent controversy is created from the very beginning of the rooting of the responsibility for building the Urban Development competence. The BYG competence division was enrolled in the CEO's network, much to the confusion and dissatisfaction of the Transportation competence division. BYG went on to construct the Urban Group based on this inherent controversy over competences. In this manner, the innovation processes of the BCMG-specific Urban Development is structured and organized in accordance with the BYG competence that has been interested and enrolled. BYG appears to be the winner of the battle over who can ascribe meaning to the network with the looser being the Transportation division.

This inherent controversy is observed and negotiated by the Urban Group in its attempts at defining Urban Development. Interestingly is it that this competence controversy between the two divisions will become very influential on the future attempts by the Urban Group at making urban development a new organizational competence.

4.1.4.   Controversy over Definitions

My research suggests that only a little and vague guidance was given by the CEO for making urban development a competence of BCMG. One interviewee articulated that at the beginning of the Urban Group, the CEO *"wish*[ed] *that we* [were] *able to combine things some more and that we can engage in more superior issues."* (Interviewee S). The quite vague formulation of what the Urban Development competence should be can be observed to result in another related controversy over the development of an Urban Development competence. As one of my interviewees explained:

"When you launch a group like Urban there must be a quite acute formulation of what it is you want to do. I do not believe that it has been acute enough from top-management. Instead, they have just put out the task that we want this done but now we need someone to define what it is that we want. And then you get a lot of discussion and that we have had and I myself have been involved in creating that discussion." (Interviewee M).

Interviewee M's observation is, I translate, a result of his translation of the Urban Group. He does not support the view of the Group as a constituted network that speaks on behalf of the CEO. Instead, Interviewee M translates the OPP on which the Urban Group is constituted to be to define what it is the top-management wants – and not trying to implement what it wants. Interviewee M translates the Urban Group into a definition group rather than an implementation group and as such, he builds a new OPP through which he tries to displace the interests of the group away from the CEO's OPP, towards his own OPP. Thus, the network's founding logic is challenged by an actor who, it must be mentioned, is originally problematized by the Group but who fights his problematization by creating a different OPP. Thus, there is no unified understanding of the OPP and as Interviewee M states, a lot of discussions follow as a result of the controversy.

It is also rather intriguing that the challenger is Interviewee M - who represents the Transportation division in the Urban Group problematization – that is, he has been constituted as the division's spokesman. I translate the controversy over the placement of the Urban Group in BYG and the resistance towards the Urban Group by Interviewee M as related through a black-box network.

The Urban Group, the physical rooting in the organization and the OPP, cannot be said to exist as a stabile network at this point in time of the construction of the Urban Group. Rather, controversies and competing OPPs exist that fight for the right to construct a different meaning to the Urban Group and thus to the Urban Development competence. The construction of the Urban Group thus becomes a battleground for controversies. However, the Urban Group keeps on fighting and is not disillusioned easily. In order to secure stability, the Group needs to secure its relation to the CEO and in order to do this, the Urban Group attempts to negotiate the controversies through a strategy of displacement. The Group problematizes Urban Development as a displacement the 'old ways' of working.

4.1.5. Urban Development Competence as a Displacement of 'Old Ways'

The Urban Group's first task is to stabilize the network that is threatened by the controversies that challenge the CEO's OPP. To do this, the Group constructs a new problematization and OPP that serves to breaks with the everyday work practice - the 'old way' of working in BCMG.

Let me start this section by firstly further describing the background for introducing urban development into BCMG. According to the UD document it was grounded on:

*"…a wish to actively contribute to the **furtherance** of the quality in city development projects and… develop **new approaches and concepts** within urban development… The time and the complexity of the projects demand of us to **take a different approach** and a number of new players are entering the scene."* (UD document; my emphasis).

The Urban Group builds a new problematization that I translate to be as a displacement away from the 'old ways' of working in relation to urban development operations in BCMG. The Group wishes to **furtherance** the quality; **develop new approaches** and take a **different approach** towards urban development projects. The Group wants to build a new competence to ensure that BCMG can follow the changing of times and dealing with ever-increasing complexity of projects, thus allowing the organization to offer enhanced quality, new approaches and concepts in projects to 'reply' to the demands of new players who are entering the scene.

Thus, this new competence is to represent the expansion of the portfolio competences which also was the CEO's OPP. By defining Urban Development as a new approach; as a new concept demanding a different approach and as a competence that builds on *"…strategic cooperation with other competences…"* (UD document), the Urban Group attempts to negotiate the controversy over competences as I described above. In this manner, Urban Development in BCMG becomes a displacement of 'how things have always been done' towards developing a new approach to urban development operations. This displacement serves to counter the controversy over competences as I observed to be an inherent nature in the constitution of the Urban Group.

Additionally, the Group cannot at this time in the story be observed to form a Group, in the understanding of a 'group' that works together towards one unified purpose with a clear definition. It can be observed that the Urban Group seems, at this point, far from a closely knit and uniform whole. Rather, *"…it was sort of more loose than it is today, could you say, thus, it was more a network than a marked group as such. You would probably call it a group but it operated more like a network…"* (Interviewee B).

"…the reason why I call it a network is that, although it is still a group that works towards more cooperation in-house, it was not as structured back then as it is today… when we first started… all the different divisions in the house were involved. Now it is centered more around our division. I believe that the ownership that beforehand existed from the other divisions has been lost a little, or lost a lot." (Interviewee B).

At this time in the story, the Group exists more as an informal network, however, as the quotation indicates, the nature of the Group will evolve to become more stabile. This observation of the Urban Group as more of

an informal network can also be identified in the lack of meeting minutes from this period in time. In later episodes, Urban Group meeting minutes occur quite frequently in my empirical data.

I will, in the next section, focus on how the Urban Group evolves from an informal network of relations in which actors are still interested, to a situation where significant problems for the Urban Group of mobilizing the organization become the crystal clear reality for the Urban Group. These problems, I will argue, can be observed to originate from the controversy over competences that have become an inherent black-box upon which the Urban Group network is constructed.

4.1.6. Summarizing the First Episode

The first episode has shown how an OPP is constructed by the CEO upon which an Urban Group network has been constituted to seek its resolution. The OPP is: <u>We must expand the portfolio competence to include urban development</u>.

From this OPP, I have observed how the BYG division and BYG Manager are diverted towards the OPP to become interested and enrolled through the delegation of mandate and economic resources from the CEO. This enrollment of the BYG competence division into the newly constructed Urban Group network, however, leads towards a controversy over competences that attempts to deconstruct the network. The Urban Group is challenged by a Transportation division spokesman who challenges the enrollment of the BYG division in an attempt to ascribe a different meaning to the Group. Further, a controversy over definitions arises from the OPP upon which the Urban Group is constructed. The Transportation spokesman translates the OPP of the CEO to be to define what it is that the CEO wants – rather than trying to implement what the CEO want.

The Urban Group network is, at the end of this episode, in a situation of instability as it is challenged by controversies. The Urban Group attempts to stabilize its network by negotiating the controversies. The Group translates the Urban Development competence as a displacement of 'old ways' of working and translates Urban Development to be a new approach urban development operations in BCMG. However, as I observed, the Group is observed by the interviewee to exist more as an informal network between individuals than a closely-knit group.

The next episode in innovation process of the Urban Development competence will show how the Urban Group network seeks to stabilize its network through translation and displacement attempts that serves to build a new OPP for the Group that focuses on enrolling an actual project as an actor.

4.2. The Second Episode –the Project Actor

The second episode is centered on the enrollment of a project into the Urban Group's network. Firstly, I will describe the initial observation of the project actor by the Urban Group and the following problematization of the project actor. Hereafter follows an observation of a translation that serves to strengthen interdivisional cooperation in order to secure the interessement and enrollment of the project actor. After these initial translations by the Urban Group, a new OPP is constructed that centers on an actual project. This focus leads the Group towards new controversies and the second episode terminates with negotiation attempts of the controversies.

4.2.1. Bringing the Project Actor into Focus

The idea of connecting Urban Development to an actual project is articulated at the very beginning of the Urban Group's existence. In the beginning of the UD document, mentioned in the previous episode, Urban Development is defined as *"…all projects – large or small, complex or simple – that have a relation to the development of cities, parts of a city, the squares of cities, constructions in cities."* (UD document). The Urban Group translates the project to be a central actor that the Group wants to enroll into its network. Without a project, there is no point for the Group to continue with its operations because Urban Development does not have a meaning without it being tied to a project in a city, according to the cited definition. As such, all activities that the Group undertakes are aimed at enrolling projects. The enrollment of a project as an actor is translated by the Urban Group to be the answer that will resolve the OPP of the CEO.

In order for the Group to enroll the project as an actor into its network, the Group attempts to define the project actor that it wants to enroll. This is exemplified in the UD document where one third of it is one long definition of what an Urban Development project is and how the project process should be planned. *"The key to a city development concept that can create 360° satisfaction and well-functioning cities is to organize and to have a capacity to manage all of the actors in the city development project and the processes that belong to this."* (UD document).

Following this translation of the key element to a city development concept[7] in the UD document is the Group's definition of management as the ability to *"analyze, describe and establish overview of the project"*, *"to define actors and stakeholders in the project"*, *"to focus on phases where all demands for the solution of the project are defined"* (ibid). Thus, by managing every actor related to a project, 360° satisfaction and well-functioning cities are ensured. Hence, the enrollment of the project actor through managing every actor relation to a project is translated as key for the Group's OPP of turning Urban Development into a competence.

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[7] The document is not consistent in terminology in relation to Urban Developement

In the UD document, the project is described to encompass developers, users, stakeholders, public authorities and politicians (UD document). The Urban Group identifies the project actor as a spokesman for many different entities that has allowed the project actor to represent their voices. Thus, if the Urban Group is to enroll the project actor, it must mobilize all of these entities and if the enrollment of the project actor is successful, then the Urban Development competence is implemented (at least this is the reasoning behind the Urban Group's translations).

The mobilization of all the interests of actors that are represented by the project as a spokesman becomes the vital issue for success. However, the attempts by the Urban Group at problematizing the project actor brings about a controversy for the Group because the project actor is constructed as a spokesman based on a black-box network of relations between entities that together ascribe a specific meaning to a specific project. As such, theoretical attempts at defining the project actor face the problem that without a specific project in focus, the entities that make out a specific project are impossible to frame. The problematization attempts by the Urban Group of the project actor remain theoretical.

4.2.2. The Missing Link Controversy

The vision for the 'new BCMG' that has the Urban Development competence is articulated as *"We develop cities and city life that creates new value for the city. We do this together with the users, stakeholders, public authorities and politicians."* (UD document). The Urban Development competence is thus observed by the Urban Group as an open and external approach to a project that has to encompass the wishes and requirements of external actors. As I cited above, the Group translates the key of an Urban Development project to be management of all actors in a project and it is further translated that *"with the understanding of management in Urban Development as a starting point, a total project process is defined…"* (ibid). Following this emphasis on the project process, a comprehensive description of five stages in an Urban Development project process is described in the UD document and each stage is described in detail. Wheels of competences are defined where different links between the organizational competences needed for an Urban Development project are described; descriptions of roles, functions and links between internal actors are unfolded etc. (ibid).

As such, a process of problematization is undertaken by the Urban Group that defines the internal actors and structures that is to organize the new Urban Development competence with the aim of interesting and enrolling the external actors into the Urban Group's network (the internal/external distinction is not my construct but it is my observation of the distinction through which the Urban Group observes the world that it interacts with).

However, due to the intrinsic and shifting nature of the entities in the black-box network behind the project actor who differs from project to project, the above-described definition exercises of the Urban Group stay theoretical. The link between the theoretical and the practical Urban Development project is missing.

According to interviewee S, the logic behind the definition attempts was that if the Group could only define in totality what the Urban Development competence was, it would then also master it. In the interview, he further translated the Urban Group's attempts at defining its way out of problems. He said that:

"I believe that we would have come interminably much longer if we had worked together with clients on specific projects instead of attempting, internally, to define and gather CVs on who that could do what and trying to define what they could and what Urban was and where they would fit into that. It became a theoretical exercise." (Interviewee S).

Following his translation of the lack of an actual project, another interviewee commented, when reflecting over the purpose of the Urban Group, that: *"my first thought was as a sparring partner… but, of cause, it is somewhat difficult to answer that question since we have not had any specific projects to take as a starting point."* (Interviewee J).

A third Interviewee had the following opinion, when I asked her how the Urban Group was to agree on what it understood sustainability in Urban Development to be. She said that *"…well, I do not think that we should come up with a definition of it. I believe… that we must develop a definition of sustainability in cooperation with our client in a project."* (Interviewee B).

As such, there seems to exits uniformity among the interviewees that the lack of an actual project makes it hard for the Group to grasp the understanding of what the Urban Development competence is or should be. Thus, the missing link between the theoretical Urban Development project and the physical Urban Development project becomes a controversy that challenges the Urban Group constituting relation to the CEO.

Based on this missing link controversy, the project actor can be observed to become the foundation for a negotiation of the controversy that displaces the Group towards a new OPP. The desire to enroll the project actor is translated to form a new OPP that is to bring together the organization as an actor and project actors to form an actual Urban Development project group. By enrolling a real project, the Urban Group attempts to enroll the organization and to mobilize the entities in the organization through the typical organizational practice of tendering[8]. Through the interessement device of tendering which aims at winning an Urban

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[8] Tendering is the typical practice through which an engineering consultancy organization normally gets projects. By producing a tender, the organization makes a bid describing how it can assist the Developer resolve a particular project. This bid is compared to other bids and the better one, on terms of 'value for money' and expertise wins the project.

Development project, the project actor is to become displaced towards the OPP for the Urban Group and for the rest of 2008, tendering an actual urban development project becomes the OPP that unifies the Urban Group efforts.

I will observe how the tendering of an actual project is eventually translated to form a new OPP for the Urban Group. By attempting to gather the entire organization around a specific project, the Group approaches the controversy over competences by trying to problematize the Urban Development as a shared and generic issue that is significant for every organizational division.

4.2.2.1. Strengthening Divisional Cooperation

In an Urban Group pre-meeting strategy PowerPoint presentation from June 2008[9], named *"Urban Planning; Urban Development; What is Urban?"* (Pre-meetPP, 26/8 2008[10]), a problematization of the project actor is presented as the Group translate the significance of the displacement of the project actor to be aligned with the Urban Group's network and OPP.

The abovementioned notion of 360° satisfaction that I observed above has now been translated into *"360° around a city – Urban Development from idea to implementation"* (ibid). From this 360° city perspective, the Group has translated its goal to be *"the creative coordinating planning process"* (ibid) by mobilizing the competence divisions of Environment, Traffic, Construction, Supply and Distribution, Roads, Energy (see Figure 2). Figure 2 represents the visible displacement of the 'old ways' and the group seeks to achieve this displacement through *"strengthening the coordinative/**unifying/creative** force"*, *"strengthening **totality thinking** in our technical competences"*, *"**visible** market position"*, *"to be able to work in **'chaos'"*** (ibid; the group's own emphasis).

In order to fixate a network involving interdivisional cooperation, the Urban Group and the project actor, the Group has thus identified the three actors that need to come together to solve the CEO's OPP. Firstly, the Urban Group must work towards *"increasing the market share* [through] *a targeted effort to participate and win urban competitions/projects on the Danish/Nordic market."* (ibid) hence, the enrollment of the project as an actor by wining projects. Secondly, this is to be achieved through *"strengthening the co-operation across the divisions"* (ibid), thus enrolling the organization as the second actor into the Urban Group (thus making the Urban Group the third actor). The enrollment of these actors is translated to be the central kernel for the Urban Development competence.

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[9] The file name of the PowerPoint was "*Urban – pre-meeting strategy, June 2008*"

[10] I assume that the presentation has been used in June, when I recovered the material from the Urban Groups file system, the date it was last saved was 26/8 2008

Figure 2: Urban Development as interdivisional cooperation in BCMG. Adopted from Pre-meetPP

As such, strengthening the cooperation across divisions is translated by the Urban Group as important for enrolling the project actor into the Urban Development project. According to the Pre-meetPP document, this is strengthening is to happen by *"seeing oneself in a project"*, by *"the employment of a coordinator"* and by *"defining Urban (through developing a competence wheel)"* (ibid).

The Urban Group translates that winning a project is going to happen by mobilizing interdivisional cooperation and the mobilization of this cooperation is (partly) to take place by mobilizing a project.

It seems like the Urban Group is chasing its own tale since the mobilization of the project relies on the mobilization of interdivisional cooperation and the interdivisional cooperation is dependent on the enrollment of the actor. I will follow the relation between the need for interdivisional cooperation and the enrollment of the project actor below, to discuss how interdivisional cooperation becomes a centre for controversy that challenge the problematization of the enrollment of the project actor.

4.2.3. The Interessement of the Project Actor

The Urban Group has problematized that it needs to interest and enroll the project actor into its network. Two founding principles for the interessement of the project actor can be identified in the empirical material. Firstly, the interessement of the actor is to be achieved through a process of *"dialogue* [that] *secures that conflicting interests and points of view are handled in the preliminary process."* (UD document) and secondly, through detailed programming. This *"…secures a 360° satisfaction with both the process and the result."* (ibid).

However, the relations between definitions, concepts, goals, processes and strategies of the Urban Group are becoming complex. As one interviewee said to me: *"My problem is that the Urban Group is the same as 360° consideration. Thus what we in our strategy ca ll 360° around obstacles or problems - that is in e ssence what Urban should be. What is Urban then? There is not a bloody lot that isn't Urban."* (Interviewee S).

As this interviewee translated, then the Urban Group is surrounded by a complex web of competing problematizations of the significant actors and of the Urban Development competence (which also makes it challenging for me as a researcher to describe the episode coherently which would also be painting an inappropriate picture). It is the case at this period in time that Urban Development has become quite complex, involving a multitude of actors, build on black-boxes inherent in the pre-existing organizational competences that become a battleground for several controversies.

I translate the desire of the Urban Group to enroll the project actor is the Urban Group's negotiation of this complexity. If only the project actor could be interested and locked into position in an Urban Development project network, the organizational actor will follow and then the controversial, stormy and complex environment that the Urban Group is finding itself in would be resolved. It would then be up to the Urban Development project network to ensure the support of all the entities that make out the project actor and the organizational actor through 360° satisfaction. If, for instance, the developer entity of the project actor's black-box is not mobilized in the Urban Development project network, the network fails its constructed purpose and the network would collapse. Similarly, if the Transportation division in BCMG is not enrolled and displaced through the Urban Development project network, then all the competences they possess would not be mobilized and the network would not be able to sustain 360° satisfaction.

The Urban Group wants to eliminate these risks for demobilization - and thus disintegration of its network - of the enrolled actors and their black-box networks through the interessement devices of dialogue and detailed programming to secure *"360° satisfaction both in relation to process and result but further,* [to] *secure progression and minimize the risk of obstacles along the way in the project completion."* (UD document).

Therefore, when the Urban Group focuses on defining the central actor - the project -, it is doing this based on the observation that the Group needs to mobilize a multitude of external entities that it does not know. The internal actors are observed to be easier to enroll. However, as I have observed so far, the Group has not been very successful in making the organizational actor accept its intended role and identity that is offered to it. The Urban Group attempts to enroll a specific project to overcome the complex environment that surrounds it.

4.2.4. The Northern Harbor Competition as OPP

The displacement of the Urban Group towards a new OPP, focusing on the enrollment of the project actor can be observed to be initiated in the status-PP. In this presentation, the preparation and participation in the

Northern Harbor project competition is presented. What will, in turn, take place, is a displacement of the Urban Group towards winning the Northern Harbor project competition. However, the participation in the Northern Harbor competition (that was to solve the controversies facing the Group) becomes instead a new source for controversy and an obstacle for constructing Urban Development as a new organizational competence.

The Northern Harbor competition is described by Arealudviklingsselskabet (The Area Developing Company General Partnership)[11] as an *"open international ideas competition for the planning of the Northern Harbor in Copenhagen…The vision is to create a dynamic, lively and sustainable city district with multiply diverse activities and room for both a broad mix of residents and business enterprises."* (Publication of Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union).

In relation to the Urban Group's displacement towards the Northern Harbor competition project (from now on just the Northern Harbor project), one of the interviewees said that *"when I started, I was thrown into the Northern Harbor project. It was an exponential learning curve. A learning curve for the organization because this was an actual project. We could call it a learning project where the house really tested this cooperation across the competence divisions and working together with others…Taken into consideration that this was our first project, I think we did bloody well. Compared to the fact that we were in a competition with a bunch of professionals, then we did not do so well."* (Interviewee B).

Another interviewee had the following experience with the Northern Harbor project. *"Someone approached me and said that people are making an bid for a project called the Northern Harbor, and they need some competences in relation to Energy…I approached the Urban people and was told of this project and that they have established a project group."* (Interviewee C).

Conflictingly, another responded, when I asked him about projects that the Urban Group had that. *"The Northern Harbor* [project] *was introduced after the strategy and the group was constructed. Then some parts of the group actively joined **our** project. So I don't know whether the Urban Group have had a project or not. We* [read: his department] *have had several projects that have been Urban or Urban-related projects in the period and it is my claim, on the part of my department, that we have handled them where they have been placed, as projects in the organization and handled them as interdisciplinary projects, to the extend it has been necessary and relevant. And as such, Urban, in my view, has not participated with anything new because projects in this house, if they contain a certain complexity or size, are per definition projects that are solved in an interdisciplinary fashion. And that is handled by the project group."* (Interviewee M; his emphasis in the interview)

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[11] It is the owner of the Northern Harbor competition

Another commented: *"The first project they entered and sort of wanted to test this Urban concept on was the Northern Harbor....I think the problem sort of were that they had not really known exactly what Urban should be, how it was to be put together or what to call it."* (Interviewee J).

And finally as interviewee S commented in the interview, then the Northern Harbor was not an Urban Project. It was prior to the Urban Group.

These very different translations show the extent of the misalignment of meanings and the controversial circumstances that the Urban Group is facing as it attempts to mobilize dispersed divisional competences to participate in submitting a Northern Harbor competition bid. As observed, some of the interviewees find that they became part of the Urban Group through their enrollment into the Northern Harbor project (Interviewee B and Interviewee C) while others, like interviewee M and Interviewee S, who like B and C figures as members of the Urban Group in the Status-PP, do not find that the Urban Group has ever had a project and that the Northern Harbor project was prior to the existence of the Urban Group.

Interestingly, retrospectively, some Urban Group members argue against the relation between the Urban Group network and the translated-to-be vital actor for the network - the Northern Harbor project.
What I can conclude though, through examining all the documents that can be connected to this second episode, is that for a long period of time while the bid for the Northern Harbor project is prepared and also after it is submitted to the competition, the Urban Group claims ownership of the Northern Harbor competition bid, the processes involved and the expected gains from the participation.

Interviewee B observed the Northern Harbor project as one long learning curve for the organization and found that the Group performed well. Interviewee C explained how he was approached by the Urban Group and enrolled in its network. Interestingly, Interviewee C actually proclaims the Project Manager of the Northern Harbor project to be Interviewee S who argued that the Northern Harbor project was prior to the Urban Group. The confusion is total.

It is the case, though, that every Urban Group document that exist from around the date of the UD document where the Northern Harbor is firstly articulated and up until the beginning of 2009 and a bit beyond, translate the Northern Harbor project as an Urban Group project. Although the ownership of the Northern Harbor project is translated differently by some interviewees, (i.e. Interviewee M claiming it is his and his departments project while others saying that it is the Urban Group's), the empirical data that represents the Urban Group all use the Northern Harbor project as a presentation of what the Urban Group and Urban Development is. Thus, an OPP of making Urban Development a portfolio competence has been displaced to being: How can we win the Northern Harbor project?

The picture I here have present of the Urban Group is a picture of a group of actors who are misaligned in their understandings of the role, function and purpose of the Urban Group. The original OPP of the CEO

have brought forward controversies that have continuously displaced the different actors away from the original OPP. As an attempt to negotiate the continuous displacements and misalignment of the Urban Group actors, a large effort is invested by the Urban Group in reconstructing problematizations and OPPs that can secure a level of stability of the Urban Group network. And in this latest re-problematization and reconstruction of the OPP, the project actor (embodied by Northern Harbor) can be observed to be translated in the Urban Group documents as the key actor that will help stabilize the Urban Group network. Inherent in this lays a controversy where the construction of the project actor as a centre for the OPP of the Group is not supported by the entire Urban Group network.

Thus, the initiating OPP of the Urban Group of how to make Urban Development a portfolio competence becomes displaced toward enrolling the Northern Harbor project actor into the Group's network.

4.2.5. Placing all the Eggs in the Northern Harbor Project Basket

One of the interviewees talked about a great deal of confusion in the Northern Harbor project:

"It actually takes some time before I realize what the project group that I am a part of actually is, who is a part of it, who has decided that the architectural company is involved…and there was a very unclear project organization around who did what, who were in charge of what. In the progression toward July, many meetings were held. I was in some of them, not all of them, and if I at any time had had an overview, well and truly lost it." (Interviewee C).

Based on his observation of his participation in the Northern Harbor project, there seem to be obstacles that relate to organizing and structuring the work practices for the Northern Harbor project.

Interviewee B offers one explanation to the obstacles as she argues that *"…in principle, we can already do Urban - that is - in many areas, because we already have many of the disciplines. However, coordinating and ensuring that all the things are included - that I believe is still the difficult part."* (Interviewee B).

Thus, interviewee B translates the obstacles of preparing the Northern Harbor bid to being issues of cooperation and overview. And the issues of cooperation are also mentioned in status-PP where it is described that 'in-the-box-thinking' as a contrast to a holistic understanding is a constraining factor to cooperation between the divisions in BCMG.

However, the obstacle of cooperation is not observed to be related to mobilizing competences through the relations to the architectural company that took part in the Northern Harbor bid. According to a PowerPoint, titled 'What is Urban', where 17 slides out of 27 are used to describe and reflect over the Northern Harbor project experience (What is Urban?, 17/12 2008), then the architectural company had the following experiences with the cooperation between BCMG and themselves. *"It was great to collaborate with*

engineers, to challenge them", *"we experienced a respectful, listening cooperation"*. (ibid). The Urban Group's experiences with the cooperation are observed as *"we experienced that together, we can do more than we might have though we could"*, *"it was very developing to collaborate with the architects"* (What is Urban?).

As a contrast to these observations, under the title 'Learning for next projects', it is observed that *"the architect expects that the Project Manager has a total overview and complete right of disposal over all the relevant resources at BCMG"*. (ibid). From these translations of the cooperation between the architectural company and BCMG, I will argue that the Urban Group has found it more of an obstacle to mobilize the organizational actor that mobilizing the competences of the architectural company.

The solution, as translated by the Urban Group, to the cooperation obstacles is by *"seeing oneself in a project"* (status-PP). Thus, the Urban Group uses the Northern Harbor project as the chance for the organization to 'see itself in a project'. The Group's translation seems to be that by employing a coordinator, by seeing oneself in a project and by specifying Urban Development (through a wheel of competence), interdivisional cooperation will develop (ibid). The interdivisional cooperation will secure that all the needed competences are included in the bid for the Northern Harbor project and when this is the case, a situation of 360° satisfaction will occur. When 360° satisfactio n is secured, the entities that make out the project actor of the Northern Harbor project (the entities that will decide who wins the competition) will become displaced towards the submitted Urban Group bid and the competition will be won. Winning an actual project has, as I have argued above, been constructed as the OPP of the Urban Group through numerous translations and negotiations of controversies. If this is achieved, Urban Development will become a portfolio competence in BCMG and the inherent controversy over competences will be flushed out as the completion of the project will require interdivisional cooperation.

It is important for me here to clarify that what I have argued above is my translation of the progression that is made by the Urban Group based on my empirical data. It is not as such an eternal truth I am arguing. Rather, it is my construction of relations that could possibly have been defined differently.

As I have hinted above, the Northern Harbor competition is not won and since the construction of the Urban Development competence rested on the success of the Northern Harbor Project, this constructed network that the Urban Group has build, collapses. This brings back the original OPP of making Urban Development a portfolio competence, however, this time soiled and stained by the tempestuous controversial circumstances that emerged and as a consequence of the deflated network.

Based on the rubble of the Urban Group, I will now show how the Urban Group attempts to revitalize itself and starts constructing an alternative network in order to resolve the original OPP that the CEO created.

4.2.6. Negotiation of the Interdivisional Cooperation Controversy

Even before the Northern Harbor bid is submitted to the competition, the Urban Group starts to reflect over the Northern Harbor project process. The Northern Harbor competition runs from the 27th May to the 26th September 2008 and on the 26th of August, the Urban Group reflects over the Northern Harbor process and the obstacles that have emerged during the process. The obstacles are observed in the following:

"…there has oftentimes been a lack of response on mails from the coordinator… and it has been necessary to send out several reminders resulting in having to call the involved parties, only to discover that they are not available." (Ex-document).

And:

"The fact that the employees from the different teams have primarily worked from their own offices has meant that the work process has taken a course that might not be the most ideal as people have been left waiting for inputs from others before they could move on with their own assignment." (ibid).

To resolve this, it is, in the document, suggested to establish a project office that would allow face-to-face interaction. However, *"This would of cause require that people disregard other projects but that is not impossible".* (ibid).

There seem to be a controversy related to the interdivisional cooperation that is centered on the mobilization of actors. An engineer in BCMG is continuously involved in many different projects at once and thus, is mobilized in many different projects simultaneously. The above citations translate the struggles of the Northern Harbor project that it encountered as related to mobilizing the necessary actors that are scattered across the divisions because mobilizing them would necessitate that the individuals are displaced from other networks that they are also mobilized in. The solution is in the Ex-document translated to be to corrupt the interessement devices that keep the actors mobilized in competing networks, thus freeing them to be displaced into the Northern Harbor project network.

The issue of how to break the interessement devices is not observed by the Urban Group as something that a project group like the Northern Harbor one can do. Rather, it calls for managerial intervention.

"A key cause [to the obstacles] *is the attitude towards non-invoicable hours in BCMG. These* [projects that only produce non-invoicable hours] *are not considered to be on equal ground of other projects and therefore end up at the bottom of the stack. This attitude must be changed as these projects often pave the road for new areas/market niches of the future that in time can prove to be utmost profitably. What is needed is visible managerial support that is communicated to the different divisions to change this attitude among the employees. The economic deficit in the individual division, experienced in connection to attaching an*

employee to such projects [of non-invoicable hour] could possibly be covered with a certain percentage by the management." (Ex-document).

In this document, the organizational economic structures are translated to conflict with innovative projects in BCMG (exemplified by the Northern Harbor project) that in the long-term perspective can help pave the road for a new market niche that will become most profitable in the future. Thus, the success of the Urban Development innovation attempt is translated to conflict with the economic structures that are set up to control the 'old ways' for structuring projects. The economic structures that are set up as devices to assist the management in keeping the economic balance of the organization in check, simultaneously conflict with wish of the CEO to making Urban Development a competence. Long-term innovation is sacrificed for short-term profit, is the translation of Urban Group in the Ex-document.

This call for managerial intervention to create an organizational situation that supports long-term innovation projects is also highlighted in my interviews. One of my interviewees told me:

"I believe that for many of these things to succeed, I wish for a change of attitude among the executives…if you are to work interdisciplinary…, then, an insensitive is needed in order to do so. If you really want people to spread out and change, they really need a reason to do it and you might say that management needs to come up with something more than thinking that people will just do it for one's own amusement… It is not enough to go out there and say: Make it happen." (Interviewee B).

Another interviewee observed how the economic structures, articulated as the PL-indicator[12], are counter-productive. He claimed that the PL-indicator is counterproductive *"because it does not pull in the direction that we want. It is therefore my claim that this PL-indicator shit, throw it out the window. What the hell am I to do with it? It is counter-productive in relation to the targets I have."* (Interviewee C)

However, not all of the interviewees believe that economic structures are real obstacles to cooperative project work. In one of my interviews, the structures were observed as absolutely necessary to organize. *"We must be careful not to proclaim the structures as the biggest ghosts. If they disappear, others will take their place… Interdisciplinary work…is no doubt limited by the way we measure. Therefore, a decision on who should have a high and who should have a low PL-indicator is required."* (Interviewee M).

Interviewee M can be observed to be the most supportive of the economic structures that are in place for controlling the Urban Group's work. I argue that the economic structures become a centre for controversy because the structures are a result of the placement of the Urban Group inside a divisional competence. The 'traditional' way for structuring projects in the competence division is by using economic control devices that

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[12] An economic indicator that measure how productive the employee is, based on the percentage of invoicable hours spent out of the total amount of hours works. Thus, it illustrates the difference between non-invoicable and invoicable hours.

serve the purpose of making the enrolled actors behave in a manner that is beneficiary to a traditional project. However, as I have argued then the Urban Group attempts to displace the 'old ways' of working in the organization, thus signifying a new approach for projects and in this perspective, the economic control mechanisms are not beneficiary for the Urban Group's innovation attempts.

After the translations of the controversy over interdivisional cooperation caused by economic structures, it is important to conclude that this controversy represent just part of the experiences gained from participating in the Northern Harbor project. The vast majority of Urban Group documents, from the start of the Northern Harbor project until the winner is announced on December 18th, only describe the positive story of the competition bid and the experience gained. This focus on the Northern Harbor experience increase in extent and towards the end, close to the announcement of the winner of the competition, the focus in the Urban Group documents is almost exclusively on the Northern Harbor project.

An example is a Road Show which is initiated that will visit the offices of BCMG in Denmark, to tell the story of the Northern Harbor project. Headings such as *"BCMG Urban competences used in the Northern Harbor"* (Road Show PowerPoint, 10/12-2008) are used and the Northern Harbor experiences become an interessement device, used to convince the entire organization that the Urban Development is something we can do.

The abovementioned 'What is Urban?' PowerPoint from the 17th December, 2008, represents the end of this episode where the Urban Development competence innovation is tightly coupled to the Northern Harbor competition bid. The Urban Group have gained many experiences from the Northern Harbor project but since the specific project no longer exists, the Urban Group find itself lacking a point of stabilization and a new displacement is necessary. This need for a new displacement of the Urban Group, I argue, takes its beginning in the 'What is Urban?' PowerPoint mentioned above. After the long description of the Northern Harbor, the focus of this PowerPoint changes towards emphasizing the clients that the Urban Development competence should target. One slide is titled 'Clients in focus' and the following 'Sales Tools'.

Thus, I translate that the unsuccessful enrollment attempt of a specific project leaves the Urban Group network vulnerable for competing problematizations and displacement attempts. The Urban Group has experienced first hand what destabilization and controversies bring forward and as a consequence, the Group initiates a displacement attempt, away from enrolling a project and towards enrolling clients in order to secure the survival of the Group.

4.2.7. Summarizing the Second Episode

The second episode was initiated on the displacement of the Urban Group towards an OPP of how to enroll the project actor. Firstly, I observed how the Urban Group emphasized the management of every single actor of a project though a 360° satisfaction. In order f or the Urban Group to manage every actor related to a project, the Group attempts to problematize the project actor. The Group faces a controversy, however, in

which the intrinsic and shifting nature of a project actor differs from project to project with the result that the problematizations of the project actor stay theoretical. The link between the theoretical and the actual project actor is missing.

As an attempt to negotiate this missing link controversy, the Group translates the OPP of the CEO to focus on winning an actual project. In order to do so, the Urban Group introduces the organizational actor which is problematized as interdivisional cooperation in order to secure 360° satisfaction since 360° satisfact ion is defined by the Group as critical for enrolling the actual project.

However, the mobilization of interdivisional cooperation through enrolling the organization as an actor becomes a question of 'seeing one self in a project' and thus, a paradoxical mutual contingency can be observed to be constructed. Furthermore, the interdivisional cooperation also becomes a centre for controversy caused by the to organizational economic control structures that are observed by the Group to be corrupting its interdivisional cooperation attempts.

The paradoxical situation is negotiated by the Urban Group as it emphasizes the importance of enrolling the project actor. The Group translates the project actor to consist of a multitude of unidentifiable actors who appear much more difficult to mobilize than it is to mobilize interdivisional cooperation. Thus, enrolling an actual project is translated to being a question of winning the Northern Harbor project. An OPP focusing on 'How can we win the Northern Harbor project?' emerges as the result of the Urban Group's negotiation of the controversies surrounding it. The logic of the Urban Group is can be observed to be that by winning the Northern Harbor competition, the organizational actor (e.g. mobilizing relevant interdivisional competences) will be enrolled and the two actors (project and organization) will be locked in place the Urban Group network. When (or if) this is the case, Urban Development as a competence will be the outcome.

The Urban Group places the success of making Urban Development a new BCMG competence on winning the Northern Harbor project. Unfortunately for the Group, the project actor refuses the Urban Group's problematization of it (i.e. the competition bid) and the needed displacement of the project actor towards the Urban Group network is unsuccessful. When the Urban Group cannot secure a project, the organizational actor also refuses the Urban Group network and the network is destabilized.

The Urban Group is, despite its unsuccessful attempt at enrolling the problematized actors into its network, not completely destroyed and the unsuccessful attempts at enrolling the project actor have not been without result despite the Group not achieving its OPP. Many lessons are drawn by the Group from its struggles during the year that has now pasted. The Group translates the unsuccessful enrollment of the project actor to be related to the lack of mobilization of interdivisional cooperation. The Urban Group further translates that in order to mobilize interdivisional cooperation, managerial intervention is needed to ensure that the economic control mechanisms are altered to sustain the Urban Group's purpose.

From these lessons, the Group actively initiates a rebuild of a new Urban Group network in order to sustain the support from the CEO that has been destabilized because the Urban Group has been unraveled due to its unsuccessful attempt at resolving the Northern Harbor OPP. The Group is returned to face the original OPP of how to make urban development a competence for BCMG.

4.3.   The Third Episode and likely initiation of a Fourth Episode

The second episode terminated by observing that a third episode emerges that translated the client actor as a key actor for solving the CEO's OPP. I have therefore followed the description of the Urban Development competence by describing the third episode and subsequent, a fourth episode, in order to describe all the critical incidents in order to stay faithful and loyal to the ANT analysis. However, due to the restrictions put on me in terms of maximum length of this thesis, I have found it necessary to only summarize my findings from the third and fourth episodes in table 1 in the discussion below. I base these findings on the third episode analysis that can be found under Appendix 1 and the fourth episode analysis that can be found under Appendix 2.

The continuous controversies in episode 2 lead to a breakdown of the Urban Group network and the enrolled actors are displaced out of the network. Constructed on the remains, a third episode emerges that centers on enrolling the client into the Urban Group network. This construction by the Urban Group is yet again challenged and the network crumbles again.

Towards the end of my empirical data, a fourth period can be observed to be initiated that centers on enrolling the mobilizing the entire organization by enrolling spokesmen from each of the competence divisions. Further, the rooting of the Urban Group in the BYG division (from episode one) is translated in the beginning of episode 4 as the main obstacle for the interdivisional cooperation to take place.

As such, I terminate my analysis with the observation that the challenges for making Urban Development a competence in BCMG does not fade away in the following episodes. Rather, more controversies emerge that again and again force the displacement of the Urban Group.

5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS

5.1.   Discussion

	Episode 1	Episode 2	Episode 3	Episode 4 'indication'
Key actor	The Urban Group	The Project	The Client	The Organization
OPP	We must expand the portfolio competence to include Urban Development	How can we win the Northern Harbor project?	What can BCMG do to gain influence over the purchase habits of the clients?	How can we ensure a solid rooting in BCMG?
Controversy	1. Controversy over competences 2. Controversy over definitions	1. The missing link to an actual project and interdivisional cooperation 2. Economic control mechanisms 3. Paradox between enrollment of project and organization 4. Unsuccessful enrollment of the project	1. Interdivisional cooperation and economic control mechanisms 2. Holistic vs. Specialist approach 3. Rooting in BYG	1. The displacement of the challenging actors in episode 3
Negotiation of controversy	1. Displace the 'old ways' of working in BCMG through interdivisional cooperation	1. Win a project 2. 'Seeing oneself in a project' 3. Win the Northern Harbor project 4. Displacement of the large Urban Group	1. Gain influence over the clients' purchase habits 2. Bring back projects to the organization 3. Displacement of actors that challenge the Group's OPP and problematization	1. Re-enrolling of actors that will ensure a representation of the entire organization in the Urban Group 2. Articulation of controversies from previous episodes
The nature of the Urban Group	Unstable informal network of relations between actors	Stabile Project Group network	Stabile Sales Group network with challenging actors displaced	A reunited Urban Group network, consisting of actors from the entire organization

Table 1: Overview of how BCMG struggle in setting up an open innovation project

Based on the insight I have gained through the story of the struggles that BCMG endured in setting up an open innovation project, I would now like to discuss my findings, firstly, through the ANT perspective and, secondly, from the other theoretical perspectives that I have build this thesis around.

This thesis has taken its starting point in the wish to gain a deeper understanding of the struggles related to an innovation project in order to illuminate the nature, emergence and influence of these struggles and to observe how these struggles are acted upon. Thus, the thesis serves to answer how BCMG struggle in setting up an open innovation project, exemplified by the Urban Development competence (see table 1 above for an overview).

Firstly, the thesis has adopted an epistemological understanding of the world that allows for describing the innovation struggles by observing how actors observe the world in which they are a part of. Further, by adopting ANT and 'A Sociology of Translation', the innovation struggles emerge as battles between actors of power over the right to ascribe a meaning to a network which is continuously challenged by not-enrolled actors who attempt to destabilize the network in order to ascribe their meaning into the network. Through a translations analysis, I have observed how the identity, will and power of these actors are translated and displaced and enrolled in a network that serves to solve an OPP. However, these translation and displacement attempts prompt controversies to emerge that challenge the meaning ascribed into the network and forces the network to negotiate these controversies in order to secure its position of power.

As the Urban Group network attempts to negotiate the controversies, it is in fact displaced away from its original OPP and in this manner, the controversies become significant for displacing the network towards new OPPs. Thus, in an attempt to subdue the controversies, the controversies instead become mechanisms which force the Urban Group to displace itself away from them. In this manner, the Urban Group network is in fact continuously moving and each time it stops running, new controversies emerge that force the network to start running again. Thus, the controversies act as displacement mechanisms that influence on the direction of the Urban Group network.

By adhering to the ANT perspective, this thesis observes knowledge, competence, controversy and innovation as social constructions whose black-box natures of actor-network relations must be understood and managed in order to make successful use of such constructions in organizational practices and to negotiate and navigate controversies. From this perspective, I believe that my thesis offers an alternative and insightful understanding of the nature of innovation processes that so often have proven difficult, hard to grasp and hidden out of sight and mind. By approaching these constructs from a micro-level perspective with the purpose of describing the creation of meaning through network relations, the black holes of innovation processes and the controversies that threaten them are illuminated and deconstructed to consist of relations of meaning and power between actors in networks.

Additionally, my thesis offers an understanding of how an idea progresses from un-used to become used. My analysis describes an innovation project that takes an un-used idea (urban development as a competence) and attempts to turn it into a used idea. The Urban Groups does not succeed in turning the un-used idea into an used idea since the Groups does not succeed in building a sufficiently strong and stable network in which a single meaning is ascribed to and stabilized in a network that renders the un-used idea as used. The different Urban Groups fail in suppressing the competing ascriptions of meaning that emerge as controversies and the un-used idea never reaches a situation where all required actors are stabilized in a network that supports one ascription of one meaning.

Secondly, by moving away from the epistemological perspective of ANT, I am able to observe how BCMG is challenged by the emergence of the dark side of competences - the rigidities - that emerge as controversies that force a displacement of the innovation project through negotiation attempts aimed at subduing the controversies. Continuously, the innovation project faces rigidities towards its progress of attempting to leverage the capability-side (through interdivisional cooperation) of the dispersed divisional competences required to construct the Urban Development competence (Leonard-Barton 1992). Thus, I have illuminated and observed in more detail how the dysfunctional flip-side of core competences emerges as powerful controversies to inhibit innovation performance.

Thirdly, in the perspective of the open innovation approach as presented by Chesbrough, the struggles over innovation emerges due to problems of the internal leveraging of knowledge resources from the competence silos in BCMG rather than the leveraging of external knowledge resources as otherwise is the main focus for the open innovation approach. In the Northern Harbor competition, an external architectural company was enrolled and the experiences from that partnership reveal that the main obstacle for the partnership was related to interdivisional cooperation. From the open innovation framework perspective, organizations will need to structure innovation processes that take into consideration both the obstructing forces for leveraging external and for leveraging the internal knowledge resources. Following this, I believe that the open innovation literature would benefit from further investigations of the obstacles to the simultaneous leverage of internal and external knowledge resources.

Fourthly, I find that my thesis contributes to the understanding of the role between divisionalization and a competence broadening innovation project as presented by Argyres. By adopting a micro-level focus, I offer an insight into the of interdivisional cooperation transaction costs in a more-divisionalized organization that engages in a competence-broadening innovation project. It can be observed that the innovation struggles that BCMG are facing are related to transaction costs as the interdivisional cooperation seems to stall and hinder the innovative performance. Thus, the stalling that Argyres argues to be a consequence of uncertainties in the development of interrelated competences is illuminated in my analysis. This indicates that in this case, the transaction costs are significantly higher between the internal divisions that between the external architectural company and the Northern Harbor project Group. The leveraging of knowledge across divisions is stalled due to the lack of uniformity over the direction of the development and I have observed

how the rooting in one competence division brings forward controversies that stall the innovation project's progress. Thus, a relation between a competence-broadening innovation strategy, the notion of core competences as double-sided coins with dysfunctional flip-sides and an open innovation approach that emphasizes the obstacles to external knowledge leverage can be observed. In this light, significant internal obstacles to innovation performance is the explanation to the innovation struggles rather than lack of internal structures for leveraging external knowledge.

Thus, what my thesis illuminates is the paradoxical attempts at developing a new innovative competence that aims at displacing the very same competences that are required for its development. As such, rooting competence-broadening innovation projects in pre-existing core competences carry two significant risks of facing the dysfunctional flip-side of competences and the risk of struggling to leverage interdivisional cooperation.

5.2. Conclusion

This thesis has sough to illuminate the struggles an organization risk facing when setting up an open innovation project. I have observed and described the progressive innovation processes and the struggles that emerged along the way by adopting an actor-network theory understanding of the world. Thus, I have viewed the construction of networks in which innovative performance, direction and influence becomes a question of securing the right, and thereby power, to ascribe a particular meaning into the constructed network. This securing of power is done by building relations between actors of influence and attempting to displace these actors to become part of the network. These displacement attempts conducted through moments of translations that serve to create an identity and purpose for an actor make the actor accept the problematization of it by interessement of it and thereafter enrolling in into the network where it is locked in place through the application of interessement devices. The purpose of these translation processes is to be able to mobilize the actor's black-box network of entities that have given the actor the right to represent them. If/when this is secured, the actor ascribes its power to the network in which it is enrolled and the network thus grows in strength and is further stabilized.

What my analysis has opened up for is an observation and insight into the continuous emerging controversies that fight the ascription of meaning to the network. These controversies attempt to destabilize the network by offering competing problematizations to the network actors and if successful, the network is corrupted and it falls apart. Thus, these controversies are of utmost importance to the network since they make out the core of the innovation struggles that the organization is facing. By understanding the inner black-box nature of innovation struggles, the organization will be able to negotiate and navigate the controversies in a manner that makes them less obstructive to the innovation performance.

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7. APPENDIX

7.1. The Third Episode – the Client as an Actor

In this third episode, I will describe how the Urban Group network is reconstituted as the client as an actor is brought into focus of the Urban Group. This client focus becomes stabilizing for the Urban Group network and a new OPP is constructed that is to align the interests of the to-be-enrolled actor. However, competing translations emerge which forces the Urban Group to battle new controversies. The stability of the Urban Group is again challenged and the third episode terminates with the crumbling of the Urban Group network.

7.1.1. Bringing the Client into Focus

The Urban Group starts the reconstruction of its network by displacing its focus towards clients and sales and marketing. The client and sales and marketing have been mentioned in previous documents that I have linked to other episodes. However, the client has not been problematized to play a part in the construction of an Urban Development network before. Rather the client was problematized as one of the entities that constituted the project actor in the previous episode.

What I translate to take place in the third episode is that the Urban Group displaces its OPP away from winning Urban Development competitions and towards promoting BCMG as an organization that can assist clients in operations that relate to urban development. This displacement can be observed in an article, published on the intranet of BCMG. It reads:

"The purpose of Urban is to be able to offer interdisciplinary total consultancy within city development, city planning, concept development and design for public and private clients..." (Article 16/2 2009).

Thus, the Urban Group latches onto the experiences from the second episode as it defines the Urban Development competence to be 'interdisciplinary total consultancy' and thus displace away from the project actor by referring to public and private clients. By taking this approach, the Urban Group is again attempting to displace 'old ways' of working, as some of the interviewees observed it.

"We are accustomed to winning tenders, to get projects through tendering. And that is the reason why we do not talk a lot with out clients…We haven't got any market department, no Market Directors, we haven't got nothing. The organization I came from right, there we had Marked Directors – we had 12 of them." (Interviewee C)

The displacement towards positioning the client as an important actor for the Urban Group network is also represented by the restructuring of the Urban Group. As I previously described, the group was observed by

some interviewees to be closer to an informal network than a closely knitted group. However, the nature of the Group is transformed through the enrollment of an individual into the Urban Group.

"I was given the responsibility for the Urban focus area and I started from scratch. I looked through all the material that existed that somewhat showed the ideas [the Urban Group] *had. I took over some people who have been doing Urban. It was all kind of loose as they all had their own things on the side. Therefore, I made a smaller close-knit group closer to me. I needed the workday to function and I needed someone who could take on some of the initiatives that are ongoing to sit and work on them. And that has primarily been people from BYG."* (Interviewee A)

Apparently, a displacement of the Urban Group is initiated because, according to Interviewee C, it lacked a shared understanding of what Urban Development is. *"I found it to be missing. And then you could say that Urban evolved. It was in reality a coordination unit, a meeting table where you sat around it. That was the Urban* [Group]*. It then evolved to what you can call a sort of secretariat with ambassadors… I became deeper involved in it because you needed, in reality, some managerial sturdiness, but then* [Interviewee A] *was invented, if I may put it like that. A and myself and B decided that it was the three of us who would carry on with the work."*

Thus, the previous Urban Group network is displaced to enroll three central organizational actors who together become responsible for the making of the Urban Development competence by attempting to interest and enroll new actors – e.g. the client – through new interessement devices such as sales and marketing.

However, the displacement of the Group carries a cost as the lack of an actual project to which interdivisional competences could relate, reappear as a controversy for the Urban Group again. I was told by Interviewee A that *"…some of the momentum was lost because now we didn't have an actual project any longer. The task was now moved to making a business case around doing Urban Development as focus area that should be prioritized in the organization. But the difficult part of it was – and is possibly partly still – that it requires interdisciplinary effort and we are not used to working interdisciplinary in this organization."* (Interviewee A).

The problematization of Interviewee A of the necessity of interdisciplinary efforts by entire organization can also be observed in the business case developed for the Urban Group. The notion of Urban Development, according to the business case is to develop a business that *"…increase the image of the entire organization and brings back projects to the rest of the organization"* (Commercial paper, 20th January 2009).
The original founding purpose of the Urban Group has not changed. It is still concerned with turning Urban Development into a business (competence) of BCMG. In order to do this, the group needs to interest, enroll and mobilize the entire organization. This is to be achieved by enhancing the overall image of BCMG and by bringing back projects to distribute to the entire organization.

By articulating that the Urban Group's objective is to be able to bring back project to the rest of the organization, the Group attempts to negotiate the controversy of the economic structures that previously were a centre for an interdivisional cooperation controversy. This controversy is negotiated by the Group and turned into the group's advantage. As such, the Urban Group has translated that only be offering invoicable projects to the rest of the organization, can the Urban Group interest, enroll and mobilize the important divisional competences and only then will Urban Development become a interdivisional portfolio competence.

This is significantly similar to the Urban Group's OPP from the second episode, however, the question remains: how is the group going to get the projects?

The Group displaces the objective of the Urban Group from submitting tenders that bring forward a number of controversies (e.g. the PL-indicator and interdivisional cooperation). Instead, the Urban Group wants to: *"strengthen our* [BCMG] *image as the preferred partner… [through] targeted marketing with branding of our 360°consideration, sustainability, uniqueness, and responsibility within Urban Development…."* (Ibid). These can be understood as the devices that are to interest the client, because *"the needs of the clients are moving toward 'overall projects' – BCMG will be able to satisfy the clients' needs by offering them 'total solutions' (one stop shop)."* (ibid).

I translate this Commercial Paper to represents a third episode of attempting to make Urban Development a portfolio competence. Urban Development becomes an issue of mobilizing the internal organization through the enrollment of clients by efforts of sales and marketing. Thus, Urban Development becomes displaced toward an OPP that is articulated in the Commercial Paper: *"What can BCMG do to gain influence on the purchase habits of the clients"* (Commercial Paper, 20th January 2009).

The OPP for the Urban Group is thus to interests, enroll and mobilize actors that can assist the Group in influencing the purchase habits of clients. However, as I am about to describe, the Urban Group is yet again facing competing problematizations and controversies that all battle the Group's construction of its OPP and thus the ascription of meaning to Urban Development.

7.1.2.   The Battle over the Ascription of Meaning

In an Urban Group meeting, the newly developed Commercial Paper is presented by Interviewee A. It had been approved by the CEO and thus, the Urban Group has been successful at sustaining the enrollment of the CEO once more (Meeting minutes, dated 4/2 2009). Interviewee A commented on this incident.

"We got the 'Go ahead' [from the CEO] *and I thought to myself - Yes, this we must be able to rejoice over - but they* [the spokesmen representing divisional competences] *were like: Well, so what? That came as something as a surprise to me because I was thinking - …now we can actually start focusing on the road we*

are going to take. That, they were actually not interested in. They were more concerned about what can we do, how big a slice of the cake can I get and - now you must be careful not intervening and taking some of our business areas. People became protectionists."

Despite the initial stalling, the newly constructed smaller Urban Group starts promoting BCMG as consultants that can assist clients with services related to urban development. The Group set up meetings with City Managers/Planning Directors in the municipalities (Minutes from Urban meeting, 25/2 2009). Furthermore, *"a committee is set up to find the genius and creative idea that will create headlines and thus visibility."* (ibid). Additionally, two advertisements are submitted to Local Government Denmark[13] (Kommunernes Landsforening) with the messages: *"Let us together shape the Urban Development of the future"* and *"Let us together shape the cities of the future"*.

Translating the client as the actor of importance of the Urban Group network is observed by the interviewees as the right approach. What they do not agree upon though, is how the interessement of the client actor should be done. One interviewee stated that *"the starting point must be the client. The client actually expects that we talk together. And some of the clients expect – at least when we deal with the higher levels, be it a City Manager, a Mayor, or an Environmental Executive in a company - that we have an overview that goes a bit beyond the tip of our departments' own nose."* (Interviewee S)

Behind this ascription of significance to the client actor lays, according to Interviewee A, an understanding that *"urban should operate on the strategic level. We should not be involved with solving projects."* Thus, Urban Development should attempt to interest and enroll actors that are found at the strategic levels/higher levels in a municipality or organization, thus displacing the targeted actor away from the traditional client actor. However, the question that keeps appearing is how is this done? And the translations of this are quite different between the interviewees.

One interviewee explained that *"it is absolutely pivotal, in regards to the public authority clients, that those who are out selling and marketing this Urban thing, demonstrate familiarity of the competence area and knowledge of the clients' conditions."* (Interviewee M). Thus, from this translation, the sales team who meet the clients must be specialists that mirror the technical competence area that the team is trying to sell. Interviewee M finds that *"… the endeavors* [of the client contacts] *are abortive. My own crystal clear opinion is that you haven't utilized the knowledge and history present in the house… you have started with some people who have not been familiar with the city planning competence area[14] and not had knowledge of the client that turned out to be the primary client – public authorities that is."* (Interviewee M)

On the contrary, Interviewee C said that:

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[13] A interest group and member authority of Danish municipalities

[14] He does not term it Urban Development

"in my world, it is an absolutely necessary gamble [client contact] *you must do but our organization… we haven't got a whole lot who has that holistic big picture perspective and can go out and talk with them on that level. We can take our engineers and go out and talk to the sewage inspector about sewages but the guy who can talk to the Technical Director or the City Director; we have only got five or six in the house who is able to, who has time, or who is deployed to do it."* (Interviewee C).

The contrasting view that Interviewee C brings forward is that for Urban Development to become a competence, the sales team should needs to enroll individuals who can operate on the highest level in an organization or a municipality. The sales team cannot use engineers of a highly specialized competence i.e. sewages. Rather what is needed is individuals with a holistic approach who can communicate with the City Director. Appropriately, Interviewee C used an interesting framing, when he said 'in my world'. Here, he hits the nail on the head because the above variation in the translation of the sales team, builds on two different and competing problematizations of the world in which the Urban Group is involved. One view represented by interviewee M, who has argues for a specialist approach and thus translate it to be a concern of competence familiarity. His problematization of the situation contrasts Interviewee C's problematization as he argues for a generalist, holistic approach to Urban Development.

Through my interviews, I can observe that a struggle over the direction of the Urban Group has taken place between the holistic approach and the specialist approach. Thus, a controversial battleground is drawn up with the victor being the actor who can secure his ascription of meaning to Urban Development by enrolling actors into his network and thereby rising to become a powerful spokesman that is can represent his translation. This battle over the right to determine the understanding of Urban Development can clearly be observed through the statements of Interviewee C:

*"… mine and A's idea, or thought, behind this was that…we will have to go out and get the projects ourselves. Because then we will be in charge. And if we have sufficiently many of these projects, then it **will** be like that. That has been the tactical approach, the strategy."* (Interviewee C; his emphasis in the interview)

As Interviewee C articulates, a clear strategy for gaining significant influence over the ascriptions of meaning existed in his displacement attempt of the Urban Group network. If he manages to bring back sufficiently many projects, his ascription of meaning in the Urban Group network will win. Therefore, he starts talking to clients.

"I have now been springing around the entire kingdom to talk with the municipalities and it has been a success. But if you ask me precisely how much that has come out of it in cool cash, then not a whole lot have come out of it yet." (Interviewee C)

However,

"…we cannot have visited twenty municipalities and not return to them. If we don't we will drop the shit in the floor. We will not be invited back in again anymore if the deals and the things we have done with them end up as nothing. Then you are unreliable. So we have come that far, A and me, that the other parts of the organization have a damned obligation to pick them up. If they don't we have lost them." (ibid)

The efforts put forward by interviewee C has, according to him, been successful – although not financially. Rather, he and A have achieved, as he puts it, that BCMG '*has a damned obligation*' to continue the work that we have started. If this is not done, the end result will not just be neutral. It will be negative for BCMG.

I argue that when Interviewee C talks of success and simultaneously dissociate his success from economic results, he articulates the power struggle that he, as a powerful actor in the Urban Group, has won. He translates himself as an actor who has successfully ascribed his meaning into the Urban Group and thus displaced the OPP of the CEO towards his meaning.

Another interviewee supports the translation of Interviewee C. He said that: *"specialists, or people that cannot see further than their own nose, **must** see the bigger picture and **must** work in a different way. That's it."* (Interviewee S; his emphasizes in the interview)

Simultaneously as Interviewee C translates the Urban Group network, he also articulates the controversies that threaten the, at this point in time, somewhat stabilized Urban Group. These controversies are raised as competing problematizations by not-enrolled actors who disagree with the Urban Group meaning that he represents. He states that:

"We haven't had the strength to visit the entire organization. It has been more important to me to visit our clients that it has been [to visit] internally in the organization, from the reflection that if only the projects came to us, we would sort things out. Therefore, I have not chosen the internal - that we have done on many other occasions but we are not making money on that. Right here, I am thinking short-term. I bloody must land some major fish on the table right and – dammit - better yesterday than today." (Interviewee C)

Once more, the interdivisional cooperation is translated to be an obstacle that would be 'sorted out' if only an actual project existed. The interdivisional cooperation is *"essential for the decision-making-process"* (Status for Urban, 11/6 2009). Therefore, it is important for the Urban Group to *"always have someone from the Urban Secretariat[15] at the table – we must practice 360° thinking."* (ibid). However, this interdivisional cooperation has not been Interviewee C's prime focus for his operations. He has translated the enrollment of a client actor as more significant than the enrollment of the organization.

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[15]The Urban Group is framed by a different name by the interviewee

Thus, the interdivisional cooperation seems to be a continuous obstacle to the making of Urban Development, having emerged as controversy continuously from the very beginning of the Urban Group in 2008 and up till this time in the process as a reoccurring obstacle to interdivisional cooperation. However, in an article on the BMCG intranet, 6th of July 2009, the Urban Group has the following news:

"Urban has won its first case with a team created by Urban that span across the organization with competences from Transportation, BYG and a landscape architectural company..." (Article, 6/7, 2009).

This is the very first actual project that the Urban Group wins and the interdivisional focus is articulated in the article that is sent out as information on. This project was, at first sight, won as a consequence of a tendering procedure and a mobilization of competences from BYG and Transportation. Despite this, it is my translation that, in reality, the project was de facto won as a result of the previous four months of intensive Sales and Marketing work undertaken by the Urban. My argument is supported by an underlying controversy that I recovered from meeting minutes of the Urban Group. The following problem is described:

"Yesterday, there was an evaluation of [a] *tendering process… The process has not been satisfactory. The first proposal was not good enough and the team was, at first, given two days to improve it.* [Two individuals] *did a great job of 'fire-extinguishing'… It is suggested to document the process because if we do not win, internal fallout is very likely to take place."* (Meeting minutes, 16th June 2009).

It is not normal tendering procedure to be given to additional days to improve a submitted tender. If the submitted tender is not good enough, the bid does not win the tendering procedure. Further, a great deal of 'fire extinguishing' was done in order to keep the Developer interested in the Urban Group's network and the threat of 'internal fallout' signifies the scale of the underlying circumstances.

Despite the controversial circumstances (of which I cannot say comment on further), the project was secured as the news article states and it is interesting to observe that the article emphasizes the interdivisional cooperation between BYG and Transportation. The Urban Group has won its first project and despite the above-described hick-ups in the tendering procedure, at this moment in the progress of the Urban Group network, the constituting relations between the enrolled actors appear quite stabilized.

This argument of stabilization, I build on the observation that in Urban Group meetings minutes representing this third episode, the agendas almost exclusively focus on up-and-coming or already held meetings with clients, with references to the progress of that work on clients. E.g. On the 7th July, a trip around Jylland is described. Representatives of the Urban Group had visited four municipalities. *"A part of the trip was concerned with learning how the municipalities think. The minutes from these meetings are now sent to the Board of Directors in order for them to see our progress."* (Meeting minutes, 7/7, 2009)

The Urban Group attempts to keep the CEO enrolled in its network by reporting to her of the group's progress and the Group appears to secure the stability of the network for a substantial amount of time. However, it appears from my interviews that the minutes do not represent the full picture of the stability of the Urban Group and the hidden battles that unfolds behind the scene.

7.1.3. The Crumbling of the Urban Group Network

Securing the continued stability of the network is, according to Interviewee A, a struggle for the Urban Group.

*"You cannot develop such a large area in a corporation where you have to come out with a new message externally – to the clients – [where] you have to go out into the market and say: 'Here we are', whilst simultaneously you have to build a completely new form of cooperation that span across departments, across divisions, that is, across competences and approaches to things and also across the country. All these issues you must keep in the picture at all times and that has resulted in that Urban has become a wide range of tasks. And additionally, you also have had, simultaneously, a **giant** pressure on you with respects to the declining market where we simply must generate some projects to take home."* (Interviewee A; her emphasis in the interview).

What Interviewee A here articulates can be translated to be an indication of the crackling of the Urban Group's network. The competing problematizations, controversies and OPPs to the Urban Group's network, all attempt to displace the Group's constituting network. The competing translations results in an implosion the Urban Group's network and the interessement devices that the Urban Group has put in place to lock in place its actors. This implosion can be observed to take place in different ways.

First of all, the one of the three enrolled actors in the small Urban Group is displaced from her position by an external actor who offers her an identity that she finds attractive. In other words, she is offered a new job. *"It is a strategically stupid time that I am stopping. But I was offered the job of my dreams. However, I am very concerned that we don't drop everything on the floor."* (Interviewee A).

She further articulates that there has been a decoupling of the, in her words, large Urban Group, (as contrast to the before-mentioned close-knit group Interviewee A established). *"…what are we to do with this now because they have sort of been left out in the cold, while, at the same time, I have tried to keep them attached to me, but they have probably lost the motivation in this episode. And then everybody has focused on their own department."* (Interviewee A).

What is now happening is that one of the key actors in the Urban Group network is displaced and the network starts falling apart.

The crumbling of the network as a result of the battles of translations is also observed by Interviewee C. He offers the following translation by stating that it was a case of *"war on the knife; that is war between Transportation, i.e. Interviewee M who rightly claimed that this Urban Development was his, but* [his divisional Director] *had said no;* [the BYG Director] *said yes, and it* [the responsibility for Urban Development] *was placed over there. Thus, it has been a case of rivalry all along the way and* [Interviewee A] *has basically spent a great portion of - and* [Interviewee B] *also for that matter – spent a great portion of their lives on and that is why that you will find today that* [Interviewee B] *is as good as gone from Urban,* [Interviewee A] *finds something else and I am on the whole also more or less gone from the Group."* (Interviewee C).

The Urban Group network has been broken down through the continuous controversies, competing translations and battles of power and thus, I am approaching the end of the third episode which terminates with the deconstruction the Urban Group's network and the client and marketing focus.

What I argue that takes place toward the end of my empirical data and after this ending of the third episode, is one more displacement of the Urban Group. The Urban Group's network ties are broken down due to the ever lasting battles and controversies and the actors that were involved in the previous attempts disappear. In the aftermath, for the first time the controversy over competences is translated by one of the Interviewees as the 'real' obstacle of the Group's work. Thus, the black-box of the Urban Group as rooted in a competence division is observed by interviewee C above to be a controversy that has taken its toll on the Urban Group with the result of displacements of the central actors in the Urban Group.

What has remained from the eradication of the Urban Group's network is the initial relation to the BYG division as laid the foundation of the Urban Group in episode one.

7.1.4.   Summarizing the Third Episode

The third episode in making Urban Development a organizational competence was initiated on the previous episode's crumbled network. The Urban Group displaced its focus away from the project actor towards the client actor as an attempt to sustain the relation to the CEO. I observed how the relation among the Urban Group actors was displaced from being an informal network, towards becoming a closely-knit group due to the enrollment of Interviewee A. She reconstructed the Urban Group to become a much smaller Group in an attempt to stabilize the network and to stabilize, through ascription, the founding actors' meaning of the 'right' path for the progression of the Group's operations. Thus, critical voices were disconnected from the Urban Group in an attempt to silence them by the exclusion from the Group.

However, the new Urban Group found itself facing the controversy over interdivisional cooperation and the economic control mechanisms. The Urban Group managed to stabilize its network by negotiating the controversies by constructing an OPP where 'what can BCMG do to gain influence on the purchase habits of the clients' became the focus of the Group. By bringing back invoicable projects to the organization, the

Group will be able to ensure a successful mobilization of interdivisional cooperation and hence, subdue the controversies.

The following period emerged as stabile for the Urban Group and the Group managed to sustain the enrollment of the CEO to its new OPP. However, as I learned in my interviews, the Urban Group was continuously challenged by not-enrolled-actors who were offering competing OPPs and problematizations to that of the Urban Group. This resulted in a controversy over the holistic approach to clients versus the specialist approach to clients.

A battle over the right to decide which approach should be ascribed to the Urban Group network was observed and winning this battle was translated to be a question of bringing back projects to share with the organization. This was to be done by interesting and enrolling the client as an actor and the interdivisional cooperation was neglected by the Urban Group as a consequence because the translation of the Group was that if only the client is enrolled, the organization will follow.

However, despite the relative successful interessement and enrollment of a client, the network became destabilized. The enrolled actors in the smaller Urban Group were displaced away from the Urban Group and thus, the Group started falling apart. Interviewee A is interested in another job and thus displaced away by another organization. Further, the rooting of the Urban Group in the BYG division was translated by one of interviewees as the main obstacle for the interdivisional cooperation to take place. As such, the third episode has terminated with another deconstruction of the Urban Group.

The following events that can be observed to unfold, can be translated to be an attempt to yet again revitalize the Urban Group, to reconstruct a new network and thus an initiation of a fourth episode of making Urban Development a portfolio competence of BCMG can be claimed.

7.2. The Initiation of a Possible Fourth Episode

The unsuccessful attempt at enrolling the client actor into the Urban Group's network and thus making Urban Development a BCMG competence can be argued to initiate one more displacement of the Urban Group. I will in the following argue that a displacement is made that serve as an initiation of a fourth episode in the Urban Development competence development and implementation. Thus, I will observe the attempts made at reconfiguring the Urban Group e.g. by setting up a new OPP. Secondly, I will observe how the Urban Group articulates some of the controversies from previous episodes that I have argued, have served to destabilize the Urban Groups from the respective episodes. This fourth initialization of a period will terminate my analysis.

7.2.1. Indication of a new OPP

In a memo, dated 1st October 2009, the following articulation appears. *"The below-mentioned is a memo that serves to… dismantle the current tasks within a reasonable time frame. This with a purpose of clarifying the real projects and thus turnover of the Urban department."* (Memo, Timeschedule, 1/10 -2009).
The memo serves several purposes. Firstly, the memo translates the need for the 'new' Urban Group to gain an overview of the visits that were conducted during the previous episode. Hence, the memo refers back to the OPP of the old group. Secondly, the 'new' Urban Group must *"determine a plan for meetings for the ENTIRE future Urban-team"* (ibid; emphasized in the memo). And thirdly, *"there is to be made a model for 'Internal Branding of Urban in BCMG'"* (ibid).

The focus on internal branding and the reuniting of the ENTIRE Urban Group is to serve the purpose of *"…a necessary listing of the cross-sectional services that will serve as the founding pillar of the Urban business area. This will give the essential clarification of the services of Urban for the employees and will as a totality, strengthen the business concept of Urban."* (ibid)

The innovation processes of making Urban Development a competence (the originating OPP from the CEO) is not explicitly mentioned in this memo. However, the memo adhere to the name of 'Urban' and the by now inherent understanding of that name to be representing the idea of 'urban development', however it might be defined. A new problematization of how to make Urban Development a portfolio competence can be observed that now translate the internal support from the entire organization as key, thus placing the sales efforts in the background. As one interviewee noticed,

"It has been interestingly to hear that [a partnering landscape architectural company] *though it was a bit crazy of us to be out selling something that you don't really know what is yet..."* (Interviewee J)

As it is towards the very end of my empirical data, I do not have substantial empirical support to argue that a new episode starts that it is centered on internal support. However, what I can argue is that some indicators that were used in previous episodes to secure the support for a new Urban Group network can be observed to occur at this point in time. One example could be that in minutes from a meeting, held on 13th October 2009, it reads "[the Urban Group members] *are working on a document for the CEO with a status for the development of Urban and with an introduction for the further implementation and organization."* (Minutes of meeting, 13/10 2009). The new Group seeks to enroll and mobilize the CEO. If it succeeds, it will be given the mandate to further develop and organize Urban Development in the direction it wants to.

Another example that also point in the direction of a reconstructed Urban Group is the construction of the BCMG Urban Think Tank. Its *"mission is internally, to teach the employees to think Urban when a project is presented to them. It must be considered whether there should/could be brought other competences into perspective in order to solve the projects in the best way."* (BCMG Urban Think, 14/9 2009).

And as a last example, in the second-to-last document I have, the current situation, the problems and possible solutions of the Urban Group are articulated. Firstly:

"One of the main challenges of the Urban department has been the rooting of the department in the remaining organization. Today, there is a situation of widespread skepticism of the durability of Urban and to some extend, a reluctance to contribute to the continuous development of Urban." (Memo - the current situation, 16/10 2009).

When a situation of reluctance towards contributing to Urban exists, it appears to be impossible to make Urban Development a cross-boarder, 360° considerati on portfolio competence. *"There is a need to create a fully transparent and very easily understood concept of Urban in order to make everyone involved or future involved partners to work towards one shared goal: **A solid rooting of Urban BCMG.**"* (ibid; emphasized in the memo).

Transparency and easily understood concepts are the solution, according to this memo, to gather actors around one shared goal: a solid rooting of Urban. Thus, the new OPP of the Urban Group could be argued to be: How can we ensure a solid rooting of Urban BCMG?

This OPP seem somewhat similar to the very first original OPP of the Urban Group of: we must expand the portfolio competence to include urban development. However, the rooting of Urban Development in the organization is the central kernel that the to-be-constructed Urban Group must be displaced towards.

It appears that the Urban Group has now come a full circle around towards the OPP from the beginning of the first episode. However, the situation for the Urban Group and for BCMG is far from the same as it was back in the beginning of 2008. The Urban Group has learned from the numerous controversies and following

displacements that it has been exposed to in the wake of the Group's work. These lessons are collected and the obstacles needed to be negotiated by the group to secure the Urban Development competence are listed:

"The Management must clearly manifest the priorities
- *Up-to-date client focus*
- *Clear description of Urban services*
- *Process description for how Urban is to work with clients*
- *How is it expected that the departments are involved*
- *Qualified estimates of hours to be spend on a typical project"* (ibid)

I find that this list illustrates a number of the controversies that the Group has encountered throughout the one year and ten months of trying to make Urban Development a portfolio competence. Thus, navigating the controversies is translated to be fundamental to the success of the Urban Group.

The final mantra of the development of Urban is translated as *"a greater extent of transparency of Urban will create a better understanding. This creates a greater sense of familiarity and it brings forward more trust – which ultimately will carry that the divisions will dare to involve themselves in the interdisciplinary work of Urban."* (ibid).

As I prepare to leave the story of Urban Development in BCMG, I find myself wondering what will happen next. Because something will happen but only the future can tell whether the portfolio competence of Urban Development becomes a success or a failure for the Urban Group. However, through the controversies over the Urban Development competence, the organization has learned a tremendous amount about itself and the processes that normally lay hidden out of view in innovation projects.

7.3. Summarizing the Initiation of a possible Fourth Episode

As I reach the end of my analysis, I find that the final documents of my empirical data show an indication of a resurrection of the Urban Group. I base my argumentation on the existence of indicators that previously were used to constitute the Urban Group's network. Firstly, I observed how a reuniting of the entire Urban Group was translated to be important, thereby breaking with the previous episode's separation. Further, I observed how the Urban Group seeks to enroll the CEO by letting her know how the Group intends to pick up the pieces and bring them forward. Additionally, an Urban Think Tank is set up aimed at bringing a message out to organizational actors that need to 'think Urban'. Further, a new OPP can be claimed to be constructed focusing on 'How can we ensure a solid rooting of Urban BCMG?' around which the to-be-constructed new Urban Group must be displaced towards.

Finally, a number of controversies from previous episodes are translated as obstacles for the successful construction of the new Urban Development competence in BCMG.

It would be incorrect to state that the making of the Urban Development competence has been without results. I will argue that BCMG has learn a lot of the progressive translations of controversies and it can be observed towards the end that then Urban Group articulates some of the previous controversies that challenged the pre-existing Urban Groups. Thus, the organization has benefited from being exposed to the black-box controversies that emerged.