

Votes for Sale

Essays on Clientelism in New Democracies

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VOTES FOR SALE. ESSAYS ON CLIENTELISM IN NEW DEMOCRACIES.

PhD Series 7-2019

Louise Thorn Bøttkjær

VOTES FOR SALE. ESSAYS ON CLIENTELISM IN NEW DEMOCRACIES.

Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies

PhD Series 7.2019

CBS  **COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL**
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

Votes for sale

Essays on clientelism in new democracies

Louise Thorn Bøttkjær

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Doctoral School of Organisation and Management Studies

Copenhagen Business School

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Preface

I used to think that writing a PhD thesis would be a lonely process, but for me, the truth is that being a PhD has been just as rewarding socially as it has professionally. Any mistakes are my responsibility, but I could never have realized this project without the help and advice from my great colleagues and general support from my loved ones.

I am truly indebted to my primary supervisor Mogens Kamp Justesen, who is one of the most devoted, hardworking, thorough, and positive people I know. I am eternally grateful to Mogens for always having high ambitions on my behalf, investing tremendous amounts of time and attentiveness to my work, and tolerating me even when I have been terribly worrisome, stubborn, or acted as a slightly arrogant PhD student. Over the past three years and during our many trips to South Africa, Mogens has not only been an incredible supervisor; he has become a great friend.

I would like to thank my secondary supervisor, Jacob Gerner Hariri, for always being supporting, providing me with valuable feedback, giving me the courage to aim for top-notch journals, and hosting me for three months at Copenhagen University. At Copenhagen University, I would also like to thank Anders Woller Nielsen and Benjamin Carl Krag Egerod for being stand-up guys and keeping me company during lunch and coffee breaks and Lene Holm Pedersen for providing me with excellent feedback on my papers, valuable academic career advice, and interesting hiking tips.

I thank the Independent Research Fund Denmark which funded the project of Crooked Politics,¹ which my PhD project is part of. Also, big thanks to Scott Gates for contributing to great discussions on our article and being excellent company in South Africa. I feel privileged that I was able to work with Washeelah Kapery and the rest of the talented team at Citizen Surveys on the data collection process. The trips to South Africa have, without a doubt, been the most rewarding part of my PhD, and I am truly grateful to Washeelah for making all of our demands possible, showing us around Cape Town, and welcoming Mogens, me, and our families into her home.

¹ Crooked Politics: Vote Markets and Redistribution in New Democracies (DFF – 4182-00080).

I have appreciated the company of my colleagues in the department, especially my fellow PhD students. The PhD communities' Friday breakfasts have been a welcome distraction in a sometimes stressful and competitive environment. I would especially like to emphasize my "Black Diamond" crew, Lea Foverskov, who has become one of my closest friends, and Mart Laatsit, with whom I have shared many great conversations. I am also grateful to Janine Leschke and Antje Vetterlein for their service as PhD coordinators. Janine's care for and devotion to the PhD community has been amazing. I have also had the pleasure of engaging with the members of our research theme, RT2. Thanks especially to Manuele Citi for coordinating these seminars, and to Jens Olav Dahlgaard, whom I consider one of the brightest and most helpful scholars I know, for providing me with very constructive feedback on my dissertation in the final stages of my project. I am also grateful to Caroline de la Porte for her service as Head of the Department throughout most of my employment and her engagement in the PhD community. I would also like to thank the PhD support for their amazing help and patience with my—at times—stupid questions.

I have had the privilege of teaching and supervising the extremely talented students at CBS. Their insightful questions and eagerness to learn has been a great motivation and has helped me develop as a teacher and a researcher. Most of my teaching was coordinated by Eddie Ashbee, who is truly a stand-up guy. Eddie's passion for teaching has been a tremendous inspiration, and it has always been a pleasure to knock on his door and talk with him about teaching, academia, and lines of argument. I would like to thank Yosef Bhatti, Nicholas Charron, Peter Sandholt Jensen, and Merete Bech Seeberg for taking time out of their busy schedules to read parts of my dissertation and provide me with valuable comments at my first and second work-in-progress seminar.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, my siblings, and my husband. Thanks to Jacob, my husband and the love of my life, for his love and admiration. I am forever grateful to him for taking on the task of planning our wedding in the final stages of my PhD and for sharing my enthusiasm for the project despite his total lack of interest in statistics and vote buying. Thanks to my father for his encouragement, loving support, and his cherished advice. It was during a long conversation with my father in his kitchen over three years ago that I took the definitive decision to write a PhD thesis. Thanks to my mother for her eternal love, who despite being a mother of five, always seems to have time enough on her hands to listen to my worries. Her ceaseless Spiderman-mantra "with great powers comes great responsibility" kept me going even when I wanted to give up. Therefore, I dedicate this dissertation to you, Mom.

English abstract

During electoral campaigns in new democracies, parties and candidates often employ clientelist strategies such as vote buying to mobilize electoral support. The academic consensus is that when voters are offered gifts or money in exchange for their votes, it has detrimental consequences for democratic and economic development. Therefore, it is imperative to explore *to what extent, why, and how does clientelism occur in new democracies?* A framing paper and four articles address this question using new survey data from South Africa and cross-country data from Africa and Latin America.

The framing paper develops a conceptual framework of vote buying as a four-step process, validates why South Africa is a relevant setting for the study of clientelism and outlines the extensive data collection conducted for this dissertation. Using an unobtrusive measurement technique called the list experiment, the first article explores the level of vote buying during the 2016 municipal election campaign in South Africa. Furthermore, the first article provides a methodological contribution to the literature by conducting an experimental test of an augmented version of the list experiment against the classic list experiment and showing that the augmented procedure produces biased results. The second article examines why candidates employ vote buying as a strategy to mobilize electoral support when the ballot is nominally secret, which enables voters to renege on their vote bargain commitments and vote as they please. The third article explores why voters vote for corrupt candidates, which enhances our understanding of how clientelism can mitigate voters' willingness to punish corrupt politicians. The fourth article examines how the character of the electoral system affects the relationship between poverty and vote buying in Africa and Latin America.

Overall, this dissertation increases our theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge of how widespread clientelism is in the developing world and why and under what conditions it flourishes. This dissertation contributes conceptually, methodologically, empirically, and substantially to the literature on clientelism and vote buying and has important implications for policy makers seeking to reduce the prevalence of clientelism in new democracies.

Dansk resumé

I nye demokratier, anvender partier og kandidater ofte klientelistiske strategier, såsom stemmekøb, for at mobilisere stemmer i valgkampagnen. Der er akademisk konsensus om, at udvekslingen af gaver og penge for stemmer er skadelig for den demokratiske og økonomiske udvikling. Derfor er det afgørende at undersøge *i hvor høj grad, hvorfor og hvordan klientelisme finder sted i nye demokratier?* Et rammesættende dokument og fire artikler adresserer dette spørgsmål ved brug af ny spørgeskema-data fra Sydafrika og tværlandedata fra Afrika og Latinamerika.

Det rammesættende dokument udvikler en konceptuel model for stemmekøb som en firetrinns proces, validerer hvorfor Sydafrika udgør en relevant kontekst for studiet af klientelisme og fremlægger den omfattende dataindsamling foretaget ifm. denne afhandling. Den første artikel bruger listeesperimentet – en ikke-pågående måleteknik – til at undersøge frekvensen af stemmekøb under den kommunale valgkampagne i Sydafrika i 2016. Derudover udgør den første artikel et metodisk bidrag til litteraturen, idet artiklen sammenligner en augmenteret version af listeesperimentet med det oprindelige listeesperiment, og viser at den augmenterede fremgangsmåde producerer systematisk bias. Den anden artikel analyserer, hvorfor kandidater bruger stemmekøb til at mobilisere stemmer, når afstemninger er hemmelige, hvorfor vælgere kan undlade at overholde deres del stemmekøbsaftalen, og i stedet stemme som de vil. Den tredje artikel undersøger, hvorfor vælgere stemmer på korrupte kandidater, hvilket øger vores forståelse for, hvordan klientelisme kan begrænse vælgeres tendens til at afstraffe korrupte politikere. Den fjerde artikel eksaminerer hvordan valg-systemets karakter påvirker forholdet mellem fattigdom og stemmekøb i Afrika og Latinamerika.

Helt overordnet øger denne afhandling vores teoretiske forståelse og empiriske viden om hvor udbredt klientelisme er i udviklingslande, og hvorfor og under hvilke forhold det flourerer. Denne afhandling bidrager konceptuelt, metodisk, empirisk og substantielt til litteraturen om klientelisme og stemmekøb og har stor betydning for de beslutningstagere, der ønsker at udrydde forekomsten af stemmekøb i nye demokratier.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

When deciding between different political strategies to attract voters, political candidates are confronted with a fundamental dilemma because “bad policies can be good politics and good policies can be bad politics” (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). On the one hand, policies that promote democratic development and economic growth such as free education and universal health care may not be electorally attractive for office-seeking candidates. On the other hand, clientelism—the exchange of votes or political support in return for material inducements—may be electorally effective (Wantchekon 2003; Keefer 2005; Vicente 2014) yet distorts the democratic process and generates poverty traps (Magaloni 2006; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013).

While early scholars considered clientelism as a preindustrial political phenomenon that would disappear as societies modernized both economically and democratically (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Landé 1977; Schmidt et al. 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981), most recent studies view clientelism as a political strategy that political candidates—particularly in new democracies—select over programmatic policies to attract and mobilize voters (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Shefter 1994; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013).

The objective of this dissertation is to answer the following research question: *To what extent, why, and how does clientelism occur in new democracies?* Building on field experiments and regression analyses of numerous data sources including cross-country data and two new surveys from South Africa, this dissertation—which consists of a framing paper and four articles—seeks to increase our knowledge of how widespread clientelism is in new democracies such as South Africa and why and under what conditions it flourishes. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the four articles’ title, publication status, and whether and with whom they are co-authored.

Table 1.1 Author and publication status for the four articles

<i>No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Publication Status</i>
1	Crying wolf: An experimental test of the augmented list experiment	Single-authored	R&R from Political Analysis
2	Electoral clientelism, beliefs and the secret ballot	Co-authored with MKJ*, JGH** and SG***	Submitted to World Politics
3	Why do voters support corrupt politicians? Experimental evidence from South Africa	Co-authored with MKJ*	Submitted to American Journal of Political Science
4	Buying the votes of the poor: How the electoral system matters	Co-authored with MKJ*	R&R from Electoral Studies

NOTE: *Professor MSO and primary supervisor Mogens Kamp Justesen, Copenhagen Business School. ** Professor MSO and secondary supervisor Jacob Gerner Hariri, Copenhagen University. *** Professor Scott Gates, Oslo University.

The dissertation does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the causes and underlying conditions of all varieties of clientelism. Instead, I restrict my analysis to *electoral* clientelism, that is, strategies that involve the distribution of benefits exclusively during electoral campaigns (Gans-Morse et al. 2014). I recognize that electoral clientelism is merely one aspect of clientelism as clientelism is not limited to conditional exchanges exclusively before elections. For example, Robinson and Verdier (2013) discuss a type of *relational clientelism*, that is, patronage politics—the distribution of public sector jobs in exchange for political support (Weingrod 1968)—that involves an iterated clientelist relationship between the candidate and the citizen (Auyero 2001; Hicken 2011; Kitschelt 2000; Levitsky 2003; Nichter 2010; Powell 1970; Scott 1969)

More specifically, I focus on one particular electoral clientelist strategy, *vote buying*, defined as “the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote” (Brusco et al. 2004, 67). I acknowledge that electoral clientelism involves a broader set of electoral exchanges, such as turnout buying (rewarding citizens for turning out to vote), abstention buying (rewarding citizens for abstaining from voting), double persuasion (rewarding citizens for vote choice and turnout) (Nichter 2008, 2010, 2014; Gans-Morse et al. 2014), and voter buying (rewarding non-registered citizens from other districts for registering) (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016).

Although, electoral clientelism has been the main focus of most recent clientelist literature (Callahan and McCargo 1996; Stokes 2005; Lehoucq 2007; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Nichter 2008; Hidalgo and Nichter 2016; Gans-Morse et al. 2014), and although vote buying has undoubtedly been the electoral clientelist strategy that has received the most attention (Bratton 2008; Brusco et al. 2004; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kramon 2016; Nichter 2014; Schaffer and Schedler 2007;

Stokes 2005), this dissertation provides new conceptual, methodological, empirical, and substantial insights to the literature.

Conceptually, this dissertation develops a novel approach for analyzing vote buying that combines existing conceptual discussions of clientelism into one framework.

Methodologically, this dissertation's most important contribution is an experimental test comparing an augmented version of the list experiment (Corstange 2009) with the classic list experiment that shows that the augmented list experiment creates biased results. This finding has important implications for researchers using list experiments to measure sensitive issues.

Empirically, this dissertation relies on data from three different sources: Besides building a cross-national dataset with 56 countries in Africa and Latin America from existing data sources, I traveled to South Africa in 2016 and 2017 to conduct two surveys that included several list and survey experiments. Thus, the majority of my conclusions are based on the new surveys from South Africa. These data have two key advantages. First, creating new surveys from scratch allows for survey designs that facilitate answers to questions that have previously been elusive in the literature. Second, focusing on South Africa provides a new context for the study of vote buying as most work has been done on vote buying in Latin America (Rueda 2015; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Nichter 2008; Auyero 2001; Brusco et al. 2004; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Larreguy et al. 2016; Imai et al. 2015; Magaloni 2006; Nichter and Peress 2016; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012).

Substantially, this dissertation adds to four different fields of literature. First, the dissertation speaks to the growing literature on electoral clientelism and its link to poverty (Aidt and Jensen 2016; Mares 2015; De Kadt and Larreguy 2018; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Kao et al. 2018; Stokes et al. 2013; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Nichter 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005, Mares and Young 2016). While scholars mostly agree on the adverse relationship between poverty and vote buying, an unanswered question is why poor countries do not always experience frequent vote buying. I argue that the character of the electoral system affects candidates' incentives to employ vote buying and shows that the electoral system can condition poverty's effect on vote buying across countries. Second, this dissertation adds to the literature on electoral institutions, 'the personal vote,' and corruption (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang 2005; Chang and Golden 2007; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Charron 2011; Alt and Lassen 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003; Lizzieri and Persico 2001). Whereas most studies in this field focus on generic forms of political and administrative corruption, I investigate how electoral institutions affect vote buying, a form of electoral corruption that affects candidates' chances of being elected to office. My findings demonstrate that poor countries with an elec-

toral system that cultivates the personal vote provide the favorable conditions for vote buying to flourish. Third, this dissertation adds to the burgeoning literature on the enforcement and effectiveness of vote buying, a question that remains unresolved and highly contested. While some scholars argue that vote choices cannot be enforced causing vote buying to be an ineffective strategy (Guardado and Wantchekon 2018; Kao et al. 2018; Lindberg 2013; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012; Van de Walle 2007), others argue that political machines enforce vote bargains, which renders vote buying an effective way to increase electoral support (Kramon 2016; Brusco et al. 2004; Wantchekon 2003). By arguing that secret ballot perceptions can condition the effectiveness of vote buying, I bridge the gap between these two conflicting arguments. My results suggest that vote buying is effective even when candidates are unable to monitor vote choices if voters doubt that they can cast their ballot in secret. Fourth, this dissertation contributes to the studies examining why voters vote for corrupt politicians (Bauhr and Charron 2017; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013, 2016; McNally 2016; Anduiza et al. 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Weschle 2016). Whereas these studies often limit their focus to examine one explanation, I compare different explanations through an experimental design that circumvents causal identification problems.


1.1 Sub-questions and structure of the dissertation

The research questions have been divided into four sub-questions (SQ):

- RQ To what extent, why, and how does clientelism occur in new democracies?**
- SQ1 *To what extent does vote buying occur in South Africa?*
- SQ2 *Why do candidates use vote buying to mobilize electoral support in the presence of ballot secrecy?*
- SQ3 *Why do voters vote for corrupt candidates?*
- SQ4 *How does the character of the electoral system condition poverty's effect on vote buying in new democracies?*

Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the framing paper and the four articles. The purpose of the framing paper that you are currently reading is to provide an overview of the commonalities of the four articles and how they relate to the overall research question. Each article addresses one of the four sub-questions and simultaneously relates to one of the chapters of the framing paper. The articles can be found in full length at the end of the framing paper. The dissertation takes a deductive approach, and in each of the four articles, I develop hypotheses that are tested empirically through quantitative and experimental research designs. While three of the four articles examine clientelism in South Africa, one article investigates a broader set of developing countries across Africa and Latin America.

Figure 1.1 The relationship between the framing paper, sub-questions, and articles



Article 1 answers the first sub-question: To what extent does vote buying occur in South Africa? The question is important for two key reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, South Africa provides a new case for the study of the prevalence of vote buying. Second, since vote buying is illegal and typically associated with negative social stigma, survey questions asking respondents directly if they have been targeted with vote buying offers tend to underestimate its prevalence, which causes measurement bias. To address the issue of measurement bias in surveys and to obtain an unobtrusive estimate of vote buying in South Africa, I employ and compare several survey measures—including two list experiments.

Both *article 2* and *article 3* answer *why* questions. *Article 2* answers the second sub-question: *Why do candidates use vote buying to mobilize electoral support in the presence of ballot secrecy?* *Article 2* addresses a central dispute among scholars concerning how vote bargains are enforced and whether vote buying is an effective political strategy. To address this unresolved quarrel in the literature, I argue that voter's belief in the secret ballot guide their responses to vote buying offers and show that vote buying is an effective strategy if it targets voters who lack confidence in the secret ballot.

Article 3 answers the third sub-question: *Why do voters vote for corrupt candidates?* The question addresses a paradox of democratic elections because elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office, but in practice, voters frequently vote for corrupt candidates. Addressing this paradox increases our understanding of why candidates decide to employ clientelism as a

political strategy to win elections. Unlike the other three articles, which examine vote buying, *article 3* focuses on a different type of clientelism, namely patronage—the exchange of public sector jobs in return for political support (Robinson and Verdier 2013).

Article 4 answers the fourth sub-question: *How does the character of the electoral system condition poverty's effect on vote buying in new democracies?* The question is relevant because poverty is often emphasized as the most important source of vote buying (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Scott 1969; Bratton 2008), however not all poor voters are targeted, and very little is known about what factors condition the relationship between poverty and electoral clientelism. To answer this question, *article 4* examines how the electoral system affects the relationship between poverty and vote buying across a broader set of developing countries across Africa and Latin America and employs regression analysis with an interaction term.

The rest of the framing paper proceeds as follows. While **chapter 1** has presented the research question, contribution, and structure of the PhD thesis, in **chapter 2**, I move on to review the literature on vote buying in order to conceptualize vote buying, present theories of the causes of vote buying, and highlight a fundamental puzzle of vote buying, namely why candidates buy votes when the secret ballot allows voters to renege on their commitments and vote as they please. *Article 2* is related to the puzzle because it demonstrates how lack of confidence in the secret ballot is enough to sway voter behavior in accordance with the wishes of clientelist parties. In **chapter 3**, I present the context and case selection of this dissertation, more specifically, the 2016 South African municipal elections. *Article 4* is related to the case selection as it analyzes what conditions are ripe for vote buying across 56 countries in South Africa and Latin America. I use the results from *article 4* to substantiate the case selection of South Africa. **Chapter 4** presents the methods and data of this dissertation. *Article 1* relates to the discussion of how to measure vote buying without getting biased results as the article compares the truthfulness of different survey estimates to measure a sensitive issue like vote buying. Finally, **chapter 5** concludes the dissertation, highlights the potential for further studies and discusses the broader implications of vote buying for the society and policy makers. *Article 3* is related to the implications by examining why people vote for corrupt politicians. The article finds that voters' willingness to punish corrupt candidates is less severe when voters expect to receive clientelist benefits in return for their vote. The finding suggests that vote buying not only undermines the democratic process of elections but serves to breed corruption—which potentially has far worse consequences for society than vote buying.

Chapter 2

Concept and theory

In this chapter, I present the concept and theories of vote buying. First, I define the term “vote buying” to avoid lack of conceptual clarity (Nichter 2014), outline the conceptual discussions in the clientelist literature and develop a novel conceptual framework of vote buying. Second, I present the most salient causes that explain the presence of vote buying and outline the theoretical explanations that each article relies on.

2.1 Conceptualizing vote buying—a new framework

In the field of political science, the use of the term “vote buying” has increased substantially in recent years. In figure 2.1, I plot the results from a search on the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI). For each of the years from 2000 to 2017, I count the number of articles with the search topic “vote buying” within the web of science category of political science.

Figure 2.1 Article count on *vote buying* within political science from 2000-2017





Figure 2.1 shows a clear trend: From 2000 to 2010, the number of vote-buying articles is relatively stable with an average of nine articles per year. From 2011, the number of articles increases sharply with an average of 27 articles per year. The increasing number of articles demonstrates an increasing interest in vote buying; unfortunately, however, it has also led to a diverse use of the term and a lack of conceptual clarity (Nichter 2014).

In this dissertation, I define vote buying as “the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote” (Brusco et al.’s 2004, 67). This definition implies that vote buying is an economic transaction between vote buyers (candidates, parties, or brokers) and vote sellers (voters), so when candidates deliver benefits to voters, the transaction aspect of vote buying involves that voters reciprocate by voting for that candidate. Thus, vote buying can be either effective or ineffective depending on whether voters do, in fact, reciprocate the favor, and as I noted in the introduction, vote buying is also a case of something broader, namely electoral clientelism, which, in turn, is merely one aspect of clientelism, which, again, is a type of political strategy. Although Brusco et al.’s (2004) definition allows me to develop a systematized² concept of vote buying and reduce conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), I outline a funnel approach to the conceptualization of vote buying to establish how vote buying differs from these broader concepts (see figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 A funnel approach to vote buying and four conceptual discussions



² A systematized concept is the “specific formulation of a concept adopted by a particular researcher or group of researchers”, in contrast, a background concept is “the constellation of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530).

Each step in the figure corresponds to four conceptual discussions within the clientelist literature. The first debate relates to the discussion of how clientelism differs from other political strategies. Whereas early scholars viewed clientelism as a feature belonging to traditional societies that would eventually disappear when the country developed democratically and economically (Boissevain 1966; Scott 1969), more recent studies view clientelism as a political strategy³ that parties use across countries with varying levels of economic development (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Hicken 2011; Hidalgo and Nichter 2016; Mares and Young 2016; Nichter 2008, 2010, 2014; Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; Shefter 1994; Stokes et al. 2013). Some of these recent scholars explain how clientelism differs from other forms of distributive politics such as programmatic politics, pork-barrel politics, and partisan bias (Hicken 2011; Mares and Young 2016; Nichter 2014; Stokes et al. 2013).

The second debate relates to the discussion of how electoral clientelism differs from other modes of clientelism. Gans-Morse et al. (2014), Mares and Young (2016), and Nichter (2010; 2014) argue that a fundamental distinction lies between strategies of electoral and relational clientelism. Electoral clientelism involves clientelist exchanges during campaigns in which candidates hand out benefits to voters before election day (Nichter 2010). By contrast, relational clientelism involves ongoing relationships beyond campaigns, where candidates handout at least some benefits to citizens after election day (Nichter 2010).


The third debate relates to the discussion of how vote buying differs from other electoral clientelist strategies. Nichter (2008; 2010; 2014) argues that scholars often conflate vote buying with other strategies of electoral clientelism such as turnout buying (rewarding citizens for turning out to vote), abstention buying (rewarding citizens for abstaining from voting), and double persuasion (rewarding citizens for vote choice and turnout).

The fourth debate relates to the discussion of how vote buying differs from a simple economic transaction because the buyers have no guarantees that voters who accept their vote bribes will comply on election day (Schaffer and Schedler 2005). This discussion highlights the difference between scholars arguing that vote buying is an effective electoral strategy (Brusco et al. 2004; Finan and Schechter 2012; Gingerich and Medina 2013; Rueda 2017; Stokes 2005), and those arguing that vote buying is futile because voters can accept the vote bribe and then vote as they please (Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012; Guardo and Wanthekon 2018; Lindberg 2013).

³ Rather than regarding clientelism as a simple political strategy, some scholars consider a broader range of positive as well as negative inducements such as election-time threats, political coercion, and violence (Mares and Young 2016, 2018; Bratton 2008)

I am not the first scholar to examine how the concept of vote buying has been applied in the literature, nor am I the first to develop a conceptual framework of vote buying. However, in contrast to the past literature that regards these four conceptual discussions as separate and unrelated (Hicken 2011; Mares and Young 2016; Nichter 2010, 2014), I combine the conceptual discussions into one framework by conceptualizing vote buying as a four-step process (figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Four steps in the vote-buying process



The first step in the vote-buying process happens *ex ante* the transaction and concerns the candidate's choice of employing clientelism as a strategy to win office. The first and second steps relate to the demand side of the transaction. I relate the first step to the discussion of how clientelism differs from other political strategies and modes of distributive politics. The second step concerns the transaction from the vote buyer's perspective, in other words who the vote buyer is and what he has to offer. I relate the second step to the discussion of how electoral clientelism differs from clientelism in general. The third and fourth steps relate to the supply side of the transaction. The third step concerns the transaction from the vote seller's perspective, in other words, who the vote-seller is what, she has to offer. I relate the third step to the discussion of how vote buying differs from other types of electoral clientelist exchanges. The fourth step happens *ex post* the transaction, and concerns the voter's response to the vote bribe, which determines if vote buying is an effective strategy. I relate the fourth step to the discussion of how vote buying differs from a simple economic transaction and examine a fundamental puzzle of vote buying, that is, in the presence of the secret ballot, what prevents voters from accepting the bribe and voting as they please?


These conceptual tasks yield three important contributions: First, I unify four conceptual discussions—what distinguishes *a)* clientelism from other political strategies, *b)* electoral clientelism from other modes of clientelism, *c)* vote buying from other electoral clientelist strategies, and *d)* vote buying from a simple economic transaction—into one framework seeing vote buying as a process in four steps. Second, I add to the literature on the puzzle of vote buying and the secret ballot by relaxing the assumption that violations of the secret ballot can occur and argue instead that altering

voters' secret ballot perceptions is enough to ensure the effectiveness of vote buying. Third, I extend Nichter's (2008; 2014) excellent conceptual typology of electoral clientelist strategies by integrating Hidalgo and Nichter's (2016) non-registered-voters dimension and inserting confidence in the secret ballot as an additional dimension.

2.1.1 First step: How clientelism differs from other political strategies

The first step concerns the candidate's choice of clientelism as a political strategy to win office. Kitschelt (2000) argues that candidates explicitly choose whether to engage in clientelism when competing for electoral support, and thus clientelism is just one of many political strategies. There are, however, at least four features that differentiate clientelism from other political strategies. This is illustrated in figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4 Four characteristics that differentiate clientelism from other political strategies



NOTE: The dark grey boxes indicate a *yes* to each question, and the light boxes indicate a *no* to each question. The figure is adapted from Stokes et al. (2013, 7).

First, parties or candidates who apply clientelism as a political strategy will potentially win office because of their ability to redistribute goods, in other words, clientelist approaches have a social welfare aspect (Dixit and Londregan 1996). Indeed, clientelism is not a programmatic redistribution, but if the alternative is that the voter receives even fewer benefits, then clientelism is “not such a bad bargain” (Hicken 2011, 302). Distributive politics, on the other hand, is aimed at providing opportunities, public goods, and services to the whole population (Stokes et al. 2013, 6).

Second, it is not just the redistributive nature of clientelism that sets it apart from other political strategies (Hicken 2011). Clientelism is also an example of a non-programmatic strategy because the distributions of clientelist benefits are not based on publicly known criteria (Stokes et al.

2013, 7). Pork barrel politics is another example of a non-programmatic strategy. Burgess et al. (2012) offers an example of “pork” in their study of Kenyan politics, where they show that the Kenyan president places extensively more paved roads in districts where his ethnicity is dominant. For a strategy to be programmatic, on the other hand, the criteria of distribution must be public (Stokes et al. 2013, 7).

Third, clientelism is excludable and targets individual or small groups of citizens⁴. Candidates may target specific groups of voters, for example by promising more resources to their home constituency (Stokes 2005), hoping to generate future electoral support. However, once the pork is delivered to those districts, the citizens of the targeted districts cannot be excluded (Nichter 2014, 322). Thus, clientelism is distinctive from non-excludable strategies like pork-barrel politics as it involves distributing selective benefits to individuals (Nichter 2014, 323).

Fourth, although other political strategies may target specific groups, clientelism always comes with “strings attached” (Hicken 2011, 291). It is this quid-pro-quo nature of clientelism that differentiates it from other non-programmatic and excludable strategies like partisan bias. An example of partisan bias can be found in Diaz-Cayeros et al.’s (2006) study of the 2006 Mexican presidential elections. Here, they find that programs distributed individual benefits to the poor, hoping to enhance Calderón’s political support. While partisan bias is based on the notion that generosity boosts goodwill toward the party or candidate, clientelism entails that generosity will turn benefits into political support, not just because of goodwill, but because that is part of the bargain (Stokes et al. 2013, 13).

2.1.2 Second step: How electoral clientelism differs from other modes of clientelism

The second step concerns the actual transaction between the vote buyer and the vote seller from the vote buyer’s perspective. By defining who does the vote buying, *when* and with *what* offers, I can distinguish electoral clientelism, such as vote buying, from other modes of clientelism, such as patronage.

In the early literature on clientelism, the vote buyer was the actual candidate competing to win office, and scholars of clientelism assumed that candidates interacted with voters directly (Scott 1972; Landé 1977; Mainwaring 1999). In the recent literature, however, brokers and party operatives are emphasized as key players in the patron-clientelist relationship. Unlike party leaders, who are typically “elected officials at higher levels of government” (Stokes et al. 2013, 75), brokers are “local intermediaries” (Stokes et al. 2013, 75) who interact face-to-face with a particular set of voters to

⁴ Yet in a recent study, Casas (2018) argues that clientelist parties may use vote buying and turnout buying to target groups of voters or voter districts if they do not know the individual preferences of the voters.

observe their behavior and gain knowledge about their political preferences. Party leaders thus rely on these brokers to buy the necessary votes and may never meet the targeted citizens (Weingrod 1968; Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005; Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Yet, in municipal elections candidates may do the brokering themselves and engage in frequent face-to-face interactions with voters to maintain local networks (Stokes et al. 2013, 75).

Hicken (2011), Nichter (2010, 2014), and Schaffer (2007) emphasize that a key attribute of electoral clientelism that distinguishes it from relational clientelism is the *timing* of the exchange. While some scholars argue that vote buying can involve politicians handing out future benefits in return for electoral support (Desposato 2007; Schaffer and Schedler 2007), most scholars agree that vote buying takes place *ex ante*—and typically on or soon before—election day (Baland and Robinson 2007; Bratton 2008; Brusco et al. 2004; Cornelius 2004; Cox and Kousser 1981; Finan and Schechter 2012; Gonzales-Ocantos et al. 2012; Hicken 2007; Kramon 2016; Stokes 2005; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009).

Furthermore, Nichter (2010) argues that the timing of electoral clientelism creates credibility problems that do not arise with relational clientelist exchanges. Because candidates hand out rewards before election day in the case of electoral clientelism, voters are likely to defect from their commitments and vote as they please (Nichter 2010). Conversely, in the case of relational clientelism, voters can expect to receive their reward only if the clientelist candidate is, indeed, elected, and thus voters are inclined to follow through on their electoral promises (Nichter 2010).

Denoting which rewards vote buyers exchange for electoral support is also a cause of contention in the vote-buying literature. Brusco et al. (2004) and Stokes (2005) mention a variety of handouts including cash, food, goods, and services. In their study of vote buying in Argentina, Brusco et al. (2004) find that food is the most frequently distributed vote-buying reward (2004: 69). This finding corresponds with my results from the survey data (round 1) in South Africa, where the most commonly reported vote-buying reward is food parcels.⁵ Also, both the Argentinian respondents in Brusco et al.’s study (2004, 69) and the South African respondents in my study mention money, clothing, alcohol, and favors.

Some scholars also consider employment and jobs as a vote-buying reward (Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Cornelius 2004; Baland and Robinson 2007; Lehoucq 2007). However, I agree with the majority of scholars that jobs for votes should be characterized as patronage rather than vote buying (Hicken 2011, Nichter 2014, Schaeffer 2007; Stokes 2009, 605-606). Patronage differs from vote buying for at least two reasons: First, with vote buying, both the incumbent party and opposi-

⁵ Food parcels include several household items and foods and typically have a sizable value for the receiver.

tion parties can buy votes, while in the case of patronage, the patron must be an office holder to offer a public-sector job⁶ (Hicken 2011, 295). Second, with vote buying; cash and food rewards are distributed *before* election day, while with patronage, employment in the public sector is a *future benefit* contingent on whether the patron wins office (Nichter 2014, 317; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009, 294).

2.1.3 *Third step: vote buying differs from electoral clientelist strategies*

The third step concerns the actual transaction from the vote seller's perspective. By defining *which* citizens are targeted and *what* actions these citizens exchange, I can distinguish vote buying from other electoral clientelist strategies. While Stokes' (2005) influential article focuses exclusively on vote buying, examining how parties bribe weakly opposed voters to switch their votes, Nichter (2008, 20) argues that "much of what scholars interpret as vote buying (exchanging rewards for vote choices) may actually be turnout buying (exchanging rewards for turnout)."

Preference buying, the main focus of most scholars (Bratton 2008; Brusco et al. 2004; Çarkoğlu and Aytac, 2015; Finan and Schechter 2012; Gallego and Wantchekon 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2014; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Kramon 2016; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Stokes 2005; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), targets indifferent or opposition voters by providing them benefits to sway their vote choices. Parties *rewarding loyalists* deliver benefits to mobilized voters who would vote for the party anyway (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2006)⁷. *Turnout buying* targets un-mobilized supporters, rewarding them for turning out to vote. In his study of Argentina, Nichter (2008) demonstrates that supporters are more often targeted than opposition or swing voters and argues that this suggests that turnout buying is more common than vote buying. However, there may be an alternative explanation of why supporters are more often targeted than opposition or swing voters. Stokes et al. (2013, 130-151) propose a broker-mediated targeting theory and argue that while party leaders prioritize distributing resources to swing districts, brokers have an incentive to target loyal partisans. Parties engaging in *double persuasion* provide rewards to influence vote choices and induce turnout (Chubb 1982, 171). In *abstention buying*, parties reward indifferent or opposing citizens for not voting (Cox and Kousser 1981, Schaffer 2002; Cornelius 2004). In *voter buying*—a concept introduced by Hidalgo and Nichter (2016)—parties provide benefits to outsiders, that is, voters registered in other districts, to transfer their electoral registration and vote for the party.

⁶ According to a study by Frye et al. (2014), patronage need not be related to a public sector job. Instead, they argue that political candidates win elections by inducing employers to mobilize their employees to vote for them, and thus, patronage can take the form of a job at the local business tycoon's firm and be offered by both the incumbent and opposition party.

⁷ According to Nichter (2014, 325), rewarding loyalists should be characterized as a type of relational clientelism rather than electoral clientelism, since rewarding loyalists involves on-going benefits that extend beyond electoral campaigns.

While turnout buying mobilizes supporting non-voters within the district, voter buying shapes the electorate's composition by importing supporting voters from outside the district (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016, 437)⁸. Finally, *non-voter buying* targets citizens not registered in the vote buyer's district and not inclined to vote (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016, 437).

In this thesis, I use the term *vote buying* as an umbrella term including *rewarding loyalists*, *preference buying*, and *double persuasion*. This understanding of vote buying differs from Nichter's conceptualization (2008, 2010, 2014) as he argues that vote buying should cover only preference buying. I broaden the concept to these three strategies because all three emphasize rewarding vote choices regardless of whether the voter was inclined to abstain (double persuasion) or vote for the party anyway (rewarding loyalists), which corroborates Brusco et al.'s (2004) definition. I recognize, however, that the other electoral clientelist strategies exist and agree with Gans-Morse et al. (2014) that political machines may combine a variety of electoral clientelist strategies depending on contextual factors such as compulsory voting and ballot secrecy.

2.1.4 Fourth step: How vote buying differs from a simple economic transaction

The fourth step concerns how voters respond to the vote bribe. In his study of vote buying in Nigerian elections, Bratton (2008) distinguishes between three alternative voter responses to a vote bribe: to refuse, defect, or comply. When refusing, the voter declines to enter into an arrangement to trade her vote. When complying, the voter enters into a vote-buying agreement and votes in accordance with the instructions of the vote buyer. When defecting, the voter also enters into a vote-buying agreement but with no intention of complying because the voter will renege on her commitments on election day by voting as she pleases or by failing to vote at all (Bratton 2008, 622). Thus, vote buying differs from a simple economic transaction because vote buyers are not guaranteed to get what they paid for (Schaffer and Schedler 2005). This uncertainty highlights a fundamental puzzle in the vote-buying literature, namely, why do candidates employ vote buying as a strategy to win office when the secret ballot allows voters to accept the bribe and then vote as they please? If most voters defect, candidates would learn that vote buying is ineffective and abandon it as a strategy (Brusco et al. 2004).

There is little consensus among scholars about the answer to this puzzle. Some scholars argue that secret ballot violations are relatively rare and that parties—particularly in Africa—do not have capacities to monitor vote choices during elections (Bratton 2008; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012; Guardado and Wanthekon 2018; Lindberg 2013; Van de Walle 2007). Consequently, these scholars

⁸ Voter-buying differs from gerrymandering in that gerrymandering manipulates the boundaries of the electoral constituency, while voter-buying imports non-registered voters from other constituencies.

regard vote buying as an inefficient electoral strategy. Others argue that clientelist parties monitor voters to ensure compliance with the vote bargain and ensure the effectiveness of vote buying (Rueda 2017; Gingerich and Medina 2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012). For example, political machines may monitor voters by handing out carbon paper so voters can copy their ballots (Schaffer and Schedler 2005, 11), by lending out mobile phones with cameras so voters can photograph how they vote (Schaffer and Schedler 2005, 11), by handing out party ballots that carry the names only of a given party's candidate (Stokes 2005, 318), or by employing brokers with local constituency knowledge to check which voters are unwilling to look them in the eye the day after the election (Stokes 2005, 317; Brusco et al. 2004, 76). Some argue that some voters have an internalized norm of reciprocity, causing vote bargains to be effective because receiving tangible benefits generates feelings of obligation (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014). Still others argue that parties engage in turnout buying (Nichter 2008), abstention buying (Cox and Kousser 1981), and voter buying (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016) rather than vote buying (see the typology in figure 2.5), which offers an alternative explanation to the secret ballot puzzle since parties engaging in turnout and abstention buying have to monitor only *whether* individuals vote (Nichter 2008, 21), while parties engaging in voter buying reward outsiders that have no incentive to defect once inside the ballot booth (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016, 437).

In *article 2*, I also address the puzzle of vote buying and the secret ballot. However, the argument set forward in *article 2* differs from the four arguments set forward by the literature. First, my argument differs from that of Cox and Kousser (1981), Nichter (2008, 2014), and Hidalgo and Nichter (2016) because I keep the focus on vote buying rather than on turnout, abstention, or voter buying. Second, my argument differs from that of Guardado and Wanthekon (2018), Bratton (2008), Van de Walle (2007), Lindberg (2013), and Conroy-Krutz and Logan (2012) as I maintain that vote buying is, indeed, effective. Third, my argument differs from that of Schaffer and Schedler (2007), Stokes (2005), and Brusco et al. (2004) since I relax the assumption that actual violations of the secret ballot occur. Fourth, my argument contrasts with Finan and Schechter (2012) as I argue that voters comply not because of norms of reciprocity but because of lack of confidence in the secret ballot. I do this by arguing that lack of confidence in the secret ballot is often enough to sway voter choices. I draw upon recent contributions emphasizing the importance of secret ballot perceptions for enforcing clientelist exchanges (Ferree and Long 2016; Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson 2014) and show that voters who do not have confidence in the secret ballot are more likely to comply with the wishes of the vote buyer (for the full argument, see *article 2*).

If voters have different levels of confidence in the secret ballot, then the optimal electoral clientelist strategy will depend not only on whether the targeted citizens are core, swing, or opposition voters, or whether they are likely or unlikely to turnout, but will also depend on the individual voter's confidence in the secret ballot. Building on Nichter's (2008; 2014) excellent conceptual typology of electoral clientelist strategies, I develop an extended typology (see figure 2.5) where I incorporate Hidalgo and Nichter's (2016) recent contribution on *voter buying* and add confidence in the secret ballot as a conditioning dimension. I use Schaffer and Schedler's (2007) term "preference buying" rather than Nichter's term "vote buying" in the cell placed in the first row, second column. In doing so, I can use "vote buying" as an umbrella term including "rewarding loyalists," "preference buying," and "double persuasion," all three of which are strategies that reward vote choices. Unlike Nichter (2008, 2010, 2014), I include trust in the secret ballot as a dimension which allows me to separate abstention buying from preference buying into two different cells and requires me to add a cell which I term "rewarding abstainers." When *rewarding abstainers*, parties provide benefits to non-voters who were not inclined to vote anyway, and thus—like rewarding loyalists—this strategy could be said to be ineffective. As figure 2.5 demonstrates, each strategy differs with regard to *which* citizens are targeted (supporting, indifferent or opposing voters), and what these citizens have to offer (vote choice, turnout, abstention, or registration).

Figure 2.5 Typology of clientelist strategies during elections

	<i>Favors party</i>	<i>Low trust in secret ballot and Indifferent/Favors opposition</i>	<i>High trust in secret ballot and Indifferent/Favors opposition</i>	<i>Not registered</i>
<i>Inclined to vote</i>	Rewarding loyalists	Preference buying	Abstention buying	Voter buying
<i>Inclined not to vote</i>	Turnout buying	Double persuasion	Rewarding abstainers	Nonvoter buying

NOTE: The grey cells demonstrate what is included in the definition of vote buying in this dissertation. The figure is based on Nichter (2008, 2010, 2014) and Hidalgo and Nichter (2016).

2.2 Theories on the causes of vote buying

The most prominent explanations of vote buying can be broken down roughly into three categories of explanations (Hicken 2011; Roniger 2004; Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007; Mares and Young 2016): The first emphasizes democratic modernization and industrialization, the second highlights institutional conditions, and the third revolves around voter characteristics. While the first two categories of explanations focus on macro-level causes, the third category of explanations focuses on micro-level causes.

2.2.1 Democratic modernization and industrialization

In the past, scholars viewed vote buying as a preindustrial political phenomenon that would disappear as societies modernized both economically and democratically (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Landé 1977; Schimdt et al. 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981). Indeed, historically, vote markets in the US and Western Europe have diminished as a consequence of economic and democratic development (Aidt and Jensen 2016; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Scott 1969; Stokes et al. 2013).

However, there is substantial empirical evidence that vote buying thrives in new democracies—and at different levels of economic development—where political machines do not appear to be losing their influence despite democratization and economic growth (Auyero 2001; Bratton 2008; Brusco et al. 2004; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012; Ferree and Long 2016; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Imai et al. 2015; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016; Larreguy et al. 2016; Magaloni 2006; Mares and Young 2018; Nichter 2008, Nichter and Peress 2016; Rueda 2015; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; Vicente 2014; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Even in advanced democracies such as Austria, Greece, Italy, Japan, and Spain, parties continue to offer voters clientelist benefits in return for their vote (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Kitchelt and Wilkinson 2007; Nyblade and Reed 2008; Piattoni 2001).

2.2.2 Institutional conditions

Confronted with the continuity of the prevalence of vote buying in new democracies, the second set of explanations focuses on how different institutional settings such as ballot secrecy, compulsory voting, the electoral system, and term of incumbency, explain different levels of vote buying across countries and regions.

First, many studies argue that ballot secrecy reduces vote buying (Baland and Robinson 2008; Cox and Kousser 1981; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Kuo and Teorell 2013; Mares 2015; Mares and Young 2016). This literature shows that ballot secrecy makes vote buying a riskier and, thereby, less favorable strategy for candidates because the secret ballot allows voters to accept the bribe and then renege on their commitments and vote as they please. While ballot secrecy may reduce vote buying, the literature nevertheless recognizes that ballot secrecy may inflate other clientelist strategies such as turnout buying and abstention buying (Cox and Kousser 1981; Nichter 2008; Gans-Morse et al. 2014) or other electoral irregularities such as registration fraud and ballot stuffing (Hidalgo and Nichter 2016; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Kuo and Teorell 2016).

Second, compulsory voting may also affect the prevalence of vote buying. However, the empirical results are inconclusive. While some scholars argue that compulsory voting reduces vote buying because it increases the number of purchased votes needed to tip the balance (Donaldson 1915;

Dressel 2005; Schaffer 2008; Uwanno and Burns 1998), empirical evidence suggests that countries with compulsory voting often experience higher levels of vote buying. Also, Gans-Morse et al. (2014) argue that vote buying is relatively more favorable compared to other electoral clientelist strategies because the fines imposed on nonvoters under compulsory voting makes abstention buying costlier and turnout buying irrelevant.

Third, a growing literature examines the relationship between electoral systems and levels of electoral corruption. Persson and Tabellini (2003, 16) identify three dimensions of the electoral system—the electoral formula (PR or plurality system), district magnitude, and ballot structure (open or closed lists)—that shape candidates’ incentive to employ clientelist strategies. However, disagreement exists as to whether plurality electoral systems or proportional electoral systems with open or closed lists produce higher levels of electoral corruption. One part of the literature argues that plurality systems or proportional systems with open lists produce *less* corruption than closed-list proportional systems (Alt and Lassen 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003). This literature argues that plurality and open-list proportional systems enable voters to hold legislators individually accountable for their performance in office, which, in turn, reduces electoral corruption. Another part of the literature argues that plurality systems or proportional systems with open lists produce *more* corruption than closed-list proportional systems (Birch 2007; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Persson and Tabellini 2003). This literature argues that the rewards from electoral competition in plurality and open-list voting systems are concentrated (personally) with the winner, which increases candidates’ incentives to use illicit means such as vote buying to increase their election chances.

Fourth, longer political incumbency is another key factor explaining different levels of vote buying across different countries because long-term incumbency increases the ability of candidates to access state resources for electoral campaigning and clientelist strategies. At the local level, long-term incumbency also allows mayors to appoint loyal partisan activists in their local administration and establish a strong and effective broker network (Mares and Muntean 2015; Mares and Young 2016; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). Other types of local elite structures function similarly to the incumbency advantage. In many African countries, for example, traditional leaders influence voters on behalf of their favored parties and thereby extend government influence to the local level (De Kadt and Larreguy 2018; Koter 2013).

2.2.3 *Voter characteristics*

The third set of explanations revolves around how voter characteristics determine which voters vote buyers target. These explanations include voters' poverty status, partisan preferences, and psychological features (Mares and Young 2016).

First, a substantial literature argues that vote buying is often targeted at the poor because poor people often lack access to basic necessities and are thus generally more willing to sell their votes at even relatively low costs (Bratton 2008; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). However, some studies find that poverty's effect on vote buying is merely conditional (Justesen and Manzetti 2017; Weitz-Shapiro 2012), while others find no empirical evidence to support the relationship (Kao et al. 2018, Khemani 2015; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). Indeed, in a recent study in Malawi, Kao et al. (2018) find that the poor dislike candidates offering vote bribes during electoral campaigns.

Second, a large part of the literature focuses on the role of voters' partisan preferences in explaining vote buying. As mentioned in section 2.1.3, the literature disagrees on whether vote buyers target swing or core voters. While most formal theory predicts that vote buyers target indifferent or weakly opposed voters (Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013, 36), most empirical evidence suggests that parties target core rather than swing voters (Albertus 2015; Bratton 2008; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013). Scholars provide different explanations of this apparent paradox. Some scholars argue that core supporters are easier to target because they are more deeply embedded in partisan networks (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Calvo and Murillo 2013). Others argue that much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying (Nichter 2008; Nichter 2014; Gans-Morse et al. 2014). However, others propose a broker-mediated targeting theory where party leaders prefer to buy the votes of swing voters, but brokers prefer to target core supporters who are easier to mobilize (Stokes et al. 2013).

Third, psychological factors such as *high-discount-rating* and *reciprocity* also contribute to understanding why some voters are targeted why others are not. For example, the vote buyers may target voters with *high-discount-rate* whom they know to be risk-averse and have shorter time horizons because these voters prefer the certainty of pre-electoral inducements to promises of programmatic redistribution after the election (Brusco et al. 2004; Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). Vote buyers may also choose to target *reciprocal* voters because these voters feel more obligated to comply and vote in accordance with the vote buyers wishes (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014). Similarly, vote buyers may avoid targeting voters with norms of voting "in good conscience"

(Vicente 2014; Collier and Vicente 2014) because parties risk losing supporters who have normative preferences against illicit strategies (Mares and Young 2016).

2.2.4 *The articles' theoretical approaches*

The articles in this dissertation also provide theoretical discussions that are linked to the three overall theoretical approaches (see table 2.1). Because *article 1* serves a purely methodological purpose, it does not relate to theoretical discussions of the causes of vote buying. In *article 2*, I focus on the set of theoretical explanations relating to voter characteristics and argue that the effectiveness of vote buying depends on voters' secret ballot perceptions. *Article 3* takes its starting point within the first theoretical approach by questioning why voters vote for corrupt politicians when democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt candidates from winning office. In *article 4*, I rely on the theoretical approach highlighting the role that institutional settings play for countries' different levels of vote buying. Specifically, I follow the literature arguing that electoral systems that cultivate the personal vote increase electoral corruption.

Table 2.1 Theoretical approaches discussed in the four articles

<i>Articles</i>	<i>Democracy and industrialization</i>	<i>Institutional conditions</i>	<i>Voter characteristics</i>
Article 1	-	-	-
Article 2	-	(Ballot secrecy)	Secret ballot perceptions
Article 3	Democratic elections	-	-
Article 4	(Democracy and industrialization)	Electoral systems	(Poverty)

Chapter 3

Case selection

The main case-focus of this dissertation is South Africa, specifically the 2016 municipal elections. Although *article 4* examines vote buying across 56 countries in Latin America and Africa, *articles 1, 2, and 3* focus exclusively on South Africa (see table 3.1). In this chapter, I will, therefore, show how the context of South Africa adds to the vote-buying literature and substantiate the case selection of the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa.

Table 3.1 Case-focus

<i>Articles</i>	<i>What</i>	<i>Where</i>
Article 1	Case study	South Africa
Article 2	Case study	South Africa
Article 3	Case study	South Africa
Article 4	Cross-country study	56 countries in Latin America and Africa

3.1 A new setting in the vote-buying literature

South Africa provides a new context for the study of vote buying as most contemporary work on vote buying has been done in Latin American countries⁹ such as Argentina (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Auyero 2001; Brusco et al. 2004; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Stokes et al. 2013), Brazil (Nichter and Peress 2016), Mexico (Larreguy et al. 2016; Imai et al. 2015; Magaloni 2006), and Nicaragua (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015). In recent years, the literature on vote buying within the African region has grown with studies examining a cross section of African countries (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Ferree and Long 2016; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), and case studies of Benin (Banegas, 2002), Kenya (Kramon 2016), Nigeria (Bratton 2008;

⁹ Scholars of vote buying have also focused on Asian countries such as Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman 2007) and the Philippines (Khemani 2015), Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon (Corstange, 2009, 2012), Jordan (Lust-Okar 2006) and Egypt (Blaydes 2010), and European countries such as Turkey (Çarkoglu and Aytac 2015) and Hungary (Mares and Young 2018).

Rueda 2015), São Tomé and Príncipe (Vicente 2014), and Uganda (Conroy-Krutz and Logan, 2012). Despite the emerging literature on vote buying in Africa, however, no study has yet examined vote buying specifically in South Africa. Rather, studies of the South African case have examined voting behavior more broadly, focusing on explanations such as the economy (Bratton and Mattes 2003; Mattes and Piombo 2001), ethnicity (Piper 2002; De Haas and Zulu 1994), geography (Christopher 2001; De Kadt and Sands 2015), race (Ferree 2006), traditional leaders (De Kadt and Larreguy 2018), and clientelism in general (Lodge 2014; Plaut 2014; Anciano 2018). Thus, this dissertation provides the first insights into vote buying in South Africa.

Furthermore, the 2016 municipal elections offer a unique opportunity to study vote buying in the context of a real election, and South Africa provides a setting where conducting new large-N surveys is practically feasible. The surveys were implemented in collaboration with Citizen Surveys, a South African consulting company that specializes in national opinion polls and surveys of the South African population. Being able to construct two new surveys with survey questions specifically developed to measure the concepts of interest in this project increases the measurement validity and constitutes a major empirical contribution.

3.2 South Africa: A least likely case


Since the country's first democratic election in 1994, South Africa has had almost 25 years of experience as a democracy and its constitution is considered to be one of the most progressive and inclusive constitutions in the world (Gouws and Mitchell 2005). Furthermore, although over half the population lives below the poverty line on less than 779 ZAR¹⁰ a month (Statistics South Africa 2015), South Africa is among the richest countries in the region and the second largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2018). Recall from section 2.2.1 that early scholars expected vote buying to disappear as societies modernized both economically and democratically. In light of these expectations, South Africa can be thought of as a least-likely case (Gerring 2007) for exploring the prevalence of vote buying (first sub-question), which makes it ideal for making strong generalizations (Levy 2008: 12). If there is evidence that vote buying is frequent in South Africa, I should expect this result to hold for other relatively developed countries as well.

Survey data show that vote buying is not common in South Africa. According to data collected by Afrobarometer (round 5), 5 percent of the citizens were offered a bribe in return for their vote during the country's 2009 national elections. This estimate places South Africa at the lower end of the vote-buying scale compared to other African countries (see figure 3.1), and far from coun-

¹⁰ 779 ZAR corresponds to 387 DKK or 61 USD (OANDA 2018).

tries like Kenya, Benin, and Uganda where vote buying appears to happen much more frequently. However, given South Africa's democratic and economic development, it is perhaps surprising that vote buying still occurs during the country's electoral campaigns.

Figure 3.1 Level of vote buying (percentages) across Africa



Source: Article 4: Bøttkjær and Justesen 2017

Turning to the institutional conditions (see section 2.2.2), South Africa appears to be a least-likely case on some parameters and a most-likely case (Gerring 2007) on others (see table 3.2). First, similar to most African countries,¹¹ South Africa does not enforce compulsory voting, which according to recent findings, should decrease vote buying (Gans-Morse et al. 2014). However, it is easy for parties to monitor whether voters have turned out to vote in South Africa since voters get their forefingers painted with election ink at the ballot stations after voting.

Second, elections for South Africa's national parliament have one of the most proportional systems in the world with a closed-list proportional electoral system and a high district magnitude of 111.¹² In *article 4*, I show that the incentives for parties and candidates to engage in vote trades are strongest in candidate-centered electoral systems like “first past the post” or open-list proportional systems and weakest in proportional systems with closed-list ballots. While the former creates an incentive to cultivate the personal vote, the latter tends to minimize incentives to use vote buying as a means to be elected to office as personal votes can be gained from party votes (Bøttkjær and Justesen 2017; Carey and Shugart 1995; Hicken 2007; Chang 2005; Johnson 2014). By the same token, candidates' incentive to engage in vote trades is strongest in “winner-takes-all” single-member districts and weakest in electoral systems with high district magnitude. While candidates

¹¹ This stands in contrast to Latin America where most countries enforce compulsory voting.

¹² South Africa's national assembly consists of 400 members, 200 elected in one large national district and 200 elected in nine provincial districts. Thus, South Africa's district magnitude is calculated as $(400 / 200) \times (200 / 1) + (400 / 200) \times (200 / 9) = 111,11$.

competing in the former will need to target their election campaigns at a relatively small number of voters to sway the election outcome, candidates in the latter compete in one national district or few districts, where more votes are needed to tilt the result of the election within each district, which would make vote buying an expensive and thus less favorable strategy (Bøttkjær and Justesen 2017; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Lizzeri and Persico 2001).

Third, South Africa has a dominant party system in which the African National Congress (the ANC) has received over half the votes in all elections since South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994. The party’s long-term incumbency causes the ANC to be a “party state” with the discretion to redistribute state resources for clientelist purposes (Booyesen 2015; Southhall 2014, 2016). This, in turn, makes South Africa a case of unilateral and monopolistic clientelism (Kitchelt 2011; Nichter and Peress 2016).

Fourth, in South Africa, voting is secret, which—according to recent studies—should reduce vote buying (Baland and Robinson 2008; Cox and Kousser 1981; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Kuo and Teorell 2016; Mares 2015; Mares and Young 2016). The literature on enforcement of vote trades argues that African parties cannot violate ballot secrecy and force voters to stick to their end of the bargain (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Bratton 2008; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012), which should decrease the level of vote buying in African countries. Monitoring vote choices requires strong party organization and an effective broker network at the local level (Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2013), but because African parties generally have weak party structures (Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Osei 2012; Van de Walle 2007), the conditions for vote buying are poor. However, as earlier argued, South Africa’s party structure is unique compared to other African countries because of the ANC’s severe dominance and strong party organization. According to Plaut (2014) and Lodge (2014), the ANC is also the main clientelist party in South Africa. Indeed, no other party in the African region fits the term “political machine” better than the ANC, and our survey data (round 1) shows that almost one in four South Africans lack confidence in the secret ballot. Thus, although voting is secret in South Africa, ANC’s strong party organization enables the party to at least give the impression that ballot secrecy can be violated, which increases vote buying.

Table 3.2 South Africa’s institutional conditions

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Effect on vote buying</i>	<i>Case</i>
Electoral system	Highly proportional	Decreases	Hard case
Compulsory voting	No compulsory voting	Decreases	Hard case
Long-term incumbency	ANC dominant party	Increases	Likely case
Ballot secrecy	Yes, but lack of trust in secret ballot	Increases	Likely case

3.3 The 2016 municipal elections: A likely case?

Common sense would have it that national elections are more interesting than municipal elections, and in South Africa, national elections also have a higher turnout,¹³ and the decisions made at the national level concern the most salient political issues such as unemployment, poverty, and health. However, the 2016 municipal election campaign can be characterized a most likely case (Gerring 2007) for observing vote buying compared to national elections in South Africa, which makes it excellent for explaining causal relationships and increasing internal validity (Beach and Pedersen 2016; Collier et al. 2010). Thus, the case of the 2016 municipal election campaign is suitable for studying *why* vote buying occurs in South Africa (sub-questions 2 and 3), but less so for establishing the extent of vote buying in South Africa (sub-question 1) because I cannot assume that the vote-buying estimate will represent the vote-buying level in national elections. The problem of low external validity is, to some extent, dealt with in *article 4*, which, besides answering sub-question 4, uses survey data on the prevalence of vote buying during national elections across 56 Latin American and African countries, including South Africa. The 2016 municipal election campaign is a most-likely case for four reasons.

First, South Africa's municipal electoral system is very different from its national electoral system. While South Africa's national electoral system is highly proportional with a closed-list proportional system and high levels of district magnitude (see *article 4*), the municipal electoral system employs a mixed or hybrid electoral system where voters cast two votes¹⁴ (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2016). The first vote elects party representative councilors, who make up the other half of the representatives. Party representative councilors are party representatives and are elected through the proportional representation system based on the proportion of votes their political party receives in the election (Local Government Action 2016). The second vote elects ward councilors who make up half of the representatives elected to the council. A ward councilor is an official elected to represent a constituency and is elected through the plurality electoral system (Local Government Action 2016). Thus, unlike national elections, the municipal elections include the "first past the post" feature, which, as mentioned earlier, increases candidates' incentive to engage in vote buying (see *article 4*). Consequently, vote buying is more likely to occur during the municipal elections than during the national elections in South Africa.

Second, according to the *high-discount-rate* argument within the clientelist literature (see section 2.2.3), the voters who are most likely to sell their votes are those who are particularly skeptical

¹³ In the last general election in 2014, the turnout was 73.5 %, while the turnout was 57.6 % in the last municipal election in 2011.


¹⁴ In district municipalities three votes are cast as the final vote goes to the district councillor.

about future rewards. This is crucial because weaknesses in government, especially regarding corruption, are much more visible at the municipal level and, as Booysen (2012, 1) argues, it is the local politicians in South Africa who “*most tangibly [are] not doing very well*”. If the high-discount-rate approach is right, vote buying is more likely to occur during municipal elections—where voters, according to Booysen (2012), are more dissatisfied—than during national elections.

Third, because local elections receive less international media attention, international election observers are less prone to monitor municipal elections compared to national elections, which gives vote buyers more leverage to engage in electoral fraud.

Fourth, the 2016 municipal elections are particularly interesting because the election campaign was highly contested, and the outcome was historic. The ANC suffered its worst election result since the first democratic elections in 1994 (see figure 3.2). The ANC managed to capture 54 per cent of the nationwide vote but lost 8 percentage points compared to the last local elections in 2011. More importantly, the ANC lost office in several of the big cities: Before the 2016 municipal elections, the ANC held absolute majorities in seven of the eight metropolitan municipalities (Metros), but after the election, the ANC holds a majority only in three of the Metros¹⁵ and formed a coalition government in Ekurhuleni. The Democratic Alliance (DA) recaptured Cape Town and formed coalition governments in Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay. The ANC’s endangered position may have boosted the ANC candidates’ motivation to engage in electoral fraud in order to uphold their position.

Figure 3.2 ANC’s vote share in the national and municipal elections



¹⁵ Buffalo City, eThekweni and Mangaung.

Chapter 4

Methods and data

In this chapter, I describe the research designs and data applied in the four articles. I employ either regression analysis or experimental designs to test the hypotheses outlined in the articles and rely on both original and existing quantitative survey data.

4.1 Methods: Experimental designs and regression analyses

In this dissertation, I employ both experimental designs and regression analysis to answer my research questions (see table 4.1). *Articles 1* and *3* both employ experimental designs, specifically an experiment testing an augmented list experiment and the classic list experiment and a survey experiment examining why voters vote for corrupt candidates. *Articles 2* and *4* both employ regression analysis, specifically two regressions with an interaction term, where the first demonstrates how secret ballot perceptions serve to condition the relationship between vote buying and party choice during municipal elections in South Africa, and the second shows how the electoral system conditions poverty's effect on vote buying across 56 Latin-American and African countries.

Table 4.1 Research design and methodological purpose of this dissertation's four articles

<i>Articles</i>	<i>Research design</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Methodological purpose</i>
Article 1	Experimental	List experiments	Infer causality
Article 2	Observational	Logistic regression with interaction term	Describe relationships
Article 3	Experimental	Survey experiment	Infer causality
Article 4	Observational	OLS regression with interaction term	Describe relationships

The object of making causal inference from data has taken a prominent role in political science (Gerber and Green 2012), and thus, there have been an increasing number of experimental or quasi-experimental studies in recent years. Because *articles 2* and *4* rely on observational data, I cannot make strong causal inference in these articles, and instead, the findings should be interpreted as

tests of relationships that may support—or contradict—the hypotheses set forward in the articles. In *articles 1* and *3*, however, I can infer causality because both articles apply an experimental research design, which produces strong causal inference (Gerber and Green 2012).

4.2 Data collection: Sample design, interviewer effects, and measurement bias

The articles in this dissertation rely on three different datasets (see table 4.2) with the number of cases varying from 56 to 3,210. In *article 4*, I built a cross-country dataset from 56 countries in Africa and Latin America from existing data sources. These data sources include survey data from Afrobarometer round 5 (2011/2013) and LAPOP (2010) as well as country level specific data (for further information about this dataset, see *article 4*). The remaining three articles rely on data from original face-to-face surveys that we conducted in South Africa in two rounds. Unlike the dataset used for *article 4*, which was based on existing data sources not specifically intended for this thesis’ research question, the original face-to-face surveys were conducted specifically for this project. The analyses in *articles 1* and *2* rely on the data from the first survey round following the 2016 municipal elections. This round had 3,210 respondents with a response rate of 88.5%. The analysis in *article 3* relies on data from the second survey round conducted a year later, in August 2017. This round had 1,500 respondents with a response rate of 77.5%. I traveled to South Africa four times to conduct fieldwork and prepare the two survey rounds.

Table 4.2 Data for the four articles

<i>Articles</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Data</i>	<i>Cases</i>
Article	South Africa	Original face-to-face survey data, round 1	3,210
Article	Latin America and Africa	Cross-country data	56
Article	South Africa	Original face-to-face survey data, round 1	3,210
Article	South Africa	Original face-to-face survey data, round 2	1,500


In this section, I describe the very extensive data collection process associated with the two survey rounds in South Africa. This section is divided into two parts. First, I will outline the sample design used for the two rounds in the original face-to-face survey. Second, I will discuss challenges associated with conducting face-to-face survey interviews in South Africa and elaborate on the measures that I took to avoid potential biases.

4.2.1 *A stratified multi-stage probability sample design*

To ensure a nationally representative sample of the South African population over 18 years, I needed a sample design more complex than a simple random sample, where each respondent has an

equal chance of being selected. Instead, I used a stratified multistage probability sample design with four stages, as shown in figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 The four stages of the sample design



Source: Citizen Surveys 2015

The first stage is *stratification*. I conducted a disproportional stratification¹⁶ to ensure acceptable coverage of subgroups (e.g., all four races). Non-sufficient coverage is a risk in simple random sample designs or a probability proportional to size sample designs (PPS).¹⁷ Non-sufficient coverage is especially a risk in a “rainbow nation” like South Africa, which is one of the most diverse countries in the world (World Elections 2016) with a population of about 53 million people, numerous ethnic groups, 11 official languages, nine provinces, and 226 municipalities (SAHO 2011). Round 1 included stratification on provinces, racial groups, municipality,¹⁸ and area.¹⁹ Round 2 did not include stratification on municipalities because this round did not focus on the municipal elections, and the sample was half the size of the first round.

The second stage is *allocation of EAs* (enumerated areas). South Africa has no adequate individuals lists or household lists to draw a random sample from, and therefore, the sample has to be drawn at a higher level. Therefore, I use the EA level, which is the smallest geographic area for which population statistics are available in South Africa. When drawing EAs, an important consideration is how many EAs we should allocate to each stratum to have the best sample, in other words, how disproportional the sample should be. A typical sample allocation design is a random sample or probability proportional to size model (PPS). However, the PPS model works well when

¹⁶ In stratified sampling, the population is divided into non-overlapping subpopulations called strata. A probability sample is selected in each stratum. The selections in the different strata are independent (Särndal et al. 1992).

¹⁷ In a simple random sample, the proportion of each subgroup in the sample is equal to the proportion of the same subgroup in the population, also known as the probability proportional to size model (PPS). However, if you conduct a simple random sample in a diverse country like South Africa, you risk ending up with very small sample sizes, or in the worst case, non-coverage of some subgroups.


¹⁸ Not all municipalities will be represented in the data because South Africa consists of 226 municipalities, and if you divide the sample size of 3,204 respondents by the number of municipalities, you would get an average of 13 respondents representing each municipality, which is too little to make meaningful analyses at the municipal levels. Therefore, we will focus on specific municipalities instead. Which municipalities will be sampled remains to be clarified, but we will ensure that both respondents that live in metropolitan municipalities and local municipalities are included.

¹⁹ Whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area.

estimating population values but is insufficient when conducting analyses within sub-groups (Lawley et al. 2007). Instead, I want to allocate the most EAs to the strata with the biggest uncertainty, meaning that the more variation within a specific stratum, the more respondents should be allocated to this stratum. This is called the Neyman allocation design (Bankier 1988). However, this approach is also not ideal because it can potentially result in large sample weights because a small proportion in the sample has to represent a big proportion in the population, which can lead to large standard errors (Bankier 1988). To minimize sample weights and still ensure respondents in each stratum, I use the power allocation rule, which incorporates both the PPS and the Neyman allocation design (see figure 4.2).

Power allocations have been widely applied in heterogeneous countries such as South Africa (Fellegi 1981; Lawley et al. 2007). The power allocation rule allows researchers to have both quality national estimates and detailed estimates by subgroups (Lawley et al. 2007). The largest areas are covered to ensure reliable estimates regarding, for example, the frequency of vote buying, while, at the same time, smaller subgroups are still allocated a large enough sample to provide significant estimates within each stratum.

Figure 4.2 Allocation designs



The third stage is the *household selection*. This sample design employs the *random walk method*, which is the most commonly used household²⁰ selection method when there are no household lists available (European Quality of Life Survey 2007; Eurobarometer 2008; Gallup 2016; Afrobarometer 2016). In the random walk method, the probability of selecting a household is regarded in the same way as with simple random sampling (Thompson and Fraser 2006). For a detailed description of the ran-

²⁰ In South Africa, a household is defined as a group of people who eat from the same melting pot (Citizen Surveys 2015).

dom walk method, see appendix A. Although the random walk pattern is an internationally recognized method in cases where household lists are not available, there are three problems with the random walk method. First, the random walk method does not gather information that can be used to calculate probabilities of selection (Himelein et al. 2015), and thus, it is not possible to calculate the weights of the random walk samples. Instead, researchers analyze samples as if all households within the chosen EA had the same probability of being selected. Bauer (2014) compares the random walk method to simple random sampling by using a simulation of all possible random routes and calculating the probability of selecting each household. The results show that there are significant differences between the random walk method and the simple random sample and that the random walk method produces systematic bias (Bauer 2014). Second, the interviewers who use random walks have a strong incentive to choose households where people are home, rather than those that are supposed to be chosen according to the protocol (Himelein et al. 2015). Third, the method is difficult to verify because even two different interviewers who start from the same point and travel on the same path may select different samples, depending on the distance they consider close enough to be included or in what sequence they count the dwellings (Himelein et al. 2015, 10). To compensate for these problems, Citizen Surveys kept detailed records of the hit rates, contacts, refusals, unsuitable respondents, and so forth and used this information to calculate sample weights. Also, Citizen Surveys locked the questionnaires so they could not be opened until the interviewer was at the right GPS coordinates, which minimizes the risk of interviewers not following the random walk pattern protocol.


The fourth stage is the *respondent selection*. To avoid selecting the person who opens the door and thereby getting a biased sample consisting only of those who are home to open the door when the interviewers are doing their fieldwork,²¹ interviewers use an internationally recognized method called “the Kish Grid,” designed to avoid bias when selecting respondents (Kish 1949). For further explanation of how the Kish Grid works, see appendix B. Previous studies (Kish 1949; Németh 2003) have shown that men tend to be underrepresented in studies that use the Kish Grid because a) men are less likely to be reached at home even with repeated call-backs, b) men are often overrepresented in the non-response statistics, and c) interviewers might substitute the chosen male with another person in the household who is willing to participate (Kish 1949, 386). In practice, however, the problem is very limited because Citizen Surveys monitor interviewers and makes follow-up calls to check whether the right person has been interviewed.

²¹ In this case, the sample would consist of primarily the unemployed, the elderly, and women who typically spend more time at home compared to the average population and, therefore, will be more likely to be home during fieldwork.

4.2.2 Interviewer effects in face-to-face interviews

The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews, which is a far costlier method than conducting telephone interviews or online surveys. However, face-to-face interviews were necessary because South Africa has an overrepresentation of prepaid phones and an underrepresentation of landline phones,²² which makes it difficult to contact people by telephone. Besides being costlier, face-to-face surveys are also more likely to yield systematic bias in the respondents' responses than telephone or web surveys (Kreuter et al. 2008). According to the stimuli response model (see figure 4.3), the specific interviewer and the interview interaction can affect the respondent's answers. The stimuli's (the interviewer's) effect on response (data quality) has received much attention in the literature (Durant et al. 2010; Kriel and Risenga 2014; Adida et al. 2016; Van der Zouwen et al. 2010). The most typical challenges in face-to-face interviews are interviewer characteristics, communication problems, and the power relation between interviewer and respondent (Kriel and Risenga 2014). These three challenges are especially important to handle in these two surveys because the interviews include sensitive questions on vote buying and are conducted face-to-face in a country where the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity is substantial.

Figure 4.3 The stimuli-response model (focus on stimulus)



Source: Goi et al. 2014

The first challenge is the *interviewer's characteristics* such as age, gender, ethnicity, and education that may create response bias (Kriel and Risenga 2014; Haunberger 2010; Lin and Kelly 1995; Adida et al. 2016). For example, a recent survey in South Africa asked respondents whether they thought the government had been successful in uniting the country following the collapse of apartheid (Adida et al. 2016). Just 45% of the white respondents agreed. However, when interviewed by black interviewers, 65% of the white respondents agreed (Adida et al. 2016). Another example is a study on sexual behavior in a rural African setting, which demonstrated that the interviewer's gender and age had a consistent effect on respondents' answers (Angotti et al. 2015). We implemented both ex ante and ex post measures to minimize response bias related to interviewer characteristics. Ex ante, local fieldworkers who live in the same area as the respondents conducted the interviews because studies

²² Only 6% of the South African population have a landline phone in their household (Pew Research Center 2015), and there are over 79,000 phone booths in South Africa (Quartz 2014).

show that interviewers with similar ethnicity to the respondent create less biased responses compared to interviewers with an ethnicity different from the respondent (Durrant et al. 2010; Kriel and Risenga 2014). Furthermore, local interviewers are familiar with the local language and culture and can, therefore, understand the concerns that the respondent might have about participating in the interview (Malhotra et al. 1996).²³ Ex post, the questionnaire includes questions regarding the respondent's as well as the interviewer's age, gender, race, education, and geo-area (urban or rural) enabling a control of whether interviewer's socio-demographic characteristics played a role in terms of the respondent's responses.

The second challenge is *communication problems* between the interviewer and respondents (Malhotra et al. 1996). Communication problems can yield response errors, especially if the interviewer herself has misunderstood the purpose of the question (Ming-Yih 1988). Several measures were implemented to minimize communication problems. First, pilot tests²⁴ of the questionnaires were conducted, which allowed for the revision of those questions that were difficult for the respondents to understand and answer. Second, the questionnaires were translated into seven languages.²⁵ Translating the questionnaires beforehand ensures uniformity across the interviews because the interviewer does not have to translate the questionnaire herself from, for example, English to Zulu, which can lead to misunderstandings. Third, before fieldwork, all interviewers participated in a mandatory two-day workshop²⁶ where they went through the questionnaire question-by-question and practiced interviewing each other. Fourth, interviewers used show cards with the response categories to make it easier for respondents to answer the questions. Fifth, difficult questions were given special attention, that is, we (the research team and I) recorded videos of how to handle the list experiments and survey experiments. These videos were available on the tablets that the interviewers used for the interviews.

The third challenge is the *power relation* between the interviewer and the respondent, which is related to the (lack of) trust between the two. Generally, the level of social trust is low in South Africa (Mmotlane et al. 2010), and especially when asked sensitive questions on vote buying, it is expected that the respondent's trust of the interviewer may substantially affect the responses. For each

²³ Local interviewers were also used for security reasons: In some of the South African townships, it can be dangerous for an "outsider" to enter and conduct an interview as certain racial and tribal groups may not be in favor of interacting with someone from a different racial and tribal group. However, it is important to stress that Citizen Surveys complies with all ethical rules and interview precautions and does not send interviewers into the field if the safety of the interviewer is at risk.

²⁴ The pilot test reports are included in appendix C.

²⁵ To ensure correct translations, forward translations (e.g., from English to Zulu) and back translations (e.g., from Zulu back to English) were conducted by two different translators.


²⁶ Citizen Surveys conducted the workshops, and we (the research team and I) oversaw the workshops.

of the two survey rounds, I participated as an observer in two to three interviews at the beginning of fieldwork to observe the interview situation. During these interviews, I did not note any trust problems or other power relation issues between the interviewer and the respondent. However, my observations may not be representative of how the interviews normally proceed as I might have affected the interview situation. To minimize potential power relation bias, interviewers stressed the respondent's anonymity and the purpose of the interview at the beginning of each interview.²⁷ Also, the questionnaires include unobtrusive measures of vote buying.

4.2.3 *Measuring vote buying in surveys*

Because vote buying is illegal and considered immoral (Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007), it makes for an interesting research topic but is difficult to measure in surveys. Because respondents may be reluctant to answer truthfully when asked about whether they received vote bribes, determining the prevalence of vote buying is challenging. In other words, the sensitivity of the question (the organism) may affect the respondent's responses (see figure 4.4). I address this issue by including four different questions on vote buying with varying degrees of directness.

Figure 4.4 The stimuli-response model (focus on organism)



Source: Goi et al. 2014

First, the questionnaire asks respondents directly if a candidate or someone from a political party offered them something like food, a gift, or money in return for their vote.²⁸ Six percent of the respondents answered affirmatively to the direct question on vote buying. However, because vote buying is illegal, respondents may be reluctant to give truthful answers to such a sensitive question. Thus, asking direct questions about vote buying can potentially result in social desirability bias (Bradburn et al. 1978; DeMaio 1984) and cause researchers to underestimate its prevalence.

²⁷ At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer states, “all information will be treated in the strictest confidence, only to be used for research purposes.”

²⁸ The exact wording of the question is “How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer YOU something, like food, or a gift or money IF YOU WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?” And the corresponding response categories are “Never,” “Once or twice,” and “Often.” See question 45A in the questionnaire in appendix D.

Second, the questionnaire asked an indirect question on whether vote buying occurred in the respondent's community or village.²⁹ Seven percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative to the indirect question on neighborhood vote buying. Although asking about neighborhood vote buying is less likely to produce untruthful answers compared to the direct individual question (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), the indirect neighborhood question can also cause measurement bias and offers no insight into which voters are targeted. For example, questions regarding neighborhood vote buying may cause researchers to underestimate vote buying in rural areas and overestimate it in urban areas where people typically live closer to each other, and thus, observations of vote-buying activities are more likely (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). Because neither the direct individual vote-buying estimate nor the indirect neighborhood estimate measures the prevalence of vote buying accurately, Brusco et al. (2004, 72) report the level of vote buying in their Argentinian study as a range between these two estimates.

Third, the questionnaire integrates a classic list experiment into the survey to measure the prevalence of vote buying. In the classic list experiment, respondents are assigned randomly into a control and treatment group (Kuklinski et al. 1997), presented with a list of items, and asked only how many of the items they would respond to in the affirmative. The list that the treatment group is presented with includes one more item—namely the item regarding vote buying—than the control group's list.³⁰ Since respondents have to reveal only how many of the items they would respond to in the affirmative, the list experiment allows respondents to answer the question truthfully while remaining anonymous.³¹ In *article 1*, I estimate the level of vote buying by comparing the average count in the control group with the average count in the treatment group, and find that 8% of the South African voters were offered vote bribes during the municipal electoral campaign.

Fourth, the questionnaire integrates an augmented list experiment to estimate the frequency of vote buying. The augmented list experiment was developed by Corstange (2009) to address a central limitation of the classic list experiment: Although researchers agree that the classic list experiment provides an unobtrusive measure for vote buying and other sensitive questions, it allows re-

²⁹ The exact wording of the question is “How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer something, like food, or a gift or money, to people in your community or village if they WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?” The corresponding response categories are “Never,” “Once or twice,” and “Often.” See question 44 in the questionnaire in appendix D.

³⁰ The exact wording of the question is “I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.” The control group received the following list of items: “They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood”, “They called me on my phone”, “They asked me to sign a petition supporting children’s rights”, and “They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio”. The treatment group received the same list of items plus an additional item: “They offered me something, like food, or a gift or money, if I would vote for them in the elections”. See question 14A and 14E in the questionnaire in appendix D.

³¹ For more information about the classic list experiment see *article 1*.

searchers to make estimates only at the aggregate level and prevents individual-level analyses of which voters are targeted. Instead, researchers use difference-in-means tests to analyze the characteristics of respondents targeted with vote bribes (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kramon 2016). However, these tests are inefficient and challenging for continuous variables (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012; Corstange 2009). The augmented list experiment enables researchers to conduct individual-level analysis while still providing respondents with anonymity. The difference between the classic and the augmented list experiment is that the augmented list experiment changes the control group's question, asking them to evaluate each of the list items individually rather than stating only how many they can affirm.³² In *article 1*, I find that vote buying stands at 30% in South Africa according to the augmented list experiment.

Although the augmented list experiment strives to solve an important problem of the classic list experiment, it has not yet been tested whether the augmented list experiment change of the control group question affects the validity of the results. In *article 1*, therefore, I conduct an experimental test comparing the augmented to the classic list experiment procedure. I show that the augmented list experiment creates biased results, overestimating the level of vote buying, because it violates one of the core assumptions of experimental designs, that is, the excludability assumption.


Thus, based on my findings in *article 1*, I conclude that the classic list experiment provides the best unobtrusive method for measuring vote buying (see figure 4.5). Therefore, I use this method for answering the first sub-question (see *article 1*): *To what extent does vote buying transpire among poor voters during elections?*

Comparing the estimate of the classic list experiment (8%) with the estimates of the direct individual question (6%), suggests that vote buying does not yield as much social desirability bias in South Africa as in other countries³³ (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Imai et al. 2015; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016). Therefore, I use the direct measure of vote buying in *article 2*, where I conduct multivariate individual-level analyses of how secret ballot perceptions condition responses to vote bribes. In *article 4*, I rely on the direct measures of vote buying provided by the Afrobarometer and LAPOP questionnaires to test how the electoral system conditions the effect poverty has on the prevalence of vote buying across developing countries. In *article 3*, the focus is on patronage rather than vote buying, and here I use a survey experiment to test how patronage can affect voters' motivation to vote for corrupt candidates.

³² For more information about the augmented list experiment see *article 1*.

³³ Correspondingly, in a study in the Philippines, Cruz (2013) finds that the difference between the estimated level of vote buying using a direct question is *not* statistically different from the estimate using the list experiment. His finding demonstrates that—also in the Philippines—the social desirability bias associated with vote buying is low.

Figure 4.5 Operationalizing vote buying



NOTE: A background concept refers to "the constellation of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept", a systematized concept refers to the "specific formulation of a concept adopted by a particular researcher or group of researchers" (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530), and an indicator is also referred to as "measures or operationalizations." The grey box indicates that the classic list experiment is the best way to measure vote buying.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation has increased our theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge of how widespread clientelism is in the developing world and why and under what conditions it flourishes. The arguments and findings presented in this dissertation have important implications for society, policy makers, scholars, and future research. This chapter summarizes the arguments and findings in the dissertation, discusses the implications for society and policy makers, and outlines the potential for further research.

5.1 Overview of findings

This dissertation has demonstrated that vote buying does occur in South Africa, a country that has had over 20 years of experience as a democracy and is one of the most industrialized countries in the African region. Scholars have previously shown that standard surveys severely underestimate the magnitude of vote buying during elections, and therefore, we know very little about the real frequency of vote buying in new democracies. To overcome the issue of social desirability bias in standard survey questions, I conducted a list experiment in the South African survey. The list experiment showed that 8% of the voting-age population in South Africa was targeted with vote bribes during the 2016 municipal election campaign. I also tested the validity of a new type of list experiment, the augmented list experiment, which employs different prompts for the control and treatment group. I employed an experimental test of the classic and augmented list experiment and showed that the augmented list experiment produces biased results. These findings have important implications not only for how we measure vote buying but also for the design of list experiments and for attempts to measure sensitive issues in general.

In addition to estimating the prevalence of vote buying in South Africa, the present study has also examined why candidates employ clientelism as a political strategy. The dissertation has

demonstrated that when corrupt candidates offer clientelist benefits to voters, these voters are less likely to punish the candidates for their corrupt behavior. Furthermore, I showed that even when voting is secret, vote buying is an effective electoral strategy if candidates convince voters that their vote choices can be monitored because, even in the presence of a nominally secret ballot, voters' lack of confidence in the secret ballot increases the likelihood that voters will comply and vote as instructed.

Finally, I explored the conditions under which vote buying flourishes across 56 developing countries in Africa and Latin America. Poverty is often emphasized as a key source of vote buying, but not all poor voters are targeted, and very little is known about the conditions under which poverty causes voters to engage in vote trades. The dissertation has contributed to the literature on the link between poverty and vote buying by arguing that the electoral system can condition poverty's effect on vote buying. I find that while there is a strong correlation between poverty and vote buying, the effect of poverty on vote buying weakens as district magnitude increases and when closed-list ballots are used.

5.2 Implications for society and policy makers

Although one could argue that the redistributive and social welfare aspects of clientelism and vote buying do have some positive implications, most scholars agree that the consequences of clientelism and vote buying are detrimental. Vote buying—the main focus of this study—contradicts democratic norms and is denounced by NGOs like Transparency International and international election observers for distorting the electoral process in developing countries (Transparency International 2004). Second, vote buying creates poverty traps since candidates have an incentive to let the poor people stay poor to keep the cost per vote down (Magaloni 2006; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). Third, vote buying creates a form of “perverse accountability” (Stokes 2005) because voters who receive bribes in exchange for their vote lose their ability to hold politicians accountable, and instead, voters are the ones held accountable for their actions, specifically for keeping their end of the vote bargain (Hicken 2011; Lyne 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Stokes 2005).

The more general phenomena of clientelism also have profound negative implications for the development and consolidation of democracy. Clientelism consolidates the incumbency advantage (De La O 2015; Hicken 2011; Robinson and Verdier 2013), politicizes bureaucracy (Golden 2003; Hicken 2011), and is linked to larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies (Roniger 2004; Hicken 2011; Hicken and Simmons 2008; Keefer 2007). Furthermore, numerous studies have

demonstrated that corruption is more prevalent in clientelist systems than in programmatic systems (Kitschelt 2007; Singer 2009)

Article 4 corroborates the link between clientelism and corruption and explains a fundamental puzzle of corruption in modern democracies: Why do some voters vote for corrupt candidates when democratic elections are supposed to prevent these candidates from getting elected? I find that voters express a strong desire to punish corrupt candidates regardless of the corrupt candidate's performance in local government. However, voters are more forgiving toward corrupt candidates if they are offered clientelist benefits in return for their vote. The finding corroborates the literature arguing that clientelism serves to reproduce corruption and, thus, has important implications not only for policy makers fighting clientelism but also for those fighting corruption.

Given these negative consequences of clientelism, policy makers wanting to ensure the functionality of democracy in the developing world should take active measures to erode the prevalence of clientelism. By increasing our understanding of the prevalence and causes of clientelism, this study thus provides useful knowledge for policy makers fighting clientelism and corruption. While previous studies have focused on the role of poverty on clientelism, a complex condition, which can be difficult for policy makers to reduce, this dissertation study has focused on two conditions, which may be easier for policy makers to change, that is, the electoral system and secret ballot perceptions. First, institutional designing that facilitates electoral systems that are more proportional and provide weaker incentives to pursue the personal vote can diminish the adverse effects of poverty on vote buying. Second, just as clientelist parties can lower voters' confidence in the secret ballot, for instance, by using threats or placing brokers near the voting stations, policy makers seeking to erode clientelism can strengthen voters' confidence in the secret ballot. For example, policy makers can employ campaigns on ballot secrecy, ban party operatives from the voting station or ensure that ballot papers are not handed to voters until they are inside the ballot booth.

5.3 Further research

This dissertation has shown that the classic list experiment solves issues of response bias associated with sensitive questions like vote buying by providing respondents with anonymity. However, the results suggest that vote buying does not appear to be as widespread or generate as strong social desirability bias in South Africa as in some parts of Latin America (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). However, these results do not suggest that vote buying and the social desirability bias associated with it are not widespread in other parts of Africa. To obtain higher external validity of the results

generated by the list experiment in South Africa, more research using list experiments in Africa is necessary.

Furthermore, the dissertation showed that the augmented list experiment produces biased results compared with the classic list experiment because it violates one of the fundamental assumptions of experimental research, that is, the excludability assumption. However, to be entirely confident that the augmented list experiment is the one that produces biased results, while the classic list experiment generates truthful answers, further research comparing the classic and augmented list experiment on a sensitive context, where we know the true answer is needed. For example, it could be useful to compare results obtained through a direct question, the classic list experiment and the augmented list experiment on an issue like voter abstention, which has previously been proved to be associated with social desirability bias (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010), but where we know the true value.

This dissertation has also demonstrated that the study of the causes of vote buying is highly relevant. The literature has identified several causes and emphasizes poverty as the key explanation of vote buying. This dissertation corroborates the strong relationship between poverty and vote buying and highlights two additional conditions: perceptions of the secret ballot and characteristics of the electoral system. More studies are needed on the conditions under which vote buying flourishes. To name a few possible causes, future studies might investigate the effect of compulsory voting, regional differences, and competition among political machines. In addition to examining the causes of vote buying, further research should also examine additional consequences of vote bribes in developing countries, for example, how vote buying affects programmatic redistribution (Justesen et al. 2014).

Also, this dissertation focuses on a specific form of clientelism, namely vote buying. However, more research is needed to understand the causes of different types of clientelism. Do other forms of clientelism such as patronage, turnout buying, and voter buying flourish under the same conditions as vote buying? Also, how does the erosion of vote buying affect the frequency of these other clientelist strategies and the prevalence of other non-programmatic strategies such as pork-barrel politics and the provision of club goods? While this study focuses exclusively on quantitative data and methods, qualitative research can help deepen our understanding of how clientelist relationships between candidates and citizens are established. For example, in a recent study, Nichter and Peress (2016) emphasize the role of citizen demands in clientelism. If this is so, candidates may not be proffering rewards in exchange for votes but merely fulfilling voters' requests. This citizen-initiating perspective on clientelism deserves further attention.

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Article 1

Crying Wolf: An Experimental Test of the Augmented List Experiment

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The list experiment has proved to be a powerful method for eliciting truthful answers to sensitive questions, yet the list experiment's weakness is that it does not allow for individual-level analyses. To overcome this weakness, recent work in the literature has developed an augmented list experiment enabling researchers to undertake efficient individual-level analysis. However, it is uncertain whether the augmented list experiment's use of different prompts for the control and treatment group creates biased results. In this article, I conduct an experimental test comparing the augmented and classic list experiment using a new face-to-face survey dataset from South Africa on the sensitive issue of vote buying. I find that the augmented list experiment severely overestimates the level of the sensitive issue, in this case, concluding that a sensitive issue like vote buying is widespread, even though it is not. These findings have important implications for the design of list experiments and for attempts to measure sensitive issues in political science.

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Introduction

When researchers use surveys to study questions concerning attitudes or behavior that are morally indefensible or even illegal, they tend to underestimate the prevalence of these sensitive issues because respondents are reluctant to give truthful answers to sensitive questions. Fortunately, the list experiment has proved to be a powerful method for obtaining truthful answers to sensitive questions by allowing respondents to remain anonymous (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Gilens, Sniderman, and Kuklinski 1998; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Corstange 2009; Corstange 2012; Blair and Imai 2012; Imai 2011; Imai et al. 2015; Çarkoglu and Aytac, 2015; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016; Glynn 2013; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).

While the respondents' anonymity allows researchers to obtain unbiased estimates at the aggregate level, it simultaneously inhibits researchers from making individual-level analyses. Instead, researchers often rely on simple difference-in-means tests across different subgroups to diagnose the characteristics that distinguish the individuals reporting the sensitive issue from those who do not (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kramon 2016). However, difference-in-means tests are problematic for continuous variables and highly inefficient as the sample size of each subgroup drastically decreases when relevant control variables are added to the analysis (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012; Corstange 2009).

In recent years, scholars have made methodological advances widening the applicability of list experiments by developing multivariate regression models to help researchers link certain respondent characteristics with answers to sensitive questions (Corstange 2009; Imai 2011; Blair and Imai 2012). One of these methodological advances is the approximate likelihood estimator called LISTTT that relies on an augmented version of the list experiment developed by Corstange (2009) here in *Political Analysis*. The difference between the classic list experiment and the augmented list experiment is that the augmented list experiment changes the question prompt for the control group, so that baseline respondents are asked to evaluate each of the list items individually. The additional information gained by changing the control group's question prompt enables researchers to make more statistically efficient analysis, and consequently, some studies have employed this method (Corstange 2009, Corstange 2012, Çarkoglu and Aytac 2015, Flavin and Keane 2009). However, no study has yet successfully tested whether the alteration of the classic list experiment has unintended consequences for the validity of the results.

In this article, I conduct an experimental test comparing the augmented list experiment procedure to the classic list experiment procedure using vote buying as an example of a sensitive issue

on new face-to-face survey data from the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa. Vote buying, defined as *“the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote”* (Brusco et al. 2004, 67), serves as an excellent example of a sensitive issue because the practice is illegal (Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007), is regarded as immoral by large parts of the electorate (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2014), condemned by NGOs and international election observers for distorting the democratic electoral process in developing countries (Transparency International 2004), and is associated with negative stigmas of poverty (Stokes 2005; Jensen and Justesen 2014).

Without denying that the problem the augmented list experiment procedure strives to solve is considerable—because researchers aspire not only to elicit honest responses to sensitive questions but also to analyze these responses rigorously—this study highlights the potential dangers of using the augmented list experiment. My analysis shows that the augmented list experiment severely overestimates the level of the sensitive issue. This is so because the augmented list experiment’s use of different question prompts for the treatment and the control group violates one of the core assumptions of experimental designs, that is, that everything except the treatment should be held constant across the treatment and control group. This mechanism creates recollection bias and accumulates social desirability bias from all the items and not just from the sensitive item. In turn, I argue that researchers should refrain from implementing the augmented list experiment to avoid producing biased results and, instead, proceed with the classic list experiment procedure.

The findings presented here have important implications for the design of list experiments and for attempts to measure sensitive issues in political science. The case of vote buying in South Africa demonstrates the importance of designing and implementing the experimental procedure in a way that ensures that nothing except the treatment affects the outcome. Researchers who neglect to adhere to the fundamental assumptions behind the experimental design risk “crying wolf,” that is, concluding that a sensitive issue like vote buying is widespread, even though it is not. Apart from the methodological implications of this study, this article’s results also contribute to the growing literature on vote buying and electoral clientelism as most work has been done on vote buying in national elections in Latin America (Rueda 2015; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Nichter 2008). I show that although electoral bribes are not exactly widespread in South Africa, vote buying does occur during municipal elections despite South Africa having more than 20 years of experience as a democracy.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, I describe the procedure of the classic and augmented list experiment and consider the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches.

Second, I present an overview of studies measuring vote buying using the two list experiments, develop my hypotheses, and argue why we need to test the augmented against the classic list experiment. Third, I describe the South African case and present the data and the methods. Fourth, I present the results and discuss why the classic and augmented list experiments arrive at different results. Fifth and finally, I conclude and consider the implications of my findings for future research.

Response bias and list experiments

When surveys ask sensitive questions that respondents are unwilling to admit to, response bias can occur (Bradburn et al. 1978; DeMaio 1984). Survey respondents are inclined to give untruthful answers to present themselves in a more socially desirable way to interviewers on issues such as racial attitudes (Berinsky 1999; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997), attitudes toward immigrants (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Janus 2010), voter abstention (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010), sexual behavior (Tourangeau and Smith 1996), and vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Corstange 2012; Imai et al. 2015; Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016). Consequently, direct survey questions about vote buying or other sensitive issues incline respondents to underreport the prevalence of the matter, resulting in systematic bias (Tourangeau and Yan 2007).

The classic list experiment

The list experiment is an excellent method for asking questions with potential social desirability bias because list experiments give the respondent an opportunity to answer the question while remaining anonymous. This anonymity should, in turn, encourage a truthful response and ensure unbiased results. In the classic list experiment, the survey sample is split into two groups, and participants are assigned randomly to the control group and the treatment group (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). The two groups are then exposed to the same question, but the number of response items varies. The question that the two groups receive asks only *how many* of the items they would respond to in the affirmative.

The premise of the classic list experiment is that since respondents must reveal only how many of the items they would respond to in the affirmative, the individual respondent can conceal whether her answer includes the sensitive item. The “real” frequency of the sensitive issue is thus found by comparing the average of the number of items answered in the affirmative in the control group with the average count in the treatment group. For example, in a study on vote buying in Nicaragua, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) employ a list experiment using the classic procedure and prompt all respondents with *“I’m going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like for you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or activists during the last electoral campaign. Please, do not tell*

me which ones, only HOW MANY.” For the control group, the following campaign activities are listed and read to respondents:

- (i) They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighborhood/city.
- (ii) They visited your home.
- (iii) They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio.
- (iv) They threatened you to vote for them.

The treatment group is shown and read a fifth category:

- (v) They gave you a gift or did you a favor.

The classic list experiment inhibits researchers from measuring vote buying at the individual level because respondents do not directly state whether they have accepted offers for their vote. Thus, the classic list experiment’s weakness is that it prevents researchers from conducting regression analyses that include the sensitive item. The anonymity in the list experiment allows researchers to get a correct measure of the frequency of vote buying at the aggregate level, but the anonymity prevents researchers from finding out *whom* parties target at the individual level. The literature often overcomes this problem by employing difference-in-means tests. Because the assignment to control and treatment is random within subgroups, we can compare the level of vote buying for treated and controls within a given sub-group, for instance by comparing the level of vote buying in low- and high-income groups (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012, 215). Nevertheless, when using difference-in-means tests, the sample is divided into several subgroups, which significantly reduces the number of respondents in each sub-group, leading to large standard errors that distort the inferential analysis (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012).

The augmented list experiment

Corstange (2009) addresses the limitation of the classic list experiment by developing an augmented list experiment and a statistical estimator called LISTIT that enables researchers to undertake individual-level multivariate analysis. The difference between the augmented list experiment and the classic list experiment is that the control group is asked to evaluate *each* item. There is no change in the design for the treatment group. For example, in a study on vote buying in Turkey, Çarkoğlu and Aytac, (2015) employ a list experiment using the augmented procedure developed by Corstange (2009) and prompt the control group respondents with: *“People decide who to vote for based on a lot of different reasons. Now I will read you some of the reasons people have told us: Please, tell me if they influenced your*

decision to vote for the party that you have voted.” The treatment group respondents are, just as in the classic list experiment procedure, prompted with the “how many” version: *“People decide who to vote for based on a lot of different reasons. Now I will read you some of the reasons people have told us. Please do not tell me which of the following have influenced your vote decision. Please just tell me how many of the following have influenced your decision to vote for the party that you have voted.”*

In the classic list experiment, we know only the average probability of responding affirmatively to the list of items for each treatment group respondent. In the augmented list experiment, however, the number of unknown probabilities is reduced to one, that is, the probability associated with the sensitive item (Corstange 2009, 49). In the augmented list experiment, we treat the number of affirmative answers in the treatment group as a binomial process with a known average probability for the list of items but unknown individual item probabilities of responding affirmatively (Çarkoğlu and Aytac, 2015). We use the additional knowledge to estimate the probability that the number reported by the respondent includes the sensitive item of vote buying. Consequently, this estimate called LISTIT is modeled into regression analyses, allowing for a more refined and efficient study of the relationship between the respondent’s characteristics and engagement in vote trades (Corstange 2009; Flavin and Keane 2009).

Although the augmented list experiment has clear advantages as a procedure first to estimate sensitive issues and then to analyze them efficiently, it violates one of the two core assumptions of experimental research, namely the excludability assumption.² In an experiment with one control and one treatment group, we expect two potential outcomes, the outcome if treated and the outcome if not treated, and assume that the only relevant causal factor affecting each potential outcome is whether the respondent receives the treatment. As a result, we can *exclude* from consideration factors other than the treatment in the potential outcomes framework (Gerber and Green 2012, 39). We presume, therefore, the outcome from the control group to be identical to the outcome from the treatment group under the condition where both groups receive treatment or neither groups receive treatment.

Violation of the excludability assumption occurs if random assignment to the control and treatment groups is unsuccessful or if a breakdown in symmetry happens in the procedure for the control and treatment groups (Gerber and Green 2012, 40-41). When the augmented list experiment applies different questions for the control group (*tell me if*) and treatment group (*tell me how*

² The second core assumption is termed the non-interference assumption also known as SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption) and assumes that subjects are not affected by the treatment of other subjects (Gerber and Green 2012, 39).

many), a breakdown in symmetry occurs. The breakdown in symmetry causes the augmented list experiment to violate the excludability assumption and can potentially bias the results.

Literature, hypothesis, and motivation

As mentioned earlier, a growing literature in political science applies the list experiment to study sensitive issues. While the classic list experiment procedure is still the most common approach to list experiments (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016), recent studies have implemented the augmented list experiment procedure (Corstange 2009; Corstange 2012; Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015; Flavin and Keane 2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the literature using either the classic list experiment or the augmented list experiment to assess the level of vote buying.

Table 1 Overview of studies using list experiments to examine vote buying

<i>Study</i>	<i>Country Year</i>	<i>List experiment</i>	<i>Estimate</i>
Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015	Turkey 2011	Augmented	35%
Corstange 2012	Lebanon 2009	Augmented	55%
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012	Nicaragua 2008*	Classic	24%
Imai et al. 2015	Mexico 2012	Classic	19%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Mexico 2009	Classic	23%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Honduras 2009	Classic	22%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Uruguay 2009	Classic	- 2%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Chile 2009	Classic	1%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Bolivia 2009	Classic	5%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Bolivia 2010	Classic	0%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Guatemala 2011	Classic	14%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Argentina 2011	Classic	7%
Kiewiet De Jonge 2015	Nicaragua 2011	Classic	8%
Kramon 2016	Kenya 2007	Classic	23%

NOTE: *Like Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012), Kiewiet De Jonge (2015) also use AAPOR data to estimate the Nicaragua 2008. I, therefore, do not include the case of Nicaragua 2008 in Kiewiet De Jonge's (2015) list of countries because Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) already includes Nicaragua 2008.

Although these studies are not a representative sample of research using list experiments in general to assess sensitive issues, they include all studies using list experiments to assess the level of vote buying. The four columns in table 1 denote the study, the case (country and year), the type of list experiment employed, and the estimated level of vote buying according to the list experiment. Given that the studies listed in table 1 examine vote buying in very different contexts (in different countries at different times), the results are not comparable, and far from prove that the augmented list experiment is biased. Rather, the overview in table 1 merely suggests that the augmented list exper-

iment tends to produce a higher number of affirmative answers compared to the classic list experiment. Based on the empirical indications in table 1 and to test whether the augmented list experiment's violation of the excludability assumption causes bias, I develop one simple, testable hypothesis.

H1. The augmented list experiment will produce a higher number of affirmative answers (more vote buying) compared to the classic list experiment.

I am not the first researcher to have noted that the augmented list experiment and classic list experiment may produce different results. Flavin and Keane (2009) test the augmented list experiment against the classic list experiment on people's attitudes toward an African-American president in a web survey. They find that the level of the sensitive issue—racial prejudice—is lower in the augmented list experiment compared to the classic list experiment and conclude that the augmented list experiment can be used as a conservative estimate (Flavin and Keane 2009, 10-11). Although promising, there are two major issues with Flavin and Keane's (2009) approach: their use of web survey data and their failing to explain the results.

First, using a web survey is a poor setting for testing list experiments because self-administered web surveys tend to yield fewer reports in the socially desirable direction than interviewer-administered face-to-face surveys (Kreuter et al. 2008). When respondents sit alone in front of their computer screen, they feel more anonymous than when they sit face-to-face with an interviewer. Therefore, a survey conducted via face-to-face interviews is a more optimal setting for testing the augmented list experiment against the classic list experiment.

Second, failing to explain why the augmented list experiment produces fewer affirmative answers than the classic list experiment is critical because (a) the overview in table 1 suggests otherwise, that is, that the augmented list experiment overestimates rather than underestimates, and (b) understanding the underlying mechanisms of why the two list experiments produce different results is essential for concluding which of the list experiments is biased.

Blair and Imai (2012) conduct an efficiency test of the augmented list experiment by replicating one of the simulation scenarios used by Corstange (2009). Their simulation study suggests that other estimators (i.e., the maximum likelihood estimator and the nonlinear least squares estimator) applied to the classic list experiment are more efficient than the LISTIT estimator applied to the augmented list experiment. However, Blair and Imai (2012) test only the performance of the statistical estimator LISTIT and not the validity of the augmented list experiment's results. Instead, they rely on Flavin and Keane's (2009) findings (Blair and Imai 2012, 65).

Given the limitations in the existing literature, we need to improve the experimental test settings for comparing the augmented list experiment with the classic list experiment, focus on the outcome of the two list experiments, and reflect on why their results differ. In the next section, I sketch out such a test. Subsequently, I discuss the results and the underlying mechanisms that cause the two list experiments to produce different results.

Context, data, and method

Empirically testing my hypothesis requires several conditions. First, I need an optimal setting for studying questions with social desirability bias without comprising the validity of the results. Second, I need an experimental design to test the outcome of the two list experiments that is robust against the typical pitfalls of list experiments. Third, I need an appropriate context for examining vote buying and conducting an experimental survey test because, of course, to study vote buying as a sensitive issue requires conducting the test in a context where electoral corruption occurs. I next describe the details of my research design and the extensive data collection in South Africa, a country that is well suited to tackle these challenges in testing my hypothesis.

Focusing on South Africa's municipal elections

The literature on electoral corruption has documented that vote buying flourishes in countries that experience high levels of poverty and have an electoral system that cultivates the personal vote (Birch 2007; Bøttkjær and Justesen 2017; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). The case of the South African municipal elections fulfills both requirements: South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income anywhere in the world (World Bank 2018), and unlike South Africa's national elections that enjoy one of the most proportional systems in the world (Gouws and Mitchell 2005), the municipal elections use a hybrid electoral system³ that includes a "first-past-the-post" element that cultivates the personal vote.

Moreover, South African municipal elections are not simply a second-order referendum on national politics. Municipal elections are essential in South Africa because the performance of government is more notably inadequate at the local level in South Africa (Booyesen 2012, 1). Moreover, the 2016 elections were the first in more than 20 years in which the ANC's dominance was threat-

³ In municipal elections, South Africans cast one vote for a ward councilor, making up one half of the elected representatives, and a second vote for a party representative councilor who comprises the other half of the elected representatives (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2016). The ward councilor is chosen via the plurality electoral system, also known as "first past the post," and PR councilors are elected through the proportional representation system based on the proportion of votes their political party receives in the election (Electoral Commission of South Africa 2016).

ened. The ANC's endangered position increased the incentive to engage in illegal measures such as vote buying to uphold their position.

South Africa also provides an interesting case for studying vote buying because most work on vote buying has been done in Latin America (Rueda 2015; Stokes et al. 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Nichter 2008), while less is known about vote buying in Africa. While De Kadt and Larreguy (2018) examine electoral clientelism in South Africa using Afrobarometer data, this study is the first time a survey in South Africa has focused specifically on vote buying using list experiments.

New face-to-face survey data

To test my hypothesis, I rely on data from a new survey conducted in South Africa following the August 3, 2016, municipal elections. I conducted the nationwide face-to-face survey of adult citizens in South Africa in collaboration with Citizen Surveys⁴ between August 4, 2016, and September 30, 2016. Besides the experimental test, the survey includes questions on the electoral campaign, clientelism, poverty, and socio-demographics. To ensure a nationally representative sample, Citizen Surveys use a stratified multistage probability sample with four stages: First, they implement a disproportional stratification of the strata provinces, race groups, municipality, and urban/rural area allowing us to obtain coverage of all subgroups. Second, they use census data to identify EAs⁵ (enumeration areas) and allocate them to the strata according to the power allocation rule (Lawley et al. 2007). Third, interviewers select the households by performing the random walk method (Thompson and Fraser 2006) with interviewer supervision.⁶ Fourth and finally, interviewers select the individual to be interviewed in each household by using the Kish Grid (Kish 1949). The survey has a response rate of 88.5% and consists of a total of 3,210 respondents.

The experimental test of the classic and augmented list experiment

For the experimental test, the sample is randomly split into three groups.⁷ The first group is the classic list experiment control group receiving a list of four items and a prompt corresponding to the classic list experiment prompt. Respondents in the classic procedure control group were asked only *how many* of the items they would respond to in the affirmative. The second group is the aug-

⁴ Citizen Surveys is a South African-based research company. For more information, see: <http://www.citizensurveys.com/>

⁵ EAs are the smallest geographic areas for which population statistics are available in South Africa.

⁶ Supervisors monitor interviewers via the GPS on the tablets to ensure that interviewers, in fact, follow the random walk pattern.

⁷ In fact, the sample was split into five groups—two control groups and three treatment groups. The two additional treatment groups consisted of treatments regarding abstention buying and turnout buying, respectively. For simplicity reasons, the results from the additional two groups are not included here.

mented list experiment control group receiving a list of four items and a prompt corresponding to the augmented list experiment. Respondents in the augmented control group were asked to evaluate each of the list items individually. The third group is the treatment group, which is identical in both the classic and augmented list experiment, receiving the same four items as the two control groups plus the additional item regarding vote buying. Respondents in the treatment group were asked *how many* of the items they would respond to in the affirmative. Table 2 shows the differences in the prompt and the list of items across the three groups.

Table 2 Prompt and list received by the three groups

<i>Control group Classic list experiment</i>	<i>Control group Augmented list experiment</i>	<i>Treatment group Both</i>
I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, tell me which ones apply. You can choose more than one activity.	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.
1 They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood.	1 They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood.	1 They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood.
2 They called me on my phone.	2 They called me on my phone.	2 They called me on my phone.
3 They asked me to sign a petition supporting children's rights.	3 They asked me to sign a petition supporting children's rights.	3 They offered me something, like food, or a gift or money, if I would vote for them in the elections.
4 They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio.	4 They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio.	4 They asked me to sign a petition supporting children's rights.
		5 They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio.

Before examining the results, I evaluate two aspects of the list experiment: ceiling effects and randomization. First, when conducting list experiments, we must aim to avoid situations in which respondents in the treatment group answer the maximum number of items, also referred to as ceiling effects (Glynn 2013). In this list experiment, if someone from the treatment group answers “five items,” the respondent reveals engaging in vote trades, which undermines the intention of the list experiment—allowing respondents to conceal their answers—and potentially biases the results. The item “They asked me to sign a petition supporting children's rights” was included to reduce the chance of a ceiling effect. The other items on the list correspond to the items in Gonzalez-Ocantos

et al.'s (2012) list experiment on vote buying.⁸ To make sure that all interviewers understood the premise of the list experiment (that respondents must state a number rather than identifying the items), thorough interviewer training was conducted, and videos demonstrating how the question should be asked were shown to the interviewers before fieldwork began. However, even with the implementation of these measures, 24 respondents in the treatment group responded, “five items” corresponding to 4% of the treatment group respondents, suggesting that a minor ceiling effect had occurred (see appendix A). Nevertheless, the ceiling effect will affect both the classic list experiment and the augmented list experiment equally.

Second, the assignment of respondents to the groups should be random, and the groups must not differ systematically. Interviewers used tablets to interview respondents, and the process of randomly assigning respondents to each of the three groups was pre-coded and—unlike paper-based face-to-face interviews—not prone to interviewer interaction (Caeyers et al. 2010). Appendix B includes a randomization check of the groups and demonstrates no statistically significant differences between the three groups regarding gender, age, race, education, poverty level, or region.

Results

Table 3 shows that the classic and the augmented list experiment arrive at two different estimations of the level of vote buying in South Africa. The first column in table 3 reports the result from the classic list experiment. The average number of activities reported by respondents in the control group receiving four items is 1.20, while the average number reported by the treatment group receiving five items (including the item regarding vote buying) is 1.28. Therefore, the level of vote buying is 8% according to the classic list experiment, although the difference is not statistically significant. The second column of table 3 reports the results from the augmented list experiment. The mean number reported by the control group is 0.98, while the mean in the treatment group is (still) 1.28. Thus, the estimated percentage of South Africans receiving vote-buying offers during the electoral campaign is 30% according to the augmented list experiment, and the sizable difference is statistically significant. The third column reports the difference-in-means between the two baseline groups, which is also the difference in estimate between the two types of list experiments because the treatment-group mean remains constant across the two list experiments. The difference is -22% and statistically significant, and I can, therefore, confirm my hypothesis that the augmented list ex-

⁸ Their list of items included the following: They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city. They visited your home. They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio. They threatened you to vote for them. They gave you a gift or did you a favor.

periment will produce a higher number of affirmative answers compared to the classic list experiment.

Table 3 The prevalence of vote buying across different question frames

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Classic LE</i>	<i>Augmented LE</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Control	1.20 (0.05) [646]	0.98 (0.03) [643]	0.22** (0.06)
Treatment	1.28 (0.05) [641]	1.28 (0.05) [641]	-
Difference	0.08 (0.07)	0.30** (0.06)	-
Level of vote buying (%)	8%	30%	-

NOTE: * Significant ($p < 0.05$). ** Significant ($p < 0.01$).

Standard errors of the estimates in parentheses. Sample sizes N in brackets.

However, how do we know which of the two list experiments is biased and which is reliable? Recalling the earlier discussion of the excludability assumption, it appears that the augmented list experiment leads to biased results. In the classic list experiment, the treatment is the added sensitive item regarding vote buying, however, in the augmented list experiment, the treatment is the sensitive item *and* the question format—asking *how many* in the treatment group and *which* in the control group.

The additional treatment in the augmented list experiment potentially creates two forms of bias: recollection bias and additional social desirability bias. Recollection bias can occur because asking the control group to identify each item they agree with may influence the respondents' ability to recall which items they have experienced. Additional social desirability occurs because the two different question prompts for the treatment and control necessitate that the difference-in-means between the control and treatment group include the level of vote buying plus the accumulated social desirability bias from all the items, thus overestimating the level of the sensitive issue. In comparison, the difference-in-means in the classic list experiment reports the level of vote buying including only the social desirability bias associated with this item. Accordingly, the augmented list experiment relies on the assumption that the non-sensitive items in the list are, in fact, non-sensitive and not prone to any social desirability bias. However, this may not always be the case because respondents may have an incentive to lie about other items on the list as well, for instance not admitting to signing petitions or being contacted by parties via telephone.

Note too that my finding opposes the result found by Flavin and Keane (2009). My results show that the augmented list experiment severely overestimates the prevalence of the sensitive issue, while Flavin and Keane (2009) find that the augmented list experiment moderately underestimates the level of the sensitive issue. My contrasting finding has both methodological and substantial implications: First, using the augmented list experiment comprises a methodological problem as

this approach is more prone to *type I* errors (biased estimates), which are generally regarded as worse than *type II* errors (conservative estimates) (Wuensch 1994). Second, the risk of a false positive result when studying vote buying creates a substantial problem because candidates risk being charged for vote buying activities while voters risk being accused of vote selling, even when both the voter and the candidate are “innocent.”

To validate further that the augmented list experiment is the unreliable procedure, I examine questions asking the respondents directly if they have experienced vote buying, if vote buying happens in their neighborhood, and whether they believe vote buying to be illegal and immoral. Appendix C displays the frequencies for these four questions. The estimated level of vote buying when respondents are asked directly about whether they have received vote buying offers is 6%,⁹ which is only two percentage points lower than the classic list experiment’s estimate. Such a result is consistent with survey data from Afrobarometer asking whether respondents had been offered a material benefit in return for their votes in the 2009 national election¹⁰ (Afrobarometer round 5 2011-2013). The survey also asked respondents whether candidates have made vote-buying offers to people in their neighborhood; 7% reported that neighborhood vote buying had occurred. When asked about the legality and morality of vote buying, approximately half do not believe vote buying to be illegal, and one in seven find it acceptable when voters accept gifts in exchange for their vote. Together, the results from these four questions suggest that vote buying seems not to be as widespread or generate as strong a social desirability bias in South Africa as in other countries (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), and they support the conclusion that the estimate of 30% reported by the augmented list experiment is invalid.

Conclusion

Recent work has developed an augmented list experiment to overcome the limitations of the classic list experiment. However, while the augmented list experiment has clear advantages as a procedure first to estimate sensitive issues and then to analyze them efficiently, no study has yet successfully tested whether changing the prompt for the control group in the augmented procedure causes biased results. I developed a hypothesis predicting that the augmented list experiment would overestimate the level of the sensitive issue compared to the classic list experiment. Using a new face-to-face survey dataset from South Africa on the sensitive issue of vote buying, I conducted an experimental test of the augmented and classic list experiment. While the classic list experiment reported

⁹ Respondents who answered that they have been offered vote bribes “Once or twice” or “Often.”

¹⁰ Afrobarometer data finds that the level of vote buying in South Africa (direct question) is 5.9%.

that the prevalence of vote buying was relatively low during the elections, the result from the augmented list experiment showed that almost one in three were offered material gifts in return for their vote.

I argued that the augmented list experiment produces biased results by violating one of the core assumptions when conducting experimental research, that is, the excludability assumption. Inconsistency in the question prompt for the control and treatment groups potentially affects the respondents' ability to recall which items they have experienced and accumulates the social desirability bias of all the items on the list and not just the bias associated with the sensitive item of interest. These two potential biases cause the augmented list experiment to overestimate the level of the sensitive issue severely. Producing biased results is especially problematic for a list experiment because when researchers choose to use list experiments to investigate vote buying, they do so because they wish to estimate the true level of vote buying and avoid underreporting. However, when applying the augmented list to overcome the issue of inefficient analysis, they undermine the very reason for deciding to conduct the list experiment in the first place. Although the augmented list experiment may allow for a more efficient causal analysis, my results show that the augmented list experiment instigates overreporting rather than underreporting.

The findings have important implications for the design of list experiments and researchers measuring sensitive issues. Researchers studying sensitive issues through surveys should avoid using the augmented list experiment because, in doing so, they risk "crying wolf" without any danger in sight. Instead, future research should build on the advanced methodological models developed by Blair and Imai (2012) and Imai (2011) to get the most out of the list experiments that follow the classic procedure. Finally, this study has provided the first systematic evidence accounting for social desirability bias of the prevalence of vote buying in South Africa. Although the results suggest that vote buying is not widespread, vote-buying stands at 8% according to the classic list experiment.

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Supplemental appendix

Appendix A. Distribution of list experiment responses

The table displays the distribution of list experiment responses and shows that a minor ceiling effect occurred.

<i>Responses</i>	<i>Control (original)</i>		<i>Control (augmented)</i>		<i>Treatment (both)</i>	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
0	214	33 %	173	27 %	205	32 %
1	233	36 %	324	50 %	214	34 %
2	104	16 %	132	21 %	130	20 %
3	44	7 %	14	2 %	47	7 %
4	51	8 %	0	0 %	21	3 %
5	-	-	-	-	24	4 %
Total	646	100 %	643	100 %	641	100 %

Appendix B. Balance tests

The table shows the results from the Anova-test and provides evidence that the treatment group, the original control group, and the augmented control group are, indeed, similar regarding gender, age, race, education, poverty level, and region.

	<i>Control (original)</i>	<i>Control (augmented)</i>	<i>Treatment (both)</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Female	0.64	0.63	0.59	0.16
Age	40.67	41.01	49.35	0.74
Education	3.49	3.48	3.51	0.95
Poverty	5.78	5.16	5.27	0.09
Black	0.74	0.76	0.73	0.49
Colored	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.88
Indian	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.49
White	0.13	0.10	0.14	0.09
Eastern Cape	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.98
Free State	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.99
Gauteng	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.98
Kwa-Zulu Natal	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.99
Limpopo	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.98
Mpumalanga	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.97
Northern Cape	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.96
North West	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.99
Western Cape	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.96

Appendix C. Additional questions on vote buying

The questionnaire asks the following questions after the list experiment toward the end of the interview. The first three questions are asked of all respondents, while the last question regarding the morality of vote buying is part of a survey experiment, and therefore, only one third of the respondents received this question.

How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer YOU something like food or a gift or money IF YOU WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?

	Frequency	Percentage
Never	2,992	93.21
Once or twice	145	4.52
Often	42	1.31
Refuse to answer	31	0.97
Total	3,210	100.00

How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer something like food or a gift or money to people in your community or village if they WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?

	Frequency	Percentage
Never	2,934	93.06
Once or twice	159	4.95
Often	62	1.93
Refuse to answer	66	1.93
Total	3,210	100.00

Do you believe it is illegal for a candidate or someone from a political party to offer voters something like food or a gift or money in return for their votes?

	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	1,546	48.16
No	1,527	47.57
Don't know	137	4.27
Total	3,210	100.00

Suppose that someone in this area is offered R200 by a party official to vote for that party. And suppose the person accepts the money. Would you say that the behaviour of the person who accepts the money is wrong or acceptable?

	Frequency	Percentage
Wrong	860	80.22
Acceptable	149	13.90
Refuse to answer	63	5.88
Total	1,072	100.00

Article 2

Electoral clientelism, beliefs and the secret ballot

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Clientelist practices are a common feature of elections in new democracies. Yet, why do political parties use strategies such as vote buying to mobilize electoral support when the secret ballot allows voters to renege on their commitments and vote as they please? In this paper, we address this puzzle by arguing that voter perceptions of ballot secrecy affect their responses to vote buying offers. We develop a game theoretical model, where voter beliefs in the secret ballot guide their responses to electoral clientelism. Empirically, we test the implications of the model using original survey data from a nationwide survey in South Africa. We analyze how vote (and turnout) buying affects vote choice for the dominant party, ANC, in the 2016 municipal election and how this relationship is shaped by voter confidence in the secret ballot. Consistent with the theoretical model, the results suggest that electoral clientelism is effective mainly when voters have little confidence in ballot secrecy. We thereby contribute to explain how and why parties operating in the shadow of the secret ballot use clientelist strategies as an important part of their electoral campaigns.

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Introduction

The secret ballot is a cornerstone of modern democracy. While democracies come in many types composed of different bundles of institutions, one common trait they share is that mass elections are conducted under the auspices of the secret ballot. Historically, the secret ballot was adopted to undermine electoral corruption and vote markets, where political parties and candidates distributed bribes to voters in order to secure support during elections (Aidt and Jensen 2017; Teorell et al. 2017; Mares 2015). The move from open to secret voting was supposed to increase voter autonomy during elections and enable voters to cast their ballot according to their political preferences without undue influences from clientelist parties or fear of repercussions from employers, landlords, and politically powerful elites (Teorell et al. 2017; Mares 2015; Lehoucq 2007). The secret ballot is therefore often depicted as a ‘weapon of the weak’ because it protects the electoral autonomy of poor and underprivileged groups, who are the most likely targets of clientelist parties and might be punished for voting “the wrong way” (Fox 1994, 158).

Electoral clientelism involves the exchange of money or material goods flowing from political parties to voters, conditional on voters reciprocating with political support or votes (Nichter 2014; Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The distribution of clientelist transfers during election campaigns includes attempts to sway people’s party choice (Stokes 2005; Brusco et al. 2004), mobilize turnout (Nichter 2008), paying people to abstain (Cox and Kousser 1981), or a combination of those strategies (Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Nichter 2014). While electoral clientelism has largely been eradicated in high-income democracies, it still flourishes during election campaigns in new democracies in the developing world (Kiewiet de Jonge 2015; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013). In fact, the key puzzle in the literature on electoral clientelism is why political parties use clientelist strategies such as vote buying to mobilize support, given that the secret ballot allows voters to renege on their commitments and vote as they please (Kramon 2016a; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Stokes et al. 2013).

In response to this puzzle, two arguments have been invoked in the literature. One part of the literature points to various compliance and monitoring mechanisms that clientelist parties rely on to enforce electoral clientelism (Rueda 2017; Gingerich and Medina 2013; Stokes et al. 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012). Another part of the literature argues that actual secret ballot violations are relatively rare and that parties – particularly in Africa – do not have the organizational capacity to implement large-scale monitoring of vote choices during elections (Guardado and Wanthekon 2018; Bratton 2008; van de Walle 2007). Attempts to mobilize support based on clientelist strategies are therefore largely futile and have little effect on election outcomes (Guardado and Wanthekon 2018;

Lindberg 2013; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012). The fundamental issue at stake is whether and why electoral clientelism affects electoral outcomes when elections are conducted under the secret ballot.

In this paper, we address this tension in the literature by developing and testing an argument emphasizing that lack of confidence in the secret ballot is often enough to sway voter behavior in accordance with the wishes of clientelist parties, and that secret ballot perceptions accordingly affect whether clientelist strategies such as vote buying become more effective in changing electoral behavior. While much of the existing literature argues that electoral clientelism is viable only if parties can *de facto* compromise ballot secrecy or orchestrate monitoring of vote choices, our argument abandons the premise that actual violations of the secret ballot are necessary to enforce clientelist exchanges during elections. Expanding upon recent contributions pointing to the importance of secret ballot perceptions for contingent electoral strategies (Frye et al. 2018; Ferree and Long 2016; Kiewiet and Nickerson 2014) and political behavior more generally (Gerber et al. 2013a, 2013b), we argue that if voters do not have confidence in the secret ballot and – rightly or wrongly – believe that their vote choice can be monitored, they are more likely to change their vote in response to an offer from a clientelist party. In this way, voter that believe that ballot secrecy can be compromised may contribute to sustain the exchange of money and material benefits in return for votes during elections, because low confidence in the secret ballot increases the likelihood that voters fulfill their end of the bargain and surrender their vote to the clientelist party. The observable implication of this argument is that secret ballot perceptions moderate the link between electoral clientelism and party choice during elections. Voter beliefs affect this link in the sense that voters who have confidence in the secret ballot are comparatively unaffected by the distribution of clientelist goods and tend to vote as they please, while voters with weak confidence in the secret ballot are more likely to reciprocate with support for the clientelist party in the ballot booth. By implication, the interaction of clientelist offers and secret ballot perceptions should matter for voter compliance.

Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we develop an argument emphasizing that the effectiveness of electoral clientelism is contingent on voter perceptions of the secrecy of the voting process. We point to a mechanism – secret ballot perceptions – that contributes to explain why strategies such as vote buying are more effective under some conditions (when voters' confidence in the secret ballot is low) but not under other conditions (when voter confidence in the secret ballot is high). Theoretically, we do so by developing a Bayesian game theoretical model, which features voters' beliefs in the secret ballot. The model shows that even with a nominally secret ballot, voters will behave as if the ballot is not secret in equilibrium, given certain exogenous signals about the nature of the political environment.

Second, we test the empirical implication of the theoretical model using original survey data collected in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa – a country that has received relatively little attention in the literature on electoral clientelism. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical argument. Specifically, our results show that voters being targeted with pre-electoral vote bribes by the ANC – the dominant party in South African politics – are more likely to vote for the ANC if they doubt the secret ballot. These results support the idea that electoral clientelism may contribute to mobilize electoral support, but chiefly if it targets voters who lack of confidence in the institutions of the secret ballot. However, identifying the effect of electoral clientelism (and secret ballot perceptions) on vote choice is complicated by endogeneity. Clientelist parties do not randomly select whom to target, and the selection is plausibly correlated with vote choice. To empirically address selection issues, all analyses control for respondents’ party identification. We also perform separate analyses of vote buying and turnout buying to further alleviate concerns about selection. The idea is that voters who are offered rewards for simply going to the polls to vote (turnout buying) might be systematically different from voters who are offered rewards to vote specifically for the ANC (vote buying): Conditional on going to the polls, the ANC expects the former group to vote for them, whereas the latter group are expected to require additional motivation to do so. There are unobserved differences between the two groups such that the former (turnout buying) more likely to vote for the ANC than the latter (vote buying). Yet, across these groups and the unobserved differences in the propensity to vote for the ANC, we find identical results. Lastly, to alleviate doubts about unobservable confounding more broadly, we perform Generalized Sensitivity Analysis (Imbens, 2003). This shows that, in order for omitted variables to explain away our findings, they would have to be much stronger correlated with electoral clientelism and vote choice than all of the theoretically motivated variables included in the analyses. While we cannot rule it out, we do not find it likely.

In this way, our paper adds to a number of strands in the existing literature on electoral clientelism. First, we contribute to the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of electoral clientelism in new democracies, which remains an unresolved and highly contested issue (Guardado and Wanthekon 2018). On the one hand, some studies find that that electoral clientelism affects voter behavior. For instance, Wanthekon (2003) shows that clientelist appeals increase electoral support – particularly for incumbents, while Brusco et al. (2004) find that vote buying is useful for mobilizing support – particularly among the poor. Kramon (2016b) finds that vote buying is most effective when voters are poorly informed, while Leight et al. (2016) – using evidence from lab experiments – show that voters are less willing to punish politicians who provide them with vote bribes. While the

evidence reported by Bratton (2008) is mixed, his results suggest that vote bribes increase incumbent support – arguably an indication that incumbents typically have access to a larger pool of state resources. On the other hand, the effectiveness of electoral clientelism has been challenged by van de Walle (2007) and Lindberg (2013) who argue that secret voting enables voters to accept vote bribes with one hand and vote for their preferred party with the other hand. Consistent with this argument, Conroy-Krutz and Logan (2012) find that although vote buying was widespread during the 2011 presidential election in Uganda, it had little impact on the outcome of the election. Guardado and Wantchekon (2018) similarly find that neither turnout nor the vote share of parties change in response to clientelist strategies. By pointing to the moderating role of secret ballot perceptions for the effectiveness of electoral clientelism, we contribute to bridge the gap between studies claiming that electoral clientelism does not work (Guardado and Wantchekon 2018; Lindberg 2013; Conroy-Krutz and Logan 2012; van de Walle 2007) and studies claiming that it can be a useful way of mobilizing electoral support (Kramon 2016b; Brusco et al 2004; Wantchekon 2003).

Second, we also add to the literature on how clientelist exchanges are enforced in the presence of a nominally secret ballot. Building on the seminal work of Scott (1969), the most common explanation of enforcement emphasizes the role of political machines in monitoring and enforcing electoral clientelism (Szwarcberg 2015; Frye et al. 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005). On this view, clientelist parties are treated as political machines that rely on a dense network of local and socially embedded party brokers. Brokers are not only involved in the distribution of targeted goods and transfers, but also specialize in gathering information about voters’ partisan preferences and electoral choices, which are used to reward or punish voters, contingent on their support for the machine (Stokes et al. 2013; Stokes 2005). A second group of studies emphasizes that clientelist enforcement does not require that party brokers are able to observe how individuals vote, but merely that electoral returns are available at sufficiently disaggregated levels, e.g. at the level of polling stations (Rueda 2017, 2015; Gingerich and Medina 2013). Given the availability of such information, brokers can monitor and enforce electoral clientelism collectively by making the flow of clientelist transfers contingent on the collective party choice of small voter groups (Rueda 2017). A third strand of the literature abandons the assumption that clientelism entails *quid-pro-quo* transactions and instead emphasizes that clientelism revolves around social norms of reciprocity. While the importance of social norms for sustaining clientelist relationship has been recognized for long (Fox 1994; Scott 1972), recent contributions by Finan and Schechter (2012) and Lawson and Greene (2014) provide evidence that norms of reciprocity underpin clientelist exchanges and makes unmonitored vote buying viable, because receiving a gift often incurs feelings of obligation to return the

favor that will induce voters to comply and support the distributing party. Without in any way denying their importance for electoral clientelism, our argument does not rely on appeals to social norms or collective enforcement. Our argument is more closely related to models of political machines, in the sense that active attempts by political parties to influence voter perceptions of ballot secrecy requires a certain level of organizational capacity at the local level (Ferree and Long 2016). However, in contrast to political machine models, our argument does not invoke the – rather strong – assumption that parties are capable of actually monitoring vote choices or *de facto* organize breaches of the secret ballot. Instead, our argument is more closely related to recent studies from Latin America (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson 2014), Africa (Ferree and Long 2016), and Russia (Frye et al. 2018) of how political parties often try to influence voter perceptions of ballot secrecy in order to enforce contingent electoral strategies. However, we move one step further by investigating – theoretically and empirically – how voter confidence in the secret ballot matters for whether voters comply with the clientelist exchange and relinquish their votes in return for pre-electoral transfers.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the theoretical argument and introduces the game theoretical model. The section after that motivates our case – South Africa – and describes the data we use. The next section shows the empirical results from a range of models where the key quantity of interest is the interaction of vote bribes and secret ballot perceptions. The final section concludes on the main findings.

Electoral clientelism and beliefs in the secret ballot

The secret ballot is an electoral institution comprised of a collection of rules and procedures (Teorell et al. 2017). These rules may, for instance, stipulate that votes must be cast using standardized paper ballots in designated and enclosed voting booths, and are returned in closed envelopes to secure voting urns – and that this entire process is supervised by election committee officials or election monitors (Teorell et al. 2017, 534-539; Kelley 2012). While all or some of the rules surrounding the process of secret voting may be enforced to varying degrees, the point of the institution of ballot secrecy is to safeguard the autonomy of voters and allow them to conceal their political preferences during the voting process (Mares 2015). Like institutions in general, a key characteristic of such rules is that they produce regularity of behavior (Greif 2006, 30). In this sense, the secret ballot is intended to generate a regularized behavioral response where voters express their sincere political preferences without worrying that their vote choice is monitored or revealed.

However, to understand voter choices, it is not enough to assume that behavior will conform to the incentives built into the formal institutional framework. In fact, electoral institutions such as

the secret ballot will only be effective if voters believe they are credible and have confidence that they can cast their ballot in secret – without fear of repercussions from party agents, employers, or powerful elites, who might otherwise punish or reward voters contingent on their vote choice. As emphasized by Gerber et al. (2013a, 78): “Whatever the truth is regarding *actual* ballot secrecy, what is crucial for understanding political behavior is whether people *think* their voting decisions are secret”.⁵ Therefore, voter perceptions of ballot secrecy are important because such beliefs affect how political preferences are channeled into actual voting behavior. For instance, a voter may prefer to support party *A*, but may end up casting a ballot for party *B* because of the belief that ballot secrecy can be compromised. Even in contemporary USA, voter beliefs in the secret ballot have been shown to be consequential for various types of political behavior, including party choice (Gerber et al. 2013a) and turnout (Gerber et al. 2013b).

The importance of voter beliefs in the secret ballot becomes even more pronounced in elections where parties employ clientelist strategies such as vote buying to mobilize support. When votes are cast under a secret ballot – and voters have confidence that they can conceal their vote choice – clientelist practices need not have any particular effect on people’s electoral behavior or vote choice. In this scenario, voters may well receive gifts or money with the one hand, and vote for their preferred party with the other hand (Lindberg 2013; van de Walle 2007). However, if voters engaged in clientelist exchanges believe their vote choice can be monitored – in spite of a nominally secret ballot – they may be more likely to comply with their commitment to support the clientelist party. In this scenario, the mere belief that the ballot is not secret may induce a change in voter behavior, particularly if voters fear that clientelist parties will punish those who vote “the wrong way” or are afraid of being cut off from the future flow of clientelist transfers (Frye et al. 2018; Ferree and Long 2016). In what follows, we formalize this idea by developing a Bayesian game theoretical model showing the importance of voter beliefs for the operation of electoral clientelism.

A Bayesian game of electoral clientelism and the secret ballot

To model the role of beliefs in the secret ballot and their effect on voting behavior in an environment of electoral clientelism, two players are featured: a Voter and a Party. Decisions are modeled sequentially. We assume that the Voter has already received and accepted a gift from the Party. We also assume that the Voter prefers not to vote for the Party, but is concerned that the ballot is not secret. Our model examines how clientelist practices can affect voting even when the ballot is secret, as long as the voter believes that the ballot may be monitored.

⁵ Italics in original.

The Game

The Party first decides whether ballots are monitored, such that $b = m$ or that ballots are secret, $b = s$. We indicate this choice with γ representing a choice to monitor ballots and $1 - \gamma$ is the choice to keep the ballot secret. The Party, however, does not declare that the ballot is secret or not secret.⁶ In figure 1, the choice to monitor ballots, γ , is seen at the top of the game tree. The decision to keep ballots secret is at the bottom. Nature makes the next move contingent on the Party choosing to monitor the ballots or to keep them secret. Nature sends signals that are exogenously produced by the general political system. The signal assumes two forms, $i = s$ (secret ballot) or $i = m$ (monitored ballot). In figure 1, a signal that the ballot is monitored is evident on the left side of the game tree. A signal that the ballot is secret is portrayed to the right side of the game tree. The probability of the Voter receiving a particular exogenous signal is contingent on the Party's choice: $\pi = \Pr(i = m \mid b = m)$, $\omega = \Pr(i = m \mid b = s)$ with $1 \geq \omega > \pi \geq 0$. In other words, π indicates a condition in which the Voter observes a signal that the ballot is being monitored when it is; ω indicates a signal that the ballot is being monitored when it is actually secret. The variables, π and ω , measure the propensity of the Party to monitor ballots, whereby:

$\pi = 1$ and $\omega = 0$, the signals perfectly indicate that the ballot is secret;

$\pi = \omega$, the signals reveal no information;

the intermediate case $0 < \pi < \omega < 1$ the signals tend to reflect the actual decision of the Party but imperfectly.

The Voter does not know whether the ballot is truly secret or not. She only observes an imperfect exogenous signal and updates her beliefs using Bayes' rule. Her ex-post beliefs are denoted as $\mu = \Pr(b = m \mid i = s)$ and $\lambda = \Pr(b = m \mid i = m)$. The information set connecting μ and $1 - \mu$ are seen to the left of figure 1, where Nature has sent a signal that ballots are secret. The information set connecting λ and $1 - \lambda$, where Nature has sent a signal that ballots are monitored is seen on the right-hand side of figure 1. After receiving a signal, the Voter must decide whether to reciprocate (vote for the Party after having accepted a gift, or comply), $j = r$, or to defect (vote as she pleases and accept the gift, or defect), $j = d$.⁷ The Voter's behavioral strategies are thus defined as $\alpha = \Pr(j = r \mid i = s)$, $1 - \alpha = \Pr(j = d \mid i = s)$, $\beta = \Pr(j = r \mid i = m)$, and $1 - \beta = \Pr(j = d \mid i = m)$.


⁶ We presume that no party wants to declare that the ballot is monitored, but rather will publicly declare it is secret.

⁷ Bratton (2008) uses the terms 'comply' and 'defect' to denote these strategies. Here r stands for reciprocate and d is for defect.

The Voter thus decides to vote to reciprocate for the gift or defect based on their beliefs regarding the signals they receive.

Figure 1 displays the interaction of the two players and the signals generated in the Bayesian game. Both players are assumed to be risk-neutral. The structure of the game and the payoff parameters (ϵ, c, p, v, x) and the signals (π, ω) are exogenously given and are common knowledge. The endogenous variables reflecting strategic choice are $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \mu$, and λ . The game exhibits many characteristics of the Inspection Game, but differs in a number fundamental respects.⁸ The variables c and x relate to the Party's payoffs, whereby the cost of monitoring is c and x is the value of a vote to the Party. For the Voter the relevant payoffs are the penalty for defecting, p ; the value of voting for one's own preference, v ; and, ϵ , the reward for reciprocating in the clientelist exchange.

Figure 1 Electoral clientelism and secret ballot beliefs



Equilibrium Analysis

We begin by considering the game played with full and complete information. Using backwards induction, we can determine the subgame perfect equilibria. Given complete and perfect information, there are no information sets in the game; we can thereby eliminate the subgames in which the signal does not correspond to the decision made by the Party, such that $\pi = 0$ and $\omega = 1$ and $1 - \pi = 1$ and $1 - \omega = 0$. This means that the upper-left-hand and lower-right-hand subgames cannot be considered as potential equilibria. Turn now to the Voter's choice when she knows that the ballot is

⁸ Becker's (1968) Inspection Game is an imperfect information game and has no pure strategy equilibria, whereby the equilibrium mixed strategies of both players are determined by the other player's payoffs. The game developed here is played sequentially and with incomplete information. In this manner, our game exhibits similarities with Kirstein's (2014) Bayesian Inspection game; however, our game fundamentally differs in that we feature the choice and beliefs of the Voter and not the inspector, which is analogous to the Party in the Bayesian game of electoral clientelism and the secret ballot. The nature of signals in our game reflects the actions of the Party and not the voter, which contrasts with Kirstein's game.

monitored and the signal reveals with no uncertainty that the ballot is monitored. This is the upper-right-hand quadrant of figure 1. The strategy β leads to a payoff of ε , while $1 - \beta$ produces $v - p$. Under such conditions, the Voter will opt to play β as her strategy. When the Voter knows that the ballot is secret, the lower-left-hand subgame, the choice is between a payoff of v and 0; the Voter will thus opt for the $1 - \alpha$ strategy. Using backwards induction, the Party thereby chooses between a secret and a monitored ballot. Given the Voter's decisions, the Party will compare the payoffs of $-x$ and $-\epsilon$. The relative values of ϵ and x will determine the Party's choice. In other words, the relative values of a lost vote and the cost of monitoring a vote will determine the decision of the Party. This result corresponds to the Pure Secret Ballot equilibrium. With complete and perfect information, electoral clientelism is not sustainable.

The Bayesian game of electoral clientelism and the secret ballot is fundamentally based on incomplete information, whereby exogenous signals reveal information as to whether the ballot is secret or monitored. The signals can be interpreted to emanate from the broader political environment in which a Voter finds herself. Rumors and gossip may play a role shaping the beliefs of the Voter regarding the secrecy of the ballot. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium $\{(\alpha^*, \beta^*); (\mu^*, \lambda^*); \gamma^*\}$ will be derived next. α^* and β^* denote the Voter's behavioral strategies in equilibrium, and γ^* denotes the Party's. μ^* and λ^* denote the Voter's equilibrium beliefs.

The Party's Reaction Function

The behavioral strategy, γ^* , of the Party serves to maximize its payoff, given the behavioral strategies (α^*, β^*) , which the Party expects the Voter to play, given the signals received by the Voter. In other words, the Party maximizes γ^* with respect to the decision to make ballots secret or monitor them given the Voter's decision to vote for the Party or not, which in turn are based on signals, not the Party's actual decision. The equilibrium value of γ^* maximizes:

$$(1) \quad \gamma[\pi\alpha + (1 - \pi)\beta](-\epsilon) + \gamma[\pi(1 - \alpha) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \beta)](-x - \epsilon) + (1 - \gamma)[\omega\alpha + (1 - \omega)\beta](0) \\ + (1 - \gamma)[\omega(1 - \alpha) + (1 - \omega)(1 - \beta)](-x),$$

which is equal to:

$$(2) \quad \gamma\pi\alpha x - \gamma\pi\beta x - \gamma\epsilon + \omega\alpha x + \omega\beta x + \beta x - x - \gamma\omega\alpha x + \gamma\omega\beta x$$

The first derivative with respect to γ is:

$$(3) \quad \pi\alpha x - \pi\beta x - \epsilon - \omega\alpha x + \omega\beta x$$

We can rearrange this equation as:

$$(4) \quad (\beta - \alpha) = \frac{c}{x(\omega - \pi)} = K$$

The Party's reaction function, $\gamma^*(\alpha, \beta)$, in turn is:

$$\gamma^* = 0 \Leftrightarrow \beta - \alpha < K$$

$$0 < \gamma^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \beta - \alpha = K$$

$$\gamma^* = 1 \Leftrightarrow \beta - \alpha > K$$

where $K = \frac{c}{x(\omega - \pi)} > 0$, such that $\omega = \pi$.

The Party's reaction function leads to a set of intermediate results, which are expressed in Lemma 1. These results will help derive the main propositions.

Lemma 1:

1. If $K > 1 \Leftrightarrow c > x(\omega - \pi)$, then $(\beta - \alpha) < K$ and the Party will choose to keep the ballot secret, $\gamma^* = 0$.
2. If $K = 1 \Leftrightarrow c = x(\omega - \pi)$, then $(\beta - \alpha) \leq K$. The Voter's choice $\beta = 1$ and $\alpha = 0$ is a strategy that induces the Party to choose γ such that $0 < \gamma^* < 1$.
3. If $K < 1 \Leftrightarrow c < x(\omega - \pi)$, then $(\beta - \alpha) > K$ which will lead the Party to choose to monitor the ballot, $\gamma^* > 0$.

If $\gamma^* = 0$ or $\gamma^* = 1$, then the Party chooses a pure strategy, such that the ballot is monitored, $b = m$, or secret, $b = s$. If $\gamma^* = 1$, then the Party has chosen to monitor the ballots. When $\gamma^* = 0$, the Party maintains a secret ballot. When $0 < \gamma^* < 1$, then the Party chooses a mixed strategy, which entails occasionally monitoring ballots. These strategies are affected by the relative costs of monitoring, c , and the weighted costs of losing a vote, $x(\omega - \pi)$. High costs of monitoring will induce the Party to keep the ballot secret, while relatively less costly monitoring will induce the Party to monitor ballots. When $K = 1$, $c = x(\omega - \pi)$, and under such conditions, the Party's reaction function reduces to $\gamma^* \in [0,1]$ for $\alpha = 0$ and $\beta = 1$, whereby the Party will be indifferent between monitoring and maintaining a secret ballot.

The Voter's Reaction Function

The Voter makes a strategic decision whether to vote her sincere preferences or to comply and reciprocate the gift from the Party with a vote. The choice of the Voter is made with incomplete information. Beliefs regarding the secrecy of the ballot shape her choice. We first examine the Voter's optimal choice given a signal $i = s$, meaning that the signal indicates that the ballot is secret. Bayesian updating leads to the following ex-post belief:

$$(5) \quad \mu = \frac{\pi\gamma}{\pi\gamma + \omega(1-\gamma)}.$$

The Voter takes these ex-post beliefs into account and chooses her behavioral strategy α^* to maximize:

$$(6) \quad [\mu\alpha\varepsilon + \mu(1-\alpha)(v-p) + (1-\mu)\alpha(0) + (1-\mu)(1-\alpha)v].$$

Expanding, (6) can be expressed as:

$$(7) \quad \mu\alpha\varepsilon - \mu p + \mu\alpha p - \alpha v + v.$$

The first derivative of (7) with respect to α is:

$$(8) \quad \mu\varepsilon + \mu p - v.$$

Which can be simplified as:

$$(9) \quad \mu(\varepsilon + p) - v.$$

By substituting in equation 5 for μ in equation 9, we obtain the following:

$$(10) \quad \frac{\pi\gamma(\varepsilon + p)}{\pi\gamma + \omega(1-\gamma)} - v.$$

To simplify this, we set:

$$(11) \quad \gamma_1 = \frac{\omega v}{\omega v - \pi v + \pi\varepsilon + \pi p} = \frac{\omega v}{v(\omega - \pi) + \pi(\varepsilon + p)}.$$

From (11) we can derive critical values, whereby:

$$(12) \quad 1 = \frac{\omega v}{\omega v - \pi v + \pi \varepsilon + \pi p} \Leftrightarrow v(\omega - \pi) + \pi(\varepsilon + p) < \omega v.$$

Equation (12) in turn can be expressed as:

$$(13) \quad \varepsilon = v - p.$$

The relative values of voting one's preferences, punishment, p , and the reward for cooperating with the Party, ε , are weighed against one another. When $\varepsilon = v - p$, clientelism is expected. When $\varepsilon < v - p$ the ballot will be secret. The relationship between the Party's choice γ and the behavioral strategy of the Voter after having observed a signal that the ballot is being secret, $i = s$, can be summarized in the reaction function $\alpha^* = \alpha^*(\gamma)$:

$$\alpha^* = 1 \Leftrightarrow \gamma > \gamma_1$$

$$0 < \alpha^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \gamma = \gamma_1$$

$$\alpha^* = 0 \Leftrightarrow \gamma < \gamma_1$$

When the Party's strategy to monitor the ballot, γ , exceeds the value of γ_1 , then $\alpha^* = 1$, whereby the Voter reciprocates by voting with the Party, $j = r$. When the Party's strategy to monitor the ballot, γ , is less than the value of γ_1 , then $\alpha^* = 0$, whereby the Voter defects and votes her preferences, $j = d$. A mixed strategy on the part of the Voter occurs when:

$$\gamma = \gamma_1 = \frac{\omega v}{v(\omega - \pi) + \pi(\varepsilon + p)}.$$

The Voter's strategy is shaped by the relative values of the Voter voting her preferences, v , the punishment for defection, p , and ε , the clientelism reward. On the other side of the game tree, figure 1, the Voter observes a signal that the ballot is monitored, $i = m$. We can follow the same procedure such that the optimal strategy $\beta^*(\gamma)$ can also be derived. Bayesian updating results in the following ex-post belief:

$$(14) \quad \lambda = \frac{(1 - \pi)\gamma}{(1 - \pi)\gamma + (1 - \omega)(1 - \gamma)}$$

The Voter maximizes with respect to β , such that:

$$(15) \quad [\lambda\beta\varepsilon + \lambda(1-\beta)(\nu-p) + (1-\lambda)\beta(0) + (1-\lambda)(1-\beta)\nu].$$

This expression can be expanded such that:

$$(16) \quad [\lambda\beta\varepsilon + \lambda p + \lambda\beta p - \beta\nu + \nu].$$

The first derivative with respect to β is then:

$$(17) \quad \lambda p + \lambda\varepsilon - \nu = \lambda(p + \varepsilon) - \nu.$$

Substitution of λ with the expression from (14) produces:

$$(18) \quad \frac{(1-\pi)\gamma(p+\varepsilon)}{(1-\pi)\gamma + (1-\omega)(1-\gamma)} - \nu.$$

Solving for γ :

$$(19) \quad \gamma_2 = \frac{(1-\omega)\nu}{-\omega\nu + \pi\nu - \pi\varepsilon + \pi p + \varepsilon + p} = \frac{(1-\omega)\nu}{(\pi-\omega)\nu + \pi(p-\varepsilon) + \varepsilon + p}.$$

From (19) we can derive critical values, whereby if

$$(20) \quad 1 > \frac{(1-\omega)\nu}{(\pi-\omega)\nu + \pi(p-\varepsilon) + \varepsilon + p} \Leftrightarrow (\omega-\pi)\nu + \pi(p-\varepsilon) + \varepsilon + p > (1-\omega)\nu.$$

Equation (14) in turn can be expressed as:

$$(21) \quad (1-\pi)(\nu-\varepsilon) p.$$

This means that given the signal of the probability of a monitored ballot $(1-\pi)$ and the value of voting one's true preferences subtracting the lost goodwill from the Party, ε , will be weighed against the degree of punishment, p . Alternatively, (21) can be expressed as $\nu - \pi p > \varepsilon$, whereby the ballot would be secret. If $\pi = 0$, and thereby $1 - \pi = 1$, the signal is that the ballot is monitored, then electoral clientelism is supported and $\beta^* = 1$. In contrast, when $\nu - \pi p < \varepsilon$, we expect to see electoral clientelism. If $\pi = 1$, indicating that the Voter has received a signal that the ballot is secret, then the secret ballot is supported and $\beta^* = 0$. The reaction function $\beta^* = \beta^*(\gamma)$ can be expressed as follows:

$$\beta^* = 1 \Leftrightarrow \gamma < \gamma_2$$

$$0 < \beta^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \gamma = \gamma_2$$

$$\beta^* = 1 \Leftrightarrow \gamma > \gamma_2$$

From the Voter's reaction functions resulting from signals of a monitored or a secret ballot, a set of results can be posited in Lemma 2:

Lemma 2:

1. $1 > \omega > \pi > 0 \wedge \varepsilon > 0 \wedge \nu < \infty$ implies $1 > \gamma_2 > \gamma_1 > 0$.
2. If $\pi = 0$ then $\alpha^* = 0$ and $\gamma_1 = 0$.
3. $\omega = 1$ implies $\beta^* = 1$, $\gamma_2 = 1$, $\mu = 1$, and $\lambda = 0$.

Since $\omega > \pi$, $\varepsilon > 0$, and $\nu < \infty$, there is no value of γ for which $\alpha^*(\gamma) > \beta(\gamma)$ holds. In addition, for $\gamma = \gamma_1$ or $\gamma = \gamma_2$, one of the Voter's optimal strategies α^* and β^* is mixed and the other is pure.

Bayesian Equilibria

Four perfect Bayesian equilibria, $\{(\alpha^*, \beta^*); (\mu^*, \lambda^*); \gamma^*\}$, are evident in this game.

Proposition 1: In the Bayesian game of electoral clientelism with ε , $\nu > 0$ and $0 < \pi < \omega < 1$, four perfect Bayesian equilibria exist

1. *Pure Electoral Clientelism Equilibrium*; $\gamma = 1$ and $\alpha = \beta = 1$; $\{(1,1); (0,0); (1)\}$;
2. *Mixed Strategy Electoral Clientelism Equilibrium*; $\gamma = \gamma_1$ and $\alpha = 1 - K$, $\beta = 1$; $\{(1 - K, 1); (\mu^*, \lambda^*); \gamma^*\}$, with $\mu = \frac{\pi\gamma_1}{\pi\gamma_1 + \omega(1 - \gamma_1)}$ and $\lambda = \frac{(1 - \pi)\gamma_1}{(1 - \pi)\gamma_1 + (1 - \omega)(1 - \gamma_1)}$.
3. *Separating Electoral Clientelism Equilibrium*; $\gamma = \gamma_2$ and $\alpha = 0$, $\beta = K$; $\{(1 - K, 1); (\mu^*, \lambda^*); \gamma_1\}$, with $\mu = \frac{\pi\gamma_2}{\pi\gamma_2 + \omega(1 - \gamma_2)}$ and $\lambda = \frac{(1 - \pi)\gamma_2}{(1 - \pi)\gamma_2 + (1 - \omega)(1 - \gamma_2)}$.
4. *Pure Secret Ballot Equilibrium*; $\gamma = 0$ and $\alpha = \beta = 0$; $\{(0,0); (1,1); (0)\}$.

Recall equations (4), (11), and (19):

$$K = \frac{c}{x(\omega - \pi)}; \gamma_1 = \frac{\omega v}{v(\omega - \pi) + \pi(\varepsilon + p)}; \gamma_2 = \frac{(1 - \omega)v}{v(\pi - \omega) + \pi(p - \varepsilon) + \varepsilon + p}.$$

Proof:

1. Pure Electoral Clientelism is an equilibrium since the Party's best reply to $\beta - \alpha > K$, and in particular to any $\alpha = \beta$, would be $\gamma = 1$, such that $\gamma_1 < \gamma_2$ for $\omega v > 0$ and $\omega > \pi$. The Voter's best reply to any $\gamma^* < \gamma_1$ would be $\alpha^* = \beta^* = 1$, confirming $\beta - \alpha > K$. Hence, $\alpha^* = \beta^* = 1$ and $\gamma = 1$ is a pure strategy equilibrium.
2. If the Voter chooses α and β such that $\beta - \alpha \leq K$, then the Party is indifferent between its pure strategies. If the Party chooses $\gamma = \gamma_1$, then the Voter's best reply would be $\beta = 1$ and consequently $\alpha = 1 - K$, which confirms that $\beta - \alpha \leq K$. Hence, $\alpha^* = 1 - K$, $\beta^* = 1$ and $\gamma = \gamma_1$ are equilibrium strategies.
3. If the Voter chooses $\beta - \alpha = K$, then the Party is indifferent between all values of γ . If the Party chooses $\gamma = \gamma_2$, then the best reply for the Voter would be $\alpha = 0$ and $\beta = K$. This confirms that $\beta - \alpha = K$. Hence, $\alpha^* = 0$, $\beta^* = K$ and; $\gamma = \gamma_2$ are equilibrium strategies.
4. Pure Secret Ballot equilibrium is maintained when the Party's best reply to $\beta - \alpha < K$, such that $\alpha = \beta$, would be $\gamma = 0$, such that $\gamma_1 < \gamma_2$ for $\omega > \pi$. The Voter's best reply to any $\gamma^* > \gamma_2$ would be $\alpha^* = \beta^* = 0$, confirming $\beta - \alpha < K$. Hence, $\alpha^* = \beta^* = 0$ and $\gamma = 0$ is a pure strategy equilibrium.

Discussion

This analysis of equilibria demonstrates the critical importance of beliefs regarding the secret ballot. Critical to the Voter's decision to reciprocate electoral clientelism with her vote – or to vote sincerely – is her belief regarding the monitoring of her ballot. In our game, the Voter's updating of beliefs (μ and λ) regarding π and ω , as well as the Party's payoffs for monitoring shape the Voter's behavior. As with the Inspection Game (Becker 1968), our equilibrium analysis shows that the Voter's behavior does not depend on her own payoff parameters, but rather on the Party's. Unlike the Inspection Game, our game features the role of beliefs.

The Pure Electoral Clientelism equilibrium is labeled as such given that a belief that the ballot is monitored induces the Voter to vote in accordance with the party in exchange for the gift. This is a pure strategy equilibrium. If the Party chooses to monitor the ballots, the Voter will vote for the

Party; both players will be confirmed in their decisions and beliefs with regard to the other player's behavior. In equilibrium, the ex-post beliefs of the Voter are confirmed $\mu = \lambda = 1$.

Mixed Voting involves a mixed voting strategy (mixing sincere voting and reciprocation voting) $\alpha^* = 1 - K$ after observing a signal that the ballot is secret. If the Voter receives a signal that the ballot is not secret, she will vote for the Party, $\beta^* = 1$. The Party chooses a secret ballot with a probability of γ_1 . This probability depends only on π and ω , ν and ε . It does not depend on γ ; so the actual decision to monitor or not does not determine the outcome. In this equilibrium, stronger signals that the ballot is monitored, whereby $1 - \pi$ is greater than $1 - \omega$, pushes the Voter to support electoral clientelism, $j = r$, and to not vote her preferences, $j = d$.

In the Separating equilibrium, the probability of sincere voting after receiving a signal of a non-secret ballot is $\beta^* = K$, but after a signal of a secret ballot the Voter will vote sincerely, $\alpha = 0$. In contrast, an increase in the strength of the signal regarding the willingness of the Party to monitor ballots will strengthen beliefs that the ballot is not secret and this will induce more clientelistic behavior whereby the Voter votes for the Party. For the Separating equilibrium, the signal regarding a secret ballot or, in contrast, a willingness to monitor the ballot will lead to two different equilibrium responses by the voters. The signal of a non-secret ballot plays a critical role. As in the original Inspection Game (Becker 1968), where the worker's behavior is affected by payoffs affecting the monitor, here the Voter's behavior is affected by the Party's payoffs. Recall that

$$\beta - \alpha = K = \frac{c}{x(\omega - \pi)}.$$

In other words, the Voter's behavior, $\beta - \alpha$, relates to the ratio of costs of monitoring for the Party, c , and the costs of a lost vote, x . By examining these parameters, the comparative statics can be evaluated. Increases in the costs of monitoring, c , correspond to rises in K . The costs of a lost vote, x , is affected by the signals of ballot monitoring, ω and π . By fixing the values of ω and π , then the larger x is, the lower the value of K . For the mixed voting and separating equilibria, a higher c will lead to more sincere voting (or more defection). In contrast, contingent on the signals received by the Voter, a higher x will result in a Voter reciprocating the Party's clientelist offer.

An important implication of the game is that voter compliance with clientelist exchanges exists in equilibrium even without direct breaches of ballot secrecy. By implication, voter beliefs in the credibility of ballot secrecy lead to differences in voter responses to clientelist offers – even within the same institutional framework for secret ballot protection. Electoral clientelism should therefore have little effect on vote choices in cases where voters have confidence in the secret ballot

as is evident in the pure strategy secret ballot equilibrium. However, when voters lack confidence in the secret ballot, they are more likely to comply with their commitments to vote as promised. The key observable implication of this argument is that the effect of electoral clientelism on voters' tendency to support the clientelist party is conditioned on their confidence in the secret ballot.

Data and empirical context

To test the relationship between electoral clientelism, secret ballot perceptions, and party choice, we rely on data from an original survey conducted in South Africa following the 2016 municipal elections. South Africa has received comparatively little attention in the literature on electoral clientelism, despite the fact that its political system is dominated by one party – the African National Congress (ANC) – which is also the main clientelist party in the country. This makes South Africa a case of what Kitchelt (2011) calls 'unilateral clientelism' and Nichter and Peress (2016) refer to as 'monopolistic clientelism'. Indeed, the ANC probably fits the description of a 'political machine' better than most other parties on the African continent. For instance, Southall (2016, 2014) and Booysen (2015) refer to the ANC as a 'party state', which in some respects is a stronger term than a political machine because it signals a fusion of the party and the state, and suggests that the party has discretion to redistribute state resources in non-programmatic ways based on partisan and electoral concerns. Similarly, Lodge (2014) outlines how the ANC's internal organization is riddled with neo-patrimonial politics, and Plaut (2014) shows how the ANC is a well-oiled and well-financed 'election machine', employing – among other things – clientelist strategies to marshal electoral support. While the practice of clientelism and patronage in South Africa is by no means limited to election time, evidence suggests that the distribution of, e.g., food parcels constitutes a systematic part of ANC's electoral strategy (Plaut 2014, 637). This is corroborated by our data, which shows that respondents most frequently report being offered a food parcel for their vote or electoral participation.⁹ Nonetheless, the ability of the ANC to actually monitor people's vote choice – an important part of machine politics – and *de facto* breach ballot secrecy is limited and almost certainly constrained by a relatively well-functioning and independent electoral commission. This makes the focus on voter *perceptions* of ballot secrecy even more pertinent. Although the ANC is the dominant party in South African politics, the municipal elections in 2016 provided a challenge to hegemony of the ANC. Indeed, the election results were widely portrayed as a landslide. First, the municipal elections in 2016 produced the worst electoral result for the ANC since the introduction of post-apartheid de-

⁹ Food parcels are often quite substantial and include a number of household and food items. Officially, food parcels are supposed to be distributed by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) – under the Ministry of Social Development – as part of their efforts to support the livelihoods of poor and destitute people.

mocracy in South Africa in 1994. Second, while the ANC remained the majority party on a nationwide basis, its political dominance in South African politics was challenged both from the main opposition party – the Democratic Alliance (DA) – and from the radical left-wing party, the Economic Freedom Fighters. The opposition challenge to the ANC was particularly pronounced in the biggest cities (Metros). In addition to Cape Town – which remained firmly in the hands of the DA – the ANC lost the elections and the Mayor’s office in an additional three (out of eight) Metros, Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay. In these cases, the DA formed coalitions and secured the office of the Mayor.

The data we use are obtained from a representative, nationwide survey of adult citizens (18+) in South Africa that we fielded shortly after the municipal elections on August 3rd 2016. The survey was conducted in collaboration with the South African research consultancy Citizen Surveys, and field work was conducted by enumerators in face-to-face interviews using tablets. The survey has a response rate of 88,5 % and consists of a total of 3,210 respondents covering all of the eight Metros and most municipalities throughout the rest of the country. To ensure a nationally representative sample, we used a stratified multistage probability sample with four stages. The first stage uses disproportional stratification based on provinces, racial groups, municipality, and urban/rural area to ensure that all subgroups are represented in the data with sufficient coverage. In the second stage, we used census data to identify relevant enumeration areas (EAs) – the smallest geographic area for which a known population statistics are available in South Africa. These are used to draw the sample of EAs using the power allocation rule to allocate EAs to the strata. In the third stage, interviewers performed a random walk to select households to include in the survey. Finally, an automated and tablet-based randomization procedure was used to select respondents within household.

Dependent variable

To measure individual party choice, we use questions asking respondents which party they voted for in the municipal elections. Municipal elections in South Africa rely on a mixed member electoral system. In the Metros, voters are given two ballots: one to vote for a ward councilor in single-member constituencies, and one to vote for a party on party lists used to create a more proportional allocation of votes-to-seats. Outside of the Metros, voters are given three ballots: One to vote for a ward councilor; one to vote for a party; and one to vote for a party in so-called district municipal council (consisting of a number of local municipalities). To measure party choice, we use information on which party respondents voted for in the elections. Since we are mainly interested in votes

for the ANC – the dominant, clientelist party – we code this variable as one (1) for those who report having voted for the ANC, and zero (0) otherwise.¹⁰

Explanatory variables and controls

To measure electoral clientelism, we rely on two questions measuring vote buying and turnout buying, respectively. Following a series of questions on the municipal election, the first question – measuring vote buying – asks: *How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would vote for them in the elections?* The second question – measuring turnout buying – asks: *How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would show up to vote in the elections?* As a follow-up on these questions, respondents were asked about the identity of the distributing party. We use this information to create two variables measuring electoral clientelism. The first variable – measuring the use of electoral clientelism by the ANC – is coded as one (1) if respondents report receiving food, gifts, or money in return for their vote or turnout, and zero (0) otherwise. The second variable measures the use of the same types of electoral clientelism by other parties. The reference groups are those who did not report encounters with clientelist practices during the elections. Our main explanatory variable is therefore respondents' experience with electoral clientelism in the form of either vote buying or turnout buying. In total, using these direct questions on electoral clientelism, around 7.5% of the respondents report being targeted with clientelist offers during the municipal elections. While other countries in Africa have levels of vote buying that far exceed this number (Jensen and Justesen 2014), it corresponds to an estimated 2.7 million people (aged 18+) nationwide being targeted with clientelist offers during the 2016 election campaign. This may be enough to sway the electoral outcome in hotly contested municipalities. Finally, an often cited problem with direct measures of electoral clientelism is that they may be subject to social desirability bias (Gonzales-Ocantos et al. 2012). However, comparison of the direct questions with a list experiment embedded in our survey shows that this is not a major issue (Bøttkjær 2017).

Since our argument and theoretical model imply that the relationship between electoral clientelism and party choice is moderated by voters' confidence in the secret ballot, we include a variable – and interact it with electoral clientelism – that measures voters' perception of the secrecy of the ballot. Specifically, we use a question asking: *How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though voting is supposed to be secret in this country?* Responses are given on a five-point scale from zero to four, where higher values denote that respondents think it is (very) likely that

¹⁰ Respondents who did not report a party choice are coded as missing.

their vote choice can be revealed.¹¹ To partially alleviate problems of confounding, all model specifications include a number of controls. These include party identification as well as standard socio-economic variables such as age, gender, education, and poverty. In addition, we include a range of fixed effects at the provincial and municipal level. Summary statistics and variable descriptions are available in appendix A and B.

Results

The key implication of our game theoretical model is that voters' confidence in the secret ballot guides their response to vote buying offers. Empirically, this implies that the effect of electoral clientelism on party choice is moderated by voter beliefs in the secret ballot. Before examining whether the ANC's use of electoral clientelism works and if this is conditioned on voters' perception of ballot secrecy, table 1 briefly compares electoral clientelism (vote buying and turnout buying) arising from the ANC to that of other parties. Thus, the table shows the correlates of electoral clientelism arising from the ANC and from other parties. Table 1 shows that the use of clientelist strategies by the ANC and other parties are quite similar, with a few notable exceptions: The ANC disproportionately targets black voters and younger voters. All parties engaging in vote buying in South Africa target uneducated, unemployed, poor, trusting citizens who are favorable towards clientelist practices. No parties seem to target voters based on gender, habits of news consumption, level of political information, or their dispositions to return a favor or reciprocate more broadly.

To explore the question if ANC vote buying works, we run regressions corresponding to the equation: $y_i = a + dV_i + \mathbf{X}_i\mathbf{b} + e_i$. The dependent variable, y_i , is a dummy that takes the value 1 for respondents who report having voted for the ANC at the municipal elections, and zero otherwise. Because the outcome variable is dichotomous, our main analyses are implemented as a logistic regression model. Our key explanatory variable is V_i , an indicator that takes the value 1 when respondent i reports having been approached by the ANC in an act of either vote buying or turnout buying, and zero otherwise. The parameter d is the coefficient of interest, which measures the association between respondents' experience of electoral clientelism from the ANC and their vote choice. \mathbf{X}_i is a vector of individual level controls, and e_i is the idiosyncratic error term. Estimating the effect of electoral clientelism on vote choice is complicated by endogeneity: Party brokers might plausibly target attendants at party rallies or partisan voters who are already inclined to vote for the party in question. To partially alleviate these concerns, all analyses include a binary control for ANC party identification, taking the value 1 for respondents who report that they feel close to the ANC.

¹¹ While most respondents believe in the secret ballot, a sizable minority does not. Specifically, 967 respondents find it very unlikely, 813 find it unlikely, 487 find it neither unlikely or likely, 476 find it likely, and 272 find it very likely.

Table 1 Correlates of Electoral clientelism from the ANC and other parties

	<i>Age</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Poverty</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>	<i>Metropol.</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Politically informed</i>
Electoral clientelism: ANC	-4.17** (-2.54)	-0.07 (-1.07)	-0.44*** (-3.14)	2.42*** (3.54)	-0.56*** (-3.32)	-0.07 (-1.45)	0.02 (0.34)	-0.14 (-0.56)
Electoral clientelism: Other	0.72 (0.40)	0.01 (0.14)	-0.68*** (-4.40)	2.62*** (4.56)	-0.73*** (-4.37)	0.01 (0.19)	-0.06 (-0.94)	-0.38* (-1.67)
	<i>News consumption</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Compliance w. clientelism</i>	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Clientelist</i>	<i>Reciprocate</i>	<i>Return favor</i>
Electoral clientelism: ANC	0.74 (1.32)	0.09** (2.04)	-0.09*** (-3.76)	0.13*** (2.72)	0.78** (2.21)	0.83*** (3.88)	-0.35 (-0.78)	-0.13 (-0.66)
Electoral clientelism: Other	0.54 (1.03)	-0.04 (-0.69)	-0.02 (-0.47)	0.20*** (3.71)	0.78** (2.03)	0.90*** (3.79)	0.09 (0.24)	0.12 (0.53)

NOTE: The table shows coefficients from regressions of each of the 16 correlates on ANC electoral clientelism and electoral clientelism from other parties simultaneously.
* Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$). Robust t-statistics in parentheses.

This is arguably the most important observable source of selection into electoral clientelism and ANC vote choice, and therefore an important control. In addition, all analyses include a control for electoral clientelism by parties other than the ANC, since this is simultaneously correlated with the ANC's use of electoral clientelism as well as respondents' vote choice. In addition, the analyses include a broad set of demographic controls, attitudinal controls, and fixed effects for province, racial group, and whether respondents live in metropolitan, urban (non-metro), or rural areas. To further account for unobserved heterogeneity, standard errors are clustered at the level of enumeration areas. Table 2 shows the results and demonstrates a highly significant association between ANC electoral clientelism and the respondents' propensity to vote for the ANC. The logit coefficient of 0.94 corresponds to a marginal change in the probability of voting ANC of 0.15. Under a causal interpretation, this would suggest that if the ANC targets 100 registered voters, 15 of these will vote for the ANC. This is a quite substantial effect. It bears mentioning that the point estimate obtains even after partialling out the influence of the electorate's identification with the ANC, which is substantial and, unsurprisingly, highly significant. Other parties' clientelist practices, the variable *Electoral Clientelism: other parties*, is negative and significant as expected.

Column (2) additionally controls for respondents' age and gender, both of which are standard demographic controls. Also, Table 1 showed that ANC targets younger voters more than other parties do and, if younger voters are more inclined to vote for the ANC for reasons other than the clientelist transfer, this could be driving our findings. Yet column (2) shows that these controls leave the size and statistical significance of the coefficient of interest, d , unchanged. Column (3) controls for a standard measure of poverty and also includes fixed effects for the four racial categories in South Africa.¹² As discussed earlier, it is well documented that poverty is a robust correlate of vote buying (cf. Jensen and Justesen 2014), and table 1 showed that the ANC's clientelist practices are disproportionately targeted at the black population compared to other parties. Again, if poor or black South Africans are more likely to vote for the ANC, this could bias upwards the estimated association between electoral clientelism and voting for the ANC. Yet as column (3) shows, these controls only change the coefficient of interest negligibly. Column (4) adds dummies for respondents in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas, and column (5) includes a full set of province fixed effects. Column (4) adds dummies for respondents in metropolitan, urban, and rural areas, and column (5) includes a full set of province fixed effects.

¹² The poverty index is based on the work of Bratton et al. (2004), and measures poverty as respondents' experience with lack of access to five basic types of household necessities: food, water, medicine, fuel to cook food, and cash income (Justesen and Bjørnskov 2012). The index comprises the sum of these five survey items. A principal component analysis shows that all five items load onto the same component ($\alpha=0.87$). The four racial groups follow the categorization by Statistics South Africa into Black, Colored, Indian, and White.

Table 2 Electoral clientelism and vote choice

<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Electoral clientelism:								
ANC	0.94** (2.55)	0.95** (2.54)	0.90** (2.15)	0.91** (2.18)	1.00** (2.33)	0.95** (2.22)	0.90* (1.94)	1.11** (2.44)
Electoral clientelism:								
Other	-1.09*** (-3.48)	-1.10*** (-3.49)	-1.18*** (-3.60)	-1.16*** (-3.48)	-1.12*** (-3.28)	-1.06*** (-3.05)	-1.04*** (-3.00)	-1.01*** (-2.75)
ANC identification	3.58*** (15.94)	3.58*** (16.02)	3.28*** (13.11)	3.28*** (13.16)	3.36*** (13.65)	3.32*** (13.26)	3.59*** (13.97)	3.40*** (13.24)
Female	0.32*** (2.73)	0.32*** (2.73)	0.21* (1.68)	0.22* (1.72)	0.20 (1.59)	0.20 (1.56)	0.16 (1.15)	0.28** (2.09)
Age	-0.01* (-1.70)	-0.01* (-1.70)	-0.00 (-0.84)	-0.00 (-0.91)	-0.01 (-1.42)	-0.00 (-1.02)	-0.01 (-1.40)	-0.00 (-0.78)
Reciprocate							-0.00 (-0.16)	
News consumption							-0.03* (-1.65)	
Political information							0.11** (2.43)	
Unemployment								-0.01 (-0.06)
Social grant recipient								-0.12 (-0.81)
Township								-0.13 (-0.53)
Race/Urban-rural/Province FE	N/N/N	N/N/N	Y/N/N	Y/Y/N	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y
Observations	2,069	2,069	2,006	2,006	2,006	1,935	1,638	1,862

NOTE: The dependent variable is voting for the ANC at the municipal election (dummy). The variable *Electoral clientelism* includes vote buying as well as turnout buying. The Urban-rural fixed effects (FE) are dummies for respondents who live in metropolitan, urban, or rural areas as classified by Statistics South Africa. N=No and Y=Yes. * Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$). Robust z-statistics in parentheses.

In both cases, the purpose is to account for unobserved geographical heterogeneity and, in both cases, these controls change neither the size nor the significance of the results. Column (6) includes an index measuring the degree to which respondents reciprocate and return favors. This predisposition could conceivably make voters more likely to comply with the clientelist bargain (Finan and Schechter 2012). Column (7) controls for two indices measuring the respondents' media consumption habits, as well as the extent of their factual knowledge about South African (and world) politics.

Increased media consumption and levels of information likely decrease voters' propensity to engage in clientelist exchanges, so controlling for these factors should yield more precise estimates (Wooldridge 2003, 202). If these factors also correlate with vote choice, as seems reasonable, excluding them would bias our estimates. Lastly, column (8) controls for characteristics of socioeconomic status – whether respondents receive social grants, are unemployed, or live in townships. Including these controls slightly increases the estimated coefficient. Overall, table 2 demonstrates the robustness of the basic association between the ANC's use of electoral clientelism and respondents' vote choice. Yet, the most remarkable feature of table 2 might be the stability of the coefficient, d . Coefficient stability is usually interpreted as an indication that the analyses are not plagued by bias from unobserved omitted variables. As argued by Oster (2017), however, coefficient stability need not reflect the absence of influential unobservables; if the included controls have little variance, coefficients change little after controls are added to the model (we discuss this in depth later on).

The conditioning role of secret ballot perceptions

The results in table 2 suggest that electoral clientelism works – respondents who are targeted by the ANC are more likely to also vote for the ANC. Yet, as our theoretical model implies, voter confidence in the secrecy of the ballot is crucial for how voters respond to electoral clientelist offers. So why, given that the individual vote is unobservable to everyone but the voter herself, does electoral clientelism seem to work? To examine this question, we augment the previous equation with an interaction term to see if the effect of electoral clientelism on vote choice is conditioned by voters' beliefs in the secrecy of the ballot. More specifically, we add an interaction between the indicator for ANC electoral clientelism, V_j , and respondents' perceived likelihood that “powerful people can find out how you voted even though voting is supposed to be secret.” This variable runs on a 5-point scale from very unlikely (low values) to very likely (high values). Table 3 shows the results where the quantity of interest is the marginal effect of the ANC's electoral clientelism on respondents' vote choice, conditioned on their perceptions of the secrecy of the ballot. Consistent with expectations, the results reported in table 3 demonstrate that the ANC's electoral clientelism has little bearing on citizens' vote choice when they have confidence in the secrecy of their ballot.

Table 3 Electoral clientelism and vote choice: Conditional on secret ballot perceptions


<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Electoral clientelism:								
ANC	-0.02 (-0.04)	-0.09 (-0.16)	-0.15 (-0.23)	-0.13 (-0.19)	-0.25 (-0.41)	-0.20 (-0.33)	-0.09 (-0.14)	-0.27 (-0.45)
Secret ballot perceptions	0.15*** (3.04)	0.15*** (3.00)	0.17*** (3.03)	0.17*** (3.05)	0.16*** (2.92)	0.16*** (2.88)	0.17*** (2.89)	0.13** (2.43)
Electoral clientelism ANC#	0.70** (2.35)	0.75** (2.47)	0.88*** (2.81)	0.87*** (2.77)	1.00*** (3.20)	0.91*** (3.15)	1.00** (2.37)	1.01*** (3.21)
Secret ballot perceptions								
Electoral clientelism:	-1.22*** (-3.52)	-1.22*** (-3.51)	-1.29*** (-3.54)	-1.28*** (-3.46)	-1.26*** (-3.41)	-1.20*** (-3.16)	-1.19*** (-3.16)	-1.13*** (-2.89)
Other								
ANC identification	3.77*** (17.58)	3.77*** (17.57)	3.51*** (14.06)	3.50*** (14.07)	3.58*** (14.00)	3.54*** (13.59)	3.83*** (13.89)	3.60*** (13.64)
Female		0.34*** (2.82)	0.26** (2.04)	0.27** (2.09)	0.24* (1.88)	0.24* (1.80)	0.17 (1.19)	0.31** (2.35)
Age		-0.01 (-1.51)	-0.00 (-0.39)	-0.00 (-0.42)	-0.01 (-1.06)	-0.00 (-0.68)	-0.01 (-1.12)	-0.00 (-0.49)
Reciprocate						-0.00 (-0.10)		
News consumption							-0.03* (-1.66)	
Political information							0.08* (1.77)	
Unemployment								-0.04 (-0.28)
Social grant recipient								-0.10 (-0.67)
Township								-0.12 (-0.46)
Race/Urban-rural/Province FFE	N/N/N	N/N/N	Y/N/N	Y/Y/N	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y
Observations	1,965	1,965	1,904	1,904	1,904	1,836	1,559	1,780

NOTE: The dependent variable is voting for the ANC at the municipal election (dummy). The Urban-rural FFE are dummies for respondents who live in metropolitan, urban, or rural areas, N=No and Y=Yes. * Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$). Robust z-statistics in parentheses.

The insignificant coefficient on ANC vote bribe in the first row shows that when respondents find it “very unlikely” that their vote choice can be discovered (corresponding to *Secret ballot perceptions* equal to zero), there is no association between electoral clientelism and vote choice. Conversely, when voters report finding it “very likely” that their vote choice may not remain secret (corresponding to the variable *Secret ballot perceptions* taking the value 4), the marginal association between the ANC’s electoral clientelism and vote choice is 0.44 and highly significant. Under a causal interpretation, this point estimate would suggest that if the ANC targets 100 voters with low confidence in ballot secrecy, this will raise the ANC vote by 44. In all columns in table 3, the marginal association between the ANC’s electoral clientelism and respondent vote choice turns statistically significant at conventional levels already when respondents report being uncertain about the secrecy of the ballot, when they find it “neither likely nor unlikely” that their vote choice will become known (corresponding to *Secret ballot perceptions* taking the value 2).

Figure 2 shows marginal association between ANC Electoral clientelism and vote choice, conditioned on secret ballot perceptions corresponding to column (5) in table 3. These results support the key implication of our theoretical model: Even in environments of formal ballot secrecy, voter responses to clientelist offers during election campaigns depend on whether they believe their vote can be cast in secret. If voters do not have confidence in the secret ballot, they are much more likely to vote as instructed and cast their ballot for the clientelist party – in this case the dominant party in South African politics, the ANC.

Figure 2 ANC Electoral clientelism and vote choice, conditioned on secret ballot perceptions



Note: The dashed lines show the 95%-confidence bounds.

Robustness

Examining the effect of electoral clientelism on vote choice is complicated by the confounding influence of unobservables that might be simultaneously correlated with both the dependent and explanatory variables. After all, the ANC does not randomly choose whom to target: Voters are targeted for a reason, and that reason might itself explain their vote choice. Arguably, the most obvious such confounder is that voters are more likely to be targeted if they are expected to comply, and they are more likely to comply if they have a predisposition towards the ANC. While such predispositions are unobservable, the analyses in tables 2 and 3 showed all results sustain even after we control for party identification, which is a useful proxy for unobserved predispositions towards party (ANC) support.

People's vote choices are, however, driven by more than just partisanship. To see if such unobserved drivers of vote choice might confound our results, we use the fact that the survey asked respondents about vote buying and turnout buying separately. Voters whom the ANC offers rewards for simply going to the polls to vote (turnout buying) might be systematically different from the voters who are offered rewards to vote specifically for the ANC (vote buying): Conditional on going to the polls, the ANC expects the former group to vote for them, whereas the latter group is expected to require additional motivation to do so.

In other words, when the ANC targets voters with turnout buying and others with vote buying, the party has revealed its expectation that – for whatever unobserved reason – the former groups is more predisposed to voting ANC than the other. Indeed, a standard explanation of turnout buying emphasizes that it is a more useful strategy for clientelist parties because it aims to mobilize partisan voters who are predisposed to vote for the distributing party, and it only requires that parties monitor whether people turn out on election day and not which party they vote for in the ballot booth (Nichter 2008). We use this observation to gauge if such unobserved predispositions are likely to bias our findings in table 4. The odd-numbered columns report coefficients from analyses of ANC *vote* buying; the even-numbered columns report coefficients from analyses of ANC *turnout* buying.

If unobservable predispositions to vote for the ANC were important confounders, the coefficients should differ between the even- and odd-numbered columns. Yet, as the table shows, across all specifications, the coefficients of interest – the interactions between secret ballot perceptions and, respectively, vote buying and turnout buying – are indistinguishable. This suggests that unobservable predispositions to vote for the ANC do not confound our results.


Table 4 Vote buying, turnout buying, and vote choice: Conditional on secret ballot perceptions

<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Vote buying: ANC	-0.47 (-0.77)		-0.51 (-0.84)		-0.63 (-0.97)		-0.56 (-0.84)	
Turnout buying: ANC		0.03 (0.05)		-0.01 (-0.01)		-0.07 (-0.08)		-0.13 (-0.17)
Secret ballot perceptions	0.15*** (3.12)	0.15*** (3.04)	0.14*** (2.93)	0.14*** (2.92)	0.16*** (2.97)	0.16*** (2.95)	0.16*** (2.91)	0.15*** (2.85)
Vote buying ANC-secret ballot interaction	0.72** (2.49)		0.76*** (2.60)		0.95*** (3.03)		0.96*** (2.92)	
Turnout buying ANC-secret ballot interaction		0.79** (2.02)		0.85** (2.10)		1.06*** (2.91)		1.20*** (3.19)
Party identification	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Race/Urban-rural/Province FE	N/N/N	N/N/N	N/N/N	N/N/N	Y/N/N	Y/N/N	Y/Y/Y	Y/Y/Y
Observations	1,965	1,965	1,965	1,965	1,904	1,904	1,904	1,904

NOTE: The dependent variable is voting for the ANC at the municipal election (dummy). The table shows coefficients from logistic regressions of ANC vote (dummy) on vote buying by the ANC (odd columns) and turnout buying by the ANC (even columns). All columns include a control for vote buying and turnout buying from other parties. The analyses reported in columns (1) (and (2) control for party identification, in columns (3) and (4) they include also gender and age. Fixed effects are included as reported. The Urban-rural fixed effects (FE) are dummies for respondents who live in metropolitan, urban, or rural areas, N=No and Y=Yes. * Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$). Robust z-statistics in parentheses.

To further investigate the pertinent issue of unobservable confounding, we used the Generalized Sensitivity Analysis developed by Imbens (2003) and Harada (2013), depicted in figure 3. This method simulates unobserved variables and asks how influential such variables would have to be in order to substantively change the estimated association between electoral clientelism and vote choice. The downward sloping curve in the left panel shows the required partial association between an unobserved factor and vote choice (vertical axis) and electoral clientelism (horizontal axis) that would render the coefficient of interest insignificant. The curve in the right panel is identical but shows what would be required to split our estimated coefficient on ANC electoral clientelism in half.

Figure 3 Generalized sensitivity analysis: Gauging the bias from unobservables



The figure shows that an unobserved factor should explain much more of the variation in both electoral clientelism and vote choice than do our most influential observed covariates (the most influential covariate is the “black” dummy). A priori, this strikes us as unlikely. The Generalized Sensitivity Analysis does not rule out that omitted variables could explain our findings. It does show, however, that we would have to assume a very strong unobserved confounding effect for an unobservable factor to substantively change our findings. The omitted variable in question would have to be much more strongly correlated with electoral clientelism and vote choice than any of the theoretically motivated variables considered in the empirical analyses.

Conclusion

In young democracies around the world, parties mobilize political support through the use of clientelist strategies during elections – even when the ballot is nominally secret. However, it is unclear whether such strategies work or not in the sense that they sway voter choices (Guardado and Wanthekon 2018; Kramon 2016b; van de Walle 2007). In this paper, we develop and model an argument where voter beliefs in the secret ballot guide their responses to electoral clientelism. The implication of the model is that when voters believe they can cast an unmonitored ballot, they are less likely to comply with clientelist offers from political parties. In contrast, when voters doubt the secrecy of their ballot, they are more likely to comply and vote for the distributing party. Empirically, we test this idea using data from a nation-wide survey in South Africa. The results clearly support the implications of the model. That is, electoral clientelism mainly works for voters who have weak or no confidence in the secret ballot, while voters who believe in the secrecy of their vote are relatively unaffected by clientelist offers. Voter confidence in the secret ballot therefore seems to be an important factor for explaining when electoral clientelism works – and when it does not. In this way, our paper shows how and why parties operating in the shadow of the secret ballot use vote buying and turnout buying as important parts of their electoral strategies, and under what circumstances such strategies are likely to work.

Although the secret ballot is supposed to provide voters with autonomy to express their preferences in the ballot booth and diminish the scope for clientelist practices to influence voter choices, our theoretical and empirical results imply that we need to place greater emphasis on the role of voter beliefs and confidence in the formal institutions guiding the voting process. As a corollary, the literature should pay closer attention to the ways in which parties influence voters' beliefs in ballot secrecy – and beliefs that distributive rewards or punishments are contingent on vote choice (Ferree and Long 2016; Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson 2014). Clientelist parties can cultivate such beliefs in numerous ways – for instance, by using threats or intimidation; placing party agents in or around voting stations; or by targeting poorly informed voters (Frye et al. 2018; Kasara and Mares 2017; Ferree and Long 2016). However, we need to know more about how parties use positive inducements in conjunction with negative inducements (Mares and Young 2016) and how this affects the viability of political clientelism as well as voters' tendency to comply or renege on their commitments to vote as promised. The joint use of distributive incentives to persuade or mobilize voters and, for instance, voter intimidation to shape voter beliefs in ballot secrecy may help clientelist parties enforce the exchange of money or gifts for electoral support – and contribute to make electoral clientelism sustainable in equilibrium.

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Supplemental appendix

Appendix A. Summary statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Electoral clientelism: ANC	3210	0.038	0.19	0	1
Electoral clientelism: Other	3210	0.037	0.19	0	1
Secret ballot perceptions	3015	1.43	1.32	0	4
ANC identification	3210	0.33	0.49	0	1
Vote choice	3146	0.38	0.49	0	1
Age	3210	40.7	15.4	18	98
Female	3210	0.61	0.49	0	1
Education	3190	3.49	1.53	0	8
Reciprocate	3083	15.30	4.48	3	21
News consumption	2637	11.91	4.28	4	20
Unemployment	3181	0.36	0.48	0	1
Social grant recipient	3186	0.49	0.50	0	1
Poverty	3133	0.23	0.22	0	1

Appendix B. Variable description

Variable: Electoral clientelism: ANC

Question(s): “How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would vote for them in the elections?”; “How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would show up to vote in the elections?”; “Which party did the person who gave you this offer come from?”

Coding: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if respondents answer in the affirmative to (at least) one of the first two questions and answer “ANC” in the last question. The indicator is zero otherwise.

Variable: Electoral clientelism: Other

Question(s): How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would vote for them in the elections?”; “How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food, or a gift or money if you would show up to vote in the elections?”; “Which party did the person who gave you this offer come from?”

Coding: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if respondents answer in the affirmative to (at least) one of the first two questions and answer a party other than “ANC” in the last question. The indicator is zero otherwise.

Variable: Secret ballot perceptions

Question(s): “How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though voting is supposed to be secret in this country?”

Coding: Five-point scale from “Very unlikely” (0) to “Very likely” (4)

Variable: ANC identification

Question(s): “Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party?” If yes “Which party do you feel close to?”

Coding: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if respondents answer in the affirmative in the first question and “ANC” in the second. The indicator is zero otherwise.

Variable: Vote choice

Question(s): “Now I would like you to think back on election day. Which political party did you vote for?”

Coding: Indicator variable that is 1 if respondents answer “ANC” and 0 otherwise.

Variable: Age

Question(s): As part of the kish grid selection, interviewers recorded name, surname, age, and sex for all household members aged 18 years and older.

Coding: Respondent age in years.

Variable: Female

Question(s): As part of the kish grid selection, interviewers recorded name, surname, age, and sex for all household members aged 18 years and older

Coding: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for female respondent and zero otherwise.

Variable: Education

Question(s): “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”

Coding: Ordinal variable running from “No schooling” (0) to “Post-graduate (Ph.D.)” (8).

Variable: Reciprocate

Question(s): “If someone does me a favor I am prepared to return it”; “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before”; “I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before”.

Coding: Answers to the three questions run from 1, “Does not apply to me at all”, to 7, “Applies to me perfectly”. The variable reciprocate is the sum of respondents answers to the three questions.

Variable: News consumption

Question(s): “During the election campaign, how frequently did you follow political news through ...”; “Newspapers”; “Radio”; “Television”; “Social Media”

Coding: Answers to the four questions run from 5, “Daily” to 1, “Never”. The variable News consumption is the sum of respondents’ answers to the four questions.

Variable: Unemployment

Question(s): “With regards to employment, what is your occupational status?”

Coding: Indicator taking the value 1 if respondents choose answer category “Unemployed and looking for job” or “Unemployed and not looking for job” and zero otherwise.

Variable: Social grant recipient

Question(s): “Do you or anyone in your household receive any social grants like child support, old age pension, or disability grant?”

Coding: Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if respondents answer in the affirmative and zero otherwise.

Variable: Poverty

Question(s): “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: a) Enough food to eat; b) enough clean water for home use; c) medicines or medical treatment; d) enough fuel to cook your food; e) a cash income?”

Coding: Each question is answered on a five-point scale from ‘never’ to ‘always’. The variable poverty is an index generated as the sum of all five items recoded to scale from 0–1, where high values indicate wealth/no poverty and low values indicate severe poverty.

Article 3

Why do voters support corrupt politicians? Experimental evidence from South Africa

Louise Thorn Bottkjar¹ and Mogens Kamp Justesen²

Democratic elections are supposed to prevent corrupt politicians from winning office. In practice, however, voters frequently vote for corrupt politicians. In this paper, we examine why voters sometimes support corrupt candidates. We interrogate this seeming paradox from the perspective of explanations highlighting that voters support corrupt candidates because of a lack of information, because of clientelist exchanges of material benefits in return for votes, or because of party loyalty. We test these explanations through an experiment in a new nationwide survey in South Africa—a country where issues of corruption are highly salient. We find that voters express a strong willingness to punish corrupt candidates across all treatment conditions. However, voters are more lenient toward corrupt politicians when they are offered material benefits in return for their vote as part of a clientelist exchange. This suggests that clientelism serves to reproduce corruption and has important implications for the fight against corruption.

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Introduction

Political corruption defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman 1999) is one of the most significant threats to economic development and a well-functioning democracy. When politicians engage in corruption and use public office for personal enrichment, they violate the fundamental principles of representative democracy in which politicians are supposed to act as agents of citizens and govern on their behalf. Evidence of the detrimental effects of political corruption is ample and has demonstrated how corruption negatively affects the economy (Mauro 1995, Tanzi and Davoodi 1998), political and social trust (Seligson 2002; Norris 2012; Rothstein and Stolle 2008), human well-being (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012, 2015), and inter- and intrastate stability (Lapiente and Rothstein 2014). The costs of corruption may also disproportionately fall upon poor people (Justesen and Bjørnskov 2014) and contribute to undermining the provision of social programs aimed at alleviating poverty (Fisman and Golden 2017, 96). However, despite much awareness from international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, corruption continues to flourish around the world (Fisman and Golden 2017; Keefer 2007; Treisman 2007)—both in new democracies and in seemingly well-functioning ones.

South Africa—the country we examine in this paper—serves as a case in point. Often ranked as a well-functioning democracy,³ Jacob Zuma—who served as president from May 2009 until February 2018—has been charged with numerous counts of corruption during his time in office and has most recently faced allegations of allowing people from his network—the business tycoons in the Gupta family—to obtain lucrative state contracts for their companies.⁴ Zuma was elected president of the African National Congress (ANC) in December 2007 and president of South Africa in May 2009, and throughout his tenure in office, corruption levels have increased. Indeed, while the perceived level of corruption in South Africa was relatively stable from 1994 to 2007, it increased considerably in the subsequent period, as shown in figure 1.⁵ Despite public concern, Zuma was elected president of South Africa in 2009 and re-elected in 2014 before finally being ousted by the ANC in February 2018.⁶ At a more general level, this raises a fundamental puzzle: Why do voters support corrupt politicians and their political parties?


³ For instance, Freedom House has ranked South Africa as “Free” since the inaugural post-apartheid election in 1994. See <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/south-africa>

⁴ <https://www.news24.com/Analysis/10-things-you-should-know-about-the-state-vs-jacob-zuma-20180406>

⁵ The increase from 2007 to 2014 is 16 percent. The figure is based on the Quality of Government Institute’s Bayesian Corruption Index, a composite measure of perceived level of corruption. The data are available at <https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata>

⁶ Our survey data from 2017 (described below) shows that 74% of the South African population thinks it likely or very likely that Zuma has been involved in corruption.

Figure 1 Corruption perceptions in South Africa (1994 – 2014)



The literature offers different explanations for this apparent paradox. Some argue that voters support corrupt politicians simply because they lack information about politicians' involvement in corruption (McNally 2016; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013). Some emphasize that clientelism conditions attitudes toward corrupt candidates, arguing that voters are more likely to support a corrupt candidate if they are embedded in his/her clientelist network and receive tangible benefits in return for their vote (Weschle 2016; Manzetti and Wilson 2007). Others highlight the importance of partisanship, arguing that party loyalists are more accepting of corruption when it concerns politicians from their party (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013).

Our paper makes three novel contributions to this literature. First, by using an experimental design embedded in a new large-scale survey in South Africa, we circumvent causal identification problems inherent in observational studies on the effects of political corruption on voter behavior (Min 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007), allowing us to study how candidates' corrupt behavior affects their likelihood of attracting support among voters.

Second, we also add to the emerging literature using experimental designs to study why voters support corrupt politicians (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013, 2016; Weschle 2016; Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013). However, this literature is usually limited to studying one causal explanation at a time and says little about how those explanations compare to each other and which explanation carries the most weight. Our survey experiment tests different hypotheses of why voters support corrupt politicians, using randomly assigned treatment conditions designed to examine the

impact of information, clientelism, and partisanship on voter support for corrupt politicians. This allows us to adjudicate between different explanations of what drives the (re)election chances of corrupt politicians. Understanding the relative strength of these explanations is essential not only to diagnose why political corruption is reproduced and operates in equilibrium in some contexts but also to fight corruption successfully.

Third, while our results suggest that voters strongly disapprove of corruption across both the informational, clientelist, and partisan treatment conditions, we also find that voters are more lenient toward corruption—and punish corrupt politicians less severely—when faced with the prospect of being part of a clientelist transaction involving the exchange of work or jobs for political support. While previous work on how clientelist strategies affect voter responses to corruption has focused on strategies such as vote buying that take place in the immediate run-up to elections (De La O 2013; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Rundquist, Strom, and Peters 1977; Weschle 2016), we provide causal evidence on the extent to which patronage—a particular type of relational clientelism (Nichter 2014)—directly affects voter support for corrupt politicians.

Explaining support for corrupt politicians

Democratic elections are supposed to serve as instruments that voters can use to hold governments and politicians accountable for their performance in office (Besley 2006). Elections should, in principle, offer voters the opportunity to punish badly performing and corrupt politicians who use public office for personal enrichment. Why, then, do voters sometimes support corrupt politicians? That is, rather than using elections as a mechanism to kick corrupt politicians out of office, why do voters sometimes seem to forgive acts of corruption—even on a grand and repeated scale—allowing corrupt politicians to survive in office? To answer this question, we draw on the existing literature to highlight three different sets of explanations.

Information

Lack of information on the part of citizens in a democracy is generally recognized as an impediment to the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable for their performance in office (Pande 2011; Besley 2006; Keefer 2004). Indeed, Lupia and McCubbins (1993, 1) argue that the major dilemma of democratic politics is that “the people who are called upon to make reasoned choices may not be capable of doing so” chiefly because voters are often poorly informed about politics.

Voters may lack information about politicians’ involvement in corruption for several reasons. Since corruption is illegal, politicians involved in corruption have obvious and strong incentives to prevent this information from reaching the public limelight. The media also plays a crucial role in

disseminating to citizens information about politicians and their performance, which should enable citizens to cast their vote on an informed basis (Besley and Prat 2006; Besley and Burgess 2002). However, voters often face severe informational constraints, since many do not have access to newspapers, radio, or TV (Keefer and Khemani 2014).

Even though voters often lack information about the qualities and performance of political candidates, they still need such information to evaluate and make reasoned judgments on which candidate to support on election day. Lack of information may lead to problems of adverse selection in the sense that poorly informed voters are more likely to elect corrupt candidates for office and less likely to replace corrupt incumbents (Besley and Prat 2006).

Informational constraints may also cause moral hazard problems because voters may not know if their elected representatives serve as good agents in the political system, which, in turn, implies that politicians can engage in corruption at a lower risk of being punished at election time. Limited access to information, therefore, implies that voters may not be aware of a candidate's corrupt behavior and cannot, for this reason, use such information in processing the decision about which candidate to support during an election (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Peters and Welch 1980; Geddes 1994). Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence suggesting that voters who lack information about corruption are more likely to vote for corrupt candidates than voters with better access to news media and public information (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013, 2016; Chong et al. 2015; Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977). Against this background, we expect that voters prefer honest, law-abiding politicians and that voters—when informed about a political candidate's engagement in corruption—are likely to punish the politician by withdrawing their support. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1. Voters will—on average—evaluate politicians who are corrupt in a negative way.

This implies that voters are less likely to vote for a political candidate when they are informed that the candidate is corrupt and that the absence of informational cues on candidate corruption leads to higher levels of voter support.

Patronage

Political clientelism and patronage are widely considered to have adverse effects on both representative democracy and the economy (Robinson and Verdier 2013; Remmer 2007; Stokes 2007). Rather than relying on programmatic policy platforms and the delivery of broad-based public services, par-

ties using clientelist strategies typically target favors and rewards at specific groups of people in return for their political support. In this way, clientelist strategies can be used as a tool to increase the (re)election chances of politicians—even if they are engaged in corruption. That is, even though voters may ideally prefer honest politicians, voter responses to corrupt politicians may be mitigated if voters are embedded in politicians' clientelist networks where material goods are distributed in exchange for political support and votes.

However, the extent to which clientelist strategies work in terms of increasing voter support is contested. On the one hand, when the ballot is secret, voters may simply accept clientelist offers from corrupt candidates and vote as they please. Indeed, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) and Guardado and Wantchekon (2018) argue that clientelist offers in the form of vote buying have little to no effect on the election outcome. On the other hand, other studies have shown that clientelist offers are an effective electoral strategy for mobilizing voter support, especially when clientelist distribution of goods is used by the incumbent party with access to state resources (Bratton 2008; Vicente 2014; Wantchekon 2003) and is targeted at particular types of voters such as the poor (Brusco et al. 2004) or people with low levels of information about politics (Kramon 2016). Our argument follows this literature as we expect that clientelist offers in the form of patronage—the distribution by (incumbent) parties of (public-sector) jobs in exchange for electoral support (Arriola 2009; Chubb 1982, 91; Rothstein and Varraich 2017, 80; Weingrod 1968, 379)—make voters more lenient in their response to corruption, making the prospect of voter punishment less severe for corrupt, office-seeking politicians.

While the literature has examined the prevalence of patronage in different contexts (Wantchekon 2003), variations in the allocation of patronage offers (Johnston 1979; Chibber and Nooruddin 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Remmer 2007), and the inefficiencies that patronage politics generate (Robinson and Verdier 2013), we know less about how patronage conditions voter support for politicians involved in corruption. Indeed, most work on the effects of clientelism on voter responses to corruption has focused on strategies such as vote buying that take place in the immediate run-up to elections (De La O 2013; Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977; Weschle 2016).

However, there are at least three reasons why patronage may shape voter responses to corrupt politicians to a larger extent than other clientelist strategies such as vote buying. First, in contrast to one-off pre-electoral vote buying schemes, patronage is a form of relational clientelism that involves repeated exchanges of material rewards flowing from political parties and candidates, contingent on voters reciprocating with political support and votes during election time (Nichter 2014). Thus, compared to vote buying, patronage represents a type of clientelist transaction that is more endur-

ing across different stages of the electoral cycle, holds greater value to the individual voter, and provides parties with greater discretionary control of the allocation of the future flow of clientelist rewards, that is, jobs.

Second, from the perspective of political parties, patronage offers opportunities for ensuring that the clientelist transaction is both repeated over time and contingent on political support. Indeed, as emphasized by Robinson and Verdier (2013), patronage is an effective political strategy precisely because clientelist offers taking the form of a job implies that the offer is reversible and can be withdrawn at the discretion of the party. Thereby politicians have “the power to replace one worker on the payroll with another” (Wilson 1961, 373) and can substitute one worker for another based on their political loyalties. Indeed, Stokes (2005) argues that the success of clientelist strategies depends less on the characteristics of voters than on the ability of politicians to monitor electoral behavior. Keeping voters close at hand by offering them jobs is essential for politicians’ monitoring ability (Frye et al. 2014; Remmer 2007) and voter beliefs that their employment situation and future income flow is contingent on their expressions of political support.

Third, when unemployment is high and often clustered in poor areas, patronage is likely to be an attractive strategy for mobilizing political support, even if the jobs that are offered are precarious and the income flow is low. In the context we examine—South Africa—almost 40 percent of the working age population are currently unemployed,⁷ and unemployment is particularly rife in poor urban townships,⁸ providing fertile grounds for patronage politics. Against this background, our second hypothesis is:

H2. Voters are less likely to punish (and more likely to support) corrupt politicians if politicians offer clientelist goods in return for votes.

For the reasons outlined above, we test this hypothesis with application to patronage—rewards in the form of work or jobs in return for votes—as an example of a clientelist good.

Partisanship

A third factor that may shape how voters respond to political corruption is partisanship, that is, voters’ deep-rooted feelings of commitment and attachment toward a particular political party (Bar-

⁷ From April to June 2017, the official unemployment rate plus the number of discouraged job-seekers amounted to 38 percent (Statistics South Africa 2018).

⁸ Unsurprisingly, this also means that unemployment is considered one of the most important problems facing South Africa today. Our data show that four out of five South Africans report unemployment as one of the most important problems in South Africa; 55% reported it as the most important issue; 79% reported it as one of the top three most important issues.

tells 2002). Strong feelings of partisanship create strong (dis)inclinations to support a particular party, even when the party or its candidates face allegations of political misconduct and bad governance. Partisanship may, therefore, also shape voter responses to corruption and make voters more forgiving of politicians engaged in—or accused of—corruption (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; McNally 2016; Eggers 2014; Min 2013; Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977). For example, in their analysis of voters' response to corrupt politicians in Spain, Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) show that the same offense is judged differently depending on whether the responsible politician is a member of the respondent's preferred party.

The idea that partisanship undermines voters' willingness to punish corruption is linked to different theories of voting behavior. First, a voter would knowingly support a corrupt candidate if the voter assessed that the corrupt candidate—who is a member of the voters' preferred party and shares the voter's view on a majority of issues—is more favorable than an honest candidate but ideologically incongruent candidate (Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook 1970). Second, Persson and Tabellini (2000, 77-81) argue that the electoral control of politicians may be undermined by voters' partisanship because partisan voters do not evaluate and elect parties and candidates based on their performance in office but, rather, cast their votes based on loyalty to the party. This argument is corroborated by several studies providing evidence that partisanship undermines electoral accountability (Carey 2003; Treisman 2003; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Kayser and Wlezien 2011). On this background, we expect that voters expressing feelings of partisanship toward a particular party are more forgiving of corruption when it involves candidates from the party they identify with. In the case of South Africa, this implies that supporters of the dominant and governing party, the ANC, should be more forgiving of corruption when the perpetrator is an ANC politician:

H3a. ANC partisans are less likely to punish (and more likely to support) corrupt ANC politicians.

By the same token, we expect supporters of the main opposition party—the Democratic Alliance (DA)—to be more forgiving of corrupt DA politicians:

H3b. DA partisans are less likely to punish (and more likely to support) corrupt DA politicians.

Research design

To test the hypotheses outlined above, we rely on a survey experiment embedded into a new nationally representative survey conducted in South Africa in 2017.⁹ Below, we describe the case selection, survey data, experimental design, and the model we use to test the hypotheses.

Case selection

Much of the existing literature on citizen responses to political corruption has directed its attention at both highly developed democracies such as Spain, Italy, UK, Japan (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; McNally 2016; Eggers 2014; Min 2013) and middle-income countries such as Mexico, Brazil and India (De La O 2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013; 2016; Weschle 2016). However, little is known about how voters respond to corrupt politicians in the South African context—despite mounting evidence that corruption is an increasing problem.

Corruption is a highly salient political issue on the public agenda in South Africa. During former president Jacob Zuma's tenure in office, allegations of corruption against Zuma and the political, business, and clientelist networks surrounding him were widespread. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index—ranking countries by their perceived levels of public-sector corruption—continues to rank South Africa in the bottom half, corroborating that corruption is a significant problem in the country (Transparency International 2016). Although Jacob Zuma was replaced as president of the ANC and the Republic of South Africa in February 2018, corruption is widely believed to have escalated at all levels of government in South Africa during the past 10 years. South Africa therefore provides a good setting for examining how voters respond to political corruption.

South Africa has held regular elections at the national, provincial, and municipal level since its transition to post-Apartheid democracy in 1994. The survey experiment revolves around a hypothetical candidate running for office in a municipal election. We focus on candidates running for office in a municipal election for three reasons. First, while grand corruption at the national level often makes the news headlines, corruption is also a major concern at the municipal level. Since municipalities play a key role as providers of basic services such as water, sanitation, and electricity, corruption at the municipal level easily contributes to undermining the delivery of public services to citizens in South Africa.

Second, municipal elections were held in South Africa on August 3, 2016—around a year before the fielding of our survey. This means that the 2016 municipal elections were closer in time to

⁹ The survey experiment is registered under ID 20171003AA at www.egap.org.

our survey (July/August 2017) than the most recent national election (2014) or the closest upcoming national election (2019). Moreover, the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa were widely considered to be landslide elections because they constituted the worst electoral result for the ANC since the inception of democratic elections in 1994. Even though the ANC won around 56% of the national vote total, they lost the mayor's office in a number of the big cities (Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Tshwane). Therefore, even if the survey was fielded a year later, the 2016 municipal elections are likely to be salient in the minds of voters.

Third, national elections in South Africa use a closed-list proportional electoral system, where the ballot structure allows voters to cast a vote for a political party only, and not for individual candidates. Therefore, in the context of national elections in South Africa, it makes more sense to ask people about their support for a political party, whereas it is harder to ask about support for a specific political candidate. In contrast, municipal elections in South Africa use a hybrid electoral system where voters in Metros—South Africa's eight biggest cities—cast two votes: one for a ward councilor and one for a party on a party list, used to increase the proportionality of the votes-to-seats allocation within municipalities. In areas outside of the Metros, voters likewise vote for a ward councilor and a political party, and also cast a vote for a party for so-called district municipalities that are responsible for broader issues of local development. Importantly, across all municipalities, candidates running for office as ward councilors compete in single-member districts with plurality elections. This differs from how candidates compete and are elected in national elections and implies that voters in municipal election have the opportunity to vote for individual candidates and use the act of voting to hold ward councilors individually accountable for their performance in office. Moreover, the plurality voting inherent in South Africa's municipal electoral system also plays a crucial role in light of our second hypothesis—that clientelist offers soften voters' response to corruption—because previous work has argued that clientelism flourishes in countries with electoral systems that provide incentives to cultivate personal votes (Birch 2007).

Survey

The data we use are from a new survey we designed that was fielded during July and August 2017 with the assistance of Citizen Surveys, a research consultancy based in Cape Town and specializing in survey research. To ensure a nationally representative study covering all nine provinces of South Africa, sampling was done using a stratified, multistage probability sample with *a*) disproportional stratification and *b*) random sampling of enumeration areas within which *c*) random walks were conducted by field workers to identify which households to select, after which *d*) an automated and tablet-based randomization procedure was used to select the respondent to interview within the

household. The sample size is $n=1,500$ and is representative at the national level (the response rate was 77.5%).

Interviews were done face-to-face by trained enumerators using tablets with pre-coded questionnaires available to the respondent in one of six languages. For the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of five versions of the survey experiment (described in detail below). Respondents were assigned to treatment groups using complete random assignment, which was pre-coded onto the tablets, meaning that the randomization process was automated and independent of enumerators and outside of their control.

Experiment

To test why voters sometimes vote for corrupt candidates in the South African context, we designed a survey experiment involving a hypothetical political candidate running for election to the municipal council. In the experiment, we randomly varied information on the candidate's corrupt activities, the candidate's use of patronage, and the party of the candidate. The description of a hypothetical candidate follows the approach of other studies of voter or citizen attitudes toward different characteristics or activities of political candidates (Weitz-Shapiro 2014; Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Muñoz et al. 2016; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013). It allows us to hold the environment constant and avoids compromising specific politicians. We use five experimental conditions, the first and simplest of which we use as the baseline (control) condition. Table 1 shows the five randomly assigned questions in the survey experiment, where the italics demonstrate the differences in the wording offered to the treatment groups.

All five versions describe a political candidate who has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in the area where the respondent lives. We decided that the description of the political candidate should include positive features—working hard to build a new health clinic in the local area—to give the candidate an appealing, but still realistic, characteristic (working hard) on an issue (health) that is important to most voters, making it harder for respondents to outright reject the candidate. The control group is given no additional information. The first treatment group is informed that the political candidate is also known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts (corruption information treatment), which is considered a widespread form of state-business corruption in South Africa (Beresford 2015; Southall 2008). All the remaining three versions of the survey experiments include information on corruption (as in the first treatment group) varying either the party (ANC or DA) or the offering of a job or work in return for the respondent's vote (patronage).

Note, however, that to examine partisanship effects (H3a and H3b), we need to match respondents' partisan affiliation with the relevant party identity treatments (ANC or DA treatments). Therefore, examining partisanship effects requires that we interact the treatment conditions with an indicator variable of respondents' partisan affiliation. After hearing the prompt, all respondents were asked how likely they would be to vote for that candidate using a five-point scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 4 (very likely). This experiment serves as the basis for testing the hypotheses developed earlier.

Table 1 Survey experimental prompts

Condition	Text with <i>treatment conditions</i> in italics
Baseline (control)	Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area.
Treatment 1: Corruption information	Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area <i>and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.</i>
Treatment 2: ANC	Let's say that a political candidate <i>from the ANC</i> is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area <i>and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.</i>
Treatment 3: DA	Let's say that a political candidate <i>from the DA</i> is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area <i>and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.</i>
Treatment 4: Patronage	Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality <i>and has offered YOU work or a job in return for your vote.</i> The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area <i>and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.</i>

Model and estimation

We analyze the survey experiment using a baseline regression model equivalent to equation (1):

$$(1) \quad y_i = a + dT_i + e_i$$

In (1), y is the outcome measured by the five-point scale of responses to the experimental conditions outlined above. T denotes the experimental treatment where respondents are randomly assigned to one of the five experimental groups; a denotes the average level of support for respondents in the control group, and d constitutes the parameter of interest—the causal effect of the treatments on the outcome. The causal effect of the treatment on candidate support is identified by

d , provided that $Cov(T, e)=0$, which is satisfied given the randomized assignment of respondents into different experimental groups.

To validate the randomization procedure, appendix A includes a randomization check of all treatment groups and demonstrates that there are no major differences between the five experimental groups on a standard set of pre-treatment covariates including gender, age, racial group, education, mother's education, father's education, unemployment, poverty level, and province.¹⁰

We have also tested whether missing values on the outcome variable—that is, respondents who answered, “don’t know” or refused to answer—are systematically related to the treatment groups (see appendix B). For instance, one of the experimental treatment conditions may have been perceived as more controversial and generated more refusals or “don’t know” responses. We have relatively few missing values on the outcome (48 observations in total), and their distribution is roughly similar across all treatment conditions. Similarly, the pre-treatment covariates listed above are generally unrelated to missing values.¹¹ Since these simple checks validate our randomization procedure, the results are obtained from regressions that do not include additional covariates. The only exception is when we test for partisanship, where we include interactions between the treatment groups and a variable asking respondents which party, if any, they identify with. The results shown are obtained using OLS regression with standard errors that are aligned with the level of randomization. That is, since we have used complete random assignment at the individual level, we use standard errors that follow that level too and are not clustered at some aggregate level (cf. Abadie et al. 2017).


Results

We begin by displaying the overall distribution of the outcome variable across all experimental groups in figure 2. This shows that voter support for the hypothetical candidates who are presented in the experimental conditions is generally fairly low with an average of 1.50 (SD=1.46; $n=1452$) on the scale from zero (very unlikely) to four (very likely). Given that the four treatments incorporate a corrupt candidate, the overall low level of voter support is not surprising but in line with our first hypothesis—that voters generally do not support corrupt candidates.

¹⁰ The balance test shows that there is a statistically significant difference between group 1 and 4 on the gender variable. However, on all other covariates, no statistically significant differences are found.

¹¹ The only exception is that there are slightly more missing values in the Free State province. However, the numbers are fairly small at a provincial level: In total, there are only 12 missing values on the outcome in the Free State province.

Figure 2 Support for political candidates (distribution of outcome variable)




To test whether voter information, party identification, and patronage have an impact on the level of voter support for political candidates, figure 3 displays the first set of results from regressions with candidate support as the outcome variable and the experimental groups as the treatment indicators. Figure 3 shows the effect of each of the four treatment conditions in table 1, compared to the control group. The dots denote the magnitude of the coefficient for each treatment group—the level of support for the candidate relative to the control group—while the dashed lines show confidence intervals at the 95 percent level. The vertical line denotes the value zero and shows whether confidence intervals cut across zero.

The results in figure 3 show that all treatment conditions involving a corrupt candidate—the informational cue on candidate corruption, additional information on the identity of the party of the corrupt candidate, and the patronage offer of jobs-for-votes by the corrupt candidate—have a strong and statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood that voters would support such a candidate with a vote. Indeed, relative to the mean of the control group (2.57), the average level of support across all treatment groups is substantially lower, with coefficient sizes ranging from -1.10 to -1.52.

The top part of figure 3 shows the result for the information treatment, testing hypothesis 1. While otherwise being equivalent to the profile of the candidate in the control group, respondents in the informational treatment group were informed only that the candidate running for election to the municipal council is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government

contracts. Relative to the control group candidate, this piece of information lowers support for the corrupt candidate with -1.30 on the scale from zero to four, corresponding to nearly 90% of a standard deviation on the outcome variable. This result supports hypothesis 1 and shows that information on candidate involvement in corruption leads to lower voter support. The finding is also in line with the literature emphasizing that access to information leads to greater voter sanctioning of bad performance and corruption by politicians (Pande 2011; Besley and Prat 2006; Keefer 2004).

Figure 3 Voting for corrupt candidates (effect of information, party identity, and patronage)




In the patronage treatment (testing hypothesis 2), the corrupt candidate offers the respondent (voter) a job or work in return for his/her vote. That is, the corrupt candidate engages in a particular form of clientelist exchange—patronage—where work or jobs are exchanged for votes and used to mobilize political support (Robinson and Verdier 2013; Stokes 2007). In this way, corrupt politicians may use patronage as a mechanism to appease voters by including them into the candidate’s clientelist network through the offering of work or a job in return for their vote. The result for the patronage treatment in figure 3 shows that—even when candidates make use of patronage as a mode of political campaigning and distribution—voters still display significantly lower levels of support relative to the control group. Interestingly, however, the size of the coefficient (-1.10) for the patronage treatment is much lower than for any of the other treatment conditions. This result is partially in line with hypothesis 2: While voters still punish candidates who engage in corruption and clientelism simultaneously, on average voters are also more lenient in the face of patronage schemes and punish candidates less severely. That is, voters do not display greater support for corrupt candi-

dates that use clientelist modes of distribution to mobilize support, but they punish them less severely. The use of patronage, therefore, seems to work asymmetrically—not by increasing voter support relative to honest candidates, but by reducing the electoral cost suffered by politicians involved in corruption.

To explore this issue further, figure 4 compares the patronage treatment to the four remaining experimental conditions (using the patronage treatment as the reference). Of particular interest here is the comparison between the patronage treatment and information treatment—with a candidate who is corrupt—because those two are equivalent (both are corrupt), except that the former uses patronage to cultivate votes. Figure 4 corroborates that the patronage treatment induces higher support—or lower punishment—compared to the corruption information treatment (and the remainder of the treatments). That is, relative to the patronage treatment, the coefficients of the other treatments (except the baseline) are negative. This shows that politicians who are known to be corrupt can use patronage to mitigate the electoral costs of corruption and suggests that patronage often co-exists with corruption because it is an instrument corrupt politicians can use to secure their survival in office.

Figure 4 Corruption and patronage




The final two treatment conditions establish the corrupt candidate as being either from the governing party, the ANC, or the main opposition party, the DA. While these tests do not speak directly to the partisanship hypotheses, they show that voters maintain punishment at a high level relative to

the control group (figure 3) when the candidate’s party is known, although the DA candidate seems to receive slightly harsher punishment than the ANC candidate.

To test how partisanship shapes voter responses to corruption among politicians—hypotheses H3a and H3b—we need to extend the regression model based purely on experimental treatment groups by adding an interaction term with a partisanship covariate. To do so, we use a question asking respondents (early in the questionnaire) what party, if any, they identify with. We construct two binary partisanship variables. One for respondents who identify with the ANC—the dominant, governing party in South Africa—and one for respondents identifying with the DA, the largest opposition party. In both cases, the reference groups are “all other voters.” This introduces a non-experimental covariate into the model and implies that we need to be cautious with regard to interpreting the results as expressions of causal effects (Gerber and Green 2012, 301-302).

Figure 5a & 5b ANC (5a) / DA (5b) partisans support for corrupt ANC (5a) / DA (5b) politicians



With this caveat, figures 5a and 5b show results from two regressions where the experimental treatments in table 1 are first interacted with the ANC partisanship covariate (figure 5a), and second with the DA partisanship covariate (figure 5b). While the regression models include a full set of interactions between all treatment conditions and each of the partisanship indicators, figures 5a and 5b show only the marginal effects of the ANC (5a) and DA (5b) treatments, using ANC partisanship (denoted 1 in figure 5a) or DA partisanship (denoted 1 in figure 5b) as moderators, that is, the marginal effects of the party treatments, conditional on voter partisanship.

However, it is clear from figures 5a and 5b that partisanship does little to moderate voters' support for corrupt politicians. Although ANC partisans (figure 5a) are slightly more forgiving of corruption if the perpetrator is an ANC politician, the difference is not statistically significant. The same picture emerges from figure 5b—where the DA treatment is interacted with DA partisanship. Again, support for a corrupt political candidate from the DA does not differ much across DA partisans and other voters. Overall, these results do not suggest that partisanship matters much for voter support for corrupt candidates in the South African context. Indeed, corrupt politicians are punished by markedly lower support from voters across political party divides and party loyalties.

Conclusion

Democratic elections are supposed to allow voters to kick corrupt politicians out of office. However, in many democracies around the world, voters frequently cast their ballots for candidates who are involved in corruption. In this article, we have examined why voters sometimes support—or punish—corrupt politicians, emphasizing the role of information, patronage, and partisanship for voter responses to politician involvement in corruption.

Using survey experimental data from South Africa, we show that voters generally punish corruption in the sense that they express lower levels of support for candidates who are known to be corrupt. Thus, eliciting information about a candidate's corrupt behavior makes voters less inclined to support that candidate. While the literature on the role of information is largely inconclusive when it comes to the effects of information on voter behavior (Lieberman et al. 2014), our results are more in line with the part of the literature that suggests that access to information plays a role for voter responses to corruption and clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro and Winter 2016; Chong et al. 2015; Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013; Banerjee et al. 2011). These results do not necessarily imply that increased access to information is the key driver in fighting political corruption, but they do suggest that certain types of voter evaluations related to candidate corruption can be swayed by eliciting information on political corruption.

Our results also show that voters will punish corruption regardless of whether they share party affiliation with the corrupt candidate. That is, in contrast to other studies (McNally 2016; Eggers 2014; Anduiza et al. 2013), our results do not find strong partisanship effects in the South African context. Even though South Africa is a country with a well-organized dominant party that has generally benefitted from strong senses of voter loyalty rooted in the ANC's key role in the struggle against apartheid and in shaping the subsequent democratic transition, our results suggest that partisanship does not always make voters more forgiving of corrupt politicians. While we cannot say

what contextual factors make partisans less forgiving of corruption in South Africa, it is plausible that continuing and increasing problems of corruption over time—combined with lack of social development in large parts of the population—make even the most steadfast partisans grow weary of corruption.

However, our survey experiment does show that if corrupt politicians employ patronage—the exchange of work or jobs for political support—as an electoral strategy, voters are more lenient and lower their level of punishment of political candidates. Clientelism can, therefore, be used as a political strategy not just to mobilize the electoral support (Nichter 2008) or persuade voters to support particular parties (Stokes 2005) but also as a tool politicians can use to compensate voters for being involved in corruption. In contexts where corruption is thriving alongside electoral democracy, this suggests that clientelism plays a pivotal role in enhancing the (re)election chances of corrupt politicians. Clientelism may, therefore, be a significant part of the reason why voters support corrupt politicians, why some corrupt politicians manage to survive in office, and why clientelism and corruption often co-exist and operate as mutually reinforcing forces (Kitschelt 2007; Manzetti and Wilson 2007).

These findings have implications for the fight against corruption since they suggest that clientelism serves to nourish corruption and that corrupt politicians can use clientelist strategies to appease voter responses to corruption. Anti-corruption efforts should, therefore, focus not only on informing voters about candidates' involvement in corruption but also seek to address and reduce the use of clientelist strategies during electoral campaigns. That is, anti-vote-buying campaigns (Vicente 2014) and campaigns aimed at limiting the appeal of clientelism as a political strategy (Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013) may also serve to weaken the durability of political corruption.

Future avenues of research should explore whether clientelism only lessens voters' willingness to punish corrupt politicians when it takes the form of patronage or whether other types of clientelism have the same effect on voter responses to corruption. More work on the mechanisms linking clientelism to corruption is also needed. While the empirical evidence in this article demonstrates that patronage lessens voters' willingness to punish corrupt candidates, we need to know more about why voters who are offered clientelist benefits in exchange for their votes are more lenient toward corrupt candidates. Finally, future research could explore the effect of clientelism on voters' willingness to support corrupt candidates in other contexts. While South Africa is an example of a country in which corruption is highly salient, information on corruption, partisanship, and clientelism may affect voters' responsiveness to corruption differently in countries with different political institutions, party systems, and clientelist cultures.

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Supplemental appendix

Appendix A. Balance tests

The table shows the results from the Anova-test and provides evidence that the control group and treatment groups are similar regarding age, education, mother's education, father's education, unemployment, poverty level, race, and region. However, there is a statistically significant difference between groups 1 and 4 on the gender variable.

	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment 1: Corruption info.</i>	<i>Treatment 2: ANC</i>	<i>Treatment 3: DA</i>	<i>Treatment 4: Patronage</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Female	0.54	0.53	0.62	0.48	0.58	0.01
Age	38.72	39.34	38.92	39.14	38.29	0.94
Education	3.68	3.70	3.65	3.63	3.72	0.96
Mother's educ.	2.55	2.75	2.61	2.49	2.70	0.55
Father's educ.	2.59	2.76	2.62	2.40	2.64	0.46
Unemployment	0.39	0.41	0.34	0.42	0.39	0.33
Poverty	5.07	4.99	4.99	4.98	4.83	0.91
Black	0.69	0.70	0.69	0.66	0.69	0.90
Colored	0.14	0.11	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.11
Indian	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.95
White	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.67
Eastern Cape	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.99
Free State	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.99
Gauteng	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.99
Kwa-Zulu Natal	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.99
Limpopo	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.99
Mpumalanga	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.99
Northern Cape	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	1.00
North West	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.99
Western Cape	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.99

Appendix B. Missing values on outcome

Treatment 1: Corruption information	-0.00 (-0.00)
Treatment 2: ANC	-0.00 (-0.00)
Treatment 3: DA	0.01 (0.70)
Treatment 4: Patronage	0.02 (1.16)
Constant (control group)	0.03 (2.62)
Observations	1500
R ²	0.00

NOTE: Results from OLS regression with a binary dependent variable, where missing values are coded 1 and non-missing values are coded as 0. This variable is regressed on the treatment group indicator to examine if there are differences between the treatment groups.

* Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$).

Appendix C. Summary statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Experimental group	1452	3	1.41	1	5
Outcome variable	1452	1.50	1.46	0	4
ANC partisans	1433	0.29	0.46	0	1
DA partisans	1433	0.09	0.29	0	1
Female	1500	0.55	0.50	0	1
Age	1500	38.88	16.03	18	95
Education	1492	3.67	1.53	0	8
Mother's education	1213	2.62	1.91	0	8
Father's education	1100	2.60	2.02	0	8
Unemployment	1489	0.39	0.49	0	1
Poverty	1500	4.97	3.08	0	12
Black	1500	0.684	0.47	0	1
Colored	1500	0.154	0.36	0	1
Indian	1500	0.058	0.23	0	1
White	1500	0.10	0.31	0	1
Eastern Cape	1500	0.14	0.34	0	1
Free State	1500	0.10	0.29	0	1
Gauteng	1500	0.19	0.39	0	1
Kwa-Zulu Natal	1500	0.18	0.39	0	1
Limpopo	1500	0.07	0.25	0	1
Mpumalanga	1500	0.06	0.24	0	1
Northern Cape	1500	0.04	0.20	0	1
North West	1500	0.06	0.24	0	1
Western Cape	1500	0.16	0.36	0	1

Appendix D. Variable description

Variable: ANC partisans.

Description: Share of respondents who feel close to the ANC.

Question(s): Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party? & Which party do you feel close to?

Response categories: Yes, No, Refuse to answer, Don't know & African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party, African National Congress (ANC), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Agang, Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), Congress of the People (COPE), Democratic Alliance (DA), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Federal Alliance, Freedom Front Plus (FF+), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Minority Front, National Freedom Party, New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement, Other [Specify], Don't know, Refuse to answer.

Variable: DA partisans.

Description: Share of respondents who feel close to the DA.

Question(s): Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party? & Which party do you feel close to?

Response categories: Yes, No, Refuse to answer, Don't know & African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), African Muslim Party, African National Congress (ANC), Afrikaner Unity Movement, Agang, Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), Congress of the People (COPE), Democratic Alliance (DA), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Federal Alliance, Freedom Front Plus (FF+), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Minority Front, National Freedom Party, New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Democratic Party (UCDP), United Democratic Movement, Other [Specify], Don't know, Refuse to answer.

Variable: Female

Description: Respondent's gender

Question(s): Please give me the name, surname, gender, and age of ALL the people aged 18 years and older who live in this household? Please give me their names from the youngest to the oldest.

Response categories: [Open-ended].

Variable: Age

Description: Respondent's age

Question(s): Please give me the name, surname, gender, and age of ALL the people aged 18 years and older who live in this household? Please give me their names from the youngest to the oldest.

Response categories: [Open-ended].

Variable: Education

Description: Respondent's level of education.

Question(s): What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Response categories: No schooling, Primary schooling incomplete, Primary schooling complete, Secondary/high school incomplete, Completed Matric, Some college / technikon / university / trade

school / still studying, Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school, Completed university degree, Post-graduate degree.

Variable: Mother's education

Description: Respondent's mother's level of education

Question(s): What is the highest level of education your MOTHER completed?

Response categories: No schooling, Primary schooling incomplete, Primary schooling complete, Secondary/high school incomplete, Completed Matric, Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying, Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school, Completed university degree, Post-graduate degree.

Variable: Father's education

Description: Respondent's father's level of education

Question(s): What is the highest level of education your FATHER completed?

Response categories: No schooling, Primary schooling incomplete, Primary schooling complete, Secondary/high school incomplete, Completed Matric, Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying, Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school, Completed university degree, Post-graduate degree.

Variable: Unemployment

Description: Share of people who are "Unemployed and looking for work" and "Unemployed and not looking for work"

Question(s): With regard to employment, what is your occupational status? Are you...?

Response categories: Self-employed / own business, Working full-time, Working part-time / contract / casual / seasonal work, Unemployed and looking for work, Unemployed and not looking for work, Scholar at school, Student at college, university etc., Disabled or receive a disability grant, Retired / Pensioner, Housewife, Other (Specify), Refuse to answer.

Variable: Poverty

Description: We measure poverty through the Living Standard Measures, which is based on 25 questions regarding whether the respondent has different material goods in his or her household.

Question(s): Please tell me which of the following are presently in your household. Do you have ... ?

Response categories: Yes/No.

Variable: Race

Description: Respondent's race by observation only, the interviewer does not ask respondent.

Question(s): What is the respondent's race?

Response categories: Black; Colored; Indian, White.

Variable: Province

Description: The province where the respondent lives. This information is automatically captured via the GPS coordinates.

Question(s): -.

Response categories: -.

Article 4

Buying the votes of the poor: How the electoral system matters

Louise Thorn Bøttkjær¹ and Mogens Kamp Justesen²

Elections in new democracies often involve the use of vote buying by political parties trying to mobilize voter support. While poverty is generally considered a key source of vote buying, we examine how the character of the electoral system conditions the effect of poverty. We argue that the effects of poverty on vote buying are strongest in electoral systems with incentives to cultivate personal votes—that is, under plurality voting, where district magnitude is low, and in open-list proportional systems. Empirically, we examine this argument using cross-country data from Latin America and Africa. While there is a strong correlation between poverty and vote buying, our results suggest that the effect of poverty on vote buying weakens as district magnitude increases and when closed-list ballots are used. Political incentives built into the electoral system may, therefore, shape incentives of political candidates to target vote-buying campaigns at the poor during elections.

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
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Introduction

Fraudulent means of winning often accompany elections in new democracies. A prominent source of election fraud is vote buying, defined as “the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote” (Brusco et al. 2004, 67). While the economic rewards exchanged in return for votes at the micro level may be relatively small, the large-scale political and economic implications of vote buying are profound: Vote buying may subvert accountability links between voters and elected representatives, undermine the fairness of the electoral process, and prevent voters from having their interests represented in the political system (Stokes 2005, 2007). Attempts by political candidates to mobilize support by distributing cash or material benefits to voters in exchange for support may also distort political incentives to provide distributive policies benefitting the poor (Khemani 2015) and reduce the supply of public goods (Baland and Robinson 2007).

While clientelist practices such as vote buying may be politically expedient as a means of mobilizing voter support (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), the extent to which parties employ vote-buying campaigns during elections varies a lot across countries in the developing world. Figure 1 shows the distribution of vote buying in 56 countries in Latin America and Africa based on survey data from the Afrobarometer and LAPOP.³

Figure 1 Vote buying in Africa and Latin America



³ We explain the data in detail later in the paper.

The survey questions asked respondents whether they had been offered material benefits in return for their vote in the most recent national election. In some countries—such as Uganda and Kenya—vote buying is very widespread during elections, while in others—like Namibia and Tunisia—vote buying is a fairly rare event. Moreover, within both the African and Latin American regions, vote buying varies a lot. Although the average for the African countries (15.4%) is slightly higher than for the Latin American countries (12.4%), vote buying also occurs frequently during elections in some Latin American countries, for example, the Dominican Republic and Mexico. This illustrates that political parties continue to allocate resources to vote-buying campaigns during elections, even though practically all new democracies have—at least nominally—adopted the secret ballot as part of their bundle of democratic institutions. This raises the question of why the level of vote buying differs so much across new democracies and what factors contribute to explaining this variation.

In the existing literature, it is widely accepted that poverty is a key source of vote buying at both the micro and macro level: Poor countries are supposed to have higher levels of vote buying, and within countries too, poor people are often identified as the prime targets of vote-buying campaigns by political parties (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013). However, poverty does not always translate into widespread vote buying, nor are incentives for political parties and candidates to pursue costly vote-buying campaigns always uniform. In this paper, we examine how the character of the electoral system may condition the effect of poverty on vote buying using cross-sectional data for 56 countries in Africa and Latin America. We focus on three features of the electoral system—the electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure—and argue that the effects of poverty on vote buying are strongest in countries where the electoral system is candidate-centered rather than party-centered—that is, in plurality systems where district magnitude is low and in open-list proportional systems.

In this way, our paper adds to the growing literature on electoral clientelism and its link to poverty (Aidt and Jensen 2016; Mares 2015; De Kadt and Larreguy 2018; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Vicente and Wantchekon 2009; Nichter 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005, see Mares and Young 2016 for a review of the literature). We contribute to this literature in two ways.

First, we examine under what conditions poverty affects vote buying and what factors contribute to strengthen or weaken the relationship between poverty and vote buying across countries. We argue that while poverty creates fertile grounds for vote buying, the extent to which parties and political candidates allocate resources to buy votes during elections is moderated by political incen-

tives to pursue personal votes. To this end, we draw on the literature on electoral institutions where it is widely accepted that the nature of the electoral system shapes the incentives of political candidates to “cultivate a personal vote” (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995). We argue that although poverty makes vote buying an attractive electoral strategy for political parties, the electoral system may offset the adverse effects of poverty by altering incentives for political candidates to pursue personal votes.

Second, we contribute to the literature by conducting an empirical analysis of the relationship between poverty, electoral systems, and vote buying for 56 countries in Africa and Latin America—the two regions where data on vote buying are available from public opinion barometers. While most of the literature on electoral clientelism and vote buying consists of single-country studies, our paper is the first to provide evidence on how electoral institutions shape the relationship between poverty and vote buying for a broad cross-section of countries.

Our paper also contributes to the literature on electoral institutions, “the personal vote,” and corruption (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang 2005; Chang and Golden 2007; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Alt and Lassen 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003; Lizzeri and Persico 2001). We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, while this literature typically focuses on generic forms of political and administrative corruption, for example, using Transparency International’s corruption perception index, we, in contrast, examine a form of electoral corruption—vote buying—that political candidates can control more directly, and which may directly affect their chances of being elected to office. Using vote buying as the main concept and dependent variable creates a closer connection between the electoral incentives politicians face and their behavior and campaign strategies during elections. It also highlights the importance of distinguishing between corruption involved in the process of getting elected—electoral corruption—and corruption exercised from an established position of public office (Mares and Visconti 2016).

Second, while much of the literature on electoral institutions argues that plurality systems produce less corruption than proportional systems (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Alt and Lassen 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003), our argument is closer to the work of Birch (2007), who shows that electoral misconduct is more widespread in plurality systems. However, within the group of proportional systems, closed- and open-list systems may have very different effects on (electoral) corruption and public policy (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). While there is no consensus on this issue, our argument implies that propor-

tional systems with open lists create incentives to cultivate the personal vote that are similar to the incentives generated by plurality systems and that the effect of poverty on vote buying is stronger in open-list systems.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the argument linking poverty to vote buying. The section after outlines the main features of the electoral system and how these may affect vote buying. We then explain the interaction argument and elaborate on why the electoral system conditions the relationship between poverty and vote buying. Next, we describe the data and methods employed in the empirical part. The subsequent section presents the results of the empirical analysis. The final section concludes with the main findings.

Poverty and vote buying


The most prominent explanations of vote buying and electoral clientelism arguably revolve around the effects of poverty and economic development (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Scott 1969). Indeed, the history of the rise and fall of vote markets in Western Europe and the USA suggests that economic development and the decline of poverty contribute to explaining why vote buying is more widespread in some countries than others. Stokes et al. (2013) and Aidt and Jensen (2016) argue that, historically, vote buying in Western countries diminished as a consequence of industrialization and economic development. For voters, economic development meant increasing incomes, which, in turn, made voters less inclined to sell their votes for relatively small economic rewards. For political parties, economic development meant a smaller pool of poor voters, and therefore, vote buying became increasingly costly—relative to supplying public services—as a strategy for mobilizing electoral support (Stokes et al. 2013, 212-213).

Aidt and Jensen (2016) argue that economic development was also instrumental in increasing the power of groups supporting secret ballot reform. The move from open to secret voting, in turn, contributed to eroding electoral patron-client relationships because it enabled voters to conceal their vote choice and made it difficult for party agents to monitor voter compliance with commitments to support a particular party (Mares 2015). The crucial role of economic development in undermining the magnitude of vote buying and other types of electoral clientelism is corroborated by studies of countries outside Western Europe and the USA. For instance, Scott (1969: 1159) famously argued that poverty was likely “the most fundamental quality” of the mass of clients that political machines used to mobilize support in post-colonial countries.

Micro-level evidence from new democracies in Africa and Latin America also show that vote buying is often targeted at the poor (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005). The

literature typically highlights time discounting and risk aversion as mechanisms that explain the relationship between poverty and vote buying at the micro level (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007): First, poor people tend to have shorter time horizons, discounting the value of future rewards over current benefits. Second, poverty may also lead to greater risk aversion. Because politicians in new democracies are often unable to credibly commit to promises of post-electoral redistribution (Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008), risk-averse voters prefer the certainty of pre-electoral vote buying transfers over promises of programmatic redistribution after the election. Therefore, poor people who often lack access to basic necessities like food and medicine are generally more willing to sell their votes for even relatively modest amounts of money than wealthier groups.

Figure 2 Vote buying and poverty (Africa and Latin America)



Based on explanations at both the macro and micro level, we should expect vote buying to decrease as the pool of poor voters decreases and the level of economic development increases. However, this apparent well-established relationship between poverty and vote buying has been challenged. Some recent studies have found no or only weak support for the relationship (Khemani 2015; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), and others have pointed to a conditional relationship between poverty and vote buying (Justesen and Manzetti 2017; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). This uneven effect of poverty is corroborated when we look at the empirical relationship between poverty and vote buying. For a cross-section of 56 countries in Africa and Latin America, figure 2 displays the simple relationship

between vote buying and poverty captured by levels of infant mortality.⁴ Figure 2 illustrates that although the empirical relationship between poverty and vote buying is positive, several countries—for example, Kenya and the Dominican Republic—have levels of vote buying that, given their level of poverty, far surpass what we would expect. In other countries, such as Lesotho and Namibia, vote buying is not very common despite high levels of poverty. This raises the obvious question of why poverty does not always lead to high levels of vote buying.

Electoral systems and vote buying

Our answer to this question is firmly embedded in the institutional approach in political science and emphasizes the key role of the electoral system in explaining not just the prevalence of vote buying but also why poverty does not always translate into high levels of vote buying. To develop this argument, we build on the literature concerning how the electoral system shapes incentives to cultivate a personal vote and lead to corrupt forms of campaign strategies (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995). Persson and Tabellini (2003, 16) identify three key dimensions of the electoral system—the electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure—that shape the incentives of politicians and governments to deliver broad-based public services or to target distributive transfers at narrow constituencies. These dimensions may also shape incentives to cultivate personal votes by the use of vote buying. This is so because they determine whether the electoral system is mainly candidate-centered or party-centered. Candidate-centered electoral systems are those that employ plurality voting, low district magnitude, or proportional representation with open-list ballot structures. In contrast, party-centered electoral systems are those operating under proportional representation, high levels of district magnitude, or proportional representation with closed-list ballot structures.

Electoral formula

The electoral formula concerns how votes are counted and translated into seats and can roughly be divided into systems using plurality/majority voting (PM) and systems using proportional representation (PR). Plurality voting typically occurs in single-member districts and tends to strengthen accountability links between voters and politicians at the constituency level, while proportional sys-

⁴ Vote buying data are from the Afrobarometer and LAPOP surveys. Vote buying is measured as the percentage of the population that has been approached by political parties with offers of money or material rewards in return for their vote during the last national election. Poverty is approximated by infant mortality rates per 1,000 births (in natural logs) in 2010.

tems prioritize a closer translation of votes into legislative seats at the national level and, therefore, strengthen the representativeness of electoral outcomes (Powell 2000).

Much of the literature on electoral institutions argues that plurality systems produce less corruption than proportional systems because plurality systems enable voters to hold legislators individually accountable for their performance in office (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Alt and Lassen 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003). However, plurality voting may also strengthen incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Birch (2007) emphasizes that the rewards from electoral competition in plurality voting systems are concentrated (personally) with the winner—whoever obtains the most votes—while the loser gets nothing. This incentive structure implies that individual accountability in single-member districts need not translate into voters holding politicians to account for “good” or “clean” governance. Indeed, the work of Lizzeri and Persico (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) suggests that plurality systems tend to result in a lower provision of broad-based public services and a larger supply of targeted transfers. This entails that voters may hold politicians accountable for their ability to deliver tangible goods and benefits, including pork-barrel policies for the local community, but also private goods such as jobs, food, or favors during election time. The “winner-takes-all” nature of plurality electoral systems may, therefore, increase the likelihood that candidates use illicit means such as vote buying to increase their election chances.

District magnitude

The size of electoral districts—district magnitude—concerns the (average) number of legislators elected per district (Persson and Tabellini 2003, 16). Countries with low levels of district magnitude are divided into several constituencies, meaning that within each district fewer votes are needed to tilt the election outcome. Therefore, candidates competing in a “winner-takes-all” single-member district will need to target their election campaigns at a relatively small number of voters to sway the election outcome. Countries with larger district magnitude have one national district or few districts, and thus more votes are needed to tilt the result of the election within each district.

District magnitude is related to the electoral formula in the sense that plurality voting typically occurs in single-member districts, while proportional systems typically have districts with multiple members—in the limit up to one national district with a magnitude equal to the number of seats in the legislative chamber (Powell 2000, 25; Carey and Shugart 1995, 419). Therefore, district magnitude affects incentives to pursue personal votes in ways that are similar to the electoral formula. Generally, larger district magnitudes imply that political candidates must attract support from broad, diffused voter groups, while smaller districts create incentives to run on a candidate-centered plat-

form and provide geographically targeted redistribution (Persson and Tabellini 2003; Lizzeri and Persico 2001).

The political incentives given by the size of electoral districts may—besides cultivating incentives to pursue the personal vote—also affect the use of vote buying strategies during elections. We expect vote buying to be most frequent when district magnitude is equal to one, corresponding to plurality voting in single-member districts. As district magnitude increases, vote buying becomes both increasingly expensive and logistically more cumbersome as candidates will need to attract votes from broader, more diffuse groups. Therefore, as district magnitude increases, vote buying should become less pronounced during election campaigns.

This argument is somewhat similar to the model of Myerson (1993), but for different reasons. Myerson (1993) argues that corruption in general decreases as district magnitude increases because the pool of candidates which voters can choose from increases. Therefore, the likelihood that an “honest” candidate is available for voters increases as district magnitude increases. Our argument, in contrast, does not imply the availability of inherently honest candidates, but simply that the political incentives to pursue personal votes—rather than running on a collective party platform—are weaker in electoral systems with larger district magnitudes.

Ballot structure

Ballot structure concerns the amount of influence the voter has on the order in which a party’s candidates are elected. Ballot structure is related to the electoral formula in the sense that plurality systems simply award a seat to the individual candidate who receives the most votes in an election. Proportional systems use two types of ballot structures: closed lists and open lists. In closed-list systems, the voter does not influence the position of the candidates on the party list. Instead, active members or the party leadership typically decide the order of its candidates (Söderlund 2016; Blumenau et al. 2016). By contrast, in open-list systems, voters choose among candidates, and the order in which candidates take seats is (partly) determined by the personal vote count of individual candidates (Söderlund 2016; Blumenau et al. 2016).

The literature on “the personal vote” emphasizes that the effect of proportional systems on (electoral) corruption and public policy may differ, depending on whether closed- or open-list systems are used (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Persson and Tabellini (2003), Persson et al. (2003), and Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that incentives to perform well are weaker in closed-list systems because voters cannot hold political candidates directly accountable for their performance in office. In contrast, open-list systems possess

some of the qualities of plurality voting systems, since they strengthen accountability links between voters and politicians by enabling voters to vote directly for (or against) individual legislators. By implication, corruption should be more widespread in closed-list systems than in open-list systems.

However, this line of argument runs counter to a different stream of work on the personal vote (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Chang and Golden 2007; Hicken 2007; Chang 2005; Golden 2003; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Carey and Shugart 1995). Much of this literature finds that by giving voters influence over not just how many seats each party wins but also *which* candidates from a given party win seats, open-list systems introduce a measure of intra-party competition among candidates (Söderlund 2016; Blumenau et al. 2016; Hicken and Simmons 2008; Golden 2003). In open-list proportional systems, intra-party competition, therefore, implies that candidates have incentives to campaign on a personal platform to distinguish themselves from rival candidates from their own party (Söderlund 2016; Blumenau et al. 2016). This, in turn, increases incentives to engage in corrupt activities (Blumenau et al. 2016; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005; Golden 2003).

Our argument follows this literature by emphasizing that candidates campaigning under open-list proportional systems face incentives to cultivate their personal vote count by the use of vote buying to a larger extent than candidates campaigning under closed-list systems, where election chances depend on votes for the party rather than for individual candidates. However, in contrast to most literature on the personal vote (Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005), we emphasize that not only intra-party competition (closed- versus open-list proportional systems) but also inter-party competition (plurality versus proportional systems) may have adverse consequences in the form of vote buying if such competition creates incentives for candidates to pursue personal votes. Therefore, proportional systems with open lists, in principle, create incentives to cultivate personal votes that are similar to the incentives generated by plurality systems—except that incentives to pursue personal votes stem from intra-party competition rather than inter-party competition.

The electoral system as a moderator

The outline of the theoretical links between electoral systems and vote buying paves the way for considering not only how electoral systems matter, but also how electoral systems may shape the relationship between poverty and vote buying—and in this way explain why poverty translates into high levels of vote buying in some countries but not in others. We argue that electoral systems not only affect political candidates' incentives to pursue personal votes but also affect which voters are targeted—in particular, whether parties or candidates mainly target vote-buying campaigns at poor

voters. The distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered electoral systems is important because the relationship that individual *candidates* have with voters may differ from the relationship that *parties* have with voters and, thus, affect which voters are targeted under different electoral systems.

To begin with, we start by assuming that vote-seeking parties and candidates aim to mobilize enough votes to sway the outcome of the election in their favor. Vote buying is an electoral strategy that is employed to realize this goal. Therefore, vote buyers—whether they are parties or candidates—want to buy enough votes to tilt the election outcome at the lowest possible cost. Since the marginal utility of income is higher for low-income groups, the same amount of money or material goods will buy more votes among poor voters than among wealthy voters (Stokes et al. 2013). Both parties and candidates will, accordingly, have to start at the bottom of the income distribution, buying the poorest voter's vote first, then the second poorest, and so on, until the party or candidate has bought just enough votes to win the election (Dixit and Londregan, 1996).

However, to target poor voters, parties in party-centered electoral systems must rely on party brokers at the local level who live in the same neighborhoods as the people they wish to target and, therefore, know who is poor (Stokes et al. 2013; Stokes 2005). While brokers frequently interact with voters and gain knowledge about their background and preferences, party leaders or candidates running on party lists are often not involved in sustained face-to-face interactions within a particular district. Instead, the resources of parties are often centralized, and campaigns are run based on a collective party platform (McAllister 2007). Brokers are, therefore, assets to party leaders in party-centered electoral systems because they help cultivate links to voters on the ground.

However, as emphasized by Stokes et al. (2013), the use of brokers also gives rise to agency problems because brokers may have their agenda, which does not always align with the goals of party leaders. Since party leaders cannot monitor the actions of brokers directly, brokers have considerable leeway in terms of deciding which voters to target within each district—and which characteristics of voters they use to mobilize support. This implies that party leaders in party-centered systems may focus more on what districts and areas to target and less on which particular voters to target within those districts. Therefore, in party-centered electoral systems, the party leadership is more inclined to allocate resource to local public goods and pork barrel policies that benefit both poor, middle-income, and wealthy voters within a given district.

In candidate-centered electoral systems with smaller electoral districts, political candidates have incentives to cultivate a closer and more direct relationship with voters. Since candidates' personal vote counts determine whether they are elected to office, campaigning on the ground often

depends on the efforts not just of brokers but also of political candidates themselves. The closer and more direct relationship between candidates and voters is precisely what is supposed to generate higher levels of accountability in candidate-centered electoral systems (Persson and Tabellini 2003; Powell 2000).

However, it may also have two additional implications that matter for whether vote buying is used as an electoral strategy and which voters are targeted with vote buying offers. First, the direct link between voters and candidates implies that candidates can more easily monitor their brokers—at least compared to party leaders—which, in turn, may contribute to reducing the broker costs associated with vote buying (Stokes et al. 2013).

Second, individual candidates do not have the same opportunities or resources as parties to allocate local public goods and pork barrel projects to particular areas as the use of such strategies typically involves collective decisions and costs that are covered by centralized (state) budgets. This makes the use of vote buying a more attractive electoral strategy for candidates seeking to cultivate personal votes because it entails that cash or material benefits are targeted directly at those voters who are likely to be most responsive to material incentives, namely the poor.

These mechanisms contribute to explaining why poverty may have different effects on vote buying under party-centered and candidate-centered electoral systems and how poverty and electoral systems jointly shape how the supply and demand sides of electoral clientelism operate. Poverty creates a set of economically driven incentives to engage in vote selling for voters and thus increases the supply of votes for sale. The electoral system—particularly from the perspective of political candidates—creates a distinct set of political incentives to engage in vote-buying campaigns during elections and thus affects the demand for buying votes. These incentives determine how much a particular candidate stands to gain—politically—from using vote-buying strategies to mobilize electoral support. Because candidates in candidate-centered electoral systems have more direct links to voters than candidates in party-centered electoral systems, we expect vote buying to be more widespread—and more targeted toward the poor—in poor countries that have a candidate-centered electoral system, that is, where the supply of votes for sale corresponds closer to candidate incentives to purchase votes during elections. In contrast, in poor countries with party-centered electoral systems, the supply of votes for sale may still be large, but incentives for political parties to mobilize support using vote-buying strategies are weaker. Accordingly, we arrive at three hypotheses for each dimension of the electoral system, which point to a relationship between poverty and vote buying that is conditional on the nature of the electoral system.

H1. The effect of poverty on vote buying is less pronounced in proportional relative to plurality systems.

H2. The effect of poverty on vote buying weakens as the size of the district magnitude increases.

H3. In proportional electoral systems, the effect of poverty is weaker under closed-list ballot structures relative to open-list ballot structures.

Data and method

To test our hypotheses, we use cross-country data on vote buying from 56 countries in Africa and Latin America.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable—vote buying—measures the country-level frequency of vote buying in 56 countries in Africa and Latin America (see figure 1). We use survey data from the Afrobarometer round 5 (2011/2013) and the LAPOP survey (2010). Both surveys are based on random samples of the adult population within each country. Data from these sources are collected approximately during the same period and contain roughly comparable questions on vote buying. The Afrobarometer and LAPOP surveys contain individual-level data on vote buying. To convert the vote buying data into a country-level variable, we calculate the percentage (0-100) of respondents—within each country—who answered affirmatively to the vote buying questions.

Three issues concerning the measurement of the dependent variable deserve attention. First, the wording in the questions in the Afrobarometer and LAPOP surveys is not entirely similar. In the Afrobarometer survey, vote buying is measured using the following question: “*And during the last national election in [year], how often, if ever did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?*” In the LAPOP survey, vote buying is measured using the following question: “*In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support?*” It is apparent that there are differences in the wording of the two questions: First, the Afrobarometer survey asks the respondents to think of a specific election—the last national election—while the LAPOP survey asks the respondents to think about election campaigns in general. Second, the Afrobarometer question concerns offers “like food or a gift or money,” while LAPOP asks about offers “like a favour, food or any other benefit.” However, both Afrobarometer and

LAPOP focus on “candidates or someone from a political party” offering material benefits to voters “in return” for their votes (or support). Therefore, both questions focus on the central phenomenon we are interested in, that is, political parties’ proffering of material benefits to voters in return for votes during elections. Third, the response categories vary across the Afrobarometer and the LAPOP surveys. In the Afrobarometer, the response categories are “*Never*,” “*Once or twice*,” and “*Often*,” while the LAPOP response categories are “*Never*,” “*Sometimes*,” and “*Often*.” However, these differences are minor and do not inhibit the validity of our vote-buying measure. Nonetheless, to guard against plausible differences in the question wording (and sampling), all regressions include a region dummy variable.

Second, the vote-buying variable cannot distinguish between whether parties use vote bribes to mobilize core supporters—so-called turnout buying (Nichter 2008)—or to target swing or moderately opposed voters to change people’s vote choice (Stokes 2005). However, for our purposes, this distinction does not change our expectation regarding the moderating role of the electoral systems on the relationship between poverty and vote buying. First, incentives to offer voters money in exchange for political support should be stronger when poverty is widespread—both when parties and political candidates aim to mobilize turnout among supporters or when they attempt to sway people’s vote choice. Second, the electoral system should also have similarly conditioning effects on the incentives of parties or political candidates to buy electoral support from swing voters or to buy turnout from unmobilized party loyalists. What is key to our argument is, therefore, whether the electoral system conditions the incentives of political candidates and parties to use pre-electoral vote bribes to mobilize support among the poor—and to a lesser extent whether vote bribes are targeted at supporters or swing voters.

Third, both the Afrobarometer and LAPOP surveys directly ask respondents about their experience with being offered material benefits by political parties in return for votes or support. However, measuring vote buying with direct survey questions gives rise to well-known problems: Because vote buying is illegal and often considered immoral (Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007), respondents may underreport their experience with vote bargains. In other words, the data may suffer from social desirability bias induced by respondents’ unwillingness to admit involvement in vote buying activities (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). However, both the Afrobarometer and LAPOP questions ask respondents if they have been *offered* benefits in return for their vote—not whether they accepted the offers. This puts the “blame” for the vote-buying act on parties rather than voters and should contribute to diminishing tendencies of respondents to underreport encounters with vote buying by parties. Moreover, as emphasized by Stokes et al. (2013, 154), if underreporting is more

or less constant across countries or uncorrelated with key variables—poverty and the electoral system—social desirability bias is less problematic. With these caveats, the data from the Afrobarometer and LAPOP surveys currently offer the best possible source of cross-country data on vote buying.

Explanatory variables: Poverty and electoral system

Since our main focus is on the interaction of poverty and the three dimensions of the electoral system, the regressions include four key explanatory variables, as well as their interactions. To measure poverty, we follow the approach of Sen (1998) and Ross (2006), who argue that infant mortality rates constitute a valid measure of poverty for cross-country comparisons. Sen (1998) and Ross (2006) argue that infant mortality rates serve as a better measure of poverty since infant mortality is more prevalent at the bottom of the income distribution—and, therefore, correlates strongly with poverty—and is easier to measure in a comparable way across countries. Moreover, average levels of income per capita may not be a good measure of poverty because a highly skewed income distribution implies that average income levels may be relatively high even though many people live in poverty. In contrast, infant mortality rates will better capture poverty levels even in cases where the income distribution is very unequal as, for instance, in South Africa. Therefore, we use infant mortality (ln) per 1,000 births as indicator of poverty across countries. Data on infant mortality are from the World Development Indicators.

To measure electoral institutions, we use three explanatory variables capturing the dimensions of the electoral system outlined in the theory: The electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure. First, we use a binary indicator for the electoral formula, which takes the value 1 if elections occur under plurality voting and 0 if elections use proportional (or mixed) formulas. Plurality voting, in this case, is not reserved exclusively for electoral systems with single-member districts and first-past-the-post voting but also accommodates systems where, for example, two legislators are elected by plurality voting in each district. Data are from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems' (IFES) Election Guide.⁵

Second, district magnitude is measured using the mean district magnitude in the lower chamber. District magnitude is the (average) number of political candidates elected for a legislative seat within each constituency. District magnitude assumes the value 1 in single-member districts with plurality voting and increases as the number of legislators per district increases and—for a fixed set of legislators—as the number of districts decreases. In the limit, when an entire country constitutes

⁵ <http://www.electionguide.org/>

one electoral district, district magnitude will be as large as the number of elected legislators in the lower chamber. Larger district magnitudes, therefore, occur more frequently in proportional voting systems and also tend to increase proportionality in the translation of votes to seats (Farrel 2001). Indeed, in our data, average district magnitude is close to 1 in plurality voting systems, while it is 12.9 in proportional (and mixed) voting systems.⁶ However, district magnitude allows for a more fine-grained measure that accommodates differences in the number of elected legislators per electoral district within plurality and proportional systems as well as in mixed-member systems that blend features of plurality and proportional voting systems. To calculate district magnitude, we rely on data from IFES' Election Guide. For each country in our sample, we calculate district magnitude as the (weighted) average of the number of legislators elected per district. By definition, in pure single-member districts, district magnitude is 1. As more legislators are elected per district—or as the number of districts decreases—district magnitude increases. In cases where countries employ a mixed system (e.g., Mexico) or use a two-tier proportional electoral formula (e.g., South Africa), we calculate the weighted average district magnitude, where the weights are determined by the proportion of seats in the lower chamber elected under different electoral formulas (in mixed systems) or in each electoral tier (in proportional systems). To ease interpretation in the interaction models, we have recoded the district magnitude variable (by subtracting 1 from all values on the variable) so the lowest value is zero, corresponding to single-member districts with a district magnitude of 1.

Third, to measure ballot structure, we use a binary variable, where 0 indicates closed (party) lists and 1 indicates open-list systems. This variable is coded only for countries employing a proportional electoral system. Data are from IFES' Election Guide.

Control variables

Since our regressions rely on observational data from a cross section of countries, the evidence we present does not allow us to make strong causal inference but should be interpreted as tests of relationships that may support—or contradict—our hypotheses. With this caveat, including four relevant control variables helps guard against spurious correlations and confounding.

First, we control for system of government using an indicator where 1 denotes a presidential system and 0 indicates a parliamentary system. This is a crucial control variable since many countries in our sample have presidential systems of government with direct elections for the presidency. While our argument focuses on the (moderating) role of the electoral system, elections for president and parliament are often concurrent in presidential systems. To ensure that the electoral system

⁶ Some plurality systems have multi-member districts, which makes the average district magnitude increase above 1.

variables do not simply pick up the effect of presidential elections, we include a control variable distinguishing presidential from parliamentary systems of government. Data are from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al. 2015).

Second, we include a control variable for the level of democracy (in 2010) using the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) developed by Pemstein et al. (2010). The UDS is a composite measure—estimated using a Bayesian latent variable model—based on 10 widely available measures of democracy. This variable helps us gauge the quality of democracy across countries. This is particularly important for cross-national studies of vote buying because political parties should be less likely to mobilize voter support using vote buying when the secret ballot is effectively enforced and voter compliance with commitments to vote as promised is difficult to monitor. While we cannot measure secret ballot enforcement directly, the overall quality of democracy serves as a useful proxy for the extent to which voters can—effectively—cast their vote in the secrecy of the voting booth.

Third, to ensure that we also account for economic inequality—which some studies emphasize as an important driver of electoral clientelism (Robinson and Verdier 2013; Stokes 2007)—we also include the Gini-coefficient for domestic income inequality as a control. Data are from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2016).

Fourth, we control for geographical region (and source of the vote-buying data) using a binary variable where 1 indicates Africa (Afrobarometer) and 0 indicates Latin America (LAPOP). Doing so removes the effect of idiosyncratic regional sources of confounding and implies that the regressions focus on within-region variation in the data. Since our dataset contains only 56 observations, we limit the set of control variables to these four. Summary statistics are available in the appendix A.

Results

To test our hypotheses, table 1 shows results from six regressions with the percentage of the population having experienced vote buying as the dependent variable. In models 1-3, we start by looking at the relationship between poverty and vote buying along with the three electoral institutions variables (and the controls). Poverty has the expected positive relationship with vote buying in all three models, and the coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. This corroborates the well-established finding that poverty tends to breed vote buying (Aidt and Jensen 2016; Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013).

Table 1 Vote buying, poverty, and electoral institutions

<i>Model</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>
Poverty (infant mortality, ln)	5.33** (2.07)	6.13** (2.55)	7.08** (2.05)	6.18* (1.81)	7.36*** (2.96)	6.21* (1.74)
Plurality	3.72 (1.49)			10.04 (0.92)		
District magnitude		-0.07 (-1.34)			0.92* (1.84)	
Open-list ballots			4.77 (1.49)			- (-2.24)
Infant mortality#Plurality				-1.76 (-0.54)		
Infant mortality#District magnitude					-0.27* (-2.00)	
Infant mortality#Open list						20.35** (2.48)
Presidential system	8.75*** (4.07)	7.98*** (3.25)	8.77** (2.62)	9.35*** (3.49)	7.88*** (3.16)	8.48** (2.54)
Democracy	-0.34 (-0.12)	0.18 (0.07)	1.54 (0.35)	-0.40 (-0.14)	0.07 (0.02)	1.74 (0.39)
Inequality	-0.10 (-0.64)	-0.03 (-0.15)	-0.26 (-)	-0.09 (-0.58)	-0.05 (-0.28)	-0.26 (-0.97)
Africa/Afrobarometer	1.25 (0.40)	1.98 (0.63)	2.30 (0.56)	1.02 (0.33)	2.22 (0.69)	3.28 (0.79)
Constant	-11.05 (-1.02)	-15.19 (-1.35)	-11.62 (-)	-14.67 (-1.04)	-18.81 (-1.66)	-8.89 (-0.60)
Observations	56	56	35	56	56	35
R^2	0.37	0.36	0.39	0.38	0.37	0.44

NOTE: The dependent is country-level percentage of population reporting experience with vote buying.

* Significant ($p < 0.01$). ** Significant ($p < 0.05$). *** Significant ($p < 0.001$).

Standard errors are robust with t-statistics in parentheses.

In terms of electoral systems, model 1 includes the binary indicator for the electoral formula: plurality (1) versus proportional (or mixed-member) systems (0). Model 1 shows that although countries with plurality systems on average have a level of vote buying that is around 4 percentage points higher than in proportional or mixed-member systems, the magnitude of the difference is statistically insignificant. Model 2 includes district magnitude, which—in line with theoretical priors—is negative, but also statistically insignificant. In model 3, we confine the sample to countries with proportional electoral systems and distinguish them by whether they use closed or open ballots. Here too, the direction of the coefficient shows that open-list systems generally produce more vote buying, but again, the difference compared to countries with closed-list ballot structures is statistically insignificant.

At face value, these findings suggest that poverty trumps the importance of electoral systems in terms of explaining vote buying across countries. This casts doubt on the role of electoral systems in driving differences in vote buying—and electoral fraud more generally—across countries (Birch 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Hicken 2007). However, while electoral systems may not have a strong direct effect on vote buying, our argument implies that different features of the electoral system contribute to moderate the impact of poverty on vote buying. This is what we test in models 4-6.

Interaction effects

Based on the results in models 1-3, the character of the electoral system appears not to be related to the use of fraudulent vote-seeking strategies among parties and candidates during elections in new democracies. However, these results do not tell us anything about whether electoral systems *condition* the impact of poverty on vote buying. If so, electoral systems should not necessarily affect the level of vote buying directly but, rather, shape the effect of poverty on vote buying. In models 4-6, we test this idea by including multiplicative interaction terms for poverty and the three electoral system variables.

In the interaction models, the coefficients of poverty refer to the effect of poverty when the electoral system variables equal zero, while the coefficients of the interaction terms refer to the marginal effect of poverty when the electoral system variables change by one unit (cf. Brambor et al. 2006). Model 4 tests how the effect of poverty is moderated by differences in electoral formulas—plurality versus proportional/mixed systems. While the coefficient of poverty shows that the relationship between poverty and vote buying remains positive in countries using proportional (or mixed) electoral formulas, the coefficient of the interaction term is small and insignificant and suggests that the impact of poverty does not differ across countries with plurality and proportional (or mixed) electoral systems.

In model 5, we test the moderating effect of district magnitude on the relationship between poverty and vote buying. While the distinction between plurality and proportional/mixed systems is crude, district magnitude accommodates more fine-grained differences between electoral systems, ranging from electoral systems based on single-member district with plurality/majority voting—with district magnitudes of 1—to electoral systems where voters elect a larger number of candidates in each district. Since we have recoded the district magnitude variable such that countries with a district magnitude of 1 assume the value 0 on the variable, the coefficient of poverty refers to the effect of poverty when the district magnitude variable equals zero—that is, in countries using elections with single-member districts. In this case, model 5 shows that the effect of poverty is positive

and highly significant. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term between district magnitude and poverty is significantly negative, suggesting that the positive effect of poverty on vote buying weakens as district magnitude increases.

To illustrate the interaction effect properly, figure 3 shows how the marginal effect of poverty changes as district magnitude increases— showing, in effect, how district magnitude conditions the relationship between poverty and vote buying.

Figure 3 Effect of poverty by district magnitude




Figure 3 shows that, while poverty has a positive and statistically significant effect at low levels of district magnitude, the positive effect tends to diminish as district magnitude increases. Indeed, the effect of poverty becomes statistically insignificant at values of district magnitude just above 10, while it is positive and significant below that level. This supports the hypothesis that electoral systems that rely on small districts tend to reinforce incentives to cultivate personal votes, while the political incentives built into electoral systems with larger district magnitudes erode the impact of poverty on vote buying. Consistent with hypothesis 2, this result suggests that larger district magnitudes tend to weaken the relationship between poverty and vote buying, and electoral systems that weaken political incentives to pursue personal votes during elections contribute to undermine the adverse effect of poverty on vote buying.

Finally, in model 6, we include the interaction between poverty and open-list ballot structure. Since the distinction between closed and open ballot lists is mainly relevant in proportional electoral

systems, we confine the sample to those countries—which reduces the number of countries to 35. The coefficient for poverty shows the impact of poverty in countries with closed-list ballot structures. While poverty increases vote buying under closed-list systems, the interaction term shows that the impact of poverty increases a lot under open-list systems. This effect is clearly illustrated in figure 4, which shows the marginal effect of poverty under closed and open-list systems.

Figure 4 Effect of poverty by ballot structure




Figure 4 illustrates that poverty has a much larger and more significant effect on vote buying in countries that employ an open-list ballot during elections, which is consistent with hypothesis 3. This means that within the group of proportional electoral systems, the effects of poverty on vote buying depend on whether the ballot structure that forms part of the electoral system is candidate-centered or party-centered and, therefore, creates incentives to cultivate personal votes through the use of illicit electoral strategies such as vote buying. While these results do not support the findings of the literature arguing that open-list ballot structures directly increase vote buying (Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005), the findings do suggest that the ballot structure conditions the effect of poverty on vote buying, and that the adverse effects of poverty are much stronger in countries using open-list ballots.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have developed a theoretical argument—supported by empirical evidence—highlighting that vote buying is not always an attractive electoral strategy even if poverty is widespread. Rather, our argument and empirical analysis suggest that the extent to which poverty translates into high levels of vote buying and electoral clientelism is conditioned by the nature of the electoral system. In relation to the existing wisdom, these findings provide new insights into the relationship between poverty, electoral systems, and vote buying.

While much of the existing literature looks at the separate effect of poverty and electoral systems on vote buying, we argue that the impact of poverty depends on the nature of the electoral system. Moreover, much of the literature argues that incentives to use electoral fraud and cultivate personal votes through the use of vote buying is, to a large extent, caused by the electoral system (Birch 2007; Hicken 2007; Chang and Golden 2007; Chang 2005). In contrast, our results suggest that while poverty is the key driver of vote buying, electoral systems, in themselves, have a relatively weak effect on vote buying. However, this does not mean that electoral systems do not matter for vote buying. Although our empirical analysis relies on simple, cross-country regressions—and, therefore, has clear and well-known limitations for causal inference—our results point toward some interesting patterns.

Indeed, the findings in this paper suggest that electoral systems—particularly district magnitude and ballot structure—shape the impact of poverty on vote buying. This implies that the key role of electoral systems is to moderate the degree to which poverty creates fertile grounds for pursuing personal votes through the use of vote buying. Even when poverty is pervasive, larger electoral districts and closed-list ballot structures may contribute to discouraging political candidates from engaging in vote buying because the incentives to cultivate personal votes are low—even though the poverty-induced supply of votes for sale is potentially large. These findings contribute to explaining why some countries—like South Africa and Lesotho—have comparatively low levels of vote buying during national elections even though poverty is widespread. Furthermore, the results imply that institutional engineering that serves to establish electoral institutions that are less candidate-centered and provide weaker incentives to pursue personal votes may contribute to eroding the adverse effects of poverty on vote buying.

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Supplemental appendix

Appendix A. Summary statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Vote buying	56	12.64	9.72	0.60	41.40
Infant mortality (ln)	56	3.50	0.68	2.03	4.67
Plurality	56	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
District magnitude	56	7.42	16.40	0.00	110.11
Open-list ballots	35	0.23	0.43	0.00	1.00
Presidential system	56	0.88	0.33	0.00	1.00
Democracy	56	0.25	0.57	-1.02	1.56
Inequality	56	48.24	6.97	37.04	68.01
Africa/Afrobarometer	56	0.61	0.49	0.00	1.00

Appendix A

Random Walk Method

The random walk method is implemented in this study by selecting six households from each of the drawn EAs. The households were selected from a “random starting point” to ensure a satisfying coverage of the area (EA). In each of the selected EAs, the interviewer systematically chooses six households by following “the random walk pattern” and a skip interval of 10 households. Every interview was conducted in a different direction, from the “random starting point” within each EA (Citizen Surveys, 2015). From the starting point, four different directions are chosen to begin the walk pattern. These directions are typically North, South, East, and West (Citizen Surveys, 2015).

Household selection procedure

- Start your walk pattern from the starting point indicated on the EA map. Imagine your starting point as a crossroad or as the cardinal points on a compass (north, south, east and west). The reason for conducting each interview in a different direction of the starting point is so that we can cover a broader area of the EA and give more households a chance of being included in the study.
- For your 1st interview, walk in a northerly direction from the starting point. Count 10 houses from the starting point and conduct your interview at the 10th house. If your call is unsuccessful, use the table below to record your progress. Continue walking and going to every 10th house until you have a successful interview.
- For your 2nd interview, go back to your starting point and walk in the direct opposite direction (i.e., south) Count 10 houses from the starting point and conduct your interview at the 10th house. If your call is unsuccessful, use the table below to record your progress. Continue walking and going to every 10th house until you have a successful interview.
- For your 3rd interview, you will go in an easterly direction, and for your 4th interview, you will go into a westerly direction, following the same procedure where you count 10 houses until you have a successful interview.
- If you have two more interviews to complete in the EA, the remaining interviews can be completed in any direction where there is a dense concentration of households as long as you follow the same procedure of counting 10 houses from where the last interview was conducted.

Appendix B

The Kish Grid

The interviewer creates a list of all the people in the household who are eligible to participate in the survey ranked from youngest to oldest. Every questionnaire has a unique number, so the interviewer uses the grid to select the specific respondent based on the last digit in the questionnaire number and the number of eligible people in the household. Thus, in the case of questionnaire No. 1054 in a household where there are four eligible people, the second listed person is interviewed, that is, the second youngest person. If the respondent is not home or not available, two subsequent phone calls are made before the respondent is substituted (Citizen Surveys 2015). If the respondent refuses to participate in the interview, the interviewer cannot interview another person in the same household but should instead continue the walk pattern until the next household on the route where a new respondent can be selected (Citizen Surveys 2015).

[Look up the final digit of the questionnaire number in the row and the number of eligible people in the household in the column. The number in the cell where the column and row meet is the person to interview]										
<i>Last digit in questionnaire</i>	<i>Eligible people in the household</i>									
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10 or more</i>
0	1	1	1	2	4	4	3	5	6	8
1	1	2	2	3	5	5	4	6	7	9
2	1	1	3	4	1	6	5	7	8	10
3	1	2	1	1	2	1	6	8	9	1
4	1	1	2	2	3	2	7	1	1	2
5	1	2	3	3	4	3	1	2	2	3
6	1	1	1	4	5	4	2	3	3	4
7	1	2	2	1	1	5	3	4	4	5
8	1	1	3	2	2	6	4	5	5	6
9	1	2	1	3	3	1	5	6	6	7

Appendix C

Pilot test reports

The first pilot test report is from the South Africa 2016 survey (round 1) and the second pilot test report is from the South Africa 2017 survey (round 2).

Pilot Report for:
SA Municipal Survey 2016



PO Box 16529 Vlaeberg 8018

1st Floor de Waal House

172 Victoria Road

Woodstock 7925

Cape Town South Africa

10 February 2016

Overall Impression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The interview was too long – Respondents tended to impatient and lose concentration about half way through the interview.
Profile of respondents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respondent 1: Black, Male, 31 years of age. Respondent 2: Coloured, Male, 36 years of age. Respondent 3: Coloured, Male, 35 years of age. Respondent 4: Coloured, Female, 31 years of age. Respondent 5: Coloured, Male, 45 years of age.
Length	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Respondent 1 took 90 minutes to complete the interview. Respondent 2 took 80 minutes to complete the interview. Respondent 3 took 70 minutes to complete the interview. Respondent 4 took 52 minutes to complete the interview. Respondent 5 took 47 minutes to complete the interview.

Item	Page	Comments
A. LANGUAGE AND LIFE SATISFACTION		
Q1	4	• Ok
Q2	4	• Ok
B. ECONOMY AND POVERTY		
Q3	5	• Ok
Q4	5	• Ok
Q5	5	• Ok
C. REDISTRIBUTION AND MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS		
Q6	6	<p>Issue: Two of the respondents had difficulty understanding the term "measures".</p> <p>Original question: Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels." Do you:</p>

Item	Page	Comments
		<p>Potential Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should find ways to reduce difference in income levels." Do you:
Q7	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue: Respondents was taking longer to answer. <p>Potential Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use a Showcard as it will be easier for the respondent to identify these questions. • Consider whether the scale should have "much less than now" on the left side and "much more than now" on the right side to reduce the risk of the interviewer selecting the wrong answer.
Q8	7	<p>Issue: Two respondents felt the question wording was too long. The question had to be repeated a number of times. One of the respondents got bored as the question was too long.</p> <p>Original Question: Across South Africa, municipal elections were recently held, you know, elections for your local government. I would like you to think back and tell me a few things about the election in your municipality. At the time of the election, what would you say were the most important problems facing your LOCAL MUNICIPALITY?</p> <p>Potential Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing 1: Municipal elections were recently held across South Africa. Thinking back, tell me what were the most important problems facing your LOCAL MUNICIPALITY at the time of the election? • Alternative phrasing 2: Municipal elections were recently held across South Africa. I would like you to think back and tell me what were the most important problems facing your LOCAL MUNICIPALITY at the time of the election?
D. PARTISANSHIP AND INCLUSIVENESS		
Q9	8	<p>Issue: This question had to be repeated a number of times to two of the respondents. One respondent observed that he felt more <i>loyal</i> than <i>close</i> to a particular party.</p> <p>• Original Question: Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party?</p> <p>Potential Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing 1: Many people feel loyal to a particular political party, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you think of yourself as loyal to a particular party? • Alternative phrasing 2: Many people feel loyal to a particular political party, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Are you loyal to a particular party?
Q10	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
Q11	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
E. REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT		

Item	Page	Comments
Q12	9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
Q13	9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
LIST EXPERIMENT 1		
Q14A	9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
Q14B	9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue: Respondents had a problem with the last two sentences as it confused them. • Original Question: As mentioned, there are several reasons not to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please DO NOT tell me which of the following have influenced your decision NOT to vote. Please just tell me HOW MANY of the following have influenced your decision NOT to vote in the municipal elections. <p>Potential Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing 1: As mentioned, there are several reasons not to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please tell me HOW MANY of the following have influenced your decision NOT to vote in the municipal elections. • Alternative phrasing 2: As mentioned, there are several reasons not to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please tell me HOW MANY of the following have influenced your decision NOT to vote in the municipal elections. Just tell me the number; don't tell me the actual reasons.
LIST EXPERIMENT 2		
Q15A	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
Q15B	10	<p>Issue: Respondent had difficulty answering this question as the last two sentences confused them.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original Question: There are several reasons to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please DO NOT tell me which of the following have influenced your decision to vote. Please just tell me HOW MANY of the following have influenced your decision to vote in the municipal elections. <p>Potential Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing 1: There are several reasons influencing us to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please tell me HOW MANY of the following items have influenced your decision to vote in the municipal elections. • Alternative phrasing 2: There are several reasons to vote. I'm going to show you a list of some of the reasons people have told us. Please tell me HOW MANY of the following items have influenced your decision to vote in the municipal elections. Just tell me the number; don't tell me the actual reasons.
F. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS		
Q16	11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider whether the scale should have "strongly disagree" on the left side and "strongly agree" on the right side to reduce the risk of the interviewer selecting the wrong answer.

Item	Page	Comments
Q17	11	<p>Issue: Respondents had difficulty answering this question as they did not understand the meaning of “secret ballot”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original question: How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country? <p>Potential Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though votes are meant to be kept secret in South Africa?
Q18	11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
Q19	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider whether the scale should have “strongly disagree” on the left side and “strongly agree” on the right side to reduce the risk of the interviewer selecting the wrong answer.
Q20	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok
LIST EXPERIMENT 3		
Q21A	13	<p>Issues: One of the respondents got confused with the words “activities” and “parties” in the current wording of the question.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original question: During the electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens to vote for them in different ways. Now I will read you some ways activities candidate and party workers have told us. Please tell me which of the following parties have used during the municipal election campaign to obtain YOUR vote. You can choose more than one option. <p>Potential Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: During the electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers use different methods to convince citizens to vote for them. Now I will read you some of the methods that candidates and party workers have told us. Please tell me which of these methods were used during the municipal election campaign to obtain YOUR vote. You can choose more than one method.
Q21B	13	<p>Issues: Respondents tended to get impatient with this question and ask for it to be repeated. One of the respondent felt this question was too long which confused him. Another respondent felt the last three sentences confused her.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original Question: During the electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens to vote for them in different ways. Now I will read you some ways activities candidate and party workers have told us. Please DO NOT tell me which of the following parties have used during the municipal election campaign to obtain YOUR vote. Just tell me HOW MANY of the following parties have used to obtain YOUR vote. <p>Potential Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: During the electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers use different methods to convince citizens to vote for them. Now I will read you some of the methods that candidates and party workers have told us. Please tell me HOW MANY of these methods were used during the municipal election campaign to obtain YOUR vote. Just tell me the number; don’t tell me the actual reasons.
Q22A	14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ok

Item	Page	Comments
Q22B	14	Issue: Some respondents felt this question did not flow naturally from Q22A Potential Solution: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider asking "From which political parties were they from?"
Q23A	14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q23B	15	Issue: Some respondents felt this question did not flow naturally from Q22A Potential Solution: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider asking "From which political parties were they from?"
G. CLIENTELISM AND POLITICIANS - CITIZEN LINKAGES		
Q24	16	Issues: One respondent did not consider anyone to be an important political figure in their municipality. This is also not an open-ended question. Potential Solutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider adding in an option for "none". Add in "single mention only" in the interviewer instruction, and remove the phrase "open-ended".
Q25	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> If we include "none" option in Q24 then there should be a skip routing on this question.
Q26	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q27	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q28	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q29	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
H. PARTY CHOICE		
Q30A	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q30B	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q31A	19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q31B	20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q31C	20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
LIST EXPERIMENT 4		
Q32A	21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ok
Q32B	21	Issue: The last three sentences tended to confuse respondents <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Original question: People decide who to vote for based on a lot of different reasons. Now I will read you some of the reasons that people have given us: Please DO NOT tell me which of the following reasons influenced your deci-

Item	Page	Comments
		<p>sion. Just tell me HOW MANY of the following have influenced your decision to vote for the party that you voted for</p> <p>Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: People decide who to vote for based on different reasons. I will read you some of the reasons that people have given us. Please tell me HOW MANY of the following statements have influenced your decision to vote for your chosen party. Just tell me the number; don't tell me the actual reasons.
I. RECIPROCITY, TIME DISCOUNTING, RISK AVERSION AND SOCIAL TRUST		
Q33	22	• Ok
Q34	22	• Ok
Q35	22	• Ok
Q36	22	• Ok
Q37	23	• Ok
Q38	23	• Ok
Q39	23	• Ok
J. INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND POLITICAL SELECTION		
Q40	24	• Ok
Q41	24	• Ok
Q42A	24	• Ok
Q42B	24	• Ok
Q42C	24	• Ok
Q42D	24	<p>Issue: Respondent did not understand what "evades paying taxes" means.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original question: If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for: A strong leader, who evades paying taxes <p>Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for: A strong leader, who does not pay his/her taxes.
Q42E	25	• Ok
K. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION		

Item	Page	Comments
Q43	25	• Ok
Q44	25	• Ok
L. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION		
Q45	25	<p>Issue: Respondent did not understand the wording “for each tell these.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original Question: Now I will read to you a list of actions people sometimes take as citizens. For each tell these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 12 months? Have you... <p>Potential Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: Now I will read you a list of actions people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done this during the past 12 months? Have you...
M. VOTE BUYING AND CORRUPTION		
Q46	26	• Ok
Q47	26	• Ok
Q48A	27	• Ok
Q48B	27	• Ok
Q48C	27	• Ok
Q49A	28	• Ok
Q49B	28	• Ok
Q50	28	• Ok
Q51	28	• Ok
Q52	28	• Ok
STANDARD SURVEY EXPERIMENT		
Q53A	28	• Ok
Q53B	28	• Ok
Q53C	29	• Ok
Q54A	29	• Ok

Item	Page	Comments
Q54B	29	• Ok
Q54C	29	• Ok
Q54D	29	• Ok
Q54E	29	• Ok
Q55A	29	• Ok
Q55B	29	• Ok
Q55C	29	• Ok
Q55D	29	• Ok
Q55E	29	• Ok
Q55F	29	• Ok
Q55G	29	• Ok
Q55H	29	• Ok
N. INFORMATION		
Q56	30	• Ok
Q57	30	• Ok
Q58	30	• Ok
Q59	30	• Ok
Q60	30	• Ok
Q61	30	• Ok
O. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND		
Q62	31	• Ok
Q63	31	• Ok
Q64	31	• Ok

Item	Page	Comments
Q65	31	• Ok
Q66	32	• Ok
Q67	32	• Ok
Q68	32	• Ok
Q69	33	<p>Issue: A respondent did not understand which letter corresponds to the income group.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original question: Please tell me into which group your TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME falls. By TOTAL monthly household income, I mean the total of all the incomes earned by all the wage-earners living in your household, before deductions. You need only tell me the letter corresponding to the income group into which you fall. <p>Solution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: Please tell me into which group your TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME falls. By TOTAL monthly household income, I mean the total of all the incomes earned by all the wage-earners living in your household, before deductions. You need only tell me the code corresponding to the income group into which you fall.
Q70	33	• Ok
Q71	33	<p>Issue: One respondent did understand "let us suppose". There is no interviewer instruction to say whether the question is multiple or single mentioned.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original Question: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a _____[R's ETHNIC GROUP]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? <p>Solutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative phrasing: If you had to choose between being a South African and being a _____[R's ETHNIC GROUP]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings? • Add in "single mention" in the interviewer instruction.
Q72	34	• Ok
P. VOTE INTENTION		
Q73	35	• Ok
Q. INTERVIEWER COMPLETED QUESTIONS		
Q74	36	• Ok
Q75	36	• Ok
Q76	36	• Ok

Item	Page	Comments
Q77	36	• Ok
Q78	36	• Replace “Where” to “Were”
Q79A	37	• Ok
Q79B	37	• Ok
Q79C	37	• Ok
Q79D	37	• Ok
Q79E	37	• Ok
Q80	37	• Ok
Q81	37	• Ok
Q82	37	• Ok
Q83	37	• Ok
Q84	37	• Ok
Q85	37	• Ok
SA MUNICIPAL SURVEY – CONSENT FORM		
Q1	38	• Ok
Q2	38	• Ok

**Pilot Report for:
SA Poverty Survey 2017**



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Woodstock 7925

Cape Town South Africa

5 June 2017

Item	Comments
Overall Impression / challenges of the questionnaire	<p>Overall, the questionnaire has a good flow. On average the questionnaire took 49 minutes to complete.</p> <p>Factors that contributed to the length were respondents asking for the questions to be repeated and having to re-read questions especially those with two or more statements, and having to explain questions.</p>
Length of interview	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview 1: 55 Min • Interview 2: 41 Min • Interview 3: 56 Min • Interview 4: 43 Min • Interview 4: 51 Min • Average length of Interview: 49 Min
SECTION A: LANGUAGE	
Q1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have added Tsonga to the list as it is one of the official languages in SA.
SECTION B: LIVED POVERTY INDEX	
Q2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OK
Q3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OK
SECTION C: COMPARE YOUR LIVING CONDITIONS	
Q4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OK
Q5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OK
Q6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OK

Item	Comments
SECTION D: PARTISANSHIP	
Q7	• OK
Q8	• OK
Q9	• OK
Q10	• OK
SECTION E: ROLE OF PARTIES IN YOUR LOCAL AREA	
Q11	• OK
Q12	• OK
Q13	• OK
Q14	• Ok
SECTION F: SURVEY EXPERIMENT 1	
Q15A- D	• OK
SECTION G: MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS	
Q16	• OK
SECTION H: LIST EXPERIMENT 1	
Q17A, B, C	• OK
SECTION I: SURVEY EXPERIMENT 2: INEQUALITY	
Q18A	• OK
Q18B	• OK
SECTION J : SURVEY EXPERIMENT 3: POVERTY	
Q19A	• OK
Q19B	• OK
SECTION K: TAXATION	
Q20	• OK
Q21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 respondents ask for the question to be repeated. We found that they had an in issue understanding what is meant by the term "Raised". When we used "Increased" and "Decreased" the respondents understood the question. • Consider replacing "Raised" and "lowered" with "Increased" and "decreased"
Q22	• OK
SECTION L: REDISTRIBUTION	
Q23	• OK
Q24	• OK
Q25	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q26	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q27	• OK

Item	Comments
Q28	• OK
F. LIST EXPERIMENT 2	
Q29A	• OK
Q29B	• OK
Q29C	• OK
SECTION N: VOTE CHOICE	
Q30	• OK
Q31	• OK
Section O: SURVEY EXPERIMENT 4: WEALTHY CANDIDATES	
Q32A	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q32B	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q32C	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q32D	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Q32E	• Consider including a "Don't Know (Do Not Read)" option
Section P: GROUP VOTING	
Q33 - 36	• OK
Section Q: ELECTIONS	
Q37	• OK
Q38	• OK
Q39	• OK
Q40	• OK
Q41	• OK
Q42	• OK
SECTION R: SURVEY EXPERIMENT 5: CORRUPTION	
Q43A	• OK
Q43B	• OK
Q43C	• OK
Q43D	• OK
Q43E	• OK
S. CLIENTELISM	
Q44	• OK
Q45	• OK
Q46	• OK
Q47	• OK
Q48	• OK
Q49	• OK

Item	Comments
Q50	• OK
Q51	• OK
Q52	• OK
Q53	• OK
Q54	• OK
Q55	• OK
Q56	• OK
SECTION T: VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT	
Q57A - C	• OK
SECTION U: RISK AVERSION	
Q58	• OK
Q59	• OK
Q60	• OK
SECTION V: TIME DISCOUNTING	
Q61	• OK
Q62	• OK
Q63	• OK
Q64	• OK
SECTION W: SOCIAL NORMS	
Q65	• OK
Q66	• OK
Q67	• OK
Q68	• OK
SECTION X: TRUST	
Q69	• OK
Q70	• OK
SECTION Y: DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION	
Q71	• OK
Q72	• OK
Q73	• OK
Q74A-E	• OK
SECTION Z: KNOWLEDGE	
Q75	• OK
Q76	• OK
Q77	• OK
Q78	• OK
Section AA: SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND	
Q79	• OK

Item	Comments																		
Q80	• OK																		
Q81	• OK																		
Q82	• OK																		
Q82A	• OK																		
Q83	• OK																		
Q84	• OK																		
Q85	• OK																		
Q86	• OK																		
Q87	• OK																		
Q88	• OK																		
Q89	• OK – We used our standard LSM																		
SECTION CC: PARENTS SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND																			
Q91	• OK																		
Q92	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The original scale use here i.e Rich, Middle income, Poor needs to be expanded. For example some people were neither poor nor middle class. They managed to get by with a little to spare, but they were not middle class either. We suggest using the table from Q5 which has more granularity. New scale options: <table border="1"> <tr><td>Very rich</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>Rich</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Just above middle income</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Middle income</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Just below middle income</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>Poor</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Very poor</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]</td><td>98</td></tr> </table> 	Very rich	1	Rich	2	Just above middle income	3	Middle income	4	Just below middle income	5	Poor	6	Very poor	7	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98		
Very rich	1																		
Rich	2																		
Just above middle income	3																		
Middle income	4																		
Just below middle income	5																		
Poor	6																		
Very poor	7																		
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98																		
Q93	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q79 table was used to replace the previous table that only had the options i.e No schooling, Primary school, Secondary/high school, college/ University New scale options: <table border="1"> <tr><td>No schooling</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>Primary school incomplete</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>Primary school complete</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Secondary/ high school incomplete</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed Matric</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed university degree</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Post-graduate degree</td><td>8</td></tr> </table> 	No schooling	0	Primary school incomplete	1	Primary school complete	2	Secondary/ high school incomplete	3	Completed Matric	4	Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5	Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6	Completed university degree	7	Post-graduate degree	8
No schooling	0																		
Primary school incomplete	1																		
Primary school complete	2																		
Secondary/ high school incomplete	3																		
Completed Matric	4																		
Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5																		
Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6																		
Completed university degree	7																		
Post-graduate degree	8																		

Item	Comments																				
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Other (Specify): _____</td><td>9</td></tr> </table>	Other (Specify): _____	9																		
Other (Specify): _____	9																				
Q94	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Please consider moving Q96 to Q94 so that we deal with education of each parent before we move onto the race of each parent. In this way we use one card for Q93 and 94 and one card for Q95 and 96. 																				
Q95	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Q79 table was used to replace the previous table that only had the options i.e No schooling, Primary school, Secondary/high school, college/ University New scale options: <table border="1"> <tr><td>No schooling</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>Primary school incomplete</td><td>1</td></tr> <tr><td>Primary school complete</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>Secondary/ high school incomplete</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed Matric</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying</td><td>5</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school</td><td>6</td></tr> <tr><td>Completed university degree</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Post-graduate degree</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Other (Specify): _____</td><td>9</td></tr> </table> 	No schooling	0	Primary school incomplete	1	Primary school complete	2	Secondary/ high school incomplete	3	Completed Matric	4	Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5	Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6	Completed university degree	7	Post-graduate degree	8	Other (Specify): _____	9
No schooling	0																				
Primary school incomplete	1																				
Primary school complete	2																				
Secondary/ high school incomplete	3																				
Completed Matric	4																				
Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5																				
Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6																				
Completed university degree	7																				
Post-graduate degree	8																				
Other (Specify): _____	9																				
SECTION DD: VOTE INTENTION																					
Q97	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OK 																				

Appendix D

Survey Questionnaires

The first survey questionnaire is from the South Africa 2016 survey (round 1) and the second survey questionnaire is from the South Africa 2017 survey (round 2).

SA Municipal Survey Final 27 July 2016



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Woodstock, Cape Town 7925
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Email: info@citizensurveys.com



FIELD MANAGER	Automatically capture in background	
INTERVIEWER NAME and SURNAME:	Automatically capture in background	
PROVINCE:	Automatically capture in background	
EA NAME:	Automatically capture in background	
EA NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY:	Automatically capture in background	
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY:	Automatically capture in background	
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
DOMINANT POPULATION:	Automatically capture in background	
DOMINANT POPULATION CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOTYPE_OLD:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOCODE_OLD:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOTYPE_NEW:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOCODE_NEW:	Automatically capture in background	
MET_UR DESCRIPTION:	Automatically capture in background	
MET_UR CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
URB_RUR DESCRIPTION:	Automatically capture in background	
URB_RUR CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
TOTAL_HH15 WEIGHT	Automatically capture in background	
RESPONDENT QID:	Automatically capture in background	
GPS Co-ordinates:	Latitude	Longitude
	Automatically capture in background	Automatically capture in background

SCRIPTER: Insert on seperate screen.

WALK PATTERN

Procedure for selecting households in an EA:

Interviewers must start the walk pattern from the starting point indicated on the EA map. Imagine the starting point as a cross-road or as the cardinal points on a compass (North, South, East and West). The reason for conducting each interview in a different direction of the starting point is so that we can cover a broader area of the EA and give more households a chance of being included in the study.

1. **For the 1st Questionnaire in an EA** walk in a northerly direction from the starting point. Count 10 houses from the starting point and visit the 10th house.
2. **For the 2nd Questionnaire in an EA** go back to the starting point and walk in the direct opposite direction (i.e. South) Count 10 houses from the starting point and conduct your interview at the 10th house.
3. **For the 3rd Questionnaire in an EA** we walk in an Easterly direction
4. **For the 4th Questionnaire in an EA** we walk in a westerly direction.
5. **If you have two more questionnaires to complete in the EA**, the remaining interviews can be completed in any direction where there is a dense concentration of households as long as you follow the procedure of going to every 10th house.

SCRIPTER: Insert on seperate screen.

SCRIPTER: Please customise BOLD text in red, which reads “I’m at my {0} (1.....10th) household”.

VISIT_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the Visit number (i.e. begin at 1, and each subsequent iteration of this loop with the same SubjectID / QID increments this value by 1).	
TIMESTAMP_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the Timestamp (i.e. DATE + TIME as one record, in the format DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM:SS, and the time component in 24-hour format).	
GPS_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the tablet's GPS co-ordinates. (Lock location)	
S1_X	<p>INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Is the household inaccessible or ineligible for an interview?</p> <p>By ‘inaccessible’ households, we are broadly referring to homes, blocks of flats, gated communities, and streets that you cannot enter because of security measures, concerns about safety in entering the home, violence, gang warfare in the area, or protests taking place.</p> <p>By ‘ineligible’ households, we are broadly referring to vacant plots, houses that are under construction, are derelict or demolished, seasonal / holiday homes, business premises (including hostels, hotels, and B&Bs), offices, and institutions / places where people do not live (schools, hospitals, clinics, libraries, etc.).</p>	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: S2_X)
No	2	(ROUTE TO: S3_X)
S2_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Why is the household ineligible or inaccessible for an interview?	
Not yet built / under construction	01	<p>SCRIPTER: Show instruction: “Click NEXT and continue with walk pattern using a skip interval of 10 houses” ROUTING: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.</p>
Demolished / derelict	02	
Vacant housing unit / vacant land	03	
Business, government office, other organization	04	
Institution (school, hospital, army barracks, etc.)	05	
Seasonal / Vacation / Temporary residence / holiday home	06	
Unable to enter building / reach housing unit/gated street	07	
Concerns about safety in entering the house (dogs, shebeen, drugs)	08	
Inaccessible because of violence and gang warfare in the area	09	
Inaccessible because of protests taking place in area	10	
Other reasons (specify)	16	

S3_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact with someone in the household?	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: "Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY "

SCRIPTER: APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY

SCRIPTER: If the Geotype is "Metro", show S4_X, then S5_X; if it is NOT "Metro", show S6_X.
Make call back either in 3 hours' time on same day, or call back in early evening or on a different day or over a weekend.
Make 2 call backs in a Metro EA
Make one call back in an Urban or Rural EA.

e.g. Monday 2016/08/01 15:00

After appointment made, "Click Options, Stop, Yes (to save).
When you resume this questionnaire, "Click next"

S4_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact on your first recall? METRO EA	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY

SCRIPTER: APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY

SCRIPTER: If the Geotype is "Metro", show S4_X, then S5_X; if it is NOT "Metro", show S6_X.
Make call back either in 3 hours' time on same day, or call back in early evening or on a different day or over a weekend.
Make 2 call backs in a metro area

e.g. Monday 2016/08/01 18:00

After appointment made, "Click Options, Stop, Yes (to save).
When you resume this questionnaire, "Click next"

S5_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact on your second recall? METRO EA	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: Click NEXT and continue with walk pattern. ROUTING: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.

SCRIPTER: If the Geotype is NOT "Metro", show S6.

S6_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact on your first recall? Urban or Rural EA	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: Click NEXT and continue with walk pattern. ROUTING: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.

SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR INTRODUCTION 1

INTRODUCTION 1	<p>Hello, my name is.... and I work for Citizen Surveys, a marketing research organisation. We are conducting a survey amongst South Africans aged 18 years and older. We want to talk about how things are going in South Africa and in your local municipality in order to strengthen the quality of local democracy and give citizens a greater voice in local government.</p> <p>The interview will take about 45 minutes to complete and all information will be treated in the strictest confidence, only to be used for research purposes.</p> <p>Your name and contact details will not be shared with anyone and will only be used to confirm that the interview took place.</p>
-----------------------	---

S7_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Has the household agreed to provide household information to start the selection process?	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: S10A_X)
No	2	(ROUTE TO: S8_X)
S8_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the initial contact person refusing to participate in the interview?	
Initial contact person / Household refused to be interviewed		1
Initial contact person is deaf / mute		2
Initial contact person has a mental disability		3
Initial contact person is drunk / drugged		4
Initial contact person doesn't speak any of the official languages		5
Household not South African citizens – spoke a foreign language		6
Initial contact person is a child		7
Other reason (specify)		9
SCRIPTER: if S7_X (2). ROUTING: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.		
SCRIPTER: if S7_X (1). CONTINUE		
SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR QUEST A		
Quest A	INTERVIEWER READ OUT: "Please tell me how many people live in this household in total? That is, all household members of any age, including babies, who live in the household for more than 15 days per month".	
S10A_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Total number of people who live in the household for more than 15 days per month?	
SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR QUEST B		
Quest B	INTERVIEWER READ OUT: "This survey that I am about to administer is open to all adults in South Africa. However, it would be too costly and time-consuming to interview everyone, therefore we must randomly select an adult member of this household to interview.. For this purpose, please can you tell me how many people who live in this household are 18 years and older ". Please include all household members aged 18 years and older who live in the household for more than 15 days per month, even if they are not here right now.	
S10B_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Number of people aged 18 years and older who live in this household, even if they are not here right now?	
KISH	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Please ensure that you include all household members aged 18 years and older who live in the household for more than 15 days per month, even if they may not be there when you visit Can you please give me the name, surname, gender, and age of all the people aged 18 years and older who live in this household?	
Scripter add instruction: PLEASE RECORD NAME AND SURNAME OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS		
NAME AND SURNAME OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBER		Gender 1 = Male, 2 = Female
		Age

S11_X	Can I please talk to [PIPE IN NAME and Surname OF SELECTED RESPONDENT]?	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 3)
No	2	(ROUTE TO: S12_X)
S12_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the selected respondent being unavailable for the interview?	
Selected respondent not home but will return later	1	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: "Click NEXT and make an appointment for when the respondent will return." Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY SCRIPTER: Return to the household when it is the time of the appointment."
Selected respondent is busy/unavailable but has agreed that you can return to do the interview	2	
Selected person away for survey period	3	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: "Click NEXT and continue with walk pattern using a skip interval of 10 houses" ROUTE TO: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.
Selected person at home but ill during survey period	4	
Selected person is physically disabled (deaf/mute)	5	
Selected person is mentally disabled/unstable	6	
Selected person is drunk or drugged	7	
Completed 2 recalls in Metro EA	8	
Completed 1 recall in Urban or Rural EA	9	
Other reason (specify)	10	
SCRIPTER: if S12_X (1 or 2) then go to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY		
e.g. Tuesday 2016/07/30 9:00		
After appointment made, "Click Options, Stop, Yes (to save). When you resume this questionnaire, "Click next" SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR INTRODUCTION 3		
INTRODUCTION 3	Hello, my name is.... and I work for Citizen Surveys, a marketing research organisation. We are conducting a survey amongst South Africans aged 18 years and older. We want to talk about how things are going in South Africa and in your local municipality in order to strengthen the quality of local democracy and give citizens a greater voice in local government. The interview will take about 45 minutes to complete and all information will be treated in the strictest confidence, only to be used for research purposes. Your name and contact details will not be shared with anyone and will only be used to confirm that the interview took place.	
S13_X	INTERVIEWER READ OUT: Do you agree to participate in the interview?	
Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: S15_X)
No	2	(ROUTE TO: S14_X)
S14_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the selected respondent being unwilling to participate in the interview?	
Selected respondent refused to participate in the interview	1	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: "Click NEXT and continue with walk pattern using a skip interval of 10 houses" ROUTE TO: WALK PATTERN, (i.e. starting from the beginning) with an incremented index number.
Selected respondent is busy/unavailable	2	
Selected person at home but ill during survey period	3	
Selected person is physically or mentally unstable	4	
Selected person is drunk or drugged	5	
Selected person doesn't speak any of the official languages	6	
Selected respondent is not home after recall	7	
Other reason (specify)	9	

S17_X		INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Details of the selected respondent..... (Pipe in Name and Surname from Kish)									
Respondent address: (Interviewer please provide full details of the number of the homestead and street name. If informal settlement, then record the shack number and description of the surroundings so that we can locate the dwelling when we do back checks. If we are unable to find this dwelling, we will not be able to use or pay for this interview).											
Town / Suburb / Township:											
Telephone number: (Interviewer please explain to respondent that we need their contact numbers to verify that this is an authentic interview)	W										
	H										
Cellphone number:	C										
S18_X • ASK ALL: If I can accommodate it, which language would you prefer to be interviewed in?											
English										02	
Afrikaans										03	
Zulu										04	
Xhosa										05	
Sesotho										06	
Setswana										11	

A. LANGUAGE AND LIFE SATISFACTION	
Let's begin by talking a little about yourself.	
1.	Which South African language is your home language? [Interviewer Prompt if necessary: "That is the language of your group of origin"]
Afrikaans	01
English	02
Ndebele	03
Sepedi	04
Sesotho	05
Setswana	06
SiSwati	07
Tshivenda	08
Xhosa	09
Zulu	10
Asian/Indian languages	11
Other [Specify]: _____	12
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

2.	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied.	
	<i>[Hand Showcard. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	0. Extremely dissatisfied	0
	1.	1
	2.	2
	3.	3
	4.	4
	5.	5
	6.	6
	7.	7
	8.	8
	9.	9
	10. Extremely satisfied	10
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

B. PARTISANSHIP AND INCLUSIVENESS		
I would now like to ask you a few questions about the political parties in South Africa.		
3.	Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party?	
	<i>[Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	No (Does NOT think of themselves as supporter of ANY party)	0 ➤ Skip to Q11
	Yes (feels close to a party)	1 ➤ Ask Q10
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98 ➤ Skip to Q11
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99 ➤ Skip to Q11

4.	Which party do you feel close to?
	<i>[Do not read options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Don't know	99

5.	Do you think that the following parties looks after the interests of all people in South Africa, or after the interests of one group only, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?		
	<i>[Read out options. One answer per party]</i>		
	Party supports all groups	Party supports only one group	Do not know enough
A1. African National Congress (ANC)	1	2	99
A2. Democratic Alliance (DA)	1	2	99
A3. Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	1	2	99
A4. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1	2	99
A5. National Freedom Party (NFP)	1	2	99
A6. Congress of the People (COPE)	1	2	99

C. REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT

6.	In talking to people about the recent 2016 municipal elections that took place on 3 August 2016, we find that a lot of people did not register as voters because they did not have the time, did not know where to register, or did not have the correct documents.	
	How about you? Were you registered to vote in the recent municipal elections?	
	<i>[Only one answer allowed.]</i>	
Not registered	01	➤ Skip to Q14
Registered	02	➤ Ask Q13
Don't know/Can't remember <i>[Do not read]</i>	99	

7.	Again, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time, and other people decided not to vote. How about you? Did you vote in the recent municipal elections? <i>[Only one answer allowed.]</i>	
	Yes – did vote	01
	No – did not vote	02
	Refused to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

LIST EXPERIMENT 1

Scripter: Randomize 14 A, 14 B, 14 C, 14 D and 14 E into five groups.

14 A	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY. <i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city They called me on my phone They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio	
	Zero items	0
	One item	1
	Two items	2
	Three items	3
	Four items	4

14 B	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, tell me which ones apply. You can choose more than one activity. <i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Multiple answers allowed]</i>	
	They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city They called me on my phone They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio None of the above apply	
	They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city	1
	They called me on my phone	2
	They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights	3
	They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio	4
	None of the above apply	0

14C	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city		
They called me on my phone		
They offered me something, like food, or a gift or money if I did <i>not</i> go and vote in the elections		
They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights		
They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

14D	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city		
They called me on my phone		
They offered me something, like food, or a gift or money if I would show up to vote in the elections		
They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights		
They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

14 E	I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or someone from a political party during the recent electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
They put up campaign posters or signs in my neighborhood/city		
They called me on my phone		
They offered me something, like food, or a gift or money if I would vote for them in the elections		
They asked me to sign a petition supporting childrens' rights		
They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS						
Let's talk some more about the recent local government elections.						
15	I am now going to read you some statements about local government elections. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree. And is that strongly agree or disagree or somewhat agree or disagree?					
	<i>[Read out list of statements. One answer per statement] Hand Showcard</i>					
Statements	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
a. The recent municipal elections held on 3 August 2016 was completely free and fair	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. I am very satisfied with how local democracy works in my municipality	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. Municipal councillors always listen to what people like me have to say	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Elections make municipal councillors pay a lot of attention to what people like me have to say	1	2	3	4	5	99

16	I am now going to read you some statements about your involvement in local politics. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree. And is that strongly agree or disagree or somewhat agree or disagree?
	<i>[Read out list of statements. One answer per statement] Hand Showcard</i>

Statements	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
a. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in local politics	1	2	3	4	5	99
b. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing my municipality	1	2	3	4	5	99
c. I feel that I could do as good a job at being a member of the municipal council as most other people	1	2	3	4	5	99
d. Sometimes local politics seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	1	2	3	4	5	99
e. People like me don't have any say about what the municipal council does	1	2	3	4	5	99
f. I followed this municipal election campaign very closely	1	2	3	4	5	99
g. I am generally very interested in politics	1	2	3	4	5	99
h. I am generally well informed about politics	1	2	3	4	5	99

17	During the election campaigning, how frequently did you follow political news through?
	<i>[Ask for each news source. One answer for each source]</i>

Media/news source	Daily	Several times a week	Once a week	Less than once a week	Never	Don't know
A. Newspapers and news websites	5	4	3	2	1	99
B. Radio	5	4	3	2	1	99
C. Television	5	4	3	2	1	99
D. Social Media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp)	5	4	3	2	1	99
A. Other sources [Please specify]:	5	4	3	2	1	99

LIST EXPERIMENT 2

Scripter: Randomize 20 A, 20 B, 20 C, 20 D, 20 E and 20F into six groups.

20A	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY , would apply to you if you received such an offer.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
I would be surprised		
I would visit the party's Facebook page		
I would read the party's election manifesto		
I would be happy		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4

20B	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, tell me which ones would apply to you if you received such an offer. You can choose more than one activity.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Multiple answers allowed]</i>	
I would be surprised		1
I would visit the party's Facebook page		2
I would read the party's election manifesto		3
I would be happy		4
None of the above apply		0

20C	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY , would apply to you if you received such an offer.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
I would be surprised		
I would visit the party's Facebook page		
I would accept the offer and vote for the party.		
I would read the party's election manifesto		
I would be happy		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

20D	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY , would apply to you if you received such an offer.	
	[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]	
I would be surprised		
I would visit the party's Facebook page		
I would refuse the offer		
I would read the party's election manifesto		
I would be happy		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

20E	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY , would apply to you if you received such an offer.	
	<i>[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
I would be surprised		
I would visit the party's Facebook page		
I would accept the offer but vote for another party		
I would read the party's election manifesto		
I would be happy		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

20F	Sometimes during elections, candidates or someone from a political party offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money if the voter will vote for them. I am going to hand you a card that mentions various reactions to such an offer. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY , would apply to you if you received such an offer.	
	[Show card on Tablet to respondent] [Only one answer allowed]	
I would be surprised		
I would visit the party's Facebook page		
I would not go and vote on election day		
I would read the party's election manifesto		
I would be happy		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5



21A	Did you attend any party meetings or rallies during the municipal election campaign?	
	<i>[Do not read out options. Follow routing correctly]</i>	
Yes	1	➤ Ask Q21B ➤ Skip to Q22A
No	2	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

21B	Which political parties meetings or rallies did you attend?	
	<i>[Do not read out options. Multiple answers allowed]</i>	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1	
African Muslim Party	2	
African National Congress (ANC)	3	
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4	
Agang	5	
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6	
Congress of the People (COPE)	7	
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8	
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9	
Federal Alliance	10	
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11	
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12	
Minority Front	13	
National Freedom Party	14	
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15	
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16	
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17	
United Democratic Movement	18	
Local party	19	
Other [Specify]: _____	20	
Refused to answer	98	
Don't know	99	

22A	During the election campaign, did any party or representative of a party contact you?	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q22B ➤ Skip to Q23
No	2	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

22B	Which political party/parties contacted you?
	<i>[Do not read out options. Multiple answers allowed]</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

E. CLIENTELISM AND POLITICIANS - CITIZEN LINKAGES

Now I would like to ask you about your relationships with various important people in your local area.

23	Who do you consider to be the most important political person in your municipality?		
	[Do not read options]		
The Mayor	1	➤ Ask Q24	
Your ward councillor	2		
Another member of the municipal council	3		
Local party leader	4		
Your traditional leader	5		
Local business leader	6		
Leader of civil society organisation / NGO	7		
Other [Specify]: _____	20	➤ Skip to Q25	
Don't know [Do not read]	99		

24	In the past year, have you turned to <i>[Pipe in from Q23 the person the respondent previously identified as the most important local political person]</i> for help?
Yes	1
No	2
Refused to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

25	In the past year, have you turned to a political party official or someone in local government for help?	
Yes		1
No		2
Refused to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>		98
26	In the recent municipal election, did you receive any advice from a local community leader concerning the best party to vote for?	
Yes		1
No		2
Refused to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>		98
27	If you lost your job, would you turn to a political party official or someone in local government for help?	
Yes		1
No		2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99
28	If you or your household faces economic hardship, would you turn to a political party official or someone in your local government for help?	
Yes		1
No		2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99

F. PARTY CHOICE

*To be asked to all respondents who live in **Metro EA** and who voted (Yes in Q13)*

29A

**Now I would like you to think back on election day.
In the recent municipal elections, you received TWO ballot papers, one to vote for a political party and one to vote for a ward councillor. Which political party did you vote for?**

[Do not read out options] Only one answer allowed

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party/Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

<i>To be asked to all respondents who live in Metro EA and who voted (Yes in Q13)</i>	
29B	And what about the ward councillor you voted for, which party did he or she come from? <i>[Do not read out options] Only one answer allowed</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

Ask **Q30A** if respondent lives in a **non-metro EA (urban or rural EA)** and who voted (**Yes in Q13**)

30A	<p>Now I would like you to think back on election day. In the recent municipal elections, you received THREE ballot papers, one to vote for a political party, one to vote for a ward councillor and one to vote for a district councillor. Which political party did you vote for in your local municipality?</p> <p><i>[Do not read out options] Only one answer allowed</i></p>
------------	---

African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

Ask Q30B if respondent lives in a non-metro EA (urban or rural EA) and who voted (Yes in Q13)	
30B	And what about the ward councillor you voted for, what party did he or she come from?
	<i>[Do not read out options] Only one answer allowed</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

Ask Q30C if respondent lives <i>in a non-metro EA (urban or rural EA)</i> and who voted (Yes in Q13)	
30C	And what about the district council election, what party did you for?
	<i>[Do not read out options] Only one answer allowed</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party /Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	18
Local party	19
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer	98
Don't know	99

G. RECIPROCITY, TIME DISCOUNTING, RISK AVERSION AND SOCIAL TRUST

Now I would like to ask you a few more questions about yourself.

31	<p>Here are a series of statements that may or may not apply to you. Please imagine a seven step ladder, where 1 means "Does not apply to me at all" and 7 means "Applies to me perfectly". For each statement, please tell me the number that indicates the extent to which the statement applies to you.</p> <p><i>[Read out list of statements] One answer per statement. [Hand seven-step ladder Show card]</i></p>
-----------	--

Statements	1 - Does not apply to me at all	2	3	4	5	6	7 - Applies to me perfectly	Don't know [Do not read]
A. If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
B. If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
C. If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
D. I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
E. If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
F. I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
G. If I do someone a favor, I expect that they will return it	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

32	Suppose you were given the choice between getting a sum of money today and a sum of money in one month: Which offer would you prefer? A payment of R500 today or a payment of R1000 in one month's time?
	[One answer only] [Read out options]
A payment of R500 today	
1	
A payment of R1000 in one month	
2	
Don't know [Do not read]	
99	

33	Suppose you were given the choice between receiving R1000 today, or a larger sum of money in one year from now. How much would that sum of money have to be, to be as valuable to you as R1000 right now?	
	[Probe for an estimate value]	
Record amount in Rands:		R
Don't know [Do not read]		99

34	Suppose in a lottery game, the possibility to win R1000 is 10%, then how much would you pay at most to buy a lottery ticket?	
Record amount in Rands:		R
Don't know [Do not read]		99

35	How do you see yourself: Are you in general a person who takes risks or do you try to avoid risks? Please grade yourself on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means you are not at all prepared to take risks and 10 means you are very much prepared to take risks.
----	---

0. Not at all prepared to take risks	0
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10. Very much prepared to take risks	10
Don't know [Do not read]	99

36	Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please imagine a seven-step ladder, where 1 means you "strongly disagree" and 7 means you "strongly agree" that the personality traits apply to you. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other? [Read out list of statements] One answer per statement. [Hand seven-step ladder Show card]
----	--

You see yourself as:	1 – Strongly disagree	2	3	4	5	6	7 – Strongly Agree	Don't know [Do not read]
A. Sociable and active person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
B. Critical and quarrelsome person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
C. Dependable and self-disciplined person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
D. Anxious and easily upset person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
E. Open to new experiences and intellectual person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
F. Quiet and shy person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
G. Generous and warm person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
H. Disorganized and careless person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
I. Calm and emotionally stable person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99
J. Uncreative and unimaginative person	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	99

37	Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means most people cannot be trusted and 10 means that most people can be trusted. [Hand Showcard] Only one answer allowed
----	---

Most people cannot be trusted						Most people can be trusted					Don't know [Do not read]
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

H. INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND POLITICAL SELECTION

The following questions are about trust in political leadership.

38	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means" you do not trust at all" and 10 means that "you trust a great deal".												
	[Hand Showcard] Only one answer allowed per statement												
		Do not trust at all						Trust a great deal					Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
President Jacob Zuma		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
The National Assembly/ Parliament		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Independent Electoral Commission		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Your municipal council		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
The mayor of your municipality		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
Traditional Leaders		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

39	And how much do you trust each of the following political parties, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means"you do not trust at all" and 10 means that "you trust a great deal".																		
	[Hand Showcard] Only one answer allowed per statement																		
						Do not trust at all							Trust a great deal						Don't know
						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A1. African National Congress (ANC)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A2. Democratic Alliance (DA)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A3. Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A4. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A5. National Freedom Party (NFP)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		
A6. Congress of the People (COPE)						0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99		

40	<p>Now I will read out a number of pairs of statements about different kinds of political leaders.</p> <p><i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel.</i></p> <p>40A. If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for:</p>
Someone who takes care of the needs of all South Africans, but is corrupt	1
OR, someone who is honest, but only takes care of the needs of one group	2
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel.</i>	
40B. If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for:	
Someone who delivers good public service to your municipality but pays people to vote for him	1
OR, someone who is elected in a fair way, but delivers poor public service to your municipality	2
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel.

40C. If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for:	
Someone who is involved in a criminal case, but can be relied on to get work done	1
OR , someone who is law-abiding, but cannot always get work done	2
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel.

40 D. If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for:	
A strong leader who evades paying taxes	1
OR , someone who always pays his taxes, but is not a strong leader	2
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel.

40 E. If you had to choose a leader to vote for, would you vote for:	
A competent leader, who does not listen to what ordinary people have to say	1
OR , someone who listens to what ordinary people have to say, but is incompetent	2
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION

I would now like you to think about your local municipality and the services it provides.

41	How well or badly would you say your municipality is handling the following matters? Would you say it is very badly, fairly badly, fairly well or very well?
	<i>[Read out options. One answer per option] Hand Showcard</i>

	Very badly	Fairly badly	Fairly well	Very well	Don't know
A. Maintaining access to clean, piped water	1	2	3	4	99
B. Maintaining sanitation and sewage systems	1	2	3	4	99
C. Removing refuse and keeping the community clean	1	2	3	4	99
D. Maintaining local roads	1	2	3	4	99
E. Maintaining access to electricity	1	2	3	4	99
F. Managing the use of land	1	2	3	4	99

42	And overall, how satisfied are you with the services provided by your municipality? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?
	<i>[Read out]</i>

Very satisfied	1
Satisfied	2
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	3
Dissatisfied	4
Very dissatisfied	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

J. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

43	Now I will read to you a list of actions people sometimes takes as citizens. Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 12 months? Have you...			
	[Read out options. One answer per option]			
		Yes	No	Refuse to answer [Do not read]
A. Worked in a political party or action group		1	0	98
B. Been a member of a political party?		1	0	98
C. Taken part in a public protest or demonstration?		1	0	98

K. VOTE BUYING AND CORRUPTION

There are different ways for politicians and others to obtain their objectives. In the following questions, I would like to talk to you about this.

44	How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer something, like food, or a gift or money, to people in your community or village if they WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?	
	[Read out. Only one answer allowed]	
Never		1
Once or twice		2
Often		3
Don't know [Do not read]		99
45 A	How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer YOU something, like food, or a gift or money IF YOU WOULD VOTE FOR THEM in the elections?	
	[Read out. Only one answer allowed.]	
Never		1
Once or twice		2
Often		3
Refuse to answer [Do not read]		98
45B	How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer YOU something, like food, or a gift or money IF YOU WOULD SHOW UP TO VOTE in the elections?	
	[Read out. Only one answer allowed.]	
Never		1
Once or twice		2
Often		3
Refuse to answer [Do not read]		98
45C	How often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer YOU something, like food, or a gift or money IF YOU WOULD NOT GO AND VOTE in the elections?	
	[Read out. Only one answer allowed.]	
Never		1
Once or twice		2
Often		3
Refuse to answer [Do not read]		98

46 A	If Q45A or Q45B or Q45C = 2 or 3 Which party did the person who gave you this offer come from?	
	<i>[Do not read out options]</i>	
	African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
	African Muslim Party	2
	African National Congress (ANC)	3
	Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
	Agang	5
	Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
	Congress of the People (COPE)	7
	Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
	Federal Alliance	10
	Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
	Minority Front	13
	National Freedom Party	14
	New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Part (NNP)	15
	Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
	United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
	United Democratic Movement	18
	Local party	19
	Other [Specify]: _____	20
	Don't know	99

46B	[If Q45A = 2 or 3] How did the offer influence your decision to vote for that party?	
	<i>[Read out options] Only one answer allowed</i>	
	I accepted the offer and voted for the party	1
	I refused the offer	2
	I accepted the offer but voted for ANOTHER party	3
	I did not go and vote on election day	4
	I was unsure of what to do	5
	Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

46C	[If Q45A or Q45B or Q45C = 2 or 3] What did they offer?	
	<i>[Do not read out. Multiple mention]</i>	
Money	1	Ask Q47A Ask Q47B
Food parcels/food	2	
Mobile phones	3	
Alcohol	4	
Business opportunities/ Tenders in Government	5	
Clothing	6	
Favours	7	
Airtime	8	
Household items	9	
Jobs	10	
Livestock	11	
Priority on housing list	12	
Other [Specify]: _____	20	
Don't Know/ can't remember	99	
47 A	[If Q46C = 1] What was the highest amount of money you were offered for your vote?	
Record amount in Rands:	R _____	
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98	
47B	[If Q46C = 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12 or 20] What was the approximate value of what you were offered for your vote?	
Record amount in Rands:	R _____	
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98	
48	If Q45A and Q45B and Q45C = 1 or 98 If a candidate or someone from a political party offered YOU something like food, or a gift or money to vote for the party, would you:	
	<i>Read out options - only one answer allowed</i>	
Accept the offer and vote for the party	1	
Refuse the offer	2	
Accept the offer but vote for ANOTHER party	3	
Not go and vote on election day	4	
Be unsure of what to do	5	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	
49 A	ASK ALL: Do you believe it is illegal for a candidate or someone from a political party to offer voters something, like food, or a gift or money in return for their votes?	
No	2	
Yes	1	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99	

50B	How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though voting is supposed to be secret in this country? [Read out options. Only one answer allowed]
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Don't know [Do not read]	99

50C	During the election campaign, how often did you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? [Read out options. Only one answer allowed]
Never	1
Once or twice	2
Often	3
Don't know [Do not read]	99

STANDARD SURVEY EXPERIMENT

NOTE: ONE control group and TWO treatment groups

Randomize 51A or 51B or 51C INTO THREE GROUPS

50A	Suppose that someone in this area is offered R200 by a party official to vote for that party. And suppose the person accepts the money. Would you say that the behaviour of the person who accepts the money is wrong or acceptable? [Only one answer allowed]
Wrong	1
Acceptable	2
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

51B	Suppose that someone in this area, who is very poor and struggles to put food on the table, is offered R200 by a party official to vote for that party. And suppose the person accepts the money. Would you say that the behaviour of the person who accepts the money is wrong or acceptable? [Only one answer allowed]
Wrong	1
Acceptable	2
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

51C	Suppose that someone in this area, who is well off and has no economic problems, is offered R200 by a party official to vote for that party. And suppose the person accepts the money. Would you say that the behaviour of the person who accepts the money is wrong or acceptable? [Only one answer allowed]
Wrong	1
Acceptable	2
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

51	In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe or give a gift to officials in your municipality in order to:					
	<i>[Read out statements.] One answer per statement Hand Showcard</i>					
		Never	Once or twice	A few times	Often	No experience with this in past year
						Don't know [Do not read]
	A. Get a document or permit	5	4	3	2	1
	B. Get water services	5	4	3	2	1
	C. Get sanitation or sewerage services	5	4	3	2	1
	D. Get electricity services	5	4	3	2	1
	E. Get another service from the municipality	5	4	3	2	1

52	How likely do you think it is that the following people are involved in corruption? Very likely, Likely, Unlikely or very unlikely?					
	<i>Read out. only one answer allowed Hand Showcard</i>					
		Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't know [Do not read]
	A. President Jacob Zuma	4	3	2	1	99
	B. Officials in President Jacob Zuma's office	4	3	2	1	99
	C. Representatives to the National Assembly/ Parliament	4	3	2	1	99
	D. The Mayor of your Municipality	4	3	2	1	99
	E. Elected members of the local government	4	3	2	1	99
	F. Local government officials	4	3	2	1	99
	G. Tax officials (e.g. SARS officials)	4	3	2	1	99
	H. Traditional leaders	4	3	2	1	99
	I. The police	4	3	2	1	99

L. INFORMATION

I would also like to ask you some questions about South Africa, the economy, and politics in general.

53	What is the OFFICIAL unemployment rate in South Africa?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	25-29%	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99

54	Who is the current Finance Minister in South Africa?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Pravin Gordhan	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99
55	Who is the current Deputy President in South Africa?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Cyril Ramaphosa	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99
56	Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nation?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Ban Ki-Moon	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99
57	Which country is South Africa's largest trade partner?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	China	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99
58	What is the name of the 2nd largest party in parliament?	
	<i>[Do not read. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Democratic Alliance	1
	Other answers	0
	Don't know	99

M. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Now we are almost finished. But before we end I would like to ask some background questions.

59	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
	<i>[Hand Showcard]</i>

No schooling	0
Primary school incomplete	1
Primary school complete	2
Secondary/ high school incomplete	3
Completed Matric	4
Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5
Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6
Completed university degree	7
Post-graduate (PhD degree)	8
Other (Specify): _____	9
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

60	Do you or anyone in your household receive any social grants like child support grant, old age pension and disability grant?
-----------	---

Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	99

61	With regards to employment, what is your occupational status?
	<i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>

Self-employed / own business	02	➤ Go to Q65
Working full-time	03	➤ Go to Q64
Working part-time / contract / casual / seasonal work	04	
Unemployed and looking for work	05	➤ Ask Q63
Unemployed and not looking for work	06	
Scholar at school	07	➤ Go to Q65
Student at college, university etc.	08	
Disabled or receive a disability grant	09	
Retired / Pensioner	10	
Housewife	11	
Other (Specify): _____	12	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

62	Do you receive unemployment benefits?
-----------	--

Yes	1
No	0
Don't know	99

ASK If working full time/part time [If Q62 = 3 or 4]	
63	Are you employed by...?
	<i>[Read out options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>
The private sector: that is any small, medium or large business or corporation which is run by individuals and companies for profit and is not owned or operated by the government?	
	1
The government/public sector: that is any government department either at a national, provincial or local government / municipal level?	
	2
A Parastatal: that is any business owned by the government such as Eskom, Transnet, SAA, Telkom, South African Post Office, SABC etc.)?	
	3
A NGO, CBO or FBO: that is non-governmental organisations, community based organisations or faith based organisations	
	4
Don't know	
	9
	9
64	Are you: <i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>
Single	
	1
Married/living with partner	
	2
Divorced/separated from/not living with spouse	
	3
Widowed	
	4
Other	
	5
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	
	98
65	How many children do you have? <i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>
Have no children	
	0
One	
	1
Two	
	2
Three	
	3
Four	
	4
Five	
	5
More than five children	
	6
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	
	98

66	Please tell me into which group your TOTAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME falls. By TOTAL monthly household income, I mean the total of all the incomes earned by all the wage-earners living in your household, before deductions. You need only tell me the letter corresponding to the income group into which you fall.				
	<i>Hand showcard [Only one answer allowed]</i>				
A	Up to R 999	03	P	R15 000 – R15 999	18
B	R1 000 – R1 999	04	Q	R16 000 – R16 999	19
C	R2 000 – R2 999	05	R	R17 000 – R17 999	20
D	R3 000 – R3 999	06	S	R18 000 – R18 999	21
E	R4 000 – R4 999	07	T	R19 000 – R19 999	22
F	R5 000 – R5 999	08	U	R20 000 – R21 999	23
G	R6 000 – R6 999	09	V	R22 000 – R23 999	24
H	R7 000 – R7 999	10	W	R24 000 – R25 999	25
I	R8 000 – R8 999	11	X	R26 000 – R27 999	26
J	R9 000 – R9 999	12	Y	R28 000 – R29 999	27
K	R10 000 – R10 999	13	Z	R30 000 +	28
L	R11 000 – R11 999	14	AA	Refused to answer	98
M	R12 000 – R12 999	15	BB	Don't know	99
N	R13 000 – R13 999	16	CC	No Income (explain): _____	31
O	R14 000 – R14 999	17			

67	What is your ethnic group, cultural community or tribe? [Only one answer allowed]		
English	01	Shangaan	09
White/European	02	Swati	10
Afrikaans/Afrikaaner/Boer	03	Venda	11
Ndebele	04	Zulu	12
Xhosa	05	Coloured	13
Pedi/North Sotho	06	Asian/Indian	14
Sotho/South Sotho	07	South African only	15
Setswana/Tswana	08	Other (Specify): _____	16
		Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

68	What is your religion, if any?	
	<i>[Do not read options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
None		1
CHRISTIAN GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS		
Christian only (i.e., respondents says only "Christian", without identifying a specific sub-		2
Roman Catholic		3
Orthodox		4
Coptic		5
Protestant – Mainline		
Anglican		6
Lutheran		7
Methodist		8
Presbyterian		9
Baptist		10
Quaker / Friends		11
Mennonite		12
Dutch Reformed (e.g. NGK, NHK, GK, Mission, APK, URC)		13
Calvinist		14
Protestant – Non-mainline <i>[L. religDenom]</i>		
Evangelical		15
Pentecostal (e.g., "Born Again" and/or "Saved")		16
Independent (e.g., "African Independent Church")		17
Church of Christ		18
Zionist Christian Church		19
Others		
Jehovah's Witness		20
Seventh Day Adventist		21
Mormon		22
MUSLIM GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS		
Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only "Muslim", without identifying a specific sub-		23
Sunni		
Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only "Sunni" or "Sunni Muslim", without identifying a		24
Ismaeli		25
Mouridiya Brotherhood		26
Tijaniya Brotherhood		27
Qadiriya Brotherhood		28
Shia		
Shia only (i.e., respondents says only "Shia" or "Shia Muslim", without identifying a spe-		29
OTHER		
Traditional / ethnic religion		30
Hindu		31
Bahai		32
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God)		33
Atheist (Do not believe in a God)		34
Other		35
Refused		98
Don't know		99

N. VOTE INTENTION		
And a final question.		
69	If there was a National election tomorrow, which party are you most likely to vote for?	
	<i>[Do not read out options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		1
African Muslim Party		2
African National Congress (ANC)		3
Afrikaner Unity Movement		4
Agang		5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		6
Congress of the People (COPE)		7
Democratic Alliance (DA)		8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)		9
Federal Alliance		10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)		11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)		12
Minority Front		13
National Freedom Party		14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)		15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)		17
United Democratic Movement		18
Other [Specify]: _____		20
Refused to answer		98
Don't know		99

CONSENT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Dear Sir / Madam

We found your feedback and input extremely valuable and we would like to reassure you that the information you have provided and your personal details will remain confidential, and will not be shared with anyone.

However, in the future, Citizen Surveys may need to conduct additional research on how things are going in your local municipality in order to strengthen the quality of local democracy and give citizens a greater voice in local government. Would you be willing to be contacted in the future to participate in such research?

Remember you are under no obligation to consent; this is completely voluntary. However, we have to ask it of all the people we have interviewed. Please sign below to indicate whether you agree or whether you refuse to be contacted for future research.

1	<i>Yes, I consent to being contacted for future research (please sign below):</i> Signature.....
2	<i>No, I do not want to be contacted for future research (please sign below):</i> Signature.....

Scripter: New screen

THANK RESPONDENT FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SURVEY

O. Interviewer to complete		
71	Respondent's race	
	<i>Interviewer to complete: Do not ask (by observation only)</i>	
	Black	1
	Coloured	2
	Indian	3
	White	4
72	In what type of dwelling does the respondent live?	
	<i>Interviewer to complete</i>	
	Formal dwelling: Permanent structure with foundation.	1
	Informal dwelling – backyard shack (this is a shack in the backyard of someone's house where a family is living e.g. Wendy house, wood or iron shack etc.)	2
	Informal dwelling other than backyard shack (this is a shack in an informal settlement. It can be made of corrugated iron, wood, cardboard etc.)	3
	Traditional dwelling (this is usually found in a rural area and can be a hut that is made of clay, mud, thatch or other traditional materials.)	4
	Hostel (this is a compound where workers live e.g. workers living on the mines.)	5
	Other (Specify).....	6
73	Were there any other people immediately present that might be listening during the interview?	
	<i>Interviewer to complete</i>	
	No one	1
	Spouse only	2
	Children only	3
	A few others	4
	Small crowd	5
74.	<i>Interviewer to complete</i>	YES NO
	A. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?	1 0
	B. Do you think anyone influenced the respondent's answer during the interview?	1 0
	C. Were you approached by community and/or political party representatives?	1 0
	D. Did you feel threatened during the interview?	1 0
	E. Were you physically threatened during the interview?	1 0

Project SA Poverty Survey June / July 2017



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FIELD MANAGER	Automatically capture in background	
INTERVIEWER NAME and SURNAME:	Automatically capture in background	
PROVINCE:	Automatically capture in background	
SUB PLACE:	Automatically capture in background	
EA NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
MAIN PLACE:	Automatically capture in background	
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY:	Automatically capture in background	
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY:	Automatically capture in background	
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY NUMBER:	Automatically capture in background	
DOMINANT POPULATION:	Automatically capture in background	
DOMINANT POPULATION CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOTYPE_OLD:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOCODE_OLD:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOTYPE_NEW:	Automatically capture in background	
GEOCODE_NEW:	Automatically capture in background	
MET_UR DESCRIPTION:	Automatically capture in background	
MET_UR CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
URB_RUR DESCRIPTION:	Automatically capture in background	
URB_RUR CODE:	Automatically capture in background	
TOTAL_HH15 WEIGHT	Automatically capture in background	
RESPONDENT QID:	Automatically capture in background	
GPS Co-ordinates:	Latitude	Longitude
	Automatically capture in background	Automatically capture in background

SCRIPTER: Insert on separate screen.

Process for selecting the dwellings where interviews have to be conducted

Procedure for selecting dwellings where interviews have to be conducted:

1. Pins have been dropped on the EA map to indicate the starting point for every two questionnaires.
2. From the starting point the interviewer must count 10 houses and visit the 10th house from the starting point.
3. Please follow the instructions carefully on the tablet if no one is home at the selected dwelling or if the household refuses to participate.
4. Remember if no one is at home you have to make two callbacks before you can substitute the dwelling.

SCRIPTER: Insert on separate screen.

SCRIPTER: Please customise BOLD text in red, which reads "I'm at my {0} household".

VISIT_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the Visit number (i.e. begin at 1, and each subsequent iteration of this loop with the same SubjectID / QID increments this value by 1).	
TIMESTAMP_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the Timestamp (i.e. DATE + TIME as one record, in the format DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM: SS, and the time component in 24-hour format).	
GPS_X	SCRIPTER: Automatically populate with the tablet's GPS co-ordinates. (Lock location)	
RS1_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact with someone at the selected dwelling?	
YES	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
NO	2	SCRIPTER: Route to RS2_X
RS2_X	What was the reason for NOT making contact with someone at the selected dwelling?	
NO REPLY AT THE DWELLING / NO ONE IS AT HOME		01 SCRIPTER: Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY SCRIPTER: Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: If no-one is home at the selected dwelling unit or if there is no reply then you have to do a recall visit to this dwelling.
Selected dwelling not yet built or under construction		02
Selected dwelling is demolished or derelict		03
Selected dwelling is vacant housing unit or vacant land		04
Selected dwelling is a business premises e.g. shop, shop-ping centre, office, factory, warehouse, garage, bus stop, taxi rank, hotel, guest house etc.		05
Selected dwelling is an institution e.g. government or municipality office or building, school, college, university, hospital, clinic, post office, library, place of worship, army barracks, fire station, hall, civic centre etc.		06
Selected dwelling is a temporary residence or holiday home		07
Violence and/or gang warfare in the area		08
Protests taking place in area		09
Concerns about safety in entering the selected		10
SCRIPTER: APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY: Recall 1		

INTERVIEWER NOTE: Record day, date and time of next visit

e.g. Monday 2016/08/01 15:00

INTERVIEWER NOTE: After appointment made, Press "OPTIONS", then press STOP, then press YES (this will save the initial section of the questionnaire). Make call back either in 3 hours' time on same day, or call back in early evening or on a different day or over a weekend.

When you resume this questionnaire, "Press NEXT" and continue.

S 4_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact on your second visit to this dwelling unit?
--------------	--

Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY SCRIPTER: Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: If no-one is home at the selected dwelling unit or if there is no reply then you have make another visit to this dwelling.

SCRIPTER: APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY

INTERVIEWER NOTE: Record day, date and time of next visit

e.g. Monday 2016/08/01 18:00

INTERVIEWER NOTE: After appointment made, Press "OPTIONS", then press STOP, then press YES (this will save the initial section of the questionnaire). Make call back either in 3 hours' time on same day, or call back in early evening or on a different day or over a weekend.
When you resume this questionnaire, "Press NEXT" and continue.

S5_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Have you made contact on your third visit to this dwelling unit?
-------------	---

Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 1)
No reply / No one at home	2	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: Press NEXT and go to substitute dwelling. Select substitute dwelling by continuing the walk pattern and count 10 dwellings. The substitute dwelling will be the 10th dwelling unit/house.

SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR INTRODUCTION 1

INTRODUCTION 1	INTRODUCTION FOR HOUSEHOLD CONTACT PERSON Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is ____, and I work for Citizen Surveys - an independent research organization. We are conducting a survey to examine issues around poverty, inequality and redistribution in South Africa. We have randomly selected your household to take part in this survey. If your household agrees to participate, the views of the interviewed person will be combined with those of the other 1,500 adult South Africans taking part around the country and reported together. This means that what they say will be completely confidential and anonymous. We do record some of the interviews, but this is for quality control purposes only. Would your household be willing to participate?
-----------------------	--

S7_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Has the household agreed to provide household information to start the selection process?
-------------	--

Yes	1	SCRIPTER: ROUTE TO QUEST A
No	2	SCRIPTER: ROUTE TO: S8_X

S8_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the initial contact person/household refusing to participate in the interview?
-------------	---

Initial contact person / Household refused to be interviewed	1	SCRIPTER: if S8_X (code 1 to 9) Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: If household refuses to provide household information Press NEXT and go to substitute dwelling. Select substitute dwelling by continuing the walk pattern and count 10 dwellings. The substitute dwelling will be the 10th
Initial contact person is deaf / mute	2	
Initial contact person has a mental disability	3	
Initial contact person is drunk / drugged	4	
Initial contact person doesn't speak any of the official languages	5	
Household does not speak a South African language - spoke a foreign language	6	
Initial contact person is a child	7	

Other reason (specify)	9	dwelling unit/house.
------------------------	---	----------------------

SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR QUEST A

Quest A	INTERVIEWER READ OUT: “Please tell me how many people live in this household in total? That is, ALL household members including yourself, other adults, children and babies. By household members we are referring to people who eat from the same pot and who live in this household for more than 15 days per month”.
----------------	---

S10A_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Total number of people who live in this household for <u>more than 15 days per month</u> ?	
---------------	--	--

SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR QUEST B

Quest B	INTERVIEWER READ OUT: “This survey that I am about to administer is open to all adults in South Africa. However, it would be too costly and time-consuming to interview everyone, therefore the electronic storage device (ESD) will randomly select an adult member of this household to be interviewed. For this purpose, please can you tell me how many people who live in this household are 18 years and older ”. Please include all household members aged 18 years and older who live in this household for more than 15 days per month, even if they are not here right now.
----------------	--

S10B_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Number of people aged 18 years and older who live in this household, even if they are not here right now?	
---------------	--	--

KISH GRID	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Please give me the name, surname, gender, and age of ALL the people aged 18 years and older who live in this household? Please give me their names from the youngest to the oldest. Kindly ensure that you include all household members aged 18 years and older who live in the household for more than 15 days per month, even if they are not here right now.
------------------	--

SCRIPTER ADD INSTRUCTION:

INTERVIEWER NOTE: Please record the name, gender and age of **ALL** household members aged 18 years and older from the youngest to the oldest. Kindly ensure that you include **ALL** adult household members aged 18 years and older.

We are conducting back-checks to verify the total number of adults living in the household. In the event of household members being left off this list the questionnaire will have to be redone at the interviewer's own expense.

NAME AND SURNAME OF EACH HOUSEHOLD MEMBER	1 = Male 2 = Female	Age

S11_X	Can I please talk to [<i>PIPE IN NAME and Surname OF SELECTED RESPONDENT</i>]?
--------------	--

Yes	1	(ROUTE TO: Introduction 3)
No	2	(ROUTE TO: S12_X)

S12_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the selected respondent being unavailable for the interview?
--------------	--

Selected respondent not home but will return later	1	SCRIPTER: Show instruction:
--	---	------------------------------------

Selected respondent is busy/unavailable but has agreed that you can return to do the interview	2	INTERVIEWER NOTE: If selected respondent is not at home but will return later or if selected respondent is busy/unavailable but has agreed that you can return to do the interview then Press "NEXT" and make an appointment for when the respondent will return. SCRIPTER: Route to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY
Selected person away for survey period	3	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: If the selected respondent cannot participate in the interview, then press "NEXT" and go to substitute dwelling. Select substitute dwelling by continuing the walk pattern and count 10 dwellings. The substitute dwelling will be the 10 th dwelling unit/house.
Selected person at home but ill during survey period	4	
Selected person is physically disabled (deaf/mute)	5	
Selected person is mentally disabled/unstable	6	
Selected person is drunk or drugged	7	
Other reason (specify)	10	

SCRIPTER: if S12_X (1 or 2) then go to APPOINTMENT FUNCTIONALITY

INTERVIEWER NOTE: Record day, date and time when you have to return to conduct the interview with the selected respondent.

e.g. Tuesday 2016/07/30 9:00

INTERVIEWER NOTE: After appointment made, Press **"OPTIONS"**, then press **STOP**, then press **YES** (this will save the initial section of the questionnaire).

When you resume this questionnaire, "Press **NEXT**" and continue.

SCRIPTER: INSERT A SEPARATE SCREEN FOR INTRODUCTION 3

INTRODUCTION 3	INTRODUCTION FOR SELECTED RESPONDENT	
	<p>Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is _____, and I work for Citizen Surveys - an independent research organization. We are conducting a survey to examine issues around poverty, inequality and redistribution in South Africa. We have randomly selected your name to take part in this survey. If you agree to participate, your views will be combined with those of the other 1,500 adult South Africans taking part around the country and reported together. This means that what you say will be completely confidential and anonymous. We do record some of these interviews, but this is for quality control purposes only.</p> <p>Would you be willing to participate?</p>	

S13_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Do you agree to participate in the interview?		
	Yes	1	SCRIPTER: ROUTE TO: S17_X
	No	2	SCRIPTER: ROUTE TO: S14_X

S14_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: What was the reason for the selected respondent being unwilling to participate in the interview?		
	Selected respondent refused to participate in the interview	1	SCRIPTER: Show instruction: INTERVIEWER NOTE: If the selected respondent is unwilling to participate in the interview, then press NEXT and go to substitute dwelling. Select substitute dwelling by continuing the walk pattern and count 10 dwellings. The substitute dwelling will be the 10 th dwelling unit/house.
	Selected respondent is busy/unavailable	2	
	Selected person at home but ill during survey period	3	
	Selected person is physically or mentally unstable	4	
	Selected person is drunk or drugged	5	
	Selected person doesn't speak any of the official languages	6	
	Selected respondent is not home after recall	7	
	Other reason (specify)	9	

17_X	INTERVIEWER FILL OUT: Details of the selected respondent..... (Pipe in Name and Surname from Kish)		
-------------	---	--	--

Respondent address: <i>(Interviewer please provide full details of the number of the homestead and street name. If informal settlement, then record the shack number and description of the surroundings so that we can locate the dwelling when we do back checks. If we are unable to find this dwelling, we will not be able to use or pay for this interview).</i>											
Town / Suburb / Township:											
Main Place / Town / City											
Telephone number: <i>(Interviewer please explain to respondent that we need their contact numbers to verify that this is an authentic interview)</i>	W										
	H										
Cellphone number:	C										

P. LANGUAGE	
Let's begin by talking a little about yourself.	
8.	Which South African language is your home language?
	<i>[Interviewer Prompt if necessary: "That is the language of your group of origin"]</i>
Afrikaans	01
English	02
Ndebele	03
Sepedi	04
Sesotho	05
Setswana	06
SiSwati	07
Tshivenda	08
Xhosa	09
Zulu	10
Asian/Indian languages	11
Other [Specify]	12
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98

Q. LIVED POVERTY INDEX

9.	Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family:					
	<i>[Read out each option. One answer per option] Hand Showcard</i>					
		Never	Just once or twice	Several times	Many times	Always
						Don't know/ Not relevant <i>[Do not read]</i>
A.	Gone without enough food to eat?	1	2	3	4	5
B.	Gone without enough clean water for home use?	1	2	3	4	5
C.	Gone without medicines or medical treatment?	1	2	3	4	5
D.	Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?	1	2	3	4	5
E.	Gone without a cash income?	1	2	3	4	5
F.	Gone without electricity in your home because you could not afford to buy or pay for electricity?	1	2	3	4	5
						99

10.	Compared to your current situation, do you expect your living conditions to get better, stay the same or get worse over the NEXT 12 months?					
	<i>[Read out list of statements. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>					
	Much Worse	1				
	Worse	2				
	Same	3				
	Better	4				
	Much Better	5				
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99				

R. COMPARE YOUR LIVING CONDITIONS

Now I would like to ask you a few questions on how you see your household compared to the rest of South Africa.						
11.	The four pictures on this card show various scenarios of how income can be shared among the population. According to you, which one best describes South Africa's population?					
	<i>Hand Showcard and also read out the number on the picture - Only one answer allowed</i>					
	PICTURE 1: Some people are rich, a few people have a middle income, and most people are poor.	1				
	PICTURE 2: Few people are rich, some people have a middle income, and a lot of people are poor.	2				
	PICTURE 3: Few people are rich, a lot of people have a middle income, and few people are poor.	3				
	PICTURE 4: A lot of people are rich, some people have a middle income, and a few people are poor.	4				
	Don't know enough to say <i>[Do not read]</i>	9 9				

12.	When you think about your own household's living conditions compared to other South African households, would you say that you are.....
	<i>Hand Showcard [Read out options] - Only one answer allowed</i>
Very rich	1
Rich	2
Just above middle income	3
Middle income	4
Just below middle income	5
Poor	6
Very poor	7
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

13.	Looking again at the pictures of how income can be shared among the South African population, what would you prefer South Africa to look like?
	<i>Hand Showcard and also read out the number on the picture - Only one answer allowed</i>
PICTURE 1: Some people are rich, a few people have a middle income, and most people are poor.	1
PICTURE 2: Few people are rich, some people have a middle income, and a lot of people are poor.	2
PICTURE 3: Few people are rich, a lot of people have a middle income, and few people are poor.	3
PICTURE 4: A lot of people are rich, some people have a middle income, and a few people are poor.	4
Don't know enough to say <i>[Do not read]</i>	9 9

S. PARTISANSHIP

I would now like to ask you a few questions about politics and political parties in South Africa.			
14.	Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. What about you? Do you usually think of yourself as close to a particular party?		
	[Only one answer allowed]		
No (Does NOT think of themselves as supporter of ANY party)		0	➤ Skip to Q9
Yes (feels close to a party)		1	➤ Ask Q8
Refuse to answer [Do not read]		98	➤ Skip to Q9
Don't know [Do not read]		99	➤ Skip to Q9

15.	Which party do you feel close to?											
	<i>[Do not read options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>											
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)												1
African Muslim Party												2
African National Congress (ANC)												3
Afrikaner Unity Movement												4
Agang												5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)												6
Congress of the People (COPE)												7
Democratic Alliance (DA)												8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)												9
Federal Alliance												10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)												11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)												12
Minority Front												13
National Freedom Party												14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)												15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)												16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)												17
United Democratic Movement												18
Other <i>[Specify]</i> : _____												20
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>												99
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>												98

16.	How much do you trust the ANC? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means "you do not trust at all" and 10 means "you trust a great deal".											
	<i>Hand Showcard [Read out options] Only one answer allowed</i>											
Do not trust at all						Trust a great deal					Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99	

10.	How informed would you say you are about politics in general?											
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed]</i>											
Very well-informed												1
Well-informed												2
Not very well-informed												3
Not at all well-informed												4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>												98

T. ROLE OF PARTIES IN YOUR LOCAL AREA

The next questions are about the role of political parties in your local area

11. Do the following parties or their political candidates have an office/or staff in your local area?

[Read out options. Respondents must answer either Yes or No for each party.]

	Yes	No	Don't know [Do not read]
A. ANC - African National Congress	1	2	99
B. DA - Democratic Alliance	1	2	99
C. EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters	1	2	99
D. IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party	1	2	99

12. Over the past year, how often (if ever) have the following parties held political meetings or rallies in your local area?

[Read out name of the political party options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard

	Never	Once or twice	Often	Don't know [Do not read]
A. ANC - African National Congress	1	2	3	99
B. DA - Democratic Alliance	1	2	3	99
C. EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters	1	2	3	99
D. IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party	1	2	3	99

13. Over the past year, how often (if ever) have the following parties tried to persuade people in your area to become members of the party?

[Read out name of the political party options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard

	Never	Once or twice	Often	Don't know [Do not read]
A. ANC - African National Congress	1	2	3	99
B. DA - Democratic Alliance	1	2	3	99
C. EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters	1	2	3	99
D. IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party	1	2	3	99

14.	Now I will read out several statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements. [Interviewer: Hand showcard and read out statements.]					
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know [Do not read]
A. In my local area, people who support the ANC are more likely to be offered A JOB in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99
B. In my local area, people who support the ANC are more likely to get access to PUBLIC HOUSING in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99
C. In my local area, people who support the ANC are more likely to receive SOCIAL GRANTS OR WELFARE BENEFITS in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99
D. In my local area, people who support the ANC are more likely to get access to PUBLIC SERVICES LIKE CLEAN WATER, SANITATION, OR ELECTRICITY in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99
E. In my local area, people who support the ANC are more likely to receive FOOD PARCELS OR FOOD VOUCHERS in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99
F. In this country, BUSINESSES who support the ANC are more likely to get contracts with the government in return for their political support	5	4	3	2	1	99

F. SURVEY EXPERIMENT 1

Scripter: Randomize 15 A, 15 B, 15 C, 15 D into FOUR groups.

15A.	Suppose that a political candidate is running for election to the South African parliament. And suppose the candidate wants to increase taxes for everyone in order to allocate more funding to unemployment benefits. How likely is it that you would vote for the party of that candidate?					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>					
Very unlikely					0	
Unlikely					1	
Neither unlikely or likely					2	
Likely					3	
Very likely					4	
Refuse to answer [Do not read]					98	
Don't know [Do not read]					99	

15B.	Suppose that a political candidate is running for election to the South African parliament. And suppose the candidate wants to increase taxes for everyone in order to allocate more funding to unemployment benefits, AND offers you a food parcel or money in return for your vote. How likely is it that you would vote for the party of that candidate?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

15C.	Suppose that a political candidate is running for election to the South African parliament. And suppose the candidate wants to increase taxes for everyone in order to allocate more funding to unemployment benefits, AND offers you work or a job in return for your vote. How likely is it that you would vote for the party of that candidate?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

15D.	Suppose that a political candidate is running for election to the South African parliament. And suppose the candidate wants to increase taxes for everyone in order to allocate more funding to unemployment benefits, AND wants to build a new sports stadium in your area. How likely is it that you would vote for the party of that candidate?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

G. MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

Now I would like to ask you a few questions about different political issues that are sometimes debated in this country.

16.	What would you say are the most important problems in South Africa that the government should address?
	<i>[Do not read out options. Code from responses. Accept up to three answers. If respondent offers more than three options, ask "Which three of these are the most important?" If respondent offers one or two answers, ask "Anything else?"] One code only per response</i>

Scripter: must be able to select "OTHER" under **1st response, 2nd response and 3rd response**

	1 st re- sponse	2 nd re- sponse	3 rd re- sponse
ECONOMICS			
Unemployment	01	01	01
Poverty / Destitution	02	02	02
Immigrants / Xenophobia	03	03	03
Management of the National Economy	04	04	04
Management of the Local Economy	05	05	05
Wages / Incomes / Salaries	06	06	06
Economic inequality/Income inequality	07	07	07
Rates (Payments for water, refuse, sanitation)	08	08	08
Taxes (Income tax, employee tax.)	09	09	09
Loans / Credit	10	10	10
FOOD / AGRICULTURE			
Food shortage	11	11	11
Drought	12	12	12
Land Distribution (Land claims, access to land or land ownership)	13	13	13
Farming / Agriculture Support (Subsidies, Training)	14	14	14
INFRASTRUCTURE			
Transport System (Busses, Trains, Taxis, Planes)	15	15	15
Communications (Phones, Post Office, Internet)	16	16	16
Roads	17	17	17
GOVERNMENT SERVICES			
Education	18	18	18
Housing	19	19	19
Water supply	20	20	20
Electricity supply	21	21	21
Sanitation	22	22	22
Orphans / Street Children / Homeless Children	23	23	23
HEALTH			
Basic health services	24	24	24
HIV and AIDS	25	25	25
CRIME AND CORRUPTION			
Crime	26	26	26
Corruption	27	27	27
Courts / Prisons / Police	28	28	28
GOVERNANCE			
Discrimination / Racism	29	29	29
Political Violence / Intimidation	30	30	30
Democracy / Political Rights	31	31	31
Nothing / No Problems	32	32	32
No further reply		33	33
Don't know	99	99	99
Other (1 st response) Specify:	34		
Other (2 nd response) Specify:		35	
Other (3 rd response) Specify:			36

H. LIST EXPERIMENT 1
Scripter: Randomize 17 A, 17 B, 17 C into THREE groups.

17A	<p>It is sometimes debated who should have the right to vote in South African elections. I am going to show you a list that mentions different groups of people, and I would like you to tell me HOW MANY of the following groups you think should be allowed to vote. Please, do not tell me which groups, only HOW MANY.</p> <p><u>Interviewer:</u> Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard.</p> <p>It is important that you make it clear to the respondent that they should only mention a number. <i>[One answer allowed]</i></p>
	Young people between the ages of 18 to 21
	South Africans living abroad
	Zimbabweans without South African citizenship
	Zero items 0
	One item 1
	Two items 2
	Three items 3
17B	<p>It is sometimes debated who should have the right to vote in South African elections. I am going to show you a list that mentions different groups of people, and I would like you to tell me WHICH of the following groups you think should be allowed to vote. You can choose more than one group.</p>
	<p><u>Interviewer:</u> Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard.</p>
	<p>Ask the respondent to point out the different groups they think should be allowed to vote. <i>[Multiple answers allowed]</i></p>
	Young people between the ages of 18 to 21 1
	South Africans living abroad 2
	Poor people 3
	Zimbabweans without South African citizenship 4
	None of the above apply 0
17C	<p>It is sometimes debated who should have the right to vote in South African elections. I am going to show you a list that mentions different groups of people, and I would like you to tell me HOW MANY of the following groups you think should be allowed to vote. Please, do not tell me which groups, only HOW MANY.</p>
	<p><u>Interviewer:</u> Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard.</p>
	<p>It is important that you make it clear to the respondent that they should only mention a number. <i>[One answer allowed]</i></p>
	Young people between the ages of 18 to 21
	South Africans living abroad
	Poor people
	Zimbabweans without South African citizenship
	Zero items 0
	One item 1
	Two items 2
	Three items 3
	Four items 4

F. SURVEY EXPERIMENT 2: INEQUALITY
Scripter: Randomize 18 A and 18 B into TWO groups.

18A	<p>Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels between the rich and the poor". Do you.....</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i></p>
Strongly agree	5
Somewhat agree	4
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Somewhat disagree	2
Strongly disagree	1
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

18B	<p>Compared to all other countries in the world, South Africa is the country where incomes are distributed most unequally in the population. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels between the rich and the poor". Do you.....</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i></p>
Strongly agree	5
Somewhat agree	4
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Somewhat disagree	2
Strongly disagree	1
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

G. SURVEY EXPERIMENT 3: POVERTY
Scripter: Randomize 19 A and 19 B into TWO groups.

19A	<p>Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should take measures to increase taxes on the rich in order to increase social grants to the poor". Do you.....</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i></p>
Strongly agree	5
Somewhat agree	4
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Somewhat disagree	2
Strongly disagree	1
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

19B	<p>In South Africa, more than half of the population lives below the national poverty line, and have no more than R1100 per month to live on. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The government should take measures to increase taxes on the rich in order to increase social grants to the poor". Do you.....</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i></p>
Strongly agree	5
Somewhat agree	4
Neither agree nor disagree	3
Somewhat disagree	2
Strongly disagree	1
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

F. TAXATION

20.	Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share, the same share or a smaller share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
	Much larger share 1
	Larger share 2
	Same share 3
	Smaller share 4
	Much smaller share 5
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99

21.	In South Africa people who earn less than R75 000 per year do not pay income taxes. Do you think this amount should be increased, decreased, or should it stay the same?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed]</i>
	Increased 1
	Stay the same 2
	Decreased 3
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99

22.	In South Africa people with high incomes pay 45% of their incomes in taxes. Do you think people with high incomes should pay more, the same or less than they pay in taxes today?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
	Much more 1
	More 2
	The same 3
	Less 4
	Much less 5
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99

I. REDISTRIBUTION

23.	For the next statements, please say whether government should spend more or less in each of the following areas. Remember if you say "MORE" it could require a tax increase, and if you say "LESS" it could require a reduction in those services. Thinking about government spending in the following areas, should there be much more spending, more spending, the same spending as now, less spending, or much less spending than now?						
	<i>[[Read out statement. One answer per option] Hand Showcard]</i>						
Area of government spending	Much more than now	More than now	The same as now	Less than now	Much less than now	Refused <i>[Do not read]</i>	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>
G. Health	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
H. Education	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
I. Unemployment benefits	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
J. Defence	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
K. Old age pensions for the elderly	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
L. Business and industry	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
M. Police and Law enforcement	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
N. Social grants/ welfare benefits	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

24.	Sometimes in political life, politicians have to make hard choices concerning how to spend taxpayer money. I am now going to ask you how you would choose between different types of government spending. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements?							
	<i>[Read out each statement and Hand Showcard. One answer per statement]</i>							
		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused [Do not read]	Don't know [Do not read]
A.	The government should spend MORE money on unemployment benefits, even if it means spending LESS money on schools and education	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
B.	The government should spend MORE money on social grants for the poor, even if it means spending LESS money on hospitals and health care.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
C.	The government should spend MORE money on pensions for the elderly, even if it means spending LESS money on roads and public transport.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

25.	Would you personally be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase government spending on health care and education?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes		1
No		2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99

26.	Would you personally be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase government spending on social grants and unemployment benefits?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes		1
No		2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99

27.	In 2017, the South African government signed an agreement to implement a national minimum wage. The minimum wage is set to R20 per hour. Do you support the effort to create a national minimum wage?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes		1
No		2
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99

28.	Do you think the national minimum wage of R20 per hour is.....?	
	<i>[Only one answer allowed] [Read out options]</i>	
Too low		1
Too high		2
About right		3
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99

J. LIST EXPERIMENT 2

Scripter: Randomize 29 A, 29 B, 29 C into THREE groups.

In August 2016, municipal elections were held throughout the entire country. Now I would like you to think back on the Municipal elections in August last year and ask you some questions about elections in this country.

29A	<p>I'm going to show you a list that mentions various activities that people sometimes do or experience during election campaigns. And I would like for you to tell me if you have done or experienced these activities during the municipal elections last year. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.</p>	
		<p><u>Interviewer:</u> Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard.</p> <p>It is important that you make it clear to the respondent that they should only mention a number. <i>[One answer allowed]</i></p>
I have talked to family and friends about political issues		
I have participated in a political rally		
I have signed a petition supporting children's rights		
Political activists have threatened me		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4

29B	<p>I'm going to show you a list that mentions various activities that people sometimes do or experience during election campaigns. And I would like for you to tell me if you have done or experienced these activities during the municipal elections last year. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.</p>	
		<p><u>Interviewer:</u> Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard.</p> <p>It is important that you make it clear to the respondent that they should only mention a number. <i>[One answer allowed]</i></p>
I have talked to family and friends about political issues		
I have participated in a political rally		
Someone from a political party contacted me to offer me money, a food parcel or housing in return for my vote.		
I have signed a petition supporting children's rights		
Political activists have threatened me		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

29C	I'm going to show you a list that mentions various activities that people sometimes do or experience during election campaigns. And I would like for you to tell me if you have done or experienced these activities during the municipal elections last year. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.	
	Interviewer: Please ensure that you read and follow all the instructions on the tablet. For this question, please show respondents the SHOWCARD ON THE TABLET and READ OUT the options on the showcard. It is important that you make it clear to the respondent that they should only mention a number. <i>[One answer allowed]</i>	
I have talked to family and friends about political issues		
I have participated in a political rally		
I have contacted someone from a political party to ask for money, a food parcel or housing for myself or my household		
I have signed a petition supporting children's rights		
Political activists have threatened me		
Zero items		0
One item		1
Two items		2
Three items		3
Four items		4
Five items		5

N. VOTE CHOICE		
30.	In talking to people about the municipal elections last year, we find that a lot of people did not vote because they were not registered, did not have the time, or decided not to vote. How about you?	
	Did you vote in the municipal elections last year? <i>[Only one answer allowed]</i>	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q31
No	2	➤ Go to Q32
Don't know / can't remember <i>[Do not read]</i>	99	➤ Go to Q32

31.	And which political party did you vote for in the municipal elections? [Do not read out options. Multiple answers allowed]
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Refused to answer [Do not read]	98
Don't know [Do not read]	99

N. SURVEY EXPERIMENT 4: WEALTHY CANDIDATES
Scripter: Randomize 32 A, 32 B, 32 C, 32 D and 32 E into FIVE groups.

32A	Imagine that someone who is a very wealthy business person is running for Mayor in your municipality. He also owns a large corporation. How likely is it that you would support that candidate? [Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98
Don't know [Do not read]	99

32B	Imagine that someone who is a very wealthy business person is running for Mayor in your municipality. He also owns a large corporation, and has been very successful at creating a profitable business. How likely is it that you would support that candidate? [Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98
Don't know [Do not read]	99

32C	Imagine that someone who is a very wealthy business person is running for Mayor in your municipality. He also owns a large corporation, and is a strong advocate of removing apartheid symbols and statues from government buildings and public spaces. How likely is it that you would support that candidate?
<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

32D	Imagine that someone who is a very wealthy business person is running for Mayor in your municipality. He also owns a large corporation, and is a famous person in South Africa who often appears on television. How likely is it that you would support that candidate?
<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

32E	Imagine that someone who is a very wealthy business person is running for Mayor in your municipality. He also owns a large corporation, and offers housing and food parcels to people in your local area who supports him politically. How likely is it that you would support that candidate?
<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
Very unlikely	0
Unlikely	1
Neither unlikely or likely	2
Likely	3
Very likely	4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

O. GROUP VOTING

Sometimes people believe it is important for members of their group to vote for the same party.

[Read out each statement. Only one answer per statement] Hand Showcard

	Very important	Some-what important	Not very important	Not at all important	Don't know [Do not read]
33. How important do you believe it is for members of your FAMILY to vote for the same party?	1	2	3	4	99
34. How important do you believe it is for people in your NEIGHBOURHOOD to vote for the same party?	1	2	3	4	99
35. How important do you believe it is for members of your RELIGIOUS GROUP to vote for the same party?	1	2	3	4	99
36. How important do you believe it is for members of your RACIAL GROUP to vote for the same party?	1	2	3	4	99

P. ELECTIONS		
37.	During the municipal elections last year, did you contact someone from a political party to ask for money, a food parcel or housing for yourself or your household?	
	[Only one answer allowed]	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q38
No	2	➤ Go to Q39
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98	➤ Go to Q39
38.	Which party was that?	
	[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1	
African Muslim Party	2	
African National Congress (ANC)	3	
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4	
Agang	5	
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6	
Congress of the People (COPE)	7	
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8	
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9	
Federal Alliance	10	
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11	
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12	
Minority Front	13	
National Freedom Party	14	
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15	
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16	
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17	
United Democratic Movement	18	
Other [Specify]: _____	20	
Don't know [Do not read]	99	
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98	
39.	During the municipal elections last year, did someone from a political party contact you to offer you money, a food parcel or housing in return for your vote?	
	[Only one answer allowed]	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q40
No	2	➤ Go to Q41
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	98	➤ Go to Q41

40.	Which party was that?
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1
African Muslim Party	2
African National Congress (ANC)	3
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4
Agang	5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6
Congress of the People (COPE)	7
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9
Federal Alliance	10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12
Minority Front	13
National Freedom Party	14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17
United Democratic Movement	18
Other [Specify]: _____	20
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

41.	During election campaigns in this country, politicians often make promises to improve public services. Using this card would you say that you can trust these promises? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where "0" means you cannot trust politicians' election promises and "10" means you can trust politicians' election promises.
	<i>Hand Showcard Only one answer allowed</i>
0. Politicians' election promises cannot be trusted	0
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10. Politicians' election promises can be trusted	10
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

42.	During elections, how likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though voting is supposed to be secret in this country?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very unlikely	1
Unlikely	2
Neither unlikely or likely	3
Likely	4
Very likely	5
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

N. SURVEY EXPERIMENT 5: CORRUPTION

Scripter: Randomize 43 A, 43 B, 43 C, 43 D and 43 E into FIVE groups.

43A	Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area.	
	How likely is it that you would vote for that candidate?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
	Very unlikely	0
	Unlikely	1
	Neither unlikely or likely	2
	Likely	3
	Very likely	4
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

43B	Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.	
	How likely is it that you would vote for that candidate?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
	Very unlikely	0
	Unlikely	1
	Neither unlikely or likely	2
	Likely	3
	Very likely	4
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

43C	Let's say that a political candidate from the ANC is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.	
	How likely is it that you would vote for that candidate?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
	Very unlikely	0
	Unlikely	1
	Neither unlikely or likely	2
	Likely	3
	Very likely	4
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

43D	Let's say that a political candidate from the DA is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.	
	How likely is it that you would vote for that candidate?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>	
	Very unlikely	0
	Unlikely	1
	Neither unlikely or likely	2
	Likely	3
	Very likely	4
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

43E	<p>Let's say that a political candidate is running for election to the municipal council in your municipality and has offered YOU work or a job in return for your vote. The candidate has worked hard in the municipal council to build a new health clinic in your area and is known for taking bribes from businesses when handing out government contracts.</p> <p>How likely is it that you would vote for that candidate?</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i></p>
	Very unlikely 0
	Unlikely 1
	Neither unlikely or likely 2
	Likely 3
	Very likely 4
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i> 98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99

Q. CLIENTELISM

Now I would like to ask you about how political parties make contact with people like you.		
44.	<p>In the past year, has anyone from a political party helped you get work or a job and asked for your political support or vote in return?</p> <p><i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i></p>	
	Yes 1	➤ Go to Q45
	No 2	➤ Go to Q46
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i> 98	➤ Go to Q46
45.	<p>Which party was that?</p> <p><i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i></p>	
	African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 1	
	African Muslim Party 2	
	African National Congress (ANC) 3	
	Afrikaner Unity Movement 4	
	Agang 5	
	Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 6	
	Congress of the People (COPE) 7	
	Democratic Alliance (DA) 8	
	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 9	
	Federal Alliance 10	
	Freedom Front Plus (FF+) 11	
	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 12	
	Minority Front 13	
	National Freedom Party 14	
	New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP) 15	
	Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 16	
	United Democratic Party (UCDP) 17	
	United Democratic Movement 18	
	Other [Specify]: _____ 20	
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99	
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i> 98	

46.	In the past year, has anyone from a political party helped you get access to public housing and asked for your political support or vote in return?		
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>		
Yes	1	➤	Go to Q47
No	2	➤	Go to Q48
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	➤	Go to Q48

47.	Which party was that?		
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>		
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1		
African Muslim Party	2		
African National Congress (ANC)	3		
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4		
Agang	5		
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6		
Congress of the People (COPE)	7		
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8		
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9		
Federal Alliance	10		
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11		
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12		
Minority Front	13		
National Freedom Party	14		
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15		
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16		
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17		
United Democratic Movement	18		
Other [Specify]: _____	20		
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99		
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98		

48.	In the past year, has anyone from a political party helped you get access to a public service like clean water, sanitation, or electricity, and asked for your political support or vote in return?		
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>		
Yes	1	➤	Go to Q49
No	2	➤	Go to Q50
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	➤	Go to Q50

49.	Which party was that?	
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)		1
African Muslim Party		2
African National Congress (ANC)		3
Afrikaner Unity Movement		4
Agang		5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)		6
Congress of the People (COPE)		7
Democratic Alliance (DA)		8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)		9
Federal Alliance		10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)		11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)		12
Minority Front		13
National Freedom Party		14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)		15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)		16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)		17
United Democratic Movement		18
Other [Specify]: _____		20
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		99
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>		98

50.	In the past year, has anyone from a political party helped you get access to a social grant or welfare benefit and asked for your political support or vote in return?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q51
No	2	➤ Go to Q52
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	➤ Go to Q52

51.	Which party was that?	
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1	
African Muslim Party	2	
African National Congress (ANC)	3	
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4	
Agang	5	
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6	
Congress of the People (COPE)	7	
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8	
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9	
Federal Alliance	10	
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11	
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12	
Minority Front	13	
National Freedom Party	14	
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15	
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16	
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17	
United Democratic Movement	18	
Other [Specify]: _____	20	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

52.	In the past year, has anyone from a political party helped you get access to food parcels or food vouchers and asked for your political support or vote in return?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q53
No	2	➤ Go to Q54
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	➤ Go to Q54

53.	Which party was that?	
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>	
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)	1	
African Muslim Party	2	
African National Congress (ANC)	3	
Afrikaner Unity Movement	4	
Agang	5	
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)	6	
Congress of the People (COPE)	7	
Democratic Alliance (DA)	8	
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	9	
Federal Alliance	10	
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)	11	
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	12	
Minority Front	13	
National Freedom Party	14	
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)	15	
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)	16	
United Democratic Party (UCDP)	17	
United Democratic Movement	18	
Other [Specify]: _____	20	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

54.	In the past year, has a local community leader or someone from a political party contacted you to find out which political party you support?	
	<i>[Respondent must answer yes or no]</i>	
Yes	1	➤ Go to Q55
No	2	➤ Go to Q56
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	➤ Go to Q56

55.	Which party was that?					
	<i>[Do not read out options. One answer allowed]</i>					
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP)						1
African Muslim Party						2
African National Congress (ANC)						3
Afrikaner Unity Movement						4
Agang						5
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO)						6
Congress of the People (COPE)						7
Democratic Alliance (DA)						8
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)						9
Federal Alliance						10
Freedom Front Plus (FF+)						11
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)						12
Minority Front						13
National Freedom Party						14
New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP)						15
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)						16
United Democratic Party (UCDP)						17
United Democratic Movement						18
Other [Specify]: _____						20
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>						99
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>						98

56.	People seek help from politicians or political parties for different reasons. Thinking about the reasons why people seek help from politicians or political parties in your area, how much do you agree with the following statements?					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>					
	Strongly agree	Some-what agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Some what disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know [Do not read]
A. People in my area must seek personal help from politicians in order to get the public services they need?	1	2	3	4	5	99
B. People in my area seek personal help from politicians in order to get access to special privileges or wealth?	1	2	3	4	5	99

R. VIGNETTE EXPERIMENT

Scripter: Randomize 57A, 57B, and 57C, into THREE groups.

57A.	<p>(Interviewer Note: PLEASE READ OUT SCENARIO IN FULL) – DO NOT SUMMARISE</p> <p>Now I would like you to think of a town that very much resembles your local area. In this town, a political candidate that enjoys great local support competed in the last municipal elections. A few years ago, this candidate attended university in Johannesburg, but returned to his home-town after completing his studies. Here, he founded a family and took up a job in the local municipality. During the last municipal election, the candidate campaigned by going from house to house and talking to voters. He presented plans to develop the town. After meeting each voter, the candidate thanked everyone he talked to and asked them to vote for him.</p> <p><i>Hand Showcard</i></p>	
A.	<p>If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that he would win the election?</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i></p>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99
B.	<p>If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for him?</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i></p>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99
C.	<p>If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for another candidate?</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i></p>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99
D.	<p>If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would not vote at all?</p> <p><i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i></p>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

E.	Now I would like to ask you some questions about the candidate. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means NOT AT ALL and 5 means VERY MUCH please tell me:						
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>						
		Not at all				Very much	Don't know [Do not read]
	1. Do you think the candidate would be a good manager?	1	2	3	4	5	99
	2. Do you think this candidate would be capable of ensuring order in the town?	1	2	3	4	5	99
	3. Do you think this candidate is likely to help poor people?	1	2	3	4	5	99
	4. Do you think this candidate might help persons like you find a job?	1	2	3	4	5	99
	5. Do you think this candidate would help persons like you when they face economic distress?	1	2	3	4	5	99
	6. Do you think this candidate has political experience?	1	2	3	4	5	99

57B (READ OUT TEXT)	(Interviewer Note: PLEASE READ OUT SCENARIO IN FULL) – DO NOT SUMMARISE	
	<p>Now I would like you to think of a town that very much resembles your local area. In this town, a political candidate that enjoys great local support competed in the last municipal elections. A few years ago, this candidate attended university in Johannesburg, but returned to his home-town after completing his studies. Here, he founded a family and took up a job in the local municipality. During the last municipal election, the candidate campaigned by going from house to house and talking to voters. He presented plans to develop the town. After meeting each voter, the candidate thanked everyone he talked to and asked them to vote for him. Other people who work for the South African Social Service Agency (SASSA) accompanied him during his campaign and promised voters' access to social grants if they supported this candidate.</p>	
	<i>Hand Showcard</i>	

A.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that he would win the election?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

B.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for him?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>	
	Very likely	5
	Likely	4
	Neither likely nor unlikely	3
	Unlikely	2
	Very unlikely	1
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

C.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for another candidate?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>
Very likely	5
Likely	4
Neither likely nor unlikely	3
Unlikely	2
Very unlikely	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

D.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would not vote at all?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>
Very likely	5
Likely	4
Neither likely nor unlikely	3
Unlikely	2
Very unlikely	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

E.	Now I would like to ask you some questions about the candidate. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means NOT AT ALL and 5 means VERY MUCH please tell me:						
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed]</i> hand Showcard						
		Not at all				Very much	Don't know [Do not read]
1. Do you think the candidate would be a good manager?		1	2	3	4	5	99
2. Do you think this candidate would be capable of ensuring order in the town?		1	2	3	4	5	99
3. Do you think this candidate is likely to help poor people?		1	2	3	4	5	99
4. Do you think this candidate might help persons like you find a job?		1	2	3	4	5	99
5. Do you think this candidate would help persons like you when they face economic distress?		1	2	3	4	5	99
6. Do you think this candidate has political experience?		1	2	3	4	5	99

57C (READ OUT TEXT)	Now I would like you to think of a town that very much resembles your local area. In this town, a political candidate that enjoys great local support competed in the last municipal elections. A few years ago, this candidate attended university in Johannesburg, but returned to his home-town after completing his studies. Here, he founded a family and took up a job in the local municipality. During the last municipal election, the candidate campaigned by going from house to house and talking to voters. He presented plans to develop the town. After meeting each voter, the candidate thanked everyone he talked to and asked them to vote for him. Other people who work for the South African Social Service Agency (SASSA) accompanied him during his campaign and threatened voters who receive social grants that they will lose the grant if they do not support this candidate.
	<i>[Interviewer: The scenario must be read out in full. Do not summarise] hand showcard</i>

A.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that he would win the election?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>
Very likely	5
Likely	4
Neither likely nor unlikely	3
Unlikely	2
Very unlikely	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

B.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for him?					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>					
Very likely					5	
Likely					4	
Neither likely nor unlikely					3	
Unlikely					2	
Very unlikely					1	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>					99	

C.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would vote for another candidate?					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>					
Very likely					5	
Likely					4	
Neither likely nor unlikely					3	
Unlikely					2	
Very unlikely					1	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>					99	

D.	If this candidate ran in an election in your town, how likely is it that you would not vote at all?					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>					
Very likely					5	
Likely					4	
Neither likely nor unlikely					3	
Unlikely					2	
Very unlikely					1	
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>					99	

E.	Now I would like to ask you some questions about the candidate. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means NOT AT ALL and 5 means VERY MUCH please tell me:					
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard</i>					
	Not at all				Very much	Don't know [Do not read]
1. Do you think the candidate would be a good manager?	1	2	3	4	5	99
2. Do you think this candidate would be capable of ensuring order in the town?	1	2	3	4	5	99
3. Do you think this candidate is likely to help poor people?	1	2	3	4	5	99
4. Do you think this candidate might help persons like you find a job?	1	2	3	4	5	99
5. Do you think this candidate would help persons like you when they face economic distress?	1	2	3	4	5	99
6. Do you think this candidate has political experience?	1	2	3	4	5	99

S. RISK AVERSION

Now I would like to ask you a few more questions about yourself.

58.	Suppose you are given the choice between the following two options. Please tell me which ONE you would choose.
	Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent says they cannot choose then ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel
Getting R200 for sure OR	
A 50/50 chance of getting R400	
Refuse to answer [Do not read]	
	1
	2
	98

59.	Please tell me which statement you agree with the <u>most</u>.	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
A good job is a stable and permanent job even though the pay is low OR		1
A good job is a highly paid job even though it is unstable and not permanent		2
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]		98

60.	Please tell me which statement describes you best.	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
I am a person who prefers to avoid risks OR		1
I am a person who is prepared to take risks		2
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]		98

N. TIME DISCOUNTING

61.	Suppose you are given the choice between getting R200 today or R400 in one month: Which offer would you prefer?	
	Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel	
R200 today OR		1
R400 in one month		2
Refuse to answer [Do not read]		98

62.	Suppose you are given R400. Which of the following two options <u>would best describe</u> how you would handle that money?	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
I would spend it within one week OR		1
I would set it aside for savings		2
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]		98

63.	Please tell me which statement you agree with the most.	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
	A good job is a job you can get today OR	1
	A good job is a job that requires you to go through many years of education	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

64.	Please tell me which statement describes you best.	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
	I am a person who cares more about today than about the future OR	1
	I am a person who cares more about the future than about today	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

O. SOCIAL NORMS

65.	Please tell me which statement you agree with the most.	
	<i>Interviewer: Read out both statements and then ask respondent to choose one of the statements. If respondent cannot choose ask them to select the one that comes closest to how they feel</i>	
	Most people can be trusted OR	1
	Most people cannot be trusted	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

66.	Suppose someone does you a favour. Would you feel obliged to return that favour?	
	<i>[Respondents must answer either yes or no. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Yes	1
	No	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

67.	Suppose someone tries to do you wrong. Would you try to take revenge?	
	<i>[Respondents must answer yes or no. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Yes	1
	No	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

68.	Suppose YOU do someone a favour. Would you expect that person to return that favour?	
	<i>[Respondents must answer yes or no. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
	Yes	1
	No	2
	Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]	98

P. TRUST

The following questions are about the president in this country.

69.	How well or badly do you feel that President Jacob Zuma is doing his job? Is it Very badly, Badly, Well or Very well?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very badly	1
Badly	2
Well	3
Very well	4
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

70.	How likely do you think it is that President Jacob Zuma is involved in corruption? Is it Very likely, Likely, Unlikely or Very unlikely?
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed] Hand Showcard</i>
Very likely	4
Likely	3
Unlikely	2
Very unlikely	1
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

T. DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTION

I would now like to ask you some questions about democracy and fairness in politics.

71.	People have different views about what kind of government is best for this country. Using this card, would you say that you support having a democratically elected government (10 on the showcard), or that you support having a government that is not democratically elected by the people (0 on the showcard). <i>Hand Showcard</i>
0. support a non-democratic government	0
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10. support a democratically elected government	10
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

72 and 73	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree that... [Interviewer: Read out statements]						
	[Read out statements. Only one answer allowed] hand Showcard						
	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused [Do not read]	Don't know [Do not read]
72. Political parties should be required by law to make information publicly available about who donates money to them.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
73. The government should be required by law to make information publicly available about handing out government tenders and contracts.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

74.	In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe or give a gift to...			
	[Read out each statement. Only one answer allowed per statement] hand Showcard			
	Never	Once or twice	Often	Don't know [Do not read]
A. A teacher or school official in order to get the services you needed from the school?	5	4	2	99
B. A health worker or hospital staff in order to get the medical services you needed?	5	4	2	99
C. A government official in order to get the documents or permits you needed?	5	4	2	99
D. A police officer in order to get the assistance you needed or to avoid paying a fine or getting arrested?	5	4	2	99
E. An official from your municipality in order to get a public service like water, sanitation, or electricity?	5	4	2	99

U. KNOWLEDGE	
I would also like to ask you some questions about South Africa, the economy, and politics in general.	
75.	What is the name of the 2nd largest party in parliament?
	[Hand Showcard. Only one answer allowed]
ANC - African National Congress	1
DA - Democratic Alliance	2
EFF - Economic Freedom Fighters	3
COPE - Congress of the People	4
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party	5
Don't know [Do not read]	99

76.	What is the OFFICIAL unemployment rate in South Africa? [Hand Showcard. Only one answer allowed]
20-24%	1
25-29%	2
30-34%	3
35-39%	4
40-44%	5
Don't know [Do not read]	99
77.	Who is the current Finance Minister in South Africa? [Hand Showcard. Only one answer allowed]
Pravin Gordhan	1
Trevor Noah	2
Jacob Zuma	3
Mcebisi Jonas	4
Malusi Gigaba	5
Don't know [Do not read]	99
78.	Which country is South Africa's largest trade partner? [Hand Showcard. Only one answer allowed]
China	1
Russia	2
Zimbabwe	3
Botswana	4
USA	5
Don't know [Do not read]	99

V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Now we are almost finished. But before we end I would like to ask some background questions.

79.	What is the highest level of education you have completed? [Hand Showcard]
No schooling	0
Primary school incomplete	1
Primary school complete	2
Secondary/ high school incomplete	3
Completed Matric	4
Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5
Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6
Completed university degree	7
Post-graduate degree	8
Other (Specify): _____	9
Refused to answer [Do not read]	98
Don't know [Do not read]	99

80.	Do you, or anyone else in your household receive any social grants like child support grant, old age pension and disability grant?	
Yes		1
No		0
Don't know		99

81	With regards to employment, what is your occupational status? Are you...?	
	<i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
Self-employed / own business	02	➤ Go to Q83
Working full-time	03	➤ Go to Q82A
Working part-time / contract / casual / seasonal work	04	
Unemployed and looking for work	05	➤ Ask Q82
Unemployed and not looking for work	06	
Scholar at school	07	➤ Go to Q84
Student at college, university etc.	08	
Disabled or receive a disability grant	09	
Retired / Pensioner	10	
Housewife	11	
Other (Specify): _____	12	
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98	

82.	Do you receive unemployment benefits?	
Yes	1	➤ GGo to Q84
No	0	
Don't know <i>(Do not read)</i>	99	

ASK If working full time/part time [If Q81 = 3 or 4]

82A	Are you employed by...?	
	<i>[Read out options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>	
The private sector: that is any small, medium or large business or corporation which is run by individuals and companies for profit and is not owned or operated by the government?		1
The government/public sector: that is any government department either at a national, provincial or local government / municipal level?		2
A Parastatal: that is any business owned by the government such as Eskom, Transnet, SAA, Telkom, South African Post Office, SABC etc.)?		3
A NGO, CBO or FBO: that is non-governmental organisations, community based organisations or faith based organisations		4
Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>		9 9

83.	If you lost your job, how long would you be able to get by without that income?	
	<i>[Read out options. Only one answer allowed]</i>	
Less than one week		1
Less than one month		2
Less than one year		3
Indefinitely		4
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>		98

84.	Are you: <i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>
Single	1
Married/living with partner	2
Divorced/separated from/not living with spouse	3
Widowed	4
Other	5
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

85.	How many children do you have? <i>[Read Out. Only one answer allowed]</i>
Have no children	0
One	1
Two	2
Three	3
Four	4
Five	5
More than five children	6
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

86.	Please tell me into which group the total monthly income of this household income falls? By total household monthly income, we refer to all the incomes received by all the people living in your household before deductions. Please include all salaries, wages, social grants, money received from family and friends, investments, maintenance, child support etc. You need only tell me the letter corresponding to the income group into which your household falls.				
	<i>Hand showcard [Only one answer allowed]</i>				

A	Up to R 999	03	P	R15 000 – R15 999	18
B	R1 000 – R1 999	04	Q	R16 000 – R16 999	19
C	R2 000 – R2 999	05	R	R17 000 – R17 999	20
D	R3 000 – R3 999	06	S	R18 000 – R18 999	21
E	R4 000 – R4 999	07	T	R19 000 – R19 999	22
F	R5 000 – R5 999	08	U	R20 000 – R21 999	23
G	R6 000 – R6 999	09	V	R22 000 – R23 999	24
H	R7 000 – R7 999	10	W	R24 000 – R25 999	25
I	R8 000 – R8 999	11	X	R26 000 – R27 999	26
J	R9 000 – R9 999	12	Y	R28 000 – R29 999	27
K	R10 000 – R10 999	13	Z	R30 000 +	28
L	R11 000 – R11 999	14	AA	Refused to answer	98
M	R12 000 – R12 999	15	BB	Don't know	99
N	R13 000 – R13 999	16	CC	No Income (explain): _____	31
O	R14 000 – R14 999	17			

87.	What is your ethnic group, cultural community or tribe? <i>[Only one answer allowed]</i>
English	01
White/European	02
Afrikaans/Afrikaaner/Boer	03
Ndebele	04
Xhosa	05
Pedi/North Sotho	06
Sotho/South Sotho	07
Setswana/Tswana	08
Shangaan	09
Swati	10
Venda	11
Zulu	12
Coloured	13
Asian/Indian	14
South African only	15
Other (Specify): _____	16
Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98

88.	What is your religion, if any? <i>[Do not read options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>
None	1
CHRISTIAN GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS	
Christian only (i.e., respondents says only "Christian", without identifying a specific sub-group)	2
Roman Catholic	3
Orthodox	4
Coptic	5
Protestant – Mainline	
Anglican	6
Lutheran	7
Methodist	8
Presbyterian	9
Baptist	10
Quaker / Friends	11
Mennonite	12
Dutch Reformed (e.g. NGK, NHK, GK, Mission, APK, URC)	13
Calvinist	14
Protestant – Non-mainline <i>[L. religDenom]</i>	
Evangelical	15
Pentecostal (e.g., "Born Again" and/or "Saved")	16
Independent (e.g., "African Independent Church")	17
Church of Christ	18
Zionist Christian Church	19
Others	
Jehovah's Witness	20
Seventh Day Adventist	21

Mormon	22
MUSLIM GROUPS / DENOMINATIONS	
Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only "Muslim", without identifying a specific sub-group)	23
Sunni	
Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only "Sunni" or "Sunni Muslim", without identifying a specific sub-group)	24
Ismaeli	25
Mouridiya Brotherhood	26
Tijaniya Brotherhood	27
Qadiriya Brotherhood	28
Shia	
Shia only (i.e., respondents says only "Shia" or "Shia Muslim", without identifying a specific sub-group)	29
OTHER	
Traditional / ethnic religion	30
Hindu	31
Bahai	32
Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God)	33
Atheist (Do not believe in a God)	34
Other	35
Refused	98
Don't know [Do not read]	99

W. LIVING STANDARD MEASURES			
89.	Please tell me which of the following are presently in your household. Do you have ... ?		
	[Read out each item and answer YES or NO] [Only one answer allowed]		
	LSM ITEM/AMENITY	Yes	No
1	Hot running water from a geyser	4	9
2	Computer/s - Desktop/Laptop	6	9
3	Electric Stove	7	9
4	Do you employ a domestic worker in this household (by this we mean a live-in or part-time domestics and/or gardeners)?	1	9
6	Is there a Flush toilet inside or outside house	5	9
7	Do you or anyone who lives in this household have a motor vehicle/s i.e. car, van, bakkie, truck, lorry etc.	1	9
8	Washing machine	2	9
9	Refrigerator or a combined fridge/freezer	6	9
10	Vacuum cleaner/floor polisher	7	9
11	Pay TV (M-Net/DStv/TopTV) subscription	4	9
12	Dishwashing machine	1	9
15	Home security service	2	9
16	Deep freezer – free standing	5	9
17	Microwave oven	8	9
20	DVD player/Blu-ray Player	3	9
21	Tumble Dryer	3	9
22	Home theatre system	8	9
23	Home telephone (this can be a Telkom or Neotel landline but not a cellphone)	4	9
24	Swimming pool (i.e. a built-in swimming pool – not inflatable pool)	5	9
25	Tap water in house/on plot	3	9
26	A Built-in kitchen sink	1	9
27	TV (television set/s)	1	9
28	Air conditioner [Interviewer explain] an air-conditioner is a major appliance or system designed to change the air temperature and humidity in an area. It is not a fan or a water cooler.	6	9
19	Does respondent live in a house, cluster house, townhouse, flat or formal dwelling?	3	9
18	Does respondent live in a rural area outside Gauteng and the Western Cape	4	9
Q89a	How many radios (excluding car radios) do you have in your household?		
	[Record number]		
NUMBER OF RADIOS			
Q89b	How many cell phones are there in your household? Please include cell phones that are owned, rented or used by anyone in the household (including your own).		
	[Record number]		
NUMBER OF CELL PHONES			
90.	Do you have a tablet (like an iPad or similar)?		
Yes		1	
No		0	
Don't know [Do not read]		99	

91.	Have you ever been on an airplane?	
Yes		1
No		0
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]		99

X. PARENTS SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

92.	Thinking about your parents living conditions when you were a child, would you say that they were rich, had a middle income, or were poor?	
	<i>[Hand Showcard]</i> Read out options	
Very rich		1
Rich		2
Just above middle income		3
Middle income		4
Just below middle income		5
Poor		6
Very poor		7
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]		98

93.	What is the highest level of education your MOTHER completed?	
	<i>[Hand Showcard]</i>	
No schooling		0
Primary school incomplete		1
Primary school complete		2
Secondary/ high school incomplete		3
Completed Matric		4
Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying		5
Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school		6
Completed university degree		7
Post-graduate degree		8
Other (Specify): _____		9
Refuse to answer [<i>Do not read</i>]		98
Don't know [<i>Do not read</i>]		99

94.	What is the highest level of education your FATHER completed?	
	<i>[Hand Showcard]</i>	
	No schooling	0
	Primary school incomplete	1
	Primary school complete	2
	Secondary/ high school incomplete	3
	Completed Matric	4
	Some college / technikon / university / trade school / still studying	5
	Completed college / technikon diploma / trade school	6
	Completed university degree	7
	Post-graduate degree	8
	Other (Specify): _____	9
	Refuse to answer <i>[Do not read]</i>	98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i>	99

95.	Could you please tell me which racial group your MOTHER belong to:	
	Black	1
	Coloured	2
	Indian/Asian	3
	White	4
	Other (Specify) _____	5

96.	Could you please tell me which racial group your FATHER belong to:	
	Black	1
	Coloured	2
	Indian/Asian	3
	White	4
	Other (Specify) _____	5

Y. VOTE INTENTION

And a final question.

97.	If there was a National election tomorrow, which party are you most likely to vote for?
	<i>[Do not read out options] [Only one answer allowed]</i>
	African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 1
	African Muslim Party 2
	African National Congress (ANC) 3
	Afrikaner Unity Movement 4
	Agang 5
	Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 6
	Congress of the People (COPE) 7
	Democratic Alliance (DA) 8
	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 9
	Federal Alliance 10
	Freedom Front Plus (FF+) 11
	Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 12
	Minority Front 13
	National Freedom Party 14
	New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP) 15
	Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 16
	United Democratic Party (UCDP) 17
	United Democratic Movement 18
	Other [Specify]: _____ 20
	Refused to answer <i>[Do not read]</i> 98
	Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> 99

CONSENT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Dear Sir / Madam

We found your feedback and input extremely valuable and we would like to reassure you that the information you have provided and your personal details will remain confidential, and will not be shared with anyone.

However, in the future, Citizen Surveys may need to conduct additional research on how things are going in your local municipality in order to strengthen the quality of local democracy and give citizens a greater voice in local government. Would you be willing to be contacted in the future to participate in such research?

Remember you are under no obligation to consent; this is completely voluntary. However, we have to ask it of all the people we have interviewed. Please sign below to indicate whether you agree or whether you refuse to be contacted for future research.

1	<i>Yes, I consent to being contacted for future research (please sign below):</i> Signature.....
2	<i>No, I do not want to be contacted for future research (please sign below):</i> Signature.....

THANK RESPONDENT FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE SURVEY

Scripter: New screen

N. Interviewer to complete		
98.	What is the respondent's race	
	<i>Interviewer to complete: Do not ask (by observation only)</i>	
	Black	1
	Coloured	2
	Indian	3
	White	4
99.	In what type of dwelling does the respondent live?	
	<i>INTERVIEWER TO COMPLETE WHILST IN EA (NOT ANYWHERE ELSE): Do not ask (by observation only)</i>	
	Formal dwelling: Permanent structure with foundation.	1
	Informal dwelling – backyard shack (this is a shack in the backyard of someone's house where a family is living e.g. Wendy house, wood or iron shack etc.)	2
	Informal dwelling other than backyard shack (this is a shack in an informal settlement. It can be made of corrugated iron, wood, cardboard etc.)	3
	Traditional dwelling (this is usually found in a rural area and can be a hut that is made of clay, mud, thatch or other traditional materials.)	4
	Hostel (this is a compound where workers live e.g. workers living on the mines.)	5
	Other (Specify).....	6
100.	Were any other people present that might have been listening in during the interview?	
	<i>INTERVIEWER TO COMPLETE WHILST IN EA (NOT ANYWHERE ELSE): Do not ask (by observation only)</i>	
	No one	1
	Spouse only	2
	Children only	3
	A few others	4
	Small crowd	5
101.	Interviewer please complete INTERVIEWER TO COMPLETE WHILST IN EA (NOT ANYWHERE ELSE): Do not ask (by observation only)	Y E S
	A. Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?	1 0
	B. Do you think anyone influenced the respondent's answer during the interview?	1 0
	C. Were you approached by community and/or political party representatives?	1 0
	D. Did you feel threatened during the interview?	1 0
	E. Were you physically threatened during the interview?	1 0

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