Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping

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ABSTRACT

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly contracted to provide security in international peacekeeping missions. Yet, we know very little about the practical implications of this development. How do PMSCs reinforce and shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for UN missions and their host populations? To answer these questions, we explore the operational, representative and regulatory security practices in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Our findings show how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign security practices can have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, we observe that the participation of security firms in MONUSCO’s security management contributes to three developments: the differentiation of security between staff and locals, the hardening of MONUSCO’s security posture, and the perpetuation of insecurity through the emergence of a local security economy. Contracted security is thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians and facilitate a sustainable peace.

KEYWORDS Private security; United Nations; practices; peacekeeping

The contracting of commercial military and security services in support of multilateral peacekeeping operations has been one of the focal points of the contestations surrounding the rapid growth of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). For early advocates of privatized military services, the potential of drawing on markets to create peace was a key consideration. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, Doug Brooks, then president of an industry organization called the International Peace Operations Association, argued that the world did have the option to ‘write a check to end a war’ and that contemporary military companies were more like the ‘messiah’ than the ‘mercenary’. Inversely, for those critical of privatization the
spectre of a market that would make wars by proxy not only an abstract possibility, but a common reality was extremely worrying.² The strong normative overtones of this discussion brought former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan to the conclusion that the world was ‘not ready to privatize of peace’.³

Paradoxically, the normativity of the debate has hampered academic and public engagement with security contracting in the context of peacekeeping operations. While contracting has been taking place in UN missions we have very limited knowledge of its practical implications in the field. It took until 2010 for the UN Working Group on Mercenaries to report in an official UN document that the UN itself was ‘using the services of private military and security personnel in some of the conflict zones in which it is engaged’.⁴ This admission started a wave of institutional self-reflection.⁵ It also paved the way for the adoption of new UN guidelines for armed and, later, also unarmed security contractors.⁶ However, the UN’s reports and guidelines remain narrowly focussed and technical, skirting the broader issue of how contracting may contribute to reconfiguring security within peacekeeping.⁷ The academic and political literature, on the other hand, has been focussed on normative questions and debates over matters of principle, such as the morality of hiring PMSCs or problems with the transparency, accountability and control over military and security contractors in multilateral peace and stability operations.⁸

In this article, we seek to steer clear of the Scylla of narrow technicality and the Charybdis of normative generality. Instead we analyze empirically the implications of security contracting for UN peacekeeping, specifically for the security it provides. By doing so, we aim to answer two questions: How do contractors shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for the security of mission staff and host populations? These questions call for two caveats. First, they do not explain the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping, generally, or MONUSCO,⁹ specifically, but aim to increase our understanding of the role

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¹Brooks, Messiahs or Mercenaries?; Brooks, “Write a Cheque, End a War.”
²Bures, “Private Military Companies”; Spearin, “Between Public Peacekeepers and Private Forces.”
³Annan, “The Secretary-General Reflects on ‘Intervention.’”
⁴UN, Use of Mercenaries, 10 (accessed 2 June 2015).
⁷Krahmann, “The UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards.”
⁹Williams, “Lessons Unlearned”; Koko, “MONUC and the Quest”; Holt and Berkman, “Protecting Civilians”; Clark, “UN Peacekeeping.”
that security contracting may play in giving rise to such assessments. Second, the effects of contracting cannot be separated analytically from broader UN security management processes and structures. We, therefore, approach these questions from a practice theoretical perspective. This perspective is particularly fruitful for our analysis for three main reasons. The focus on practices allows us to investigate the meshing of public and private security management in UN peacekeeping in three forms of practices: operation, representation and regulation. Second, adopting this approach allows us to recognize that seemingly mundane, uncontroversial practices can have as serious consequences as the extreme behaviour and scandals that are commonly the focus of debates about PMSCs. Finally, practice theory makes it possible to acknowledge that the effects of UN security contracting cannot be conceived in terms of direct and singular causality. Rather, like speech acts, bureaucratic processes, images, or technologies constitute, re-produce, enact, or perform security so do the hybrid security practices described above. Practices re-produce how interests are defined, how situations are made sense of, and what strategies appear fruitful to the UN mission staff and the security contractors they rely on. Our analysis directs attention to how the everyday, complex, contested and fragmented practices of operation, representation and regulation surrounding the employment of PMSCs in UN peace and stability missions contribute to reproducing not only security, but also insecurity. The overall argument we make is that security contracting is involved in rendering MONUSCO’s practices ever less capable of producing what the organization and its mandate would like to achieve: increased security for UN Staff and for the local population.

**Contribution and Method**

By investigating the role of PMSCs in MONUSCO’s security practices this article illustrates how practice theory can contribute new insights to two strands of literature. One concerns the contracting of security in regional

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10Practice theoretical approaches in their many variants engage reflexively with the implications of categories or category effects as Bourdieu (“Authorized Language,” 164) puts it and hence make these effects and the categories themselves endogenous rather than exogenous to the analysis. This makes it possible to explore the evolving “fields”, assemblages and/or regimes of knowledge practice (Leander, “Understanding US National Intelligence”).

11Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization.”

12Bigo et al., *Mapping of the Field*.


15Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility*.

16Reproduce, enact and perform have all been used to conceptualize securitization. This is not to claim that they are generally the same. Obviously, they are anchored in different theoretical traditions and therefore have different connotations and meanings.
conflicts and multilateral interventions. The other regards the marketization of UN peacekeeping.

Private security studies is a flourishing field. Early research focussed on the emergence of so-called ‘mercenary’ companies like Sandline International and Executive Outcomes and their active participation in hostilities in Sierra Leone and Angola. It expanded significantly following the extensive use of PMSCs by the United States military during the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the well-known Blackwater incident. Today, military and security contracting has become widespread among industrialized nations, including not only the United States and the United Kingdom, but also a growing number of continental European countries. Questions about the legitimacy, regulation, transparency, accountability and control of PMSCs have figured centrally in these studies. However, with the expansion of commercial security services to ever-new areas, such as border control, banking and cybersecurity, the questions have also changed. How do nationality, gender and public-private assemblages govern the international market for private military and security services? Moreover, what are the practical implications of the marketization of security? While the literature is exceedingly diverse, it has demonstrated across contexts that contracting security is not simply a matter of shifting who provides security services. Contracting changes how and what kind of security is provided, to whom and on what terms. However, there are also significant gaps in the private security studies literature. A major gap concerns the employment of PMSCs by international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and the European Union. Research about the extent, practices and consequences of security contracting by international organizations, specifically the hire of PMSCs by UN peacekeeping operations, is still in its infancy. As noted above, several publications on UN security contracting address fundamental and ethical questions. Little do we know empirically about how the involvement of PMSCs in UN peacekeeping impacts on the security of the missions and host populations. This article aims to close this gap.

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18 Cilliers and Mason, Peace, Profit or Plunder?; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone"; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability."
20 Leander, Commercialising Security in Europe.
22 Eicher, Gender and Private Security; Williams, "Global Security Assemblages"; Leander, "The Politics of Whitelisting.”
24 Østensen, “In the Business of Peace”; Pingeot, Dangerous Partnership; Pingeot, Contracting Insecurity; Krahmann, "NATO Contracting in Afghanistan"; Krahmann and Friesendorf, The Role of Private Security Companies.
By addressing this question, we also add to the analysis of marketization in the context of multilateral humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations more broadly. There is ample discussion of the creation and unintended consequences of markets in the humanitarian field. Markets are refashioning the funding of NGOs, the careers of their employees and their interactions with surrounding societies.25 UN missions are giving rise to ‘peacekeeping economies’ where sex, security and domestic services are sold to international staff and peacekeepers.26 However, the significance of security contracting by UN agencies is often neglected.27 Fassin, for example, posits a ‘three way relationship’ between the military forces, the victims and the NGOs in humanitarian missions, leaving out the place of markets and companies.28 By investigating the UN’s collaboration with PMSCs we illustrate how the organization contributes to creating regional security industries and how this, in turn, shapes local perceptions of humanitarian and stability operations.

As our case study, we have selected the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, 2010-) because it is one of the longest and largest UN peacekeeping operations to date.29 Moreover, studies of security provision in the DRC indicated that commercial security plays a central role, for example, around extractive industries, residential housing areas or villages.30 This made it seem likely that the same would hold for MONUSCO’s security management. To investigate the operational, representational and regulatory security practices involving PMSCs and their implications we draw on a heterogeneous archive, including primary sources such as UN documents, manuals, budgets, as well as interviews. In addition, we examine secondary material such as the accounts of ethnographic field work, reports by NGOs active in the region and relevant academic, policy-oriented articles and reports.31

25Cooley and Ron, “The NGO Scramble.”
27Autesserre, Peaceland.
28Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, chapter title and 227.
31We are in other words offering an ethnographic account that is not based on long termed sustained fieldwork but that is increasingly common form of research for documenting practices. To distinguish it from classical field-work based ethnographies Johns (Non-Legality in International Law, 21–6) refers to it as “quasi-ethnography”. Considering how common it has become also in ethnography and anthropology we would be less willing to add the quasi qualifier as this reproduces a static and conservative rendering of ethnographic method (Czarniawska, “Why I Think Shadowing”; Gupta and Ferguson, “Discipline and Practice”).
Our findings highlight how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign operational, representational and regulatory practices can have unintended negative consequences. In contrast to the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, security contracting in MONUSCO takes the form of local and unarmed security guards. Its operational and representational security practices are focused on the protection of UN compounds. The use of PMSCs is regulated through UN guidelines and local laws. However, the implications of these mundane and responsible practices for the kind of security that MONUSCO provides are surprisingly problematic. We observe that UN security contracting contributes in important ways not only to the differentiation and hardening of security, but also to the perpetuation of insecurity in UN peacekeeping. PMSCs are thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians, reduce the place of armed insecurity and facilitate a sustainable peace.32

**MONUSCO’s Security Contracting Practices**

We begin our account by examining how contracting has become part and parcel of MONUSCO’s security management. To do so, we distinguish between three areas of practices: operational security provision, representational security practices and practices regarding the regulation of security services.

**Providing Security**

In MONUSCO, as in other complex humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, security contracting is essential to the operation. It deals with tasks that, often, overstretched UN peacekeeping forces cannot or will not take on. How security is contracted is shaped by UN Security Risk Management policies in which security has steadily gained importance since the decision of the UN to switch from a policy of ‘when to leave’ to one of ‘how to stay’.33 The scale and implications of security contracting for MONUSCO are easily overlooked. Security contracts are not immediately visible in UN procurement information, and their weight in the contracting total is relatively small. To support MONUC and its successor mission, MONUSCO, the UN awarded purchase orders amounting to a total value of US$ 642 million between 2006 and 2015.34 The number of security services and

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32See UN, “MONUSCO Background.” For a discussion of the mission’s aims see Boutellis, “From Crisis to Reform”; Clark, “UN Peacekeeping”; Holt and Berkman, “Protecting Civilians on the Ground”; Koko, “MONUC and the Quest.”

33UN, CEB – United Nations System, 8; UN, Comprehensive Report, 4–5.

34UN, Procurement Division; UN, UNDP – United Nations System.
security equipment purchase orders awarded ranged between 7 and 20 per year in the same period with a total value of about US$ 37 million. Although the share of security contracting to total contracting has quadrupled between 2006 and 2015, increasing from around 2.6% for MONUC to above 11.3% for MONUSCO, it appears limited compared to other budget items.

However, these figures downplay the actual scale of security contracting in two ways. The figures only include contracts explicitly classified as ‘security services’ and ‘security equipment’, while prime contracts for multiple services with security components or contracts for security equipment, involving maintenance, operation or use, are listed under other headings. Second, since UN peacekeeping missions do not have dedicated security service budgets, security expenses are frequently ‘hidden’ in other parts of the budget. Even if the published data did account more fully for the security contracting taking place, the figures would probably seem comparatively small because services are inexpensive compared to more costly budget items, such as construction and real-life support.

A more comprehensive way of assessing the importance of security contracting in MONUSCO is to consider the extent to which it has become part of operational practices. Due to the assignment of high risk levels to specific regions in the DRC, security has become a fundamental requirement. It is structured into concentric circles with distinct security practices, responsibilities and effects. Occasionally UN premises are co-located with individual peacekeeping contingents and hence benefit from their protection. Since co-location with military contingents contributes to blurring the boundaries between the UN’s civilian and military operations, many civilian UN agencies consider a degree of separation from the peacekeeping contingents beneficial for their operations. Most UN premises are therefore not co-located with the military components of the mission. Peacekeeping contingents typically refuse to carry out guarding duties at these locations, and local police or national military forces are not allowed within their inner circle. The consequence is that individual UN operations and agencies usually award their own security contracts and pay for security from whatever budgets they have available. Providing security for UN missions has turned into a major obligation, warranted by the security risks facing staff. UN staff in Goma for example, has been ‘obliged to hire private security at their homes and offices and are only allowed to move through the highly-secured spaces of Goma’.

Another feature, which characterizes the operational practices of MONUSCO, is that security contracting is distinctly local. As Table 1 demonstrates, only two of the five biggest security contractors, Nowar and HESCO, are non-regional and they both provide specialized equipment, such as military technology or protective barriers. The protective security companies are

35Schouten, “Political Topographies”, 70.
The explanations for this include a range of things such as the fact that regional and local employees are cost competitive, interested in working in the area, and that they had the ‘local knowledge’, ‘competence’ and networks necessary to provide security effectively. There is also an articulated UN policy of ‘local preference’ intended to favour the local economy.

Finally, the local character of security contracting is reinforced by a close involvement of security firms with the local armed and police forces that provide security at the outer circle. By law, security guards in the DRC must be unarmed. This means that security contractors often make arrangements with public police or military forces so that they can be called upon when there is a need. Usually, private security companies set up arrangements for paying, training and/or equipping a specifically dedicated group within the public forces that they can draw upon. As Mr. Sebera of the Kenyan security company KK Security explained, ‘We pay an extra “tax” so that way we are sure that there are people [from the public armed forces/police] who will work with us … We train them to make sure they understand our way of working and have the competencies we expect from them’.

In sum, the way security contracting is inscribed in MONUSCO’s operational practices are as distant as they could possibly be from the image of the international Blackwater guards shooting their way through a crowded Nisour Square in Baghdad while protecting VIPs. In the DRC, security contracting is mainly unarmed, local and low key. At the same time, it has become part of every aspect and activity of a UN that is focussed on ‘how to stay’ in a hostile environment in order to carry out its peacekeeping mission and humanitarian work.

Table 1. Main security contractors (2006–2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. contracts</th>
<th>Top 5 Value USD</th>
<th>Top 5 contracts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>15,730,058</td>
<td>KK Security Congo SPRL / Rwanda SARL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>14,601,190</td>
<td>Delta Protection SPRL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,382,271</td>
<td>Magenya-Protection &amp; Gardiennage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,337,262</td>
<td>Hesco Bastion Limited (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>491,634</td>
<td>Askar Security Services Limited (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,451,273</td>
<td>Nowar Security Equipment GmbH (DE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Non-regional companies in italics.

These conclusions were confirmed in interviews in which we were told that MONUSCO had only awarded security guarding contracts to six local or regional companies: KK Security (DRC), Magenya-Protection & Gardiennage (DRC), Ultimate Security (United Republic of Tanzania), Saracen Uganda (Uganda), Askar Security Services (Uganda) and Delta Protection (DRC). Interview with OCHA staff, New York, 3 April 2014.

For more detailed accounts of how these arrangements work, see De Goede, Private and Public Security.

Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.
Representing Deterrence

Contracted security has also become part and parcel of the way the UN mission is representing itself, that is of its representational practices. Security contractors protect the mission and in so doing become a very visible part of it. Indeed, UN policies expect private security guards to provide ‘a visible deterrent to potential attackers (raising their perceived risk from targeting the protected target)’.\(^{39}\) This introduces a deep-seated ambiguity at the heart of MONUSCO’s representational practices. While deterrence is wanted to avoid the use of force, it presents a visual image of distrust and violence to the outside world. Deterrence takes effect and is made visible specifically in the presentation of security guards and the spaces reserved for the mission. As Schouten observes ‘security guards in military-looking outfits bar anything that does not look like a 4x4 jeep from entering barb-wired, watch-towered and fenced humanitarian spaces’\(^{40}\). While the companies emphasize the non-violent nature of their security practices, backed up by training, technologies and local knowledge, they indicate that they are also capable of responding by using force if this should prove necessary. A photo on the homepage of Askar Security, for example, shows rows of security guards, dressed in dark blue uniforms, marching in what looks like a military parade. Together with the name of the company – Askar means soldier in Arabic and Swahili – the image leaves little doubt that the company can respond with force. Deterrence is also apparent in the public space into which the mission extends through the presence of its staff or offices. As a reporter writes from Goma, where MONUSCO has an important base: ‘[the entrance to the city] is guarded with an eye towards maximum intimidation, and despite its reputation for bribery and lawlessness, the airport is ringed with symbols of authority […] the inner perimeter is surrounded by security guards, high walls and barbed wire’.\(^{41}\)

Finally, deterrence and distrust run through the UN’s representations of its local security environment and security contractors in the online security training course, which all UN staff travelling or working in the field are obliged to take. On the one hand, the training recalls the violence that makes deterrence and prudence necessary and justifies contracted security. ‘We face ongoing dangers to our personal safety and security and are at substantial risk of being targeted because of our heightened visibility as representatives of the international community’, argues the security course, showing the photo of a room with a smashed window and turned over shelves, like after a blast.\(^{42}\) On the other hand, the material communicates a deep-seated

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40 Schouten, “Political Topographies”, 70.
41 Rosen, “A Day in the DRC.”
42 UN, BSITF II, Module 1 – Introduction: Why This Course?
distrust of the local population and public security forces as well as the UN’s own contracted security guards. ‘Remember, you are responsible and accountable for your safety and security’. An illustrative story tells of a UN officer and his driver being taken hostage by ‘guards’ at a refugee camp. The message is that neither local police and armed forces nor the civilians, which the UN seeks to help, can be trusted. The online course teaches that even the local driver, house keeper, hotel receptionist and private security guard have to be watched because their behaviour can endanger the UN staff by being unconcerned or idle.

In short, MONUSCO’s security contracting is deeply enmeshed with visible representations of deterrence. Deterrence as representational practice is always about recalling the threats, violence, insecurity and anxiety that make deterrence necessary. It takes over and dominates the communication of the, by law unarmed, security contractors in the DRC in ways reproducing a schizophrenic image of the mission which, although MONUSCO is there to embody security and stability, manifests a fundamental distrust vis-a-vis their local surroundings.

**Regulating Responsibly**

Last, but not least, contracting has generated a layer of regulatory practices which have come to characterize MONUSCO’s security management. Regulation of its security contractors is a core concern for the UN. It has linked the mission to a decentralized and fragmented web of rules and regulations, including formal UN regulations, the contracting practices of individual UN agencies, national and international laws, and voluntary international principles and codes of conduct guiding security contracting.

The sensitivity surrounding the hiring of armed security guards in conflict contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan has made the UN increasingly attentive to the regulation of contract security staff. Following years with rather vague requirements that ‘the guards shall be properly trained and licensed, in accordance with local law, to perform security services, including but not limited to, the carrying of firearms’, the UN adopted extensive new ‘Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies’ in 2012 and expanded its regulations to unarmed guards in 2016.

However, to be effective, regulatory standards must be reflected in the work and organization of the contracted security companies. MONUSCO has

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44 UN, BSITF II, Module 7 – Your Personal Safety: Case Study – Hostage Taking.
45 UN, BSITF II, Module 7 – Your Personal Safety: Watching the Watchers.
46 UN, United Nations Field Security Handbook, 0–4.
placed the responsibility for training and equipment with the contractors. This is not to say that the mission has disregarded its responsibilities. On the contrary, the UN has sought to pressure companies into living up to strict regulatory standards. In addition to being as specific as possible with regards to requirements in the contracts, UN security officers also control the suitability of security companies through references from previous clients, general background checks and by verifying a company’s ability to vet, select, train, supervise, equip and manage a guard force. The new UN regulations have provided additional guidance and standards, for example, in the form of training subjects, lists for new recruits, and guards in service. When a UN security contractor was convicted for criminal association by a DRC court in 2015, the UN police component of MONUSCO carried out a two-day ‘training session for 200 agents, representing twelve private security companies’.

The pressure to comply with UN requirements as well as national and international regulations is reflected in the care all the companies take in flagging that they are managing their activities properly and professionally. The main MONUSCO security contractors claim that they follow Congolese law, international training programmes and provide services in conformity with International Standards Organization (ISO) standards. Some companies such as KK Security, Askar Security and Delta Protection even signed up to the voluntary International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) to underscore the point.

Despite these efforts, the regulation of PMSCs is not always effective. In addition to the weaknesses within the UN guidelines, international and Congolese law as well as industry self-regulation discussed in the literature, the fragmentation and devolution of security contractor regulation present major problems for MONUSCO because they entail a decentralization of regulatory responsibility. Not only the Congolese government and multiple UN agencies, but also the security companies themselves, are responsible for implementing security standards within MONUSCO. This is causing tensions when the behaviour of companies is questioned and criticized. Although the local population generally reports that the behaviour of UN security contractors is professional and courteous, the contracting of local security firms is sometimes alleged to feed into the informality and corruption of the local economy. There is a tradition to work according to a ‘wink, wink and nudge, nudge’ logic where ‘people give contracts and jobs to their friends’.

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48Ibid., 9.
49UN, Use of Private Security.
52Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
in the rest of the world, local and regional PMSCs invite influential personalities to their boards, with the consequence that some companies have been linked to controversial political or armed groups.\textsuperscript{54} One example is the inclusion of Modest Makabusa on the board of KK Security. The Makabusa family has close connections with the Rwandan government and groups that are sponsored by it.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, Kellen Kayonga, co-founder of Askar Security, is the sister-in-law of General Salim Saleh, a younger brother of President Yoweri Museveni, who has set up a system of family rule in Uganda.\textsuperscript{56}

As the preceding discussion of the operational, representational and regulatory practices shows, security contractors play a major role in the UN’s security management in the DRC. Security firms protect the innermost of MONUSCO’s concentric circles of security, collaborate with police and armed forces to secure the outer perimeters, support the UN’s strategy of visible deterrence and are expected to assist the UN in regulating security in a responsible, but decentralized fashion. In the next section, we reflect on the implications of these practices for security in the DRC.

**Security Implications in the DRC**

MONUSCO’s security contractors are enmeshed in operational, representational and regulatory security management practices of the organizations and these have major implications for security in the DRC. Specifically, we observe three effects: the differentiation of security, the hardening of the MONUSCO’s security posture and the perpetuating of insecurity.

**Differentiating Security**

Foremost, the preceding practices are contributing to a differentiation of security in the sense of rending the security of some far more important than that of others. As has been pointed out in the literature, this is an almost inevitable consequence of turning security into a service to be bought and sold in markets.\textsuperscript{57} Only some can pay for security and benefit from it. In the DRC, it is primarily the inhabitants of ‘Peaceland’, i.e. UN staff, who can afford and have access to security.\textsuperscript{58} Security contracting within MONUSCO reinforces and helps to enact the tendency of the UN to seal its missions off from local populations in ways that clearly signal the superior significance of the UN’s own security. MONUSCO and its staff are

\textsuperscript{53}Interview with Doug Brooks, Consultant, former Director of ISOA, 5 March 2014.
\textsuperscript{54}For a discussion of these networks in general terms see Oder, “Understanding the Complexities” or Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory*.
\textsuperscript{55}Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory*.
\textsuperscript{56}The Independent, “Family Rule in Uganda.”
\textsuperscript{58}Autesserre, *Conflict Resolution*.

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increasingly finding themselves in fortified compounds and private residences with high walls, barbed wire, protective glazing, few public entrances and adjacent watchtowers. In this they follow the trend of other international missions across the world towards ‘bunkerization’.\textsuperscript{59}

Contracted security plays a central yet mostly neglected role in bringing about this trend.\textsuperscript{60} Security companies usually design the risk scenarios and develop the response plans.\textsuperscript{61} They also tend to provide the equipment and staff necessary to carry them out. PMSCs are increasingly involved in setting the standards for how much security of what kind is warranted.\textsuperscript{62} The result is an increasingly dense wall of security around anyone who can afford to pay for it, including humanitarian missions such as MONUSCO. The local security guards form a protective belt around what increasingly appears as bunkers, as well described in work on security provision in these contexts.\textsuperscript{63} The security contractors impose a range of strictly regulated security routines at the gates. Anyone wishing access to the mission has to provide a well-founded purpose and only after verification is allowed entry into the compound where those whose security is clearly prioritized reside.

On the outside, beyond the protected area, is the Congolese population whose security MOUNSCO is supposed to ensure and who are reportedly empowered by the mission. The local population, however, is unambiguously excluded from the safe areas of the privileged, at least in normal times. When violence becomes immediate and pressing, citizens are sometimes given access to the compounds or force themselves into them, with the consequence that these become shelters of sorts. Thus, Protection Gateway reports:

UN peacekeeping compounds, bases and their environs – no matter how rudimentary or ill-prepared – often become the site for impromptu camps and de facto ‘safe areas’ in times of crisis when vulnerable civilians gravitate towards them seeking the protection and sanctuary of the UN.\textsuperscript{64}

This is sometimes advanced as one of the justifications for and potential advantages of these bunker-like structures. However, the access to privileged security is temporary, uncertain and fragile. The bunkerized compounds are designed mainly for safeguarding MONUSCO and mission staff from the threats of its surroundings. For locals in Bukavu, where the UN has a major base, it is clear that the contracted security guards are only there to

\textsuperscript{59}Duffield, “Risk Management.”
\textsuperscript{60}It is surprising that even detailed analysis of this trend and its implications overlook the significance of companies and markets in generating it. Lisa Smirl for example does not delve on the companies that make and market that cars, compounds and hotels she argues is re-shaping humanitarianism. Smirl, \textit{Spaces of Aid}.
\textsuperscript{61}Krahmann, “Beck and Beyond.”
\textsuperscript{62}Leander, “The Politics of Legal Arrangements.”
\textsuperscript{63}Hönke, \textit{Transnational Companies}; Schouten, “Political Topographies.”
\textsuperscript{64}Hunt, “Peacekeepers and the Protection.”
defend the mission and that they contribute nothing to the protection of Congolese citizens.65

This differentiation of security has contributed to a negative image of the UN in regions of the DRC with high levels of violence.66 It has also weakened MONUSCO’s ability to carry out its mission and even posed dangers to it. In the province Bandundu, 68% of the population did not feel safe even with the presence of UN.67 In Ituri, a village with a large MONUSCO base, a man reported: ‘We don’t really have any relationship with them [MONUSCO] because we don’t have any contact with them. They come here to secure us from the war, but they always come late’.68 In Bukavu, some citizens had the impression that the UN was mainly concerned with its own safety and less with that of the local population.69

The resentment among Congolese citizens is such that it sometimes ushers in attacks on the UN mission. In 2008, protesters threw stones and rocks at the fortified MONUSCO headquarters in Goma, described earlier in this article. They also assembled outside three other UN compounds in eastern Congo because they believed that UN peacekeeping forces had not done enough to protect civilians against rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda, when he attempted to seize the city.70 In 2012 there were again ‘protests against perceived U.N. inaction’ after the M23 rebel movement took Goma.71 One newspaper reported that ‘Across the east of the country, angry mobs surrounded U.N. positions, threw stones at aid workers and burned U.N. compounds. Asked what they thought of MONUSCO, a group of young men standing by the shore of Lake Kivu in Goma cried out in unison: “Useless”’.72 In sum, the differentiation between UN staff and local civilians, which is reproduced through MONUSCO security contracting and the associated operational, representational and regulatory practices, has major consequences for how security is experienced in the DRC.

**Hardening Security**

MONUSCO’s security management practices have also contributed to a hardening of security where technology and gear occupy a central place. The contracting of security reinforces this development by making available the sophisticated equipment that peacekeeping contingents from, mostly,

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65Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
68Oxfam, Commodities of War, 18.
69Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
70CBC News, “UN Helicopters Sent.”
71Al Jazeera, “UN Test Combat Brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo.”
72Hatcher and Perry, “Defining Peacekeeping Downward.”
poorer countries do not have. Moreover, the security industry actively promotes the acquisition of innovative technologies for its own profit-motivated reasons since equipment is usually much more expensive than services. In the DRC, the hardening of security is also tied to the need of unarmed security contractors to deter risks by means of visible and operational references to the possibility to use or to call in the use of force. One mechanism through which this is taking place is through the way contracting has upgraded the technology and equipment of the local police forces. Contracted security guards in the DRC have paid, trained and equipped police units so that they can provide harder forms of security when and if needed. Equally central are the less obvious processes of security hardening. The deterrence approach has resulted in something akin to a race for the best defensive security equipment. The omnipresent towers, armoured vehicles, and surveillance drones are the visible expression. Even more banally, security contractors wear militarized uniforms to impress their deterrence function on their surroundings. The uniforms have to be different from those of the military or police forces as well as from those of the UN peacekeeping contingents. However, they usually mimic a military style and they are of considerable importance for the contractors. ‘You would not believe how important these uniforms are. It seems as one the key reasons for people to work […] I think it is about status. You become a someone with a bit of power’73 was one observer’s view on it.

The presence of uniformed contractors certainly reinforces the emphasis on a gadgetized, technologized security that recalls and makes possible to call up more forceful forms of paramilitary security. A striking example of the extent to which security has hardened is the faith placed in the potential of the first ‘humanitarian drone’ leased from the Italian firm Selex ES belonging to the Finmeccanica group.74 It is operated by ‘international crews and drone consultants, some of them American veterans, [who] have moved to Goma to work as contractors’.75 The five drones are supposed to be deployed to help MONUSCO monitor the terrain so that it can more effectively intervene when necessary. Besides relaying information about what is happening in an inaccessible terrain, the local population is to be educated about the fact that it is now being observed and therefore can no longer act with impunity. This drone policy enshrines the hardening of security. The population is observed at distance and recast as suspect of horrific violence in the inaccessible conditions of the jungle that justify keeping it at arms-length. The educational programme intended to inculcate restraint but also to counter this casting has yet to be implemented let alone have a demonstrable effect.76

73Interview with Thomas Mandrup, Assistant Professor, Institute for Strategy of the Danish Defence Academy, 28 February 2014.
74Mackey, “Let Slip the Drones of Peace.”
75Oakford, “Drones, Drones, Everywhere.”
The faith placed in the ‘humanitarian drone’ in spite of this, as well as the investment in it in the first place, is a strong indicator of the status technologies, and especially defensive technologies, have come to occupy in security practices.

The hardening of security accentuates the differentiation of security discussed above. In addition, the contracting of hard security redistributes resources, focus and energy towards commercial technology and gear rather than soft skills, information exchanges and the management of good relations with the civilian population. A common complaint among the Congolese is thus the lack of direct engagement between the UN and locals, which contributes to the slowness of MONUSCO responses to attacks. The growing reliance on security technologies supports this approach of providing security at a distance. Moreover, the implications of defensive, security and surveillance technologies for basic rights, privacy and politics and the possible need to regulate these, that are intensely discussed elsewhere, have received little attention from MONUSCO.

**Perpetuating Insecurity**

MONUSCO’s policy of contracting local and regional security firms also plays a role in the perpetuation of insecurity in the DRC. Security has come to occupy a core and expanding place in the local economy and hence the livelihood of local populations becomes invested in insecurity. ‘We provide jobs to locals’ as the director of one security company put it. Also local populations view UN security contracting as an important source of employment.

Most obviously security contracting sustains and bolsters the position of the security profession. For one, some security professionals are drawn from the local armed forces and police and hence facilitate an expansion of the number of people working with security. The public forces also often depend, directly and indirectly, on payment from security companies who rely on their services as they cannot themselves carry weapons or engage in law enforcement. This contributes to the upgrading of the forces as well as the maintenance of a force larger than would otherwise have been the case. However, it also raises questions about the interdependence between the public security forces, which are considered corrupt by many Congolese, and MONUSCO. Most controversially, the local security industry recruits people who have gained their experience from or retain connections to the many armed groups in the region. This is an obvious concern because armed groups and their members can finance themselves through this

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77 Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.
78 Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
79 Ibid.
market. The UN therefore forbids the employment of members of armed
groups of any kind by its contractors. However, the rules for vetting are
strict but also difficult to implement. In the DRC, there are many armed
groups with fluid structures and changing memberships. They do not
provide discharge papers, which are essential in a context where many
people move between the various armed groups and civilian life. Even the
discharge papers that exist are unreliable, including those documenting partici-
pation in the CONADER or UEPNDDR programmes. Security companies,
try to compensate for this. They work with the national intelligence agency
(Agence Nationale de Renseignements), which keeps lists of people that
security companies can use when vetting new staff. However, these lists are
often incomplete. The most common way of recruitment is to rely on reputa-
tion and networks. As a company representative explains: ‘We have to
rely on our local managers. They know who people are’.82

In addition, security companies compete for project funding and contracts
with other organizations that work in the region. Security companies may not
only try to attract donor funding for security projects, rather than for example
healthcare and education, but they also increasingly compete for humanitar-
ian projects with NGOs.83 The overall outcome is that security is not only
competing with other sectors, but also expanding into them, taking over
their staff and activities. An excellent example of this is the security
company named ‘Human Dignity in the World’. It was established Jean-
Luc Mutukumbali, formerly interpreter for MONUC/MONUSCO and
member of parliament in Kinshasa.84

Security contracting creates a market for old and new security professionals
perpetuating the role of insecurity in the livelihood of many people the DRC.
Considering their central place in this economy, the UN Missions have not
been aloof of this development. Although Congolese citizens comment posi-
tively on the employment opportunities provided by UN security contracting,
some are also sceptical of the long-term implications of this development.85
Not only will the jobs be lost again with the end of MOUNSCO creating
renewed insecurity, the intermeshing of private and public security forces is
also a major factor reproducing insecurity because of corruption and partisanship
in the struggle between political groups and candidates. As one local

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80 CONADER claimed to have demobilized around 116,000 people and the UEPNDDR has the declared
ambition of demobilizing another 150,000. CONADER (Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démo-
bilisation et Réinsertion) was active 2003–2007; UEPNDDR (l’Unité d’Exécution du Programme National
de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion) replaced it in 2007. In addition to this come the
reinsertions taking place outside these national level structures.
81 National Intelligence Agency.
82 Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.
83 Interviews with Maria Eriksson Baaz, Senior Researcher Nordic Africa Institute, 3 March 2014, and Thomas
Mandrup, Assistant Professor, Institute for Strategy of the Danish Defence Academy, 28 February 2014.
84 Interview with Jason Stearns, Graduate Student, Yale University, 5 March 2014.
85 Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
argues, instead of fighting for security, the security services defend insecurity. They are no better than the army or the FARDC. Another agrees, it is difficult to say that these companies are worse than the police or the FARDC. They all generate insecurity at times.  

Conclusion

MONUSCO’s security contracting is seemingly unspectacular and responsible. It draws on unarmed and local companies; it focusses on visible deterrence; and it is accompanied by multiple levels of regulation. Yet, the operational, representational and regulatory practices encompassing contractors are supporting UN security management in the DRC in ways that are deeply problematic. MONUSCO contracting and security management practices are contributing to differentiating security in a manner that places the local civilians at the bottom and international staff at the top. In addition, security firms have promoted and enabled a hardening the UN’s security approach by accentuating the focus on technology and gear while diminishing direct relations with local citizens. Finally, the UN’s policy of contracting locally is perpetuating insecurity by generating an economy around the provision of protective services.

The unintentional implications of these developments for the security of the Congolese population are considerable. The open differentiation and implicit distrust expressed in the operations and visible representations of contracted security in MONUSCO provide additional grounds for the alienation of the local population. Many Congolese citizens have the impression that MONUSCO is failing even in its basic mandate to protect civilians. Moreover, by hiring regional security firms with the intention of generating jobs for the local economy, the UN is facilitating a security industry that, due to fragmented and decentralized regulation, perpetuates insecurity by offering employment to the former members of armed groups or by holding connections with autocratic families. Arguably, the UN has a responsibility to ensure the safety of its staff and peacekeepers. However, the preceding practices support security management processes and structures which not only place the security of the UN mission above its mandate to safeguard the local population, but also operate in ways that unintentionally undermine the security of the latter.

In sum, the example of MONUSCO shows that the centrality and implications of security contracting for UN peacekeeping and the marketization of humanitarian missions have so far been underestimated. In the absence

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86 Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
of major international scandals involving UN security contractors, the literature has focussed on largely abstract normative and technical debates. It has missed the fact that UN security contracting is already a significant part in UN missions and its peacekeeping economies. The lack of dedicated security budgets conceals the growing role of PMSCs in peacekeeping missions. As our article shows, in the field the enmeshing and potentially negative consequences of hiring local security firms for UN security management become evident. Even if the practices involving security contracting are only one of many reasons for the perceived failure of MONUSCO, it is something that the UN can control and change. Precisely because this is not true of so many of the other processes that shape UN peacekeeping, the insights presented in this article are particularly important.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/J021091/1].

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