An Empirical Cross-linguistic Study of Directives

A Semiotic Approach to the Sentence Forms Chosen by British, Danish and Russian Speakers in Native and ELF Contexts

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AN EMPIRICAL CROSS-LINGUISTIC STUDY OF DIRECTIVES:

A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO THE SENTENCE FORMS CHOSEN BY BRITISH, DANISH AND RUSSIAN SPEAKERS IN NATIVE AND ELF CONTEXTS

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CBS COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

AN EMPIRICAL CROSS-LINGUISTIC STUDY OF DIRECTIVES

A semiotic approach to the sentence forms chosen by British,

Danish and Russian speakers in native and ELF contexts

Doctoral dissertation in Intercultural Business Communication

By Olga Rykov Ibsen

Supervised by Per Durst-Andersen and Søren Brier

Copenhagen Business School

May 2016

Olga Rykov Ibsen
*An empirical cross-linguistic study of directives: A semiotic approach to the sentence forms chosen by British, Danish and Russian speakers in native and ELF contexts*

LIMAC PhD School is a cross disciplinary PhD School connected to research communities within the areas of Languages, Law, Informatics, Operations Management, Accounting, Communication and Cultural Studies.

This study is part of the GEBCom project sponsored by the Carlsberg Foundation and directed by professor Per Durst-Andersen. The five-year project started in 2012 at the Department of International Business Communication at the Copenhagen Business School. The aim is to investigate the effectiveness of intercultural business communication via English as a Lingua Franca by studying speech production, speech reception, and word association at the Carlsberg Group in Denmark, Russia, China, Japan, and England. This dissertation belongs to the speech production part of the project.

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Copenhagen, May 2016   O.R.I.

Abstract

According to Durst-Andersen's theory of communicative supertypes all languages can roughly be described as belonging to one of the following supertypes: (1) reality-oriented languages such as Russian and Hindi that speak of reality through the situation being common to the speaker and the hearer; (2) speaker-oriented languages such as Spanish and Japanese that speak of reality through the speaker's experience of the situation; and finally (3) hearer-oriented languages such as Danish and English that speak of reality through the hearer's experience of it.

Using the above-mentioned approach, this dissertation investigates the following hypotheses: (I) native speakers of British English prefer indirect requesting strategies; (II) Danes and Russians favour direct requesting strategies in their mother tongue; (III) Danes and Russians transfer direct requesting strategies from their mother tongue to English; (IV) British, Danish, and Russian speakers prefer interrogative sentence structures with the situations where the speaker and hearer do not 'share the same world'.

Cross-cultural data consisting of the Trolley (Permission), the Window (Prohibition), and the Library (Impossibility) situations has been collected through role play from Danish, Russian, and English speakers (control group) at Carlsberg, and consists of both English Lingua Franca Data and Mother Tongue Data.

The analysis of these three situations partially provided support for hypothesis I with the native speakers of English and II with the Russians though not with the Danes. By construing requests in terms of a 'problem-solving' activity, I found that almost half of the British English speakers 'solved the problem' straightaway by using the imperative sentence structure in the Trolley situation, e.g. *Put your luggage on the trolley!* Yet, among the three groups, the British English speakers were the only group who employed interrogatives most often. Both the Russian and Danish speakers preferred to solve the problem by offering their 'best bid for a solution of a problem' in the form of the declarative sentence structure in English, like.g. *You can put your luggage on the trolley,* whereas they preferred other ways of solving the problem in their native languages: the Russian mother tongue speakers overwhelmingly solved the problem on the spot with the help of the imperative form as in *Stav'te svoi vešči na moju teležku!* for 'Put (IPFV) your belongings on my trolley!', and the Danish mother tongue speakers mostly chose to solve the problem by 'stating' it, which is done with the hlp of the interrogative sentence structure, like *Skal jeg ikke lige smide den med på min vogn ?* for 'Don't you want me to throw it on my trolley?'.

Hypothesis III was also partially confirmed with the Russians, who appeared to transfer the imperative sentence structure from Russian to Russian English in the Trolley and the Library situations. In addition, due to the original view on directives as trichotomous entities, it was possible to discover covert influence of Russian aspect and transfer of the imperative mood in Russian to Russian English. The analysis did not reveal any direct transfers of syntactic structures from Danish to Danish English.

Finally, hypothesis IV was completely confirmed since the British, Danish, and Russian respondents largely preferred the interrogative sentence form with the Library situation.

Even though the present study has analysed only a small sample, the findings for direct and subtle transfers from a mother tongue to English as a Lingua Franca can prove instrumental in improving global communication, say, in the form of developing teaching material for cross-cultural business organisations that use English as medium of communication.

Ifølge Durst-Andersens teori om kommunikative supertyper kan alle sprog groft beskrives som tilhørende én af de tre følgende supertyper: (1) virkelighedsorienterede sprog som russisk og hindi, der taler om virkeligheden gennem situationen, som er fælles for afsender og modtager; (2) afsenderorienterede sprog som spansk og japansk, der taler om virkeligheden gennem afsenders oplevelse af den; og endelig (3) modtagerorienterede sprog som dansk og engelsk, der taler om virkeligheden gennem modtagers oplevelse af den.

Ved at brug denne radikale tilgang til sprog undersøger denne afhandling følgende hypoteser: (I) englænderne foretrækker indirekte opfordringsstrategier; (II) danskerne og russerne favoriserer direkte opfordringsstrategier på deres modersmål; (III) danskerne og russerne overfører automatisk direkte opfordringsstrategier fra deres modersmål til engelsk; (IV) de engelsk-, dansk- og russisktalende foretrækker en spørgende sætningsform i de situationer, hvor afsender og modtager ikke 'deler den samme verden'.

De tværkulturelle data er indsamlet gennem rollespil med konstruerede samtalesituationer såsom "Bagagevognssituationen" (Tilladelse), "Vinduessituationen" (Forbud) og "Bibliotekssituationen" (Umulighed) fra dansk-, russisk- og engelsktalende (kontrolgruppe) personer på Carlsberg og består af de engelske- og modersmålsdataene.

Analysen af disse tre situationer bekræftede delvist hypotese I hos englænderne og II hos russerne, dog ikke hos danskerne. Ved at anskue opfordringer som 'problemløsning', fandt jeg, at næsten halvdelen af de engelsk-modersmålstalende 'løste problemet' med det samme, ved at bruge bydeformen i Bagagevognssituationen, fx *Put your luggage on the trolley!* Samtidig gjorde de brug af en spørgende sætning oftere end de andre to grupper. Både de russisk- og dansk-engelsktalende foretrak i høj grad at løse problemet ved at tilbyde deres 'bedste bud på en løsning af et problem' i form af en fremsættende sætning, såsom *You can put your luggage on the trolley*, mens de foretrak andre måder at løse problemet på deres modersmål: de russisk-modersmålstalende fortrak at løse problemet på stedet ved hjælp af bydeformen, som i *Stav'te svoi Vesci na moju teležku!* for "Stil (IPF) dine ejendele på min vogn!", og de dansk-modersmålstalende valgte hovedsageligt at løse problemet ved at 'konstatere' over for modtageren, at der er et problem, hvilket de gjorde ved hjælp af en spørgende sætning, fx *Skal jeg ikke lige smide den med på min vogn?*

Hypotesen III blev ligeledes delvist bekræftet hos russerne, som lod til at overføre den imperati-

ve sætningsstruktur fra russisk til russisk-engelsk i Bagagevognssituationen og i Bibliotekssituationen. Desuden, takket være det originale syn på opfordringer som bestående af tre forskellige betydninger – nemlig Symptom, Signal og Model – var det muligt at opdage i russisk-engelsk en skjult indflydelse fra den russiske aspektkategori. Og dog, har analysen ikke kunne afsløre nogen direkte overførsel af syntaktiske former fra dansk til dansk-engelsk.

Endelig blev hypotese IV helt bekræftet, da englænderne, danskerne og russerne i høj grad fortrak spørgende sætningsform i Bibliotekssituationen.

Selvom den foreliggende undersøgelse kun har analyseret et lille udsnit af dataene, kan resultaterne for direkte og skjulte overførsler fra éns modersmål til engelsk være med til at forbedre den globale kommunikation, eventuelt i form af undervisningsmateriale til internationale virksomheder som bruger engelsk som deres primære kommunikationsmiddel. Målet er ikke at udrydde brugen af 'globalt-engelsk', men at opnå en mere bevidst og hensigtsmæssig brug af engelsk.

BED   British English Data

CCSAR Project Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realisation Project

CBS   Copenhagen Business School

DED   Danish English Data

DESs   Danish English Speakers

DMTD   Danish Mother Tongue Data

DMTSs   Danish Mother Tongue Speakers

ELF   English as a Lingua Franca

ELFD   English Lingua Franca Data (comprising the DED, the BED, and the RED)

ENSs   English Native Speakers

ESPT   English Speech Production Test

GEBCom Project   Global English Business Communication Project

IBC   International Business Communication

IF   Imperative Frames

MTD   Mother Tongue Data

NSPT   Native Speech Production Test

RED   Russian English Data

RESs   Russian English Speakers

RMTD   Russian Mother Tongue Data

RMTSs   Russian Mother Tongue Speakers

RPT   Role-playing Test

SAP-model   Speech Act Process Model

SPP   Speech Production Project

SPT   Speech Production Test

STT-model	Speaker's Train of Thought Model
WDCT	Written Discourse Completion Task

In-text references

i) All examples and tables carry the same numbering, starting with number 1 in each new chapter

ii) References to examples and tables are made by enclosing the number in square brackets, e.g. example [4] in section 2 is referred to as (see [2.4]), when the reference is given outside section 2.

iii) References to examples and tables within the same section do not carry the number of this section, e.g. example [4] within one and the same section is referred to as (see [4])

iv) References to sections are made in the same way without square brackets, e.g. section 3.1 is referred to as (see section 3.1).

'Single quotation marks'

i) terms used in a semi-technical sense or terms whose validity is questioned

ii) meanings of words and sentences

iii) quotations and 'direct speech'

"Double quotation marks" – quotations within quotations only.

The use of gendered pronouns as generic terms

i) 'she' is used for the speaker (S) and 'he' is used for the hearer (H)

The use of italics and capital letters with technical terms

i) italics are used with the categories of the SAP-model, e.g. the subcategory of *warning*

ii) capitals are used with the notions of the IF-framework, e.g. Warning.

$\mathbf{C}$ontents

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

1.2. Research hypotheses and goals of the Speech Production Project

1.3. The structure of the present paper

'God is in the detail'
(Ancient proverb)

1.1. Background

The Global Business English Communication Project (henceforth the GEBCom Project) was initiated to discover whether the culture-specific mental universe belonging to any particular mother tongue influences a non-native English-speaker's production and comprehension of English concepts (at word level) and utterances (at utterance level) and, if so, to determine what these influences are. The wish to investigate the level of efficiency of intercultural business communication via English Lingua Franca (henceforth ELF) was prompted by the growing number of cases in the business world – the Carlsberg Company, in particular – where the communication between two parties (e.g. management – subordinates, speaker/seller – hearer/buyer) has repeatedly resulted either in partial or complete misunderstanding (i.e. pragma-linguistic and/or socio-pragmatic failure), or even ended more dramatically with the breaking off of contract negotiations.

Second, a great number of empirical intercultural studies of requesting behaviour for both natives and non-natives (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Trosborg, 1995; Fredsted, 1998; Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009) reveal a range of cross-linguistic differences, thereby challenging the deep-seated myth that English is more cost-effective than using a country's indigenous language. Even within the field of higher education (Vinke, 1998; Tange, 2009), the introduction of English as the sole medium of instruction in countries where English is not a native language has proved to have a harmful effect on student learning. Unfortunately, not much research has been done on the issue of the efficiency of English as a lingua franca in the context of cross-cultural business encounters.

However, we do have one case study at our disposal (Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009), the results of which demonstrate that the use of English in cross-cultural contexts may lead to communication lapses. According to Arnsberg & Bentsen (2009), 13 Danish and 13 Spanish businessmen, who took part in 'The Request Project', spoke a kind of English that bore no resemblance to Standard (British or American) English. Interestingly, they attempted to transfer their Danish and Spanish 'cultural identities' to the English language, thereby making their English sound anything but English. The researchers concluded that the use of English as a global lingua franca by businessmen whose native language is other than English may lead to incorrect or infelicitous interpretations, ineffective teamwork, and difficulties in concluding contracts to mention just a few of the unavoidable repercussions.

Bearing Arnsberg & Bentsen's (2009) findings in mind, it is obvious that there is a need for tools within the business world that will enable business partners having a mother tongue other than English to avoid communication lapses when using ELF as their sole means of communication.

Accordingly, the GEBCom Project set out to study six languages: British English, Danish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish. The GEBCom Project aims at investigating speech reception (Stine Evald Bentsen), language association (Fumiko Kano and Stine Mosekjær), and speech production (Olga Rykov Ibsen and Xia Zhang). The last-mentioned studies deal mainly with the requesting behaviour of British English native speakers (control group) and non-native speakers of English. The present study focuses on the requesting behaviour of the Russians and the Danes, while Zhang's PhD project (Durst Andersen, 2016) will primarily deal with that of the Chinese.

1.2. Research hypotheses and goals of the Speech Production Project

The general goal of the Speech Production Project (henceforth SPP) is to investigate qualitatively patterns of various kinds of request realisations within socially different situations across a number of different languages and cultures, including both native and non-native varieties. The decision to investigate requests, or 'directives' in Searle's terms, is based on the idea that when people make requests, they initiate a 'negotiation process', the outcome of which will be signing a 'contract' or not (for a detailed discussion, see section 3.3). Only in situations of making a contract are people 'forced' to come into close contact with each other, which can be unpleasant for interlocutors at best and at worst lead to inadvertent insults, especially in an intercultural communication setting. This is why requests rather than, say, informative utterances are particularly interesting to study.

The study deals primarily with the linguistic behaviour of Danish speakers of English (henceforth, DESs), Russian speakers of English (henceforth RESs), and British English native speakers (henceforth ENSs) across a number of different social contexts. The test will henceforth be referred to as the English Speech Production Test (ESPT). The SPP additionally tests the mother tongue requesting behaviour of Danish mother tongue speakers (henceforth, DMTSs) and Russian mother tongue speakers (henceforth RMTSs) across the same social situations as those used in the above-mentioned test. These tests will henceforth be referred to as the Native Speech Production Tests (NSPTs).

The SPP was designed to test a number of research hypotheses, defined according to Searle's universal principle of conventional indirectness as well as Durst-Andersen's (2011a) notion of a *private* vs. *public voice* of a language. While the former does not require further comment, the latter is related to

the belief that our mother tongue goes into our bodies and blood, so to speak, eventually being conducive to automatic transfer of requesting strategies from a mother tongue to a lingua franca. It has been suggested that children acquire the *private voice* of their language at an early age not only through, for instance, swear words, forms of address, affectionate diminutives, but also through pure grammar. For example, a characteristic feature of Danish is the usage of particles like *bare, vel, nok, vist, nu, da*, etc. The theory proposes that when people learn a language at a later point in time, they do not acquire the private voice of the language in question, but its *public voice* instead. In Durst-Andersen's view (ibid.), the latter is not connected to the body in the same way as the private voice of a language, which he illustrates with the example of young immigrants in Denmark, whose Danish expresses a mixture of both their own and the Danish culture and mentality simply because they acquire Danish not as their mother tongue but as a second language after they start going to school (see more in sections 2.1.3.4 & 2.2).

Moreover, the research hypotheses have been formulated within the framework of the *theory of communicative supertypes*, which provides the general philosophical background for the present study (see section 2.1). The choice to study British English, Danish, and Russian is not accidental either and is based on the typological classification of these languages within the theory of communicative supertypes. More specifically, British English and Danish are said to belong to 'hearer-oriented' languages and Russian is claimed to represent the group of 'reality-oriented' languages. All in all, another objective of the present study is to test the assumptions about British English, Danish, and Russian as languages belonging to different communicative supertypes.

The SPP's research hypotheses are as follows:

    I)   Native spakers of British English largely employ indirect requesting strategies such as questions and declaratives (see section 2.5);

    II)   Danes (see section 2.1.3.4) and Russians (see section 2.5) are more likely to employ direct requesting strategies when communication takes place in their mother tongue;

    III)   Danes and Russians transfer direct requesting strategies from their respective mother tongues to ELF (based on the private vs. public voice distinction);

    IV)   Danes, Russians, and Brits mostly employ interrogative constructions in the situations where the speaker and the hearer 'do not share the world' (see section 5.3.1).

The following objectives of the SPP have been formulated on the basis of the above-mentioned hypotheses:

1) What are the similarities and differences in the request patterns of native (the ENSs) and non-native speakers of English (the DESs and the RESs) in the same social situations (interlanguage variation)?

2) What are the similarities and differences in the request patterns across mother tongue languages (in casu Danish and Russian) in the same social situations (cross-cultural variation)?

A further objective of the study:

3) To what extent is the DESs' and RESs' choice of requesting strategies determined by interactional styles operating within the Danish and Russian speech communities, respectively (intralanguage variation)?

In the present study, I shall employ Durst-Andersen's radical theoretical framework that is continuously under development. It comprises:

1) his 1995 approach to speech acts called 'Imperative Frames' (henceforth IF);

2) the analytical tool based on the IF-approach and employed in Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009), called 'the Speaker's Train of Thought Model' (henceforth the STT-model);

3) the latest revision of the IF and the STT-model, which is still being developed, called the Speech Act Process Model (henceforth the SAP-model).

Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework is a holistic approach to language and communication in that it incorporates virtually all the traditional descriptive strata, from the level of morphology to the level of communication, which are a priori assumed to reflect what goes on cognitively. I shall investigate the explanatory potential of this radical theoretical framework in its current state by subjecting it to the interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses of the English Lingua Franca Data (henceforth ELFD) and the Mother Tongue Data (henceforth MTD). In those cases where it fails to provide an explanation for the linguistic phenomena, an attempt will be made to draw on alternative explanatory factors from various approaches to speech acts in order to see if the framework can be improved by incorporating these factors.

1.3. The structure of the present paper

In the sections below, I deal with the linguistic similarities and differences both along the native/non-native and the cultural axes. I first present the general philosophical framework of my study,

which draws on the theory of communicative supertypes (Durst-Andersen, 2011a & 2011b). After that, I undertake a short review of the traditional theory of speech acts, focusing in particular on Searle's (1975) theory of indirect speech acts and Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness. The discussion also includes the issue of modality as it is traditionally understood. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of my reasons for employing Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework. In chapter 3, I engage in describing and explaining Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework, starting with his first proposal for analysing speech acts from 1995, the IF-approach. Subsequently, I outline Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009) STT-model and the SAP-model, which is at the point of writing still in the process of being developed (Durst-Andersen, 2016). In chapter 4, I look at different methods for collecting cross-cultural data in order to discover which are most suited to obtaining representative responses, and present the elicitation techniques that have been adopted in the present study. Subsequently, I describe the design of the pilot test and discuss its results and the implications for carrying out the Speech Production Tests (henceforth SPTs) at Carlsberg on which this study is based. In chapter 5, I apply Durst-Andersen's holistic framework to the data in the form of requests collected in the ESPTs and the NSPTs. The analysis includes the findings for the three scenarios – namely, the Trolley situation, the Window situation, and the Library situation. Chapter 6 draws the descriptive and analytical parts together and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of this theoretical framework in its current state. I end up my discussion by presenting the conclusions and implications for further research.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. The philosophical background of the present study

2.2. On the notion of 'transfer'

2.3. The traditional approaches to speech acts

2.4. On modality

2.5. On the choice of Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework

2.1. The philosophical background of the present study

Before embarking on the theoretical framework applied to speech acts, it is necessary to explain the underlying philosophical idea behind the present study and its research hypotheses, namely the Theory of Communicative Supertypes. This is a relativist theory, originally introduced by Per Durst-Andersen in his doctoral thesis Mental *Grammar. Russian Aspect and Related Issues*. It divides languages into three major groups from a communicative-semiotic perspective. The theory has been developing since 1992 and a number of languages have been described and classified within the three supertypes. However, a large number of languages still has to be studied and it is therefore at present uncertain whether they match any of the supertypes.

The main reason for taking my point of departure in this theory is its relation to the object of the present study, i.e. the production of directive speech acts in Danish, Russian, and British English. While other typological theories about languages usually classify them according to their origin or syntax, the theory of communicative supertypes provides valuable insights into language in use.

2.1.1. Reality exists in three modalities

Nobody would contest the fact that an ordinary communication situation requires three parties, i.e. reality, speaker, and hearer. This refers to a prototypical oral communication situation, where the speaker and hearer are facing each other. Interestingly, Durst-Andersen (2009:126) maintains that what we normally conceptualise as 'reality' does not exist as such in the prototypical communication situation. Inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce's classification of signs, Durst-Andersen (2011:77) maintains that a *state of affairs* has three modalities of existence: (1) a specific situation shared by the speaker and the hearer; (2) the situation as it is experienced by the speaker; and (3) the situation as it is experienced by the hearer. That is, when speaking about a state of affairs, one may refer to the situation itself (corresponds to *thirdness* in Peirce's terminology), to the speaker's experience of it (viz. *firstness* in Peirce's terminology), or to the information to the hearer concerning that situation (viz. *secondness* in Peirce's terminology). Despite the fact that Peirce regarded the speaker's experience to be *firstness,* Durst-Andersen follows Karl Bühler (1934) in claiming that the speaker's experience must presuppose a situation behind her experience, and any information given to the hearer therefore of necessity presupposes an experience by the speaker. Given the existence of these three distinct modes of reality, how can we explain that interlocutors know exactly what type of reality is being referred to in a specific communication situation?

In Durst-Andersen's view, in order to avoid the potential three-way ambiguity, the speaker and hearer must agree on one of the three modalities of existence. Borrowing Bakhtin's (1929) notion of *voice*, he argues further that the speaker and hearer, extrapolated to the whole speech community, must make a choice of which *voice* they want to speak with, i.e. the voice of reality (3rd person), the voice of the speaker (1st person), or the voice of the hearer (2nd person). This means that the members of a speech community must choose a *semiotic direction* of their language, i.e. do they want it to point to situations in reality shared by the speaker and hearer, to the speaker's experience of the situation, or to the information intended for the hearer. It should be pointed out that Durst-Andersen (2011b:155) construes *information* as the linguistic result of the speaker's comparison of her own experience with that of the hearer – if they match, we have *old information*, and if they do not, then we are dealing with *new information.*

This does not, however, imply that a speaker must make this choice every time she intends to encode a message for the hearer. So while it is up to the speaker to decide *what to say*, it is by no means up to her to decide *how to put it.* The latter is done by the members of the speech community that the speaker belongs to. Put differently, it is not the speaker herself, but the speaker's language that determines which mode of existence she has to use simply because it is already embedded in its grammar. Hence, a grammar will always point to either:

[1]

> Specific situation – *Model (3rd prs)*
>
> Speaker's experience of this situation – *Symptom (1st prs)*
>
> Information for hearer – *Signal (2nd prs)*

Taking its point of departure in Bühler's organon model (see section 3.5.2), the constellation in [1] is purely *indexical*, that is, it represents three different types of grammar, or as Durst-Andersen (2011a) terms it, three different *communicative supertypes.* Consider [2], which demonstrates three possible directions that a language grammar can take.

Given that words are arbitrary symbols that cannot refer to reality on their own (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b), they must necessarily have a grammar whose primary function is to direct the symbols to their target by giving them a semiotic direction, i.e. by pointing to situations in reality (i.e. Model),

to the speaker's experience of the situation (i.e. Symptom), or the hearer's experience of it as compared to that of the speaker (i.e. Signal). This is so because 'just as a vehicle cannot drive in three different directions at the same time, a grammar cannot point to the situation, the speaker and the hearer at the same time' (ibid., 156).

[2] The speaker's model – the Grammatical Triangle (from Durst-Andersen, 2011b:156)

For the sake of illustration, we can take the following sequence of English words, *how you go*. This does not make any sense without being anchored in a specific communication situation by means of the grammatical categories of time and aspect – *How are you going?* The grammar functions as the linguistic rules of the game which must be followed by both the speaker and the hearer if they want the outcome of the communication to be successful.

2.1.2. Reality exists in three modalities in mind

Besides observing that 'reality' as such does not exist in a prototypical communication situation but surfaces in the form of one of its three modalities (i.e. speaker, hearer, or a specific communication situation), Durst-Andersen (2012) provides a detailed description of human processing of visual stimuli. Interestingly, his view seems to be based on how these three modalities are connected to the human mind. The idea is not new and has traditionally been dealt with in the field of psychology, where researchers refer to these three stages of the dynamic processing of visual stimuli in terms of short-term memory, working memory, and long-term memory (cf. Atkinson and Schiffrin, 1968).

In Durst-Andersen's view, the process of understanding a particular situation and storing this in the long-term memory begins when people identify a 'state' according to their visual experience. Imagine that you open your key-locker and do not find the key you are looking for. You identify a

'stable picture' depicting a certain state '{key}', which Durst-Andersen describes as experience or *input* (see stage I in [3])

.

[3] The dynamic process of visual stimuli (from Durst-Andersen, 2012:94)

However, owing to your background knowledge telling you that the key was in the locker, you realise that somebody must have removed the key from there. Most importantly, you arrive at this understanding by comparing two contradictory pieces of information: '{key}' in a present world and 'key' in a past world. To use Durst-Andersen's terms, you achieve the understanding of the present situation through the application of a specific 'mental model', and since you understand that some activity has caused this change, you will use the 'event model' (for a detailed description of 'states', 'activities', 'events' and 'processes' see Durst-Andersen, 2011). In other words, your understanding of the situation is more complex than what the 'stable picture' informs you of. Durst-Andersen calls this cognitive process of assimilation *intake* (see stage II in [3]).

Finally, you need to store both what you have experienced, a present 'stable picture' of '{key}' and your knowledge about a past activity, which you did not see, i.e. 'somebody produced the activity

of removing the key from the locker'. Together they yield your understanding of the whole 'event' or your understanding of whole situation, i.e. the one experienced directly (present) and the previous situation (past) which you extract from your long-term memory. A combination of visual experience, the *input*, and the propositionally based *intake* is referred by Durst-Andersen as the stored result or *outcome* (see stage III in [3]).

All in all, the theory of communicative supertypes proposes a missing link between the way human beings communicate with each other by using different grammars and their cognitive processes – from visual experience in the form of *input* (perception), to the propositionally based *intake* (cognition), to the stored result, *output* (perception + cognition).

2.1.3.   The Three Communicative Supertypes

Languages whose grammar is a Model of situations will describe reality and speak with the voice of reality. Languages whose grammar is a Symptom of the speaker's experience of reality will focus on describing the speaker's experiences of it and, hence, speak with the voice of the speaker. Finally, languages whose grammar is a Signal to the hearer will always be preoccupied with the hearer's knowledge of the situation or the lack of it, and consequently speak with the voice of the hearer. As a result, we have three communicative supertypes:

[4]

> Reality-oriented languages
>
> Speaker-oriented languages
>
> Hearer-oriented languages

It is important to stress that languages belonging to the same supertype in [4] do not necessarily form completely identical grammatical systems by virtue of their unique diachronic development. Moreover, taking into consideration that we are dealing with different rules in the case of different *systems* within a single supertype, whereas we are concerned with different *principles* in the case of different supertypes, languages will inevitably differ with respect to rules because a principle can be interpreted in various ways (Durst-Andersen, 2011b:155f). It is even possible that different interpretations will lead to similarities across the three communicative supertypes. I shall now consider each of the

supertypes in [4] in detail, paying special attention to the languages that are the object of the present study, namely Russian, Danish, and English.

2.1.3.1.   Reality-oriented languages – Russian

Russian, Chinese, and Hindi belong to the prototypical reality-oriented languages (Durst-Andersen, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). In view of their common feature, i.e. focusing on a concrete situation 'out there', they have chosen to speak with the third-person voice, also called the voice of reality. From a grammatical point of view, a third-person-oriented speaker acts as a *reporter* whose task mainly lies in presenting an objective description of reality (Durst-Andersen, 2011a:129). This, in turn, would not be possible without a grammar that allows for the possibility of distinguishing between present and absent states (in the case of verbs) and objects (in the case of nouns) in the situation referred to. Let me illustrate the point by means of an example from Russian.

Russian distinguishes between the imperfective and perfective aspect (Maslov, 2004; Plungjan, 2003), corresponding to what Durst-Andersen calls processes and events. According to Durst-Andersen (2011b:13ff), processes are defined in terms of an activity (p) having a state (q) as its goal ([5a]), whereas events refer to a state (q) caused by an activity (p) ([5b]):

[5]   a. Kogda papa vošel v komnatu, ona *risovala* (IPFV) kartinku.

　　　'As the father entered the room, she *was painting* a picture.'　　　　　[process]

　　　b. Kogda ona *narisovala* (PFV) kartinku, papa vošel v komnatu.

'　　　When she *had finished painting* the picture, the father entered the room.'　　[event]

The aspectual opposition in [5] has traditionally been described in terms of the degree of *accomplishment* of an action from the point of view of the time of utterance (Maslov, 2004). More specifically, Russian has two forms of the same word, e.g. *risovat'* (IPFV) / *narisovat'* (PFV) for 'paint', because an action can only manifest itself in objective reality either as a process or an event: (1) she is producing the activity of painting and the (completed) picture does not exist in a real world location or (2) the (completed) picture exists in a real world location, but the specific activity that caused it does not exist.

The nominal system in Russian supplements the verbal system by similarly focusing on whether an object is present or absent in a particular situation. For example, the nominative, the accusative,

and the genitive case in Russian all point to a specific situation. However, while the first two indicate that the object is present in the situation referred to, the genitive indicates that the object is absent in the situation referred to. Consider the examples below:

[6]   a. *Mam-a* doma.   [NOM.SG]
       '*Mother* is at home.'

       b. My ljubim našu *mam-u*.   [ACC.SG]
       'We love our *mother*.'

       c. *Mam-y* net doma.   [GEN.SG]
       '*Mother* is not at home.'

Overall, the grammatical categories of aspect and case in Russian ensure the distinction between (1) language (*copy* in Durst-Andersen's terms) matches the objective reality (*original* in Durst-Andersen's terms) and (2) language (*copy*) does not match the objective reality (*original*). It is necessary to bear in mind though that languages with a grammatical orientation towards situations can differ with respect to their grammatical categories by virtue of their different foci. For example, Russian has been claimed to have a retrospective time perspective and have the perfective aspect as its prominent member, whereas Chinese has a prospective time perspective, thereby having the imperfective aspect as its prominent category (for a detailed overview of Chinese, see Durst-Andersen, 2013).

2.1.3.2. Speaker-oriented languages

Languages which are typically oriented towards the speaker include Bulgarian, Spanish, Arabic, and Japanese. They speak with the first person voice, as it were, i.e. their grammar functions as a Symptom of the speaker's experience of situations (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b:232). From a grammatical point of view, a first-person-oriented speaker acts as a *commentator* and speaks with a subjective voice. Like reality-oriented languages, these languages possess the category of aspect since events and processes can be experienced. Nevertheless, their *determinant* grammatical category is mood. This is because the grammar's function here is to tell the hearer whether the speaker did or did not see the situation referred to. This applies not only to physical experiences but notably also to mental experiences like assessment, opinion, interpretation, etc. (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:36). Consequently,

these languages are said to have well-developed modal systems within the indicative mood. Bulgarian, for instance, has chosen to focus on the speaker's direct and indirect experience (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b:224). In the case of the former, the speaker commits herself to the truth of the propositional content by virtue of having direct evidence for it. She does this by means of the three mood forms that were originally tense forms, i.e. the perfect form, the imperfect form, and the aorist form. Consider this example of the perfect form, borrowed from Durst-Andersen (ibid., 248):

[7]   Stojan   *e pročel*   knigata.

        Stojan   read.PF.PERF.DIR.EXP   book

        'Stojan *has read* the book.'

If the speaker does not have a direct experience of the situation, presumably because she did not witness it, she refrains from committing herself to the truth of the propositional content. Strikingly, the three mood forms that are said to express the indirect experience, namely the re-narrative form, the inveritative form, and the conclusive form, also allow the speaker to commit herself to the external commitment made by, say, another speaker. In other words, utterances expressing indirect experience contain two voices, that of the cited speaker, whose experience the actual speaker evaluates as being true or false, and the voice of the actual speaker. Let me illustrate the point with the example of the re-narrative form, borrowed from Durst-Andersen (ibid., 225):

[8]   Stojan   *pročel (Ø)*   knigata.

        Stojan   read.PF.AORIST.RENARRATIVE   book

        '(It is said that) Stojan *read* the book.'

The principle of direct vs. indirect experience within the Bulgarian verbal system is echoed in its nominal system. More specifically, the function of the definite article *–ta* in, say, the word *knigata*, meaning 'the book', is to point to a specific book in the speaker's mind, whereas the zero-form *kniga* points to the book that is not part of the speaker's experiences, but instead a hypothetical book in a real situation (ibid., 157).

To sum up, languages oriented towards the speaker have chosen to talk about the speaker's expe-

rience of the objective reality 'out there'. The speaker in these languages has various mood forms at her disposal that allow her to tell the hearer whether she actually saw the situation referred to or not (ibid., 232). The same opposition is found within the nominal system of these languages, where the category of article (or particles in the case of Japanese) is used to refer either to a specific object in the speaker's mind or a hypothetical object in the world 'out there'.

2.1.3.3.   Hearer-oriented languages – English and Danish

Typical representatives of languages oriented towards the hearer are the Scandinavian languages and English. They have chosen to speak with the second person voice, i.e. their grammar functions as a Signal to the hearer to look for the situation referred to behind the information, so to speak. From a grammatical point of view, a second-person-oriented speaker acts as an *informer / messenger* and speaks with an intersubjective voice (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b:233). The identification mark in these languages is the prominence of the grammatical category of tense. In Danish and English, for instance, it has gained its prominence at the expense of the verbal categories of aspect and mood. As has convincingly been demonstrated by Klinge (2002), it is not merely at the level of content that the English and Danish category of tense determines the functions of other categories. Providing syntactic proof that auxiliaries *do*, *be*, and *have* in English and Danish have the function of keeping the tense marker in the same position, as in *Why <u>did</u> you do that?; She <u>didn't</u> say that; etc.*, Klinge argues that these languages should be called T2-languages rather than V2-languages. This, however, does not mean that, say, English does not have aspect or cannot express hypothetical situations. The crucial point here is that the aspectual and modal meanings do not play a central part in the grammatical systems of these languages (e.g. the progressive vs. non-progressive aspectual opposition in present-day English), or simply have other grammatical categories at their disposal (e.g. the past tense for expressing the imagined world, *I wish you were here with us*).

Accordingly, the second-person-oriented speaker will always have to frame her message to the hearer in a kind of intricate way in that she will not be concerned about whether language corresponds to reality, as it is the case with reality-oriented languages, nor will she be concerned with the question of whether language corresponds to her own experience of reality. Instead, the speaker here will seek to correlate her own experience of the situation with the hearer's. If they match, the speaker will frame her message in the form of *old information* – i.e. the hearer already has an experience of the situation referred to. If the hearer has no experience of the situation referred to, the speaker will have to frame it

in the form of *new information*. This is exactly what the simple form and the perfect form do, having the temporal meanings of *storytelling / flashback* and *news flash*, respectively:

[9] a. I *saw* the latest Batman movie with Christian Bale yesterday. [storytelling]
   b. I *have seen* the latest Batman movie with Christian Bale.   [news flash]

In [9a], the simple past form signals that the speaker's information to the hearer is *old information*, as it were, presumably because the hearer knew that the speaker was going to watch the movie. In [9b], on the other hand, the present perfect form indicates that the speaker's information to the hearer is new for the latter. Holberg (2011:45ff) provides an interesting overview of the verbal system in British English, where the perfect form appears to have not only a temporal meaning of *news flash*, but also the aspectual meaning of *person characterisation*, thereby entering into the aspectual opposition with the progressive form, standing for *picture description.*

As far as the nominal system of speaker-oriented languages is concerned, the function of the category of article is that of pointing to the hearer's world of experience. This is why, among other things, this category is probably the most difficult one to acquire for adult language learners with a Model- or Symptom-type of grammar, e.g. Russian. This is because it is a completely different way of thinking, where the speaker always needs to pay attention to what the hearer knows and does not know. As a result, this constant conversation in the speaker's head leads to the following grammatical output: the definite article denotes that the hearer has an experience of the object experienced by the speaker, whereas the indefinite article signals that the hearer has no experience of it.

Finally, the basic unit of *information* in hearer-oriented languages has been claimed to be responsible for the indirect type of communication, peculiar to the languages at hand (see hypothesis I). More specifically, communication in these languages is characterised by a heavy use of metonymy (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b:95ff), which is in direct contrast to Russian or Chinese. Consider an illustrative example, borrowed from Durst-Andersen (ibid., 97f):

[10] *Bush and Blair* stayed in Iraq and the violence got worse.

[10] is an utterance from an English web-based newspaper from 2007, in which *Bush* and *Blair* are used as metonymies for the American and British troops. It does not cause any problem for native

speakers of English to render it, for they know that the English language should not be understood literally, since it functions as a Signal to the hearer to find the original situation in the world 'out there' by resorting to her background knowledge. Accordingly, the fact that Bush and Blair, the heads of the United States and Great Britain, respectively, and can thus make military decisions, is part of the shared knowledge of the English-speaking speaker and hearer. In other words, it is not the grammar of [10] that accounts for the linkage of Bush and Blair with American and British troops. Put differently, when hearing [10], a native speaker of English would know that the utterance is an indirect reference or, in Durst-Andersen's terminology *information*, indicating a continuing presence of the American and British troops in Iraq.

If we make a direct translation of [10] into Russian, we will get a completely different meaning, simply because in Russian the use of metonymy is primarily reserved for literary purposes. The only interpretation of [10] the Russian grammar allows is that Bush and Blair decided to stay in Iraq, and the fact that the violence got worse has a direct relation to their presence there. In other words, while making perfect sense in English, the utterance in [10] will be nonsensical in Russian. Consider an idiomatic Russian translation of [10] in [11], where the presence of American and British military forces in Iraq is spelled out (ibid.):

[11]   *Po rešeniju Buša i Bléra amerikanskie i anglijskie vojska ostalis' v Irake i v rezul'tate slučai nasilija učastilis'.*

'Following a joint decision by Bush and Blair, the American and the British troops remained in Iraq and consequently the actions of violence became more frequent.'

Summing up, what is characteristic of languages oriented towards the hearer is to talk about reality through the basic unit of information, construed within Durst-Andersen's theory of communicative supertypes in terms of the speaker's comparison of her own experience of the situation with that of the hearer. This is mainly done by the well-developed tense system, which, in turn, serves as a means of conveying aspectual and modal meanings. Interestingly, the nominal system in these languages seems to be in harmony with the verbal system, where the category of definiteness/indefiniteness is employed to refer to the hearer's world of experience. In the case of the former, the article points to a specific object in the hearer's mind, whereas in the case of the latter, the indefinite article indicates that the object referred to is not part of the hearer's experience or knowledge, thus automatically pointing to the speaker's world of experience.

2.1.3.4. Differences between English and Danish

As has been mentioned previously in this section, languages belonging to one and the same supertype usually have internal differences. There are a number of grammatical differences between British English and Danish; for instance, the difference in the time perspective (Durst-Andersen, 2011b: 213f), which has a direct relationship to the principal and secondary voice in the two languages (ibid., 251ff).

Since prime interest of the present study is speech acts, I shall elaborate on an unusual grammatical feature of Danish that distinguishes it from English. It appears that when making requests in their native language, Danes often use direct imperative constructions with particles like *bare*, *lige*, *så*, and *nu* (see [12]). These are notoriously difficult to translate. In Durst-Andersen's (1995: 636ff) view, these particles express the hearer's preconditions to the speaker, either *describing* (DESCRIPTIVE MODALISERS *lige* and *nu*) or *prescribing* (PRESCRIPTIVE MODALISERS *bare* and *så*) the final state and thereby indirectly pointing to a type of modality (see more on the issue of modality in section 2.4)

. [12] Descriptive and prescriptive modalisers in Danish (from Durst-Andersen, 1995:641)

	Alethic modality	Deontic modality	
Possibility	Sæt dig **lige** ned! 'Sit JUST down!'	Sæt dig **bare** ned! 'Sit MERELY down!'	Permission
Necessity	Sæt dig **nu** ned! 'Sit NOW down!'	Sæt dig **så** ned! 'Sit THEN down!'	Obligation

First of all, it is necessary to point out that all examples in [12] are imperative utterances, which, in turn, have been said to be unmarked with respect to the illocutionary act (Leech, 1983; Palmer, 1990). This means that in terms of their content they are polyvalent (e.g. *Sit down* can render Invitation, Suggestion, Advice, Permission, or even Order). Durst-Andersen suggests that the Danish modal particles in [12] should be treated as descriptive or prescriptive modalisers that disambiguate the vague status of the bare imperative with respect to the level of politeness (*bare* and *lige* are polite modalisers, whereas *nu* and *så* are impolite modalisers) and the type of speech act (i.e. Possibility, Necessity, Per-

mission, and Obligation). If this is valid, Durst-Andersen (1995) provides a relatively straightforward explanation for why these particles do not make imperative utterances sound impolite in Danish and constitutes the rationale behind research hypothesis II (see section 1.2).

2.1.4.   Final remarks

In this section, I have dealt with the theory of communicative supertypes (Durst-Andersen, 1992, 2011a & 2011b), which constitutes the philosophical framework for my study of requests in British English, Danish, and Russian. It is proposed that all languages can be divided into three broad categories called 'supertypes' with respect to the semiotic direction of their grammar. More specifically, [13] below gives an overview of: (1) languages that have chosen to speak with the voice of reality and have *situation* as their basic unit; (2) languages that have opted for the voice of the speaker and have *experience* as their basic unit; and finally (3) languages that have decided to speak with the voice of the hearer and have *information* as their basic unit.

[13] Table showing the three linguistic supertypes (from Durst-Andersen, 2011b: 234)

	Reality-oriented	Speaker-oriented	Hearer-oriented
Representatives	Russian & Chinese	Bulgarian & Georgian	English & Danish
Basic Unit	Situation	Experience	Information
Speaker Orientation	Third person	First person	Second person
Speaker Function	Reporter	Commentator	Informer
Identification Mark	Aspect Prominence	Mood Prominence	Tense Prominence

It is interesting to note that Bhat's (1999) monumental typology of languages of India, classifying them into languages with aspect, mood, and tense prominence, indirectly supports Durst-Andersen's hypothesis based on the study of languages like Russian, Bulgarian, Danish, English, German, French, Chinese, etc. Furthermore, Bhat concludes his study by stating that the most prominent verbal category influences not merely the structure of verbal forms but also the nominal categories, in the form of nominalisations, case marking, adjectival and adverbial systems, etc. Most importantly, his conclusion echoes Durst-Andersen conclusion in attributing a particular world view of the speakers to each specific language type. I shall comment continuously on this relativist version of the Sapir-Whorf

hypothesis throughout the present study.

2.2. On the notion of 'transfer'

Given that research hypothesis III concerns 'linguistic transfers' from a mother tongue into a lingua franca, it seems reasonable to include in the present study a short discussion of the contrastive analysis hypothesis (CAH) from the field of foreign language acquisition and its relation to Durst-Andersen's notion of a private vs. public voice of a language (see introduction).

The idea that a native language and culture may influence a learner's acquisition of a foreign language and culture is not new. As early as in the mid-fifties, Lado's *Linguistics and Cultures* (1957) combined the ideas of structural linguistics and behavioural psychology into what later became known as CAH. This approach was mainly developed with the theoretical and practical purpose of *predicting* 'behaviour' whereby 'individuals tend to transfer the forms and meanings and the distribution of forms and meanings of their native language and culture to the foreign language and culture' (Lado, 1957:2).

Lado's notion of 'behaviour' reminds us of Durst-Andersen's (2011a) distinction between a *private* vs. *public voice* of a language. As mentioned in the introduction, the former is acquired by children at an early age, absorbed as it were with their mother's milk, whereas the latter is learnt by grown-ups at a later point in time and is not connected to the body in the same way as the private voice of a language. For example, Danish has various modal particles like *bare*, *lige*, *jo*, *nu*, *så*, *etc.* that are usually used together with direct requests. In Durst-Andersen's view, these particles do not merely express lexically different levels of politeness but have an important grammatical function in that they can express the speaker's conditions to the hearer and the hearer's conditions to the speaker (see a detailed discussion in section 3.5.5.2.2). The deep semantic structure of these particles that is acquired by children at an early age makes it difficult – if not impossible – to learn them in adulthood (ibid.). In other words, the distinction between a private and public voice seems to underscore the role of grammar rather than semantics. Yet, Durst-Andersen's idea about two types of voice does not tell us what particular type of grammatical transfers we can expect to find in L2. It simply assumes that the two voices differ with respect to their connection to the *body* or the absence of it. Clearly, the 'bodily' metaphor links the term with cognitive linguistics, which treats linguistic meaning as embodied structures (see Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). At the same time, this distinction incorporates the principles of behavioural psychology in that it treats 'transfer' in the broader meaning of the term, i.e. 'carrying over the habits of his mother tongue into the second language' (Corder, 1971:158).

Accordingly, the private vs. public voice distinction differs from CAH in several respects. First of all, it does not make any predictions about a particular 'behaviour' of L2 speakers. Nor does it treat this 'behaviour' in terms of errors, also called positive or negative transfers from L1 to L2. This is presumably due to the fact that it is conceived of as applying to speech *production*, having little to say about *linguistic structures*. Klein (1986:25) provides a clear observation of this difference:

> A major reason for this relative failure [to explain the lack of transfer in CAH] lies in the fact that structural similarities and dissimilarities between two linguistic systems and the processing of linguistic means in actual production and comprehension are two quite different things. Contrastive linguistics was concerned with the former; acquisition, however, has to do with the latter. It is not the existence of a structure as described by the linguist that is important, but the way the learner deals with it in comprehension and production. Therefore, comparison of structures may totally miss the point.

Summing up, the present study does not follow the principles of CAH in that its main interest is not to make any judgements about the level of proficiency of non-native speakers of English by gauging the number and type of errors they make. Its main objective is to provide a *description* of the request patterns in the three languages, both in terms of their differences and similarities. Moreover, the analysis will not be limited to the study of surface linguistic structures but will also include the discussion of the deeper mechanisms that may cause linguistic transfers from L1 to L2. Even though one of the objectives of the present study concerns the issue of transfers, the aim is to investigate the 'speech production behaviour' of Danish and Russian speakers of English from the point of view of its *effectiveness* rather than structural *interference* of the speaker's native language system.

2.3. On previous approaches to speech acts

The study of speech act was originally located in the philosophy of language. The ideas offered in the works on speech act theory (Searle, 1975), the principles of cooperative conversation (Grice, 1975), and the principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) relate to the analysis of illocutionary acts, e.g. making statements, giving directions, apologising, thanking, etc. A classic example of an indirect request is *Can you reach the salt?*, which is formulated as a question, but meant as a request for the hearer to pass the salt. In other words, nobody contests the claim that there are certain minimal units of human interaction where the speaker's utterance meaning (i.e. her intention with the utterance) does not coincide with the sentence meaning (i.e. its literal meaning).

Virtually all writers on speech acts define direct speech acts as those where the speaker says what she means. Searle (1975:177), for instance, speaks of direct speech acts in terms of directives, i.e. flat imperative sentences (e.g. *Close the window*) or explicit performatives (e.g. *I order you to close the window*). On the other hand, the notion of *indirectness* is normally understood either as certain forms of language that are conventionally used to issue directives (Searle, 1975) or as the role of general principles of conversation, especially the principle of *relevance*, in the process of encoding and decoding indirect meaning in context (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1986).

Another controversial issue concerns the alleged interdependence of the notions of politeness and indirectness. According to Searle (1975), politeness is held to be a chief motivation for indirectness. Following Searle, a large number of researchers (cf. Gordon & Lakoff, 1975; Fraser, 1980; Brown & Levinson, 1978; Blum-Kulka et al., 1989) link the universal principles of politeness with indirectness.

Critics of the principle of universal indirectness have commented on its marginal role in Slavic languages (cf. Durst-Andersen, 2009) and East Asian languages and cultures (cf. Matsumoto, 1988; Ide, 1989). According to Wierzbicka (1985), negative politeness is not only not typical of the western world as a whole (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1978:245), but is essentially a monocultural phenomenon characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon culture:

> English seems to have developed a particularly rich system of devices reflecting a characteristically Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition: a tradition which places special emphasis on the rights and on the autonomy of every individual, which abhors interference in other people's affairs (*It is none of my business*), which is tolerant of individual idiosyncrasies and peculiarities, which respects everyone's privacy, which approves of compromises and disapproves of dogmatism of any kind. The heavy restrictions on the use of the imperative in English and the wide range of use of interrogative forms in performing acts other than questions, constitute striking linguistic reflexes of this socio-cultural attitude (Wierzbicka, 1985:150).

Thus, her proposal to conceive of principles of politeness as language-specific and culture-specific undermines the view of the universal principle of indirectness generally accepted within Western pragmatics and maintains that conventional forms of requesting behaviour are deeply rooted in cultural norms and values, rather than general norms of politeness. She even goes as far as proposing to entirely abandon the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts, suggesting that individual speech acts should be examined in cultural terms (Wierzbicka, 1991:88).

In line with her culture-specific approach to politeness, a number of East Asian studies (see Lee-Wong, 1994; Hong, 1999), for example, have observed that Chinese does not fit into the universal category of conventionally indirect requests. In addition, they have pointed out that those indirect forms that are normally associated with politeness in English (e.g. interrogatives, hedges, and hints) express uncertainty, necessity, sarcasm, anger or impatience in Chinese (cf. Hong, 1999:10). In certain languages, indirectness may have a completely different function. For instance, in Japanese it is said to 'express empathy between participants, symbolising a high degree of shared presuppositions' (Kasper, 1990:200). Analogously, directness is not necessarily associated with rudeness. For the Japanese to be polite, it is essential to know what social position the social norms prescribe in a particular context, which they can show with the help of, say, honorifics (cf. Ide, 1989:230).

Moreover, research on languages spoken in the 'collectivist societies' (Gu, 1990 on Mandarin Chinese) reveals the inappropriateness of the concept of positive / negative face. In a society where the group is valued higher than the individual, politeness should not be considered as linguistic choices made by the speaker in order to meet her interlocutor's positive and/or negative face needs. Rather, it is people's desire to behave according to culture-specific norms in a society, in other words, 'to fulfil the social contract they are in with all members of the community' (Devos & Olmen, 2013:6). This desire has also been called 'group face' (Nwoye, 1992:313). According to Sifianou (1992:137), in Greece, there is a 'duty or even obligation of every individual to help others, thus creating the opportunity for everybody to live in a harmonious in-group' and, thus, bald on-record requests are not felt to be impolite. A similar 'in-group' mentality has also been observed in African language societies, where direct requesting strategies have been regarded as more polite than the indirectness of hedged performatives and strong hints (cf. Kasanga's 2006 study of Northen Sotho; Devos & Van Olmen's 2013 study of 150 Bantu languages).

Furthermore, the cross-cultural requesting behaviour of Danes and the British have been studied by Trosborg (1995:276), who found that, compared to Danish learners of English, native speakers of English used significantly more indirect requesting strategies when interacting with authority figures than friends. That finding, however rare it might be, in turn supports the view proposed by Durst-Andersen (2011a:174f), namely that the Danish opt for direct requesting behaviour to a greater extent than those who have English as their mother tongue. The purely linguistic explanation of the Danes' assumed preference for direct speech acts has been said to be related to such pragma-semantic particles as *bare*, *nu*, *lige*, and *så* (see sections 2.1.3.4 & 3.5.5.2.2).

In summing up, it can be concluded that there is enough cross-cultural evidence undermining

the notion of positive / negative face and, related to these, principles of politeness. Accordingly, the goal of my study is not to provide further criticism of Brown & Levinson (1978). Rather, it is to test an alternative approach to speech acts proposed by Durst-Andersen, which not only treats the notion of directness / indirectness in a different manner, but is essentially based on the idea of solving problems by means of language. I shall provide a detailed description of the problem-solving view on speech acts in section 3.3. Prior to this we still need to consider the issue of modality as the basis for the methodological framework of the study at hand.

2.4.   On the issue of modality

In spite of the fact that modality has long been the object of study in philosophy and logic, in the middle of the 20th century this category was extracted from the field of logic, mainly due to the 1951 work of Finnish philosopher Georg von Wright, *An Essay in Modal Logic*. My research inquiry into the traditional account of the domain of modality, however, revealed an ambiguous picture, notably because various schools address the question of the category's borders differently.

Within Western linguistic tradition, the focus has mainly been on the distinction between what has variously been referred to as deontic, root, objective, pragmatic or agent-oriented modality on the one hand and subjective, hypothetical, speaker-oriented, or epistemic modality on the other (cf. Coates, 1983; Bybee & Pagliuca, 1985; Heine, 1995:17-53; Palmer, 2001:236). While epistemic modality is usually connected to the notions of possibility or necessity of the *truth of propositions*, thus involving knowledge and belief (Lyons 1997:793), deontic modality is claimed to be related to the necessity and possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents (ibid., 823), and is hence associated with the *social functions* of permission and obligation.

Still, the distinction between the non-epistemic and epistemic meanings is not as straightforward as one might expect. For instance, according to Bybee & Fleischman (1995:5), '[T]he traditional division of modality into epistemic and deontic reveals some interesting cases of polysemy in which the same form can be used for both types of modality.' A classic example of this is the English modal *may* that can express either deontic permission (e.g. *she may sit down now*) or epistemic possibility (e.g. *it may be the last time we see each other*). The ambiguity of modal meanings arises primarily as a result of the fact that different modal types are expressed lexically, mainly by means of modal auxiliaries and adverbs. This means that the distinction between them is not completely grammaticalised in English.

Another problem seems to be related to the classification of the so-called root possibility ('alethic

mode' in Von Wright's terms) within the epistemic mode (see Aarts et al., 2014), by virtue of being concerned with the necessary *truth of propositions*. The most typical grammeme associated with physical/root possibility or 'existentiality' (Palmer, 2001) in English is the modal verb *can* (e.g. *she can go to school*). It has been pointed out in Coates (1995:63), though, that there are cases (e.g. *we hope this coding system can be useful*) that are fuzzy with respect to root (i.e. logical possibility/impossibility) and epistemic possibility (i.e. probability). Finally, the last moot point regarding modality is the fuzziness of the epistemic/non-epistemic boundary. It has been claimed that epistemic modality also contributes to truth-conditional content by virtue of the fact that epistemic meanings are also established by the speaker (Papafragou, 2006; Ljapon, 1990:303-304).

Within the Russian and German linguistic tradition, the modal distinction is primarily made within the realis-irrealis dimension (Heine, 1995:20) and is usually referred to as 'objective' and 'subjective' modality (Plungjan, 2000; Ljapon, 1990). The former conveys the relationship of the proposition to reality, whereas the latter is understood as the speaker's attitude towards the proposition. Interestingly, it has been claimed that the East Slavic languages make the distinction within the objective modality alone, i.e. between alethic and deontic meanings (Durst-Andersen, 1995:617f). This is because the alethic vs. deontic distinction is grammaticalised in these languages, where the former is conveyed by the perfective aspect (e.g. in Russian, *vojdite!* – 'It is (physically) *possible* for you to come in') and the latter by the imperfective aspect (e.g. the Russian *vxodite!* – 'It is *permitted* for you to come in'). As far as subjective modality in these languages is concerned, it appears to have a secondary or parenthetical status within their grammatical systems (cf. Ljapon, 1990). To be more specific, epistemic meanings are usually rendered through parenthetical units outside the propositional structure of the utterance, for example by means of the modal particles *vrode* ('a kind of') and *jakoby* ('supposedly'), interjections *uvy* ('alas') and o*j*-o*j*-o*j* ('oh'), modal adverbs *dolžno byt'* ('(it) must be') and *možet byt'* ('(it) can be'), by means of intonation, as well as the reverse word order (ibid.).

All in all, it is obvious that Western linguists have mainly been interested in epistemic modality, which plays no role at all in languages like Russian. Since the present study investigates two Germanic languages (English and Danish) and a Slavic language (Russian), it was necessary to employ a theory of modality that could incorporate representatives of both language families. Accordingly, I have adopted the approach to modality that was introduced by Durst-Andersen in his 1995 article *Imperative Frames and Modality. Direct vs. Indirect Speech Acts in Russian, Danish, and English.* First and foremost, his approach is based on the division between deontic and alethic modality on the one hand and epistemic modality on the other. Secondly, it incorporates the notion of deontic logic introduced by the Finnish

philosopher Georg von Wright.

According to Von Wright (1951), the deontic modality, unlike alethic or epistemic modality, has no logical connections with matters of fact (i.e. truth and falsehood) and is thus always related to what he terms 'moral codes'. In this respect, therefore, the deontic categories involve Obligation, Cancellation of obligation, Permission, and Prohibition (ibid., p. 2). Moreover, Von Wright categorises the group of concepts which have traditionally been called modal (e.g. Necessity, Non-necessity, Possibility, Impossibility) as 'alethic modalities'. By applying a number of logical principles, he makes a sharp distinction between the system of alethic modes and the system of epistemic modes, the logical status of the former being 'possible' (also known in the literature as *modes of truth*) while that of the latter is 'verified' and 'undecided' (also known as *modes of knowledge and belief*). The focal difference between the alethic and epistemic modality concerns the logical distinction between *truth in the world* vs. *truth in an individual's mind.* In line with Von Wright's suggestion, Durst-Andersen (1995:619) similarly draws the fundamental distinction between 'knowledge' and 'lack of knowledge', also called the *universe of knowledge* and the *universe of beliefs*. Consider the table below:

Knowledge		Non-Knowledge
Alethic modality (the laws of nature – ergo '*to be possible*')	Deontic modality (the laws of society – ergo '*to make possible*')	Epistemic modality
Will you sit down? (The speaker describes that the desired state is possible – it is possible for the hearer to be seated)	Won't you sit down? (The speaker makes the desired state possible by issuing Permission in order to remove the obstacle)	He has probably gone to the library. He might have gone to the library. He may have gone to the library.

Von Wright's (1951) view, however, was criticized by Palmer (1986:11), who claimed that there is no difference between what is logically true and what the speaker believes to be true, stating that 'there is no formal grammatical distinction in English, and, perhaps, in no other language either, between alethic and epistemic modality'. The approach adopted here, though, follows Durst-Andersen (1995, 2011), who, like von Wright, draws a sharp line between 'non-epistemic' (i.e. *dealing with laws of nature and society*) and 'epistemic' (i.e. *dealing with an individual's beliefs*) modalities.

The justification for using this distinction mainly pertains to the grammatical system of languages like Russian in which the epistemic modality is claimed not to play any particular role within its verbal system (Durst-Andersen, 2011b:217; Klinge & Müller, 2005). As mentioned above, the perfective and imperfective aspects in Russian are connected to two different types of non-epistemic modality. The former basically involves a description of a state and is paired with alethic modality, whereas the latter refers to a description of an activity and is coupled with deontic modality. Consider the Russian examples in [14] and [15]:

[14]

the perfective aspect alethic modality	Examples
• *Vojdite!* (Possibility) • Dver'polomana, ee ne *zakryt'*. (Impossibility) • *Zakrojte* dver'! Silno skvozit. (neccessity) • Ne *zakrojte* dver'! Potom ne vyjdete. (Non-necessity)	• *Come in*! • The door is broken – you *cannot close* it. • *Close* the door! There is a draught here. • *Be careful with closing* the door! Otherwise you won't be able to come out.

[15]

the imperfective aspect deontic modality	Examples
• *Vxodite!* (Permission) • *Dver'ne zakryvat'*! (written on the door; Prohibition) • *Zakryvajte* dver'! Vy ne u sebja doma. (Obligation) • Dver' včera počinili. Ne *zakryvajte* ee! (Cancellation of obligation)	• *Come in!* • *Close* the door! • *Close* the door! It's not your home. • The door was repaired yesterday. You *don't have to close* it.

In summary, there are various linguistic approaches to the domain of modality that differ mainly with respect to the classification of a range of modal meanings in different languages with different grammatical systems. Bearing in mind the reasons mentioned above, my study follows Durst-Anders-

en's 1995 account of modality.

2.5.   On the choice of Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework

When studying Searle's 1975 theory of indirect speech acts, Durst-Andersen discussed a number of issues concerning its inapplicability to non-English data. Searle's account of indirect speech acts has been claimed to be 'far from providing sufficient information for being called a theory' (Dörge, 2004:12). One of its main weaknesses (Durst-Andersen, 2009:318) pertains to the claim that any imperative utterance should be described in terms of obedience conditions (see Searle, 1983), compliance conditions (see Smart, 1984) or satisfaction conditions (see Hamblin, 1987). Moreover, it is common practice to analyse requests in terms of the conditions imposed by the speaker on the hearer alone, e.g. Advice, Invitation, or Suggestion (positive / polite speech acts) and Order, Threat, or Warning (negative / impolite speech acts). To illustrate this point, the utterances *Give me that gun right now!* or *Can't you turn off your mobile?* would normally be interpreted as Order, Warning or Threat, whereas such indirect request as *Won't you sit down?, Will you open the window?, Can you pass me the sugar, please?*, will usually be analysed as Invitation or Suggestion.

The reason behind the tendency to analyse an utterance in terms of a single speech act presumably relates to one of the main claims about language, namely the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. According to Durst-Andersen (2009:52ff), words and utterances have traditionally been treated identically in terms of symbols where the relationship between the form and the content is arbitrary and established by convention. Consider, for example, Austin (1962: 59), who states that

> […] the correlation between the words and the type of situation, event … is absolutely and purely conventional. We are absolutely free to appoint any symbol to describe any type of situation, so far as merely being true goes.

When arguing that a speech act is a minimal unit of linguistic communication, Searle (1965:80) similarly seems to treat symbols, words, and sentences as equal entities.[1] This view has resulted in a tendency to describe indirect speech acts in the literature on pragmatics in terms of 'rules or conventions'. In *How to do things with words*, Austin (1962:100) speaks of speech acts as idioms, 'We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention.' A similar point of view is found in Searle (1975:69), stating, 'All the examples given [indirect speech acts] are

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1 This quote is from a time when there was not yet a clear distinction between an utterance and a sentence, which was first established after Austin and Searle.

idiomatic in current English … they are idiomatically used as requests.'

Presumably, the tradition within pragmatics to regard utterances as idiomatic entities goes back to the first model of communication, namely the organon model of language (Bühler, 1934). This will be discussed in detail in section 3.5.2 in relation to the SAP-model. At this point it will suffice to mention that the organon model treats both objects and state of affairs as simple signs (symbols), which cannot possibly be true, taking into consideration the fact that they belong to different language levels (see section 3.5.3).

In addition to treating indirect speech acts in terms of idiomatic entities, it has long been an accepted practice to analyse indirect speech acts in terms of the speaker's intentions alone. For instance, Wilson and Sperber (1993:1) speak of 'a linguistically encoded logical form [that] is contextually enriched and used to construct a *hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention*' (my italics). A similar interest in implicatures is found in Green (2004:408), who describes one of the basic assumptions within linguistic pragmatics in terms of the speaker and hearer's mental models of each other. She claims that the addressee will never be able to understand the speaker's intention with the utterance without having specific beliefs about her mental model of him, even though these beliefs are inaccurate. Admittedly, the idea of inferring the pragmatic (illocutionary) information makes good sense when dealing with indirect speech acts – which is the primary area of study within traditional (Western) pragmatics. This framework, however, becomes incomplete when it comes to analysing direct speech acts in languages like Russian, where the speaker would normally formulate her intentions with the hearer directly, as in *Sit down.*

The claim that the speaker would normally formulate her intentions directly goes back to the basic principles of the theory of communicative supertypes (see section 2.1.1), according to which the task of communication is divided between the speaker, the situation, and the hearer. In the case of English, a hearer-oriented language, the speaker's input will be her own *experiences* of the situation, the language will be *information*, and the hearer's intake will be the *situation*. Following this approach, it seems quite plausible that a native speaker of English may be blinded by her mother tongue and search for the interpretation of utterances in the situation or context.

Let me illustrate the point by applying the supertype approach to the indirect request *Won't you sit down?*, uttered by a host to a guest. Assuming that the English-speaking addressor's role in the communication situation is to attend to her own experiences of the situation, she might have the following experience of the situation: 'I know that the hearer wants to be seated, but I can see that she is not

taking a seat.' In Durst-Andersen's view (1995, 2009), this is because there is an obstacle – the hearer is not on her own territory, and according to the conventional rules, she cannot do what she wants without obtaining permission from the host. Accordingly, the speaker's experience of the situation takes the form of a Thought, to use Durst-Andersen's terminology; and assuming the speaker does want the hearer to be seated (i.e. she intends to remove the existing obstacle), she seeks to confirm her Thought by asking whether her experience of the situation corresponds with that of the hearer, which results in a speech act involving Permission: 'Does my experience of the situation correspond with yours?' or 'Is it true that you will not sit down?' In this respect, the speaker's comparison of her own experience of the situation with that of the hearer results in what Durst-Andersen calls *information.*

The English-speaking hearer understands the speaker's utterance perfectly well, because she, as a native speaker of English, knows that *Won't you sit down?* directed at her is *information* which she has to decode through 'reading' the context, i.e. *situation*: 'The speaker (host) knows that I (guest) want to sit down and I know that she wants me to be seated – this is our shared background knowledge. Hence, she would not have asked me whether it is true that I will not sit down, if she had had an opposite expectation.'

The analysis above makes it plausible that an utterance, like *Won't you sit down?,* would be analysed as a single speech act in terms of an Invitation. Moreover, it explains why the relevance approach to speech acts (cf. Wilson & Sperber, 1993) is so popular, especially with hearer-oriented languages, like English, where the hearer will always try to work out something the language alone does not convey.

However, the difficulties with its application arise as soon as one turns to languages other than English, e.g. Russian. As mentioned above (see section 2.1.3.1), this language speaks with the voice of reality (i.e. a situation shared by both the speaker and the hearer) and prefers direct speech acts, like *Sit down!,* to indirect ones, like *Won't you sit down?* This is because the division of work between the speaker, the hearer, and reality in Russian differs from English. By contrast, nobody would deny that making a request in a bald manner by using a pure imperative is an imposition and extremely impolite in English (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1978). Nevertheless, there are languages that regularly use direct requesting strategies that are not perceived as imposing actions: e.g. imperative constructions with particles in Danish (Durst-Andersen, 1995:641ff), various on-record strategies in Greek (Sifianou, 1992), Slavic languages (Durst-Andersen, 1995, 2011b), Bantu languages (Devon & Olmen, 2013), etc.

Given the inappropriateness of the traditional theory of speech acts for languages like Russian,

the present study employs Durst-Andersen's holistic and theoretical framework under development, comprising his 1995 IF-approach to speech acts, the STT-model of Arnsberg and Bentsen from 2009, the problem-solving view on requests, as well as the SAP-model in its current state.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Imperative Frames

3.2. The Speaker's Train of Thought Model

3.3. The problem-solving approach to requests

3.4. Three different 'decision models'

3.5. The Speech Act Process Model (under development)

3.1. Proposing Imperative Frames

In accordance with Durst-Andersen's hypothesis (1995), speech acts in all languages can be analysed on the basis of eight universal imperative frames, all of which instantiate basic units of non-epistemic modality. As has been mentioned in section 2.4, in contrast to epistemic modality, non-epistemic modality deals with various types of knowledge, i.e. with laws of nature (alethic modality) and laws of society (deontic modality). While alethic modality bears upon (physical) possibility and impossibility as well as (internal) necessity and non-necessity (in Von Wright's sense of the term), deontic modality is concerned with permission, prohibition, obligation, and cancellation of obligation. Accordingly, the four alethic types of modality make up four 'descriptive' imperative frames and the four deontic ones include four 'prescriptive' imperative frames. It is worth pointing out that 'possibility' is the underlying primitive of the eight frames. Consider the table below:

[1]

Descriptive frames	Prescriptive frames
Possibility	Permission (make PSBL)
Impossibility (~ PSBL)	Prohibition (~ make PSBL)
Necessity (~ PSBL ~)	Obligation (~ make PSBL ~)
Non-necessity (PSBL ~)	Cancellation of obligation (make PSBL ~)

Following Von Wright, Durst-Andersen (ibid.) maintains that the four alethic frames are descriptive by virtue of merely *describing* what is possible or impossible, necessary or unnecessary. In Searle's (1983:7) terminology, they have the word-to-world direction of fit, that is, the words match reality; and to the extent that they do or fail to do so, they are called true or false. For example, in formulating her request in terms of possibility, as in *Can you pass me the salt, please?*, the speaker simply asserts what she believes is physically possible for the hearer to do, notably because there is no obstacle for the hearer to carry out the act: i.e., 'I hereby ask you whether it is true that it is *possible* for you to pass me the salt.'

The four deontic frames, on the other hand, are more difficult since they are structurally more complex than the alethic frames. Their complexity is caused by the fact that they do not simply describe what is possible / impossible / necessary / unnecessary, but rather *make* it possible / impossible

/ necessary / unnecessary for the hearer to carry out an act. Accordingly, a deontic speech act has the so-called world-to-word direction of fit (ibid.): that is, words are not supposed to match reality, but are supposed to induce changes in the world so that the world can be in accord with the propositional content of the speech act. In a classic example of permission, *Won't you sit down?*, the speaker *makes* it possible for the hearer to sit down by removing the existing 'obstacle' which is 'H does not dare to perform an action without the speaker's permission'. On the level of Output, the speaker puts this into effect by asking whether her assumption: 'H will not sit down', – corresponds to the hearer's actual state of mind (see a detailed discussion in section 3.5.6.5).

Besides being based on the deontic and alethic modality, the eight imperative *frames* have been given this label because of their complex structure. First and foremost, this relates to Durst-Andersen's fundamental idea about a speech act: namely, any utterance can be interpreted as consisting – explicitly or implicitly – not just of a single speech act, as traditionally held but of three different speech acts. In his view, each speech act corresponds to one of the three obligatory participants in a communication situation – i.e. speaker, hearer, and reality (see the evidence for this view in sections 3.5.1 & 3.5.2). In his 1995 article, Durst-Andersen provides a description of the imperative frame and its three independent speech acts.

> **The Imperative Frame: Pre-conditions, Request, Post-conditions**

Consider a description of his seven imperative frames below (from Durst-Andersen, 1995:614):

[2] **Prescriptive frames** (all involving deontic modality)

    a. non-negated

        1. PERMISSION—REQUEST—ADVICE/*ORDER/etc.

        2. OBLIGATION—REQUEST—ORDER/*SUGGESTION/etc.

    b. negated

        3. PROHIBITION—REQUEST—WARNING/*ADVICE/etc.

        4. NON-OBLIGATION—REQUEST—ADVICE/*WARNING/etc.

Descriptive frames (all involving alethic modality)

    a. non-negated

      5.   POSSIBILITY—REQUEST—ADVICE/*ORDER/etc.

      6.   NECESSITY—REQUEST—ORDER/*ADVICE/etc.

    b. negated

      7.   POSSIBILITY—REQUEST—CAUTION/*THREAT

It should be pointed out that 7 in [2] is described in Durst-Andersen (ibid.,631) in terms of the '*unnecessary and undesired state*', which corresponds to his description of the descriptive imperative frame involving Unnecessity / Non-necessity (Durst-Andersen, 2009:331f). This must imply that the imperative frame having Possibility as its *pre-conditions*, also called *satisfaction conditions*, and Caution as its *post-conditions*, also called *obedience conditions*, must represent the descriptive frame involving Non-necessity.

Of particular note is the link between *satisfaction conditions* instantiated by Possibility, Permission, Prohibition, etc. in [2] and the category of aspect in Russian. As mentioned above (see [2.14] & [2.15]), the perfective aspect is linked to the alethic modality and the imperfective aspect to the deontic modality. This being the case, by describing (i.e. Possibility) or prescribing (i.e. Permission) the final state, a Russian speaker is said to 'satisf[y] the preconditions for the hearer's to comply with his request' (see Durst-Andersen, 1995:628).

Finally, it is important to point out that IF presents a holistic approach to analysing speech acts in that it incorporates three different angles: i.e. the hearer's point of view, the speaker's point of view, and even the point of view of reality. More specifically, the hearer perceives the eight imperative frames in [1] in terms of four descriptive and four prescriptive frames. From the speaker's perspective, the eight frames in [1] divide into polite and impolite frames. From the point of view of reality, the eight imperative frames can be concerned with changing the world or preserving the world as it is at the moment of speech.

In Durst-Andersen 2009, we find a detailed overview of the five frames involving the change in the world in [3] and three frames not involving any change in [4]. It should be mentioned though that

[4] presents a slightly revised version of Durst-Andersen's (2009:331f) Non-necessity in terms of *obedience conditions*, notably exemplifying Caution. This is mainly related to the fact that Durst-Andersen (1995:614) describes this frame as a negated descriptive frame having Possibility as its *satisfaction conditions* and Caution as its *obedience conditions* in [2].

[3]

Type of Imperative frame	Obstacle	Satisfaction conditions	Obedience conditions	Politeness degree	Example
Permission	Obstacle – H does not dare to produce an action	S issues permission in order to remove the obstacle	S attempts to compensate for H's troubles	Polite in direct as well as indirect uses	Non-negated imperative
Obligation	Obstacle – H does not want the state	S issues an obligation in order to remove the obstacle	S attempts to secure obedience by promising a penalty	Impolite in direct as well as indirect uses	Non-negated imperative
Possibility	No obstacle – H wants the state	S describes that the desired state is possible	S attempts to compensate for H's troubles	Polite in direct as well as indirect uses	Non-negated imperative
Impossibility	No obstacle – H will assist S	S asks if it is possible for H to assist	Irrelevant	Neutral	Non-negated imperative
Necessity	Obstacle – H will not assist	S describes that the desired state is necessary	S attempts to secure obedience by promising a penalty	Impolite in direct as well as indirect uses	Non-negated imperative

[4]

Type of Imperative frame	Obstacle	Satisfaction conditions	Obedience conditions	Politeness degree	Example
Prohibition	No obstacle – H will do something	S issues a prohibition in order to establish an obstacle	S attempts to secure obedience by promising a penalty	Impolite in direct as well as indirect uses	Negated imperative
Cancellation of obligation / Non-obligation	Obstacle – H feels that she is obliged to do something	S cancels H's feeling of obligation which is an obstacle for S	S attempts to secure obedience by pointing out non-necessity	Neutral	Negated imperative
Non-necessity	Obstacle – H is not aware of an undesired state for her	S describes the unnecessary state H is unaware of	S attempts to secure obedience by issuing a caution	Neutral	Negated imperative

3.1.1.   Final comments on Imperative Frames

The IF-approach to speech acts forms the methodological background for devising scenarios for the pilot test as well as the Carlsberg Speech Production Tests. It involves four descriptive and four prescriptive frames grounded, respectively, on the alethic and deontic modality. It is important to emphasise that the description of Durst-Andersen's eight universal frames and their obligatory speech acts in [2], [3], and [4] takes its point of departure in the distinction between the perfective and imperfective aspect in Russian. Notably, the imperative frame of Non-necessity (called 'Possibility (negated)' in Durst-Andersen, 1995) seems to make good sense in Russian, where the negated perfective imperative construction, like *Ne upadi* for 'Mind you don't fall' (Durst-Andersen's example), involves the sequence of speech acts, Possibility—Request—Caution. The English equivalent, however, seems to be a constructed utterance since it rarely occurs in real-life situations. Moreover, I would argue that in contrast to the Russian *Ne upadi*, the English *Mind you don't fall* has Threat, rather than Caution, as its post-conditions. This problematic issue will be addressed in section 5.2, when dealing with the Window situation instantiating Prohibition.

Secondly, the notion of 'frame' should be understood as a complex structure involving a number of different categories which the speaker verbalises in the form of separate linguistic units or utterances. Moreover, the complex nature of the frame is stipulated by the trichotomous conceptualisation of speech acts, rendered in terms of the speaker, the hearer, and a specific situation.

 Finally, the eight imperative frames proposed by Durst-Andersen (1995; 2009) can be classified in terms of the speaker, the hearer, and reality. From the point of view of the speaker, they are divided into polite frames, thereby expressing *compensations* (see section 3.5.5.3.1.1), and impolite frames, all involving *sanctions* (see section 3.5.5.3.1.2). From the hearer's perspective, the eight frames are divided into four descriptive frames (Possibility, Impossibility, Necessity, and Non-necessity), and four prescriptive frames (Permission, Prohibition, Obligation, and Cancellation of obligation). In terms of reality, they are divided into five frames involving change in the world and three preserving the world as it is at the moment of speech. On the whole, though, IF pays much more attention to the speaker's active role in communication as opposed to previous theories mostly pointing to the hearer's ability to recover the speaker's speech intention (cf. Grice, 1975, 1978; Brown & Levinson, 1978; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). From this perspective, it provides a more elaborate framework to analyse the speaker's different choices of direct as well as indirect speech acts.

3.2. The Speaker's Train of Thought Model

The idea about speech acts as complex structures was applied for the first time in Arnsberg & Bentsen's (2006) empirical cross-cultural study of requests. Building upon IF, the researchers devised a model, termed the 'Speaker's Train of Thought Model', which enabled them to analyse various requests in terms of different categories arranged in a logical order corresponding to the speaker's train of thought. The basic idea is that any category in a sequence is dependent on the preceding one, and every element in a linguistic realisation is a verbalisation of one of these categories. According to Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009:66), the speaker will normally start with *tuner* and end with *justification* (see [5]). This, however, does not imply that the speaker will always begin with *tuner*. At any point, she can verbalise any other category from the wheel, depending on which step in the wheel she enters. Overall, the STT-model makes up a *frame*, and any speech act is thought to be an *index* pointing to a particular step within that frame.

[5] The Speaker's Train of Thought (from Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:66)

In the data collected by Arnsberg and Bentsen (ibid.), many instances of requests did not consist of a single utterance. In most cases, they consisted of several utterances. Interestingly, the MTD and the ELFD in the present study similarly exhibited a great number of lengthy responses, comprising between one and ten different utterances. Therefore, I shall in the following employ the term 'com-

municative event' instead of 'utterance', thereby taking into account the fact that requests can involve more than one utterance.

Moreover, the STT-model incorporates the IF-approach to speech acts as essentially tripartite entities and therefore includes three basic categories, namely, *obedience conditions*, *satisfaction conditions*, and *compliance conditions* or simply the imperative form, which stand for the three different speech acts defined in relation to the three obligatory participants in a communication situation:

[6]

> Speaker (1st prs.) – *obedience conditions*
>
> Hearer (2nd prs.) – *satisfaction conditions*
>
> Reality (3rd prs.) – *compliance conditions*

It should be pointed out that in semiotic terms, the speaker's conditions to the hearer correspond to the function of a Symptom, the hearer's conditions fulfill the function of a Signal, and the last set of conditions is equivalent to the function of a Model (see a detailed discussion of a speech act defined in terms of Symptom, Signal, and Model in section 3.5.3).

Moreover, this model can be said to be essentially phenomenological in that it deals with the linguistic data in a particular way defined by its categories. This seems to be its prime weakness in that other analytical tools may approach the data in a different way and elicit other interpretations.

Inasmuch as the present study employs a revised version of the STT-model, I shall not here describe its individual categories in detail. It will suffice to mention that the point of departure for developing the SAP-model has been the work of Arnsberg and Bentsen (ibid.) and the IF-approach to speech acts.

3.3. The problem-solving view on speech acts

When Fraser presented his conversational-contract (CC) view in his 1990 paper, he was mainly engaged in contributing to the already existing debate on politeness (Grice, 1975; Lakoff, 1973; Leech, 1983; Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1987). Giving credit to Grice's notion of a Cooperative Principle, he envisaged politeness as 'getting on with the task at hand in light of the terms and conditions of the

CC' (Fraser, 1990:233). It follows thence that in order to be polite interactive participants act within a specific set of rights and obligations that can change during the course of time or because of a change in a context, i.e. the negotiated constrains are situation dependant.

The idea of the conversational contract is also found in Durst-Andersen (2011b:116ff), according to which language is used as a conduit of communication to conclude and confirm a social contract between the speaker and hearer. However, while Fraser's CC is essentially context-dependent – which is understandable considering his interest in politeness – Durst-Andersen's view of conversational contract extends beyond a specific situation to a linguistic society as a whole.

Most importantly, Durst-Andersen's idea is directly related to my study in that, in his view, whenever people use a request, they initiate a negotiation process and the outcome is either 'signing or not signing a contract' (ibid.). In addition, Durst-Andersen (2016) also considers requests in terms of solutions to problems between people. By drawing on Rawls and Habermas's conception of 'relative equilibrium', he claims that problems between people lead to an imbalance in society, which is at variance with the idea about a well-ordered society that continually aims at maintaining a decent level of equilibrium. In short, Durst-Andersen considers directives within a general psychological frame, i.e. people solve problems with the help of speech acts, thereby establishing a natural / normal social context.

According to his latest view on directives, Durst-Andersen (2016) divides them into two major groups: (1) those that enter into a situation involving problem-solving, and (2) those that do not do so. This sharp distinction is clearly seen in Russian, Polish, French, Spanish, etc., where the imperative form can be used with (1), but not with (2). For instance, in the Russian Army all orders have the form of infinitive, like in *Vstat'!* (literally 'To stand up'). The same is observed on public signs (when issuing a ban) in public transport (e.g. *Ne prislonjat'sja!* – literally 'Not to lean against [the door]'), official buildings (e.g. *Ne kurit'!* – literally 'Not to smoke'), as well as in manuals for professionals (when giving instructions). Durst-Andersen (2011b:122–123) accounts for this pattern of linguistic behaviour by referring to the notion of 'contract' which already exists between the speaker and hearer. For example, in the Army context, the contract says that if H is a soldier and he does not obey orders, he is liable to punishment (cf. Xrakovskij, 2001: 44). In other words, when entering the Army, a soldier signs a contract which cannot subsequently be negotiated. On the other hand, on the Russian subways one will normally meet the sign *Stojte sprava – Proxodite sleva* (literally 'Stand to the right – Walk to the left'). That is because when approaching the escalator the passenger is suddenly faced with a problem: do I have to go to the right or to the left? Put differently, in the situation without any prior signed contract

the imperative is licensed, since its main function is linked to solving a problem.

According to Durst-Andersen, the distinction between speech acts that solve a problem and those that do not is important not only in terms of a particular language. In his terminology, it also provides a psychological frame within which directives are set in a particular socio-cultural context. This implies that, worldwide, people do not necessarily regard the same thing as being a problem. Nor is it predetermined that the speaker perceives one and the same situation identically.

This brings to mind a polite situation involving Permission where the speaker is a host and the hearer is a guest who does not dare to sit down despite wanting to do so (Durst-Andersen, 2009:322ff). In this situation, Russians would say *Sadites'!* (literally 'Sit down') while native speakers of English would probably say *Won't you sit down?* (according to Searle's principle of conventional indirectness). Assuming that there is a 'problem' in this particular situation, these two distinct linguistic realisations imply that it might be viewed differently by the two language groups. It seems not utterly implausible that Russian speakers would see the hearer's failure to sit down as the hearer's problem (Problem: The hearer is not sitting), whereas English speakers would regard it as being their own problem (Problem: The hearer will not sit down) and would let hearers themselves decide whether to solve the problem or not. Let us dwell on this important issue in the next section.

3.4. Three different 'decision models'

After having made the general distinction between requests that directly solve a problem and those that do not do so, Durst-Andersen maintains that, from the point of view of the speaker, she has to choose between three main ways of solving a problem that correspond to what he calls three different 'decision models' (see [7] below). In his view, people solve 'problems' in specific communication situations with the help of language according to the following scheme:

I.   The speaker discovers that the hearer has a problem which the speaker can help him solve.

II.   The speaker asks herself: How do I solve the problem through language?

III. The speaker has three options at her disposal, and each of them is a 'Communication and Decision Model for solving a situation problem'

[7] Communication and decision models for solving a situation problem

	Imperative sentence structure	Declarative sentence structure	Interrogative sentence structure
Function	Solving a problem	Best bid for a solution to a problem	Stating a problem
Example	Sit down!	You can sit down.	Won't you sit down?
Form	Final state description	Action description	Modal description
Speaker orientation	First person	Third person*	Second person
Manner of contract negotiation	Monologue	Dialogue	Trialogue*2
Type of contract negotiation	No further negotiation	Joint negotiation	No negotiation
Speaker's role	Problem solver	Problem-solving mediator	Problem-solving initiator

Let us consider each of the decision models in [7] in turn, by drawing on the above-mentioned Host-Guest situation:[2]

i.   By means of the *imperative sentence structure*, the speaker is believed to **solve the problem** (hence a first-person orientation), e.g. *Sit down!*

   •   Problem: The hearer is not seated;

   •   Solution: The hearer is seated – the *state description* as a solution to a problem.

In language societies like Russian (see on collectivist cultures in section 3), where the imperative is used systematically in both private and public contexts, its application might imply the existence of a contract between its members meaning that 'problems must be eliminated straightaway' without any further negotiation. Given the existence of this kind of social contract in a society, people will not perceive the 'direct' / 'bare' / 'blunt' way of solving a problem as being impolite. On the contrary, they will perceive it both as neutral and as the fastest and easiest way of solving a problem. Accordingly, Durst-Andersen tentatively suggests that there must be a correlation between the speaker's application of the imperative form and her perception of the problem. In his view, the speaker sees it not as her own problem but as the hearer's problem and is thus ready to help him solve the problem immediately.

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2 See below.

ii. By means of the *declarative sentence structure* as a directive, the speaker is believed to offer the hearer a contract which the latter either has to accept or reject. Neither the speaker, nor the hearer solves the problem on their own, i.e. they approach this together (hence a third-person orientation). This is the speaker's **best bid for a solution to a problem**, e.g. *You can sit down.*

- Problem: The hearer is not seated;

- Speaker's best bid: The hearer sits down – the *action description* as a solution to a problem.

There are different ways of making an offer. For instance, the Chinese variant involves a kind of 'recommendation' to the hearer, the rejection of which will have an offensive effect on the speaker. Durst-Andersen (2013) explains that this is mainly due to the fact that by offering the hearer a 'recommendation', the speaker indicates that the hearer is worthy of it. Interestingly, the Chinese (e.g. Gu, 1990) have been described as a collectivist culture where people are said to have a 'group face' simply because they desire to fulfil a contract they have with all members of the community (cf. Nwoye, 1992:313). Unlike Russian, however, Chinese grammar does not have the imperative form, which would allow the 'solving-a-problem' decision model. Consequently, the Chinese apply direct bald on-record strategies by framing requests by means of the indicative sentence structure. As Durst-Andersen explains (2013), this is the only option they have since the existence and application of the imperative form would imply too much touching (see a detailed description of the connection between language and body in Durst-Andersen, 2014). The English, Danish, Russian etc. variant, on the other hand, involves a mutual negotiation, where the speaker would normally supplement her best bid for a solution to a problem with her own conditions to the hearer's acceptance or rejection of the offer (see *obedience conditions* in section 3.5.5.3.1). In short, by using a declarative sentence form, the speaker invites the hearer to enter into a dialogue / a negotiation process, the outcome of which will always be either signing a contract or not.

iii. By means of the *interrogative sentence structure* as a directive, the speaker is suggested to 'present' the problem for the hearer, which she does by **stating that there is problem**, and it is up to the hearer to decide whether to solve it or not (hence a second-person orientation), e.g. *Won't you sit down?*

- Problem: The hearer will not sit down;

- Solution: The hearer will sit down – the *modal description* as a solution to a problem.

In Durst-Andersen's (2009) terms, the interrogative is an underlying *statement* of a problem, the solving of which the speaker leaves completely to the hearer. In the Host-Guest situation, the speaker presumes that the problem is: 'You will not sit down', and opts to respond to her own Thought by asking the hearer whether her assumption corresponds to the hearer's actual state-of-mind, hence a negated interrogative *Won't you sit down?* Durst-Andersen tentatively suggests that the use of interrogative sentence structures as directives may reflect the speaker's uneasiness about solving a problem or offering a possible solution directly, presumably because she sees the problem as being her own, rather than the hearer's. All in all, the interrogative form does not seem to solve a problem, nor does it offer the hearer a contract to sign. By asking a question, the speaker seems to avoid coming into contact with the hearer.

As can be seen from above, the only decision model containing a contract is the declarative sentence form, whereas the two other forms presuppose a different kind of contract. The order in which they occur is not accidental either. The imperative is the first by any measure, which implies that it can be used by anybody whose language has its form. The declarative form presupposes the imperative, while the interrogative is the latest addition to decision models.

A final remark should be made on the notion of directness / indirectness. The previous studies on requesting strategies, from John R. Searle to present-day cross-cultural research, have mainly been focused on the dimension of directness / indirectness with respect to speakers' perceptions of social reality (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010). The most influential empirical study of requests within cross-cultural pragmatics so far has been the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realisation Project (henceforth CCSARP) (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989), and the directness / indirectness model designed and used for their project has been the most-used coding scheme ever since. However, their empirical evidence from three different studies of requesting behaviour essentially supports the Searlian principle of conventional indirectness (Searle, 1975), thus having little to say about cross-linguistic variation (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989:136-152).

Wierzbicka (1991:81), on the other hand, goes so far as suggesting that the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts should be abandoned. Durst-Andersen concurs with her in this respect. Still, he offers an alternative application of the term in question: (1) by using the imperative the speaker is *directly* involved in solving the problem; (2) with the declarative utterance the speaker is involved as a *mediator* in problem-solving by virtue of negotiating with the hearer, and finally (3) by using the

interrogative the speaker is only *indirectly* involved in that the task of problem-solving is being handed over to the hearer. We can also put it in another way and say that, with the imperative form, the speaker is a 'problem solver', with the declarative, the speaker is a 'problem-solving mediator', and, finally, with the interrogative structure, the speaker is a 'problem-solving initiator'.

Assuming a language society has all three problem-solving models, their application in a particular communication situation can be argued to be stipulated according to the following general parameters:

    a)   private / public voice, viz. in a private vs. official context;

    b)   solution to the problem lies within the situation /speaker / hearer;

    c)   speaker and hearer share / do not share the same world, viz. the type of imperative frame;

    d)   the key to the advantage / disadvantage – speaker or hearer, viz. determined by the type of the imperative frame.

Given the fact that British English, Danish, and Russian have the three types of problem solving at their disposal, I shall now proceed to discuss the ways in which the three decision models can be employed.

3.5. The Speech Act Process Model (under development)

Since the completion of the pilot test in 2012, the STT-model has been radically redefined – and work is still in process – in terms of its principal categories and their functions. The new model, called the SAP-model, differs from the previous one in several respects.

Firstly, it represents a holistic and radical framework for analysing requests because it attempts to cut across traditional descriptive strata which are assumed a priori to reflect what goes on cognitively. Consider a schematic idea:

[8]

More specifically, the SAP-model represents a *communicative* model because it allows a multi-layered analysis of speech acts in terms of the three participants in a communication situation, i.e. speaker, hearer, and a specific situation. Secondly, the central part of the SAP-model, called 'the pragmatic wheel', makes it a *pragmatic* model, notably because it provides the missing link between language (via a speech act) and the world 'out there', i.e. in a particular communication situation we start out with a problem and end up solving this problem. This is done through a communication situation, which the speaker / hearer changes or keeps unchanged.

The SAP-model seems to be a *semantic* model as well in that it is based on the use of a functional paraphrase as well as incorporates the three semantic functions of language, viz. Naming, Framing, and Anchoring, which correspond to the three *semiotic* functions of language, viz. Symptom, Signal, and Model (consider an overview in [9] and a more detailed description in section 3.5.5).

[9]

Participants	Function	Index-type	Speech act type
First person	Naming	Symptom	Acceptance / Non-acceptance
Second person	Framing	Signal	Permission, Prohibition, etc.
Third person	Anchoring	Model	Compensation, Sanction, etc.

Fourthly, the model is based on the principles of the *sentential* grammar and arranges its categories in a particular order which results in a particular interpretation of linguistic units, or simply utterances, depending on their positioning within the communicative event.

Fifthly, the SAP-model also represents a semiotic model in that it treats utterances in terms of Symptom, Signal, and Model (see a detailed discussion below).

Finally, the SAP-model can also be called a *cognitive* model since it incorporates the basic idea of the STT-model, namely that the linguistic output and its sequential arrangement reflects the speaker's train of thought. More specifically, any form of Output is believed to be triggered by a particular Thought at the level of Input, and the link between them is suggested by the theory of communicative supertypes (see section 2.1.2).

Giving credit to the ambition of the SAP-model to encompass the complexity of the linguistic phenomena, its application, however, may lead to certain problems. One of them concerns its immense conceptual inventory. In the following, I shall therefore attempt to account for the new terms introduced by Durst-Andersen which the reader may not be familiar with. Another problem relates to its phenomenological nature, which essentially allows for more than one plausible interpretation of one and the same linguistic phenomenon. Taking these mostly methodological difficulties into account, an attempt will be made to provide a plausible interpretation of the data in the present study.

However, before we proceed to the detailed description of the SAP-model and its components, it is necessary to provide an account of the theoretical considerations behind the revised part of the model, the pragmatic wheel.

3.5.1.   Sadock's trichotomous conceptualisation of speech acts

As already mentioned elsewhere in the paper, Durst-Andersen's approach to speech acts differs fundamentally from the previous Searlian theory by its tripartite view on a speech act. More specifically, an utterance is claimed to correspond not to one single type of speech act, but to three different speech acts defined in terms of the three obligatory participants in a communication situation, i.e. speaker, hearer, and reality (Durst-Andersen, 2007, 2011a & 2011b).

Searle's linguistic theory of indirect speech acts from 1975 in combination with Grice's theory of conversational co-operation and shared background knowledge has arguably been the most debated one within the linguistic research community. Even though numerous researchers have repeatedly criticised it for its stiffness in terms of constitutive rules and 'uneconomical classificatory system' (see a comprehensive overview in Sadock, 2004) and its presumed universality (Hong, 1999; J. M. Sadock, 1974, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1988), nobody has apparently offered an adequate alternative.

Although it does not present a holistic theory of speech acts, Sadock's (1974, 1994) taxonomy seems noteworthy in several respects. Referring to the origins of the presented idea in Eilfort and Shiller's book and giving credit to Austin's thoughts on speech acts, Sadock challenges the Searlian view by pointing out the following components and their function in a speech act:

> Now the ordinary speech of act […] has a value in all three of the principal communicative dimensions: it is a conventional representation of the world; it is conventionally suited to the bringing about of a certain social outcome; and it is a conventional display of a particular emotional state of the speaker. (Sadock, 1994:400)

Of particular interest, is his view of the three facets of speech acts as being simultaneous and independent communicative dimensions at one and the same time. Sadock convincingly demonstrates his point by means of the example of the act of promising '*Okay*', which in his view, necessarily involves: a) the 'informational' dimension of communication or 'a representation of the world as one in which a certain voluntary act will be carried out by the speaker'; b) the 'effective' dimension or 'the creation of a social obligation for the speaker to carry out the voluntary act'; and c) the 'affective' dimension or 'the expression of the speaker's intention to carry out the said act'. In his interpretation of this example, the so-called 'effective' dimension is primary, since it involves that the speaker has to do something, the 'representation' is necessary (covert or elliptical) in that we may accomplish social ends by representing the world, and finally the 'affect' or the display of the speaker's emotion is invariable. Regardless of whether a particular act is information-, effect-, or affect-oriented, the two other communicative dimensions may inevitably be present as well, either explicitly or implicitly. The presented approach does not, of course, apply to 'defective' speech acts, like *Ouch! Hi, Huh? Boy, it's hot* and *I bet 5$*, because as Sadock himself explains, they simply lack one or two of the above-mentioned dimensions.

At this point, it will suffice to mention that there is a remarkable resemblance between Sadock's and Durst-Andersen's views of speech acts, and the fact that they arrived at more or less the same idea along different routes might – if not confirm its truth – then simply deserve closer attention.

3.5.2.   Durst-Andersen's trichotomous view on speech acts

As mentioned above, the advocated approach to speech acts differs from previous accounts mainly by its trichotomous nature. The idea of a speech act defined in terms of the speaker, the hearer,

and a specific situation shared by interlocutors rests on several theoretical pillars, one of which is the famous organon model.

In his 1934 work *Sprachtheorie*, the German psychologist, Karl Bühler, made his seminal observations on the semantic functions of language. His idea of three basic functions behind any linguistic sign can be summarised as in [10]:

[10]   **a. The expressive function** – the linguistic sign is a symptom of the sender's state of mind.

b. The appeal function – the linguistic sign is a signal intended to move the receiver into some kind of attitude or action.

c. The representative function – the linguistic sign is a symbol of objects and state of affairs.

The organon model was devised by Bühler as a reaction to Saussure's thesis of bilaterality, i.e. linguistic phenomena understood as two-sided entities consisting of a sound and a function (Bühler, 1934). Bühler's main point of criticism concerned Saussure's focus on substance that excluded physical, psychological, and physiological facets of language. To put it simply, Saussure's materialistic conception of language as pure 'linguistic facts' failed to give credit to the speaker and hearer as two autonomous 'psycho-physical station systems' in the process of communication. In Bühler's terms, a linguistic sign comprises three semantic notions: it is always a *Representation* of objects and state of affairs, an *Expression* of the speaker's sensory experience of them, and an *Appeal* to the hearer to casts her eyes on these objects or state of affairs. This observation is revolutionary in several respects. For the purposes at hand, however, we will consider its relation to linguistic semiotics.[3]

The central claim of linguistic semiotics relates to the idea that a *state of affairs* or a communication situation exists in three different modalities: 1) the situation itself shared by speaker and hearer, 2) the speaker's experience of that situation, and finally 3) the hearer's experience of it. If we look at this sequence from a third person perspective (see Bühler's organon model above), the situation takes place prior to the speaker's experience of it, just like there is no information for the hearer without its prior experience by the speaker. In Durst-Andersen's terms (2007:77-78), that would correspond to Charles Sanders Peirce's notions of *firstness*, *secondness*, and *thirdness*. It should be pointed out, though, that Peirce himself considered experience to be firstness, which does not contradict the logic of things if we

3 The theory of linguistic semiotics was introduced by Durst-Andersen (1992) and comprises his own ideas together with Peirce's semiotics, Bühler's communication theory, Bakhtin's notion of voice, the cognitive approach to modern linguistics, etc.

look at it from the first person perspective (i.e. a human mind perspective), or what in Durst-Andersen's terms is called the chronological order of processing: Input, Intake, and Outcome. While Input will correspond to the *speaker's experience* of the situation, Intake will match with her *understanding* of the situation, and Outcome will tally with a combination of the *speaker's memory* of the experienced situation and her *understanding* of that experience.

Interestingly, it has been claimed in Durst-Andersen (1992, 2009) that from a semiotic point of view, an utterance is a complex sign that will always be directed either to the situation itself, the speaker, or the hearer. In other words, grammar is *the* tool that makes words (simple signs) dynamic by giving them a particular semiotic direction (see a detailed discussion of linguistic signs in Durst-Andersen, 2009). Given the fact that grammar of a language cannot point to the three obligatory participants in a communication situation at one and the same time, speakers of a particular speech community have to agree on the semiotic direction of their grammar. They need to choose a common *voice* in the Bakhtinian sense of the word in order to distinguish between the speaker and her encoding process, on the one hand, and the hearer and her decoding process, on the other. In short, it does not seem possible to have a grammar that simultaneously points towards three different directions. This assumption, in turn, serves as a basis for the typological theory of communicative supertypes (see section 2.1).

Let us sum up what we have established so far. In contrast to previous theories of speech acts, the approach advocated in this study treats utterances as complex signs which, in turn, is predicated on their semiotic nature (i.e. they are indexes). To extrapolate this grammatical conceptualisation of utterances to pragmatics must necessarily mean that an utterance does not express the propositional content function, the essential function, or the sincerity condition of Searle alone (see Searle, 1969). Instead, an utterance corresponds to all three functions simultaneously, i.e. those of the speaker, the hearer, and reality.

3.5.3. The revised organon model – the semiotic wheel

Before we proceed to the discussion of the SAP-model and its categories, it seems logical to dwell for a moment on its grammatical predecessor – the semiotic wheel.

First, it is necessary to bear in mind that the organon model is a *hearer's* model. It was designed by Bühler with the purpose of telling the hearer how to *decode* an utterance: the hearer's task is both to find the *message* behind the utterance and by using 'mental models' to get access to the specific situation referred to (see section 2.1.2). To my knowledge, nobody has proposed a coherent model

for the speaker that focuses on the process of *encoding* the message – the process of *framing*. To put it differently, the model described below was developed by Durst-Andersen to account for the way in which speakers actually 'wrap their messages into gift-wrapping paper', to use his own metaphor, or simply, how they *frame* their messages into comprehensible and proper utterances.

Returning to the organon model, Durst-Andersen (2009:55-61) discovered inconsistency in the relationship between utterances on the one hand, and the objects and state of affairs they point to on the other. This inconsistency mainly pertains to the semiotic status of an utterance, in Bühler's model referred to as a symbol of objects and state of affairs. According to Durst-Andersen, symbols are simple linguistic signs whose function is solely to name. In this respect, therefore, there is no contradiction in stating that words are simple signs, i.e. they are symbols of objects. This is so because, in semiotic terms, symbols are static and can neither point back in time to the speaker's experience nor forward in time to the hearer's experience. As Durst-Andersen explains, a common noun *book* is made static for a specific – and important – reason, namely its abstract capacity to refer to any possible book in either the real or an imagined world. At the same time, this arbitrariness between a symbol *book* and any book in the word 'out there' makes it *omnipotent*, so to speak. In other words, lexemes are static signs, which also makes them omnipotent. However, for a word *book* to refer to a specific book it needs a vehicle; it requires a grammar in form of an article (e.g. *a book* or *the* book) or a pronoun (e.g. *this book* or *that* book). In short, utterances in Bühler's model must function as complex signs, or indexes that owing to their dynamic nature always point in a particular direction. In this respect, therefore, Durst-Andersen found it reasonable to remove Symbol from Bühler's triad and replace it with the lacking index – Model – that would correlate with the representative function of language. Thus, an utterance is a Model that points to a specific situation.

Moreover, there was a need to replace a purely static organon model with a dynamic one simply by virtue of the dynamic nature of communication and its basic components, utterances. Transforming the triangle into a wheel solved this problem (consider [11] below).

Durst-Andersen argues that different languages arrive at different places in the wheel by virtue of their different grammars. For instance, a British or a Danish hearer will arrive at *information* and have information as his Output, a Russian or an Indian hearer will land at *situations* and have situations as his Output, while a Spanish or a Japanese hearer will hit *experiences* as his Output. Still, the hearer of a particular language has to take a full tour in the wheel and via a reconstruction (i.e. decoding) process get access to the two other parts, namely Input and Intake (see a detailed discussion of the three types of grammar in Durst-Andersen 2011b).

[11] The hearer's model – the semiotic wheel (from Durst-Andersen, 2011b:153)

In contrast to its predecessor, namely Karl Bühler's organon model, it presents communication as a dynamic process, in which an utterance is a complex dynamic sign that always points to three different places, being a Symptom of the speaker's feelings and attitudes, a Signal to the hearer to do something, and a Model of a specific situation.

3.5.4.   On the imperative form as Symptom, Signal, and Model

In traditional approaches in pragmatics the imperative as a grammatical form is usually understood as a signal to the hearer to do something. For instance, in *Put the book on the shelf!*, the imperative form directs the hearer to perform an action in order to achieve a final state: 'The book is on the shelf'. One of the plausible explanations of that could be its zero form, which might tell the hearer that there is no *original* in the world 'out there', which thereby functions as a Signal to the hearer to create this *original*.

Within the present analytical framework, however, the imperative form is conceptualised not only in terms of the second person (corresponding to Signal in semiotic terms), but also in terms of the first person (Symptom) and the third person (Model). This can be explained in several ways. A purely intuitive explanation could be a simple logic of things: i.e., the fact that 1) if you want somebody to do something, it must necessarily presuppose that you desire it yourself; and 2) the fact that the hearer *knows* what to do must imply some sort of instruction given by the speaker. Put differently, in addition to the Signal meaning of the imperative form, there must also be a Symptom as well as a Model

meaning, which, respectively, expresses the speaker's feelings and emotions and provides a Model of a new situation.

Speaking grammatically, the three meanings of the imperative pertain to the properties of its grammatical form and the properties of the verb lexeme, simply because there is always a verb in the imperative mood, as it were. While the grammatical form is linked to the meaning of the second person, the verb's image-idea pair corresponds to the meanings of Symptom and Model. In Durst-Andersen's 1992 theory of linguistic semiotics, noun and verb lexemes are distinguished in terms of their deep semantic structure. The image-idea pair of nouns is made up of either a figure or a ground, whereas the internal structure of verb lexemes will always comprise both a figure and a ground. In other words, the image-idea structure of nouns will correspond to the ground-situational and the ground-propositional structures of verbs. It is essentially in this respect that the two other functions of the imperative form are said to have first- and third-person meanings.

Furthermore, Durst-Andersen claims that ground-propositional structure is made up of Symptom, while the ground-situational structure shows a *picture* (i.e. a *copy*) of the desired situation – Model. While the former licenses the speaker's acceptance of a change / non-change of a situation, the latter provides an 'instruction', without which the hearer would not know what to do.

Inasmuch as the imperative can be analysed in first-, second-, and third-person terms, all instances of its various forms have in the following been analysed by using three main paraphrases. Consider the following example from the BED collection (see the attached Excel-file I.3):

[12]

Communicative event	Paraphrase of the imperative
• *P103: *Hello John .* • *P103: **Put your luggage onto the trolley!** • *P103: *There's room here.*	• Symptom: 'I hereby accept th[e] problem and want to solve it.' • Signal: 'I hereby solve the problem by removing the obstacle.' • Model: 'I hereby show the model o[f] the situation for you to follow s[o] that the problem is solved, i.e. "you[r] luggage is on the trolley".'

Given Durst-Andersen's approach to directives in terms of three decision models – (1) 'solving the problem', (2) 'best bid for a solution to a problem', and (3) 'stating the problem' – the imperative deals with a problem by solving it, which can be seen from the three paraphrases above.

Moreover, having this unique property, the imperative fills in all the three parts in the pragmatic wheel, which must inevitably have implications for its association with the notion of im/politeness. We shall consider the discussion of the imperative in terms of im/politeness in sections 5.1.1.2 & 5.1.1.3), when dealing with results for the three situations. For the purposes at hand, it will suffice to point out that all three functions of the imperative form carry equal weight and none of them are considered as predominant or primary.

3.5.5. The internal structure of the pragmatic wheel

We have now arrived at the central part of the SAP-model called 'the pragmatic wheel' (see [13] below). It basically preserves the three components of the semiotic wheel, i.e. an utterance defined as Signal, Symptom, and Model.

Moreover, it draws a sharp distinction between different levels of language on the one hand and its semiotic counterparts on the other. The three semiotic functions of language have been dealt with in detail in the previous section. As far as its semantic counterparts are concerned, I construe Naming, Framing, and Anchoring by drawing on Durst-Andersen's description of these concepts (see Durst-Andersen, 2011b). I shall continually apply the three notions in relation to specific examples throughout this and the following chapters. For now it will suffice to outline their main features.

In Durst-Andersen's terms (ibid., 31-53), Naming is a semantic function of a verb phrase or predicate level. It corresponds to simple two-word utterances, like *Mia go*, and is understood in terms of the initial grammar learnt by children. Interestingly, different languages appear to have three different naming strategies, representing three different types of figure-ground constellations (ibid., 28-36). Within the pragmatic wheel, Naming is construed in terms of the *speaker's acceptance / non-acceptance* of a new situation / problem and is linked to the point of departure in the wheel, where the speaker formulates her Proposal.

However, one thing is Naming and another thing is Framing what has already been named (ibid., 53-65). Framing is taken to be the semantic analogue to the syntactic level of the sentence in which the Naming of a figure-ground constellation is presented to the hearer. In other words, it basically corresponds to utterances consisting of more than two words and is claimed to be the next language level learnt by children following the level of two-word utterances. Within the pragmatic wheel, by adapting the hearer's conditions to her Proposal, the speaker presents it to the hearer as a Final Offer of making a contract.

[13] The pragmatic wheel (from Durst-Andersen, 2016)

Finally, Anchoring is construed in terms of text and is congruous with a broader context within which an utterance is to be understood. Within the pragmatic wheel, the speaker may add to her offer an 'allonge' in the form of her own conditions to executing the offer. At this point, the hearer either accepts the offer and signs a contract or does not do so. If the hearer accepts the speaker's offer including possible conditions to its implementation, he subsequently effectuates it, thereby changing the situation and solving the problem.

3.5.5.1. On the categories of Naming

The first part of the pragmatic wheel covers the categories of Symptom and in linguistic terms corresponds to the level of Naming. These categories represent the speaker's feelings and attitudes, i.e. refer to the first person. Correspondingly, these functions derive from Bühler's expressive function and are similar to Searle's 1969 sincerity condition as well as Sadock's 1974 affective aspect (see 3.5.1). We have already discussed the Symptom function of the imperative form in the previous section. What we still need to consider is the category which we have provisionally named 'speaker's acceptance'.

3.5.5.1.1. Speaker's acceptance Symptom

The term 'speaker's acceptance' speaks for itself and implies that linguistic realisations of this category convey two possible interpretations: (1) the speaker accepts the problem and desires its solution or (2) she does not accept the problem and abdicates any possibility of solving it. For the sake of illustration, I provide the following sample of Permission given by a British respondent (see the Trolley situation in Appendix VII):[4]

[14]   *P116: *Mr John!*

          *P116: **Please** *give me your bag!*

          *P116: *There's more than enough room on here.*

In [14] the token *please* is analysed as *speaker's acceptance* by virtue of the following paraphrase:

'I hereby want to say that I recognise your problem.'

The functional reading of *please* in [14] is due to a number of factors. First of all, the present analysis integrates the perspective of sentential grammar and distinguishes between *please* in initial and final positions (see the section on *please* below). Secondly, I consider prosodic aspects as well, in this case the notion of a conversational unit (henceforth C-unit), which is operated within conversational analysis (see CLAN Tutorial). In [14], the token *please* has been analysed as part of the C-unit by virtue of the absence of a prosodic break between *please* and *give me your bag*. These two factors, concerning the role of position in an utterance and prosodic elements, are primary in determining the reading of *please* within the present analytical framework in terms of the category of *speaker's acceptance Symptom*.

Finally, it is crucial to remember that the description of the categories of the SAP-model pro-

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4 All examples provided in the main body of the text have been coded and transcribed according to the rules of CLAN (see the tutorial on http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/clan/). None of them have been changed with respect to misspellings and other kinds of linguistic errors and represent actual linguistic realisations from the ELFD and the MTD. And yet, the main body of the text contains their linguistic material alone. For full transcriptions, see Appendix VII.

posed in the present study is only one way of interpreting the data and that other researchers may have approached the same data in a different way (e.g. *please* is construed in terms of 'Alerters' in Blum-Kulka et al.'s (1989) coding scheme).

3.5.5.2.   On the categories of Framing

The second part of the pragmatic wheel covers the categories of Signal and in linguistic terms corresponds to the level of Framing. It comprises three categories: 1) the Signal meaning of the imperative form, 2) *speaker's acceptance* in its meaning of Signal, and finally 3) *satisfaction conditions*. We have already discussed the function of the imperative as Signal (see section 3.5.4) and will now focus on the two other categories.

3.5.5.2.1. Speaker's acceptance Signal

The category of what is called 'speaker's acceptance Signal' corresponds to the category of *speaker's acceptance Symptom* and can usually be represented by the same linguistic material as its Naming counterpart. Let us consider the following example given by a Russian respondent (see the Trolley scenario in Appendix VII):

[15]   *P3: ***Please !***

        *P3: *Use my trolley !*

        *P3: *Because your bag is very heavy .*

        *P3: *It's absolutely possible to take your own bag .*

        *P3: *Because my is not so huge and heavy .*

The token *please* in [15] is analysed as the *speaker's acceptance Signal* by virtue of the following paraphrase:

'I hereby make you know that I want to be cooperative.'

There is an obvious similarity between the instances of *Please* in [14] and [15]. The difference in their function, though, is due to their different formal properties. First, in contrast to [14], *Please* in [15] constitutes a prosodically independent C-unit in that it is separated from the following utterance *Use my trolley!* both intonation-wise, by having a terminal falling tone, and because of a short filled pause between them. Second, instances of *Please* in both [14] and [15] occur in a pre-imperative position, which is the rationale for having them analysed in terms of, respectively, Symptom and Signal. Conversely, by following the logic of sentential grammar, the token *please* in a post-imperative position would have been viewed as an instance of so-called 'obedience conditions' (see section 3.5.5.3).

3.5.5.2.2. *Satisfaction conditions*

The last category belonging to Framing is what is called 'satisfaction conditions' (cf. Durst-Andersen, 1995). The term's meaning is self-evident and relates to a set of conditions the hearer always lays down for the speaker to satisfy, if he were to carry out the request. This is why within the IF-framework they are also called 'pre-conditions' (see section 3.1).

Imagine a situation where a family is having a dinner with the grandparents. The children have finished their meal and look as if they would like to leave the table, rather than sit and wait for the grown-ups to finish. However, the children hesitate to ask for permission to get down from their chairs. Their hesitation to leave can be caused by various reasons: e.g. a fear to break a prescribed rule of the house, according to which you are not allowed to get down until everyone at the table has finished their meal. Their fear of upsetting the parents and hesitation to ask for permission to get down are considered to be an *obstacle*, which in our case can be *removed* by the parents if they want to comply with their kids' wish to do something other than remain seated at the table. In short, the parents can satisfy the children's *pre*conditions (or *ante factum* conditions) by issuing Permission for them to get down against the background of the rule prescribed by the parents. In linguistic terms, they will motivate their children to accept the offer by setting up a propositional structure in the shape of a so-called 'state prescription', which can be realised with the help of the permissive speech act, *You may get down now, children*. Within the analytical framework at hand, the utterance can be paraphrased as:

'I hereby **make it possible** for you to produce an activity with the intention
that it be sufficient for you to get down.'

In the same situation without any prescribed table etiquette, the children would not require their parents' permission to get down, for they have it to begin with. Given the parents' presupposition that their kids want to do something else (run out and play, watch TV, etc.) except be part of a 'boring' adult conversation, the parents may give a Signal to them about which of the *possible* activities the parents want them to engage in. The linguistic realisation the parents might opt for would be the constative speech act, *You can get down now, children*, against the background of a so-called 'state description'. Within the present analytical framework, the utterance can be paraphrased as:

'I hereby say you that **it is possible** for you to produce an activity with the
intention that it be sufficient for you to get down.'

Both, *You may get down now, children* (i.e. the speaker removes the obstacle) and *You can get down now, children* (no obstacle at all), are said to satisfy the hearer's conditions to accept the offer inasmuch as both are derived from Bühler's appeal function, where language appeals to the hearer (see section 3.5.2.). This function will equally conform to Searle's 1969 essential function and Sadock's 1974 effective aspect (see section 3.5.1.). In Durst-Andersen's terminology, the utterances above will be instances of the category *satisfaction conditions* that, in semiotic terms, always functions as Signal to the hearer.

Finally, the speaker's removing an obstacle by means of language does not mean that she cannot install it, assuming she does not want the hearer to do something. In this case, the speaker can install an obstacle by issuing a Prohibition. For example, imagine that you have invited your friend Mike for a beer. He has not seen you for some time and does not know that you have acquired a puppy. You see that Mike likes the puppy and is about to pick it up, but you forgot to tell him that your sweet puppy is a biter. You do not want a dog bite victim on your hands and, in order to prevent Mike from performing an action, you say *Don't pick it up, Mike!* Within the SAP analytical framework, it will be paraphrased as:

'I hereby **make it impossible** for you to produce the activity intended by you
to be sufficient for you to hold the puppy.'

It should also be mentioned that in relation to *satisfaction conditions*, I follow Durst-Andersen's

2009 description of the token *just*. Within traditional research in pragmatics, it is usually discussed in relation to requests and offers as a device that can contribute to the politeness of a request (see Aijmer, 1996:169-170). Durst-Andersen, however, construes this particle as a *descriptive* or *prescriptive modaliser* (see [2.12]).

In deontic contexts, such as Permission, *just* functions as a prescriptive modaliser which removes the obstacle that prevented the hearer from complying with the request. This reading becomes even more obvious when we consider its Danish counterpart *bare*, which literally means 'naked'. By using *bare* in Danish, the speaker would make the road 'naked', as it were, in order to remove the obstacle that prevented the hearer from complying with her request (e.g. *Du kan bare tage en kop kaffe,* meaning 'You can just take a cup of coffee').

In alethic contexts, such as Possibility, *just* is construed as a descriptive modaliser, which simply implies that the state is possible (i.e. no obstacle at all). Its Danish equivalent *lige* literally reads as 'direct', and by using it, the speaker states that the road is direct, i.e. without obstacles (e.g. *Du kan lige tage en kop kaffe*, meaning 'You can just take a cup of coffee').

In summary, the term 'satisfaction conditions' corresponds to the hearer's preconditions, which the speaker needs to satisfy for the hearer to accept her offer. The speaker can achieve that by either removing (e.g. in case of Permission) or establishing (e.g. in case of Prohibition) an obstacle, which, in turn, will always function as a Signal to the hearer to do or not to do something. After the hearer has received the speaker's acceptance of the new situation and after that the speaker has removed possible obstacles, the hearer needs to decide whether he will accept the offer or not. Still, for him to make a final decision, the speaker has to make the last move – to show the hearer a Model of the situation, which the speaker wants to change or keep unchanged.

3.5.5.3. On the categories of Anchoring

The second-last step within the pragmatic wheel the speaker can choose to stop at is where a communicative event functions as a Model of a situation. It seems to correspond to Bühler's representative function and is similar to Searle's 1969 propositional content condition as well as Sadock's 1974 informational aspect (see 3.5.1). The Anchoring categories include the Model meaning of the imperative form and so-called 'obedience conditions'.

We have already seen that the Model function of the imperative form operates on a deep sematic structure of a verb lexeme and derives from its ground-situational structure, thereby providing an *image* of a given situation. It is due to this unique feature of verbs that the imperative's third-person meaning comes into force. It is also owing to the *image*-side of verbs that the speaker can show the hearer a *copy* of reality according to which she can make an *original* (see section 3.5.4). On this level, the speaker 'instructs' the hearer on how to effectuate the agreement and carry out the act.

Finally, and most importantly, on this level the communicative event can eventually be *anchored* in a specific situation, thus closing the full circle from a situation to the speaker's experience of it, to the speaker's Signal to the hearer, to the speaker showing the hearer a Model of a desired situation, to the hearer either following the Model and implementing necessary changes (a new situation) or not following the Model (an old situation). To my knowledge, the last step in the sequence has not been described in pragmatics yet. I shall, therefore, deal with it in detail in section 3.5.5.4. For now, let us take a closer look at the category of 'obedience conditions'.

3.5.5.3.1. Obedience conditions

Within IF, *obedience conditions* have been construed as the speaker's *post-conditions* (or *post factum* conditions) imposed on the hearer, whose effects cannot be seen before the hearer has chosen to follow or not to follow the request (see section 3.1 above). In this sense, they have been claimed to stand for Symptom and express the speaker's feelings and emotions. In the revised SAP-model, however, *obedience conditions* are connected with the function of Model. Although, on the face of it, this inconsistency might appear as a serious error in the model, it is cleared up when we look at the semantic difference between what *obedience conditions* presuppose and what they assert.

According to Durst-Andersen, there is no inconsistency in saying that *obedience conditions* are the speaker's conditions inasmuch as they *presuppose* her background attitudes and beliefs. On this account, they derive from the first person (i.e. Symptom). What they *assert*, however, is a Model of a situation by means of which the speaker 'instructs' the hearer on how to carry out the act. In this

respect, therefore, the deep semantic structure of *obedience conditions* and their surface semantic structure are as inseparable as the two sides of a coin. Given that the pragmatic wheel is devised to analyse the speaker's Output rather than Input, Durst-Andersen claims that it is crucial to focus on what *obedience conditions* assert, thereby construing them in terms of 'instructions' to the Model of situation.

For the present, I operate with a number of subcategories of *obedience conditions* defined in terms of positive and negative consequences, or simply 'compensations' and 'sanctions' (cf. Durst-Andersen, 2009). The former comprises such subcategories as *gratification, reward, release, advice, caution,* etc., whereas the latter is made up of *threat, order, warning,* etc. Interestingly, these post-conditions seem to conform to the type of request: e.g., under normal circumstances, cases of Permission go with *gratification, release,* etc., **Johnny! You may get down now and go and play with Jessica. Otherwise you'll be on the naughty step when we return home.* We shall now consider these positive and negative consequences in the following sections.

3.5.5.3.1.1.   On compensations

Let us for a moment make a minor digression and recall the idea of making requests as entering into a contract (see section 3.3). In terms of this conversational-contract view on requests, both parties might have conditions which are necessary prerequisites for a successful outcome of negotiations, i.e. signing a contract. This idea does not seem to contradict with the present account. While the hearer has a set of pre-conditions that have to be satisfied by the speaker before he can accept the offer and implement any changes, the speaker has a set of post-conditions she imposes on the hearer as well. These post-conditions can become relevant after – and only after – the hearer has accepted the speaker's offer and, by following the Model, effectuated the agreement. One way of doing this is to promise the hearer some form of 'compensation' (hence the term) for her trouble. This is also seen as an instance of *obedience conditions* with positive consequences for the hearer. To illustrate the point, consider an instance of *gratification,* produced by a Russian respondent (see the Trolley scenario in Appendix VII): [16]

> **P1: Mr John !*
>
> **P1: Look !*
>
> **P1: I have lots of place on my trolley .*
>
> **P1: Put your bag **please** !*

The token *please* in [16] is analysed as an instance of *gratification* as a result of the following

paraphrase:

> 'I hereby want you to know that if you accept my offer and effectuate the
> agreement, then I will be grateful.'

By following the same logic as in [14] and [15], where *please* is construed as the *speaker's acceptance Symptom / Signal*, the token *please* in [16] is analysed in terms of *obedience conditions* by virtue of its C-final syntactic position within the communicative event. It could also be put the other way around: by putting *please* at the end of the communicative event, the speaker informs the hearer of her being glad in case the latter accepts her offer and puts the bag on the trolley.

The speaker can also choose to express her *gratification* in a more explicit manner. Consider, for instance, [17] in which a Russian respondent gives her colleague permission to use a copier (see the Copy-machine situation in Appendix VII):

[17]

> *P25: *John !*
>
> *P25: *Come on !*
>
> *P25: ***I'm glad to help you** .
>
> *P25: *It's better to give you one minute .*
>
> *P25: *I can wait .*

The instance of *gratification* in the communicative event [17] is particularly interesting. My immediate response would be that in this particular situation a native speaker would regard *I'm glad to help you* too personal and would perceive as slightly 'unnatural'. Conversely, Russians would not be bothered by the speaker's explicitness in [17], presumably by virtue of their grammar, i.e. Russian speaks with the voice of reality (see section 2.1.3.1).

Another way to express *compensations* is to promise a hearer *reward* for doing the speaker a favour. The sample of the present study did not elicit any examples of this particular type of *obedience conditions* simply because it did not contain a scenario description triggering *reward*. However, this subcategory can be demonstrated by means of the following hypothetical example:

[18]

> *S: *Halloa! It's Mark.*
>
> *H: *Hello Mark! How are you doing?*
>
> *S: *I'm good. Listen, I have a favour to ask of you, mate.*

> *S: *Jane and I are moving to a new apartment next Saturday.*
>
> *S: *Can you give us a hand with it?*
>
> *H: *Sure thing, mate.*
>
> *S: *Thanks a lot!* **I'll definitely make it worth your while**.
>
> *H: *No worries at all, mate.*

In [18], speaker not merely expresses her gratification by means of the fixed expression *thanks a lot*, but seconds it with the promise to return the favour in form of *I'll definitely make it worth your while.*

While *gratification* and *reward* imply positive consequences, the subcategory of *release* conveys neutral consequences for the hearer. Originally, the term was meant to designate 'remission of debt', which would cover instances where the speaker verbally annuls any possible debt the hearer might feel (see the Trolley scenario in Appendix VII):

[19]

> *P6: *Mr John there is space on my trolley .*
>
> *P6: ***So I don't mind if you put your luggage on my trolley .***
>
> *MA: *Yeah .*
>
> *P6: *You are welcome .*

In [19], is the speaker's expresses her post-conditions in the form of *release* due to the following paraphrase:

> 'If 'your luggage is on my trolley', then you will not be indebted to me.'

Wrapping up the subcategory of *compensations*, it is construed as the speaker's positive post-conditions to the hearer, through which the speaker can promise the hearer to be glad / grateful (as in [16] & [17]), promises the hearer some kind of reward (as in [18]) or simply cancels the hearer's feeling of debt (as in [19]).

3.5.5.3.1.2.   On sanctions

In contrast to *compensations*, the category of *sanctions* conveys negative consequences for the hearer. Durst-Andersen (1995:614) distinguishes three main types of *sanctions*. Firstly, *threat* is regarded as least polite in that by formulating her post-conditions in the form of a *threat*, the speaker

promises the hearer to perform a 'punishment' herself. In accordance with the description of conditions for the imperative frames in [3.3], I presume it can occur with impolite frames like Obligation and Prohibition.

Consider the example of *threat* in [20], which is taken from the pilot test and instantiates a situation, where a British respondent was asked to imagine that he is on his way to work and is sitting in a quiet compartment on a train. Suddenly, a mobile phone rings, and a young girl starts speaking loudly. One of the passengers draws her attention to the 'quiet' sign. Five minutes later, the young girl's mobile is again ringing, and she starts speaking loudly, ignoring everyone. The respondent was instructed to react to that as a 'last straw' and leave her no chance by making a request:

[20]

> DK3: ***Hvis du vil beholde din telefon*** .
> 'If you want to keep your phone.'

> DK3: *Må du gå udenfor* .
> 'You must go out.'

Situation in [20] instantiates an example of Obligation in that the passenger finds the young girl's behaviour outrageous and in order to make her comply with his request, he covertly promises her a 'penalty' in the form of what I regard as a *threat* of having her phone removed:

> 'I hereby state the following condition: if you do not accept my offer and effectuate the agreement now, I will punish you.'

Secondly, *obedience conditions* can be framed in terms of an *order*, which intuitively seems to be an 'objective', rather than a 'subjective' punishment. While the latter is construed in terms of the speaker promising the hearer to perform a 'penalty', the former is understood in 'societal' (i.e. third-person) terms. Moreover, *order* is claimed to occur with impolite frames like Obligation and Necessity (see the structure of the frames in [3.2] and the Chit-chat situation in Appendix VII):

[21]

> *P104: *I'm sorry* .
> *P104: *But you are going to have to leave* .
> *P104: **Now** !

[21] instantiates a situation based on the imperative frame involving Obligation, where the

speaker is brought into a state of irritation after having asked her good colleague, Anna, to leave several times without the desired result. By means of *Now!*, the speaker seems to express her *obedience conditions* to the hearer, which from a traditional approach to speech acts would instantiate a Command (see Durst-Andersen, 2009:319-320). Even though my choice may appear somewhat speculative, I am nevertheless inclined to analyse *Now!* in [21] as an instance of *order* rather than *threat*, thereby instantiating a third-person executor of punishment:

> 'I hereby state the following condition: if you do not accept my offer and effectuate the agreement now, somebody will punish you.'

Finally in [22], a British respondent stops his boss from opening the window in a very hot room without air conditioning, explaining his request with the reference to a broken window (see Appendix VII):

[22]

> *P112: *Ehm I know it's hot in here .*
>
> *P112: *But please don't touch the window .*
>
> *P112: *It's broken .*
>
> *P112: *If you touch it .*
>
> *P112: **It will end up on the floor and damage somebody perhaps** .*

The response in [22] was given to a Window situation designed in terms of the imperative frame of Prohibition, which according to [3.2] must involve the following cluster of speech acts: PROHIBITION—REQUEST—WARNING. Hence, there does not seem to be any inconsistency between it and the rendering of *It will end up on the floor and damage somebody perhaps* in terms of *obedience conditions*, where the speaker *warns* her boss of the disadvantageous outcome:

> 'I hereby state the following condition: if you do not accept my offer and effectuate the agreement, then you will cause some damage.'

In this respect, therefore, *warnings* and their less impolite variation, *cautions*, are the least impolite type of *sanctions* in that they do not imply a 'penalty' per se for the hearer, but rather prevent a certain type of action from happening in the future.

In short, *sanctions* are construed within the present analytical framework as negative consequences which will affect the hearer if he does not accept the speaker's offer.

3.5.5.4. On the category of execution

We have finally come to the last step within the pragmatic wheel, the level of Executing Offer and its category of *execution*. On this level, the hearer follows a Model in order to effectuate the agreement, as it were, and by doing that, he implements changes in the world, thereby solving the problem – the *original* of the *copy* is on the world location. This is, of course, not to mention that changing the world comes into being only if hearer decides to accept the speaker's offer.

As has been mentioned in 3.5.5.3, this level of actual realisation or execution of the request is of particular importance in that it seems to be the only place where we get access to the world 'out there'. Moreover, for the first time we can witness a change in the world as a result of a speech act. Or put differently: on the level of Executing Offer, we can 'touch' a visible part of a request – the actual performance by the hearer. This is why the SAP-model has also been called a 'pragmatic' model.

Even though the category of *execution* within the pragmatic wheel is the only hearer's category per se, it is included in the present description of the pragmatic wheel because the speaker can choose to comment on the actual place of execution. To demonstrate this point, consider [23], produced by a Russian respondent (see Appendix VII):

[23]

> *P13: *Mr John !*
>
> *P13: *I have space on my trolley .*
>
> *P13: *So if you want some help .*
>
> *P13: *Please just take it .*
>
> *P13: **It's right here** .*

By giving Permission in [23], the respondent verbally points to the place of effectuating the agreement. *It's right here* can thus be paraphrased as follows:

'I hereby point to the place of execution of the offer, the trolley.'

One might ask why somebody would choose to verbalise what is obvious in the situation. One might even argue that it makes the response sound 'unnatural' to a native speaker. This is a relevant and vital question, which will be examined in more detail in section 5.1.2.3. For now, it will suffice to mention that, according to the ELFD, speakers do seem to draw hearers' attention to 'reality' non-verbally or by verbalising the category of *execution* .

3.5.5.5.   Conclusions on the pragmatic wheel

The revised version of IF is noteworthy on several accounts. First, it construes a communicative event in terms of the three obligatory participants in a communication situation, namely the speaker (the level of Naming), the hearer (the level of Framing) and a specific situation (the level of Anchoring).

In semiotic terms, Naming will correspond to a Symptom of the speaker's acceptance of a new situation, the place where she shows her feelings and beliefs. Framing will tally with a Signal to the hearer to accept the offer, while Anchoring will stand for a Model of the situation the speaker wants to change.

So far, it is the speaker only who is supposed to do the work: i.e., with the help of language, the speaker 1) satisfies the hearer's preconditions by either removing or installing an obstacle; 2) instructs the hearer on how to implement the required / possible / necessary / etc. changes by showing a Model of a new situation; 3) imposes her conditions for the hearer's obeying or disobeying her request by promising a *compensation* or a *sanction*. The last step in the sequence, though, comes into force in case the hearer accepts the speaker's offer and her post-conditions and executes the offer.

Second, the imperative form is construed within the pragmatic wheel as a tripartite category that conveys three distinct meanings: first-person (i.e. Symptom), second-person (i.e. Signal), and third-person (i.e. Model). Durst-Andersen accounts for this referring to the deep-semantic properties of verbal lexemes and the grammatical indexing of the imperative form.

Third, the model allows us to access a real situation in the world 'out there'. More specifically, assuming the hearer accepts the speaker's offer and her conditions and by following the instructions in the form of Model implements the changes, then the world will change. That is to say that the problem, the rationale of making a request, will be solved. Finally, at the phase of *execution*, we deal with the hearer's visible / physical action of effectuating the agreement with the speaker.

Finally, a communicative event functions as a tripartite entity within the pragmatic wheel and conveys the meaning of Symptom, Signal, and Model. In terms of division of labour between the speaker and hearer, I construe the communicative event as being essentially bipartite: i.e. at one end, the speaker performs a number of mental and verbal actions, and, at the other end, the hearer carries out a physical act.

3.5.6. On the categories outside the pragmatic wheel

In the following, I shall deal with the categories that are not part of the pragmatic wheel. They can either precede it (i.e. *tuners, need, motivation, presupposition,* and *verbalised thought*) or follow it (i.e. *justification*, *future action*). It is important to remember that by using these categories the speaker does not solve any problem. Nor does she invite the hearer to negotiate a possible solution to the problem. In most cases, the speaker uses these categories in order to supplement and support her request. An exception to the rule, though, is the category of *verbalised thought*, which the speaker can invoke without making use of other categories of the SAP-model. This means that *verbalised thought* occupies an intermediate position within the model and should be understood as the one that 'sets the wheel into motion'. Accordingly, by using this category the speaker states that there is a problem and leaves it up to the hearer to decide whether to solve it or not.

3.5.6.1. On tuners

The category of *tuners* was first used in Arnsberg and Bentsen's study of 2009 and was partially inspired by the so-called category of Alerters, which, in turn, was used in the CCSARP coding scheme (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989). The two categories are similar in that both are meant to draw the hearer's attention to the speaker's ensuing request. In Blum-Kulka et al. 1989, one can find a detailed description of Alerters, e.g., *title/role* (Professor, waiter), *surname*, *attention getter* (e.g. hey, excuse me, listen), etc. The same linguistic realisations in Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2010) study, however, are handled by what is labelled 'tuner' (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2010). The argument for using the term *tuner* in lieu of Alerters relates to a difference in conceptualisation of the category. The Alerters' function is 'to alert the Hearer's attention to the ensuing speech act' (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989:277), whereas the former is claimed to tune the hearer in to the same channel as the speaker (Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2010:66-67). I concur with Arnsberg and Bentsen's understanding of the category and therefore employ the term *tuner* in the study at hand.

Moreover, it is worth highlighting the pragmatic function of devices by means of which the speaker attracts the hearer's attention (e.g. *look, listen, hey, Paul*). According to traditional research in pragmatics, when these devices occur in combination with imperatives, they are used to mark politeness (see Aijmer, 1996:185).

In the present analytical framework, I shall follow Durst-Andersen's concept of *tuner*, construed in terms of the first, second, and third person:

Tuner I (1. prs) is used to mark politeness: i.e. 'I hereby show you my respect.'

Tuner II (2. prs) is used in its personal implication: i.e. 'I hereby tune you in to my channel.'

Tuner III (3. prs) is used to mark location: i.e. 'I hereby focus your attention on reality itself.'

For the sake of illustration, let us consider several examples of *tuner I* ([24]), *tuner II* ([25] & [26]), and *tuner III* ([26]) from the sample (see Appendix VII):

[24]

> *P111: ***Excuse me*** .
> *P111: *Don't touch that window* .
> *P111: *It's quite important it's not touched* .
> *P111: *Because it's broken and it'll fall and hurt somebody* .

[25]

> *P20: ***Dear boss !***
> *P20: *The window is broken* .
> *P20: *If we open it* .
> *P20: *The glass will fall in street* .
> *P20: *And maybe we can find another room for our meeting* .
> *P20: *If there is too hot* .

[26]

> *P1: ***Mr John !***
> *P1: ***Look !***
> *P1: *I have lots of place on my trolley* .
> *P1: *Put your bag please !*

Interestingly, the above classification of *tuners* echoes the trichotomous view characteristic of Durst-Andersen's works, from linguistic semiotics across the theory of communicative supertypes, to the pragmatic wheel. In my opinion, it is a simple and comprehensible tool for analysing a whole range of linguistic material.

3.5.6.2. On need

By the same token, the category of *need* was inspired by the CCSAR Project and its category of Grounder, by means of which '[t]he speaker gives reasons, explanations, or justifications for his or her request' (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989:287). In Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009:67) study, however, *need* is used as a separate category covering the speaker's description of her own or the hearer's desire. Consider a response given by a British respondent to a Chit-chat situation (see Appendix VII):

[27]

> *P105: *Anna !*
> *P105: ***I really need to get this done*** .
> *P105: *You're gonna have to go back to your desk* .
> *P105: *I'll come and speak to you later* .

In [27], the speaker attempts to get his talkative and distracting colleague Anna out of her office. She does not resort to the imperative form (e.g. *Go away!*) or the indicative-interrogative form (e.g. *Will you go away!*), presumably because these two forms are associated with heavy imposition on the hearer in English. Instead, the respondent asks her colleague to leave by underscoring her desire to finish the report she has been working hard on, which can be paraphrased as follows:

> 'Speaker's desire: The report is done.'

In my view, however, the highlighted utterance in [27] can be construed in terms of the category of 'motivation' in that the description of one's need or desire can just as well be interpreted in terms of reason. In this respect, therefore, it seems equally reasonable to treat *need* within the category of 'motivation'.

3.5.6.3. On motivation

Sometimes the speaker may opt to verbalise her reason behind the linguistic response. Within the CCSARP's coding scheme, this is also covered by the collective category of Grounder. Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009), though, applied 'motivation' as a separate category, responsible for linguistic realisations where the speaker verbalises the cause – or the 'key' – to the solution of a problem.

The ELFD and the MTD contains a host of communicative events exhibiting this category. For the sake of illustration, I provide the following example given by a Danish respondent to the Trolley

situation (see Appendix VII):

[28]

>   *P54: *Mr John !*
>
>   *P54: **I have a trolley here .**
>
>   *P54: *You can put your suitcase on mine .*

In [28], the respondent motivates his boss to put the suitcase on her trolley by verbalising the source to the solution of a problem. Thus, *I have a trolley here* can be paraphrased in the following way:

'I can solve your problem because I have got a trolley.'

It should also be pointed out that the category of *motivation* and that of *justification* (see below) are similar in terms of their linguistic realisations. By following the CCSARP's coding scheme, however, I distinguish between *motivation* and *justification* by their initial and final positioning within the communicative event or their pre-Head-Act and post-Head-Act position (see the definition of 'Head Act' in Blum-Kulka et al., 1989:275).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in relation to *motivation* Durst-Andersen (1995:621–623) also distinguishes between *alethic* and *deontic sources*, which usually appear in requests in the form of utterances that precede the 'Head Act'. While the former is linked to alethic imperative frames where the speaker describes that something is possible, impossible, necessary, or unnecessary, the latter occurs when the speaker issues a permission or prohibition, imposes an obligation or cancels an obligation. In the case of English, however, this distinction appears to be largely irrelevant, simply because the English modal verb *can* has now been extended to instances of informal use, whereas about 100 years ago only the modal verb *may* was legitimate (Jespersen, 1924:325). Or put the other way around: the English modal verb *can* stands for both alethic and deontic modalities, e.g. *You can attend the lectures* (cf. Huddleston & Pullum, 2002:183; Palmer 1979:72). The same cannot be said about Russian, though, where the alethic modality rests on the imperfective aspect while the deontic modality operates on the perfective aspect (see Durst-Andersen, 1995:624-626).

3.5.6.4. On presupposition

The next category is that of *presupposition.* It was developed by Durst-Andersen (2009) and first applied in cross-cultural analysis of requests by Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009). This category is meant

to account for linguistic realisations where the speaker states her assumptions about the relations that manifest themselves in a situation. In this respect, therefore, it tallies with Searle's 1969 *preparatory conditions*. Within the present framework, however, I shall follow Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009) and construe *presupposition* as an independent category mainly because my data exhibits a few of its instances.

It goes without saying that *presupposition* will vary from situation to situation, be it a Permission or a Prohibition scenario. Consider an example from the Chit-chat situation in the RED (see Appendix VII):

[29]

> *P15: *Anna it's very annoying .*
> *P15: ***But you can't stop speaking .***
> *P15: *So I'm leaving.*

In [29], the informant states what is normally presupposed in a situation. We can paraphrase the given linguistic realisation in the following way:

'I hereby state my assumption that you cannot and do not want to stop talking.'

Still, this category is very rare in my sample, while no examples were found in Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009) pilot study. Even Searle (1969) observed that it is an underlying condition of all illocutionary acts and as such should not be distinguished as a separate category. I agree on this point since I believe that people do not normally verbalise what is presupposed in a situation. Hypothetically, though, this does not preclude the possibility of it being used in real life, which my data actually illustrates.

3.5.6.5. On verbalised thought

This category was developed by Durst-Andersen (1995) and applied in Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009) cross-cultural study of requests. In their work, it appears as the speaker's Thought, or *mental proposition*, which is claimed to rest on her general background knowledge. Within the SAP-model, *verbalised thought* is construed as a linguistic realisation of the 'stating-a-problem' decision model, where the speaker states that there is a problem. In other words, the label is used to distinguish between the category of the SAP-model (on the level of Output) and the speaker's Thought (on the level of Input). In addition, this decision is prompted by the need to distinguish between the interrogative

sentence structure as a *question* per se and the interrogative as a *request*.

On the level of Framing, the speaker can choose to state the problem by asking the hearer whether her Thought corresponds to the hearer's actual state of mind. This will normally be done by asking a question. Let us consider the following case from the RED (see Appendix VII):

[30]

>*P1*: *Johnny* .
>*P1: **Would you like some more ice cream ?***

In [30], P1 was asked to imagine that he invited a colleague, his wife, and their 5-year-old child, Johnny, for dinner. All have finished eating ice cream, and Johnny looks as if he would like to have some more. However, he hesitates to ask about it. The respondent's background knowledge should have told him that Johnny wanted a final state q (i.e. more ice cream), but did not dare to produce an activity of taking more ice cream (p) because he is a guest. What can 'remove' this mental obstacle is the host's permission, which, according to Durst-Andersen's (1995) analysis of indirect speech acts in English, should have been a negative question, e.g. *Wouldn't you like some more ice cream?*

However, [30] is a positive question, and in line with Durst-Andersen's logic, the positive question should be analysed in terms of an alethic request involving Possibility. Why would our respondents assess a deontic situation of Permission in terms of Possibility?

In the interviews, the respondents expressed a general reluctance to exercise authority towards children, which, in fact, cancels any need to seek permission from 'authoritative' adults. Hence, in this particular scenario, the social variables of status and power seem to overrule the distribution of roles (i.e. a host and a guest) determined by the etiquette. And yet, the equality of status between a grown-up and a child can be interpreted as the absence of any 'obstacle', thereby resulting in an alethic perception of the given situation.

Going back to the example in [30], P1 might have had the following Thought:

> 'He intends to take some more ice cream with the intention that it be sufficient for him to have some more ice cream.'

To put it simply, this Thought reads as *He would like some more ice cream,* which P1 chose to frame in the form of a question and therefore asked Johnny whether her assumption corresponded to his actual state of mind, *Would you like some more ice cream?*

Another way of using the category of *verbalised thought* is when the speaker asks about her Thought by negating the presupposition (for a similar treatment of negated interrogatives in terms of assertions rather than questions, see J. Heritage, 2002). An interesting example of this can be found in the BED (see Appendix VII):

[31]

> *P102: *Look !*
> *P102: *I've told you once !*
> *P102: **Will you please leave my rucksack alone !**

[31] is an example of the Bus scenario based on the imperative frame involving Obligation. In the situation, the speaker is on her way to work on a crowded bus. She is standing close to other passengers being squeezed and pushed on all sides. Suddenly, she feels someone behind her touching her rucksack, so she turns round and asks the person politely to stop doing this. The person behind her does not seem to comply and keeps rubbing against her rucksack. At this moment, the following Thought comes into her mind:

> 'He does not intend to produce the activity of leaving me alone (p) with the purpose that p be sufficient for q (I am alone).'

As Durst-Andersen explains (1995:645), this mental proposition has the status of assumption. However, in the situation at hand the same person keeps ignoring the speaker's polite attempts to stop him doing it. As a result, the speaker's assumption becomes a *presupposition*:

> 'He does not intend to stop simply because he does not *desire* q, nor does he *desire* p.'

Correspondingly, the speaker's presupposition *He will not leave me alone* functions as a key to the linguistic output *Will you please leave my rucksack alone!*, where the speaker imposes her own will by denying the hearer's own non-desire.

Let us summarise what we have got. The category of *verbalised thought* stands for linguistic realisations where the speaker asks the hearer whether her Thought corresponds to the hearer's actual state of mind (hence the term). Thus, this category always takes the propositional form of question asking. In the light of the fact that *verbalised thought* arises from the speaker's assumptions, it will vary from situation to situation. Indeed, as can be seen from [30] and [31], the speaker can either choose to

verbalise her assumption by asking the hearer whether it corresponds to his actual state of mind, or the speaker can opt for verbalising the presupposition by negating her assumption. The outcome of using the two strategies will also differ with respect to the degree of politeness. While [30] will normally be perceived as a polite request, [31] will be associated with impoliteness, as it is understood by Brown and Levinson (1987).

3.5.6.6. On justification

The category of *justification* is similar to *motivation* (see above) in that it covers linguistic realisations where the speaker gives reasons, explanations, or justifications for her request. The rationale for distinguishing the two is their syntactic positioning within the communicative event.

It should be reiterated that the two categories also appear in the CCSARP's 1989 coding manual in the form of Supportive Moves that are external to the Head Act (i.e. the request proper in Blum-Kulka et al.'s (1989) terminology) and occur before or after it. However, Blum-Kulka et al. (1989) do not place their emphasis on positional variation and deal with *motivation* and *justification* under the collective category of Grounder.

Interestingly, this view is also found in Durst-Andersen (1995), who considers these two categories in terms of what he calls deontic or alethic 'source' of producing a request (see above). While *motivation* precedes the 'Head Act' and functions as a 'key' to the solution of a problem, justification follows the 'Head Act', thereby proving a form of a justification for issuing a request.

Consider an example from the scenario involving Obligation in [32], where a Russian respondent was instructed to make her little son, Johnny, return a book belonging to the bank (see the description of the Bank scenario in Appendix III and the response in Appendix VII):

 [32]

> *P23: **Johnny it's not good to do things like that** .
> *P23: *We must give this book back* .
> *P23: **Because it is not ours .**

Ironically, [32] is an instance where the respondent verbalises both categories. First, she verbalises *motivation*, i.e. the key to her 'best bid to solution of a problem', which is *It's not good to do things like that*. Second, she justifies her proposal by providing an additional reason in the form of *justification*: i.e. according to the rule, 'It is wrong to keep a book that is not yours.'

My data demonstrates that the two categories were frequently used by the Danish, Russian, and

British respondents, especially in situations involving deontic modality. In this respect, I concur with Blum-Kulka et. al (1989) and believe that the hearer perceives them as a kind of a *mitigating device* whose function is to reduce perceived impositions.

3.5.6.7.   On future action

The last outside-the-pragmatic-wheel category of the SAP-model is 'future action'. The term is pretty straightforward and is meant to account for linguistic realisations where the speaker informs the hearer about the plan of future actions, as it were. Let us take an illustrative example from the Trolley situation in [33] (see Appendix VII):

[33]

> *P56: *I can see your suitcase is very heavy* .
> *P56: *And I got space here on my trolley* .
> *P56: *So if you want to* .
> *P56: *You can put yours here* .
> *P56: ***And then we can shift and rolling it*** .

[33] does not need much explanation: it is an instance of a communicative event produced by a Danish respondent within a situation implying Permission.

Finally, my data exhibited only a few instances of this category, which mainly suggests its supplementary status within the SAP-model.

3.5.7.   On *please* within the SAP-model

The lexical item 'please' is recognised as the most prominent politeness marker in English, which has led researchers to analyse it from different perspectives. It has been studied in terms of its grammatical distribution in relation to requests (Bach, 1980; Geukens, 1978; Gordon & Lakoff, 1975; Sadock, 1974; Searl, 1975; Stubbs, 1983), situational usage (Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2005; Firmin et al., 2004; Gleason et al., 1984; House, 1989; Sifianou, 1999), positional variation of *please* in requests produced by children (Wootton, 1984), and intonation patterns of utterances containing *please* (Wichmann, 2004). Stubbs (1983:72) speaks of *please* as purely interaction-driven and thus exclusively occurring in spoken language. Ajimer (1996) claims that *please* is more common in institutional contexts, which is supported by the findings of House (1989), Economidou-Kogetsidis (2005), and Sato (2008), who found that *please* is more readily used in 'standard situations' where the speaker and the

addressee behave according to the socio-pragmatic roles set out.

As far as the sentence type that co-occurs with *please* is concerned, it is most common with imperatives or 'directives for taking action' (Sato, 2008; House, 1989; Sadock, 1974) and explicitly marks the utterance as directive, even though it seems to be performing other speech acts (Searle, 1975:68). The overview of the previous research on *please* mainly suggests that its distribution is mostly context/culture-based, rather than grammar-based (Geukens, 1978), hence the two most predominant views are either that it can be an addressee-focal politeness marker functioning as a lexical downgrader (Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2005; Leech, 1975; Stubbs, 1983; Trosborg, 1995), a request marker (House, 1989; Wichmann, 2004) or a formulaic expression (Gleason et al., 1984) .

To support my case, I would limit myself to the studies of *please* whose findings are more or less in line with its categorisation within the present analytical framework. One of them is a corpus-based study of grammatical distribution of *please* in American and New Zealand English (Sato, 2008). Sato applied an integrated perspective of sentential grammar and interactional discourse in order to investigate the degree of politeness expressed by *please* in relation to its positional variations within turn-constructional units (TCU). Sato's findings are interesting to us in several ways. First of all, she argues that the core properties of *please* in terms of both politeness and directive nature can be explained principally by its position in a sentence, i.e. TCU-initial/-medial/-final position. Examining a total of 200 tokens of *please* found in American and New Zealand spoken English, she found that the most frequent sentence type for both varieties of English is the imperative, which confirms the previous studies (see above). The directive force of *please* becomes strongest in the TCU-initial position, where the speaker's 'assertive attitude and emotional involvement' is evident (Sato, 2008:1272). Interestingly, Sato's data analysis did not reveal any instances of *please* as the addressee-focal politeness marker in TCU-initial position. On the contrary, all TCU-initial instances exhibit 'self-directed' linguistic behaviour on the part of the speaker (Sato, 2008:1275) and are usually related to the speaker's immediate interactional goal of completing the activity, which may not necessarily be beneficial to the hearer. According to Sato,

> The speaker's limited interest in engaging in facework is subject to the recipient's evaluation, which can be oriented toward positive and negative ends of social import. Various assessments can be borne out such as '*expressive*' and '*enthusiastic*' on the one hand, and '*insistent*' and '*aggressive*' on the other. The results suggest that regardless of the nature of the interpretation, the core task of TCU-initial please is to mark the *speaker's firm disposition*, where the politeness effects tend to be largely manipulated. (ibid.; my italics)

The fact that with utterance-initial *please* the speaker adheres to claiming her face needs in either an 'expressive', 'enthusiastic', 'insistent', or 'aggressive' manner correlates pretty well with the semantic properties of *please* advocated in our framework. Namely, when *please* appears in prior-imperative position without intonation break between 'please' and the following utterance, it is categorised under Symptom as *speaker's acceptance/non-acceptance* (see section 3.5.5.1.1).

Furthermore, the semantic properties of TCU-final *please* differ from those of TCU-initial *please* by referring to a set of conventionalised social rules rather than expressing the speaker's feelings or emotions. As Sato (2008) explains, instead of making strong self-claims, the speaker chooses to appeal to the hearer's social-self, so to speak, and the use of *please* 'is prescribed by socially conventionalised use and the presence of *please* is acknowledged as the social protocol by all participants' (ibid., 1267). In a number of examples Sato (ibid., 1266-1269) further demonstrates her point in ascribing a strong 'persuasive' element to utterance-final instances of the token. In my view, the reference to tacit social rules, which in Sato's terms is as persuasive a strategy as explicit demands (ibid., 1273), renders a deontic meaning of *please* and, as a result, corresponds to the persuasive function of the 'obedience conditions', i.e. speaker's post-conditions to the hearer, which mainly inform the hearer of the consequences in case she either accepts or refuses to accept the speaker's 'contract' (see section 3.5.5.3.1.1). Besides, there is a striking resemblance between the 'contract-based' (according to Fraser's (1990) conversational-contract view) type of politeness associated with final *please* and Durst-Andersen's (2007) idea of any requesting activity as being essentially about satisfying the conditions of both parties (i.e. speaker and hearer) when they negotiate a 'contract'.

Wichmann's corpus-based study (2004) of the intonation patterns of utterances containing *please* is notable in at least two respects. First, Wichmann found that the intonation contours of *please*-utterances correlate in relatively straightforward way with their context of situation, in casu 'private' or 'public' domains (after Brown & Levinson, 1987). While 'private' speech primarily occurred with a request ending high (high terminal), 'public' speech mostly co-occurred with a final falling contour (low terminal). Wichmann explains the systematic co-occurrence of the high terminal and *please*-utterances in 'private' situations by such notions as 'openness for negotiation' or 'openness for non-compliance' (ibid., 1545; (Brown, Currie & Kenworthy, 1980; Cruttenden, 1997; Wichmann, 2000) In other words, private speech situations presuppose a more or less symmetrical power relationship between the interlocutors and the hearer's right to refuse to comply with the request by virtue of the minimal imposition. Conversely, 'public' *please*-utterances ending low are considered as 'non-negotiable' (Wichmann, 2004:1545; Croft, 1995), because of the larger social distance and asymmetrical

power relationships involved.

Second, Wichmann (2004:1547) reconceptualises the literal meaning of *please* as being 'a courtesy formula which acknowledges debt with greater or lesser sense of obligation'. In this respect, the intonation specifies the degree of obligation as well as the 'hearer-based' or 'speaker-based' occurrence of *please*:

> In my view, a more unifying explanation for both the absence of *please* in very indirect requests, and its presence in transparent requests, is to see it as a gesture of courtesy that contextualises the accompanying request as occurring within a known set of rights and obligations. It indicates that this is a licensed, and therefore appropriate, request and that the speaker acknowledges the debt. In some cases, this is consistent with the notion of *please* as a request 'propitiator' (Biber et al., 1999: 1093), where the word *please* is an appeal to the <u>hearer</u> to find the request acceptable and to comply. In other cases it may be a signal that the <u>speaker</u> believes the request is legitimate and assumes compliance. Both the hearer-oriented appeal and the speaker-oriented expression of belief would constitute legitimate felicity conditions for a request. (ibid., 1546)

The results of her study suggest that the hearer-oriented *please* is associated with 'private' speech, rising end tone, and seeking cooperation, on the one hand, and the speaker-oriented *please* is representative of a 'public' speech, falling intonation, non-negotiable compliance, on the other. Interestingly, Wichmann supports her arguments by referring to the book by Ulrich Busses and providing the diachronic evidence in the form of the two early polite formulae, as found in Shakespeare: *I pray you/ pray/ prithee* and *if you please, if it please you*. While the former expressions normally prefaced commands and 'put the focus on the speaker and assert[ing] his/her sincerity: speaker sincerely wants X to be done', the latter 'ask for the willingness of the listener to do X' (ibid., 1546-1547).

Although in the pragmatic wheel the categories within Symptom (*speaker's acceptance*), Signal (*speaker's acceptance*) and Model (*obedience conditions*) are construed otherwise, there are unquestionably clear parallels between them and Wichmann's speaker- and hearer-oriented meaning of *please*. The speaker-oriented interpretation of *please* resembles both *speaker's acceptance* (i.e. 'S *accepts* that there is a problem and *wants* to solve it') and *obedience conditions* (i.e. 'S informs H of the *consequences* of H's complying or not complying with the request'). Wichmann's hearer-oriented reading of *please,* on the other hand, can be paraphrased as 'S wants H to be cooperative'. Irrespective of these differences in interpretation, Wichmann's findings seem to provide solid proof for the categorisation of the token

please within the present theoretical framework.

3.5.8.   On performative speech acts within the SAP-Model

Performative speech acts similarly require a special note since their syntactic form seems to bring about more than one pragmatic reading. In Searle's (1976) classification of speech acts, performative requests are treated as directives in that their illocutionary point 'consists in the fact that they are attempts … by the speaker to get the hearer to do something' (Searle 1976:11). Palmer (1979:69) speaks of performatives as essentially belonging to deontic modality, while Leech (1983) construes assertives (e.g. *I want you to*) as second (after the imperative) most direct and least polite requests. Consider his scale of directness from Leech (1983:108):

[34]

[A] Answer the phone.

[B] I want you to answer the phone.

[C] Will you answer the phone?

[D] Can you answer the phone?

[E] Would you mind answering the phone?

etc.

more direct	less polite
less direct	more polite

Within the SAP-model, analogously, performative requests are analysed in a similar fashion as imperative forms. That is, they are treated in terms of Symptom, Signal, and Model. Interestingly, the ELFD and the MTD contain instances of performative acts produced by Russian respondents alone. Here is one of them from the Trolley scenario (see Appendix VII):

[35]

> *P27: *Prošu **postavit'** čemodan sjuda* .
> *P27: '(I) ask you to put (IPFV) the suitcase down here.'

By the same token, such performatives as *I invite you on my trolley* (see *P18 in Appendix VII) should read as both Symptom, Signal, and Model. As far as the latter is concerned, performatives will take the function of *compensation* in positive requests (as in the Trolley situation) or *sanction* in negative requests (e.g. Prohibition, as in *Bluebeard* (Perrault, 2009:106), 'You may open everything and go everywhere, except for this private room, where I forbid you to go').

Another noteworthy example is a phatic utterance *you're welcome*, which in traditional research within pragmatics is treated as a special kind of request, called 'invitations' (Edmondson & House, 1981:131f). Both invitations and offers are claimed to present the action as beneficial to the hearer. However, invitations also bear an element of imposition, which offers lack. Within the analytical framework of the SAP-model, this construction is construed in terms of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. In addition to the meaning of the category of *satisfaction conditions* (Signal), *you're welcome* renders the meaning of the *speaker's acceptance* (Symptom) and *compensation* (Model). These three interpretations of *you're welcome* below are more or less in accord with Edmondson and House's view (see the DED in Appendix VII):

[36]

Communicative event	Paraphrase of the Head Act
• *P52: *John !* • *P52: **You're welcome to put your suitcase on my trolley** .	• Symptom: 'I am pleased to have your suitcase on my trolley.' • Signal: 'I hereby say that it is possible for you to produce the activity because there is no psychological or physical obstacle to solving your problem.' • Model: 'If your suitcase is on my trolley, I'll be glad.'

3.5.9. On permissive constructions within the SAP-model

The analysis of the ELFD and the MTD revealed a large number of imperative constructions like *Allow me*, *Let me*, and *Let's* that proved to be more complicated to analyse than one would expect at first sight. While their surface structure – represented by the imperative form – places them within 'solving-a-problem' decision models, their semantic structure offers a 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' reading.

The ambivalent nature of these forms has also been pointed out in the traditional literature on linguistics. Some researchers (Palmer, 2001; Volodin, 2000:36-60; Plungjan, 2011) deal with these 1st person singular forms in terms of the imperative-hortative modal systems, in which hortative constructions that are formed with the verb *let / allow* in the imperative form can generate 'permissives'. Aijmer (1996:190) discusses them in terms of speaker-based routines expressing offers. That is, being

imperatives syntactically, these forms do not function as directives but elicit pragmatic meanings of an offer, a suggestion, or an invitation. Thus, although *let me / allow me* formally constitute imperative constructions, their pragmatic inference lends the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' reading.

Hence, irrespective of their formal features, within the present theoretical framework I shall construe them in terms of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. Consider the following example, which clearly illustrates the point (see Appendix VII):

[37]

Communicative event	Best bid for a solution to a problem
• *P61: Let me grab that.*	• *My proposal to you:* 'I take you huggage on my trolley'.

3.5.10. A summary of the SAP-model

I have focused so far on the analytical tool for analysing directives, the model that have been termed the Speech Act Process Model. First, it was established that the model is based on the conversational-contract idea of requests. Both the speaker and the hearer enter into the negotiation with their own sets of conditions. The hearer's conditions are *satisfaction conditions*, which the speaker has to satisfy before the hearer can comply with the request. The speaker has her conditions to the hearer too in the form of *obedience conditions*, which do not come into effect first before the hearer has accepted the speaker's offer and effectuated the agreement. In other words, given the terms of the contract are accepted and the two sets of conditions are satisfied, the contact will be signed with a win-win outcome for both parties.

Second, the SAP-model treats requests in terms of dealing with a problem that can either be solved, stated or approximated. More specifically, the model construes three propositional structures of order giving, statement making, and question asking in terms of, respectively, the state description, the action description, and the modal description. Or put differently: the three types of problem-solving models function as a key to the three possible propositional structures: i.e. an imperative utterance, an indicative utterance, and an interrogative utterance. Furthermore, the order in which they occur is not accidental. While the imperative is the first by any measure, which implies that it can be used by anybody whose language has the form, the declarative form presupposes the imperative and the interrogative is the latest addition to decision models.

Third, most communication models focus on the hearer's mental actions (hence a heightened interest in the notions of implicature and inference). The SAP-model, however, highlights the speaker's actions, which enables us to account for the process of encoding a message. The implications of this are numerous, and the most obvious one is understanding how speakers go from Input to Output, i.e. how they frame their utterances.

Fourth, the central part of the SAP-model, the pragmatic wheel, construes a communicative event as a tripartite entity involving the three obligatory participants in a communication situation, i.e. speaker, hearer, and reality. This conceptualisation rests on the famous organon (1934) model designed by the German psychologist, Karl Bühler, and partially recalls Jerrold Sadock's 1994 three basic speech act types. In short, the model provides a holistic approach to a communicative event that pays attention to the voice of the speaker and hearer, and even takes into account the last dimension in a communication situation, the situation itself.

Finally, and most importantly, the SAP-model seems to be the first model that allows accounting for what happens after the hearer has carried out the act, or *executed* the offer, as well as how the hearer could possibly have known what he had to undertake. In case of the former, the hearer may choose to accept the speaker's offer and the conditions coupled with its realisation, thereby prompting a new situation and a change of the world, as it were. In the case of the latter, the hearer knows what to do by being instructed: i.e. the speaker shows a Model of a situation (i.e. a *copy* of a new situation) and asks the hearer to follow it and realise the *original.*

4. Data Collection and Methods

4.1. Methods for collecting cross-cultural data

4.2. The ESPT and NSPT data collection procedures

4.3. The pilot test

4.1. Methods for collecting cross-cultural data

4.1.1. Ethnographic observation

Ethnographic observation is meant to capture authentic and spontaneous data in naturally occurring settings. The major advantage of this research instrument is that it allows one to analyse the situational and interactional settings for specific speech acts when they are used by language users in natural real-life situations (see Jones et al., 1989:174-194; Mitchell & Rintell, 1989:250). Nevertheless, even though the collection of naturally occurring data by means of ethnographic observation would have been the ideal data, collecting cross-cultural data like requests in English, produced by people having a mother tongue other than English, presents major practical limitations.

First of all, the task of collecting such kind of data is extremely time-consuming in that those difficult-to-observe linguistic phenomena arise as a natural part of communication (see Billmyer & Varghese, 2000:518). Second, the probability of the same type of speech act occurring under observation is, in fact, close to zero (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:16; Rintell & Mitchell 1989:250). Nor is it possible to control for the interpersonal relations between the speaker and the hearer, so that it is impossible to ensure that the same communication activities, involving the same 'context external' and 'context internal' factors, will be repeated more than once under the observation (see Beebe & Cummings, 1996:67; Gass & Houck, 1996:45—46; Mitchell & Rintell, 1989:250). Thus the method of collecting naturally occurring data does not seem suitable for the purpose of cross-cultural studies.

4.1.2. The WDCT

Numerous cross-cultural and interlanguage studies in requesting behaviour (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010; Fukushima, 2000) have been conducted using a Written Discourse Completion Task (WDCT). This research instrument is normally based on a number of previously devised scenarios that take their point of departure in real-life situations which the informants will easily relate to. The major concern about this method is the hypothetical nature of the situations as well as the representativeness of the linguistic data obtained through the WDCT. Moreover, the reliability of written responses has also been heavily criticised in linguistic studies for a number of reasons (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 2005; Golato, 2003; Kasper, 2000). The main point of criticism relates to the fact the written form of tests is inappropriate for studying actual language use and behaviour, but rather elicits data based on intuition, i.e. participants' beliefs about

situationally appropriate responses within imaginary interactional settings. This, however, has been partially refuted by Economidou-Kogetsidis (2013), who found that, although the WDCT requests and naturally occurring requests in a service-encounter telephone situation differed on a number of parameters, they were similar in terms of directness and lexical modification. Economidou-Kogetsidis therefore concludes that this tool can elicit requests that approximate natural data. However, she considers that the WDCT should be treated as a preliminary tool and be used alongside other research methods like methodological triangulation (see below).

One of the major advantages of using the WDCT, on the other hand, is the fact that the instructor does not take part in the test and has therefore no influence on the informants' responses. The participants will probably be influenced by the written scenario descriptions. These, however, are the same for all the respondents, whereas the influence of a physical instructor would naturally vary across the participants. Finally, the length of responses is predetermined by the space made available for them, which makes the final amount of the received data much more manageable (see Beebe & Cummings, 1996:68-80; Cohen, 1996:25–26).

As briefly mentioned above, it is practically impossible to collect large amounts of data of a given type of request in the same interpersonal and situational context. As Rintell and Mitchell (1989:250) point out, 'it is impossible to control the contextual variables so as to ensure that the same context will be repeated even once'. Therefore, as a research instrument, the WDCT allows us to obtain large quantities of data of high comparability due to the controlled nature of the task (cf. Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford, 2005). Moreover, it allows control over the demographic information of the informants used.

In spite of the advantages mentioned above, I have nevertheless refrained from using the WDCT, notably because of its non-interactive nature as well as being a tool that yields written language samples that may not be representative of authentic, spontaneous spoken language (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:18-19; Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010:2269, 2278).

4.1.3. Role play

In contrast to the WDCT, an oral role play is a semi-ethnographic research instrument in that the participants take on the roles, but do this by displaying pragmatically appropriate linguistic behaviour similar to that found in real-life interactional settings (cf. Cohen, 1996). The method is meant to place a respondent in a particular situation that would elicit the desired speech act, either

in a written or oral form. More specifically, the instructor and an informant engage in a dialogue that may contain either one turn (a closed role play) or several turns (an open role play) (see Gass & Houck, 1996:47-57; Cohen, 1996). This set-up makes the role play tool a much more structured and controlled method, which is not merely less time-consuming than the ethnographic observation mentioned above, but also increases the possibility of obtaining the desired linguistic outcome.

However, one of its major limitations relates to the fact that the respondents may not easily identify with particular scenario descriptions and hence produce responses that may not be representative of authentic, spontaneous spoken language (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:17; Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010:2278). Therefore, it is necessary to design scenarios as accurately as possible in order to minimise undesirable misinterpretations. Besides, in order to ensure that the scenarios resemble real-life situations, it is crucial to devise *realistic* situations that are directly relevant to the participants' everyday life and the social roles they normally take on (cf. Fukushima, 2000:153; Bonikowska, 1988:170). The presentation of the scenarios in the participant's mother tongue is believed to similarly increase the authenticity of the experimental set-up.

All in all, even though the informants' responses are elicited by means of an imagined situation, they can nevertheless be regarded as authentic interactive language samples, albeit without absolute certainty that they reflect the participants' actual spontaneous language (see Gass & Houck, 1996:47–48; Mitchell & Rintell, 1989:250–251, 269–270).

As far as the open role play method is concerned, it is usually considered to be more suitable than the WDCT for the study of authentic speech, since natural and spontaneous speech acts normally occur in longer dynamic interactions (see Gass & Houck, 1996:47–57). One of its main drawbacks, though, pertains to the fact that it generates a large amount of data that can vary across the informants (see Beeby & Cummings, 1996:66–67). In addition, the dynamic interaction between an instructor and a participant also implies a greater danger that the instructor will influence the informant and his responses. Some researchers have even pointed out that it is not possible to ensure the consistency of the instructor's behaviour (see Cohen, 1996; Gass & Houck, 1996:47–57).

Compared to open role plays, closed role plays allow for a more manageable amount and type of data. Moreover, any potential influence by the instructor on the speaker's perception of a particular situation and her verbal output is less than when applying open role plays. Still, the major disadvantage of closed role plays is related to the fact that the informant's responses can be constrained by the format of the method itself, and in this respect differ from authentic language (see Gass & Houck, 1996:47).

4.1.4. Social variables

According to Leech (1985), it is necessary to distinguish between *pragma-linguistics* and *socio-pragmatics*. While the former relates to the linguistic material available in the language for producing particular illocutions, the latter should be understood in terms of social conditions that influence the requesting behaviour. In this respect, therefore, when designing the scenario descriptions, one should take into consideration a number of social parameters that may bring about all variations in the use of speech acts (cf. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989).

In the selected literature on speech acts (cf. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Brown & Levinson, 1978), the social variables which are considered to be decisive in influencing speaker's linguistic choices are social distance (D), social power (P), and imposition (R) of the requested act. However, a number of authors (cf. Wiezbicka, 1991; Fukushima, 2000) have pointed out the problem of terminological inconsistency associated with the use of the above-mentioned variables: 'social power' (Fukushima, 2000) and 'dominance' (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Trosborg, 1995), as well as 'familiarity' instead of 'social distance' (Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010).

Since I was undertaking a cross-cultural linguistic study, it was necessary to ensure a systematic means of collecting the data and control for at least some of the social variables. Thus, it was decided to include 'social distance' and 'social power' in the way they are defined in Brown and Levinson (1978). It is noteworthy that the preliminary analysis of the ELFD and the MTD did not reveal any obvious correlation between the respondents' gender, age, and social status – just to mention a few of the possible social variables – and their linguistic output (cf. studies with similar results Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010; Rundquist, 1992; Bargiela-Chiappini & Harris, 1996). Therefore, in the end it was decided to focus solely on linguistic structures and opt for levelling out the differences in terms of socio-cultural variables, so that the data obtained represented a sample of linguistic output stripped of any specificity related to social variables. This means that my analysis will only indirectly include the explanatory factor of social variables and will mainly be restricted to the study of syntactic structures that are tractable and finite. The same cannot be said for social variables (see, for example, Brown & Levinson's 1978 'gender', 'age', etc.). Similarly, the factor of 'individuality' makes it almost impossible to systemise the data results. A further complication is that a respondent can simply produce 'unusual' or 'individual' responses. Overall, Brown and Levinson's (1978) theory did not seem to be appropriate for the analysis of the present data collection, simply because basing one's analysis solely on social

variables hardly tells us anything about people's actual language use.[5]

4.1.5. The participants' reflections

Semi-structural interviews is another valuable method which is usually employed as a complementary tool to the main research instrument of the study. They are often conducted immediately after the role play and aim at gaining some qualitative insights into the participants' views, beliefs, and opinions regarding requests, i.e. their understanding of extra-linguistic parameters like social distance, social power, and participants' rights and obligations (cf. Cohen, 1996; Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010:2270).

In the ESPTs and the NSPTs, I supplemented the main elicitation instrument of the study with the speakers' reflections on the nature of the interactional settings (see Appendix I & III). However, taking into account the fact that the respondents might be tired and start losing concentration after being through a number of scenarios, I decided to carry out only short interviews with the informants.

In the end, though, the analysis of these semi-structural interviews turned out to be beyond the scope of the present study and is therefore not included in the main discussion.

4.1.6. Methodological triangulation

It is quite obvious that none of the research instruments mentioned above can be said to elicit adequate data on speech acts on its own. The ideal solution would thus appear to be a combination of a number of various methods that will elicit the speakers' requesting behaviour as well as the influence of the situational and cultural factors behind the verbal interaction (see Beebe and Cummings, 1996:81; Cohen, 1996). One such triangulation method could be a combination of ethnographic observation with setting up hypotheses on the basis of its results and testing those through role-playing. Subsequently, the researchers could carry out a WDCT, which would allow greater control of the contextual variables as well as the possibility to focus on a wide range of requests that are otherwise difficult to observe in natural settings (see Billmyer & Varghese, 2000:518; Cohen, 1996; Rintell & Mitchell, 1989:250). By approaching the linguistic phenomena in such a manner the researchers will hopefully succeed in increasing the credibility and validity of the empirical results. However, triangulation requires substantial resources both in terms of time and funding, which is most often the reason for ruling it out as an option.

5. I am grateful to Michael Haugh (The University of Queensland) for this valuable comment.

As far as the study at hand is concerned, I asked the respondents to fill in the questionnaire eliciting the demographic information of the subjects. Then, I carried out the role plays based on a number of carefully designed scenarios. Finally, I obtained additional information on the respondents' requesting behaviour by interviewing them on their assessment of the specific situation and its participants.

4.2. The SPTs data collection procedures

4.2.1. Participants of the SPTs

As already mentioned in the introduction, I primarily intended to study how Russian and Danish businessmen make requests in English. More specifically, I was interested in discovering whether their respective mother tongues are reflected in their use of English and in what way. Therefore I investigated two groups of businessmen in Denmark and Russia, each consisting of 25 informants. Although this number cannot be said to be representative of the whole speech community, it was nevertheless considered to be sufficient for the purposes of the investigation at hand. The total number of 25 answers for each of the 17 scenarios was also considered sufficient for undertaking a statistical analysis of the data in the future and subsequently coming up with tentative conclusions about the requestive specifics of the two varieties of ELF, i.e. Danish English and Russian English. It needs to be pointed out, though, that owing to the qualitative and detailed nature of the method chosen for analysing the ELFD and the MTD, the present study ended up involving the analysis of only three situations (see chapter 5). Finally, in order to ensure the validity of the results from the DED and RED, I additionally included a British control group consisting of 24 informants employed at the Carlsberg Company in Northampton, Great Britain.

In terms of the criteria for data collection, only the informants who grew up in the three particular countries and spoke Danish, Russian, and English as their native language were recruited for the tests. Even though the original intention was to discard the respondents who reported that they were native speakers of an additional language other than English or that they had lived in a foreign country for more than a year (see Economidou-Kogetsidis, 2010: 2268), in the end, however, we decided to include such cases into the analysis because we believed that thy were too few to have an influence on the overall results. On the whole, the demographic information related to the subjects' ethnic origins and their knowledge of foreign languages, English in particular, was collected prior to the SPTs (see Appendix II).

With respect to the issue of the English language, it is important to underscore that all participants chosen for the ESPTs were required to have a good command of English and use it at work on a day-to-day basis. However, as the purpose of the study was to test the efficiency of cross-cultural business communication in English as it is at Carlsberg in Denmark and Russia, no specific requirements were made as to the participants' English language proficiency level. Moreover, in order to make sure that their answers sounded natural, the informants were instructed to give as spontaneous responses as possible, without paying too much attention either to grammar or formulations (see Appendix II).

As far as the internal structure of groups is concerned, the criteria for data collection did not include position, age, and gender parameters. One of the advantages of investigating mixed groups is a wide range and variation in data, which homogeneous groups do not provide. Greater individual variation within heterogeneous groups, however, could result in fewer similar features in the participants' responses within a group. Conversely, it was thought that the internal shared patterns would be stronger, in that they cut across age, position, and English proficiency level. Finally and most importantly, the systematic nature of the participants' responses within the groups is believed to be a sign of transfers of particular mother tongue patterns to English, even though their command of English differs (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:26).

A final consideration concerning the group composition involved making an interlanguage analysis of internally homogeneous groups (see Morgan, 1997:35-37). It was crucial to ensure that the Danish, Russian, and English groups' internal composition was similar in terms of age, sex, position, and the level of English. Even though the groups differed most with respect to the last parameter (e.g. the Russian informants had a lower English proficiency level than the Danish ones), this linguistic difference was, nevertheless, considered to be part of the picture of reality 'out there' in various companies and firms.

In conclusion, irrespective of the groups' relative internal heterogeneity, it was found reasonable to make intra and inter-group comparisons, since all shared a sufficient number of shared patterns.

As mentioned in the introduction, after conducting the ESPTs in Denmark, Russia, and Great Britain, I carried out the NSPTs in Denmark and Russia. Both the criteria for recruiting the participants for these tests and the number of respondents were identical to those of the ESPTs. In other words, the informants for the NSPTs were native speakers of, respectively, Danish and Russian, and were also employed at Carlsberg in the two countries. No particular requirements as to the knowledge of foreign languages was stipulated. However, in order to prevent the participants of the NSPT and

the ESPT from making unintended socio-pragmatic or pragma-linguistic transfers from their mother tongue to ELF, it was decided to recruit different respondents for these two tests in Denmark and Russia. The NSPT in Denmark eventually comprised 22 out of the desired 25 respondents and the NSPT in Russia included 25 respondents.

4.2.2.   Using role play in SPTs

As already mentioned in section 4.1.3, any researcher should aspire to obtain 'authentic' data, recorded during natural interactions. This, however, was hardly feasible under the conditions of the present study. Furthermore, I wished to compare requests not only within the same language, but also interlanguage-wise, as produced by native and non-native speakers. However, it seemed highly unlikely that it would be possible to obtain specific types of requests produced by non-native speakers of English through observations in their native mother tongue environment. These requirements for comparability ruled out the use of ethnographic observation, which is otherwise invaluable for gaining insights into speech behaviour.

It was decided to use the closed role play method, which was found most suitable for gathering the type of data in question. In contrast to the CCSAR Project (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989), where the respondents were instructed to literally 'play a role' of, say, a policeman or a professor, the scenarios used for the SPTs were especially designed to reflect and deal with possible real-life situations at work, at home, and in public places. After having consulted an expert in quantitative methodology, it became clear that for a quantitative analysis of data of this type, it would be easier at a later stage if the scenarios were placed into four categories, each containing four further subcategories. Keeping these statistic considerations in mind, we ended up with 17 scenarios, 16 of which were based on the deontic modality and included four types of imperative frames: Permission, Prohibition, Obligation, and Cancellation of obligation. Consider an example in [1] that instantiates the imperative frame of Permission:

[1]

> **You are at the airport**
>
> You are on a business trip with your boss, Mr. Johnson. The plane has just landed, and you have collected your luggage and you want to let your boss know that he can put his suitcase on your trolley, so you say:
>
> The respondent's answer:
>
> (The hearer's response): '*Thank you so much. It's very kind of you.*'

Moreover, the four situations belonging to each of the four imperative frames differed in terms of social context and interpersonal relations between the speaker and the hearer. To maintain the systematic nature of the 16 deontic scenario descriptions, I applied Van Dijk's (1977:219) classification of social contexts:

(a) private

(b) public

(c) institutional / formal

(d) informal

In their pilot study of Danish and Spanish businessmen, Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009) analysis of the situations based on the alethic modality did not reveal any significant variation in the linguistic forms produced by the two groups. In view of this, it was decided not to include situations based on alethic imperative frames, i.e. Possibility, Impossibility, Necessity, Non-necessity, except for one – that of Impossibility. The decision to include this particular alethic scenario was prompted by a wish to provide support for Arnsberg and Bentsen's (2009) tentative findings. Notably, the choice of directness / indirectness with the alethic modality does not seem to be culturally dependent to the same extent as the deontic frames. Consequently, in the present study, this assumption took the form of research hypothesis IV (see section 1.2).

Prior to conducting the SPTs at Carlsberg, it was necessary to take into account a number of factors that might affect the validity of the results. First of all, it was necessary to devise types of scenarios that would allow me to discover basic tendencies that could relate to a speech community as a whole,

rather than a Carlsberg setting alone. Therefore, it was decided to include situations that would reflect everyday occurrences and cover both the participants' professional life at Carlsberg and their day-to-day life outside the workplace.

Secondly, in order to minimise the number of possible misunderstandings, I had to construct the scenarios as precisely as possible and then discuss them in group sessions with the researchers participating in the GEBCom Project. Before carrying out the tests, it was similarly necessary to ensure that the scenarios served the purpose they were intended to fulfil and test them on international students from Russia and England studying in Denmark as well as Danish native speakers (see Appendix I).

Another important issue that had to be settled prior to carrying out the SPTs in Denmark, Russia, and Great Britain, was the presentation format. It was decided that the instructor should present the scenarios individually to each participant. My first intention was to act out the scenarios. The reason for this was the original wish to decrease the potential misinterpretations that might otherwise arise in an experimental set-up. However, the need for the homogeneity of the experimental set-up made me give up the idea of 'performing' the scenarios live. Eventually, we settled for reading them out loud.

Moreover, we had to agree upon the order in which to present the scenarios. More specifically, we found it reasonable to begin the test with the situations that might have the least deterring effect on the informants and end up with those involving face-threatening acts. The idea behind this goes back to Mitchell and Rintell (1989:266–269) who claimed that the interaction itself between an instructor and a participant might affect the participants' responses, notably that they would produce more polite linguistic behaviour than in a real-life situation. In other words, we predicted that at the beginning the participants would worry about their relationship with the instructor, but that, as the test progressed, they would feel more and more comfortable with the situation and speak more freely. So, our argument behind enacting the scenarios in that particular order was based on the wish to ensure that the participants' answers reflected spontaneous spoken language rather than the desire to build up a positive relationship with the instructor.

Finally, for the ESPT investigations, the three groups of participants in Denmark, Russia, and Great Britain were given the scenario descriptions not in their respective mother tongues, as was originally intended in order to decrease a number of possible misunderstandings, but in English. This was because we anticipated that the ESPTs would be criticised with respect to its representativeness[6]. That is to say, assuming the situations were presented in the respondents' respective mother tongues, the responses produced by Danish and Russian speakers of English could later be criticised for being

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6 I would like to thank my colleague, Laura Balling (CBS), for that insightful observation.

interpreted by us in a way that supported one of the hypotheses of the study, namely that the culture-specific mental universe, indirectly defined by a mother tongue, influences a non-native speaker's production of English (see hypothesis III in section 1.2).

In terms of the methods for the MTD collection, the 17 scenario descriptions for the ESPTs were translated into Danish and Russian[7].
It goes without saying that the process of translation involved adapting culturally to the Danish and Russian social and pragmatic systems. For instance, the 'Quiet' sign in the Mobile scenario was the 'Shhhh' sign in Danish and 'The sign saying to keep silence' in Russian.

4.3. Pilot study

4.3.1.   Participants

As has been mentioned in the section above, before we could embark on the final tests in Denmark, Russia, and Great Britain, the situations had to be tested in a pilot study. We decided to carry out the pilot study of ELF speech production alone with 15 voluntary international students studying at the Technical University of Denmark and the Copenhagen Business School. As already mentioned in the introduction, the present study is part of the larger GEBCom Project, aiming at investigating six different languages in terms of speech reception, language association, and speech production. That being the case, the informants participating in the pilot test had Danish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and British English (the control group) as their mother tongues.

In terms of the procedure, I set out by making an announcement of the project that was placed on the web pages of the two above-mentioned universities (see Appendix I). The respondents had to meet the following three criteria:

(a) to be native speakers of either Danish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, or British English

(b) have a good command of English;

(c) have little or no command of other foreign languages.

Out of 15 informants, only 13 volunteered for the pilot test, with only one out of the three re-

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7 I myself translated the scenarios from English into Russian, whereas the translation into Danish was done by Mary-Ann McKerchar (CBS).

quired Russian-speaking subjects. Furthermore, the two Japanese respondents who were interested in participating in the pilot study spoke Japanese as their second language and had Korean and Sinhala, respectively, as their mother tongues. Yet, given the sparsity of the collected responses, their answers were included into the analysis.

In spite of these mismatches between the data collection requirements and the de facto availability of the subjects, the analysis of the total of 187 responses (eleven informants) to the 17 scenario descriptions seemed to have served the purpose of detecting the ambiguous or incorrectly formulated situations.

4.3.2.   Demographic information

As a mandatory part of data collection, the pilot study participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire prior to taking the test. The questionnaire was compiled and distributed with the help of the programme Survey Exact and involved a number of questions aimed at eliciting the demographic information about the informants' ethnic origin and their linguistic competencies. It was briefly mentioned in section 4.2.1 that the overall purpose of this study was not to test the informants' level of proficiency in English, but the effectiveness of their intercultural communication in ELF. In this respect, therefore, the questionnaire did not contain any specific questions on the formal English language tests (e.g. IELTS level, TOEFL, ESOL, etc.), although it did include questions on the number of English classes they had taken (see Appendix I).

In terms of ethnic information, the population involved ten non-native speakers of English (i.e. three ethnic Danish, three ethnic Chinese, one ethnic Japanese, one ethnic Korean, one ethnic Sri Lankan, and one ethnic Russian subject) and three British English native speakers. The latter came from England and did not belong to any ethnic minority there, which, within the framework of the test, was construed as not being influenced by other cultures and languages.

As far as linguistic information is concerned, English was a foreign language for all the participants except the control group. Furthermore, none of them spoke languages other than English except for one Danish student who spoke German, as well as a Korean and a Sri Lankan student who had Japanese as their second language. Moreover, only two of the 13 participants had lived in another country for longer than a year. In terms of the amount of English instruction they had received, only two respondents had studied English for less than seven years. Finally, the three Chinese informants judged their level of proficiency of English as 'Average', all Danish, Russian, Korean, and Sri Lankan

respondents stated that their English skills were 'Very high', and it goes without saying that the three British participants estimated their knowledge of English as 'Excellent: Mother tongue level'.

4.3.3.   Procedure

As already mentioned in section 4.2.2, the elicitation technique used in the pilot test was the role play. The test involved 17 scenarios in English representing different real-life situations (see Appendix I).

In terms of the experimental set-up, all interactions between the individual respondents and the instructor / observer were recorded on a dictaphone. In the literature on cross-cultural studies, the use of secondary data collection tools such as a camera or a dictaphone is regarded as having a disturbing effect on the respondents' speech behaviour. That is to say, the respondents' awareness of being filmed or audio-recorded may result in less 'natural' responses (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009). Nevertheless, the possibility of having access to data collected with the help of such electronic devices is invaluable, since it allows for a much more accurate transcription and analysis of the collected material.

This being the case, I asked the respondents in an e-mail to allow me to use a dictaphone during the test which was sent to them before they came to my office. All of them responded positively, which allowed me to avoid mentioning the presence of the recorder and place it in the room so that it was not directly visible to them.

After conducting the pilot study with the first six respondents, it became obvious that some of them had a hard time imagining the test situations. To be more specific, several of the participants asked me to repeat the descriptions or ended up misunderstanding part or the whole of the scenario. I therefore found it useful to supplement each scenario description with a picture depicting a relevant social setting (see Appendix I). To give an illustration, consider the Mobile situation in [3] accompanied by a picture in [2]:

[2]

[3]

> **Imagine yourself in the quiet compartment on a train in England**
>
> You and other passengers are in the quiet compartment. Suddenly, a mobile phone rings, and a young woman starts speaking loudly. When she stops, one of the passengers points to the 'quiet' sign, while you say to her: 'No mobiles here'. She turns away from you without responding, looking at you as if you are an idiot. Five minutes later her mobile rings again, and again she speaks loudly, ignoring everyone. You have had enough now, so you say:
>
> The respondent's answer:
>
> (The instructor's response): *'Ok-ok. As you want. Keep your hair on!'*

As can be seen from the picture above, I had to resort to Photoshop in several cases in order to create pictures that would reflect a particular situation. My assumption about the beneficial effects of using a complementary tool together with the scenario descriptions turned out to be valid, since all the subsequent non-native speakers understood the scenario descriptions correctly.

Apart from the instructor, an observer was also present in a test room. The former's task was to read the scenarios out loud at a moderate tempo while simultaneously having eye contact with a participant in order to ensure that he understood the descriptions correctly. The latter's role was (a) to provide information to the participant about the test, (b) to ensure the instructor's uniform behaviour, (c) to make notes of the participants' responses, and (d) to interview the participants immediately after the role play to clarify details of the situations that were comprehended incorrectly as well as enquiring about unexpected and curious linguistic choices.

In order to minimise possible constraints of the experimental setting on the respondents' linguistic realisations, we sought to create a comfortable atmosphere and a positive relationship between the respondent and the instructor / observer (cf. Beckmann et al., 2006). Hence, we greeted each informant at the door and thanked them for their willingness to contribute to our project. Moreover, with the purpose of decreasing the possibility that the respondent would feel monitored and hence less comfortable about the test situation, the observer had to occupy a place at a reasonable distance from

both the respondent and the instructor. The observer explained the purpose of the test and instructed the respondent on her task. Most importantly, the observer emphasised that the purpose of the study was not to test the participants' English skills or their knowledge of English grammar but a spontaneous reaction to various real-life situations. In addition, the instructor and the observer demonstrated the procedure of the test to the participant by performing one of the scenarios before proceeding to the test. Finally, the respondent was urged to ask questions during the test in order to reduce possible doubts and misunderstandings.

Since the pilot test was aimed at testing English scenario descriptions, all communication between the participant, the instructor, and the observer took place in English. This applied to instructions, scenario descriptions, participants' responses, and small talk.

4.3.4. The results for the pilot study and its conclusions

After conducting the pilot study, several scenarios were taken out for a number of reasons. One of them was the limited amount of linguistic material obtained. This point can be illustrated by means of the Bill situation in [4] (see Appendix I):

[4]

Imagine that you are at a restaurant

You are having a nice dinner with your family. You have finished eating the dessert and have asked the waiter to bring you the bill. He does so and quickly leaves you again, so that you can check the bill. He comes back to you after a while and clears the table. You have put the payment on the table, but the waiter hesitates to take it. You can see that he wants to take the money, and you want to let him know that it is ok for him to take it, so you say in English:

The respondent's answer:
(The waiter's response): '*Thank you.*'

The pilot study revealed that seven out of nine responses to the scenario in [4] were very short illocutions: e.g. *Here, Here you go, Here you are, Here's the money, We are ready, That's the payment*, etc. The informants undoubtedly interpreted the scenario at hand as Permission. Howev-

er, given the IF-approach distinguishes between speech acts on the basis of the alethic vs. deontic modality (see section 3.1), we attempted to collect linguistic data that would allow this kind of analysis, i.e. we aimed at designing the scenarios in a way that would trigger utterances containing a VP with a modal verb, e.g. *It's alright. You <u>can take</u> the money*.

Another important observation relates to the responses to the Trolley scenario [5] given by the two British English speakers in [6].

[5]

> **You are at the airport**
>
> You are on a business trip with your boss, Jack Johnson. The plane has just landed, and you have collected your suitcase and put it on a trolley. Then you see your boss walking with his two suitcases, but no trolley. You only have one suitcase and you believe that your boss needs the trolley more than you do. You want to let him know that it is fine by you, if he uses your trolley, so you say in English:
>
> The respondent's answer:
>
> (Jack Johnson's response): '*Thank you.*'

[6]

> **English 1**: 'I'd take my luggage off if there wasn't enough room and say: "Here you go," [while nodding and pointing to the trolley] straightaway and offer him the trolley; or I'd start to put his luggage on the trolley.'
>
> **English 2**: 'Here, you use this [pointing to the trolley]. I only have one suitcase, after all.'

As can be seen from [6], the participants chose to accompany a particular speech act with various non-verbal expressions, such as pointing to the trolley by means of a nod, a hand gesture, a gaze, etc. I interpret these findings in terms of 'visualisation' (see Durst-Andersen, 2000), i.e. the automatic and completely unconscious choice to focus on the picture. It seems quite natural that by visualising a situ-

ation shared by both interlocutors, verbal communication can to a certain extent become superfluous. Interestingly, the requesting behaviour of the native speakers marked by non-verbal expressions stands in direct contrast to the responses produced by non-native participants of the pilot study. None of the latter chose non-verbal signals over verbal ones. This crucial finding convinced us of the importance of recording on video the final Carlsberg tests in addition to using a dictaphone.

While some scenarios (e.g. the Dessert situation and the Bill situation) were excluded on the grounds stated above, other scenarios were partially modified. Consider, for instance, the Dinner scenario in [7], which was replaced by the Ice-cream situation in [11].

[7]

> **You are at your place**
>
> It is evening and you are having a family dinner with your friends. The children have finished their meal and look as if they would like to leave the table, rather than sit and wait for the grown-ups. However, the children hesitate to leave the table, because they usually wait until everyone has finished. You wish to let them know that it is alright, so you say in English:
>
> The respondent's answer:
>
> (Children's response): '*Thank you.*'

There were two arguments for replacing this scenario. Firstly, irrespective of their native language background, most respondents opted for speech acts involving alethic Possibility in [9] instead of the expected Permission in [8].

[8]

> **Japanese**: 'You *may* go. You may leave.'
>
> **English**: 'Ok. If you've said "Thank you", you *may* leave the ta-

[9]

> **Danish**: 'So, kids, isn't it time for you go and play? You *can* talk to your grandparents later?'
>
> **English**: '*Do you want to go and play upstairs . . . do you want to watch TV . . . do you want to do something . . .?*'
>
> **Russian**: '*Maybe you could go and play*? You see? We could just eat between ourselves. So, if you want so, just put your dishes   The respondent's answer:
>
> (The instructor's response): '*Ok-ok. As you want. Keep your hair on!*'

During the interviews held immediately after the test, the respondents admitted that giving permission to one's children by using the modal verb *may* might sound rather formal, and that it would be inappropriate and somewhat 'marked' to use it unless the children were very small. As can be clearly seen from [9], the participants preferred giving their children an option, by describing a Possibility rather than issuing a Permission.

On the other hand, irrespective of whether friends or grandparents were invited to dinner, the Chinese and Japanese subjects appeared to be unable as parents to allow their kids to get down. Intriguingly, the permission to get down was to be issued by the guests. Consider [10] for some illustrative examples.

[10]

> **Chinese 1**: 'Children, thank your grandparents for this great supper, and after that you can go.'
>
> **Chinese 2**: 'Will ask the guests for permission by saying: "Would you mind if I let my kids to play by themselves?"'
>
> **Japanese**: 'If you ask your grandparents if it's ok to leave the table, you can leave.'

It is worth pointing out that nothing was wrong with the Dinner situation in terms of the conditions it was based on in that it was framed in terms of Permission. The fact that the respondents assessed it in terms of Possibility rather than Permission does not justify its exclusion from the data

collection in that Possibility and Permission are two counterparts on the scale of alethic-deontic mo-dality. Hence, the decision to reformulate it into the Ice-cream scenario in [11] was solely based on the specific socio-cultural norms associated with this type of situation in some speech communities, which appeared to prevent respondents from reacting to it in the expected way.

[11]

> **You are at your place**
>
> You have invited a colleague, his wife, and their child, Johnny, for a dinner. You have finished eating ice cream for dessert and Johnny looks as if he would like to have some more ice cream. However, he hesitates to ask about it. You wish to let him know that it is alright, so you say in English:
>
> The respondent's answer:
>
> (Children's response): '*Thank you.*'

The pilot study similarly revealed situations based on deontic modality (Prohibition and Obliga-tion) that appeared to trigger alethic speech acts. This was, for example, the case in the Dog scenario in [12], which was designed in terms of Prohibition, but was consistently understood by the participants as Warning in [13].

[12]

> **You are at your place**
>
> You invite your friend, John, over for a beer. He has not seen you for some time and does not know that you've got a puppy. You have forgotten to tell him that it bites. And in the next moment, you can see that he is about to pick it up. You do not want an accident, so you say in English:
>
> The respondent's answer:
> (John's response): '*Oh, cheers, mate!*'

[13]

> **Japanese**: 'Mind you it may bite.'
>
> **English**: 'Careful, he might bite you!'
>
> **Chinese 1**: 'Careful my friend!'
>
> **Chinese 2**: 'Be careful and keep away from the dog. It may scary you.'
>
> **Danish**: 'Watch out! It's a bit feisty.'

Consequently, the two prohibitive scenarios, namely the Dog situation and Crab scenario (see Appendix I) were replaced by the Poison scenario and the Peanut situation (see Appendix III).

On the basis of similar considerations, the Bank situation I (Appendix I) was replaced by the Bank scenario II (Appendix III), both instantiating Obligation. To be more specific, the initial Bank situation was changed with respect to the social variable of power. I assumed that situations where the speaker with less power than the hearer would issue Obligation were highly implausible – although not impossible. However, this factor obviously made the situation unpredictable, if not completely unreliable, in that it could eventually give rise to requests that did not match the scenario description. Hence, it was decided to redefine this situation in terms of power, namely, the (+P(ower)) speaker and the (-P(ower)) hearer.

The last issue that needs to be mentioned in relation to the scenarios based on Obligation is the final decision to replace the Mobile scenario by the Bus situation which was used as a demonstration during the pilot test. This decision was similarly based on the reasons mentioned above, namely the mismatch between the design of the situation and the received responses. Presumably, this mismatch was caused by the fact that the respondents had a hard time accepting the premise of the Mobile situation that sets the stage for a highly face-threatening act; and nearly all informants participating in the pilot study reacted to it by verbalising Possibility instead of the anticipated Obligation: e.g. 'Can you please turn off your phone? We have already told you once, so it would be very nice if you turn it off this time' or 'Do you mind standing out in the vestibule?'.

As to the respondents' reflections on the scenarios, some of the participants found a few of them rather implausible. For instance, a Japanese informant commented that the Mobile situation would not occur in Japan by virtue of the unsaid conventional rules of behaviour in public transport, where

speaking aloud is considered to be ill-mannered.

Keeping these cultural discrepancies in mind, we decided to ask the participants who had a hard time relating to and accepting the premise of a particular situation to transfer it to a foreign environment, where the respondent would be expected to employ ELF. We assumed that this would not be a problem since the participants were Carlsberg employees who would travel to the countries where the situations described in the scenarios could well be part of reality. Eventually, the situations that were potentially unrealistic in some of the language communities were reformulated in terms of the location of the scene and ended up taking place in England.

In terms of using pictures as an extra tool, it became clear that they needed a further and more scrupulous adjustment in terms of gender and cultural differences. More specifically, it turned out that a Western-looking woman could be perceived differently in Asia and Western Europe. Furthermore, the pilot test showed that respondents may have a hard time associating with the opposite sex of the character in the scenario. We addressed this problem by deciding to portray a unisex speaker, which was thought to facilitate the respondents' process of 'imagining' the situation.

Ironically, this – as well as a number of the decisions mentioned above – did not completely produce the desired results in terms of understanding the scenarios as intended. In the case of cartoons, for example, many of the SPT respondents in Russia ended up misconstruing some situations mainly because they were not familiar with the cartoon genre and couldn't identify with the person in the picture. Retrospectively, it was clear that the simple and unambiguous pictures used for the pilot study seemed to produce better results than some of the cartoons made by the professional cartoonist (see all cartoons in Appendix III).

However, at the time of the pilot study, we believed that the cartoon was the best format as an elicitation tool for intercultural purposes. That is, it was assumed to eliminate differences in gender associations in different cultures. This can be illustrated by means of the cartoon depicting the Library scenario (see [14]).

Finally, the pilot study revealed that when the subjects were given the description of the first situation, they were still somewhat uncomfortable about the experimental set-up and showed signs of anxiety and tension (for similar findings, see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009). This was obviously because they felt insecure about their English and explains why they sought the instructor's approval of their responses (e.g. numerous repetitions, rephrasing, using interrogative intonation pattern with declarative utterances, etc.).

[14]

Despite the fact that this might not bring about the desired results, it was decided to deal with this issue by visiting the factories in Denmark, Russia, and Great Britain a day before launching the tests, because we believed that meeting the participants at their workplace and talking to them in a casual atmosphere would remove their initial embarrassment.

5. Data Analysis

As already mentioned in chapter 4, the ESPTs and the NSPTs were carried out in Denmark, Russia, and the UK using 17 different scenario descriptions (see Appendices III, V, VI). Not all of them, however, were equally successful with respect to their transparency. I have, therefore, chosen to consider just a few scenarios, the results of which yielded distinctive and transparent patterns among, respectively, the Danish, Russian, and British speakers. The scenarios included in the analysis are the following:

[1]

- The Trolley Scenario (involving Permission)

- The Window Scenario (involving Prohibition)

- The Library Scenario (involving Impossibility)

Accordingly, the present analysis includes 121 cases for each situation, i.e. 24 responses given by the ENSs (the control group), 25 responses given by the RESs, 25 responses given by the DESs as well as 25 responses produced by the RMTSs and 22 requests produced by the DMTSs. All in all, the data analysis involves 363 instances of requests from the ELFD and the MTD.

Moreover, it is necessary to stress that all examples provided in the sections below have been transcribed and coded as separate C-units according to the rules of CLAN (see the tutorial on http://childes.psy.cmu.edu/clan/). None of them have been changed with respect to misspellings and other kinds of linguistic errors; they therefore represent the *actual* linguistic realisations in the ELFD and the MTD. Nevertheless, for reasons of clarity the main body of the text contains their linguistic material alone (for full transcriptions, see the appendices).

Most importantly, the analyses were carried out by subjecting each individual utterance to a functional paraphrase, which was also the basis for their categorial affiliation. By 'functional' one should understand a paraphrase that directly reflects a specific category. For example, the paraphrase 'I accept a new situation' is a way to paraphrase various utterances that, within the SAP-model, are treated in terms of the category *speaker's acceptance as Symptom.* For full paraphrases, see the attached Excel-documents I, II, and III.

All the tables in this chapter involve only the categories that emerged during the analysis. The detailed analysis of the three situations in terms of the categories of the SAP-model and Imperative Frames was carried out in Excel.

In the end, it is necessary to reiterate that I shall approach my analysis of the Trolley situation, the Window situation, and the Library situation by drawing primarily on the SAP-model. The original IF-approach, however, will also be included in the analysis of the Window situation in particular.

5.1. The Trolley situation

Scenario	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social Distance
Trolley	Permission	Formal	Boss	Hearer	Some/Great

In addition to discussing the results of the interlanguage, cross-cultural and intralanguage analyses, the purpose of this section is also to provide an illustration of a possible way of employing the SAP-model. Therefore, I shall begin presenting the results for the individual ELF data sets separately and end the discussion at the level of the interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses.

Thus, the discussion of the results is arranged in the following way: (1) decision models for the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs; (2) categories outside and inside the pragmatic wheel that emerged during the analysis; (3) interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses of the principal categories verbalised by the five groups; (4) an interlanguage analysis of the category *speaker's acceptance*; (5) interlanguage variation in the assessment of the imperative frame behind the Trolley situation; (6) general conclusion on the Trolley situation.

5.1.1. The British

5.1.1.1. *On decision models and categories outside the pragmatic wheel*

Let us begin by considering the decision models for the ENSs in [2]. It should be noted that their total number in [2] does not correspond to the actual number of participants (24 in all). This is mainly due to the fact that some respondents produced requests containing more than one decision model, or, to use Durst-Andersen's words, 'made a tour in the pragmatic wheel several times'. Hence, the methodological decision was to count the imperative frames for each communicative event rather than for each respondent (see the analysis of the BED in the attached Excel-document I.3):

[2]

As can be seen from [2], despite our expectations, the ENSs appeared to make a large use of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model, which functions as an entrance to the imperative frame. This implies that when dealing with the BED results, we will meet the category of *imperative* in its three functions, i.e. *imperative as Symptom, imperative as Signal,* and *imperative as Model.* However, the ENSs also used the interrogative frame (i.e. 'stating-a- problem'), which is in accordance with our initial hypothesis I, according to which indirect requesting strategies are the ones that are favoured among the ENSs (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Finally, the analysis revealed the least number of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model among the ENSs, which I did not predict would be found in the results on Permission, involving a prescriptive and – most importantly – polite scenario description. This is so because declaratives are claimed to be another preferable indirect requesting strategy among the ENSs (ibid.). Consider examples of the three decision models for the Trolley scenario:

[3]

Desicion Models	**Linguistic Realisations**

• Solving a problem
  'Your luggage is on the trolley'
• Best bid for a solution to a problem
  'You put your bag on my trolley'
• Stating a problem
  'You want to put that on the trolley'
	• *P103: *Put your lugagge onto the trolley.*
	• *P121: *You can put your bag on here.*
	• *P114: *D'you wanna put that on the trolley?*

As already mentioned above, speaking about the categories outside the pragmatic wheel, *verbalised thought* stands out as the most frequent category applied by the ENSs for the scenario description at hand (see the attached Excel-file 1.3):

[4]

The statistics in [4] present more or less predicted results for the ENSs in that they have been claimed to largely employ indirect requesting strategies. However, what I did not expect is the finding concerning the category of *motivation*:

[5]

Interestingly, I observed a particular tendency among the ENSs to combine *motivation* with *verbalised thought*, which did not seem to be the case with the RESs and the DENs (see below). Consider also an example from the DED in [6]:

[6]

> *P101: *John.*
>
> *P101: **I've got a trolley here with space on.**
>
> *P101: *Would you like to just put your suitcase on my trolley here?*
>
> *P101: *And then we'll push it.*
>
> *P101: *It'll be easier for you.*

We have already seen in section 3.5.6.3 that *motivation* is a pretty straightforward category used when the speaker wants to motivate the hearer to accept her offer by describing the so-called 'key' to the solution of the problem. Hence, the paraphrase of *I've got a trolley here with space on*:

> 'I can solve your problem because I have got enough space.'

Finally, we shall have to supplement [4] by an in-depth analysis of the category of *verbalised thought*, which may exhibit findings that are not obvious from the functional analysis. Ironically, I found that most occurrences of *verbalised thought* in the BED constituted instances of the imperative frame involving Possibility. Thus, most of the ENSs perceived the otherwise prescriptive scenario based on Permission in terms of Possibility. To illustrate the difference between the two types of speech acts, consider [7] and [8] below, which instantiate Possibility and Permission, respectively.

[7]   *P114: *D'you wanna put that on the trolley?*

In [7] a British respondent might have got the following Thought:

> 'He desires to produce an activity with the intention that it be sufficient for
> him to have his suitcase on the trolley.'

which makes sense only in a situation where the speaker does not see any possible reason for why the hearer would not use the trolley. One of the plausible explanations of that could be that the trolley is not the speaker's property, but belongs to the airport, which, in turn, must make her think that Permission is not appropriate in this situation. Whatever the case may be, if we transform this

Thought into English, we get *He wants to put his suitcase on the trolley,* which, according to Durst-Andersen (1995), functions as a 'key' to the imperative frame involving Possibility.

[8]   *P120: *Why don't you put your case on my trolley?*

In [8], on the other hand, another British respondent's Thought might read as following:

> 'He does not intend to produce an activity with the intention that it be suffi-cient for him to have his case on my trolley.'

The speaker in [8] knows that her boss wants his case to be on her trolley. What she is experiencing at the moment of speech, though, is that her boss does not want to perform a particular action so that the final state can be on the world location. If we translate it into English, we get *He does not intend to put his case on my trolley,* which functions as a 'key' to the imperative frame involving Permission. P120 sincerely desires her boss's case to be on her trolley. Hence, she expresses her surprise by asking whether her assumption corresponds to his actual state of mind, *Why don't you put your case on my trolley?* In this situation, the boss will know that he should put his case on the trolley according to the speaker's expectation, since why should P120 be surprised if she wanted her boss's case on her trolley.

In conclusion, only one out of ten ENSs used the category *verbalised thought* for the imperative frame involving Permission. This is presumably because of the formal format of the Trolley scenario, which imposes certain limitations on the participants' perception of the trolley as something not belonging to them. However, this explanation does not hold for the NSPTs, where most of the Russian and Danish respondents issued Permission with the given scenario description, using the imperfective aspect in the case of the former and a negated interrogative in the case of the latter. I shall consider these important differences in the three groups' perceptions of the Trolley situation in section 5.1.4.3.

5.1.1.2.   On the categories of the pragmatic wheel

The results for the ENSs' application of the categories within the pragmatic wheel are presented below:

[9]

Let us begin our discussion by considering the category of *imperative.* When discussing the results for the ENSs' decision models on the level of Input in the section above, I found ten instances of the so-called 'solving-a-problem' structure, which functions as a 'key' to the imperative frame. Table [9] presents the Output results with ten cases of the category of *imperative,* which is claimed to fill in the three parts of the pragmatic wheel in the form of *imperative as Symptom, imperative as Signal,* and *imperative as Model.* Let me demonstrate the analysis of the imperative instances on the example below (see the attached Excel-file 1.3):

[10]

Within the SAP-model, *Give us your bag!* in [10] should read as follows:

1) Symptom of P99's feelings, whereby she accepts a new / changed situation, where both bags are on the trolley;

2) Signal to the boss to carry out the action, whereby P99 satisfies the boss's pre-conditions by making it possible for him to comply with the request;

3) Model of a new situation, whereby P99, on condition that the boss accepts her offer, instructs him how to carry out the act so that 'his bag is on the trolley'.

It goes without saying that the act of 'permitting' per se is realised by the *imperative as Signal* in that here the speaker removes a 'mental' obstacle (i.e. the hearer does not dare to produce an action) by issuing a Permission.

In the traditional literature on pragmatics, polite imperatives, are often associated with informal vocabulary, as in *Give **us** your bag!* (Aijmer, 1996:185). In this respect, it is worth highlighting that the informal use of the pronoun *us* bears a resemblance to what Rossi (2012) calls the participants' relative 'ownership' of the activity they are engaged in. Analysing bilateral and unilateral requests in Italian, he found that imperative forms were used in cases where the requested action was part of the encompassing project, to which both interlocutors have already established a joint commitment. Another study of staff requests to adults with intellectual impairments (cf. Antaki & Kent, 2012) resonates well with this point, underscoring the importance of 'benefit', which both parties equally get from engaging in a joint activity.

Furthermore, it has already been mentioned that the results of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model refuted my initial expectations with regard to the ENSs, whom I expected to follow Searle's 1975 principle of universal indirectness in the scenario instantiating an asymmetrical power relationship between the speaker (-P(ower)) and the hearer (+P(ower). I attempted to solve this alleged 'inconsistency' by considering a socio-cultural variable like the dimension of organisational structure and found that it is hierarchical rather than flat in UK business organisations (see Hofstede, 2001). I have similarly tried to apply the hearer-oriented logic of the so-called benefactor-beneficiary status to this particular scenario, according to which, the speaker would inverse the benefactive gradient from an imposition to a favour (Clayman & Heritage, 2014). Put differently, in cases of offers or suggestions, which are oriented towards the hearer's benefit and leave the hearer the choice whether to accept the offer or not, the imposition associated with the imperative is not felt to be heavy (see Aijmer, 1996:184). Following this logic, we can conclude that most of the ENSs reversed the relationship defined by the

Trolley scenario from (+P(ower), +D(istance)) into (-P(ower), -D(istance)) and employed positive or solidarity politeness strategies, i.e. the imperative form in combination with mitigation (e.g. an informal way of using the pronoun *us*).

Still, I wonder if the ENSs' use of mitigated directness with this particular scenario can be explained in purely grammatical terms. After having rebutted plausible explanations in terms of social variables, I eventually drew on Durst-Andersen's conception of the imperative form. As has been mentioned in 3.5.4, the SAP-model construes the *imperative* not only in terms of the second person (i.e. Signal), but also in terms of the first person (i.e. Symptom) and the third person (i.e. Model). Hence, it does not seem implausible that this unique quality of the imperative form makes it 'self-sufficient' in grammatical terms. This explanation goes very well with languages where it is not associated with impoliteness: e.g., Dutch (Fortuin, 2003), Russian (Durst-Andersen, 1995; Holberg, 2014), Polish (Wierzbicka, 1985), Greek (Sifianou, 1992), Chinese (Hong, 1999), some African languages (De Kadt, 1995; Devon & Van Olmen, 2013).

And yet, we cannot refute the fact that the imperative can have impolite pragmatic inferences in English (Searle, 1975; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Blum-Kulka et. al, 1989). I shall return to this issue at the end of this section, when providing a grammatical explanation of the ENSs' great usage of the imperative form with the Trolley situation.

Going back to Table [9], the next category is *satisfaction conditions,* which usually stands for the so-called 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model (see the attached Excel-file I.3): [11]

> *P109: *John !*
> *P109: **You can use my trolley .**
> *P109: *If you want to .*

By uttering *You can use my trolley*, P109 offers the boss her best bid to solution of a problem, which can be paraphrased as follows:

> 'I hereby want you to know that there is *no obstacle* to solving your problem.'

If we follow the logic of IF, the paraphrase above implies that P109 does not issue permission for her boss to use the trolley, but simply describes that it is possible for him to carry out an action – ergo, she opts for the alethic request of Possibility.

Finally, we have arrived at the last category in Table [9], namely *obedience conditions,* which is

represented by the subcategory of *release.* Let us consider example [12] (see the attached Excel-file I.3):

[12]

> *P109: *John !*
>
> *P109: *You can use my trolley .*
>
> *P109: ***If you want to*** .

In the traditional pragmatic research, *if* is described as a request marker that has the pragmatic force of 'a polite concession towards the addressee, who is not expected to refuse the speaker's request' (Perkins, 1983:124). It is generally construed in terms of tentative and formal request formulas of the type *if you would,* or *if you could*; and in cases where the action obviously benefits the hearer, it is used for an offer (cf. Aijmer, 1996:152, 191). In [12], I analyse *if you want to* as an instance of *release* in that it expresses the speaker's condition to the hearer, which cancels the hearer's feeling of debt to accept the offer (cf. Devlin, 1910:29 for a similar description of if-clauses):

> 'I hereby state that if you (really) want to accept my offer, I will not put any
> pressure on you.'

5.1.1.3. On the category of Justification

As can be seen from [4] above, this category was verbalised by ten out of 24 respondents. I have already mentioned in section 3.5.6.6 that the utterances conveying the function of *justification* usually follow the Head Act. Consider the following example (see the attached Excel-file I.3):

[13]

> *P102: *Hey, John !*
> *P102: *Give us it here .*
> *P102: *I'll stick this on the trolley with mine .*
> *P102: ***There's plenty of room .***

The paraphrase of the highlighted utterance reads as:

> 'I hereby want you to know that your suitcase will not cause any problem at
> all.'

Interestingly, the linguistic realisation, *There's plenty of room,* appeared to be the most typical way of expressing *justification* in the BED (see [17] below).

The speaker can also choose to 'justify' her request by underscoring its benefit to the hearer, as in

[14] (see the attached Excel-file I.3):

 [14]

>> *P118: *D'you want to pop that on here ?*
>> *P118: **You look like you're struggling with that .**

Its paraphrase reads as follows:

> 'I hereby want you to know that you do not need to struggle with your big bag,
> because I've got a trolley you can use.'

Finally, the ENSs used *justification* in order to point out that the outcome of the request is for the mutual benefit of both the speaker and the hearer (see the attached Excel-file I.3):

[15]

>> *P115: *Here you go.*
>> *P115: *Let me give you a hand and pop it on here .*
>> *P115: **Make <it> [///] life a lot easier .**

We can paraphrase the instance of *justification* in [15] in the following way:

> 'I hereby want you to know that it will be easier for both of us if your luggage
> is on my trolley.'

All in all, it seems that most of the ENSs used the category of *justification* to focus on the trolley itself. Consider the table below, which illustrates its distribution in the BED:

[16]

	S in focus	H in focus	S & H in focus	Trolley in focus	In all
Justification	0	3	1	6	10

I entertain the idea that the nature of the topic – be it the trolley, speaker, hearer, or both the speaker and hearer – might be directly related to the discussion above, namely, the ENSs' large use of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model with the Trolley situation. In my view, talking about the trolley, which is the property of the airport, the ENSs would imply that it is *possible* for the boss to use it. When employing this particular kind of justification of the request together with the imperative sentence structure (NB: the imperative form is ambiguous in English with respect to its modality), the

interrogative sentence structure (see the results above), or the declarative sentence structure (NB: the modal *can* is ambiguous in English with respect to its modality), the overall reading of the communicative event acquires the alethic reading – namely, Possibility.

Let us summarise what we have found so far. Speaking about the categories of the pragmatic wheel, the analysis revealed a great number of instances of the imperative construction, which refuted my initial hypothesis I, according to which I expected the ENSs to employ indirect requesting strategies in a scenario where there was an asymmetrical power relationship between the speaker and hearer.

First of all, I presume that the perceived lack of imposition of using the imperative form in this particular scenario is due to the fact that it never occurred on its own in the BED, but went together with various informal markers (e.g. the pronoun *us*), tuners (e.g. *look*), as well as conditional statements in the form of *justification.* The studies of Rossi (2012) and Antaki and Kent (2012) both support my findings. According to these studies, imperative constructions are licensed in cases where both interlocutors share the status of 'ownership' of the joint project they engage in, equally reaping the 'benefits' of it.

Furthermore, by distinguishing between different topics (see [16]), I found that most of the ENSs justified their requests by talking about the trolley. This led me to the following tentative conclusion: by not positioning themselves as the 'authority' that can issue permission, the ENSs divert the otherwise deontic scenario into an alethic one, i.e. 'There is *no obstacle* for H to use the trolley because it is not my property'. As a result, we see that the prescriptive element of the deontic frame involving Permission, which in an imperative utterance must be perceived by the hearer as imposing, is cancelled by *justification* formulated in alethic terms. This prescriptive element can metaphorically also be described as a 'red light' (an obstacle) that informs the hearer of the speaker's non-acceptance of the situation (Symptom): 'It is not OK... because there is an obstacle.' This is so because speech acts belonging to the deontic modality (e.g. Permission, Prohibition) presuppose that the hearer intends to carry out an act, but he cannot fulfil it without the speaker's approval (see a similar account in Shatunovsky, 2000).

This being said, the employment of positive politeness strategies seems to be licensed by the ENSs' perception of the Trolley situation in alethic terms (grammar), rather than their desire to establish common ground by cancelling the presumed difference in power and reducing the distance between themselves and their boss (social variables).

5.1.2.   The Russians

5.1.2.1. On decision models

By the same token as with the ENSs, I shall start by considering the results of the decision models in the RED (see [17]). As in the case with [2], [17] contains more decisions models than the actual number of participants (25 in all) because some of the respondents produced requests containing more than one decision model, or, to use Durst-Andersen's words, 'made a tour in the pragmatic wheel several times'. Hence, the methodological decision was to count the imperative frames for each communicative event rather than for each respondent (see the analysis of the RED in the attached Excel-document I.1):

[17]

The statistics in [17] present unexpected results in that, contrary to hypothesis III, which stated that the Russian respondents would transfer the 'solving-a-problem' decision model from their mother tongue to ELF, most of the RESs employed the declarative frame, which is an instance of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. Consider an example (see the attached Excel-file I.1):

[18]

Communicative event	Paraphrase of the Head Act
• *P11: *You can put your luggage on my trolley* . • *P11: *If you want* .	• My best bid for a solution to you problem: 'You put your luggage o my trolley'.

Speaking about the other two decision models in [17], they exhibit more or less predicted results since only two Russian respondents formulated their requests by using the interrogative sentence structure and many of them employed imperative utterances. Since in this section I only deal with the interlanguage results, the findings for the RMTD will be presented and discussed in section 5.1.4.1.

5.1.2.2. On the categories outside the pragmatic wheel

In comparison with other categories outside the pragmatic wheel, the RESs appeared to make the largest use of the category of *motivation*. However, they did this in a different way from the ENSs (compare [19] to [5]).

[19]

The use of *motivation* in conjunction with other categories (the RED)

Motivation

Imperative (Signal) I, Satisfaction conditions II, Verbalised Thought III, Motivation alone IV

In contrast to the ENSs, who preferred *motivation* together with *verbalised thought*, the RESs mostly accompanied it by the category of *imperative as Signal* and *satisfaction conditions.* However, if we take into consideration that in Russian the imperative operates on the category of aspect, whose extra-linguistic function corresponds to that of the category of *satisfaction conditions*, notably 'to satisfy the preconditions for the hearer to comply with the request' (Durst-Andersen, 1995:628), it does not seem implausible to assume that the instances of *imperative as Signal* in the RED are triggered by the Russian category of aspect. Besides, both *imperative as Signal* and *satisfaction conditions* belong to the same place within the pragmatic wheel, where the speaker frames her proposal to the hearer (see section 3.5.5.2.), and, in this respect, they share the same function.

This is an important finding, which I shall consider in detail in the intralanguage analysis. For now it will suffice to give an example of *motivation*, which in most cases surfaced as [20] (see the attached Excel-document I.1):

[20]

> *P1: *Mr John !*
> *P1:*Look !*
> *P1: **I have lots of place on my trolley .***
> *P1: *Put your bag please !*

5.1.2.3. On the categories of the pragmatic wheel

Table [21] presents the results for the categories of the pragmatic wheel. In contrast to [9], where native speakers of English employed *obedience conditions* in the form of *release,* the Russian respondents made the additional use of *compensation* and *execution.*

[21]

While the linguistic realisations of the first two categories in [21] are very similar to those in [9], the last three categories deserve a closer look.

First of all, *release* appeared to be the most frequently used subcategory of *obedience conditions* among the RESs. In contrast to the ENSs, who justified their requests by talking about the trolley, the RESs focused on their own persona when expressing their post-conditions to the hearer in the form of *release.* Let me demonstrate the point by means of the following example (see the attached Excel-document I.1):

[22]

> *P19: *Mr John !*
> *P19:*There is a space on my trolley .*
> *P19: *So you can put your luggage on it .*
> *P19: *And I will bring it closer to the car .*
> *P19: **And it's ok** .*
> *P19: **There's nothing to worry about** .*

In [22], the respondent wraps up her request by cancelling the hearer's assumed feeling of debt to accept the offer. Its linguistic realisation can be paraphrased as follows:

> 'I hereby want you to know that you should not feel indebted to me, because it is no burden for me.'

As can be clearly seen from the paraphrase, the focus of the speaker's post-conditions is the speaker herself. This, in turn, echoes the previous discussion about the respondents' different perceptions of the scenario at hand in terms of Possibility or Permission. More specifically, the RESs' interest in cancelling any possible feeling of debt with the hearer (either covertly, as in [22], or overtly, as in [3.19], *I don't mind if you put your luggage in my trolley*), which they achieve through talking about their own persona, must imply that they perceive the Trolley scenario in terms of Permission. Moreover, this tentative conclusion is supported by the RMTD, where most of the Russian respondents issued Permission either by using the imperative form of the imperfective verb (consider an example in [23]) or the declarative with the modal verb *may* (see [24]):

[23]

> *P29: *Ivan Ivanyč !*
>
> *P29: ***Stav'te*** *svoi vešči na moju teležku !*
>
> *P29: '*Put* (IPF) your belongings on my trolley!'*

[24]

> *P44: *Ivan Ivanovič .*
>
> *P44: *Vy ***možete*** *položiť svoj čemodan na moju teležku .*
>
> *P44: 'You *may* put your suitcase on my trolley.'*

Speaking about *compensations*, none of the ENSs or the DESs made use of this subcategory of *obedience conditions*. This is an interesting finding in itself, especially considering its linguistic realisations in the RED in the form of the token *please* in the final C-unit position, as well as various performative speech acts. Consider the example of the former in [3.16] and the latter in [25] (see the attached Excel-document I.1):

[25]

> *P18: *I invite you on my trolley .*

As already mentioned in section 3.5.8, instances of performatives are analysed as tripartite entities within the SAP-model, simultaneously standing for *speaker's acceptance* at the level of Symptom, *satisfaction conditions* at the level of Signal, and *obedience conditions* at the level of Model. Thus, the communicative event in [25] can be paraphrased in the following way, with the Model-meaning instantiating *compensation* (see Durst-Andersen, 2009:317):

Communicative event	Paraphrase of the Head Act
• *P18: *I invite you on my trolley* .	• Symptom: 'I want you to be part o[f] my domain.' • Signal: 'I hereby say that it i[s] possible for you to produce th[e] activity in that there is n[o] psychological or physical obstacle t[o] solving your problem.' • Model: 'If you take part of m[y] trolley, it will not cost you anything.'

Like *compensation*, the RED alone yields a few instances of the category of *execution* (see the attached Excel-document I):

[26]

> *P22: *Mr John !*
> *P22: *You can use my trolley* .
> *P22: **It's here** [points at the trolley].
> *P22: *Place free for you* .
> *P22: *Let's go* .

By giving Permission in [26], the respondent also comments on the actual place of *execution*, both verbally and non-verbally. *It's here*, can thus be paraphrased as follows:

> 'I hereby physically instruct you by pointing at the place of executing the offer in the real world, i.e. the trolley.'

5.1.2.4. Preliminary conclusions

In concluding the discussion of the Russian English results for the Trolley situation, the RED exhibited an overwhelming number of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision models. This finding, however, does not correspond with my initial expectations in hypothesis III where it was stated that since the Russian speakers do not master the private voice of English, they are expected to make direct transfers from Russian to ELF. Moreover, these results are not supported by the RMTD,

where most respondents employed the 'solving-a-problem' decision model. Therefore, as far as the scenario at hand is concerned, there are no direct transfers of the requesting strategies from Russian to Russian English.

However, I found that the RESs motivated the hearer in conjunction with *satisfaction conditions*, which has led me to the following tentative conclusion: even though the imperative conveys the meanings of Symptom, Signal, and Model at the same time, the category of aspect in Russian lays the main emphasis on the category of *satisfaction conditions* and highlights the meaning of Signal. In other words, the influence of Russian seems to be indirect rather than direct because: 1) the RMTSs are used to verbalise the whole wheel in their mother tongue by using the imperative; but since 2) the category of aspect in Russian is coupled with *satisfaction* conditions, 3) what therefore seems to be transferred is their emphasis on *satisfaction conditions*, which takes the form of the use of *motivation* together with *satisfaction conditions.*

Another notable finding relates to the categories of *compensation* and *execution* found in the RED. Neither the BED, nor the DED yielded instances of these two categories. This might imply that the RESs, by not having English in their bodies and brains, as it were, would choose to be on safe ground and employ the declarative frame. Even so, by using the 'solving-a-problem' decision model and thereby verbalising the whole wheel in their mother tongue, and they would perhaps feel that something of Symptom, Signal, and Model is missing in English. The outcome is that we see that the RESs do not merely offer their 'best bid for solution to a problem'. They support it lexically by additionally providing some *motivation*, promising the hearer a form of *compensation* for the trouble, and even pointing to the place of *executing* the request, i.e. the trolley. This might additionally imply that Russian grammar has an indirect influence on Russian English.

Finally, the results of *release* in the RED imply that the RESs perceive the Trolley scenario as that involving Permission. This is mainly due to the fact that they speak about their own persona when cancelling the hearer's feeling of debt, which, in turn, presents them as some kind of 'authority' entitled to issue Permission. Most importantly, this tentative conclusion is supported by the RMTD, where most respondents issued Permission by either employing the imperfective aspect or the modal verb *may.*

5.1.3. The Danish

5.1.3.1. *On decision models and the categories outside the pragmatic wheel*

Following the same procedure as above, I shall start out by considering the Danish English results of decision models in [27]. As was the case with [2] and [17], some of the DESs made a round in a pragmatic wheel several times:

[27]

Interestingly, the statistics in [17] and [27] are more or less similar, except for a minor difference in the results for interrogative frames (two in [17] vs. six instances in [27]). In other words, both the RESs and the DESs used the declarative sentence structure with *can* most frequently. This is similarly a surprising result for the Danish speakers, whom I anticipated would employ imperative utterances to a larger etxent than can be seen in [27] (see the initial hypothesis II in section 1.2). In section 5.1.3.2, I shall consider specific linguistic realisations of the imperative frame employed by the DESs, which occurred more frequently in the DED than in the BED and the RED. For now, it seems reasonable to include the DMTD and see whether the results conform to my initial hypothesis.

[28]

The results in [28] are not in accordance with the initial hypothesis II either in that in revealed many more instances of the interrogative frame than the expected imperative one. Moreover, 14 out of 15 instances of the interrogative frame in [28] represent negated questions, which I construe in terms of Permission (see section 3.5.6.5). Ironically, the DMTSs preferred to use the interrogative frame – which is exactly what I expected to find with the ENSs. Put differently, in terms of traditional research in pragmatics, the Danish respondents have ostensibly accepted the conditions of the deontic frame at hand (i.e. (+P(ower), +D(istance)), thereby employing negative politeness strategies (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Scollon and Scollon, 1983:167).

Going back to the Danish English results in [27], it was not feasible to establish whether the DESs perceived the Trolley scenario in terms of Permission, simply because the distinction between the deontic and alethic meanings of *can* is blurred in Modern English (see section 3.5.6.3). I shall, therefore, base my general conclusions for the Danish speakers on the Mother Tongue results, namely that the Danes perceive the Trolley situation as such involving Permission.

Still, neither [27] nor [28] proves our initial expectation with the Danes, whom I anticipated would largely employ imperative sentence structures in their mother tongue, on the one hand, and transfer imperative forms from Danish into Danish English, on the other. I shall return to this issue of the obvious lack of direct transfer of the requesting strategies when doing an intralanguage analysis in section 5.1.4.1.

5.1.3.2.   *On the categories of the pragmatic wheel*

As mentioned in the previous section, most of the DESs made use of declarative utterances,

mainly surfacing in the form of the category *satisfaction conditions*, as in [29] (see the attached Excel-document I.2):

[29]

> *P55: *Should I take your bag ?*
> *P55: **You can just put it up here .***
> *P55: *[And I'll probably help him lift it or something] .*

The communicative event in [29] is interesting in several respects. First, P55 states the problem, as it were, by asking a question, *Should I take your bag?* Still, the interrogative form *should I* is inappropriate because it implies either irritation on the part of the speaker or simply reads as if the speaker was debating with herself about whether to take the bag or not, which is definitely not the case in the situation at hand.

Second, P55 offers the hearer her 'best bid for a solution to a problem' by employing the declarative sentence form with the token *just*, which in [29] I construe as an instance of a prescriptive particle whose function is to *remove* the obstacle that prevents the hearer from complying with the request (see sections 2.1.3.4 & 3.5.5.2.2).

Eventually, I believe that both *should I* and *just* in [29] are linguistic transfers from Danish, where they correspond to, respectively, *skal jeg* and the prescriptive particle *bare.*

Moreover, the DESs employed different imperative forms to those produced by the ENSs and the RESs. Besides the distinctive 2nd person imperative, like *Put your bag on the trolley*, the DED also exhibited 1st person plural forms, like *Let's share the trolley*, and a small number of 'permissive' constructions, such as *Let me* and *Allow me*, which are analysed in the present study in terms of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-the-problem' decision model (see section 3.5.9). Consider an example (see the attached Excel-document I.2):

[30]

> *P59: *Mr John !*
>
> *P59: *Please **let me take your luggage on my trolley** .*
>
> *P59: *Because I have enough space .*

It is particularly interesting that the DESs used imperative constructions like in [30], since just a few of the ENSs and the RESs made use of them. Moreover, similar cases of the speaker's offer to help the hearer were also found in the DMTD. They are either framed as interrogatives and represent the category of *verbalised thought*, as in [31], or exemplified by the category of *future action*, as in [32].

[31]

        *P78: ***Skal jeg ikke lige smide den med på min vogn?***
        *P78: 'Don't you want me to throw it on my trolley?'

        *P78: *Vi skal alligevel følges.*
        *P78: 'We are going the same way anyway.'

[32]

        *P88: *Ah få den nu herop!*
        *P88: 'Oh come on! Put it up here!'

        *P88: ***Så skal jeg nok lige tage den.***
        *P88: 'I'll take it.'

This distinct tendency among the Danish respondents to underscore the speaker's costs to herself at one end, and benefits to the hearer at the other, further supports my argument about their perception of the Trolley scenario: i.e., a subordinate (-P(ower) is giving Permission to her superordinate (+P(ower). Interestingly, this level of complaisance was not found with the ENSs, nor was it observed with the Russian respondents.

All in all, the analysis of the DED and the DMTD did not reveal any direct linguistic transfers. The interrogative frame was mostly applied by the DMTSs, while the declarative frame with *can* was predominant among the DESs. But there is evidence of the socio-pragmatic transfer from Danish into Danish English in the form of the speaker's pronounced desire to help the boss with his problem, notably the DESs' employment of the permissive forms *Let me / Allow me.*

5.1.4. Interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses of the ELFD and the MTD

5.1.4.1. *On decision models and linguistic transfers from mother tongue into ELF*

Concerning the issue of interlanguage variability in the choice of syntactic structures, I was concerned with detecting culturally distinct requesting behaviour. The findings in [33] point to interesting and unexpected interlanguage and cross-cultural differences in the three decision models among the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs:

(a) There are high levels of interlanguage variation in the choice of the interrogative, declarative, and imperative frames between the ENSs on the one hand, and the RESs and the DESs on the other hand. The control group and the two test groups were found to disagree on the choice of decision models for the Trolley scenario.

(b) There is some interlanguage agreement between the ENSs and the RESs, i.e., almost equally high levels of employing the 'solving-the-problem' decision model.

(c) There are high levels of cross-cultural agreement between the RESs and the DESs, that is, both employed the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-the-problem' decision model most often.

[33]

First of all, it is worth pointing out that both the RESs and the DESs – non-native speakers of English – displayed a similar requesting behaviour, mostly giving preference to declarative structures. This makes them stand in direct contrast to the control group, the ENSs, who used imperative utterances on a par with interrogative ones in this particular situation. The results of the interlanguage variation in (a) are expected since I anticipated finding a certain degree of divergence between native and non-native speakers of English. Yet, while a high level of imperative structures with the RESs in (b) can be explained through the direct influence of Russian, to account for the high percentage with the ENSs has proved a more challenging task, notably requiring a more detailed analysis of the category of *justification* (see above). Finally, the results in (c) are similarly unexpected and the high percentage of declarative frames with the RESs and the DESs may partly be related to the notion of the private vs. public voice of a language (see section 1.2). I shall elaborate on this at the end of this section.

On the other hand, these results yield the reverse configuration than that formulated in hypothesis I: i.e. the ENSs were expected to mostly employ the 'stating-a-problem' decision model, whereas it was anticipated that the RESs and the DESs would prefer the 'solving-a-problem' decision model. There is no doubt that in order to account for these findings I shall have to involve the results from the MTD as well:

[34]

It is important to point out that since permissive constructions in the present study are analysed in terms of the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model (see section 3.5.9), the results of the RMTD for the declarative frames in [34] include permissive speech acts like *Davajte postavim vešči na teležku* ('Let's put the luggage on the trolley').

As far as the 'solving-a-problem' decision model is concerned, the findings for the RMTD in [34] roughly confirm hypothesis II in that most of the RMTSs employed imperative utterances. Most importantly, the analysis of these imperative constructions revealed 14 out of 16 instances of 2nd person singular imperative constructions with verbs in the imperfective aspect, which within the IF-framework are construed in terms of deontic modality and in our case instantiate Permission. Consider an example from the RMTD (see the attached Excel-document I.4):

[35]

> *P29: *Ivan Ivanyč !*
>
> *P29: **Stav'te** svoi vešči na moju teležku !*
>
> *P29: '*Put* (IPFV) your luggage on my trolley!'

In contrast to the Russian findings in [34], the DMT results did not appear to confirm hypothesis II and exhibited only five instances of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model. Interestingly, most of the DMTSs opted for the 'stating-a-problem' decision model and used interrogatives. A further analysis of these interrogative utterances revealed that in twelve out of 14 cases the respondents employed a negated interrogative construction, which in the present study is construed in terms of deontic modality, in casu Permission (see section 3.5.6.5).

Consider an illustrative example (see the attached Excel-document I.5):

[36]

> *P81: ***Skal jeg ikke lige tage din kuffert op på min bagagevogn her ?***
> *P81: 'Shall I not just take your suitcase onto my trolley here?'
>
>
> *P81: *Det går vist lidt nemmere .*
> *P81: 'It'll be easier.'

To sum up the intralanguage findings, I hypothesised that against the background of Russian and Danish speakers not mastering the private voice of English, I would expect them to transfer the requesting structures form their respective mother tongues to English. Since this did not prove to be the case in this particular scenario, the lack of the private voice of English with the Russian and Danish respondents might have resulted in them wanting to be on 'safe ground', as it were. While they might presume that native speakers of English would perceive imperative constructions as too coercive (according to Searle's principle of universal indirectness), the use of interrogatives would be too unnatural in the case of the Russians, and too risky from the DESs' point of view. Even though this might be a highly speculative account, the most obvious choice in casu seems to be the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. I find further evidence supporting this argument in the RESs' and the DESs' employment of the token *please* in the functions of *speaker's acceptance* as well as the use of performative constructions – none of which was found among the ENSs. Let us consider this issue in more detail.

5.1.4.2. *On interlanguage variation in the category of speaker's acceptance*

Besides being similar in giving preference to the declarative sentence structure, both the RESs and the DESs differed from the ENSs in their use of the categories *speaker's acceptance Symptom* and *speaker's acceptance Signal.*

[37]

As can be observed in [37], there is a significant difference in the occurrence of *speaker's acceptance* on the level of both Symptom and Signal. The DESs and the RESs demonstrated a greater application of these categories as compared with the ENSs. While the results of linguistic realisations of *speaker's acceptance Symptom* are presented in [38], all instances of *speaker's acceptance Signal* were represented by the token *please* (see the attached Excel-document I. 1-3).

As can be seen from [38], Russian respondents were most diverse in their linguistic choices and verbalised the category in question by using the token *please,* the phatic utterance *You're welcome* and even a performative speech act, namely *I invite you on my trolley.* Moreover, according to [37], the Russian speakers were also most 'productive' in terms of making use of the token *please* in the *speaker's acceptance Signal* (see [3.15]).

[38]

	please	you're welcome	performa- tives	in all
RESs	2	3	1	6
DESs	5	1	0	6
ENSs	2	0	0	2

Interestingly, the DESs appeared to largely use the token *please* in [37] in conjunction with the permissive *Let me help you*, which is construed as the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model.

Wrapping up the discussion above, although the RESs and the DESs used different linguistic realisations of the categories of *speaker's acceptance Symptom / Signal*, both made a greater use of them

as compared with the ENSs. Most importantly, in the majority of cases they appeared in conjunction with the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-the-problem' decision model. This being said, the use of these categories by the Russian and Danish informants seems to provide further support for my argument as to why non-native speakers of English opt for the declarative sentence structure in this particular situation.

5.1.4.3. Interlanguage variation in the assessment of the Trolley situation

I deal with the ENSs', the RESs' and the DESs' perception of the Trolley scenario in terms of what I shall call a phenomenon of 'there's lots of place on my trolley', by which I mainly refer to a common denominator behind a whole range of linguistic variations of the utterance, *There's lots of place on my trolley*. It appears that this utterance can occur in utterance-initial and utterance-final positions and surface in the form of the categories of *motivation* and *justification*, respectively.

Interestingly, I found that the RESs favoured it in utterance-initial position as *motivation* that would precede the linguistic realisations of the categories of *satisfaction conditions* or *imperative* (see [19]), whereas five out of eight ENSs used it as *justification* following the *imperative* (see the attached Excel-document I).

In [39], the interlanguage results are presented for the utterance *There's lots of place on my trolley* analysed in terms of the categories of *motivation* and *justification* (NB: the results in [41] include the instances of *motivation* in combination with the categories of *satisfaction conditions* and *imperative* alone).

[39]

Speaking about the ENSs' assessment of the Trolley situation, it turned out that they employed *There's lots of place on my trolley* in utterance-final position when justifying their requests. Examining the utterance at hand in terms of different topics, I found that in most cases the ENSs justified their requests by talking about the trolley (see [16]). In other words, I believe that by speaking about the trolley, which belongs to the airport, native speakers of English would reverse the otherwise deontic scenario of Permission into an alethic situation involving Possibility. This is mainly the rationale for my argument as to why the ENSs made a large use of imperative constructions in a scenario based on asymmetrical power relationship between the speaker and hearer (see also section 5.1.1.3).

As far as the RESs' perception of the type of frame behind the Trolley scenario is concerned, the results of *obedience conditions* proved most helpful. As can be observed from [21], Russian speakers favoured *release* and highlighted their own persona when expressing their post-conditions to the hearer. Put differently, the RESs' preference for *release* may assess the Trolley situation as one of involving Permission, and the results of the NSPT confirm this finding (see the attached Excel-document I.1 and I.4).

Finally, as can be observed from [39], the DESs also gave preference to *justification.* However, I could not detect any prevailing pattern in their topicalisation of this category. The results of sequential analysis of the utterance *There's lots of place on my trolley* were similarly inconclusive, only revealing an almost equal distribution between utterance-initial (i.e. *motivation*) and utterance-final (i.e. *justification*) positions. Eventually, I was inclined to draw my conclusion for the DESs' assessment of the Trolley scenario from the findings of the NSPT, according to which Danish speakers perceived the Trolley situation as involving Permission (see section 5.1.3).

5.1.5.   General conclusions on the Trolley situation

We began this chapter by considering the variation in the choice of syntactic structures in the deontic situation description involving Permission by the ENSs (the control group), the RESs, and the DESs. The findings of interlanguage variation between native and non-native speakers of English revealed that the ENSs were the only group that employed imperative sentence structures as often as interrogative forms. The speakers of Russian English and Danish English, on the other hand, demonstrated certain interlanguage agreement by mainly giving preference to declarative utterances. Both findings were equally unexpected and were not in line with research hypotheses I and III, according to which English native speakers were predicted to prefer interrogatives, whereas it was anticipated that

Russian and Danish speakers of English would transfer imperative constructions from their respective mother tongues to ELF.

While in a few cases the use of the imperative form by the native speakers of English can be explained by the pronoun *us* that renders a specific perception of the situation in which the trolley is a common property of both the speaker and the hearer, the majority of instances of the imperative sentence form seems to be licenced by the ENSs' assessment of the Trolley scenario in terms of Possibility rather than Permission.

This argument may appear highly controversial, especially given the traditional pragmatic view of construing imperative utterances containing such mitigating devices as informal pronouns and tuners in terms of polite 'invitations' or offers to use the trolley rather than 'commands'. However, I had to decline the traditional account in that I find it implausible that in the situation in question British English speakers would opt for positive politeness strategies, aiming at establishing a 'common ground' with their boss. In this respect, therefore, the traditional notion of 'positive politeness' seems to be inappropriate, if not directly erroneous with the scenario at hand. What does seem to be the case here is that the ENSs perceive the Trolley situation in terms of alethic Possibility rather than deontic Permission. This argument is based on the analysis of the category of *justification*, which revealed the preference among the ENSs for justifying their requests by talking about the trolley, the property of the airport. Hence, I believe that the appearance of alethic *justification* together with informal vocabulary will override the 'command' reading, normally associated with the imperative form in English.

The ENSs' perception of the Trolley situation stands in direct contrast to how the Russian and Danish respondents assessed it. The findings for the RED revealed that most of the RESs made use of the category of *release*, i.e. they highlighted their own persona when presenting their boss with the post-conditions. This led to the argument for their perception of the Trolley scenario in terms of Permission, which, among other things, was supported by the results obtained from the MTD.

The results for the DED, on the other hand, were inconclusive and had to be backed by the MTD, revealing the majority of negated interrogatives, which are analysed in the present study in terms of deontic Permission.

In terms of the cross-cultural agreement between the RESs and the DESs to employ declaratives rather than the expected imperative constructions, the findings similarly revealed an equally high percentage of the categories of *speaker's acceptance Symptom / Signal* in the two groups, which in most cases surfaced in combination with declaratives. Since few of the ENSs verbalised these categories, I

am likely to interpret these cross-cultural findings as an internal argument for why non-native speakers would seek out 'safe ground' and choose the declarative sentence structure when producing permissive requests in ELF.

The intralanguage analysis revealed direct linguistic transfers from Russian to Russian English in that Russian speakers were the only group who produced the largest number of imperative utterances with the Trolley situation. Moreover, the in-depth analysis of the categories of the pragmatic wheel disclosed noteworthy 'covert' transfers.[8] Interestingly, I found traces of the Russian grammatical category of aspect in Russian English in the form of the linguistic realisations of the category of *motivation* coupled with declarative utterances representing the category of *satisfaction conditions*. Given the idea that aspect in Russian puts an emphasis on *satisfaction conditions*, I argue that the instances of *motivation* in this particular scenario description are indications of the indirect influence of Russian on Russian English. In addition, the fact that the RESs was the only group who used the categories of *compensation* and *execution* indicates an indirect influence of the way the direct requesting strategies are employed in Russian on the requesting strategies in Russian English, i.e. what in Russian is handled by grammar seems to be managed by lexical means in Russian English.

Finally, the intralanguage analysis of the Danish data did not exhibit any direct linguistic influence. However, the DED revealed some covert transfers from Danish. This concerns the cases of a speaker's pronounced willingness to help the hearer that took the form of the permissive *Let me / Allow me* in the DED and interrogative constructions in the MTD. Correspondingly, in contrast to the covert influence of the grammatical category of aspect and direct requesting strategies in Russian on Russian English, we seem to encounter here indirect socio-pragmatic transfers from Danish to Danish English. This is a remarkable finding in itself, mainly because neither the British nor the Russian respondents made any notable use of the permissive constructions. This, in turn, may have important implications for further research in Danish requesting behaviour, allowing further disclosure of distinct features of the Danish 'cultural DNA'. Notably, it might be interesting to examine whether this pronounced readiness to help others is also present in equal status situations.

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8 By the term 'covert', I do not refer to linguistic forms as such but to the influence a mother tongue can have on ELF, e.g. the influence of a grammatical category in L1 on L2 that does not have this category.

5.2. The Window situation

Scenario	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social Distance
Window	Prohibition	Formal	Boss	Hearer	Some/Great

Since the analysis of requests in terms of the SAP-model has been presented in detail in the previous sections, in the following, I shall skip the individual analyses of the BED, the RED, and the DED and proceed directly to the interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses. First, I shall start by looking at the results for decision models in the ELFD and the MTD in cross-cultural and interlanguage terms. Subsequently, I shall present the categories of the pragmatic wheel that emerged during the analysis in order to determine the respondents' assessment of the situation at hand. Third, I shall address the issue of linguistic transfers from mother tongue to ELF by including the results for the adverb *please* in the ELFD and the MTD. Last, I shall present possible reasons for the lack of correspondence between the findings for the MTD and the ELFD.

5.2.1. Cross-cultural, interlanguage, and intralanguage analyses of the ELFD and the MTD

5.2.1.1. On decision models

First of all, I shall consider the interlanguage results in order to discover any similarities or differences in the performance of prohibitive speech acts by the native speakers of English on the one hand, and the Russian and Danish speakers of ELF, on the other hand. This will be done by considering the employment of the 'solving-a-problem', 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem', and 'stating-a-problem' decision models in [40]. It should be borne in mind that the total number of decision models in the tables below does not coincide with the actual number of respondents, as some of them have taken several tours in the pragmatic wheel (see the attached Excel-file 2. 1-3).

(a) There is some interlanguage agreement between the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs i.e., high levels of employing the imperative frame.

(b) There is some interlanguage agreement across the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs, that is, moderate levels of employing the declarative sentence structure.

(c) There is some interlanguage variation in the choice of the imperative frame between the ENSs, on the one hand, and the RESs and the DESs, on the other. Relatively higher levels of the imperative frame are licensed with the ENSs than with the two other groups.

(d) There are high levels of cross-cultural agreement in the application of the imperative frame between the RESs and the DESs.

(e) There are high levels of cross-cultural agreement in the application of the declarative frame between the RESs and the DESs.

(f) There is a high level of interlanguage agreement across the three groups in that none of the participants in the ESPTs made use of the interrogative frame.

[40]

Despite the general interlanguage agreement across the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs for the application of the three decision models, as can be observed from [40], the ENSs appeared to be the only group who showed an overwhelming preference for the imperative frame. This is an interesting finding because, according to research to hypothesis I, the British were anticipated to give preference to declarative structures, which in the traditional approach to requests are considered to be less direct than the bald on-record strategies. This unexpected finding will be considered more closely in section 5.2.1.2.2.

In terms of cross-cultural findings, the results in [40] present high levels of cross-cultural agreement between the RESs and the DESs in the choice of the imperative frame as well as some cross-cultural agreement between these two groups, with the DESs scoring a bit higher on the declarative sentence structure than the RESs. In hypothesis II, it was predicted that the Danish and the Russian

speakers would prefer the imperative form, but I had expected them to employ it to a larger degree than [40] actually displays.

Nevertheless, it is also necessary to see whether my expectations are true for the results for the MTD. Consider the findings for the decision models below (the BED is included for the sake of a fuller picture):

[41]

Most strikingly, in contrast with the ENSs, the RMTSs and the DMTSs appeared to prefer the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. This is a highly unexpected finding and does not support research hypothesis II, according to which both the Russians and the Danish were anticipated to give preference to the imperative form. In this light, therefore, no direct transfer of syntactic structures from Russian into Russian English, on the one hand, and Danish into Danish English, on the other hand, can be observed from comparing [41] to [40]. However, before I can consider the possible reasons for the obvious lack of correspondence between my research hypotheses and actual findings, it is necessary to take a closer look at the categories of the pragmatic wheel.

5.2.1.2. Interlanguage variation in the assessment of the Window situation

In the following three sections, I shall address the issue of the assessment of the scenario at hand by the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs mainly by drawing on the interlanguage results for the realisation of the categories within the pragmatic wheel in [42]:

[42]

Within the pragmatic wheel (the ELFD)

5.2.1.2.1. The category of imperative

The category of *imperative* in [42] appeared in many cases to surface in the form of the prohibitive constructions that are not used to stop a state of affairs, but rather to see to it that it does not start, e.g. *Stop, Hang on, Wait, Walk away, Leave that,* etc. (see the attached Excel-document II. 1-3).

Within the IF-framework, these prohibitive constructions could formally stand for Necessity or Obligation. This is because, in contrast to Russian, the distinction between alethic and deontic modality is not grammaticalised in English, thereby making these imperatives ambiguous with respect to the pre-conditions. Nor are these imperative utterances explicit with respect to the post-conditions as they can imply Order, Warning, or Caution (see Durst-Andersen, 1995:614). However, neither of the two readings of the non-negated imperative construction seems to match the conditions of the Window situation. While in the case of Obligation the speaker *dictates* her conditions in order to remove the obstacle (in casu the hearer does not desire the state), with Necessity she simply removes the obstacle (in casu the hearer does not desire to assist the speaker) by *describing* the necessary state. Nevertheless, both have in common that the speaker desires a change in the world, which she achieves by describing or removing the obstacle.

The Window scenario, however, is designed within conditions that do not involve a change in the world. The speaker desires the window to stay closed and in order to keep the world as it is, she establishes a verbal obstacle by asking the hearer not to realise the prohibited state. In the case of the given imperatives, however, the fact that the hearer intends to open the window simply because he is not aware of it being out of order and of the danger ensuing from opening it might be the speak-

er's warrant for warning the hearer about the undesired state, i.e. 'the window is open'. Hence, even though we are dealing here with non-negated imperatives, their post-conditions appear to instantiate a Warning, rather than an Order, i.e. a warning against the change in the world, which may lead to undesired and unnecessary repercussions.

Unfortunately, the IF does not provide the answer to this question in that it basically construes the function of an utterance in terms of its form (see [3.3] & [3.4]). I therefore had to search for the solution to the puzzle elsewhere. In Xrakovskij (2001:37-40; 69), we find a classification of prohibitive constructions, according to which there are non-negated imperative constructions and markers that are used for warnings, also called 'admonitives' and 'preventives', i.e. a situation where the speaker wants to prevent the hearer from realising a state of affairs. Interestingly, Xrakovskij (2001) classifies these non-negated imperative forms as a subclass of prohibitives, e.g. constructions with verbs like *stop, prevent,* and *abstain*. I am inclined to adopt this account, notably because the Window situation is designed according to the set of conditions that match a situation description where the speaker wants to prevent a future state of affairs from taking place. After having considered the options, in the present study it was eventually decided to render communicative events involving (1) non-negated imperative constructions like *Stop, Hang on,* or *Wait* alone, or (2) those exhibiting the latter together with negated imperative utterances in terms of Prohibition. Consider illustrative examples below (see the attached Excel-document II.3):

[43]

> *P113: ***Whoa whoa hold on*** *!*
>
> *P113: *That window's broken .*
>
> *P113: *If you open that .*
>
> *P113: *It's gonna fall out .*

In [43], the speaker prevents the hearer from opening the window by issuing Prohibition by means of the non-negated imperative utterance *Whoa whoa hold on.* Its reading in terms of Prohibition relates to the argument discussed above, namely that non-negated imperatives can sometimes function as prohibitions if the speaker wants to terminate the action already in progress (ibid., 69) or to prevent the future state of affairs from happening by warning the hearer about undesired repercussions. Moreover, despite the fact that Prohibition is described as a negated prescriptive frame in the IF (see [3.2]), the utterance *That window's broken*, which is analysed here as the speaker's post-conditions and obviously conveys the meaning of *warning*, seems to support the reading of the entire communicative event in [43] in terms of Prohibition.

Consider the paraphrase of *That window's broken*:

> 'I hereby warn you that if you realise your intention and open the window, you will cause some damage.'

Yet, in most cases, the non-negated imperative utterances were supplemented with the negated ones (see the attached Excel-document II. 1-3):

[44]

> *P115**: Hold on !**
>
> *P115: *The window's broken .*
>
> *P115: **Don't touch it !**
>
> *P115: *We'll just have to cope with the heat .*

In [44], the speaker follows his initial warning with *The window is broken*, which either serves as a *motivation* for issuing Prohibition proper *Don't touch it!* or functions as a *justification* of employing the prohibitive speech act *Hold on!* – depending on the where one places the borderline between the turns. In either case, *The window is broken* functions as a deontic source that determines the reading of the communicative event in [44] as Prohibition. This is because English does not grammatically distinguish between the alethic and deontic modality, and such negated imperatives as *Don't touch it* are ambiguous with respect to their modal reading, i.e. they can instantiate both Prohibition and Cancellation of obligation (see Durst-Andersen, 1995:648f). In my view, it is, among other things, the nature of the deontic source in [44] that determines the reading of the whole communicative event as Prohibition.

And yet, the ELFD revealed a few examples of non-negated imperative constructions that differ from those discussed above by virtue of having Non-necessity (called negated Possibility in Durst-Andersen (1995)) rather than Prohibition as its pre-conditions. This is so because, in the IF, Non-necessity is the only frame where the speaker asks the hearer to do something so that the possible state is not realised (see [3.4]). Consider the example below (see the attached Excel-document II.2):

[45]

> *P74: *Boss !*
>
> *P74: **Please be careful !**
>
> *P74: *The window is broken .*

*P74: *It actually may fall all out if you open it .*

In [45], the speaker prevents the hearer from opening the window by issuing Non-necessity *Please be careful!* in lieu of the anticipated Prohibition.

'I hereby tell you that it is possible for you to be in danger.'

Moreover, even though the post-conditions in [45], *The window is broken,* represent an identical linguistic realisation as the one in [43], it seems to function here as a more polite Caution rather than Warning, presumably due to the Head Act with the help of which the speaker satisfies the hearer's pre-conditions. That is, assuming *Please be careful!* in [45] has Possibility as its pre-conditions, viz. Possibility—Request—Caution (see [3.2]), then it will have a less coercive effect on the hearer mainly becuase according to [3.4] it *de*scribes rather than *pre*scribes the undesired state, which the hearer is unaware of. Consider the paraphrase of *The window is broken* as Caution below:

'I hereby tell you that if you don't follow my request, it is possible for you to
 be in an unnecessary and undesired state.'

In other words, in [45] the speaker does not establish an obstacle for the hearer on his way to realise the state of affairs, but simply describes the possibility for the hearer to end up in an unnecessary and undesired state if he does not follow the speaker's request.

Interestingly, Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009: I.33–I.35) provides several situations involving Non-necessity which exhibit non-negated imperative structures like *Watch out*, *Take care*, *Be careful, etc.*, and caution markers such as *Careful, Caution, Danger, Alert*, etc., which are not followed by the negated imperative of the form 'Don't…!'.

Hence, even though the IF construes Non-necessity as a negated frame, the study at hand analyses non-negated imperatives like [45] in terms of Non-necessity, notably because they have Non-necessity (also Possibility) as their pre-conditions and Caution as their post-conditions.

Thus table [46] below presents the overall results for the ELFD for the number of communicative events containing (1) non-negated imperatives alone functioning as Non-necessity, (2) non-negated imperatives functioning as Prohibition, and finally (3) both non-negated and negated imperatives, overall rendered in terms of Prohibition.

[46]

	Non-necessity	Prohibition (Non-negated imp.)	Prohibition ((Non-negated) + negated imp.)	Communicative events in all
British	0	4	18	22
Russians	0	2	17	19
Danes	3	4	11	18

As can be clearly seen from [46], in most cases the participants of the ESPTs preferred prohibitive constructions proper, i.e. those with the negated imperative. Regarding communicative events involving Non-necessity, the DESs appeared to be the only group that exhibited three of its instances out of in all 18 communicative events containing the imperative form.

5.2.1.2.2. *On deontic source*

I could conclude the discussion of the category of the *imperative* above by claiming that there is a high level of interlanguage agreement across the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs in perceiving the scenario at hand in terms of Prohibition. However, it would not be prudent to make any conclusive suggestions about the respondents' assessments of the Window scenario without considering the issue of deontic source.

As has been mentioned in section 3.5.6.3, the deontic / alethic source surfaces in the form of the categories of *motivation* and *justification*, both of which should be understood as the rationale behind producing a request. While the deontic source is linked to the frames based on deontic modality (i.e. Permission, Prohibition, Obligation, and Cancellation of obligation), the alethic source goes with the alethic frames (i.e. Possibility, Impossibility, Necessity, and Non-necessity). Since the Window scenario was designed within the frame involving Prohibition, I shall consider the two above-mentioned categories in terms of the deontic source.

[47]

As can be clearly seen from [47], the number of instances of the category of *motivation* is too small to draw any meaningful conclusions. As far as its functional counterpart, *justification*, is concerned, the analysis revealed a range of utterances that syntactically can be both *warning* and *justification*. Thus, many of these linguistic realisations have been construed in terms of *warning* (the subcategory of obedience conditions), *justification*, or both. Some of the instances allowed a straightforward rendering in terms of *warning* (see [48]). However, the ELFD also contains ambiguous utterances, which seem to license both readings (see [49]).

[48]

> *P98: *Boss !*
>
> *P98: *Don't open the window .*
>
> *P98: **It will fall out .***
>
> *P98: *It's pretty dangerous .*

In [48], it seems reasonable to construe *It will fall out* in terms of *warning*:

> 'I hereby tell you that if you realise your intention, it is possible for the window to be on the ground.'

whereas *It's pretty dangerous* can be said to provide a further justification of the warning, hence the paraphrase:

> 'I hereby tell you that if you realise your intention, somebody will be hurt.'

At the same time, there are examples where, from the perspective of sentential grammar, the same utterance, *It will fall out*, is rendered as the justification for the preceding warning:

 [49]

> *P99: *Don't open that window !*
>
> *P99: *It's broken .*
>
> *P99: **It'll fall out .***

And still, there are cases where, for instance, *It's broken* is analysed in terms of *justification*, which is mainly licensed by the conjunction *because* (see the attached Excel-file II.1):

[50]

> *P11: *Please don't open it .*
>
> *P11: **Because it's broken .***

In order to avoid these ambiguous readings, I have therefore decided to treat the instances of *warning* and *justification* in the Window situation under a combined heading (see [47]) rather than separate headings. The two categories appear to be very similar in that, without exception, their linguistic realisations for the Window situation seem to provide a deontic source that justifies issuing Prohibition.

 It must be pointed out that my analysis of these instances in terms of *warning / justification* does not exclude other possible and reasonable ways of construing them. And yet, the present study revealed that the participants of the ESPTs largely employed the category of *warning* than *justification* (see the attached Excel-documents II.1, II.2, & II.3):

 [51]

	Warning	Justification	In all
British	25	7	32
Russians	15	11	26
Danes	20	5	25

Since *warnings* appear to be part of the deontic frame involving Prohibition (see [3.2]), the findings in [51] seem to support the conclusions in [46], namely that the majority of the imperative constructions in the ELFD render a prohibitive reading.

5.2.1.2.3. Satisfaction conditions

The last issue that needs to be considered with respect to the interlanguage assessment of the frame behind the Window situation is the category of *satisfaction conditions* (see [42] above).

First of all, it is important to repeat that the English modal *can* is ambiguous in terms of its modal affiliation, which is why it was not possible to determine whether the declarative utterances with *cannot* instantiated deontic Prohibition or alethic Impossibility. Consider the example (see the attached Excel-document II.3):

[52]

> *P110: *The window's broken* .
>
> *P110: ***Can't open it*** .

The ELFD revealed the largest number of the declarative utterances like [52], which obviously has a less coercive effect on the hearer than the prohibitive *mustn't*.

On the other hand, the ELFD exhibited a number of utterances, such as *No!*, which used to initiate a communicative event containing a negative imperative. Most importantly, the negative particle *no* seems to underpin a prohibitive reading of the whole communicative event. Notably, in Xrakovskij's (2001) classification of prohibitives, the negative particle *no* is construed in terms of the prohibitive marker.

In the present paper, the utterances like *No no no!* in [53] are construed as the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model in that syntactically they represent neither the 'solving-a-problem' decision model, nor the 'stating-a-problem' decision model. Yet, by the same token as *You're welcome* these utterances allow three different reading within the pragmatic wheel, namely those of Symptom (*speaker's acceptance*), Signal (*satisfaction conditions*), and Model (in casu, *warning*). Let me illustrate the point in the example from the BED (see Appendix VII):

[53]

Communicative event	Paraphrase of 'No no no!'
• *P107: *No no no !* • *P107: Don't touch the window . • *P107: if you do that . • *P107: It'll fall out .	• Symptom: 'I hereby say that I do no accept /desire a new situation.' • Signal: 'I hereby make it impossibl for you to produce the activity.' • Model: 'I hereby make you know that if you don't do what I say, the you will cause some damage.'

Moreover, the analysis revealed a few cases of a 'reversed' Prohibition, as in [54], obviously functioning as an indirect, and hence more polite, way of preventing the hearer from opening the window.

[54]

> *P5: *Please don't open it !*
>
> *P5: *It'll just fall down .*
>
> *P5: **We can open the door .***
>
> *P5: *But don't touch the window .*

Ironically, the ELFD revealed only one communicative event with the modal verb *must*, which, according to the IF-approach, licences the prohibitive reading of a request:

[55]

> *P112: *I know it's hot in here .*
>
> *P112: *But please don't touch the window .*
>
> *P112: *It's broken .*
>
> *P112: *If you touch it .*
>
> *P112: *It will end up on the floor and damage somebody perhaps .*
>
> *P112: **So you mustn't touch it .***

As far as the last example is concerned, by employing a declarative sentence with the modal *must* the speaker is claimed to adopt the 'objective' voice of society and speak with the third-person voice, as it were (see Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009: 83ff).

Besides expressing prohibition by means of the negative particle *no* and the negative modal *must*, the sample revealed an instance of a performative prohibitive construction ([56]) in the RED and a curious example of a passive prohibitive construction ([57]) in the DED (see the attached Excel-doc-

ument II.1 & II.2):

[56]

> *P24: *Mr Carlsson* .
>
> *P24: ***I kindly ask you to not [!] open the window*** .
>
> *P24: *Because it would be damaged* .

[57]

> *P64: *Sorry* .
>
> *P64: *This one is broken* .
>
> *P64: ***It's not meant to be opened*** .
>
> *P64: *I don't know who forgot to put a sign on it* .
>
> *P64: *but we'll take care of that* .

[57] is particularly noteworthy in that the speaker seems to issue a prohibition indirectly on the basis of a particular set of rules, rather than her subjective judgement of the hearer's intentions. In this respect, [57] is similar to [55] in that P64 likewise seems to verbalise Prohibition by adopting the objective 'voice of society' and to prohibit her boss from opening the window on behalf of the entire society (see similar examples from the RMTD in [68] & [69]).

All in all, the participants of the ESPTs seemed to avoid the prohibitive declarative sentence form, giving preference to requests involving less imposing and hence more polite Possibility and Impossibility. Consider the overall results for the category of *satisfaction conditions* realised syntactically in the form of a declarative sentence structure and pragmatically in the form of various prescriptive and descriptive frames:

[58]

	Prohibition	Impossibility	Necessity	Possibility	Non-obligation	Declarative utterances in all
British	4	5	1			10
Russians	1	1		4	2	8
Danes	1	5	2	1	1	10

5.2.1.2.4. Final remarks on the interlanguage assessment of the Window situation

In summing up, the results of the category of *satisfaction conditions* with the ENSs, RESs, and the DESs were too diverse and sparse to draw any definite conclusions with regard to the interlanguage assessment of the imperative frame behind the Window scenario. Nevertheless, the analysis revealed a slight tendency among the respondents of the ESPTs to prefer describing the impossible state or proposing an alternative possibility to the solution of a problem rather than prohibiting the hearer from carrying out the act.

On the other hand, the analysis of the category of *imperative* clearly showed that most of the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs favoured the negated imperative construction standing for Prohibition. Even though the sample at hand is too small to draw any definite conclusions, the fact that imperative sentence structures on the whole outnumbered declarative ones ([42]) seems to be a reasonable justification for concluding that most of the respondents participating in the ELFTs assessed the Window situation in terms of Prohibition.

5.2.1.3. Cross-cultural variation in the assessment of the Window situation

The analysis of the cross-cultural results in the perception of the Window scenario by the Russian and Danish speakers will be undertaken in a fashion similar to that of the interlanguage results in the previous section.

In contrast to the RESs and DESs, both the RMTSs and the DMTSs strongly favoured the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. Thus, in order to discover the respondents' assessments of the situation at hand, we shall have to focus on the linguistic realisations of the imperative and declarative frames in [41] in terms of the categories of *the imperative* and *satisfaction conditions*.

[59]

5.2.1.3.1. The category of the imperative

The analysis of the RMTD in [59] revealed 13 instances of the imperative frame, all of which were realised in the form of the category of the *imperative*. Given the existence of the category of aspect in Russian, we shall have to consider them with respect to the imperfective or the perfective aspect of the verb. While the former is linked to deontic modality, in casu instantiating the speech act of Prohibition, the latter goes with alethic modality, in casu instantiating Possibility. And yet, the RMTD disclosed both a number of perfective non-negated imperatives usually introducing the communicative event as in [60] and a number of imperfective non-negated imperatives, as in [61] (see the attached Excel-document II.4).

[60]

> *P40: ***Stojte !***
> *P40: 'Stop (IPFV)!'
>
> *P40: *Okno slomano !*
> *P40: 'The window is broken!'
>
> *P40: *Ne trogajte ego !*
> *P40: 'Do not touch it!'

As already mentioned in section 2.4, the non-negated imperfective imperatives in Russian can either stand for the imperative frame involving Permission or Obligation (see [2.15]). Neither of them,

however, seems to match the conditions for the Window scenario, especially considering the fact that Permission will normally go with positive post-conditions, such as Compensation, whereas Obligation is inseparable from negative post-conditions, normally realised in the form of Threat. However, all the instances of the non-negated imperfective imperatives are accompanied by the deontic source in the form of a Warning. Furthermore, neither Permission nor Obligation is described by Durst-Andersen (2009) in terms of preserving the world as it is (see [3.4]).

Moreover, when dealing with [60] and similar cases, it is utterly important to bear in mind the idea that the speaker can take several turns in the pragmatic wheel and her request can therefore contain several speech acts. However, the boundary between the turns is not clear, which leads to the possibility of two different interpretations. The request in [60] consists of two separate turns by virtue of the two imperative utterances or the so-called 'Head Acts'. My point here is that *Okno slomano* can be analysed as *obedience conditions* (viz. *warning*) following the imperative *Stojte*, or it can be seen in terms of *motivation*, which functions as a 'key' to issuing Prohibition *Ne trogajte ego*. In other words, the idea of taking turns makes the analysis less straightforward than one could wish it to be. My basis for analysing *Okno slomano* as a *warning / justification* is predicated on my decision to put the boundary between the two turns in [60] before *Ne trogajte ego*.

As far as the perfective non-negated imperatives are concerned, within Durst-Andersen's 1995 framework they would be described in terms of Necessity. Yet, as has already been mentioned in section 5.2.1.2.1, the conditions for the situation at hand do not fit in within the imperative frame involving Necessity. Inasmuch as the IF does not provide a description of an imperative frame that would match the linguistic reactions to the Window situation, I decided to follow Xrakovskij (2001) and treat both the non-negated imperfective and perfective instances of imperative constructions in terms of Prohibition, especially because their *obedience conditions* usually surfaced in the form of a *warning*. Consider, for example, a communicative event with the non-negated perfective imperative, where *Okno slomano !* exemplifies the post-conditions in the form of *warning*:

[61]

        *P28: ***Ostanovites'*** *požalujsta !*
        *P28: 'Stop (PFV) please!'

        *P28: *Okno slomano .*
        *P28: 'The window is broken.'

*P28: *Možet upast' .*

*P28: 'It may fall out.'

Regarding the instances of negated imperative utterances, all without exception exemplify Prohibition proper by virtue of involving imperfective imperatives (see the attached Excel-document II.4):

[62]

*P34: *Ivan Ivanyč okno slomano .*

*P34: 'Ivan Ivanych the window is broken.'

*P34: ***Ne trogajte ego požalujsta .***

*P34: 'Do not touch (IPFV) it, please.'

Still, there is one instance, similar to [45] above, in which the speaker does not establish an obstacle for the hearer on his way to carry out an act, but simply describes the possibility for him to end up in an unnecessary and undesired state if he does not follow the speaker's request. Notably, the request in [63] seems to have *caution* rather *warning* as its obedience conditions, and is consequently rendered in terms of the alethic imperative frame involving Non-necessity, ergo negated Possibility—Request—Caution (see [3.2]):

[63]

*P50: ***Bud'te ostorožny !***

*P50: 'Be careful!'

*P50: *Delo v tom čto okno slomano .*

*P50: 'The thing is that the window is broken.'

*P50: *Možet proizojti kakoj_nibud' kazus .*

*P50: 'An incident can occur.'

In order to get a clear picture of the category of *imperative* with respect to the assessment of the scenario in question by the RMTSs, it is worthwhile considering the number of the imperatives utterances exemplifying: (1) negated imperatives alone issuing Prohibition proper; (2) non-negated imperatives alone or in combination with negated imperatives, also licensing Prohibition; and (3) non-negated imperatives rendering Non-necessity:

[64]

Prohibition proper negated imp. alone	Prohibition non-negated	Non-necessity	Imperative utterances in all
4	8	1	13

The table [64] demonstrates that in most cases the Russian speakers issued Prohibition by means of a non-negated imperative sentence form, instead of the anticipated negated imperative construction (see [3.4]). This is an interesting finding, which is presumably related to the design of the Window situation, i.e. the speaker wants to prevent a future state of affairs. However, the sample is too small to permit any definite conclusions concerning the respondents' verbal reactions to the Window situation.

Concerning the DMTD, as can be seen from [59], there are 14 instances of the imperative frame, surfacing in form of the category of the *imperative*. Intriguingly, the sample reveals only one instance of the negated imperative, which, according to Garbacz & Johannessen (2013), appears to be ungrammatical by virtue of the negative particle *ikke* for 'not' preceding the finite verb (see the attached Excel-document II.5):

[65]

*P84: *Chef Chef !*
*P84: 'Boss boss!'

*P84: ***Ikke åbne det vindue !***
*P84: 'Don't open that window!'

*P84: *Det er i stykker !*
*P84: 'It is broken!'

As far as the rest of the imperative utterances is concerned, [66] demonstrates an almost equal distribution between non-negated imperatives issuing Prohibition and non-negated imperatives expressing Non-necessity.

[66]

Prohibition negated imperative	Prohibition non-negated imperative	Non-necessity non-negated imperative	Imperative utterances in all
1	6	7	14

As can be observed from [66], the Danish speakers preferred to verbalise Non-necessity, which can be illustrated by the following example from the DMTD (see the attached Excel-file II.5):

[67]

  *P86: **Pas lige på**!
  *P86: 'Just be careful!'

  *P86: *Vinduet det er I stykker !*
  *P86: 'The window it is broken!'

  *P86: *Altså lad os prøve at se om vi ikke kan åbne døren i stedet for .*
  *P86: 'I mean let's see if we can open the door instead of.'

  *P86: *Eller så lad os lige holde fem minutter for at lufte ud .*
  *P86: 'Alternatively let's just take a five-minute break and air the room.'

It is worth mentioning that, in contrast to Russian, where the distinction between the alethic and deontic modality is directly linked to the distinction between the perfective and imperfective aspect, Danish can distinguish between the two modalities by means of particles (see section 2.1.3.4).

The DMTD revealed two instances of the imperative utterance with the particle *lige* and one example of the particle *nu* (see the attached Excel-document II.5). According to Durst-Andersen (1995:636ff), the former licenses the imperative frame involving Possibility, and the latter goes with Necessity. As already mentioned above, neither seems to match the Window situation, where the hearer is unaware of the danger that may result from opening the window (see the description of conditions for Possibility in [3.2] and [3.3] and Necessity in [3.2] and [3.4]). It is nevertheless the affiliation of these two particles with the alethic modality that supports the polite or neutral reading of the whole request, which I construe in terms of the alethic descriptive Non-necessity.

However, given the size of the DMTD as well as the fact that the other half of the imperative

utterances is represented by speech acts representing Prohibition, it does not seem possible to make any claims about the DMTSs' assessment of the situation. We shall, therefore, also have to take into account the results for the category of *satisfaction conditions*.

5.2.1.3.2. Satisfaction conditions

Dealing with the RMTD in terms of the declarative frames, I found only one out of 19 cases in [59] of the category of *satisfaction conditions* instantiating Prohibition with the adverb *nel'zja*, which corresponds to the English negative form of the modal verb *must* and its past participle form *be allowed* (see the attached Excel-document II.4):

[68]

> *P29: *Ivan Ivanyč ostorožno !*
> *P29: 'Be careful Ivan Ivanych!'
>
> *P29: *Éto okno slomano .*
> *P29: 'This window is broken.'
>
> *P29: ***Ego nel'zja otkryvat' .***
> *P29: 'It is not allowed to open it.'

In [68], P29 issues Prohibition by opting for the predicative construction with the imperfective infinitive 'nel'zja + infinitive (IPFV)', which would correspond to the English 'not allowed + infinitive'. Interestingly, the highlighted utterance in [68] instantiates an impersonal sentence in Russian, i.e. its nominal element *ego* is in the accusative case:

[69]

Ego	nel'zja	otkryvat'.
It-ACC	must not-PROH-adverb	open-IPFV-INF

'It is not allowed to open (it).'

This impersonal sentence with the infinitive compound predicate allows P29 to issue Prohibition by adopting the objective 'voice of society' and to prohibit her boss from opening the window on behalf of the entire speech community (see section 3.3 on the infinitive in Russian). Intriguingly, Arnsberg and Bentsen (2000:83ff) also found that Danish respondents applied the modal verbs *must*

and *have to* in situations involving Prohibition. In their view, this allowed the respondents to avoid being an agent of the face-threatening act of Prohibition and instead refer to the norms of society.

As for the rest of the declarative utterances in the RMTD, most of them were the cases of the alethic descriptive Non-necessity. Consider an example (see the attached Excel-document II.4):

[70]

> *P32: ***Ostorožno !***
> *P32: '(Be) careful (adv.)!'
>
> *P32: *Ono ne ispravleno .*
> *P32: 'It is broken.'

Still, the overall results of the declarative sentence form among the Russian speakers in [71] are too diverse for us to make any consistent suggestions as to the Russians' assessment of the Window situation (see the attached Excel-document II.4):

[71]

Prohibition	Impossi-bility	Necessity	Possibility	Non-obligation	Non-necessity	Declarative utterances in all
3	2	3	3	3	5	19

The DMTD revealed the largest number of instances of the category of *satisfaction conditions* in [59]. Interestingly, most instantiated prohibitive declaratives, comprising declarative constructions with the negative modal verb *må*, corresponding to English 'must', and declarative sentences with the prohibitive marker *nej* (cf. Xrakovskij, 2001), corresponding to English *no*:

[72]

> *P77: ***Nej for guds skyld !***
> *P77: 'No for god's sake!'
>
> *P77: ***Du må ikke åbne vinduet** !*
> *P77: 'You must not open the window!'
>
> *P77: *Så falder det ud .*

*P77: 'As it will fall out.'

*P77: *Det er ødelagt .*
*P77: 'It is broken.'

*P77: *Det er i stykker .*
*P77: 'It is out of order.'

*P77: **Vi må holde varmen ud .**
*P77: 'We have to endure the heat.'

*P77: **Åbne døren .**
*P77: 'Open the door.'

[72] is a representative example of the communicative event, where the speaker takes several turns in the pragmatic wheel. The speaker could have accomplished her request by uttering *Nej!* alone. Still, P77 takes another turn in the form of Prohibition, consisting of the category of satisfaction conditions *Du må ikke åbne vinduet!* and the following *warning / justification.* It is necessary to remember that, by employing a negative auxiliary construction with *m*å, the speaker can issue a prohibition by referring to the norms of society. In the third turn in the pragmatic wheel, P77 comes up with an alternative proposal to the solution of the problem, surfacing in the form of Necessity, *Vi må holde varmen ud,* åbne *døren.*

Overall, the analysis of the category of *satisfaction conditions* with the Danish speakers revealed the following results (see the attached Excel-document II.5):

[73]

Prohibition (with 'no')	Prohibition (with 'must + not')	Possibility	Necessity	Impossibility	Declarative utterances in all
5	7	1	2	3	18

5.2.1.3.3. Final remarks on the cross-cultural assessment of the Window situation

Let us now summarise the findings for the two mother tongue data sets in terms of the respondents' assessment of the Window situation. Regarding the use of the category of the *imperative* realised in the form of the imperative utterances, the Russian speakers appeared to largely employ a non-negated imperative sentence form, which in the study at hand is construed in terms of Prohibition. The findings for the Danish speakers, however, appeared to be inconclusive with respect to which type of request was prevalent.

According to the Russian results for the category of *satisfaction conditions*, most of the respondents made use of the speech act of Non-necessity (see [71]), whereas most of the Danes verbalised the speech act of Prohibition (see [73]).

Even though the MTD is too small to allow us to draw any meaningful conclusions about the cross-cultural assessment of the Window situation, there is a relatively clear tendency among both the RMTSs and the DMTSs to perceive the situation in question in terms of Prohibition. While the former appeared to employ prohibitive speech acts with the imperative utterance, the latter issued Prohibition with the help of the declarative sentence form.

Whatever sparse they are, these findings are important with respect to the cross-cultural assessment of the given scenario and likewise, the research hypothesis concerning linguistic transfers from mother tongue to ELF, which I shall address in section 5.2.2.

5.2.1.4. The interlanguage and cross-cultural variation in 'please' in the ELFD and the MTD

The ELFD exhibited a large number of occurrences of the English adverb *please*, whereas there were very few instances of *please* in the MTD:

[74]

The distribution of please (ELFD & MTD)

As can been observed from [74], there is a high level of interlanguage agreement among the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs on the use of *please* when it functions as the *speaker's acceptance Signal*. Consider the following example (see the attached Excel-document II.2):

[75]

> *P72: **Please** [!] don't open the window !
> *P72: If we do .
> *P72: It falls out .

The functional realisation of *please* in [75] can be summarised as the following paraphrase:

'I hereby make you know that I want you to be cooperative.'

By using *please* with prohibitive speech acts in English, it obviously functions as a Signal to the hearer to be cooperative, rather than a Symptom of the speaker's in casu *non-acceptance* of the new situation. Interestingly, the adverb was very frequent with non-native speakers, whereas the ENSs rarely used it. This is a notable funding, especially since the native speakers of English were expected to employ the token *please* together with a negative imperative more frequently (see Aijmer, 1996:182ff). Although the sample is small, it seems plausible that a high level of danger ensuing from opening the window in the situation at hand may eventually override the need for being polite. Nevertheless, the RESs and the DESs made frequent use of it along with negative imperatives. Could it be the result of linguistic transfer from mother tongue into ELF?

Ironically, while the RMTD revealed just two instances of *please*, no occurrences were found in the DMTD (see table [74] above). As far as the former is concerned, the adverb occurred in the function of *compensation*, given its syntactically post-imperative position within the communicative event (see section 3.5.5.3.1.1). Consider this example (see the attached Excel-document II.4):

[76]

> *P34: *Ivan Ivanyč okno slomano .*
> *P34: 'Ivan Ivanych the window is broken.'
>
> *P34: *Ne trogajte ego **požalujsta** .*
> *P34: 'Do not touch it *please*.'

This is an important finding in that it indicates a considerably high level of cross-cultural agree-

ment between the RMTSs and the DMTSs. Both showed a clear tendency of refraining from employing the adverb *please* together with negated imperatives in situations involving an element of risk or danger.

Accordingly, the high percentage of *please* in the ELFD in [74] cannot be explained in terms of the linguistic transfer from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English. In this respect, therefore, I am inclined to explain this finding in terms similar to those of the Trolley situation. More specifically, both the RESs and the DESs were found to make extensive use of the declarative sentence form in the Trolley scenario, which I ascribed to the lack of pragma-linguistic competence in English. By the same token, I argue that the results in [74] can be explained as a consequence of the fact that Russian and Danish speakers do not master the private voice of English, and, in order to be on 'safe ground' with respect to politeness, they opt for the internal mitigating device in the form of the token *please.*

5.2.2.   On the lack of convergence between research hypotheses and the findings

Finally, I here wish to address the issue of the lacking correspondence between the research hypotheses and the findings. In the case of hypothesis I, the majority of the ENSs appeared to employ direct requesting strategies in the form of imperative utterances with the Window situation (see [40]) instead of the anticipated more indirect declarative ones. What could be the reason for this incongruence? To answer this question, I shall consider the linguistic realisations of the categories of *obedience conditions* and *justification* in relation to the design of the scenario.

As has been mentioned in section 3.5.5.3.1.2, both *warnings* and *threats* are subcategories of *sanctions.* However, in contrast to impolite *threats*, where the speaker attempts to secure obedience by promising a penalty, *warnings* would appear to have less impolite overtones than *threats.* This is mainly a result of the fact that by framing her conditions to the hearer, the speaker does not 'demand' obedience, but merely 'informs' the hearer about undesirable consequences that may follow from not acting on her request. Furthermore, the speaker, in actual fact, does the hearer a favour by preventing the undesired and even dangerous outcome. The following example will serve as illustration (see the attached Excel-document II.3):

[77]

> *P111: *Excuse me .*
> *P111: *Don't touch that window .*
> *P111: ***It's quite important it's not touched .***
> *P111: ***Because it's broken and it'll fall and hurt somebody*** .

Interestingly, Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009:84) provide a similar account of the widespread occurrence of on-record directives with Danish respondents, who, in a prohibitive situation with an asymmetrical power relationship, justified their face-threatening act by 'masking Prohibition under Warning' (my translation).

In all probability, it is the design of the Window situation in terms of impending danger that overrides the speaker's need to pay attention to the hearer's positive / negative face in the form of such mitigating devices as the use of the token *please* and tuners (cf. Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2000:83), etc. The BED indeed revealed a very small number of tuners and *please* (see the attached Excel-document II.3). Even the cases of non-negated imperative constructions like *Stop / Wait / Leave it* etc. that are regarded as highly face-threatening on their own with respect to the post-conditions (i.e. *order*; see also Devos & Van Olmen, 2013:31ff), do not seem to have an impolite or imposing effect on the hearer in the scenario at hand, simply because, without exception, all respondents of the SPTs framed the post-conditions of the requests in terms of *warning / justification.*

As far as research hypothesis II is concerned, both the RMTSs and the DMTSs appeared to largely employ the declarative utterance rather than the expected imperative sentence form ([41]). In the case of the former, none of the respondents issued Prohibition by using second person singular imperatives. Strikingly, most of them opted for lexical forms of prohibitive cautions, such as *ostorož*no for 'careful', *akkuratnee* for 'more cautiously'. Within the present analytical framework, I interpret these instances in terms of alethic Non-necessity rather than deontic Prohibition, notably because none of the instances in the RMTD were followed by *warnings* or *threats,* but rather more polite *cautions.*

In other words, the RMTD did not confirm research hypothesis II in that most RMTSs appeared to prefer solving the problem indirectly by employing the more polite Non-necessity rather than issuing Prohibition in the form of the negated imperative construction. However, despite the sparsity in the RMT sample, it is not unlikely that the preference for the more polite Non-necessity in the situation at hand can be attributed to the higher status and power of the hearer. Still, I assume that RMTSs would opt for more impolite non-negated imperatives, like *Stop*, and negated imperative constructions in the form of 'Don't…!' when addressing the (-P(ower) hearer, e.g. children.

In contrast with the RMTSs, the DMTSs appeared to verbalise significantly more instances of Prohibition. They did this by means of negative declarative constructions with *må* for '*must*', which, according to Arnsberg and Bentsen (2009:83), allows the speaker to issue Prohibition by adopting the authoritative voice of society rather than using their own individual voice. Strikingly, the RMTD exhibited only one instance of the prohibitive declarative, which likewise instantiates the negative declarative construction with *must*.

Although sparse, the results for the MTD indicate that when issuing Prohibition in the form of a declarative utterance, the Russian and Danish speakers opt for constructions which allow them to speak with a third-person voice. At first sight, it is not implausible that this specific linguistic strategy of issuing Prohibition can be explained in terms of social variables: that is, the speaker employs the prohibitival strategy of negative infinitival (see [69]) or negative auxiliary constructions (see [72]) in situations with the (-P(ower) speaker and (+P(ower) hearer. However, to prove this would require further study of similar situations as well as situations with the (+P(ower) speaker and (-P(ower) hearer.

On the other hand, when considering the results of the category of the *imperative* for the RMTSs and the DMTSs, I found that the former issued Prohibition by using non-negated imperatives like *Ostanovites'* for 'Stop', whereas the latter favoured Non-necessity in the form of the non-negated imperative construction *Pas på* for 'Be careful'. Whatever the results, they are too sparse for us to draw any meaningful conclusions.

Most importantly, we have to see to whether research hypothesis III holds water, i.e. whether Danish and Russian respondents transferred the requesting strategies from their respective mother tongues to ELF. Surprisingly, the interlanguage findings revealed that both the RESs and the DESs issued Prohibition largely by means of negated imperative constructions (see [46]). Conversely, the intralanguage analysis of the Window situation did not reveal any obvious linguistic transfer from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English (compare [42] and [59]). Hence, my question is whether these findings relate to the notion of the private voice of language.

The interlanguage differences in the results for the adverb *please* with the ENSs, on the one hand, and the RESs and the DESs, on the other, seem to be indicative of the latter's inadequate command of the private voice in English (see [74]). However, the high level of interlanguage agreement in [40] for the imperative frame between the ENSs, on the one hand, and the RESs and the DESs, on the other, seems to indicate the latter's pragma-linguistic competence in English. Even the fact that the DESs did not transfer the negative auxiliary construction with *must* to Danish English, which presumably

has negative and impolite connotations associated with the negative auxiliary construction *mustn't* in present-day English (see the only instance of *mustn't* in the BED in [57]), indicates the DESs' linguistic competence in English.

In the absence of other evidence, the fact that the RESs and the DESs agreed with the control group in giving preference to the imperative frame instantiating Prohibition must indicate that the RESs and the DESs have a good command of the private voice of English.

I acknowledge that, to draw any tenable conclusions about the mechanism of prohibiting, one needs to supplement the present study by examining situations containing different socio-cultural parameters, e.g. a symmetrical power relationship with the hearer ((-P(ower), -D(istance)). Finally, it would be beneficial to study situations where the speaker not only wishes to prevent the hearer from changing the world, in casu the Window scenario, but also wants the hearer to stop the activity that is going on at the moment of speaking.

5.2.3.   Final remarks on the Window situation

In the first place, it is necessary to repeat that the prescriptive frame involving Prohibition is described in the IF-framework (see Durst-Andersen, 1995) as having Warning as its *obedience conditions* (see [3.2]). This seems to be in line with the overall results of the interlanguage analysis of the Window situation, which demonstrated a high level of agreement between the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs in that they verbalised Prohibition together with *warning*. Interestingly, the analysis of the MTD revealed a substantial number of more polite *cautions*, which I am inclined to construe in terms of Non-necessity (see [3.2] & [3.4]).

Yet, Durst-Andersen's 2009 account (see [3.4]) is a bit confusing in that it describes the imperative frame involving Prohibition as being impolite by virtue of having 'penalty' as its *obedience conditions*, which within the present analytical framework comprises impolite *orders* and *threats* (see section 3.5.5.3.1.2). None of the respondents participating in the SPTs verbalised Prohibition involving these two subcategories as the speaker's post-conditions. Even more perplexing is the fact that the same results were achieved in the pilot test, carried out before the final SPTs at Carlsberg, where the respondents similarly warned the hearer about undesired consequences rather than threatening him with a 'penalty' (see [4.12] and [4.13]).

Arnsberg and Bentsen's pilot study from 2009 revealed similar results for the prohibitive situation, where the Danish respondents appeared to prefer Prohibition in combination with *warning*.

The researchers account for the usage of *warning* rather than the more impolite 'penalty' in terms of the social variable of Power, according to which the speaker with less social power and status opts for 'masking Prohibition under Warning' (Arnsberg & Bentsen, 2009:84, my translation).

As far as the findings of both the pilot test and the final SPTs are concerned, I am inclined to construe them in terms of the design of the Window situation based on the deontic frame of Prohibition. More specifically, this prohibitive scenario instantiates a situation where the speaker wishes to *prevent* a certain type of action from happening in the future. In view of this, it therefore seems plausible to assume that such situation will involve requests having *warnings* rather than *threats* or *orders* as the *obedience conditions*. On the other hand, I believe that prohibitive situations where the speaker wishes to *stop* the activity that is going on at the moment of speaking might exhibit Prohibitions involving a 'penalty' as the *obedience conditions.* All in all, there is a need to extend the present analysis of a prohibitive situation where the speaker wishes to prevent a certain type of action from happening in the future to the study of situations where she wishes to stop the activity that is going on at the moment of speaking. If my predictions are valid, Durst-Andersen's description of the imperative frame involving Prohibition in terms of PROHIBITION—REQUEST—WARNING in [3.2] should be supplemented with another type within the prohibitive imperative frame, namely PROHIBITION—REQUEST—THREAT/ORDER.

Secondly, the idea that the speaker can take several turns in the pragmatic wheel allows analysing communicative events that comprise more than one speech act. However, its weakness is that the boundary between separate turns is not fixed by virtue of the possibility of drawing different borderlines between individual speech acts within one and the same communicative event. Consequently, the analysis of the Window situation presented in the study at hand is only one possible interpretation of the sample.

My third and last point concerns the issue of the inconsistency between the form of a range of imperative constructions, usually initiating a request, and their function within the IF. More specifically, the Window sample exhibited a large number of non-negated imperative utterances like *Wait / Hang on / Stop*, etc. which according to the IF should be analysed in terms of either descriptive Necessity or prescriptive Obligation. Put differently, their non-negated form determines their function, which within the IF-approach can only be Necessity or Obligation (see [3.3]).

The scenario description at hand, however, is based on a different set of conditions that clearly exclude these two readings. It does not seem plausible that the Window situation based on the imper-

ative frame of Prohibition which preserves the world as it is will evoke Necessity or Obligation speech acts, both of which involve a change in the world. On the contrary, I am inclined to construe these non-negated imperatives in terms of Prohibition, i.e. PROHIBITION—REQUEST—WARNING.

This is because prohibitive constructions with the verb, e.g. *stop*, are claimed to be used in situations where the speaker wants to prevent a state of affairs (see Xrakovskij, 2001:13). On the other hand, both Necessity and Obligation involve *threats* as their obedience conditions, and this was not found in the present sample. Rather, the sample revealed ample use of *warning*, which within the IF-approach is only licensed with Prohibition (see [3.2] as well as [3.3] & [3.4] for a more detailed description of the conditions determining the given imperative frames). And yet, *warnings* differ from *threats* by lacking the semantic component of 'penalty' (see section 3.5.5.3.1.2).

My point here is that there seems to be a lack of consistency between the description of the imperative frame in question and the actual linguistic realisations. It does not appear to be true that the speaker would issue a Necessity or an Obligation in a situation where the hearer is simply not aware of the danger ensuing from carrying out the act of opening the window (NB: with both Necessity and Obligation, the speaker has to act upon the hearer's initial disobedience to comply with her request by 'enforcing' his obedience).

In sum, the sample presented results that do not support the IF's claim about the determining role of form in analysing requests. In actual fact, the linkage between a form and a function does not appear to be as straightforward as it is assumed to be. If my analysis is correct, then the prohibitive constructions in [3.3] should include not only negated imperatives but also non-negated imperatives. By the same token, acts involving Non-necessity (e.g. [45]) should include non-negated imperative constructions like e.g. *Watch out*, *Take care*, *etc*. and caution markers, such as *Careful, Caution, Danger, Alert*.

5.3. The Library situation

Scenario	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social Distance
Library	Impossibility	Public	Stranger	None	Some/Great

Before proceeding to the interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses of thecategories that emerged from the analysis, it is necessary to provide an account of the theoretical considerations underlying the paraphrases of interrogative utterances and their intonation patterns because these decisions have been instrumental in the manner the functional analysis has been carried out.

5.3.1. On the choice of paraphrases

According to Durst-Andersen (2009:328), the descriptive imperative frame involving Impossibility is the only frame where the speaker and the hearer do not 'share the world'. This implies that the speaker is most likely to approach the hearer indirectly and frame her request in terms of the 'stating-a-problem' decision model (see hypothesis IV, section 2.1).

The ELFD revealed a great number of interrogative utterances with modal verbs such as *can* and *will*, their past-tense forms *could* and *would* as well as idiomatic constructions containing these modals like *would you mind, will you be able, would you be kind*, etc. (see the attached Excel-file III. 1-3). Since the present study approaches the analysis of requests by using the language of paraphrase, it was necessary to provide paraphrases that will reveal semantic differences between present-tense modal verbs and their past-tense counterparts. However, very few studies deal with English modals from the point of view of their paraphrases.

One such study is Diver (1964), which provides the paraphrases of a number of English modals in what is called 'the System of Hypothesis' (see table [78] below). This system arranges the verbs according to the likelihood of the occurrence of the hypothetical event, from *do* that expresses the confidence of the outcome of the hypothetical event to *can* where the probability of the occurrence of the hypothetical event is the least. Interestingly, various hypothetical forms on this scale are presented in terms of their 'Non-Past' meaning and as such are in direct contrast to their indicative counterparts, as in *She told me last week that he **could** leave yesterday* (Past meaning) vs. *He **could** leave tomorrow* (Non-Past meaning).

[78] The Scale of Hypothesis (from Diver, 1964:330)

Scheme VIII

The System of Hypothesis

Archi-member	Scale of Likelihood		Unintegrated member
Various forms 'hypothetical'	*do*	'certain'	
	must	'very likely'	
	should	'more than likely'	Imperative
	may	'less than likely'	
	can	'possible'	

Moreover, *would*+Non-Past and *could*+Non-Past are said to signal that the event is 'less likely' to occur than that indicated by *will* and *can*. Consider the example of *can* where the downward pointing arrow indicates that the meaning of *could* is further down on the Scale of Likelihood:

[79]

He can be here by tomorrow.

⬇   He could be here by tomorrow.

However, Diver's language of paraphrase involving the notion of 'likelihood' did not appear feasible for the purposes at hand. This is mainly a result of the complexity of the paraphrases obtained, which are meant to provide a straightforward and unambiguous 'message' to the hearer. Let me illustrate the point by means of the following example of the paraphrase of *could*:

[80]

Communicative event	**Paraphrase of the Head Act**
• *P99: *Excuse me please* . *P99: ***Could** you just pass me that book from up there ?* *P99: *I'm not tall enough* .	• '*I assume that it is unlikely* tha you pass me that book from u there and hereby ask you if this i the case.'

My argument here is that the paraphrase above does not pass the test of clarity and transparency, i.e. how the hearer would know that the speaker wants him to pass her the book if the paraphrase states otherwise.

Another study (see Klinge, 1993) provides paraphrases of the five central English modals, *can*, *may*, *will*, *must*, and *shall* in terms of 'potentiality' rather than 'likelihood'. More specifically, he analyses these modals in terms of the correspondence between their propositional content, also called the SITUATION REPRESENTATION, and a real-world situation, called the WORLD SITUATION.

For example, he provides the following paraphrase of *can* (ibid., 334):

> The SITUATION REPRESENTATION turns out to be a true description of a WORLD SITUATION and the SITUATION REPRESENTATION turns out not to be a true description of a WORLD SITUATION.

This paraphrase of *can*, however, does not seem to be easily applicable to the data analysed in the present study and would at the very least require a more straightforward and simplified reformulation. Moreover, Klinge (1993) does not provide a semantic description of the past-tense forms of the above-mentioned modals.

In the field of linguistics, the modal auxiliaries have traditionally been treated in terms of the binary opposition between non-modalised factuality / actuality / validity and modalised non-factuality / non-actuality / open validity (cf. Palmer, 2001; Narrog, 2005). This can be illustrated schematically using the example of *can*:

[81]

Even though the non-factual part of the scheme gives credit to the temporal and non-temporal meaning of modals, its factual part lacks the epistemic or hypothetical meaning of *can*, as in *He can be in his office* (see section 2.4). Nor is it obvious how the paraphrases of the factual and non-factual semantic representation of the modals should be made. A possible way of doing this could be to paraphrase the former as 'It is possible / impossible / permitted / forbidden' and the latter as 'I set up a

world where it is possible / impossible / permitted / forbidden'. Consider the example of this with the modals *can* and *could*:

[82]

Although [82] attempts to render the hypothetical meaning of *could*, it seems a bit awkward and cumbersome, only remotely resembling a natural-language paraphrase.

Finally, Durst-Andersen (2011a: 251ff) distinguishes between the real / objective world and the imagined / subjective world. The former involves the speaker's experiences and their abstract version, knowledge, and the latter consists of the speaker's beliefs and opinions. According to this approach, the present-tense forms provide the speaker's description of the objective reality – a real situation description – whereas the past-tense forms convey the speaker's own imagination, a description of a subjective reality. Put differently, the present tense signals that the speaker uses her *objective voice* and the past tense indicates that the speaker speaks with her *subjective voice* (ibid., 254). Consider the following example of the opposition (ibid., 253):

[83]

    a. *Jeg tror, at der **vil** være mange i køen.*

      I think that there will be many in the queue

      'I think that many people will be standing in the queue.'

    b. *Jeg tror, at der **ville** være mange i køen.*

      I think that there would be many in the queue

      'I think that many people would be standing in the queue.'

While in [83a] the speaker refers to a specific queue in a future world, in [83b] we are positioned inside the imagined world of the speaker, which tells us nothing about a real situation 'out there'.

If we use this distinction for the purpose at hand, we obtain the following result:

[84]

Compared to the previous examples of paraphrases, the paraphrases in [84] are less detailed. However, they seem to be more straightforward and immediately understandable. Even though one might argue that 'imagine' does not involve the past-tense meaning of the past-tense modal forms (see [80] above), it seems to be the best suited for the present study, notably because the data did not reveal any instances of the past-tense modals in the Past meaning (for all paraphrases, see the attached Excel-file III). This being said, my analysis will follow Durst-Andersen's way of construing modals.

5.3.2.   On the intonation patterns

The functional analysis of the DED and the RED exhibited several instances of communicative events that were both initiated and concluded by the interrogative utterance. Consider the following example from the DED (see the attached Excel-file III.2):

[85]

> *P71: *Sorry .*
>
> *P71: ***Could you please help me ?***
>
> *P71: *I can't reach that far .*
>
> *P71: ***So could you [pointing up] take that book two and a half metre up in there for me please ?***

Since the functional analysis within the SAP-model requires a sequential division of the communicative event into individual utterances, it was necessary to decide whether these interrogative structures functioned as questions proper or requests. As can be observed from [85], the two interrogatives are identical in terms of their formal features in that both have the propositional structure of a question with the modal *could.* Since [85] and other similar cases were produced by the Danish and the Russian speakers of English, it was necessary to examine whether the intonation patterns characteristic of making requests and asking questions in Danish and Russian differed from those in the DED

and the RED.

As far as the interrogative utterances in the BED are concerned, the auditory impressionistic observations suggested that in a few cases the interrogatives had a final low rise only when the utterance ended with the token *please*, as in *P112: *Would you mind passing it to ↗ me please?* Otherwise, the interrogatives were characterised by a fall on the last accented syllable followed by a falling pattern on the subsequent unstressed syllables, e.g. *P104: *Can you reach this ↘ book for me please?* Since English is said to have a final rise for general questions (Hirst & Di Cristo, 1998:26), it does not seem inappropriate to treat the interrogative constructions with a final fall in the BED in terms of requests.

In Danish, general questions have a falling intonation (see Grønnum, 1998:308f). The auditory impressionistic observations of the interrogative utterances in the DMTD also revealed a falling pattern, which suggests that general questions framed as requests similarly have a falling intonation in Danish.

Yet, the auditory impressionistic observations of the DED did not reveal any clear falling pattern in the interrogative constructions. In fact, they had various degrees of rising intonation patterns, from a low rise to a high rise. In other words, there did not seem to be any intonational transfer from Danish to Danish English. However, to decide which of these interrogatives were general questions and which were requests would require a closer phonological analysis of these Danish English interrogatives (e.g. by using the Praat program on http://goo.gl/pnlNTV), which is beyond the scope of the present study. Accordingly, the factor of intonation was not systematically considered in the present analysis of the DED and, for the sake of consistency, all instances of interrogatives were analysed in terms of requests, implying that the speaker took more than one turn in the pragmatic wheel (see also the attached Excel-file III.2).

Like Danish, Russian is characterised by a final falling pattern for general questions (ibid., 24). In contrast to the interrogative utterances in the DED, the auditory impressionistic observations suggested that a great number of the interrogatives in the RED had a falling intonation pattern (from high to mid), and, in this respect, are not unlike the intonation patterns of the British English interrogative utterances in the BED. Interestingly, the Russian interrogative constructions in the RMTD were similarly pronounced with a final fall. Still, to make any conclusive statements about the presence or absence of the intonational transfer from Russian to Russian English would require a further phonological analysis, which is beyond the scope of the present study. Furthermore, it was not practicable to distinguish intonation-wise between general questions and questions framed as requests. For the sake

of uniformity, the present study treats all instances of the interrogative constructions in the RED in terms of requests. Consider the example (see the attached Excel-file III.1):

[86]

*P2: ***Would you please help me ?***   [low fall – request]

*P2: *There is a book upstairs and I cannot even reach it .*

*P2: ***Will you help me ?***   [low rise – request]

5.3.3.   Interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage analyses of the ELFD and the MTD

5.3.3.1. *On decision models and linguistic transfers from mother tongue to ELF*

Let us begin the discussion by considering the interlanguage results for the ELFD in order to discover potential differences or similarities between native and non-native speakers of English in the performance of the speech act involving Impossibility (see table [87]). As in the case of the previous two scenarios, the total number of decision models in the tables below does not coincide with the actual number of respondents as some of them took several rounds in the pragmatic wheel.

(a) There is a high level of interlanguage agreement between the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs, i.e. high levels of employing the interrogative frame.

(b) There is a high level of interlanguage agreement between the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs in that almost none of the participants made use of the declarative frame.

(c) There is some interlanguage variation in the choice of the imperative frame between the ENSs and the DESs, on the one hand, and the RESs, on the other. The four RESs employed the imperative frame, whereas none of the respondents from the two other groups made use of it.

[87]

176

In line with research hypothesis IV (see section 1.2), the three groups in [87] appeared to largely prefer the 'stating-a-problem' decision model. The only group that seems to stand out is the RESs, who produced the smallest number of the 'stating-a-problem' decision models, on the one hand, and made use of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model, on the other. Given the fact that Russian allows the application of non-negated imperatives with the imperative frame involving Impossibility (see [3.3]), the findings in [87] could be a result of linguistic transfer from Russian to Russian English.

Let us consider the cross-cultural results of the decision models for the MTD in [88] (the BED is included for the sake of a fuller picture):

[88]

In contrast to [87], both the Danish and the Russian respondents in [88] employed a smaller number of the 'stating-a-problem' decision models. While the results of the former can be explained through the smaller number of interrogative utterances in the DMTD than in the DED (see the attached Excel-file III.5), the latter is more likely to be related to a comparatively high number of the 'solving-a-problem' decision models in the RMTD.

In terms of the intralanguage findings, there does not seem to be any indication of a direct transfer of requesting strategies from Danish to Danish English in that in both [87] and [88] the Danish respondents made use of the 'stating-a-problem' decision model and demonstrated the same type of requesting behaviour as the native speakers of English.

As far as the intralanguage results for the Russian speakers are concerned, four instances of the imperative utterances in [87] are possibly the result of the direct linguistic transfer from Russian, notably because in [88] the RMTSs made a considerable use of them. Compare the examples from the RED and the RMTD (see the attached Excel-files III.1 and III.4):

[89]

> *P3: ***Please take this book from the shelf*** *.*
>
> *P3: *If you don't mind* .*

[90]

> *P43: ***Izvinite (.) podajte požalujsta vot ètu knižku*** *.*
>
> *P43: 'Excuse me, give me please this book.'*

It is worth pointing out that the imperative utterance in [90] is fully licensed in Russian, whereas [89] seems rather odd – albeit not completely unacceptable – in English. Assuming that [89] is a result of direct linguistic transfer from Russian to Russian English, one could say that, in this particular situation, it could endanger the *effectiveness* of the intercultural communication between Russian speakers of English and native speakers of English. However, taking into account the fact that the Library scenario is based on a polite imperative frame, where the of risk of threatening the face of the hearer is close to zero, it does not seem reasonable to speak of the danger of a severe insult. Rather, the application of the imperative construction here can apparently lead to the British English hearer being slightly puzzled. And yet, we should not exclude the possibility of the *ineffectiveness* of employing the 'solving-a-problem' decision model under different conditions and in a different cross-cultural set-up.

5.3.3.2. *The interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage results for the category of tuners*

The interlanguage analysis showed that the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs used the category of *tuners*. The frequency with which they did so varied. Consider table [91]:

[91]

As can be observed from [91], the ENSs appeared to employ the category of *tuner I* twice as much as the two other groups. Within the SAP-model (see section 3.5.6.1), this category is construed in first-person terms and is used to mark politeness following the paraphrase 'I hereby show you my respect'. Consider an example from the BED (see the attached Excel-file III.3):

[92]

> *P120: **Excuse me.**
>
> *P120: *Would you mind passing me the book?*
>
> *P120: *As I can't reach it.*

Moreover, the ENSs were the only group who overwhelmingly used the apology phrase *excuse me* (in 20 out of 21 cases) for *tuner I*. In Aijmer (1996:102ff), phrases such as *excuse me* and *I'm sorry* are described in terms of a 'disarming apology strategy' that usually precedes a request involving an effort on the part of the hearer. In this respect, the frequent use of *tuner I* by the ENSs in the Library situation, where the speaker intrudes on the hearer's privacy or 'physical space', seems to be in line with traditional pragmatic research.

The RED exhibited eleven instances of *excuse me* and just two examples of *sorry*, and the DED revealed the smallest number of *tuner I* realised in the form of apology phrases like *excuse me*, *sorry*, and *pardon* (see the attached Excel-file III.1 & III.2).

In contrast to the RESs, the DESs turned out to use *tuner II* most often (see [91]). As already mentioned in the section on the category of *tuners* (see section 3.5.6.1), *tuner II* has a personal implication with the following paraphrase 'I hereby tune you into my channel'. In all cases, except an instance of the form of address *tall man*, the DESs 'tuned the hearer into their channel' with the help of *sir*. While the RED exhibited only one case of *sir*, none of the ENSs employed this form of address. Only one British English respondent made use of this category, which, however, cannot really be counted as *tuner II* but rather as an instance of humour. Consider the example (see the attached Excel-file III.3):

[93]

> *P113: *Excuse me **Big John**.*
>
> *P113: *Could you do me a favour please and could you just get me that book   there?*
>
> *P113: *0It'll be excellent!*
>
> *P113: *Yeah [/] yeah!*
>
> *P113: *That's the book!*
>
> *P113: *Thanks.*

*P113: *Thanks very much.*

Finally, it is interesting to examine whether the tendency among the non-native speakers of English to use *tuners* less often than the native speakers of English in [91] can also be found in the MTD. Table [94] presents the cross-cultural results for tuners (the BED is included for the sake of a fuller picture):

[94]

In comparison with [91], the RMTSs in [94] used more or less the same number of *tuner I*, but employed many more *tuner II*. In the majority of cases, the Russian instances of *tuner I* in [94] represented the same apology phrases as those found in the ELFD (see the attached Excel-file III.4). Consider an example:

[95]

*P27: **Prostite.***

*P27: 'Excuse me.'

*P27: *Ne mogli by vy mne pomoč' dostať von tu knižku?*

*P27: 'Couldn't you help me reach that book up there?'

By contrast, the RMTD revealed a large number of *tuner II*, which surfaced in the form of *mužčina* (literally 'man') or *molodoj čelovek* (literally 'young man'). For example:

[96]

*P40: **Mužčina** podajte požalujsta knižku s verxnej polki.*

*P40: '*Sir*, give me please the book from the upper shelf.'

It is worth pointing out that there was a tendency among the native speakers of Russian to initiate the request by using either *tuner I* or *tuner II*, rather than using both in one and the same request. This result indicates that cross-culturally both the native speakers of English and the native speakers of Russian employ the category of *tuners* with a similar frequency in the Library situation. The difference between them is a qualitative one in that the latter can choose to initiate the request with the help of *tuner I* or *tuner II*, whereas the former will probably use *tuner I* only. Interlanguage-wise, though, the Russians seem to be less 'polite' than the native speakers of English by virtue of having used *tuner I* to a lesser degree than the ENSs (see [91]).

Finally, the intralanguage results for the category of *tuners* did not suggest any linguistic transfer from Russian to Russian English in that the RMTSs employed the apology phrases *excuse me* and *I'm sorry* with more or less the same frequency as the RESs. Nor did the intralanguage analysis reveal any direct transfer of *tuner II* from Russian to Russian English.

As far as the DMTD is concerned, [94] revealed a large proportion of *tuner I*, mainly realised in the form of *undskyld* for 'excuse me' (see the attached Excel-file III.5):

[97]

> *P90: **Undskyld**.
> *P90: 'Excuse me.'
>
> *P90: *Kan jeg ikke få dig til at tage den med engelsk grammatik ned til mig?*
> *P90: 'Can I get you to take that (book) on English grammar down for me?'
>
> *P90: *Jeg kan ikke nå den.*
> *P90: 'I cannot reach it.'

The DMTD also revealed four instances of a rather informal attention-getter *ved du hvad* (literally 'you know what'). Interestingly, neither the Russian nor the British respondents made use of informal tuners in the Library situation, which might imply that the DMTSs perceive this situation as being more casual than do the other groups. This is an important finding, which I shall return to below.

Moreover, the fact that the DMTD exhibited only one instance of *tuner II* in the form of *herre* for 'sir' implies that there is no direct transfer of *tuners* from Danish to Danish English. Interestingly, it is not implausible that the DESs attempted to compensate for the perceived lack of politeness in English – which in our case would have been to follow their mother tongue pattern and use *tuner I*

alone – by additionally employing the address form *sir* for *tuner II* (see [91]). If this is correct, then the Danish speakers of English can be said to demonstrate an even more polite requesting behaviour than the native speakers of English. And yet, in contrast to the latter, who mostly apologised for disturbing the hearer, by means of *sir* the Danish speakers of English emphasised a larger distance between the speaker and the hearer (see the attached Excel-files III.2 and III.3).

To sum up, the results of the interlanguage and cross-cultural analyses revealed that the ENSs used *tuner I* most often. Since it stands for the first person and conveys the speaker's expression of polite attitude towards the hearer, the ENSs can interlanguage-wise be said to be most 'polite' or *effective* among the three groups of respondents. While the DESs were less *effective* by supplementing *excuse me* with the address form *sir,* which presumably highlights a larger distance between the speaker and the hearer, the RESs appeared to be least *effective*, presumably because they did not additionally make use of *tuner II*.

As we have seen, the cross-cultural results showed that the Russian speakers employed both *tuner I* and *tuner II* and can statistically be said to be as *effective* as the British English speakers. Thus, the above-mentioned lack of politeness with the RESs can either be the result of the lack of transfer from Russian to Russian English or the absence of the private voice of English. It should be pointed out, though, that the results are too sparse to make any definite conclusions about the level of risk for the *effectiveness* of cross-cultural communication between the Russian and the British English participants.

The intralanguage results for the Danish speakers did not suggest any direct linguistic transfer from Danish to Danish English either in that the DMTSs mostly made use of *tuner I*, whereas the DESs employed *tuner I* and *tuner II* with almost equal frequency. Nor can the assumption that the Danish speakers of English were as *effective* as the British English speakers be attributed to the DES's knowledge of the private voice in English. For that to be the case, the DESs should have followed the same pattern as that of the ENSs and made greater use of *tuner I*. They did it, though, by using a different strategy, namely by supplementing *excuse me* with *sir*. In other words, from the Danish perspective, the use of *tuner II* in the form of *sir* can be interpreted as a strategy for raising the *effectiveness* of the Danish-English communication. This seems to be the case especially because the DMTSs appeared to make use of the informal attention-getter *ved du hvad*, which I interpret as an indicator of their perception of the situation as being relatively casual.

However, from the point of view of the native speakers of English, the 'excuse me + sir' strategy would presumably be less *effective* in that for them it may sound too formal and, hence, inappropriate

in this particular situation. (NB: the BED revealed no instances of the address form *sir.*)

5.3.3.3.   On interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage results for 'please'

In addition to *tuners*, the analysis of the ELFD and the MTD revealed a vast number of occurrences of the adverb *please*, which surfaced in the form of the category of *speaker's acceptance Signal* or the subcategory of *obedience conditions*, namely *compensation*. Consider the results for the ELFD analysis:

[98]

As can be seen from [98], there is a clear difference between the native and non-native speakers of English in the use of *please*. The ENSs favoured *please* in the utterance-final position, whereas the RESs and the DESs mostly used it in utterance-initial or utterance-middle positions. The rationale for analysing *please* in the pre-request position as *speaker's acceptance Signal* has been dealt with in the sections on the theoretical framework (see sections 3.5.5.1.1 & 3.5.5.2.1). As far as *please* in the utterance-middle position is concerned, the present study also construes it in terms of *speaker's acceptance Signal.* Consider the following example from the DED (see the attached Excel-file III.2):

[99]

> *P51: *Sorry sir !*
>
> *P51: *Can you **please** [!] help me take down that book up there ?*

The functional realisation of *please* in [99] can be summarised as the following paraphrase:

> 'I hereby make you know that I want you to be cooperative.'

By using *please* in the intermediate position with interrogative utterances, the speaker obviously asks the hearer to be willing to solve her problem. In other words, it seems that it functions as a Signal to the hearer to be cooperative.

Going back to the interlanguage results in [98], it is notable that the native speakers of English were the only group that preferred to employ *please* with the interrogative constructions in the function of *compensation* (see the attached Excel-file III.3):

[100]

        *P119: *Excuse me .*

        *P119: *Could you pass me that book* **please** *?*

The token *please* in [100] is analysed as an instance of *compensation* on the basis of the following paraphrase:

        'I hereby want you to know that if you accept my offer and effectuate the agreement, I will be grateful.'

With respect to the non-native speakers of English, there is a high level of interlanguage agreement in the application of *please* in the function of *speaker's acceptance Signal.* It is, therefore, interesting to see whether this tendency can also be observed in the MTD (the BED is included for the sake of a fuller picture):

[101]

In comparison with the interlanguage results in [98], [101] suggests a minor difference in the

application of *please* between the RESs and the RMTSs: the RMTD exhibited a small increase in the number of *compensations* (see [102]) and a small fall in the number of *speaker's acceptance Signal* (see [103]):

[102]

        *P38: *Mužčina .*
        *P38: 'Sir.'

        *P38: *Mogli by vy podat' mne knižku vot s ètoj polki ?*
        *P38: 'Could you give me the book from this shelf?'

        *P38: *Ona očen' vysoko .*
        *P38: 'It's very high up.'

        *P38: *Ne dostaju .*
        *P38: '(I) cannot reach it.'

        *P38: ***Požalujsta .***
        *P38: 'Please.'

[103]

        *P40: *Mužčina podajte **požalujsta** knižku s verxnej polki.*
        *P40: 'Sir, give me *please* the book from the upper shelf.'

It is worth pointing out that the RMTSs preferred to initiate requests by means of constructions like *bud'te ljubezny / dobry* corresponding to 'please' in English. They also used the adverb *požalujsta* in the middle position less often than in the initial position.

As far as the linguistic realisations of *compensation* are concerned, besides *požalujsta*, the RMTSs also used gratitude expressions like *budu blagodaren* (literally '(I) will be grateful') (see the attached Excel-file III.4).

Speaking about the DMTD, [101] revealed that almost half of the interrogative utterances contained the construction *vil du (ikke) være sød* (literally 'will you (not) be kind'). The present paper analyses this and the minor variations of it as a counterpart of the English adverb *please.* Consider the

following example (see the attached Excel-file III.5):

[104]

    *P94: Undskyld .

    *P94: 'Excuse me.'

    *P94: ***Vil du ikke være så flink*** at hjælpe mig med at tage den der bog ned fra hylden til mig ?

    *P94: 'Will you *please* [!] help me take that book down from the shelf for me?'

The DMTD in [101] also exhibited two instances of *compensation* in the form of gratitude expressions like *det ville være pænt af dig* and *det ville være sødt af dig*, both meaning 'it would be nice of you' (see the attached Excel-file III.5):

[105]

    *P81: *Ved du hvad .*

    *P81: 'You see.'

    *P81: *Kan du nå den bog (.) 0give den op til mig ?*

    *P81: 'Can you reach that book and give it to me?'

    *P81: *Jeg kan ikke selv nå .*

    *P81: 'I cannot reach it myself.'

    P81: **Det ville være pænt af dig .*

    *P81: 'It would be nice of you.'

    *P81: Tak .

    *P81: 'Thank you.'

All in all, the cross-cultural results showed that the British English speakers made extensive use of the adverb *please* in terms of *compensation*, whereas the RMTSs and the DMTSs mostly preferred *please* in the function of *speaker's acceptance Signal*.

In terms of the intralanguage findings, the contrastive analysis of [101] and [100] did not suggest any direct linguistic transfers from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English.

This is because the ELFD exhibited a high frequency of *please* in the function of *speaker's acceptance Signal*, by means of which the speaker motivates the hearer to be willing to assist. Even though the MTD also revealed more cases of *please* and its lexical counterparts in Russian and Danish functioning as *speaker's acceptance Signal* than *compensation*, the sample is too small to draw any definite conclusions on the issue of linguistic transfers.

Finally, the interlanguage results suggest a noticeable difference in the use of the adverb *please* by the ENSs, on the one hand, and the RESs and the DESs, on the other. It is hard to tell, though, whether this different behaviour has a negative effect on the *effectiveness* of cross-cultural communication through ELF.

5.3.3.4.   *On interlanguage, cross-cultural, and intralanguage results for verbalised thought*

The interlanguage and the cross-cultural analyses of the decision models for the Library situation in [87] and [88] showed that the respondents mostly had a preference for the 'stating-a-problem' decision model. If Durst-Andersen's idea (see section 3.4) about requests framed as interrogatives is true, then the results of the scenario at hand suggest a general tendency to perceive situations involving Impossibility as cases where the speaker 'states' or 'informs' the hearer about her problem and leaves it to the hearer to decide whether to solve it or not. This is an important finding in itself in that it tentatively supports the notion that 'impossibility speech acts' have the form of a question. And yet, it is interesting to see whether the Danish, the Russian, and the British differ in the manner of framing requests in the form of questions. Consequently, it is necessary to take a closer look at the category of *verbalised thought*.

As mentioned in section 5.3.1, the language of paraphrase is the rationale behind the analysis of interrogative constructions where special attention is paid to the paraphrase of modal auxiliaries. By means of the present-tense forms the speaker gives a description of her immediate experience of a situation, i.e. she provides an objective 'observation' of a particular situation. With the help of the past-tense forms the speaker moves from a real situation into an imagined world, i.e. she 'imagines' that the real situation corresponds to her beliefs. In other words, all linguistic realisations of the category of *verbalised thought* are analysed on the basis of the opposition between the *real* and *imagined world*.

The interlanguage results for the category at hand are presented below:

[106]

As can be observed from [106], the three groups appeared overwhelmingly to use past-tense modals with the Library situation and 'stated the problem' in a *subjective* way, as it were. Consider the following example from the DED (see the attached Excel-file III.2):

[107]

> *P57: *Tall man ! [laughing]*
> *P57: **Could you please take down the book** ?*
> *P57: *Because I cannot reach it* .*

The interrogative utterance in [107] is analysed as the speaker's 'imagined world description' on the basis of the following paraphrase:

'I imagine that you can take the book down and hereby ask you if this is true.'

The results in [106] also raise the question of whether the use of the subjective vs. objective voice is related to politeness or the level of *effectiveness* of the cross-cultural communication through ELF.

Let us digress for a moment and reflect on the conditions of the Library situation. Assuming it is true that (1) it is the speaker who has a problem, (2) the speaker wants the hearer to solve her problem, (3) the speaker and the hearer do not 'share the same world' or are strangers, in traditional terms, then it seems plausible that the speaker cannot be absolutely sure that the hearer is willing to assist her and thus can only use her subjective voice. This interpretation seems to be in line with the traditional account of past-tense modals (see Leech, 1983:118; Koike, 1989:191, 194), according to which these forms convey a hypothetical meaning which creates a larger 'distance' between interlocutors and hence mitigates the force of the request. Put differently, the fact that the speaker knows that the hearer wants

to help her solve the problem but does not state it openly presupposes that she takes on a modest and humble stance towards the hearer, which is apparently perceived as polite and has a positive effect on him.

As far as the cross-cultural results for the category of *verbalised thought* are concerned, the analysis yielded the following picture:

[108]

In [108], the British respondents mostly spoke with the subjective voice and framed their requests in terms of the 'imagined world description', the Danish respondents largely preferred the objective voice, and the Russians used both voices almost equally often.

If we assume that the use of the subjective voice with impossibility speech acts increases politeness and the use of the objective voice has an opposite effect, can we then say that the Danes exhibited the least polite requesting behaviour among the three groups? It could be the case for the interlanguage results. However, the findings in [108] present the results for the MTD, which makes it hard to believe that the majority of the Danish respondents produced impolite requests. Rather, it seems plausible that the Danes perceive the Library situation as one where the social variable of 'distance' does not seem to play a great role.

Interestingly, Denmark is usually described as a country with an egalitarian culture that stresses the values of participation and equality (see Hofstede, 2001; Kaye, 2004). The element of public equality can partly be seen in the cross-cultural results for the category of *tuners*, where the DMTSs were the only group who made use of a rather informal tuner *ved du hvad* for 'you know', on the one hand, and avoided a more formal form *herre* for 'sir', on the other.

Alternatively, the Danish results in [108] can be interpreted in terms of the choice between the objective and subjective voice. If we assume that the public space is Denmark is associated with openness, default trust, and functionality, then the use of the objective voice would be an obvious expression of politeness. Conversely, the use of the subjective voice in a public context may convey a certain degree of uncertainty and mistrust of the hearer, which can reduce the effectiveness of the problem-solving activity. Since the Library situation instantiates a public social context, the predominant present tense forms in [108] must imply that the use of the objective voice in the Danish public sphere is the 'norm'. In other words, within the Danish speech community politeness can be understood in terms of trust between interlocutors and effectiveness of the problem-solving activity rather than the social variable of distance. To prove this, however, would require a contrastive study of many more scenarios based on the public vs. private social context.

As far as the intralanguage analysis is concerned, [106] and [108] did not suggest any direct linguistic transfers from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English. Although the Russian intralanguage findings for the category of *verbalised thought* are not substantial, the results seemed to indicate that the DESs favoured the past-tense forms. Moreover, there is a clear distinction between a large number of present tense forms in the DMTD and the opposite tendency in the DED. This discrepancy does not seem to relate to linguistic transfers. Rather, the fact that both the ENSs and DESs were similar in giving preference to verbalising their beliefs suggests that the DESs had a comparatively better command of the private voice of English than did the RESs.

5.3.4. General conclusions and remarks on the Library situation

First, it is worth commenting on one of the basic foundations of the SAP-model, namely the sequence of its categories. The analysis of the Library scenario revealed that some categories appeared in a different order than expected (see the attached Excel-files III). For instance, the category of *compensation* sometimes followed *justification* instead of preceding it (e.g. *P81: Jeg kan ikke selv nå / Det vil være pænt af dig* for 'I cannot reach it myself (justification) / It will be nice of you (compensation)'). This means that if these utterances are analysed within one and the same 'turn in the wheel', the claim that the categories are arranged in a fixed order does not seem to hold water. Alternatively, if they are construed as separate 'turns in the wheel', the results appeared to be in accordance with the claim. This being said, the idea that the speaker can take several turns in the wheel can lead to ambivalent interpretations, which seems to weaken the theoretical basis of the SAP-model.

Secondly, the interlanguage analysis of the ELFD revealed that the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs largely preferred the 'stating-a-problem' decision model and made use of the interrogative sentence structures most often. A high level of interlanguage agreement between native and non-native speakers of English supported hypothesis IV in that the three groups of respondents appeared to predominantly employ interrogative constructions in the alethic situation description involving Impossibility. Yet, a detailed analysis of the category of *tuners* and the use of the adverb *please* revealed distinct interlanguage differences.

As far as *tuners* are concerned, the ENSs were the only group that overwhelmingly expressed a preference for *tuner I* and its linguistic realisation *excuse me.* While the RESs and the DESs also used it most often, the DESs also appeared to make great use of *tuner II* and its linguistic realisation *sir.* These findings suggest a certain level of interlanguage variation in the use of *tuners* with the 'stating-a-problem' decision model, which can be interpreted in terms of the absence of the private voice of English on the part of the RESs and the DESs. The findings for *tuner II* with the DESs similarly support this tentative conclusion, notably because their requests were more 'formal' and marked a larger distance between the speaker and the hearer than those employed by the native speakers of English. It is, however, unclear how important this interlanguage variation in 'formality' is for the *effectiveness* of the cross-cultural communication via ELF.

The token *please* similarly had different interlanguage results in the three groups. The native speakers of English preferred it in the function of *compensation*, while the non-native speakers of English mostly employed it as *speaker's acceptance Signal.* That is, the ENSs demonstrated the speaker's gratitude for the favour, whereas the RESs and the DESs motivated the hearer by emphasising their desire for the hearer to be cooperative. As in the case of *tuners*, this radically opposite type of behaviour must indicate the absence of the private voice of English on the part of the RESs and the DESs. To establish whether these differences have a negative effect on the *effectiveness* of the cross-cultural communication via ELF would require another type of study, e.g. a speech reception test where native speakers of English respond to requests produced by non-native speakers of English.

The category of *verbalised thought*, which is a functional realisation of all interrogative sentence structures in the ELFD and the MTD, was analysed in terms of the present tense and past tense forms of modal verbs. The former was construed as the speaker's 'description of a real situation', where the speaker is said to use her objective voice, and the latter was dealt with in terms of the speaker's 'description of an imagined world', where the speaker speaks with her subjective voice.

The interlanguage analysis of the ELFD revealed that the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs favoured the subjective voice when framing their requests in the form of interrogatives. These findings imply a high level of interlanguage agreement, which can be interpreted as an indication of the knowledge of the private voice of English on the part of the RESs and the DESs.

This tentative conclusion is further supported by the fact that the intralanguage analysis of the MTD did not reveal any significant linguistic transfers since the RMTSs and the DMTSs demonstrated a different behaviour from the RESs and the DESs.

The intralanguage analysis of *tuners* showed that the RESs used *tuner I* more often than the RMTSs, thereby exhibiting native English speaker behaviour. By contrast, the RMTSs employed *tuner II* to a greater extent than the RESs. On the whole, these results did not suggest any direct linguistic transfer from Russian to Russian English.

Nor did the intralanguage analysis of the DED and the DMTD reveal any direct transfer of *tuners* from Danish to Danish English. The DMTSs largely preferred *tuner I* and were thus similar to the native speakers of English. When speaking English, though, the Danes made less use of *tuner I* (for *excuse me*) and used *tuner II* (for *sir*) more often than the DMTSs.

In other words, these results did not suggest any direct transfer of *tuners* from Danish to Danish English. Moreover, the DESs' use of *sir*, which is said to mark distance between interlocutors, stood in direct contrast to the native speakers of English, who made no use of it at all. This can be read as the absence of the private voice of English on the part of the DESs. And yet, it is hard to determine if it is perceived as being less polite in English. Nor is it possible to establish whether this has a negative effect on the *effectiveness* of the cross-cultural communication between the Danish and the British. In the worst case, the use of *sir* by a Danish English speaker will have the effect of puzzling the British English hearer.

As far the intralanguage results of the token *please* and its Russian and Danish counterparts are concerned, the fact that, in contrast to the ENSs, it was preferred as *speaker's acceptance Signal* by both the mother tongue speakers of Russian and Danish and the RESs and the DESs may be indicative of a certain degree of linguistic transfer from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English. However, the intralanguage results of *please* as *compensation* did not suggest direct linguistic transfer because it occurred more often in the MTD than the ELFD.

Finally, the intralanguage analysis of the category of *verbalised thought* did not suggest any direct linguistic transfer from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English either. The

RMTSs verbalised their beliefs and spoke with the subjective voice less often then the RESs, and the DMTSs, in direct contrast to the DESs, exhibited a clear preference for the objective voice.

Even though the decrease in the amount of *verbalised thought* in the RMTD can be related to the results of another category, namely the *imperative*, which was used by the Russian respondents only, the fact that the Russians preferred to use interrogative constructions in both Russian and Russian English – thereby exhibiting native-speaker-of-English behaviour – can hardly be interpreted in terms of direct linguistic transfer. An exception to this is the occurrence of the four instances of imperative utterances in the RED, which could be a result of direct transfer from Russian, especially because the RMTD revealed ten such instances. Still, it is very unlikely that the Russians' different behaviour in this particular situation would cause miscommunication between the Russian and the British or even lead to offend the latter. This is mainly owing to the fact that the Library scenario instantiates a polite situation where the risk of insulting the hearer is relatively small. Besides, the number of cases of the imperative utterances with the RESs is too small to speak about the *ineffectiveness* of the cross-cultural communication between the Russian and the British in this particular case.

As far as the Danes are concerned, they were the only group who favoured using their objective voice with the interrogative utterances in Danish and largely preferred the subjective voice in English. On the one hand, this suggests no linguistic transfer from Danish to Danish English and indicates their good command of the private voice of English. On the other hand, the predominant use of the objective voice by the DMTSs suggests a difference from the native English speakers' perception. It is not implausible that the Danish perceive politeness in the public space in terms of public trust and functionality rather than the traditional social variable of distance. If my assumption is true, then the application of the objective voice will be licensed as a polite – and highly effective – strategy in public situations.

6. Conclusions and Perspectives

6.1. The method

6.2. The analytical tool

6.3. The results

6.4. Contributions and perspectives

The present study is part of ongoing research within the GEBCom Project, which was initiated to discover whether the culture-specific mental universe belonging to any particular mother tongue influences a non-native English-speaker's production and comprehension of English, and if so, to determine whether this has an effect on the effectiveness of intercultural business communication.

The study at hand has focused on studying speech production at Carlsberg in Great Britain, Russia, and Denmark. The study's object of research was directive speech acts, which, according to Durst-Andersen's conversational-contract view on requests, can shed light on possible reasons for lapses in intercultural communication. The decision to investigate the above-mentioned speech communities relates to the basic assumptions of the theory of communicative supertypes (Durst-Andersen, 2011a): English and Danish represent hearer-oriented languages, whereas Russian belongs to the group of reality-oriented languages. The supertype affiliation is also believed to account for the speakers' general preferences for particular requesting strategies. The British are assumed to prefer indirect requesting strategies such as declaratives and interrogatives because English is said to represent hearer-oriented languages. Danes are also believed to have these strategies as their default choice (i.e. the supertype affiliation), but contrary to the British, they make a much larger use of imperative constructions by virtue of the presence of Danish particles like *bare*, *lige*, *så*, and *nu*. Finally, the Russians favour imperative sentence structures owing to the orientation of their language towards reality. In addition to the aforementioned assumptions, the present study investigates the claim about a private and public voice of a language, according to which people tend to automatically transfer their culture-specific mental universe from mother tongue to ELF. Specifically, the intralanguage analysis of the RMTD and the DMTD on the one hand, and the RED and the DED on the other, has been carried out in order to see whether any linguistic transfers have occurred from Russian and Danish to Russian English and Danish English, and if so, to determine whether these transfers can have a negative effect on the *effectiveness* of intercultural communication via English.

The data was collected by employing a semi-ethnographic method that allowed the collection of cross-cultural linguistic material, namely role play. As far as the analytical tool is concerned, the present study has employed the SAP-model, which is still under development. In the following I shall evaluate the role play method and the analytical tool in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the experiment and the explanatory power of the SAP-model.

6.1. The method

It goes without saying that present-day pragmatic research prefers naturally occurring linguistic data to data elicited in experimental settings. However, the cross-cultural set-up of the present study made it necessary to control for social-cultural variables and specific speech acts, thereby excluding the option of using ethnographic observation. Keeping this in mind, it was important to collect valid linguistic material that would reflect authentic, spontaneous speech as closely as possible. The oral play method was found to meet these cross-cultural requirements. Accordingly, the closed role play was chosen as the primary data elicitation tool on the basis of the following considerations:

1) it is said to produce data that resembles naturally occurring speech more closely than written DCT;

2) it is said to allow more manageable amounts and types of data than ethnographic observation and open role play;

3) it is believed that it is easier to ensure the consistent behaviour of the instructor in a closed role play than in an open one.

4) the internally heterogeneous composition of experimental groups in terms of age, status, and gender parameters is assumed to strengthen the validity of the internal shared patterns;

5) the externally homogeneous composition of experimental groups in terms of age, status, and gender parameters is believed to make the findings of the cross-cultural analysis more valid;

6) the use of cartoons as an additional elicitation tool is thought to elicit more authentic speech;

7) the scenarios were read out loud in order to ensure the consistent behaviour of the instructor;

8) the use of the video camera and the dictaphone allowed a detailed transcription of the data that included not only the linguistic material but also non-verbal language and intonation patterns.

9) the use of semi-structured short interviews immediately after the role play enabled us to gain some qualitative insights into the participants' views, beliefs and opinions regarding requests, i.e. their understanding of extra-linguistic parameters like social distance, social power, and participants' rights and obligations.

Yet, the choice of the experimental tool also exhibited a number of flaws:

1) reading out loud the scenarios may have led to the decrease in authenticity of the experimental set-up and staging the situations might have produced more authentic responses;

2)   the use of the camera may have had an inhibiting effect on the respondents' natural speech production and spontaneity;

3)   some respondents became confused about the cartoons and had a hard time identifying themselves with the person in the picture;

4)   the methodological triangulation of using role play in combination with the ethnographic observation and the WDCT would have increased the credibility and validity of the empirical results;

5)   testing speech production in the form of role play can only tell us one part of the story and a study of speech reception is needed to give a full picture in terms of the *effectiveness* of intercultural communication.

It is difficult to find the ideal method. Totally authentic data are difficult to compare and control while more experimental data, though being more manageable, lack authenticity. The compromise adopted in this study has shown that our choice of tool was indeed able to elicit interesting results.

6.2. The analytical tool

The present study employed Durst-Andersen's theoretical framework to analyse directive speech acts, including the IF-approach from 1995 and his SAP-model, which is still under development. The decision to use this framework is related to the wish to study requests from the point of view of the speaker rather than the hearer and the desire to focus on the process of encoding rather than decoding the message. Moreover, the present framework made it possible to approach requests in terms of the three *decision models* for solving a problem that can surface in the form of three possible syntactic structures, i.e. the imperative from, the declarative from, and the interrogative form, which, contrary to social variables, are limited and tractable. Finally and most importantly, this framework proposed a radically new view of speech acts as trichotomous entities, involving the meaning of Symptom, Signal, and Model, rather than only one of them as in traditional pragmatic research. This means that by saying, for example, *Put your luggage on the trolley*, the speaker not merely 'invites' the hearer to make use of her trolley by Signalling the hearer the 'green light': 'I am removing the obstacle on your way to the trolley.' She also implies that she accepts the new situation, where the hearer's luggage is on her trolley, thereby expressing her emotions: 'I accept / am glad that your luggage is on my trolley'. Finally, the speaker instructs the hearer in how to effectuate the act by showing him a *copy* of the new situation (language) and asking him to realise the *original* (the new situation): 'Do this so that your luggage exists on my trolley.' In other words, the analysis revealed the following strengths of the employed theoretical framework:

1) it proposes a radical framework that encompasses all traditional descriptive strata, from the level of morphology to the level of communication;

2) it views requests in terms of 'social contracts' the speaker and hearer make when they need to solve a particular 'problem'; this can be done directly, mediately, and indirectly;

3) it construes directive speech acts as tripartite entities and allows a more complete and holistic view of them in terms of Symptom, Signal, and Model;

4) it construes the three possible syntactic realisations of requests in terms of three decision models: (1) the 'solving-a-problem' decision model, (2) the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model, and (3) the 'stating-a-problem' decision model;

5) it is based on a functional paraphrase of utterances, which is the rationale for implementing the categorial analysis;

6) the level of effectuation in the pragmatic wheel gives access to a real situation 'out there' where the hearer carries out the physical act;

7) the large number of functional categories enable us to undertake a highly detailed qualitative analysis of the linguistic material, e.g. the analysis of *tuners* in terms of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person.

However, the use of this holistic framework revealed the following weaknesses:

1) its immense conceptual inventory made it difficult to keep the common thread and to navigate between various categories and their linguistic realisations;

2) its holistic nature made it difficult to apply it to real data in the form of requests;

3) its phenomenological nature made its application largely impressionistic, allowing more than one plausible interpretation of one and the same utterance (see section 5.2.1.2.2);

4) the irreversible order of its categories did not prove to be true for all cases because sometimes the respondents appeared to change the sequence (see the attached Excel-file III);

5) the idea that the speaker can make several turns in the pragmatic wheel resulted in the fuzziness of the boundaries between individual speech acts within one and the same communicative event (see section 5.2.1.2.2), thereby resulting in ambiguous readings;

6) the analysis of the Window situation revealed the inability of the IF to account for some of the data and should therefore be revised in terms of the imperative frames involving Prohibition and Non-necessity;

7) its many categories made it difficult to test the qualitative results by submitting them to the quantitative analysis.

Despite its weaknesses, the analytical tool proved to be very useful, its most important asset being its ability to detect differences in making requests across various speech communities by locating the speaker's point of departure in or outside the pragmatic wheel. Likewise it is difficult to overestimate the explanatory value of its trichotomous view on speech acts. In this respect, further research should be done in order to address the issues that have not been solved in the present study.

6.3. The results

My conclusions are based on 363 cases of the three situations that were chosen for the present analysis: the Trolley scenario instantiating deontic Permission, the Window scenario representing deontic Prohibition, and the Library scenario exemplifying alethic Impossibility. The present study examines the requesting patterns of the British English speakers, the Danish speakers of English and Danish, and the Russian speakers of English and Russian. The preliminary analysis of the 17 scenario descriptions did not reveal any obvious correlation between the social variables and the linguistic output, which led to the decision to only indirectly include the explanatory factor of social variables and mainly restrict myself to the study of syntactic structures, which are tractable and finite.

6.3.1.   The interlanguage results for the ENSs, the RESs, and the DESs

The British (the control group)

Research hypothesis I stated that native speakers of British English largely employ indirect requesting strategies such as questions. The analysis of the Trolley situation only partially confirmed the hypothesis, notably because the British were the only group who used the largest number of the 'stating-a-problem' decision model in English. However, they appeared to employ the 'solving-a-problem' decision model as often as the 'stating-a-problem' decision model, which can be related to the particular design of this situation. Namely, the detailed analysis of the British responses in terms of *release* and *justification* allowed to get at a very salient detail: the respondents preferred to justified their requests by talking about the trolley, thereby reversing the deontic scenario of Permission into an alethic situation of Possibility. Accordingly, imperatives formulated in alethic terms seem to be less coercive than those framed as deontic permissions, which is mainly the rationale behind the received results.

The design of the Window situation in terms of the impending danger similarly seemed to override the speaker's need to pay attention to the hearer's face in the form of the indirect requesting strategies as well as such mitigating devices as the adverb *please*.

The only case where all British respondents made use of the 'stating-a-problem' decision model and verbalised past-tense interrogative sentence structures was the Library situation, where the speaker and hearer are said not to 'share the same world'. This finding completely confirms hypothesis IV since I expected the majority of the respondents participating in the SPTs to make use of interrogatives with the situation instantiating Impossibility. The only feature that needs to be mentioned here is that the

British were the only group that largely used the token *please* in the function of *compensation*, presumably signalling their gratitude for the provided favour.

Bearing in mind the design of the three scenarios and the sparsity of the studied samples, the findings of the present study confirmed hypothesis IV and did not falsify hypothesis I. Further similar studies are necessary to investigate the latter more fully.

The Russians

In accordance with research hypothesis III, the Russians were expected to transfer direct requesting strategies from Russian to ELF. The analysis of the Trolley situation, the Window situation, and the Library situation did not exhibit any obvious linguistic transfers.

They preferred the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model and verbalised declarative utterances with the Trolley situation. They exhibited a behaviour similar to the ENSs' requesting behavior in both the Library situation and the Window situation, mostly using the 'stating-a-problem' decision model with the former and largely employing negated imperatives with the latter.

I interpret the findings for the Trolley situation as the lack of the private voice in English in that, contrary to the ENSs, the RESs mostly used the 'best-bid-to-a-solution-for-a-problem' decision model. While the 'solving-a-problem' decision model can be seen as too coercive, the 'stating-a-problem' decision model can be perceived as too unnatural by the Russian respondents. Consequently, they seem to compensate for their presumed lack of the private voice in English by giving preference to the declarative sentence structure in English. This tentative conclusion seems to be in line with their use of *please* in the function of *speaker's acceptance Symptom*. More specifically, the RESs largely used it in order to emphasise their willingness to meet the needs of the hearer, whereas the native speakers of English made a very little use of *please* with the Trolley situation. Finally, the results showed that the Russians were the only group who verbalised the categories of *execution* and *compensation* with the Trolley situation, which makes them stand out from the other two groups. These differences are presumably related to the lack of the private voice in English. Still, it is difficult to conclude whether this may have any negative effect on the *effectiveness* of the intercultural communication via ELF. Given the polite context of this situation, in the worst case the Russians' requests will have the effect of puzzling the British English hearer.

As was the case with the British, the findings for the Window situation can similarly be attributed to the design of this situation rather than linguistic transfer from Russian. In contrast to the native speakers of English, though, the Russians highlighted their desire for the hearer to be cooperative with

the help of *please*, which could be a case of expressing compensation for intrusion in a polite way. In this respect, this finding can indicate the case of overcompensation for the lack of the private voice in English, which within the Window situation can only have a very polite effect on the English hearer.

Finally, the results for the Library situation can be interpreted in terms of the Russians' knowledge of the private voice in English, notably because most of them framed their requests in the form of past-tense interrogatives. And yet, the use of *please* in the function of *speaker's acceptance Signal* distinguishes them from the native speakers of English, who used it in order to express their gratitude for the favour. Again, it seems very unlikely that this behavior will be perceived as being less polite – and hence less effective – in English.

The Danes

In accordance with research hypothesis III, the Danes were expected to transfer direct requesting strategies from Danish to ELF. As in the case with the Russians, this did not seem to be the case. Interestingly, the Danes appeared to employ more or less the same requesting strategies in the three situations in English as did the Russians. Yet, the analysis of DED did exhibit several unexpected differences. Among these were the Danes' use of permissive constructions like *Let me / Allow me* in the Trolley situation and they compensated for the lack of the private voice in English in the form of pronounced use of the tuner *sir* in the Library situation. However, this deviation from the requesting behavior of the native speakers of English can hardly be interpreted as less polite or less effective. In all probability, it will at most be perceived as being slightly odd by the British English hearer. Still, it is not possible to make any reasonable suggestions about the effectiveness of the intercultural communication without studying the same situations from the point of view of speech reception.

6.3.2.   The cross-cultural results for the RMTSs and the DMTSs

The Russians

According to research hypothesis II, the Russians are more likely to employ direct requesting strategies when communication takes place in their mother tongue. The analysis of the RMTD showed this to be the case only for the Trolley situation, where the majority of the respondents employed the 'solving-a-problem' decision model. In the Library situation, the majority of the Russian respondents employed the 'stating-a-problem' decision model, whereas the remaining speakers appeared to use the imperative form.

In the Window situation, the respondents preferred the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model. I am inclined to explain this in terms of the design of the Window situation, which describes impending danger rather than stopping the ongoing activity, thus presumably allowing more polite declaratives framed as alethic Non-necessity, rather than coercive prohibitive imperatives like *Don't do it*! Until further research has been undertaken, there are as yet insufficient grounds to falsify research hypothesis II.

Even though the results for the Window situation deviated from my initial expectations, the findings for the Trolley and Library situation did provide confirmation for research hypothesis II. In addition, hypothesis IV appeared to hold water too in that the majority of Russian requests in the Library situation instantiated interrogative constructions.

The Danes

According to research hypothesis II, Danes are more likely to employ direct requesting strategies when communication takes place in their mother tongue. The analysis of the three situations did not prove this to be the case in that the respondents appeared to largely prefer indirect requesting strategies with all three scenarios. Hypothesis II was formulated in accordance with the assumption that the presence in Danish of modal particles like *bare*, *lige*, *nu*, and *så* allows the use of the imperative sentence structure. Yet, the present analysis did not reveal any correlation between the employment of the particles and the choice of the 'solving-a-problem' decision model.

As in the case of the Russian findings, the lack of correspondence between hypothesis II and the Danish findings for the Window and the Library situations could be a result of their design. However, the findings for the Trolley scenario indicated an unexpected pattern of requesting behaviour, where the social variable of power of the hearer (+P(ower) seems to be a determining factor for the speaker's choice of decision model. Moreover, the analysis revealed what I believe can be seen as a characteristic feature of Danish requesting behaviour. Notably, the Danes' more extensive use of the permissive constructions *Let me / Allow me* with the Trolley situation than was the case in the other two groups implies their pronounced readiness to render assistance.

This being said, the situations chosen for the analysis in the present study did not allow me to establish whether hypothesis II holds water, and whether the Danes do or do not largely employ imperative constructions in combination with various particles. To establish this it would be necessary to study situations similar to that of the Trolley, but with a different internal composition, for example with a symmetrical power relationship between the speaker and the hearer as well as with a (+P(ower)

speaker and (-P(ower) hearer.

As far as hypothesis IV is concerned, the findings for the Library situation are totally confirmed since the only decision model used by the DMTSs was that of 'stating-a-problem'.

6.3.3. The intralanguage results for the Russians and the Danes

The Russians

On the surface, the analysis did not reveal any direct syntactic transfers from Russian to Russian English that could have a diminishing effect on the effectiveness of the intercultural communication. With the Trolley situation, the Russians preferred the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model in English, even though they largely used the 'solving-a-problem' decision model when speaking Russian. However, between the two groups of non-native speakers of English that participated in the SPTs, the Russians' second favourite strategy in English was the use of the imperative form. The same holds true for the Russian English findings for the Library situation, where the Russians were the only group who used the 'solving-a-problem' decision model and verbalised a relatively high number of imperative utterances.

These two findings can be regarded as an instance of direct grammatical transfer from Russian to Russian English, partially confirming research hypothesis III according to which the Russians transfer the imperative form found in Russian to Russian English.

Moreover, due to the original conceptualisation of the imperative form within the pragmatic wheel, i.e. Symptom, Signal, and Model, it was possible to identify several interesting 'covert' transfers.

In the Trolley situation, the RESs were the only group who appeared to exhibit a distinct behaviour of employing the category of *motivation* in conjunction with the category of *satisfaction conditions*. Since the category of aspect in Russian is said to put the main emphasis on the category of *satisfaction conditions*, the marked use of *motivation* with this category in particular can be regarded as an instance of the indirect influence of Russian aspect on Russian English.

In addition, the RESs largely used the category of *speaker's acceptance Symptom* and the fact that the RESs were the only group who made use of the categories of *compensation* and *execution* can also be viewed as a covert influence of the default imperative constructions in Russian on Russian English. This is because, in Russian, the grammatical form of the imperative coupled with a verb in the perfective or imperfective aspect automatically makes it possible to verbalise three meanings simultaneously,

i.e. Symptom, Signal, and Model. As already mentioned, a direct transfer of the imperative sentence structure from Russian was not significant in the RED. What I did find, though, seems to be a covert influence of Russian on English. That is, in Russian, the three meanings of the category of imperative are *grammaticalised* within a single form of the verb in the imperative mood, but they surface in English separately through *lexical* realisations of Symptom, Signal, and Model.

If this explanation is valid, then linguistic transfers can be said to play a role different from that originally envisaged. That is, they are not necessarily realised in the form of direct transfers from L1 to L2. L1 can actually have a covert influence on L2 in the form of prompting various compensatory strategies, in casu filling lexically the lacking meanings of Symptom and Model. Even though this explanation is highly speculative and for the present cannot be supported by other internal linguistic evidence, the assumption that the category of aspect plays such a crucial role in Russian that its traces can be found even in Russians' L2 definitely deserves closer inspection.

While it is doubtful that the presence of the above-mentioned direct and indirect transfers in the Trolley situation can lead to misunderstandings in the intercultural communication via ELF, the instances of direct transfer in the Library situation, although sparse, are likely to bring about miscommunication, if not cause direct offense.

All in all, if we consider the direct syntactic transfers from Russian to Russian English as well as accept the notion that the effect of covert influence of the mother tongue on L2 that can surface in the form of various compensatory strategies is comparable to direct transfers, then the present results for the Russians can be said to partially prove research hypothesis III.

The Danes

The analysis of the three situations did not reveal any direct syntactic transfer from Danish to Danish English. Interestingly, the Danes exhibited a different form of requesting behaviour when they spoke English: i.e. they mostly used the 'best-bid-for-a-solution-to-a-problem' decision model in the Trolley situation; the adverb *please* in conjunction with the 'solving-a-problem' decision model in the Window situation; and the subjective voice together with the 'stating-a-problem' decision model in the Library situation. The fact that this behaviour did not completely resemble the behaviour of the native speakers of English and can thus be attributed to their lack of the private voice in English has already been discussed above. The only transfer worth mentioning, which I construe as an 'indirect' transfer, seems to be the Danes' pronounced readiness to help in the Trolley situation that surfaced in the form of the permissive forms *Let me / Allow me* in Danish English and appeared as various interrogative

constructions in Danish. This feature, though, might have an even more polite effect on the British English hearer than the 2nd person imperative constructions that were largely used by the ENSs.

Summing up the intralanguage results for the Danes, the analysis of the three situations did not enable me to find support for the assumption that the Danes transfer direct requesting strategies from Danish to Danish English.

6.4. Contributions and perspectives

This study is part of a larger initiative sponsored by the Carlsberg Foundation to investigate the belief that English as a Lingua Franca is the most cost-effective medium of communication. The fourth largest brewery company in the world, the Carlsberg Group, was among the first to recognise that introducing English as the company's sole medium of cross-cultural communication is a challenging task. Its direct involvement in the GEBCom project, mostly in the form of providing respondents to the tests, was an attempt to face this problem and find possible solutions.

Even though the present study has analysed only a small sample, if its findings were to be aggregated on a larger scale, knowledge about the subtle transfers found so far could prove instrumental in improving global communication, say, in the form of teaching material for cross-cultural business organisations that use English as medium of communication. Hopefully, the present study will, at the very least, do its share towards underpinning the importance of the role of the mother tongue and will help raise awareness among global corporations that the use of English as the sole medium of intercultural communication can be a risky venture. This is because even minor cultural transfers can diminish the effectiveness of the communication via ELF and the recognition of that can potentially save companies billions of dollars. Nelson Mandela once said that ELF goes to your head, a mother tongue to your heart. And since business is not only a matter of the head, but also of the heart, it is important to strike the right balance between the use of L1 and ELF in a multinational company.

I see my own major contribution to the development of the theoretical framework employed in the study as being the description of the SAP-model and the pragmatic wheel.[9] Notably, I have attempted to validate the proposed categories by drawing on the data collected in the SPTs and justifying their semasiological capacity by connecting them to similar theoretical and empirical descriptions found elsewhere. In addition, I have subjected the model to empirical data in the form of requests and

9 After I had completed the description of the SAP-model, including the pragmatic wheel, and only a few weeks before submitting my thesis, Durst-Andersen (2016) summarised his latest views on the pragmatic wheel in a Danish article entitled *Introduktion til det pragmatiske hjul* – En ny tilgang til direktiver. Any changes in his conceptualisation have therefore not been included in my description.

evaluated its explanatory power. It is due to my application of the original idea that any speech act can simultaneously have the meaning of Symptom, Signal, and Model that I managed to discover covert linguistic phenomena that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. And if the proverb 'God is in the detail' is true and the truth lies in the detail, subtlety, and refinement, then with this dissertation we have come one step closer to understanding the deeper mechanisms of intercultural communication.

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Appendices

Appendix I – Pilot test

Appendix II – Demographics: the ESPTs

Appendix III – The ESPTs

Appendix IV – Demographics: the NSPTs

Appendix V – The Danish NSPT

Appendix VI – The Russian NSPT

Appendix VII – CLAN transcriptions

Appendix I

Pilot test

The overview of the situations presented in the same order as during the test

Situation	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social distance
Bus (demonstration)	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Copy-machine	Permission	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Dog	Prohibition	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Dinner	Permission	**Private**	Children	**Speaker**	Some
Library	Impossibility	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Dessert	Permission	**Public**	Waiter	**Speaker**	Undefined
Trolley	Permission	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Train station	Cancellation of obligation	**Public**	An elderly lady	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Bill	Permission	**Public**	Waiter	**Speaker**	Undefined
Crab	Prohibition	**Public**	Waiter	**Speaker**	Undefined
Lunch	Cancellation of obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Window	Prohibition	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Resignation	Prohibition	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Mobile	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Chit-chat	Obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Birthday	Obligation	**Private**	Mother	**Hearer**	Undefined
Moving	Cancellation of obligation	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Bank	Obligation	**Formal**	A younger man	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Meeting	Cancellation of obligation	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great

The overview of the pictures used during the test

Bus situation

Copy-machine situation

Dog situation

Dinner situation

Library situation

Dessert situation

Trolley situation

Train-station situation

Bill situation

Crab situation

Lunch situation

Window situation

Resignation situation

Mobile situation

Chit-chat situation

Birthday situation

Moving situation

Bank situation

Meeting situation

The announcement for recruiting test subjects

Help us with our research!
And get 2 MOVIE TICKETS ☺

We are a group of researchers from Copenhagen Business School, who are working on the Global English Communication Project. We are looking for international students from Russia, China, Japan, and Great Britain, as well as Danish students, who are willing to participate in our pilot-test. The respondents we look for should speak <u>no other languages</u> than their <u>mother tongue</u> and <u>English</u>.

During the test you will get several short scenario descriptions in English (e.g. Bus-scenario, Café-scenario), which you will have to react to verbally.

Besides being of great help to the research, you will be thanked in the form of two movie tickets ☺

Those who are interested in participating in the test are kindly asked to contact *Olga Holberg*, either by mail – <u>oh.ibc@cbs.dk</u> or by phone – (+45) 30 13 18 32.

Demographic information in Survey Exact sent to test subjects via e-mail

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Your mail address

_____

Gender

(1) ❏ Male

(2) ❏ Female

Age

(1) ❏ 20-24 years old

(2) ❏ 25-29 years old

(3) ❏ 30-34 years old

(4) ❏ 35-39 years old

(5) ❏ 40-49 years old

(6) ❏ 50-59 years old

(7) ❏ 60-69 years old

(8) ❏ 70 years old or above

Country of birth

_____

Current city/town

_____

Mother tongue

_____

Foreign language 1

_____

Other foreign languages (if relevant)

_____

Current job-title

_____

The total amount of received English classes
(3) ❑ 3-6 months
(1) ❑ 1 year
(2) ❑ 2-3 years
(4) ❑ 4-6 years
(5) ❑ 7 years or more

How much English teaching have you received this year?

_____

How many hours a week do you practise your English?

_____

The longest stay abroad and the language used

The name of the country   _____
How long have you stayed
there?   _____
What was the purpose of the
stay?   _____

English skills
(1) ❑ Excellent: Mother tongue level of English
(2) ❑ Very high: Have no problems with understanding and speaking English
(3) ❑ High: Have a few problems with understanding and speaking English
(4) ❑ Average: Neither high, nor low
(5) ❑ Below average: Have some problems with understanding and speaking English
(6) ❑ Low: Have big problems with understanding and speaking English
(7) ❑ Very low: Can hardly understand and speak English

The test procedure: presentation and instructions

Hello and welcome! My name is Olga and this is my colleague, Mary-Ann. During the following 20 minutes, you will engage in a role-play, where Mary-Ann will read several short scenarios for you and you'll have to respond to them by giving an immediate reaction. While Mary-Ann is reading a particular scenario for you, your task is to listen carefully and try to imagine the situation as if you were in it yourself. You do not have to think too much about the answer, but to come up with an immediate reaction instead. As an extra help for you, Mary-Ann will give you a picture that shows the situation before reading the scenario description. I will sit behind / next to you and observe the role play – so, please, try to ignore me.

For you to see what we expect you to do, Mary-Ann and I are now going to demonstrate you the role-play, where I will be playing your part. After that, you can ask whatever question you might have.

> **Imagine that you are on a bus**
> It is early morning, and you are on your way to work by a crowded bus. You are standing close to other passengers being squeezed on all sides. You feel that a young man behind you is fiddling with your bag, so you turn to him and ask him politely to stop doing that. You turn away from him, but can feel him fiddling with your bag again. You get angry, turn to him for the second time and say:
> (Observer): *If you don't stop now, I'll call the police!*
> (Instructor): *Keep your hair on!*

I'd also like to point out that your responses will help us with a larger survey on how people make requests in English, and we would really appreciate if you don't worry about the correctness of your English, because it's not important to us. Please, feel relaxed and natural about the whole set-up.

Finally, all information is completely confidential and nobody will know about your responses because your name will be anonymised.

After the survey, I'll ask a couple of questions about your thoughts and ideas about the scenarios. Do you have any questions before we begin? Alright. Let's go to it!

The interview after the test

The observer:

1. I'd just like to hear what did you think about the scenarios.

2. Which scenario made the largest impression on you?

3. Did you find any of the scenarios strange/odd or unrealistic?

The situations presented in the same order as during the test

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You are printing out a large number of copies of a meeting agenda. Your colleague, John, comes into the copy room. There are two copy machines there, and only one of them works. John looks like he needs to use the copy machine *right now*, but does not dare ask you about that. You want to let him know that it is quite ok to use it, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Thanks a lot, mate!'

Imagine that you are at home

You invite your friend, Mike, over for a beer. He has not seen you for some time and does not know that you've acquired a puppy. You see that Mike likes the puppy and is about to pick it up, but you forgot to tell him that your sweet puppy is a biter. You do not want a dog bite victim on your hands, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Oh, cheers mate!'

Imagine that you are at home

It is evening and you are having a family dinner with the grandparents. The children have finished their meal and look as if they would like to leave the table, rather than sit and wait for the grown-ups. However, the children hesitate to ask for permission to get down. You wish to let them know that it is ok to leave the table, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Thanks, dad / mom!'

Imagine that you are at the library

You have come to the library to find a good textbook on English grammar. The librarian has recommended you one and has told you where to find it. You have found the right bookcase and the book, but you cannot get at the shelf because a tall elderly gentleman is standing just in front of it. You want him to take the book from the shelf for you, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Certainly! Just a moment. Here you are.'

Imagine that you are at a restaurant

You have invited your colleagues out for dinner, which you are going to pay for. All of you have finished eating the main course and the waiter comes to clear the table. He asks whether you want the dessert and fruit now, which you say yes to. Still, he did not ask about serving coffee with the dessert, and you can see that the waiter is not going to serve it. You want to let him know that it is alright for him to serve the coffee too, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Very well, sir.'

Imagine that you are at the airport

You are on a business trip with your boss, Jack Johnson. The plane has just landed, and you have collected your suitcase and put it on a trolley. Then you see your boss walking with his two suitcases, but no trolley. You only have one suitcase and you believe that your boss needs the trolley more than you do. You want to let him know that it is fine by you, if he uses your trolley, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you so much. It's very kind of you.'

Imagine that you are at a restaurant

You are having a nice dinner with your family. You have finished eating the dessert and have asked the waiter to bring you the bill. He does so and quickly leaves you again, so that you can check the bill. He comes back to you after a while and clears the table. You have put the payment on the table, but the waiter hesitates to take it. You can see that he wants to take the money, and you want to let him know that it is ok for him to take it, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you.'

Imagine that you are at a restaurant

You are at a dinner party organised by your department. You are going to have crab as a starter, and your colleague, John, who is sitting next to you, tells you that he is allergic to crab, and that he has ordered another dish instead of it. While he has gone to the toilet, a waiter appears with the crab. He is about to put the plate with the crab in front of John's chair. You want to prevent the waiter from doing it. So, you say to him in English:

(Instructor's response): 'I'm sorry, sir. I'll be back in a minute with the starter for Mr John.'

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You are sitting in your office and the lunchtime break is soon. You usually have lunch with your colleague, Anna, at 12 p.m. It is almost 12 now, but you are still writing a report, which you have to submit to your boss as quickly as possible. So you call Anna and ask her to wait for you. Half an hour has passed and you still haven't finished your report. You call her again and want to give her the possibility to go for lunch without you, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'No worries at all.'

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You are sitting in a meeting. It is quite hot in the room, and you can see that your boss, Jack Johnson, is walking towards the window in order to open it. Apparently, he doesn't know that the window is broken, and if you open it, it will fall out. You want to prevent him from opening it and say to him in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you. I didn't know.'

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You are going to quit your job for a better-paid one in another company. You decide to wait telling the news to your colleagues until the last day of work. One day you talk to your wife on the phone about your new job. Your good colleague, John, overhears that and asks you whether you are going to leave them. You know that he talks a lot and are afraid that the news will get out before you planned it. You want to ensure he keeps silent, so you tell him in English:

(Instructor's response): 'No worries, mate. Mum's the word.'

Imagine that we are sitting in the quiet compartment on a train in England

It is early morning, and you are on your way to work. There are four people in the compartment. Suddenly, a mobile phone rings, and a young girl in front of you picks it up. She starts speaking loudly. After she has finished her talk, one of the passengers draws her attention to the "quiet" sign, while *you* say to her: "Could you please go outside next time your phone rings?" Five minutes later the young girl's mobile is again ringing, and she starts speaking loudly, ignoring everyone. That is enough for you, so you leave her no chance by saying in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Alright, alright! Already on my way out.'

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You have been busy the whole day preparing a presentation for an important meeting. Your good colleague, Anna, comes into your office and starts talking. You say to her: "Anna, please, could you leave now, because I need to finish a presentation this afternoon?" But she does not understand that you want her to leave. You ask her twice to leave, but she keeps on talking. Now you lose patience and, in order to get rid of her, say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Ok, ok. I get the picture. I'm leaving now.'

Imagine that you are at home

You are having a birthday party for your child. Family and friends are invited. Your mother gives him a present. Your son forgets to thank his grandmother for the present. She finds that rude and corrects the child in front of everyone. Your son gets very upset and is about to cry. And you say to your mother: "Please, mum." But she ignores your request and continues telling off the child. You get angry with her and to protect your son from her, so you take your mother to one side and say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Very well. I just thought that a few good manners wouldn't do any harm.'

Imagine that you are at home

You have asked your good friend, John, to help you move into a new flat. He happily agreed to do so, although he lives far away and is busy at the moment. Now it turns out that your family is coming to help you, so his help is not needed anymore. You call him to let him know that your family is going to help you instead of him, so you say in English:

(Instructor's response): 'Fine by me, mate. No offence taken.'

Imagine that you are in the bank

You have an appointment with your bank manager in 10 minutes. A younger man sits next to you. Suddenly, he turns to you and asks whether he can borrow a pen. You take out a very expensive Montblanc fountain pen and give it to him. Five minutes later you ask him politely about the pen. He says that he will give it back in a minute and keeps on writing in his notebook. You have to see your manager now and ask him twice about the pen – but he still keeps on writing. You get up from the chair and want to have your expensive pen back *now*, so you say to him:

(Instructor's response): 'My bad, sir / mme. Sorry about that. Here you are.'

Imagine that you are at your place of work

You are sitting in a meeting. It is quite stuffy in the room, and you can see that your boss, Mr Jones, is walking towards the window in order to open it. Apparently, he doesn't know that the latch is broken, and you that it is impossible close it again if you open it. You want to prevent him from opening it and say to him:

(Instructor's response): 'Thanks for letting me know. I appreciate it.'

Appendix II

The Demographics:
English Speech Production Tests

E-mail

_____

Gender

(1)   male

(2)   female

Age

(1)   15-19

(2)   20-24

(3)   25-29

(4)   30-34

(5)   35-39

(6)   40-49

(7)   50-59

(8)   60-69

(9)   70 or above

Nationality

_____

What language(s) have you grown up with?

_____

Latest (completed) education

(1)

(2) Secondary school

(3) Sixth Form (college)

(4) Undergraduate (bachelor's degree)

(5) Post-graduate (master's degree)

(6) PhD

Current job title

_____

English skills (1: beginner .... 7: as good as my native language)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Writing skills	(1) ❑	(2)	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Speaking skills	(1) ❑	(2)	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Reading skills	(1) ❑	(2)	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Listening skills	(1) ❑	(2)	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑

Have you ever lived in other countries than your home country?

(1) Yes

(2) No

If you answered "yes" to the above, please continue answering the following questions:

Where have you lived?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

How long have you lived in this country?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

How often do you use English?

(1)   Weekly

(2)   Daily

When do you use English?

(1)   At work only

(2)   At work and privately

If you ticked "At work and privately", please specify when and with whom.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Gender

	Male	Female	In all
Danes	11	14	25
Russians	11	14	25
British	14	10	24

Age

	15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 34	35 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 - 69	70 or above
Danes			2	5	5	8	4	1	
Russian		7	5	5	1	6	1		
British		3	3	4	4	6	4		

Nationality

	Danish	Russian	Latvian	British
Danes	25			
Russians		24	1	
British				24

What language(s) have you grown up with?

	Danish	Russian	English	Ukrainian	Bulgarian	Hungarian	Hindi	Punjabi	German
Danes	25					1			
Russian		25	2	1	1				
British			24				1	1	1

Mother tongue(s)

	Danish	Russian	English	Latvian	Hungarian	Hindi	Punjabi
Danes	24				1		
Russian		25		1			
British			23			1	1

Other languages, if any

	Danish	English	German	French	Italian	Spanish	Hungarian
Danes	25	6	5	1	2	1	
Russians	25	3	5				
British		1	2				

Latest (completed) education

	Junior high school	Secondary school	Sixth Form (college)	Undergraduate (bachelor's degree)	Post-graduate (master's degree)	PhD	Technical college
Danes	1	2	6	13			3
Russians		3	7	12	3		
British	5	6	8	5			

Current job title

	Management	Middle management	Administration	Production/ technical support	Miscellaneous
Danes	6	14	2		3
Russians	6	18			
British	2	8	12	2	

English skills (1: beginner .... 7: as good as my native language)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Danes							
writing skills			2		13	9	1
speaking skills			1	1	11	11	1
reading skills			2		8	13	2
listening skills			1	1	10	12	1
Russians							
writing skills			3	5	13	4	
speaking skills			1	10	11	3	
reading skills			1	1	14	8	1
listening skills			4	7	10	4	

Have you ever lived in other countries than your home country?

	Yes	No
Danes	16	9
Russians	5	20
British	7	17

Where have you lived?

	Danes	Russians	British
Australia	1		1
Austria	1		
Belarus		1	
Canada	1		
China	2		
Cyprus		1	
Denmark			1
England	1		
Estonia		1	
Finland		1	
France	1	1	
Germany	1		
Hong Kong	1		
Hungary	1		
India		1	1
Ireland			2
Latvia		1	
Luxemburg	1		
New Zealand	1		1
Singapore			1
USA	7		

How long have you lived in this country?

	Danes	Russians	British
Australia	7 months		2 years
Austria	2 years		
Belarus		5 years	
Canada	1 year		
China	6 months		
	7 months		
Cyprus		3 months	
Denmark			12 months
England	1 year		
Estonia		1 year	
Finland		8 months	

France	11 months	my whole life	
Germany	4 years		
Holland	5 months in 2006		
Hong Kong	½ year		
Hungary	8½ years		
India		6 months	21 years
Ireland			10 years
			3 years approx.
Latvia			
Luxemburg	½ year		
Latvia		36 years	
New Zealand	11 months		4 months
Singapore			2 years
USA	2 years		
	3 years		
	4 years		
	2 years		
	1 year		
	1 year (93/94)		
	11 months		

How often do you use English?

	Weekly	Daily
Danes	1	24
Russians	16	9

When do you use English?

	At work only	At work & privately
Danes	14	11
Russians	12	13

If you ticked 'At work and privately', please specify when and with whom.

Danes	Russians
Med kollegaer, venner og familie	when I travel abroad (business or leisure).
på arbejde - kollegaer privat - venner (fra UK, Colombia)	Some my friends in Europe countries and via social network

Når jeg er privat med kollegaer eller på ferie	I have a friend from England and watch some movies
Engelsk er arbejdssprog Privat; i samtale mv.	In presentations for colleagues
Har familie i USA og har haft udvekslingsstudent boende. Har også udenlandske venner.	At work - colleagues from abroad At home – with foreign friends
min undervisning har være på engelsk siden 2005. dvs skriftlige opgaver, mundtlig eksamen, præsentationer - modtage undervisning i tale og skrift. jeg har venner fra Spanien, Rusland og Indonesien og taler derfor ofte engelsk med dem. Flere af mine familie medlemmer er fra Polen og Italien.	I am a buddy for an employee from other country, so we go to a notary, to a doctor etc. When I am travelling (3-4 times per a year) I speak English.
Kolleger, eksterne samarbejdspartnere (analytikere, investorer)	Communications with friends from another countries, some web-resources
Hovedparten af det man læser online er engelsk (manualer, guides, skrifter mv.) Film, Ikke dansktalende venner mv. Hvornår: sporadisk Hvem: venner + det meste læsning	I use English for communications with my colleagues from Carlsberg. I have friends among citizen of Great Britain, Cyprus, Australia, and Germany. They visit me in Sankt-Petersburg. Two of my friends (native speakers) live in Sankt-Petersburg and we have meetings very often.
Læser privat bøger på engelsk og ser tv uden undertekster	During travelling, may be while professional books reading
på rejser....	Speaking with friends (Internet, Skype)
Havde engelsktalende kæreste for nylig	With colleagues, friends, working with computer
	With my daughter I help her with English homework, during English courses at home with my husband and teacher
	A little at the internet
	With my French colleague to discuss some interesting things; listen music and watching movies; read some articles in English.

Appendix III

Carlsberg Tests:

English Speech Production Tests

The overview of the situations presented in the same order as during the test

Situation	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social distance
Mobile (demonstration)	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Copy-machine	Permission	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Bank	Obligation	**Formal**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Train-station	Cancellation of obligation	**Public**	An elderly lady	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Resignation	Prohibition	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Ice-cream	Permission	**Private**	Colleague's son	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Peanuts	Prohibition	**Public**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Lunch	Cancellation of obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Seat	Permission	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Birthday	Obligation	**Private**	Mother	**Hearer**	Undefined
Window	Prohibition	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Moving	Cancellation of obligation	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Poison	Prohibition	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Chit-chat	Obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Trolley	Permission	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Bus	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Library	Impossibility	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Meeting	Cancellation of obligation	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great

The overview of the pictures used during the test

Mobile situation

Copy-machine situation

Bank situation

Train-station situation

Resignation situation

Ice-cream situation

Peanuts situation

Lunch situation

Seat situation

Birthday situation

Window situation

Moving situation

Poison situation

Chit-chat situation

Trolley situation

Bus situation

Library situation

Meeting situation

The consent form in English

COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

CONSENT FORM
Research group for Global English as international business language

Material gathered during this research will be treated as confidential and securely stored. In subsequent publications or use of these recordings your name will be removed where used and your comments made unattributable. Likewise, the name of the company you represent will be altered and details that might identify the company will be changed or left out, as will sensitive information about the company. You may at any point withdraw from participating in the data collection without giving any explanation.

By signing this consent form you agree to the activity you participate in being recorded and to these recordings being used for research purposes (in accordance with the conditions outlined above) by researchers at the Research group for Global English as international business language. Short clips may be used during research activities and conference presentations.

If you agree to participate in this research under the conditions outlined here and in the information sheet, please sign below. The principal researcher will countersign.

I, the respondent, agree to these conditions (please use capital letters):

Name: Email:

Position: Nationality:

Signature: Date:

I, the principal researcher, agree to these conditions:

Name:

Signature: Date:

Research group for Global English as international business language: The significance of the mother tongue for speech production, reception, and the formation of association

COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

INFORMATION SHEET

General information concerning recordings

You are being asked to participate in the audio and/or visual recordings of a particular activity. This information sheet tells you about the study you are participating in, how the recordings will be carried out, and how the data will be used and stored after the recordings are completed.

The GEBCom Project: Global English as international business language

The GEBCom project is an international research team that has been established by researchers from Copenhagen Business School. The purpose of the GEBCom project is to investigate whether any given mother tongue influences one's production of requests in English, as well as comprehension of certain English texts and words.

Recordings are confidential and participation is anonymous and voluntary

All material gathered during the study will be treated as confidential and securely stored. Furthermore, participation in the project is anonymous. This means that in subsequent use of the material your name will be removed where used and if relevant your comments will be adjusted so they cannot be attributed to you. Likewise, the company you represent is also guaranteed change and/or removal of name and business details (cf. "Consent Form"). You may at any point withdraw from participating in the data collection without giving any explanation. In such a case, please contact Olga Holberg at oh.ibc@cbs.dk or +45 3815 3969.

What happens to the recorded material?

The audiovisual files will be archived and transcribed. Members of the GEBCom project will be able to use the material and the transcripts for research purposes and subsequent publication. Excerpts may be played to other bona fide researchers (e.g. at conferences), and anonymized screen shots (where video has been produced) used in publications. The material may also be used in seminars and workshops providing feedback to the workplaces involved in the research.

Feel free to contact Olga Holberg should you have any further questions at oh.ibc@cbs.dk or +45 3815 3969.

Research group for Global English as international business language: The significance of the mother tongue for speech production, reception, and the formation of association

The test procedure: presentation and instructions

Hello and welcome! My name is Olga and this is my colleague, Mary-Ann. During the following 20 minutes, you will engage in a role-play, where Mary-Ann will read several short scenarios for you and you'll have to respond to them by giving an immediate reaction. While Mary-Ann is reading a particular scenario for you, your task is to listen carefully and try to imagine the situation as if you were in it yourself. You do not have to think too much about the answer, but to come up with an immediate reaction instead. As an extra help for you, Mary-Ann will give you a picture that shows the situation before reading the scenario description. I will sit behind / next to you and observe the role play – so, please, try to ignore me.

For you to see what we expect you to do, Mary-Ann and I are now going to demonstrate you the role-play, where I will be playing your part. After that, you can ask whatever question you might have.

> **Imagine yourself in the quiet compartment on a train in England**
> You and other passengers are in the quiet compartment. Suddenly, a mobile phone rings, and a young woman starts speaking loudly. When she stops, one of the passengers points to the 'quiet' sign, while you say to her: 'No mobiles here.' She turns away from you without responding, looking at you as if you are an idiot. Five minutes later her mobile rings again, and again she speaks loudly, ignoring everyone. You have had enough now, so you say:
> (Instructor's response): 'Will you go outside right now, young lady?! If you don't, I will call the conductor!'

I'd also like to point out that your responses will help us with a larger survey on how people make requests in English, and we would really appreciate if you don't worry about the correctness of your English, because it's not important to us. Please, feel relaxed and natural about the whole set-up.

Finally, all information is completely confidential and nobody will know about your responses because your name will be anonymised. After the survey, I'll ask a couple of questions about your thoughts and ideas about the scenarios. Do you have any questions before we begin? Alright. Let's go to it!

The interview after the test

The observer:

1. I'd just like to hear what did you think about the scenarios.

2. Which scenario made the largest impression on you?

3. Did you find any of the scenarios strange/odd or unrealistic?

The situations presented in the same order as during the test:

Imagine yourself in the quiet compartment on a train in England

You and other passengers are in the quiet compartment. Suddenly, a mobile phone rings, and a young woman starts speaking loudly. When she stops, one of the passengers points to the 'quiet' sign, while you say to her: 'No mobiles here.' She turns away from you without responding, looking at you as if you are an idiot. Five minutes later her mobile rings again, and again she speaks loudly, ignoring everyone. You have had enough now, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Will you go outside right now, young lady?! If you don't, I will call the conductor!'

Imagine that you are at work

You are printing out a lot of copies, when your colleague, John, comes into the copy room with just one piece of paper in his hand. There is only one printer in the room, and you can see that John is in a hurry to use the machine, but does not like to ask you. You want to tell him that it is ok, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Oh, cheers mate!'

Imagine that you are in the bank

You have a meeting with your bank manager, and your five-year-old son, Johnny, is with you. He is looking at a picture book belonging to the bank. When your meeting is over, you ask Johnny to return the book. He does not want to and hides the book behind his back. You tell Johnny to PLEASE put it on the shelf, but NOW he starts running away from you. You get really annoyed with him and say:

(Instructor's response): 'I don't like you, dad!'

Imagine that you are on a platform on a train station in England

You and your colleague are going on a business trip. While you wait for him on the platform, you suddenly realise that you forgot to buy a ticket! Your bag is heavy, so you ask an elderly lady next to you, if she can keep an eye on it. She says: 'Yes, but my train will arrive in five minutes.' You promise to be quick, and then you see your colleague, who has time to look after your luggage. You turn to the lady and say:

(Instructor's response): 'You're welcome.'

Imagine that you are at work

You have got a new job, but you have only told your wife, not your colleagues. One day, you speak with your wife on the phone and say: "Yes darling, I'm going to hand in the resignation to the boss next Friday". Your colleague, John, overhears that and asks: "Are you **leaving us**?" You know that John is a bit of a gossip, and you do not want others to know about your resignation. Since John heard everything you said, you cannot lie about it, so you have to say:

(Instructor's response): 'Of course. Mum's the word.'

Imagine that you are at home

You have invited a colleague, his wife and their 5-year-old child, Johnny, for dinner. You have finished eating ice cream, and Johnny looks as if he would like to have some more. However, he hesitates to ask about it. You want to let him know that it is alright, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you.'

Imagine that you are at a restaurant

You have gone out for dinner with your wife and 5-year-old son, Johnny, who has allergy to nuts and could die if he eats only one nut. On the table are some snacks that look like chocolates, but you have just tasted one and found out that they are nuts covered with chocolate! And in the next moment, you see Johnny taking one. You get alarmed and immediately say:

(Instructor's response): 'Ok, dad. I didn't know they were nuts.'

Imagine that you are at work

You are working on a report, and lunch break is soon. Usually, you eat with your colleague, Anna, but you realise, you will be delayed today. You call and ask her to wait for you, and she says okay. But 20 minutes later, you are still busy with the report, which has to be on your boss's table before 1pm. You do not want Anna to starve, so you call her and say:

(Instructor's response): 'Okay, that's fine by me. Don't worry about it.'

Imagine that you are at the airport

You are sitting in the departure lounge waiting for your delayed flight, and all seats are taken. You see a tired-looking mother with a crying baby wandering around looking for an empty seat. You feel sorry for her, so you get up and say:

(Instructor's response): 'Thanks. You are a life saver.'

Imagine that you are at home

Your five-year-old son, Johnny, is having a big birthday party. Johnny's grandmother gives him a present, but he is so excited, that he snatches it from her and starts opening it. Grandma finds that so rude that she smacks his hand and tells him loudly that he is a bad boy. He is scared of her angry face and starts crying, saying: 'Sorry grandma, sorry . . .', but instead of calming down, she just shouts louder. (læs langsomt nu!!): And now EVERYONE is looking. You do not want your mother to turn the party into a scandal, so you have to say:

(Instructor's response): 'Well, in my opinion, a few manners wouldn't do any harm.'

Imagine that you are at work

You are in a meeting. It is very hot in the room, and there is no air condition. Your boss is walking over to the window to open it. What he does not know is that the window is broken, and you know that IF someone opens it, it WILL fall out onto the street. You get up from your seat to prevent him from opening it and say:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you. I didn't know.'

Imagine that you are at home

You have asked your good friend, John, to help you move into a new apartment tomorrow. He has happily agreed to do so and even taken the day off from work. But then your family surprises you by arriving to help you move. This now makes John's help unnecessary, so you have to call him and say:

(Instructor's response): 'That's fine by me. No worries at all, mate.'

Imagine that you are at home

Your friend, John, comes over for some beers and snacks. You discover a mouse in the kitchen, but luckily you have some poison. The poison looks exactly like small cheese squares, which you put into a bowl. The door-bell suddenly rings, and John arrives. You say hello, and he follows you into the kitchen. You get two beers from the fridge, and as you turn round, you see that John is just about to put a cheese square in his mouth, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Oh, THANK YOU mate!'

Imagine that you are at work

You are very busy preparing an important presentation. Your good colleague, Anna, enters your office, sits down and starts chatting. You say to her: 'Sorry, Anna, but I can't talk right now. I really need to finish this!' Anna keeps chatting. You get irritated with her and say: 'Anna, are you listening to me?! I am in a HURRY!' But she does not get it! Now you lose patience and, in order to get her out of the office, you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Ok, ok. I get the picture. I'm leaving now.'

Imagine that you are at the airport

You are on a business trip with your boss, Mr John. The plane has just landed, and you have collected your luggage and put it on a trolley. You see your boss walking with a very heavy suitcase. You want to let Mr John know that there is space on your trolley, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Thank you so much. It's very kind of you.'

Imagine that you are on a bus

You are on your way to work on a crowded bus. You are standing close to other passengers being squeezed and pushed on all sides. You feel that someone behind you is touching your rucksack, so you turn round and say in an irritated voice: 'Stop doing that!' A minute later, you feel the person touching your rucksack for the second time. Now you get really angry and say:

(Instructor's response): 'Keep your hair on!'

Imagine that you are at the library

You want to find a book on English grammar. You ask the librarian, who recommends one and tells you where to find it. You find the right bookcase and the book, but you cannot get at the shelf because a tall man is standing right in front of it. You have to ask him to take the book down from the shelf for you, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Certainly! Just a moment. Here you are.'

Imagine that you are at work

The manager of the Carlsberg IT department in England, Mr. Johnson, has arrived at your work this morning. You would like his opinion on a project and ask him if he could possibly attend your meeting this afternoon. The time does not suit him too well, but he agrees to come anyway. Unexpectedly, the meeting is cancelled. You have to call Mr. Johnson on his mobile to inform him about the situation, so you say:

(Instructor's response): 'Ok, that's fine by me.'

Appendix IV

The Demographics:
Native Speech Production Tests

Køn

(1) ❑ mand
(2) ❑ kvinde

Alder

(1) ❑ 15-19
(2) ❑ 20-24
(3) ❑ 25-29
(4) ❑ 30-34
(5) ❑ 35-39
(6) ❑ 40-49
(7) ❑ 50-59
(8) ❑ 60-69
(9) ❑ 70 or above

Nationalitet

_____

Hvilke(t) sprog er du vokset op med?

_____

Modersmål 1

_____

Seneste (gennemførte) uddannelse(r)

(1) ❑
(2) ❑ Folkeskole
(3) ❑ Gymnasium
(4) ❑ kort videregående uddannelse (erhvervsuddannelse)
(5) ❑ Universitet (Bachelor)
(6) ❑ Universitet (Master)
(7) ❑ Ph.d

Nuværende stilling (titel)

_____

Engelskfærdigheder (1: begynder .... 7: lige så godt som mit modersmål)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Skrive	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Tale	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Læse	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Lytte	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑

Har du nogensinde boet I andre lande end Danmark?

(1) ❑ Ja
(2) ❑ Nej

Hvor længe har du boet I dette (disse) land(e)?
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Hvor ofte bruger du engelsk?
Vælg en af flg. muligheder:

(1) ❑ Et par gange om ugen
(2) ❑ Dagligt

Ved hvilke lejligheder bruger du engelsk?
Vælg en af flg. muligheder:

(1) ❑ Kun på arbejde
(2) ❑ Både på arbejde og privat

Hvis du har svaret ja til både arbejde og privat, så angiv venligst hvornår og med hvem.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Пол
(1) ❏ мужской
(2) ❏ женский

Возраст
(1) ❏ 15-19
(2) ❏ 20-24
(3) ❏ 25-29
(4) ❏ 30-34
(5) ❏ 35-39
(6) ❏ 40-49
(7) ❏ 50-59
(8) ❏ 60-69
(9) ❏ 70 и старше

Национальность

_____

В окружении какого (каких) языков Вы выросли?

_____

Родной(ые) язык(и)

_____

Ваше последнее законченное образование

(1) ❏ Средняя школа, 9 класс
(2) ❏ Средняя школа, 11 класс
(3) ❏ Бакалавр
(4) ❏ Специалист
(5) ❏ Мастер
(6) ❏ Кандидат наук

Занимаемая Вами на данный момент должность

_____

Навыки английского языка (1: начальный уровень .... 7: на ровне с моим родным языком)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Навыки письма	(1)	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Навыки говорения	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Навыки чтения	(1)	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑
Навыки устного понимания	(1) ❑	(2) ❑	(3) ❑	(4) ❑	(5) ❑	(6) ❑	(7) ❑

Жили ли Вы в других странах, помимо Вашей родной страны?

(1) ❑ Да
(2) ❑ Нет

Как долго вы там жили?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Как часто Вы используете английский язык?
(1) ❑ Еженедельно
(2) ❑ Ежедневно

Где Вы используете английский язык?
(1) ❑ Только на работе
(2) ❑ На работе и дома

Если Вы выбрали «на работе и дома», то уточните, пожалуйста, когда и с кем:
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Gender

	Male	Female	In all
Danes	14	8	22
Russians	11	14	25

Age

	15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 34	35 - 39	40 - 49	50 - 59	60 - 69	70 or above
Danes		4	4	2	5	6	1		
Russians		1	5	3	4	6	5	1	

Nationality

	Danish	Russian
Danes	22	
Russians		25

What language(s) have you grown up with?

	DK	RUS	ENG	UKR	Estonian	German	Tatar	Byelorussian	Karachay-Balkar	Kazakh
Danes	22		19							
Russians		25		1	1	1	2	1	1	1

Mother tongue(s)

	Danish	Russian	Ukrainian
Danes	22		
Russians		25	1

Other languages, if any

	Danish	English	German	French	Swedish	Spanish	UKR
Danes		19	9	2	2	1	
Russians		15	1	1			1

Latest (completed) education

	Junior high school	Secondary school	Sixth Form (college)	Undergraduate (bachelor's degree)	Post-graduate (master's degree)	PhD	Technical college
Danes			5	4	9		4
Russians			1	13	6	2	

Current job title

	Management	Middle management	Administration	Production/ technical support	Miscellaneous
Danes	4	9	5		4
Russians	3	19	1		

English skills (1: beginner .... 7: as good as my native language)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Danes							
writing skills	1	1	3	4	8	5	
speaking skills			2	4	7	9	
reading skills			2	5	4	9	2
listening skills				4	7	7	4
Russians							
writing skills	3	1	3	1	1		
speaking skills	3	1	2	2	1		
reading skills	3	1	1	1	3		
listening skills	3	1	1	1	3		

Have you ever lived in other countries than your home country?

	Yes	No
Danes	9	13
Russians	4	17

Where have you lived?

	Danes	Russians
Australia	2	
Austria	1	
Canada	1	
France	1	
Germany		2
Greenland	1	
Hungary		
Kazakhstan		1
New Zealand	1	
Singapore	1	
South Africa	1	
Syria		1
USA	2	

How long have you lived in this country?

	Danes	Russians
Australia	6 months	
	10 months	
Austria	5 months	
Canada	6 months	
France	8 months	
Germany		5 years
		6 years
Greenland	6 months	
Kazakhstan		until 18 y.o.
Latvia		
New Zealand	6 months	

Singapore	2 ½ year	
South Africa	6 months	
Syria		2 years
USA	6 months	
	4 years	

How often do you use English?

	Weekly	Daily
Danes	14	8
Russians	18	2

When do you use English?

	At work only	At work & privately
Danes	7	15
Russians	17	3

If you ticked 'At work and privately', please specify when and with whom.

Danes	Russians
Arbejde - Service desk. Nogle gange oversætter vi artikler og pressemeddelelser Privat - når jeg snakker med mine venner over Facebook fx.	в отпуске и на выходных когда бываю в другой стране
Udlands rejser, udenlandske venner, online medier	Чтение книг, журналов. Без устной и письменной практики.
Arbejde i f.t. Coca-Cola og internationale kunder. Privat grundet vennekreds og familie	во время общения с руководителями и англоязычными коллегами , на собраниях , в переписке с иностранными коллегами
Har engelsk på primært sprog på mit studie	С детьми и в отпуске (Финляндия)
venner	
Amerikanske hjemmesider, bekendte fra udlandet	
Ser primært engelsk tv	

på nettet

Arbejde er det når der er kontakt til Gruppen i forbindelse med projekter, eller hvis kollegaer fra andre lande kontakter mig, eller jeg kontakter dem. Privat er det fordi der i min omgangskreds findes folk der ikke snakker dansk, og der er engelsk det sprog vi taler sammen.

Mine venner er engelske og min kones bijob er blandt engelsktalende.

TV, internet, e-mails med venner o.l.

med internationale venner og netværk.

rejser og venner

Med udenlandske venner

Appendix V

Carlsberg Tests:

Danish Native Speech Production Test

The overview of the situations presented in the same order as during the test

Situation	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social distance
Mobile (demonstration)	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Copy-machine	Permission	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Bank	Obligation	**Formal**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Train-station	Cancellation of obligation	**Public**	An elderly lady	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Resignation	Prohibition	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Ice-cream	Permission	**Private**	Colleague's son	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Peanuts	Prohibition	**Public**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Lunch	Cancellation of obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Seat	Permission	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Birthday	Obligation	**Private**	Mother	**Hearer**	Undefined
Window	Prohibition	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Moving	Cancellation of obligation	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Poison	Prohibition	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Chit-chat	Obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Trolley	Permission	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Bus	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Library	Impossibility	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Meeting	Cancellation of obligation	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great

The overview of the pictures used during the test

Mobile situation

Copy-machine situation

Bank situation

Train-station situation

Resignation situation

Ice-cream situation

Peanuts situation

Lunch situation

Seat situation

Birthday situation

Window situation

Moving situation

Poison situation

Chit-chat situation

Trolley situation

Bus situation

Library situation

Meeting situation

The consent form in Danish

CBS **COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL**
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

Forskningsgruppen for globalt engelsk som internationalt forretningssprog

Alt materiale indsamlet i forbindelse med forskningsprojektet vil blive behandlet fortroligt og opbevaret sikkert. Når materialet anvendes i forbindelse med publikationer eller til andre videnskabelige formål, vil vi sørge for, at du er anonym ved at ændre dit navn og sikre os, at citerede udtalelser ikke kan identificeres som dine. Ligeledes vil firmanavn blive ændret, og oplysninger, der kan være med til at identificere virksomheden eller på nogen måde er at regne for følsomme for virksomheden, vil blive ændret eller udeladt. Du kan på ethvert tidspunkt trække dit samtykke tilbage uden at skulle forklare dig, hvorefter din medvirken i projektet vil ophøre, og dine data vil blive fjernet fra vores datasamling.

Når du underskriver denne erklæring, giver du dit samtykke til, at den aktivitet, du deltager i, må optages, samt at disse optagelser kan bruges til forskningsformål (i henhold til de retningslinjer, der er beskrevet foroven) af forskere i Forskningsgruppen for globalt engelsk som internationalt forretningssprog. Kortere lydklip kan blive anvendt i forbindelse med forskningsaktiviteter og præsentationer ved konferencer.

Såfremt du indvilliger i at deltage i denne forskning i henhold til de betingelser, der fremgår af denne erklæring og dokumentet med information om dataindsamling, bedes du underskrive nedenfor. Forskeren med hovedansvaret for denne indsamling vil kontrasignere.

Jeg, respondenten, indvilliger i disse forhold (brug venligst blokbogstaver):

Navn: E-mail-adresse:

Stilling: Nationalitet:

Fødeår: Dato: Underskrift:

Jeg, den hovedansvarlige forsker, indvilliger i disse forhold:

Navn:

Underskrift:

Global English as international business language: The significance of the mother tongue for speech production, reception, and the formation of association

CBS COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

Generel information om optagelserne

Du er blevet spurgt, om du vil deltage i en aktivitet, der bliver lyd- og/eller videooptaget. Dette dokument informerer om den undersøgelse, du skal deltage i, hvordan optagelserne vil blive udført, og hvordan dataene vil blive brugt og opbevaret, når optagelserne er fuldført.

GEBCom Project: global engelsk som internationalt forretningssprog

GEBCom-gruppen er et internationalt forskningshold, der består af medlemmer fra Copenhagen Business School. Et af GEBCom-projektets formål er at undersøge hvordan man laver opfordringer på dansk.

Optagelserne er fortrolige, og deltagelse er anonym og frivillig

Alt materiale, der indsamles i forbindelse med undersøgelsen, er fortroligt og bliver opbevaret sikkert. Endvidere er du som deltager anonym. Dette indebærer, at dit navn vil blive ændret, og, såfremt det er nødvendigt, at dine udtalelser vil blive modificeret, så de ikke kan identificeres som dine. På samme vis er virksomheden sikret anonymitet, idet virksomhedsnavn og -detaljer ændres eller udelades (jf. "Samtykkeerklæring"). På ethvert tidspunkt kan du forlade datasamlingen uden at angive en årsag hertil. Hvis du skulle ønske dette, bedes du kontakte Olga Holberg på e-mail-adressen oh.ibc@cbs.dk eller telefon +45 3815 3969.

Hvad sker der med optagelserne?

Lyd- og videooptagelserne vil blive arkiveret og transskriberet. GEBCom-medlemmer vil kunne bruge optagelserne og transskriptionerne heraf til forskningsformål samt i deres publikationer. Uddrag af lydoptagelser kan blive afspillet for andre forskere (f.eks. ved konferencer), og anonymiserede screenshots fra videooptagelser (i de tilfælde hvor sådanne har fundet sted) kan blive brugt i publikationer. Desuden kan optagelserne blive anvendt i forbindelse med seminarer og workshops, som udbydes af forskningsgruppen for at give feedback til de virksomheder, der deltager i forskningsprojektet.

Har du yderligere spørgsmål, er du meget velkommen til at kontakte Olga Holberg på e-mailadressen oh.ibc@cbs.dk eller telefon +45 3815 3969.

Global English as international business language: The significance of the mother tongue for speech production, reception, and the formation of association

The test procedure: presentation and instructions

Velkommen! Jeg hedder Olga og det er min kollega, Mary-Ann. I løbet af de næste 20 minutter ville du deltage i en slags rollespil, hvor Mary-Ann vil læse nogle scenarier op for dig, som du så skal reagere på umiddelbart efter at hun er færdig med at læse. Mens hun læser et scenarie op for dig, vil din opgave være at lytte omhyggeligt til det og at prøve at forestille dig situationen som om du selv var i den. Du skal ikke tænke for meget over responsen. I stedet skal du prøve at reagere omgående på scenariebeskrivelsen. For at du bedre kan sætte dig ind i scenarier og hurtigere komme med svaret, vil Mary-Ann også give dig et billede som viser dem. Det er også vigtigt at understrege at dine responser vil indgå i en større spørgeundersøgelse, og det er derfor yderst vigtigt at du ikke bekymrer dig for meget om hvor korrekt dit engelsk er, da dette ikke er vigtigt for os. Du skal derfor føle dig afslappet og naturlig i omgivelserne.

Under rollespillet vil jeg sidde og kigge på forløbet. Så prøv at lade være med at tænke på at jeg sidder her. Når du er færdig, vil jeg stille et par spørgsmål til hvordan du oplevede de forskellige scenarier.

Lige inden vi starter, vil Mary-Ann og jeg vise dig hvordan rollespillet fungerer. Bagefter kan du stille spørgsmål, hvis du har nogen. Til sidst ville jeg sige at alle dine data er fortrolige og ingen vil se dine responser, i og med at hele processen er anonym.

> **Forestil dig, at du sidder i togets stillekupé i England**
>
> Du sidder sammen med nogle andre passagerer i stillekupéen. Pludselig ringer en mobiltelefon, og en ung kvinde begynder at tale ret højt. Da hun er færdig, peger en af passagererne på skiltet, hvor der står 'Stillezone', og du siger: 'Man må ikke tale i mobil herinde'. Hun kigger på dig, som om du er idiot og vender ryggen til dig. Fem minutter senere ringer hendes mobil igen – og IGEN er hun højrøstet og ignorerer alt og alle. Nu har du simpelthen fået nok, så du siger:

Inden du forlader os ville jeg bare lige høre hvad du synes om scenarierne.

1) Var der nogen af dem som gjorde mest indryk på dig?
2) Var der nogen som du synes var mærkelige?
3) Hvad synes du generelt om scenarierne?

The situations presented in the same order as during the test

Forestil dig, at du sidder i togets stillekupé i England

Du sidder sammen med nogle andre passagerer i stillekupéen. Pludselig ringer en mobiltelefon, og en ung kvinde begynder at tale ret højt. Da hun er færdig, peger en af passagererne på skiltet, hvor der står 'Stillezone', og du siger: 'Man må ikke tale i mobil herinde'. Hun kigger på dig, som om du er idiot og vender ryggen til dig. Fem minutter senere ringer hendes mobil igen – og IGEN er hun højrøstet og ignorerer alt og alle. Nu har du simpelthen fået nok, så du siger:

Du er på arbejde

Du er i gang med at printe en masse dokumenter ud, da din kollega Martin kommer ind i kopirummet med et enkelt A4-ark i hånden. Der er kun én printer i lokalet, og du kan se på ham, at han har travlt og har brug for printeren med det samme. Men Martin tøver med at spørge dig. Du vil gerne sige til ham, at det er i orden med dig, så du siger:

Du er i banken

Du er til møde med din bankrådgiver, og din femårige søn Mikkel er med. Han kigger i en billedbog, som tilhører banken. Da mødet er slut, beder du Mikkel om at lægge bogen tilbage. Det vil han ikke, så han gemmer den på ryggen. Du gentager, at nu skal han altså lægge bogen tilbage, men så begynder Mikkel at løbe væk fra dig. NU bliver du rigtig sur på ham og siger:

Forestil dig, at du befinder dig på en togstation i England

Du og din kollega skal på forretningsrejse. Du står og venter på ham på perronen, men pludselig slår det dig, at du har glemt at købe billet! Din taske er tung, så du spørger en ældre dame ved siden af dig, om hun gider holde øje med den. Hun siger: 'Det skal jeg nok, men mit tog kommer om fem minutter'. Du lover at skynde dig, men så får du øje på din kollega, som har tid til at passe på bagagen. Du vender dig mod damen og siger:

Du er på arbejde

Du har fået nyt job, men du har kun fortalt din kone det – og ikke dine kolleger. En dag taler du i telefon med din kone og siger: 'Ja skat, jeg skal nok give chefen min opsigelse næste fredag'. Din kollega, Martin, overhører telefonsamtalen og spørger: 'FORLADER du os?'. Du ved, at Martin er lidt af en sladdertante, og du ønsker ikke at andre skal vide noget om din opsigelse. Siden Martin har hørt alt hvad du sagde, kan du ikke lyve om det, så du bliver nødt til at sige:

Du er hjemme

Du har inviteret en kollega, hans kone og deres femårige dreng, Mikkel, på middag. I er færdige med at spise is, og Mikkel ser ud, som om han godt kunne tænke sig noget mere, men han tøver med at spørge om lov. Du vil gerne sige til ham, at det er i orden, så du siger:

Du er på restaurant

Du er ude og spise med din kone og femårige søn Mikkel, som har nøddeallergi og kunne dø af at spise bare en enkelt nød. På bordet står der nogle snacks, som ligner chokolader, men du har lige smagt på en af dem og fundet ud af, at det er nødder, som er overtrukket med chokolade. I næste øjeblik tager Mikkel en af nødderne. Du bliver forskrækket og siger øjeblikkeligt:

Du er på arbejde

Du arbejder på en rapport, og det er snart spisetid. Normalt går du til frokost med din kollega, Anna, men du kan se på det hele, at du bliver forsinket i dag. Du ringer til hende og beder hende om at vente på dig, og hun siger ja. Men 20 minutter senere sidder du stadigvæk og knokler med rapporten, som skal afleveres til din chef før kl. 13. Du vil ikke have at Anna skal gå til af sult, så du ringer til hende igen og siger:

Du er i lufthavnen

Du sidder ved gaten og venter på dit forsinkede fly, og alle sæder er optaget. Du får øje på en mor med en grædende baby. Moren ser totalt udmattet ud, og du får ondt af hende, så du rejser dig op og siger:

Du er hjemme

Du holder stor fødselsdagsfest for din femårige søn Mikkel. Hans bedstemor giver ham en gave, men han er så spændt, at han river den ud af hænderne på hende og begynder at åbne den. Bedstemor synes at det er så uartigt, at hun smækker ham over fingrene og råber af ham. Mikkel bliver bange for hende og begynder at græde og sige: 'Undskyld bedste . . .', men i stedet for at falde ned råber hun bare endnu højere. (LÆS LANGSOMT NU) Nu kigger ALLE gæsterne i deres retning. Du vil ikke have din mor til at ødelægge selskabet, så du bliver nødt til at sige:

Du er på arbejde

Du er til møde. Der er meget varmt i lokalet, og der er ingen air condition. Din chef Martin begynder at gå over til vinduet for at åbne det. Han ved ikke, at vinduet er i stykker og at HVIS nogen åbner det, så falder det simpelthen ned på gaden. Du skynder dig at rejse dig for at forhindre ham i at åbne vinduet og siger:

Du er hjemme

Du har bedt din gode ven, Martin, om at hjælpe dig med at flytte ind i en ny lejlighed i morgen. Han har beredvilligt sagt ja og har endda taget fri fra arbejde for at hjælpe til. Pludselig ankommer din familie som en overraskelse for at hjælpe med at flytte. Det betyder, at Martins hjælp bliver overflødig, så du bliver nødt til at ringe til ham og sige:

Du er hjemme

Du har inviteret din gode ven, Martin, til hygge med øl og forskellige snacks. Du opdager pludselig en mus i køkkenet, men heldigvis har du noget musegift på lager. Giften ligner til forveksling små ostestykker, som du hælder op i en skål. I det samme ringer dørklokken, og det er Martin. Du siger 'Hej', og han følger efter dig ud i køkkenet. Du tager to øl fra køleskabet, og da du vender dig om ser du, at Martin er lige ved at putte et af ostestykkerne i munden, så du siger:

Du er på arbejde

Du knokler på livet løs med en vigtig præsentation. Din gode kollega Anna kommer ind på dit kontor, sætter sig og begynder at snakke. Så siger du: 'Anna, jeg har ikke tid lige nu, det her skal være færdigt!'. Anna snakker bare videre. Det går dig på nerverne, så du siger: 'Anna, hører du hvad jeg siger? Jeg skal skynde mig!'. Men hun fatter åbenbart ikke noget! Nu taber du tålmodigheden, og for at få hende ud af dit kontor, siger du:

Du er i lufthavnen

Du er på forretningsrejse med din chef Martin. Flyet er landet og du har hentet din bagage og lagt den på en bagagevogn. Så ser du din chef komme gående med en meget tung kuffert. Der er plads på din bagagevogn, så du siger:

Du kører i bus

Du skal på arbejde og befinder dig på en overfyldt bus. Alle passagerer står som sild i en tønde, og der mases og skubbes fra alle sider. Du mærker, at en eller anden bagved dig piller ved din rygsæk, så du vender dig om og siger irritabelt: 'Gider du lade være med det!'. Lidt efter mærker du igen en berøring af din rygsæk. Nu bliver du virkelig vred og siger:

Du er på biblioteket

Du skal bruge en bog om engelsk grammatik. Du spørger bibliotekaren, som anbefaler en bestemt bog og forklarer dig, hvor du kan finde den. Du finder den rigtige bogreol, men du kan ikke komme til, fordi en høj mand står lige foran den. Du bliver nødt til at bede ham om at tage bogen ned fra hylden til dig, så du siger:

Du er på arbejde

IT-chefen for Carlsberg i hele England, hr. Johnson, besøger din arbejdsplads her til morgen. Du ville sætte stor pris på hans mening vedrørende et bestemt projekt og spørger ham, om det er muligt for ham at deltage i dit møde i eftermiddag. Tiden passer ham ikke helt, men han indvilliger dog i at komme. Men af ukendte årsager bliver mødet aflyst. Nu bliver du nødt til at ringe til hr. Johnson og informere ham om situationen, så du siger:

Appendix VI

Carlsberg Tests:

Russian Native Speech Production Test

The overview of the situations presented in the same order as during the test

Situation	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social distance
Mobile (demonstration)	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Copy-machine	Permission	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Bank	Obligation	**Formal**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Train-station	Cancellation of obligation	**Public**	An elderly lady	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Resignation	Prohibition	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Ice-cream	Permission	**Private**	Colleague's son	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Peanuts	Prohibition	**Public**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Lunch	Cancellation of obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Seat	Permission	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Birthday	Obligation	**Private**	Mother	**Hearer**	Undefined
Window	Prohibition	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Moving	Cancellation of obligation	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Poison	Prohibition	**Private**	Friend	**None**	None
Chit-chat	Obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Trolley	Permission	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Bus	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Library	Impossibility	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Meeting	Cancellation of obligation	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great

The overview of the pictures used during the test

Mobile situation

Copy-machine situation

Bank situation

Train-station situation

Resignation situation

Ice-cream situation

Peanuts situation

Lunch situation

Seat situation

Birthday situation

Window situation

Moving situation

Poison situation

Chit-chat situation

Trolley situation

Bus situation

Library situation

Meeting situation

The consent form in Russian

РАЗРЕШЕНИЕ НА ВЕДЕНИЕ ВИДЕОЗАПИСИ

Английский язык как средство международного делового общения

Всем материалам, собранным в ходе исследования, будет обеспечено безопасное и конфиденциальное хранение. При использовании в дальнейших публикациях или презентации видеоматериала в связи с научной (например, на конференции) или учебной деятельностью (лекции, доклады и т.д. в университете), Ваше имя будет анонимизировано. Подобным образом будет изменено имя и любая другая важная информация о компании, в которой Вы работаете. Вы также можете в любой момент отказаться от участия в данном исследовании, без дальнейших на то объяснений.

Подписывая этот документ о разрешении на ведение видеозаписи, Вы даете согласие на видеосъемку Вашего участия в данном исследовании, а также использование видеозаписи участниками ГЕБКОМ-проекта в упомянутых выше целях.

Если Вы согласны с вышеуказанными условиями участия в данном исследовании, а также условиями, изложенными ниже на информационном листе, то, пожалуйста, подпишитесь ниже. Данный документ будет скреплен подписью научного сотрудника, несущего ответственность за соблюдение условий, указанных в этом документе.

Я, участник данного исследования, согласен с вышеупомянутыми условиями документа (пишите, пожалуйста, печатными буквами):

Фамилия, имя, отчество: Электронная почта:

Должность: Национальность:

Дата: Подпись:

Я, научный сотрудник, согласен с вышеупомянутыми условиями документа:

Фамилия, имя, отчество:

Дата: Подпись:

Английский язык как средство международного делового общения

CBS **COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL**
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

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ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЙ ЛИСТ

Английский язык как средство международного делового общения

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Общая информация о аудио- и видеозаписи

Вас попросили принять участие в научном исследовании, которое будет записано на видео. На этом информационном листе Вы узнаете об исследовании, а также о том, как оно будет проведено и, что произойдет с полученной информацией.

ГЕБКОМ-Проект

ГЕБКОМ-проект состоит из группы научных исследователей Копенгагенской школы бизнеса. Главной целью данного проекта является исследование влияния родного языка на использование английского языка в речи, письме, чтении и восприятии на слух. Одной из подцелей данного проекта является изучение употребления речевого акта «просьба» носителями английского, датского, испанского, китайского, японского и русского языков.

Конфиденциальность полученной информации и добровольное участие в исследовании

Всем материалам, собранным в ходе исследования, будет обеспечено безопасное и конфиденциальное хранение. При использовании видеоматериала в связи с научной (конференции) или учебной деятельностью (лекции, доклады и т.д.), Ваше имя будет анонимизировано. Подобным образом будет изменено имя и любая другая важная информация о компании, в которой Вы работаете. Вы также можете в любой момент отказаться от участия в данном исследовании, без дальнейших объяснений. В этом случае, свяжитесь, пожалуйста, с Ольгой Хольберг по электронной почте oh.ibc@cbs.dk или по телефону (0045) 38153969.

Что произойдет с записанным аудио- и видеоматериалом?

Все аудио- и видеозаписи будут помещены в архив и затем будут транскрибированы. Участники ГЕБКОМ-проекта смогут использовать аудио- и видеозаписи и их транскрипции в научных и просветительских целях (публикациях в научных журналах, конференциях, докладах и т.д.).

За дополнительной информацией о данном исследовании, обращайтесь, пожалуйста, к Ольге Хольберг по электронной почте oh.ibc@cbs.dk или по телефону (0045) 38153969.

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Английский язык как средство международного делового общения

</div>

The test procedure: presentation and instructions

Вас пригласили принять участие в своего рода ролевой игре. Суть этой игры состоит в том, что Вам нужно будет отреагировать словесно на несколько различных ситуаций из жизни. Я буду их читать вслух, а Вашей задачей будет отреагировать на них непосредственно после того, как я закончила читать их описание. Очень важным условием этой игры является Ваша спонтанная и естественная реакция на ту или иную ситуацию. Другими словами, чем меньше времени Вы будете думать над ответом и чем спонтаннее он будет, тем естественнее и правильнее будет Ваш ответ. Так как формат ролевой игры уже сам по себе искусственный, а моей целью является вызвать у Вас реакцию настолько естественную, насколько это только возможно, то я Вас попрошу очень внимательно слушать описание каждой ситуации и постараться представить себе, что Вы на самом деле находитесь в этой ситуации. Для того, чтобы Вам помочь увидеть перед собой ту или иную ситуацию и прочувствовать ее, я Вам дам картинку с ее изображением.

Чтобы Вам было понятней, что от Вас требуется, я Вам сейчас продемонстрирую ролевую игру на примере ситуации в поезде.

> **Представьте себе, что Вы находитесь в Англии и едете в купе электрички, в котором запрещено громко разговаривать**
>
> Сейчас раннее утро. Вы едете в электричке на работу. Помимо Вас в купе сидят ещё трое пассажиров. Неожиданно раздается звонок мобильного телефона, и молодая девушка, сидящая впереди Вас, берет трубку и начинает громко разговаривать. После того, как она положила трубку, один из пассажиров купе указывает ей на знак, говорящий «Соблюдать тишину», но она игнорирует его замечание. Тогда Вы ей говорите: «Вы не могли бы выйти из купе, если Ваш телефон опять зазвонит?» Проходят пять минут и ее телефон начинает звонить. Она, не обращая внимания ни на кого из сидящих в купе, снова начинает громко разговаривать. Тут Вашему терпению приходит конец, и Вы ей говорите:
>
> (Инструктор): «*Сколько можно вам повторять! Если вы не выключите телефон,*

У Вас есть какие-либо вопросы к игре? Хорошо, тогда приступим.

Спасибо за Ваши ответы. Перед тем, как Вы уйдете, я хотела бы у Вас спросить:

1. Какой из сценариев произвел на Вас наибольшее впечатление? Почему?

2. Были ли среди сценариев ситуации, показавшиеся Вам странными? Почему?

3. Были ли они реалистичны? Что Вы думаете о ситуациях, использованных в игре?

The situations presented in the same order as during the test

На работе

Вы стоите в комнате для копирования и делаете много копий программы сегодняшнего собрания. Ваш коллега, Сергей, заходит в комнату с одной бумагой в руке. В комнате всего одна копировальная машина, которую используете Вы. По лицу Сергея видно, что ему срочно нужно сделать копию документа, но он не осмеливается попросить Вас на минуту уступить ему ксерокс. Вы не видите в этом никаких проблем и поэтому говорите:
Ответ Сергея: «Большое спасибо!»

В банке

У Вас назначена встреча с Вашим банковским консультантом. Вы пришли на десять минут раньше и ждете встречи в комнате ожидания с Вашим пятилетним сыном, Сережей. Сережа взял на столике детскую книжку с картинками и стал их рассматривать. Через десять минут банковский консультант приглашает Вас в свой кабинет. Вы просите сына положить книжку на место, но он отрицательно качает головой, спрятав ее за своей спиной. Вы просите Сережу во второй раз вернуть Вам книжку, но вместо этого, он начинает от Вас убегать. Вы не собираетесь играть с ним в догонялки, и, чтобы получить книжку назад, Вы встаете и говорите:
Ответ Сережи: «Нет! Она моя!»

На железнодорожной станции

Вы примчались на станцию, чтобы успеть на поезд. Неожиданно Вы обнаруживаете, что Вы забыли купить билет. Так как у Вас тяжелый чемодан, Вы просите сидящую на скамейке пожилую женщину присмотреть за Вашим багажом. Она соглашается Вам помочь, несмотря на то, что ее поезд должен прибыть с минуты на минуту. Неожиданно вы встречаете Вашего английского коллегу, Джона, и поэтому помощь пожилой женщины оказывается Вам больше не нужной. Вы возвращаетесь к ней и говорите:
Ответ пожилой женщины: «Пожалуйста».

На работе

Вы собираетесь уйти с работы на более прибыльное место в другой компании. При этом, Вы решаете не сообщать об этом Вашим начальнику и коллегам до последнего дня работы. Как-то Вы, разговаривая со своей женой по телефону о новой работе, говорите ей: «Дорогая, я все-таки подам заявление об увольнении в следующую пятницу». Ваш коллега, Сергей, случайно становиться свидетелем этого разговора и спрашивает, на самом ли деле Вы решили покинуть компанию. Вам известно, что он не умеет держать язык за зубами и боитесь, что другие узнают о Вашем уходе раньше времени. Вы хотите обеспечить его молчание и поэтому говорите:
Ответ Сергея: «Буду нем как рыба».

Вы у себя дома

Вы пригласили на ужин Вашего коллегу по работе с женой и их пятилетним сыном, Сережей. После того, как все закончили есть мороженое на десерт, Вы видите, что Сереже хотелось бы добавки. Однако он не осмеливается попросить Вас об этом. Вы не видите никаких причин, почему он не может получить добавки и поэтому говорите:
Ответ Сережи: «Спасибо».

В ресторане

Вы пришли поужинать в ресторан вместе с женой и пятилетним сыном, Сережей. На столе, за которым вы сидите, лежат несколько видом закусок, в том числе покрытые шоколадом лесные орехи. Вашему сыну недавно был поставлен диагноз очень опасной формы аллергии на орехи. Врач сказал, что Ваш сын может умереть всего от одного ореха. Сережа не знает, что перед ним лежат не шоколадные конфеты, а орехи, и берет один из них в руку. Вы, сильно испугавшись, говорите ему:

Ответ Сережи: «Ой, мамочка! Я думал, что это шоколадные конфеты».

На работе

Обычно Вы обедаете ровно в полдень вместе с Вашей коллегой, Аней, с которой вы в дружеских отношениях. Сейчас почти полдень, а Вам еще нужно успеть закончить доклад для начальника. Поэтому Вы звоните Ане и просите ее подождать Вас. Проходит пол-часа, и Вы все-еще все-также коптите над докладом. Вы звоните ей во второй раз, чтобы дать ей возможность пообедать сегодня самой, и говорите ей:

Ответ Ани: «Без проблем. Пообедаем вместе завтра».

В аэропорту

Вы сидите в зале ожидания перед выходом на посадку Вашего самолета, который задерживается. Все кресла для сидения заняты пассажирами, с нетерпением ждущими самолета. Вы замечаете, как молодая женщина с очень усталым видом и маленьким ребёнком на руках ходит вокруг, ища свободное место. Она останавливается перед Вами, и Вы четко видите ее страдания. Вам становится ее жалко, и Вы, дабы уступить ей свое место, встаете и говорите:

Ответ молодой женщины: «Большое Вам спасибо».

Вы у себя дома

Вы празднуете день рождения Вашего маленького сына с семьей и друзьями. Ваша мама дает ему подарок, но внук с нетерпением выхватывает подарок из ее рук и начинает его разворачивать. Ваша мама принимает такое поведение за недостаток в воспитании и начинает его упрекать в присутствии всех гостей. Ребенок очень расстраивается и начинает плакать, но она все-равно продолжает свою тираду. Теперь внимание всех гостей обращено на бабушку с внуком. Вам становится стыдно перед гостями, и Вы, дабы избежать скандала, говорите:

Ответ бабушки: «Хорошо. Хотя немного хороших манер ему не повредят».

На работе

Вы сидите на совещании. В помещение очень жарко, и Вы видите, что Ваш начальник, Иван Иванович, направляется к единственному в комнате окну, чтобы его открыть. Вы догадываетесь, что он не знает о поломке окна, и боитесь, что если он его откроет, то оно просто вывалится из рамы. Поэтому Вы ему говорите:

Ответ Ивана Ивановича: «Спасибо, что предупредили. Я не знал, что оно поломано».

Вы у себя дома

Вы попросили Вашего хорошего друга, Сергея, помочь Вам с переездом на новую квартиру. Он с радостью соглашается Вам помочь, несмотря на то, что он живет далеко от Вас и достаточно занят в настоящий момент. Неожиданно ситуация меняется, поскольку Вы узнаете, что Ваши родственники смогут помочь Вам с переездом. Помощь Сергея оказывается теперь ненужной, и Вы звоните ему и говорите:

Ответ Сергея: «Без проблем. Всегда рад помочь другу».

Вы у себя дома

Вы пригласили Вашего старого друга, Сергея, к себе в гости сегодня вечером. Вдруг Вы обнаруживаете в Вашей гостиной живую крысу и спешите в магазин за крысиным ядом. Вернувшись с магазина, Вы кладете яд в форме кукурузных хлопьев на столе в гостиной. Вечером приходит Сергей и Вы просите его пройти в гостиную, пока Вы идете на кухню за чем-нибудь вкусненьким к пиву. Когда Вы возвращаетесь, Вы видите, что Сергей, держа в руке горсть кукурузных хлопьев, собирается их съесть. Дабы избежать несчастного случая, Вы ему говорите:

Ответ Сергея: «Ну ты меня испугал!»

На работе

Весь день Вы были заняты приготовлением презентации для важного собрания. Ваша коллега, Аня, с которой Вы в приятельских отношениях, зашла к Вам немного поболтать. Вы ей говорите: «Ань, извини, я не могу сейчас с тобой разговаривать. Мне нужно срочно закончить презентацию». Однако она не реагирует на Вашу просьбу уйти и продолжает свою болтовню. Вы просите ее уйти во второй раз, говоря: «Аня, уйди, пожалуйста. Я очень занят!» – но она и не думает уходить. Тут Ваше терпение лопается и, дабы избавиться от нее раз и навсегда, Вы ей говорите:

Ответ Ани: «Ой, извини. Я уже ухожу».

В аэропорту

Вы летите в командировку вместе с Вашим начальником, Иваном Ивановичем. Самолет только что приземлился, Вы забрали Ваш багаж и положили его на тележку. Через некоторое время Вы видите Вашего начальника, несущего два тяжелых чемодана в обеих руках. Так как у Вас всего один чемодан, Вы решаете, что тележка ему нужна больше, чем Вам, и поэтому Вы ему говорите:

Ответ Ивана Ивановича: «Вы уверены, что обойдетесь без нее? Тогда спасибо».

В автобусе

Сейчас раннее утро, и Вы едете на работу в битком набитом автобусе. Вы стоите зажатая со всех сторон и чувствуете, как молодой мужчина, стоящий позади Вас, трется о Вашу сумку. Вы поворачиваетесь к нему и вежливо просите его не трогать Вашу сумку. Однако, ещё не успев отвернуться от него, Вы чувствуете, как он опять начинает свою возню. Его поведение выводит Вас из себя, и Вы, повернувшись к нему во второй раз, говорите:

Ответ мужчины: «Спокойно, мамаша/папаша. Не надо так горячится».

В библиотеке

Вы пришли в библиотеку, чтобы найти хороший учебник по грамматике английского языка. Библиотекарь порекомендовал Вам одну книжку и сказал, где ее найти. Вы нашли нужный шкаф и полку, на которой она лежит. Однако Вы не можете ее достать потому, что перед полкой стоит пожилой мужчина высокого роста. Вы хотите, чтобы он подал Вам книжку и поэтому говорите ему:

Ответ пожилого мужчины: «Да, конечно. Вот, возьмите, пожалуйста».

Представьте себе, что Вы находитесь у себя на работе

Сегодня утром к Вам приехал начальник ИТ-департамента компании «Карлсберг» в Великобритании, Джон Джонсон. Вам очень важно знать его мнение по поводу проекта, над которым сейчас работает Ваш отдел, и поэтому Вы его спрашиваете, не мог бы он прийти на собрание Вашего отдела сегодня во второй половине дня. Время собрания его не очень устраивает, но после нескольких минут размышления, он все-таки соглашается прийти. Позже Вы узнаете, что сегодняшнее собрание отменено. Вы хотите сообщить об этом Джону Джонсону. Поэтому Вы ему звоните и говорите:

Ответ Джона Джонсона: «Без проблем».

Appendix VII

CLAN transcriptions[10]

The situations referred to in the study are presented in alphabetical order

Situation	Imperative frame	Social context	Hearer	Power	Social distance
Bank	Obligation	**Formal**	Child	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Bus	Obligation	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Chit-chat	Obligation	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Copy-machine	Permission	**Informal**	Colleague	**None**	None
Ice-cream	Permission	**Private**	Colleague's son	**Speaker**	Some/Great
Library	Impossibility	**Public**	Stranger	**None**	Some/Great
Trolley	Permission	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great
Window	Prohibition	**Formal**	Boss	**Hearer**	Some/Great

The Bank situation (the RED)[11]

*P1:   · Johnny please don't run !

*P1:   please put it on the desk !

*P1:   I will (.) buy you: another one with lots of (..) colourful

pictures .

*P2:   if you want you will leave [*] [: keep] it .

*P2:   but I will (.) spend money &er: for it .

*P2:   and after that you will not have your sweets .

*P3:   [Try, try, try to catch him and take it forcefully as this book from him.

Maybe. Because if he couldn't understand the speaking word, then it's only one possible way to try. But, of course, without rude, but just take it from him] .

*P4:   &um (...) [smacking her lips] please sit &er (.) near me .

*P4:   and we will &er (...) discuss what to do with this book .

*P4:   &er (.) <how to> [//] how can we (.) take it or: (.) if we have to return it .

*P5:   Johnny !

*P5:   it's not really polite .

*P5:   please come back and put it back (.) &er and return it to bank .

*P5:   I'll buy you another book later .

*P6:   &ahem (...) stop play [*] [: playing] this game Johnny !

*P6:   it's illegal to have &er (..) stuff that &er (..) <you can't> [/] you can't get .

*P6:   because it's not your stuff .

*P6:   so please stop [!] and give this book xxx .

*MA: yeah .

*P6:   and (.) let's finish this .

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11 The transcription of the RED was carried out by Olga Rykov Ibsen (CBS).

*P7:   &ok son please &er return book .

*P7:   it's not &er our book .

*P7:   it's · bank book .

*P7:   but if you want &er .

*P7:   · we will (.) go and (.) take another

        interesting book for you .

*P8:   &hahaha .

*P8:   · &ahem (..) Johnny please !

*P8:   honey !

*P8:   you have to return this book .

*P8:   [I don't know].

*MA: yeah .

*MA: right .

*P9:   Johnny please !

*P9:   we are in a lack og time .

*P9:   put this book back !

*P10:   Johnny come back please !

*P10:   return the book right now !

*P10:   so it's not our book .

*P10:   please return it .

*P11:   [Maybe, I'll go to him to take off his books. Or maybe…

        I think, yeah. I don't be the xxx I don't… I stop talking with him and just make
        some physical [MA: Uhhuh.], you know, just [MA: Yes.] take his hand and take book

        . [MA: Yeah. Right.]]

*P11:   [It's very bad situation. [OH: Yeah, yeah.] And it's not property [OH: Uhhuh.] in
        society . But right now in bank don't scream, but run after him … It's [shakes her
        head] [OH: You wouldn't do that.] . No,

        no . [OH: Ok, so then you would just, you know, take the book from him.] Yes .
        [OH: Ok, ok.]]

*P12:	I told you lots of times .

*P12:	it's 0a bad thing to steal .

*MA:	&hahaha .

*P12:	something we will have a discussion at home .

*P12:	but now you should (.) put it on the shelf .

*P13:	Johnny you have to put it back on the table .

*P13:	or [I don't know where it was] .

*MA:	it's alright .

*P13:	ok .

*MA:	on the shelf <&haha> .

*P13:	[<ok> so I would say] Johnny you have to do this .

*MA:	yeah .

*P14:	&uh (..) this is not so good .

*P14:	&er (..) please return book .

*P14:	&er (...) · put it on the shelf .

*P15:	[· &ahem I will &apolo apologize &er for their &bank bank managers [*]] .

*P15:	[· and maybe I will pay them for this book] ?

*P15:	[that's all &haha] .

*MA:	ok &haha .

*P16:	[&hmm (..) [exhaling] I haven't children] .

*P16:	[ok <&haha>] .

*MA:	<yes it's &haha> .

*P16:	[I think I would say] .

*P16:	[clears the throat] (..) Johnny you &uuu uncorrect .

*P16:	and I will buy some sweets for you .

*P16:	if you · do &in this thing in cort [*] [: correct] way .

*MA:	yeah .

*P16:   if you bring back .

*MA: yeah .

*P17:   please [!] &er (.) give me this book to me [*] !

*P18:   Johnny !

*P18:   I know you hide something [*] · at the back .

*P18:   give me it !

*P19:   &ahem please [!] put the book back !

*P19:   [or otherwise if he doesn't [*] [: does] want it for sure] .

*P19:   · [I will ask the bank manager to take the book · with me

&hahaha] .

*P19:   <[yeah]> .

*MA: <right> .

*MA: thank you .

*P20:   &er Johnny if you don't stop your terrible behaviour .

*P20:   &er you will (.) have no computer &hehe and [/] (.) and sweets for a week or a

month &ha .

*P21:   [I think I will try to find something to switch off [*] [: shift] his attention to some

thing else, because it's a child and [MA: Uhhuh.] we need to find something [/]

something special, not just put this book on the table . Maybe, I will find some

sweets or some other ... Maybe, I will take advertising leave that [*] in the same bank

[MA: Uhhuh.] from the another [MA: Shelf.] table . From the shelf, yes . And give

him and show him and tell him] .

*P21:   look this [*] [:here] !

*P21:   there are so many pictures here !

*P21:   you will enjoy this .

*P21:   · please take this .

*P21:   but this [!] book we should stay [*] [:leave] here .

*MA: uhhuh .

*P21:   · [something like that] .

*OH: ok .

*OH: thank you .

*P22:   &oh .

*P22:   [just like] stop please !

*P22:   go back from [*] [: to] me !

*MA: yeah .

*P23:   Johnny it's not good to: [/] to do things like that .

*P23:   we must &er give this book back .

*P23:   because it is not ours .

*P24:   [so as a good father I will say him] .

*P24:   [&er what's his name] ?

*P24:   [Johnny] .

*P24:   [· &er I will say him] Johnny please !

*P24:   let's [/] let's discuss it [lauging] [for example] Johnny .

*P24:   please &er (..) you should return this book .

*P24:   because this book is not your property .

*P24:   this book is a property of 0the bank .

*P24:   so · <I can> &um [smacking the lips] [/] I can buy you &er · a sort of book (.) like this .

*P24:   please now you should return this book .

*OH: but imagine that you have already [!] said that [//] all that to [/] to your son .

*P24:   [well, my point of view that he: (...) must return this book] .

*MA: uhhuh .

*OH: yeah exactly .

*MA: <so what> .

*OH: <how do you> put it into words or in <[stammers]> the action ?

*P24:   <[clears the throat]> .

*OH: what do you do ?

*OH: or what do you say ?

*P24:   [· maybe run after him &hehehe] ?

*OH: yeah .

*OH: in the bank <xxx> ?

*P24:   [<&hahaha> for example] .

*OH: ok .

*P24:   [in my suit <in> my tie &hahaha] .

*MA: <yeah> .

*P24:   [yeah &hahaha] .

*P24:   [running &hahaha] .

*MA: and what whould you say ?

*MA: if you would say anything (.) to him .

*P24:   (...) &oh come on Johnny !

*P24:   let's play at home !

*P24:   &hahaha with books &hahaha .

*OH: ok .

*P25:   Johnny please !

*P25:   come [!] to me .

*P25:   · I [/] (.) I would like to tell you <one thing> [//] one secret.

The Bus situation (the BED)[12]

*P98:   Hey what are you doing

         (And then I would just take it off and put it on the floor # I

         wouldn't really be wanting to start a confrontation # laughing

         # on the bus .

*P99:   It seems like you're trying to take something out of my ru # rucksack .

         Can you stop touching it please !

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12 The transcription of the BED was carried out by Mary-Ann McKerchar (CBS). The CLAN conventions were not followed in her transcriptions.

*P100: (I wouldn't say anything # what would I like to say ? respondent is prompted) Back off and leave my bag alone .

*P101: Excuse me mate are you # I hope you're not # gettin' into my bag there # ehm # do you mind # ? going to another part of the bus to get out of my way .

*P102: Look ! I've told you once ! Will you please leave my ruck . .

.rucksack alone . . eh . . . [yeah]

*P103: I've told you once don't touch my rucksack !

*P104: Stop !

*P105: Did you not hear me the first time ? Can you stop doing that please !

*P106: Hang on a minute what's happening here ?

*P107: Will you pack that in now please !

*P108: Would you stop fucking touching the rucksack !

*P109: (Ehm # I wouldn't do that anyway .

I'd actually # the first time it happened

I'd turn around so the rucksack is facing in the opposite direction and then you'd know whether or not they're actually touching the rucksack or trying to touch you # so #).

*P109: I told you once not to touch my rucksack please don't do it again .

*P110: Can you not touch my bag .

*P111: Look I'm warning you you do that again and-eh you know there will be some conse quences just # just back off yeah just respect my space thank you .

*P112: Ehm I know it's busy in here and I know it's squashed ehm but don't keep takin my

ruck ¤ touching my rucksack # ehm # things go missing on the Tube and things get stolen and I don't want to find some thing stolen and then have to accuse you of taking it .

*P113: (D'you know I don't know if I would say an # I'd take my rucksack off and put it in front of me) .

*P113: Wha ¤ what's the problem ?

(I'd probably # you lot what's the pro # what's up ¤ whasup ¤ wha ¤ what do you want) .

*P114: D'you wanna keep that hand ?

*P115: What's the issue, why do you keep touching my rucksack ?

*P116: Excuse me, I've asked you once . . . but please don't touch my

rucksack !

*P117: Mate do we have a problem ? Is everything ok ? This is my space can you not . . . touch me . . . do you need me to move ? . . . can you just not do that ? I've been quite clear .

*P118: Excuse me ! I've asked you once not to do that if you don't stop I'm gonna ¤ gonna . . . press the button to stop the bus .

*P119: Please stop !

*P120: What are you doing ? . . . Do not touch my rucksack or I will call security !

*P121: Eh . . . [long pause] I know it's crowded on the bus but you've

touched my bag for a second time . . . can you please try and just find a place eh with a bit more space ?

The Chit-chat situation (the RED)

*P1:   Anna don't you mind if in the evening we would will go and take [//] have some coffee ?

*P2:   one word (.) and you will &ha · &ummm (...) fly away from there.

*P2:   &hahaha · with my leg &hahaha in your ass .

*P3:   please go away ! [laughing]

*P3:   don't [stammers] xxx .

*P3:   I'm [stammers] real [*] [: really] in a hurry .

*MA: yeah .

*P3:   sorry that I'm rude .

*P3:   but &er (.) I need to do my work .

*P4:   &um (..) Anna please !

*P4:   &er (.) take off [*] [: leave] &er (..) · the office now .

*P4:   I'm sorry .

*P4:   but I have to finish my work .

*P4:   and then we can meet and talk +/.

*MA: yes .

*P4:   +, some time .

*MA: right .

*P4:   [and I think I will stand up and turn to her] .

*P5:   please leave me right now !

*P5:   I'm preparing an important report and will talk about everything

         later .

*P5:   but right now I'm really [!] busy .

*P5:   stop it !

*P6:   Anna [exhaling] !

*P6:   ok [exhaling] .

*P6:   you didn't listen to me .

*P6:   so (..) come with me to your room .

*P6:   let's drink a tea [*] [: tea] .

*P6:   and then you stay here and I come back and do my work .

*P7:   Anna [exhaling] .

*P7:   please .

*P7:   I don't have enough time .

*P7:   I'm very busy .

*P7:   it's impossible .

*P7:   please .

*MA: yeah .

*P7:   don't talk [laughing] .

*P8:   · [exhaling] &oj &p please .

*P8:   can I (.) &um finish my work ?

*P8:   and actually maybe I will come to your office later .

*P8:   [I don't know] .

*P9:   Anna please !

*P9:   I will come to you later (.) to talk .

*P10:   let's discuss it later .

*P10:   please &er (..) let [*] [: let's] return it [*] to it later .

*P10:   · <get out &plea> [/] get out &plea: please <&hahaha> .

*MA: <hahaha> .

*P11:   [&ahem I think I'll keep calm and &er (.) don't say anything] .

*P11:   [just · [smacks her lips] try to: (.) concentrate on my work] .

*P12:   &ahem xxx I ask you to: go out .

*P12:   and &er leave me alone [probably] .

*MA: <yeah> .

*P12:   [<something> like that] .

*MA: yeah .

*MA: right .

*MA: thank you .

*P13: &ahem sorry Anna .

*P13: I'm not going to talk 0to you anymore .

*P13: and I'm not going to listen [!] to you anymore .

*P13: so I would just wish to 0go back to my work .

*P13: and you can keep talking as much as you want .

*P14: [I have 0a portative [*] [: portable] notebook] .

*P14: [I will take it and go in other room] .

*MA: [laughing] .

*P14: [to finish] ∞

*OH: ok .

*P14: [laughing] .

*MA: right .

*P15: · Anna it's very annoying .

*P15: but you [/] you can't stop speaking .

*P15: so I'm leaving .

*P16: [[clears the throat and exhales] I say] .

*P16: Anna !

*P16: please !

*P16: five munites of silence .

*P16: or maybe (..) do you want to help me +/.

*MA: &hahaha .

*P16: +, in my report ?

*P16: [it's 0an everyday situation &ha] .

*MA: right [laughing] .

*P17:   · could you please [!] leave our office ?

*P17:   because (.) right now I'm very (.) hardworking [*] with (.) my job .

*P18:   [audible inhaling] Anna !

*P18:   you are [audible exhaling] a bird speaker .

*P18:   but I: (.) need to finish my work .

*P18:   (...) .

*P18:   · please !

*P18:   just looking [*] for me .

*P18:   but &er don't speak .

*MA: &hahaha .

*P19:   Anja !

*P19:   please go (.) to the (.) coffee machine .

*P19:   and bring me two coffees &hahaha and waffles &hahaha .

*P19:   [and maybe she will chat with someone &hahaha in the
        corridor and I will finish my report] .

*P20:   Anna !

*P20:   if you don't get out now .

*P20:   · I won't (.) help you &he &any · &anymore at work .

*P20:   and I won't even say you a word
        [: I will never talk to you again] .

*P21:   Anna !

*P21:   imagine yourself on my place .

*P21:   if you · need do some important work .

*P21:   and · I will come and · will mess you [//] &er will
        [smacking the lips] &er disturb you .

*P21:   &ha what will be your reaction ?

*P21:   so: (.) you can understand me .

*P21:   please stop talking .

*P21:   and let me finish with this presentation .

*P22:   Anna !

*P22:   leave please the room !

*P22:   because · it's really important · an exercise set I have to do .

*P22:   so · no talking right now .

*MA: yeah .

*P22:   yeah really .

*P22:   leave it please .

*P23:   Anna please !

*P23:   [laughing] &don don't distract me from my work .

*P23:   · <I can> [/] I can [/] I can &ch meet you and chat +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P23:   +, later .

*P24:   Anna are you listening 0to me ?

*P24:   please stop talking !

*P24:   and come back to me in (.) fifteen minutes .

*P25:   &am (...) [laughing] it's difficult .

*MA: yes .

*P25:   Anna !

*P25:   I know your secret .

*P25:   [I suppose she will (.) stop [/] stop talking] .

The Chit-chat situation (the BED)

*P98:   I need to get this done today # you are just simply talking too much # I really need to get this done and you distract me . Are you ok # just come back in an hour's time I can talk to you properly then but for now I really need you to go .

*P99:   Have you got no work to do go away .

*P100: Zip it hun I really need to get on !

*P101: Anna honestly now please just give me a minute I've got this work to do # ehm # I can't concentrate if # you're nattering away . Please just give me a minute and come back when I'm finished .

*P102: Anna look ! I've told you once I'm tryin' to get this finished. It's a deadline . I need to finish it .

*P103: Anna, please go away, I need to complete this presentation.

*P104: I'm sorry # but you are going to have to leave # now .

*P105: Anna I really need to get this done # ehm # you ¤ you're gonna have to ¤ you're gonna have to go back to your desk # I'll ¤. I'll come and speak to you later .

*P106: I'm sorry # I'm gonna have to ask you to leave .

*P107: Anna, I've told you twice [audibly swallowing] and I've told you [swallowing] I've told you nicely please # [swallowing] will you go away .

*P108: Anna I've ¤ I've said to you a couple of times I'm in a ¤ in a schedule, I am hurried ¤ I am in a hurry at the minute I need to get this report out please ! I'd really appreci ate it if you could leave the room now and # eh we can ¤ we can have a good discus sion later .

*MAM: [asked about what he would have said to a good male colleague]

*P108: Would you mind getting the fuck out of the room ?

*P109: Anna just get up and go please .

*P110: Anna I have to finish this can I come and see you # when I'm finished and then we'll have a chat .

*P111: Anna look I really don't wanna be rude # I ¤ I'm happy to talk to you but I just can't do it right now ok I ¤ I'm busy # eh # we'll pic ¤ we'll pick this up later ok .

*P112: Anna I've told you a couple of times politely now I need to get this finished do you mind # ehm going somewhere else I'll give you # a shout when we're finished and then you can come and speak to me about it .

*P113: (I'd say):

Anna look seriously I'm not kidding I really need to focus and get this piece of work done I know that whatever you've got to tell me is important but can we just # please # do it another time just let me get this finished .

*P114: Do you mind ?

*P114: Ehm . . .

*MAM: three times you have asked her . .

*P114: You know I'm trying to do something, you know I'm not usually ratty, but I really have to get this done, an d you're wittering behind me, and it's really annoying !

*P114: Do you mind ? I'm trying to work . If you want to natter please # go away and [laughing] do it somewhere else .

*P115: I . . . I've got a deadline to meet, I need to focus, we'll need to catch up later, I'll arrange a time, I'll look at your diary and pop it in .

*MAM: She hasn't reacted, three times now . . . you want to get her out of the office .

*P115: [I'd probably say]

*P115: Sorry !You're really gonna have to stop, I've got to get this finished for the deadline, otherwise I'm going to get into trouble with my boss, and I know you wouldn't want that, so I'm   really gonna have to ask you to leave .

*P116: Anna I'm sorry . For the last time I must finish this I'll catch up with you later .

*P117: Anna ! Do you have any business priorities right now ? Yes ? No ? If no can we catch up later ? Is there anything I need to do for you in the next 10 minutes ? No ? Then please let me crack on I've got a deadline I need to get things done.

*P118: Anna ! We'll have this conversation later I've got to finish this now I'm not being rude but can you just . . . leave me alone and I'll come and find you when I'm done.

*P119: Anna-e I don't mean to be rude but I really need to finish this piece of work so let's catch up later .

*P120: Anna I'm deadly serious I cannot speak to you right now can we talk later please ?

*P121: Sorry but I've told you . . . I'm really busy if you need anything I'll be free at . . . eh . . . free tomorrow you need to come back then .

The Copy-machine situation (the RED)[13]

*P1: [· &er I would say] John !

*P1: if you really need it .

*P1: I can stop my <printing> [//] (.) process .

*P1: and you can print your page .

*P2: just easily: make one copy .

*P2: no problem I'll wait .

*P2: because I have a lot of work to do .

*P2: but to not to let you wait for a long period of time .

*P2: you just can easily copy one piece of shit [*] [: sheet]

*P2: no problem .

*P3: yes (.) please .

*P3: make your copy .

*P4: [I say] please .

*P4: take a copy .

*P4: because I have &er a lot of paper .

*P4: and &er (.) it's your turn .

*P4: and I will finish later .

*MA: yeah .

*P4: after you .

*P5: &ahem sorry !

*P5: &ah I can stop and you can take your picture right now .

*P5:   maybe we can stop my printing ?

*P5:   [like this] .

*MA: yeah .

*P6:   it's ok .

*P6:   you may use this (..) &er (..) printer .

*P6:   and then I: (..) [/] I will print my stuff .

*P7:   [I say] please stop the copy .

*P7:   and take me (...) &er copy machine .

*P8:   &ahem ok .

*P8:   you can make a copy .

*P8:   please .

*P8:   if you want .

*P9:   &ahem if you are in a hurry .

*P9:   you can use the machine .

*P10:   · so John please &er .

*P10:   <you can use the> · &uh &um &co [//] you can make your copy · right now .

*P10:   so +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P10:   +, please .

*MA: yeah .

*P10:   you are welcome .

*P11:   &ahem you can use this apparat [*] [: machine] .

*P11:   and <I'll stop my> [//] I'll stop to do my copics [*] [: copies] to: · &er let you (.) make (.) some ∞

*P12:   &ahem do you want to copy it ?

*P12:   feel free .

*P13:   yeah !

*P13:   you can definitely use it .

*P13:   while I'm here .

*P13:   that's no problem .

*P14:   [I say him] ok .

*P14:   make this copy .

*P14:   [because this is &er (..) · &er (..) polite behaviour] .

*P14:   [<I'm ready>] +/.

*MA: <yeah> .

*P14:   [+, to help <my> colleague] .

*MA: <yes> .

*MA: yeah .

*P15:   · ok you can use it later .

*P15:   maybe after I will [*] finish my job ?

*P16:   [coughing] it's ok .

*P16:   you can: (..) use 0the printer .

*P16:   and I (..) [//] it's not 0a problem to wait for a minute or for a second for one copy .

*P17:   yes it's ok .

*P17:   just give me these paper .

*P17:   and can I print it out for you ?

*P17:   it's [*] will not take a second .

*MA: right .

*P18:   [I say] just a minute .

*MA: you say +"/ .

*MA: +" just a minute .

*P18:   [yes] .

*P19:   I just want to finish this one .

*MA: yes xxx .

*P19:   after this I will make [*] a break .

*MA: yeah .

*P19:   and you can make a copy <of your list> .

*MA: <right> .

*MA: thank you .

*P20:   &ahem if you want to print your copy .

*P20:   · do it !

*P20:   I'll finish my work .

*P20:   so · (..) do it of course !

*MA: yeah .

*P21:   &ahem John don't worry .

*P21:   please do it !

*P21:   I will wait .

*P21:   no problem .

*P22:   [and I will say something like] .

*P22:   · no problem .

*P22:   you are welcome &hehe .

*P22:   · it's [//] I can stop the copy [*] .

*P22:   and you will make 0your 0copy .

*P22:   yeah .

*P23:   it's ok .

*P23:   please [/] please do your work .

*P23:   if you want .

*MA: yeah .

*P24:   [smacking the lips] ok John .

*P24:   please use the printer !

*P25:   John !

*P25:   come on !

*P25:   I'm glad to help you .

*P25:   it's &hehehe [/] &er · it's better to: [/] to give you one minute .

*P25:   I can wait .

The Ice-cream situation (the RED)

*P1:   Johnny .

*P1:   would you like some more ice cream ?

*P2:   go on !

*P2:   another piece of &er · &er icecream &er will not kill you .

*P2:   but you have to do several physical exercises .

*P2:   just not to get fat .

*P3:   · feel free to: (..) [/] to take (..) &er this ice_cream .

*P4:   · &umm (.)[I say] if you want &er (..) some more ice_cream .

*P4:   please &er_umm (...) give me a note xxx to know it .

*P4:   and if your parents <don't doubt> [//] don't adoubt [*]
        [: don't mind] .

*P4:   I will &er (.) take [//] give you some more .

*P5:   you can take <a little> [/] a little bit more !

*P5:   so we've got a lot of ice_cream .

*P5:   take it .

*P6:   it's ok .

*P6:   if you won't &er (.) &to ask something .

*P6:   just ask .

*P6:   no problem .

*P7:   yes .

*P7:   please .

*P8:   &oh if you would like to: [/] to: [//] more ice_cream ?

*P8:   you can ask me .

*P8:   &er +//.

*MA: yeah .

*P8:   so (.) it's no problem .

*P9:   · Johnny would you like some more [!] ice_cream ?

*P10:   &ahem please &Joh John !

*P10:   don't &hesi hesitate to ask me · &er 0about the ice_cream .

*P10:   &er (.) I can give it to you .

*P11:   · &ahem do you want one more ice_cream ?

*P12:   &er (.) <if you> [/] if you want some more Johnny .

*P12:   please &er take &hehehe .

*MA: yeah .

*P13:   [yeah] .

*P13:   [I would say] Johnny it's totally ok .

*P13:   you can have as much ice_cream as you want here .

*MA: right .

*P14:   would you like &er (.) to have else [*] [: more] ?

*P15:   &oh you can join me .

*P15:   and (.) try to: eat this with me ?

*P16:   [if I have <any ice_cream> [//] any more [!] ice_cream].

*P16:   [I would (.) [clears the throat] ask him] .

*P16:   do you want (.) some more ?

*MA: yeah .

*P17:   &uh we have a lot of ice_cream .

*P17:   and I would like to give you more [!] .

*P18:   · [audible inhaling and exhaling] ok .

*P18:   ice_cream is always for children .

*P18:   but flowers is always for women [*] .

*MA: &hahaha .

*P18:   go on .

*P19:   Johnny would you like (.) another piece of ice_cream ?

*P19:   &er don't hesistate [*] [: hesitate] to ask 0about anything in my kitchen .

*P19:   feel free .

*P19:   and: (..) · yeah .

*P19:   if you want .

*P19:   just tell how much [!] of ice_cream &hahaha do you want ?

*MA: <&hahaha> .

*P19:   <&hahaha> .

*P20:   &ahem &J Johnny !

*P20:   if you: · want to eat something else .

*P20:   <I'll ask> [//] I'll go and find something .

*P20:   don't hesitate to say about it .

*P21:   [If it is ok with his sort [*] [: throat] &he because in our climate it is &he a big prob
        lem sometimes with children, they've got a cold and because of ice_cream and ev
        erything [MA:Haha] . If [/] <if he> [//] it is &he not [!] our problem [MA: Haha], I
        will allow him [MA: Yeah] and I will tell him] .

*P21:   if you want .

*P21:   please (.) take more .

*P22:   · Johnny !

*P22:   you can easily take &er some more ice_cream .

*P22:   it's · ok .

*P23:   [smacking the lips] · &ahem Johnny !

*P23:   do you like some more [!] ice_cream ?

*MA: yeah .

*P23:   [directly &haha] .

*MA: yeah .

*P23:   thank you .

*P24:   &well Johnny .

*P24:   what about influenza ?

*OH: that's (.) well .

*MA: yeah .

*MA: that what the lady said before .

*OH: yeah .

*MA: this is new to me but interesting +/.

*OH: <yeah that's interesting> .

*MA: +, <interesting> very

        [!] interesting .

*OH: &he .

*P25:   (..) Johnny !

*P25:   · do you have some questions &he ?

The Library situation (the RED)

*P1:   excuse me .

*P1:   could you please help me (.) and get this book for me ?

*P2:   would you please help me ?

*P2:   there is a book upstairs [*] [: up there] and I cannot [!] even reach it .

*P2:   &er (.) will you help me ?

*P3:   [stammers] please take this book from the shelf .

*P3:   [stammers] if you don't mind .

*P4:   &um I'm sorry .

*P4:   <can you do me a favour> [//] can you get this book for me ?

*P4:   &er (.) if it's &er (.) ok for you .

*MA: yeah right .

*P4:   thank you in advance .

*P5:   excuse me .

*P5:   can you please help me ?

*P5:   I need &thi this book .

*P5:   <but it so> [//] (.) I'm not hight enough to take it .

*P5:   could you please help me +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P5:   +, with it ?

*P6:   &ahem (..) excuse me please .

*P6:   would you give me this: (.) book ?

*P6:   I can't reach it by hand .

*P7:   excuse me .

*P7:   please me [*] .

*P7:   &er (.) could you help me and [/] and &t take this book (.) for me ?

*P8:   · &ahem excuse me .

*P8:   can you help me (.) to get this book &fom (..) from the shelf ?

*P9:   could you please help me and &er (.) take the book from the shelf ?

*P10:   please sir .

*P10:   help me to take the book down .

*P11:   &ahem please (.) could you help me ?

*P11:   I need this book .

*P12:   &ahem could you please help me with &er that [!] book ?

*P13:   excuse me sir .

*P13:   can you please help me with getting this book from up the shelf ?

*P14:   please (.) help me: (.) to take this book from the shelf.

*P15:   could you help me ?

*P16:   &um I'm sorry .

*P16:   can you help me ?

*P16:   please !

*P16:   this book is very high [*] .

*P16:   and · I'm not [!] very tall .

*P16:   can you help me please ?

*MA: yeah &hahaha .

*P17:   could you be so kind just to take this book and give it to me ?

*MA: yeah .

*P18:   [audible inhaling and exhaling] we 0are all different .

*P18:   you are so tall .

*P18:   please !

*P18:   give me this book !

        %com: the character is laughing .

*P19:   excuse me .

*P19:   · can you please give me this book from the: seventh shelf ?

*P19:   (be)cause I'm quite short .

*P19:   and I really [!] need this book .

*P19:   and it would be really [!] easy for you to take this · 0book from the shelf .

*P19:   · &oh thank you very much !

*P19:   and so on <&hahaha> .

*MA: <&hahaha> .

*P19:   [he will do it &hahaha] .

*MA: of course [/] of course he will &haha .

*P20:   &ahem exuse me .

*P20:   could you please give me that book ?

*P20:   I'm · not tall enough to reach [*] [: reach out for] it myself .

*P21:   excuse me .

*P21:   could you help me to get that book ?

*P21:   · &em (..) .

*MA: yeah .

*P21:   because it's difficult for me to [/] to get it .

*MA: yeah .

*P22:   · &ahem exuse me .

*P22:   · &er I really need a book right up to you [*] .

*P22:   · so if it's · not hard .

*P22:   can you take it for me the · English grammar book [*] ?

*P23:   it would be very nice of you .

*P23:   if you will help me with this book .

*P24:   please could you help me to: bring this book 0down 0for 0me ?

*MA: uhhuh .

*P25:   excuse me .

*P25:   could you please help me ?

*P25:   · &em (...) I'm 0a happy person &by but

      [the character is searching for a right word]

· &h high [//] &t (.) tall ?

*P25:   [net [:no]] .

*P25:   tall .

*P25:   but I'm not [!] a tall (..) +/.

*MA: exactly .

*P25:   +, person .

*P25:   [yeah] .

*P25:   but I can't do it +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P25:   +, myself .

*MA: &hahaha .

The Library situation (the RMTD)[14]

*P26:   vy ne budete tak ljubezny podat' mne etu knižku ?

*P27:   prostite .

*P27:   ne mogli by vy mne pomoč' dostat' von tu knižku ?

*P28:   možno vas poprosit' podat' mne knigu vot s etoj vot polki ?

*P28:   spasibo bol'šoe .

*P29:   molodoj čelovek možno vas poprosit' dostat' mne ètu knižku ?

*OH: <spasibo> .

*P29:   <ona> mne očen' nužna .

*OH: spasibo bol'šoe .

*P30:   uvažaemyj ne budete li vy tak ljubezny dostat' mne vot s verxnej polki tom takoj_to knigi ?

*P31:   mužčina ja diko izvinjajus' .

*P31:   ne mogli by vy mne pomoč' dostat' vot ètu knižku ?

*P31:   ja prosto očen' nizkogo rosta i ne mogu samostojatel'no èto sdelat'.

*P31:   zaranee vas blagodarju .

*P32:   razrešite voz'mu knižečku .

*P33:   &è_è_è ne mogli by vy mne pomoč' dostat' von tu knižku ?

*P34:   · mužčina vy ne mogli by podat' mne vo:n tu &kni knižku ?

*P35:   · molodoj čelovek buď'te dobry pomogite mne požalujsta .
*P35:   mne nužna vot [!] s toj vysokoj polki knižka a mne ne dotjanutsja .
*P35:   buď'te [!] dobry dostan'te da [!] [/] [=3 times] <vot ètu> [/] .

*P36:   (..) vy možete mne podat' knižku &xa_xa_xa &v von tu ?
*P36:   [i vse] .

*P37:   &è_è_è buď'te ljubezny .
*P37:   vy ne dotjanetes' vo:t do toj polki ?
*P37:   mne nužna grammatika anglijskogo jazyka .
*P37:   mne ne dostat' a vy tako:j [!] vysokij prjam kak djadja Stepa .

*P38:   &a_a_a mužčina &è_è_è mogli by vy podat' mne knižku vot s ètoj polki ?
*P38:   ona očen' vysoko .
*P38:   ne dostaju .
*P38:   požalujsta .

*P39:   molodoj čelovek ne mogli by vy byt' tak ljubezny · dostatj mne vo:t [!] ètu knižečku ?
*P39:   ona mne očen' [!] neobxodima .
*OH: ugu .

*P40:   mužčina podajte požalujsta knižku s verxnej polki .

*P41:   · izvinite vy ne mogli by mne pomoč' &vot dostat' tu samuju knižku ?
*P41:   u vas (..) rost pozvoljaet .

*P41:   a mne nikak ne dotjanutsja .

*P42:   [ja emu govorju] &è_è_è buďte ljubezny &è_è_è vy ne smogli by pomoč' dostat' vot ètu knigu na polke ?

*P42:   esli vy (.) ne možete èto sdelat' .

*P42:   to požalujsta otojdite .

*P42:   ja èto sdelaju sama .

*P43:   izvinite podajte požalujsta vot ètu knižku .

*P44:   molodoj čelovek buďte tak ljubezny .

*P44:   dostaňte mne (.) vot ètu knigu .

*P45:   mužčina èto tak [!] udačno čto vy zdeś naxodites' .

*P45:   bez vas soveršenno ne spravitsja .

*P45:   pomogite požalujsta s vot ètoj knižečkoj .

*P46:   · &è_è_è dobryj den .

*P46:   prošu proščenija za bespokojstvo .

*P46:   no: &xxx u menja est' k vam neboľšaja pros'ba &xm_x .

*P46:   moj rost ne pozvoljaet dotjanuťsja do nužnoj mne polki.

*P46:   možete li vy mne pomoč' ?

*P47:   · molodoj čelovek !

*P47:   [smacking with tongue] ne mogli by vy mne pomoč' ?

*P47:   prjam nad vami knižka kotoraja mne očeň nužna .

*P47:   (...) dostaňte požalujsta ee mne .

*P47:   a to mne ne doprygnut' .

*P48:   požalujsta (.) podaj knigu .

*OH: ugu .

*P48:   (...) budu blagodaren za to čto sdelaeš' .

*P49:   &nu pomogite požalujsta .

*P49:   mne nužna vot èta knižka .

*P49:   takaja_to knižka .

*OH: ugu [/] ugu .

*P49:   ona vo:n tam .

*P50:   · izvinite požalujsta .

*P50:   · &è_è_è vy by ne mogli &è_è_è podat' vot knižku s: predposlednego polki sverxu ?

*P50:   &è_è_è ja k sožaleniju ne mogu dostat' .

The Library situation (the DED)[15]

*P51:   sorry sir !

*P51:   &eh can you please [!] help me take down that book up there ?

*P52:   <could you> [//] * will you be able to help me get that book [points] up there?

*P53:   excuse me (.)

*P53:   sir ?

*P53:   could you help me get that one ? [points]

*P53:   or the pink one if it's pink .

*P54:   &em (..) sir .

*P54:   <I have> [/] I have a book and I cannot [//] it's [/] it's up on the upper shelf .

*P54:   can you help me taking it down ?

*P54:   I really [!] appreciate if you could help me .

*P55:   excuse me sir .

*P55:   you're very [!] tall .

*P55:   would you mind reaching up and getting that book ? [pointing at the book]

*P55:   it's up there on the shelf [//] it's blue one up there .

*P56:   can you please help me ?

*P56:   I'm not that tall .

15 The transcription of the DED was carried out by Olga Rykov Ibsen (CBS).

*P56: so (..) and I need a book from [pointing] the upper shelf or.

*P56: so could you please help me ?

*P57: &er tall man ! [laughing]

*P57: could you please take down the book ?

*P57: because I cannot reach it .

*P58: could you please help me ?

*P58: I need that book up there .

*P58: but I'm [//] &well I'm <too> [/] too short .

*P58: so (.) could you please help me out ?

*P59: I'm really [!] sorry .

*P59: but could I kindly ask you to grab the book up there for me ?

*P59: thanks .

*P60: excuse me .

*P60: would you please help me get that book from the shelf ?

*P60: I can't reach it .

*P61: could you please [!] <grab> [/] grab that book for me ?

*P62: excuse me sir .

*P62: could you help me get that book ?

*P63: &er could you please help ?

*P64: sir could you please help me out here ?

*P64: I can see that <you> [/] you're fairly tall and I need [pointing] that book up there .

*P65: sorry !

*P65: could you please help me ?

*P65: I need that book up there [looks up] .

*P65:   would it be possible for you to get it down for me ?

*P66:   excuse me .

*P66:   can you please help me get the book on the fifth shelf ?

*P67:   excuse me !

*P67:   could you please [!] help me reaching the book all the way up there ?

*P67:   I can't reach it myself .

*P68:   can you help me ?

*P68:   I'm not so tall and I need to get that book all the way up there .

*P69:   could you please help me ?

*P69:   I need the book that is standing up there .

*P69:   the red one .

*P70:   could you please hand me the book [pointing] up there ?

*P71:   sorry .

*P71:   could you please help me ?

*P71:   I can't reach that far .

*P71:   so could you [pointing up] take that book two and a half meter up in there for me please ?

*P72:   oh please [!]

*P72:   you seem a bit taller than I am and I need a book up there on the top shelf .

*P72:   could you please hand it to me ?

*P73:   sir (.) would you please do me a favour and pass the book on the top shelf to me ?

*P74:   sir (.) could you please get that book for me ?

*P74:   I'm not tall enough to get it and I don't know where I can find a ladder .

*P75:   pardon .

*P75:   could you help me reach that book for a second ?

The Library situation (the DMTD)[16]

*P76: undslyld .

*P76: men kan jeg lige [!] få dig til at hjælpe mig med at få den der bog ned ?

*P77: undslyld .

*P77: kunne du måske lige hjælpe mig et øjeblik ?

*P77: jeg skal bruge den her bog op .

*P77: jeg kan simpelthen [!] ikke nå den .

*P77: kunne du ikke lige tage den for mig ?

*P78: undslyld .

*P78: gider du ikke hjælpe mig med at tage den bog ned oppe fra hylden af ?

*P79: undslyld .

*P79: men er du ikke rar at tage den bog til mig ?

*P80: kunne jeg ikke få dig til at tage bog X ned fra reolen ?

*P80: den er lige der [peger] .

*P81: ved du hvad .

*P81: kan du nå den bog (.) 0give den op til mig ?

*P81: jeg kan ikke selv nå .

*P81: det ville være pænt af dig (.) tak .

*P82: kan jeg bede om din hjælp ?

*P82: jeg skal bruge den bog du kan se deropppe .

*P82: men jeg kan desværre ikke lige nå den .

*P82: vil du hjælpe ?

*P83: undskyld .

*P83: er du sød at række mig bogen på hylden [et eller andet] ?

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16 The transcription of the DMTD was carried out by Mary-Ann McKerchar and edited by Olga Rykov Ibsen.

*P84: undskyld herre.

*P84: er det muligt at du kan tage den bog ned oppe på den øverste hylde ?

*P84: da jeg desværre ikke kan nå den .

*P85: undskyld .

*P85: vil du ikke være sød at række mig den bog der står deroppe ?

*P85: det er nummer det og det og det .

*P86: ved du hvad .

*P86: jeg kan ikke rigtig nå den her bog .

*P86: kan du ikke hjælpe mig med det ?

*P86: det er den og den .

*P87: vil du være sød at hjælpe mig med at nå den bog deroppe ?

*P88: undskyld .

*P88: kunne jeg lige komme til her ?

*P89: vil du ikke være sød at tage den bog derned ?

*P90: undskyld .

*P90: kan jeg ikke få dig til at tage den med engelsk grammatik ned til mig ?

*P90: jeg kan ikke nå den .

*P91: undskyld .

*P91: vil du ikke være sød at hjælpe mig med at nå den bog der står oppe på femte hylde ?

*P91: den kan jeg ikke selv [!] få fat i .

*P92: kan jeg få dig til at hjælpe mig med at få den grammatikbog ned der er på hylde fem [eller et eller andet] ?

*P93: ved du hvad .

*P93: du er så høj [!] (.) det er jeg ikke .

*P93: kan du række den der bog oppe til mig ?

*P93: det ville være sødt af dig .

*P94: undskyld .

*P94: vil du ikke være så flink at hjælpe mig med at tage den der bog ned fra hylden til mig ?

*P95: ved du hvad .

*P95: vil du være sød at hjælpe mig med at tage den der bog ned foran dig ?

*P95: jeg kan ikke nå den .

*P96: vil du være sød at række mig den bog der står deroppe ?

*P97: du er sådan en høj mand .

*P97: er du ikke sød at række mig den bog der ?

The Library (the BED)

*P98: Eh excuse me . I need that book up there . Is there any chance you could get it for me please ?

*P99: Excuse me please . Could you just pass me that book from up there ?

I'm not tall enough .

*P100: Excuse me . Can you do me a favour and reach that book for me please ?

*P101: Excuse me please me [*] reach that book up there and pass it down to me ?

*P102: Excuse me ! Do you mind passing that book . . . that's above your head . I can't reach it .

*P103: Excuse me # could you possibly reach that book for me ?

*P104: Excuse me # can you reach this book for me please ?

*P105: Eh # eh # please could you ¤ please could you help me # I'm ¤. I need that book from the # eh ¤ from the top shelf # please (.) could you # get it for me ?

*P106: Can I trouble you to pass that down to me please ?

*P107: Excuse me # I don't mean to bother you but could you reach that book [pointing] ? It's just out of my way .

*P108: Eh excuse me # would you please be kind enough to-eh get me that book from this-eh second shelf from the top please ?

*P109: Excuse me # can you help me by passing the book down please ?

*P110: Could you pass me that book above you please ?

*P111: Ehm excuse me # would you mind doing me a favour ? Eh there's a book up there I can't quite reach . I see you're a ¤ you're a tall fellow-ehm you can easily reach that for me if you don't mind please . Thank you .

*P112: Ehm excuse me # I need that book up there on the-eh fifth shelf and I don't seem to be able to reach it would you mind passing it down to me please ?

*P113: Eh # 'scu ¤ 'scuse me Big John # could you-eh # do me a favour please 'n' # could you just get me that ¤ that book there ? Be excellent ! Yeah ¤ yea' that's the book . Thanks thanks very much .

*P114: Excuse me ehm # I'm-e # really short # [laughing] as you can see, would you mind getting that book [laughing] for me please ?

*P115: Excuse me # could you just give me a hand ? I'm trying to get that book, [pointing] could you get it down for me ? Thank you !

*P116: Excuse me # would you mind reaching that book . . . and passing it to me ?

*P117: Hi ! I'm so sorry to bother you # do you mind just reaching and
        grabbing that book for me ?

*P118: Excuse me can I be cheeky ? I need that book up there and I can't reach it would you
        mind passing it down ? Thank you .

*P119: Excuse me # could you pass me that book please ?

*P120: Excuse me # would you mind passing me the book as I . . . can't reach it ?

*P121: Eh excuse me # I'm looking to get that book on the . . . shelf just above you can you
        just grab it for me please ?

The Trolley situation (the RED)

*P1:   mr John !
*P1:   look !
*P1:   I have lots of place on my trolley .
*P1:   <let's put> [//] put your bag please !

*P2:   there is a space on my trolley .
*P2:   can I help you ?
*P2:   it will be easier for you just to work [*] [: walk] .
*P2:   without picking [*] [: holding] it (.) in your hands .

*P3:   please !
*P3:   &er use my trolley !
*P3:   because your [/] your bag is very heavy .
*P3:   it's &er (..) absolutely possible to: (..) [/] to take your own bag.
*P3:   because &um (..) my is not so huge and heavy [stammers] .

*P4:   &um (..) dear mr John !

*P4:   &er (.) · let me help you .

*P4:   we can use my trolley to: · our boss &er (.) &lugga luggage +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P4:   +, our boss bags .

*MA: yes .

*P4:   suitcase [I think] .

*MA: &heee .

*P5:   please !

*P5:   take a place on my trolley !

*P5:   it's [/] it's not difficult for me to take it .

*P5:   but it <will solve> [//] looks like so: (.) heavy .

*P6:   &ahem mrs [*] [: mr] John there is space on my trolley .

*P6:   so (.) <don't worry if you> &xxx (..) [//] I don't mind if you put your luggage in [*] [: on] my trolley .

*MA: &uhu yeah .

*P6:   you are welcome .

*P7:   [I will say] .

*P7:   German !

*P7:   take [*] [: give] me (.) your luggage !

*P7:   I have &fr free space on my 0trolley .

*MA: yeah .

*P8:   &oh please !

*P8:   can you put your &er sweetcase [*] [: suitcase] on my trolley ?

*P8:   and (..) it will be easy for you to go .

*P9:   I have some space on the trolley .

*P9:   so you are welcome to use it .

*P10:   [smacks her lips] &ahem (..) let's I [*] [: let me] help you &haha .

*P10:   give me your luggage .

*P10:   and · we will do it together .

*P11:   &ahem you can put your luggage on my trolley .

*P11:   if you want .

*P12:   &ahem (..) please !

*P12:   &ta (.) we can share the trolley .

*P13:   mr John !

*P13:   your: [//] I have a [*] space on my trolley .

*P13:   so if you want some help .

*P13:   please just take it .

*P13:   it's right here .

*P14:   put your: (..) &er heavy baggage on my trolley .

*MA: yeah .

*P15:   you can join my luggage [*] .

*P15:   there is a lot of space .

*P16:   mr John <you can> [//] &er can you give your: &um (.) bag
         on my trolley ?

*P17:   · my dear boss !

*P17:   please put your luggage on &th my trolley &haha .

*P18:   [[audible inhaling] I know the (.) Odessa proverb] +"/ .

*P18:   [+" &er every man [audible inhaling and clearing the throat] keep [*] his own lug
         gage] .

*P18:   [but &hahaha] I invite you &hahaha <for my> [//] on my trolley
         &hahaha.

*P19:   mr John !

*P19: there is a [*] space on my trolley .

*P19: so you can put your luggage · on it .

*P19: and (.) I will bring it (.) closer to the car .

*P19: · and: it's ok .

*P19: there's nothing to worry about .

*P20: &oh (.) there is &er · some space on my trolley .

*P20: you can put it here !

*P20: and · there is no waiting in [/] in · gering [*] [: getting] the
       trolley .

*P20: so · do it !

*P20: and it's [/] it's very easy for me .

*P21: you can use my trolley .

*P21: 0you 0are welcome [points at the trolley].

*MA: yeah [/] yeah .

*P21: &hahaha .

*P21: can I help you &hahaha ?

*MA: right .

*P22: mr John !

*P22: you can use my · &er +/.

*MA: trolley .

*P22: +, trolley .

*P22: it's [/] &er it's here [points at the trolley] .

*P22: place .

*MA: yeah .

*P22: free for you .

*MA: yeah .

*P22: <let's go> .

*MA: <right> .

*P23: may I help you ?

*P23:   you can use my trolley .

*P23:   it's [/] it's [//] it is enough space +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P23:   +, for your luggage .

*P24:   if you want .

*P24:   I can help you .

*P25:   · &oh John !

*P25:   don't lift · &um the baggage .

*P25:   I have free space on my trolley .

*P25:   come !

*P25:   &c come on !

>

The Trolley situation (the RMTD)

*P26:   [čto ja govorju] ?

*P26:   [ja pod teležku podstavljaju i govorju] .

*P26:   stav'te Ivan Ivanovič .

*P27:   prošu postavit' čemodan sjuda .

*P28:   vy možete položit' svoj bagaž na moju teležku (.) esli vy xotite .

*P29:   Ivan Ivanyč !

*P29:   stav'te svoi vešči na moju teležku !

*P30:   · Ivan Ivanyč dajte ka svoj čemodančik .

*P30:   my vmeste doedem do taksi .

*P31:   Ivan Ivanyč !

*P31:   davajte .

*P31:   čto vy mučaetes' ?

*P31:   davajte ja vam pomogu !

*P31:   u menja na moej teležke esť ešče svobodnoe mesto .

*P31:   davajte razmestim vaš čemodan na moju teležku .

*P31:   vam budet namnogo [!] prošče .

*P32:   davajte &p pomogu vam podvezti vaš čemodan .

*P33:   Ivan Ivanyč vam pomoč' ?

*P34:   Ivan Ivanyč postav'te +//.

*P34:   davajte postavim vaš čemodan na teležku .

*P34:   i: &è_è_è vam budet namnogo legče .

*P35:   stav'te &č čemodan na teležku .

*P35:   ja vam podvezu [!] .

*P36:   davajte postavim &mmm sjuda na teležku (.) čemodan vaš .

*P36:   dovezem .

*P37:   &m_m_m Denis Vladimirovič .

*P37:   ja vižu vam tjaželo .

*P37:   vot u menja esť svobodnoe mesto .

*P37:   <davajte ja> [//] <davajte ja vam pomogu> [//]

         davajte ja vam pomogu postaviť vaš o:čen' [!] tjaželyj čemodan .

*P38:   Ivan Ivanovič .

*P38:   davajte vaš čemodan na teležku .

*P38:   čto vy mučaeteś ?

*P38:   tjaželyj veď navernoe .

*P38:   [nu: (.) kak to tak] .

*OH: ugu .

*P38:   davajte ja povezu vse [/] vse vešči odnovremenno na odnoj teležke .

*P39:	· Ivan Ivanovič .

*P39:	stav'te svoj čemodan (.) i vezite teležku .

*OH:	ugu [/] ugu .

*P39:	[potomu čto on že muzčina] .

*P39:	[ja ž ne budu sama vezti] .

*OH:	konečno .

*P40:	davajte vaš čemodan ko mne .

*P40:	vmeste doedem na odnoj teležke .

*P41:	· Ivan Ivanovič .

*P41:	položite svoj čemodan ko mne na teležku .

*P41:	&ja &možno tak budet prošče +/.

*OH:	ugu .

*P41:	+, donesti .

*P42:	[ja emu govorju] Ivan Ivanovič .

*P42:	ne nado tjagat' takie tjaželye vešči.

*P42:	vot mesto svobodnoe .

*P42:	kladite vaš čemodan .

*P43:	Ivan Ivanovič !

*P43:	davajte čemodan sjuda !

*P44:	Ivan Ivanovič .

*P44:	my možete položiť svoj čemodan na moju teležku .

*P45:	prisoedinjajteś ko mne .

*P45:	tak udobnej .

*P46:	Ivan Ivanovič .

*P46:	ja vižu vaš čemodan tjažel .

*P46:	&è_è_è davajte položim ego na teležku .

*P46:   i: mne ne sostavljaet truda &sobstvenno_govorja ètu teležku katit' .

*P47:   Ivan Ivanovič !

*P47:   pristraivajte požalujsta svoj čemodan .

*P47:   u memnja tut dostatočno mesta .

*P47:   čto vy tam mučaetes' ?

*P48:   Ivan Ivanyč .

*P48:   požalujsta .

*P48:   položite svoj čemodan na teležku .

*P48:   i: poexali &xe_xe na legke .

*P49:   Ivan Ivanyč .

*P49:   davajte svoj čemodan sjuda postavim !

*P50:   Ivan Ivanyč !

*P50:   · brosajte na teležku svoj čemodan !

*P50:   · vmeste (.) dojdem do mašiny .

*P50:   i: &kak_by nikakoj gruz nas ne budet stesnjat' po doroge .

*P50:   poobščaemsja .

The Trolley situation (the DED)

*P51:   John !

*P51:   you can put it on # my-eh # trolley here ¤ no you can put your
        trolley on my wagon here .

*P51:   eh its # looks easier for you .

*P52:   John !

*P52:   you(.) [//] you're welcome to put your (.) shootcase [*]
        [: suitcase] on my trolley .

*P53:   there's space here .

*P53:   if you wanna put it there .

*P54:   mr John !

*P54:   I have a trolley here .

*P54:   <we can> [//] you can put your suitcase on mine .

*P55:   &ehm # should I take your bag ?

*P55:   you can just put it up here .

*P55:   [and I'll probably help him lift it or something] .

*P56:   I can see your # suitcase is very heavy .

*P56:   and I got # space here on my trolley .

*P56:   so if you want to .

*P56:   you can put yours here .

*P56:   and then we can [yeah] shift and # rolling it [laughing] .

*P57:   &eh mr John !

*P57:   &eh please feel free to: put your luggage on my trolley .

*P57:   &eh there's <a lot of> [/] &eh a lot of room .

*P58:   &well please put your suitcase on the trolley .

*P58:   &ehm there's lots of room for it .

*P58:   so don't worry .

*P58:   you shouldn't break ¤ [laughing] break your back on that .

*P59:   mr John !

*P59:   please let me take your ¤ &eh luggage on my &eh trolley .

*P59:   because-e I have &eh # enough space .

*P60:   sir please let me take that .

*P60:   I can put it on the trolley and take it with me as well .

*P60:   and there is plenty of room .

*P61:   let me grab that .

*P62:   please allow me .

*P62:   [and then I would take it # from him and put it on my trolley] .

*P63:   0do 0you need help ?

*P64:   &wha ¤ why don't you just let me take that one ?

*P64:   there's plenty of room on this one .

*P65:   you don't need to carry that # heavy suitcase .

*P65:   I have space on my trolley .

*P65:   you can put it here .

*P66:   &eh do you need some help ?

*P66:   I have a trolley .

*P66:   you can # carry it on .

*P67:   hey mr John !

P67:   [sighs] &ehh there're [sic] some available space on my trolley.

*P67:   if you # don't want to carry # eh the heavy luggage yourself .

*P68:   I have space on my trolley .

*P68:   if you don't want to carry it .

*P68:   it looks heavy .

*P69:   John !

*P69:   let's share the trolley !

*P69:   &eh put your luggage on this one .

P69:   then we can follow in the same pace .

*P70:   do you wanna put your suitcase here ?

*P71:   John .

*P71:   there's plenty of room on this trolley .

*P71:   but just put your suitcase here .

*P71:   we're going the same way more or less .

*P71:   so …

*P72:   &ehm please boss .

*P72:   &eh if you would like to &eh put your suitcase &eh on the trolley .

*P72:   it seems quite heavy .

*P72:   &eh we might as well do it like that .

*P73:   John !

*P73:   I have some space on my trolley .

*P73:   would you like to have your suitcase # on my trolley ?

*P74:   John !

*P74:   That bag looks heavy .

*P74:   yo ¤ you can just put it on my trolley .

*P74:   it won¤will be &ea ¤ easier for you .

*P75:   Do you want your bag on trolley?

*P75:   I have extra room .

The Trolley situation (the DMTD)[17]

*P76:   Vil du have din kuffert herop sammen med min?

*P77:   Hvad Martin . Skal du ikke lige have den her op på vognen? Den ser lidt tung ud.

*P78:   Ska' jeg ik' li' smide den me' på min vogn ? Vi skal alligevel følges.

*P79:   Ve' du ik' ha' den op her på?

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17   The DMTD transcription of the Trolley situation was carried out by Mary-Ann McKerchar.

*P80: Øh ska' du ve' du ik' ha' din bagage på min ... min bagagevogn?
Det ser tungt ud.

*P81: Skal jeg ikke lige tage din kuffert op på min bagagevogn her?
Det går vist lidt nemmere.

*P82: Kære chef! Det ser ud som om du har lige lovlig rigelig at slæbe på. Skal du ikke lige sætte den herop på? Så tager jeg mig af det.

*P83: Du kan låne nogen billig transportmuligheder her.

*P84: Chef, skal vi ikke smide din kuffert op på min bagagevogn? Den ser ret tung ud.

*P85: Vil du ikke have kufferten op her? Der er masser plads.

*P86: Hvad-øh har du svært ved at bære (GRINER) den # jeg har plads på min stil den her op # så ta'r vi den

*P87: Smid den op her så # kør'r vi den derudaf!

*P88: Arhh få den nu herop så ska' jeg nok li' ta' den

*P89: Ve' du ik' ha' din-øh kuffert op på min bagagevogn?

*P90: (FNISER) Kom (GRINER) med din taske op på den her du ska' ik' gå å' slæbe på den

*P91: Martin ska' vi ik' t' . v? din kuffert op på bagagevognen så du slipper for at få dårlig ryg på vejen (GRINER)

*P92: Øh Martin ku' du tænk' dig å' få-ø dit bagage op på min bagagevogn der er plads

*P93: Kom her smid den op på-ø min bagagevogn je' ka' se du slæber som en hest

*P94: Øhh # du ka' # du ka' bar' smide din bagage op på min vogn og så # ka' je' køre det for dig

*P95:   Vil du ikke have din kuffert op på min bagagevogn?

*P96:   Jeg har plads på min [!] bagagevogn. Så behøver du ikke at bære din taske selv.

*P97:   Martin ve' du ik' køre med?

The Trolley situation (the BED)

*P98:   Ehm John do you want to just put your stuff on this trolley # there's more than
         enough space # yea so then I can just take both .

*P99:   Here you are Mr . John . Give us your bag . I'll put it on my trolley .

*P100: Let's share the trolley it's big enough for both cases .

*P101: John I've got a trolley here with space on # ehm # would you like # en # to just put
         your suitcase on my trolley here and then we'll push it it'll be easier for you .

*P102: Hey, John, give us it here, I'll stick this on the trolley with mine, there's plenty of
         room .

*P103: Hello John, put your luggage onto the trolley . There's room here .

*P104: Ehm # please # please join me # eh # I have room on mine .

*P105: Eh # Mr . John feel free to put your bag on my trolley # and-eh ¤ and we ¤ we can
         share it .

*P106: Room for one more .

*P107: I've got space on my trolley if you want to use it . Do you want ¤ do you want a
         hand ?

*P108: John would you like to put your-eh suitcase on the trolley as well ? There is plenty of space available on mine please feel free to put it on .

*P109: John you can use my trolley if you want to .

*P110: Do you want to put that on the trolley ?

*P111: Ehm # Mr . John I've ¤ I've got a trolley here # there's # there's plenty of room for both of our bags . Do you ¤ do you want a hand with that ? I mean there's no point in you # struggling with that when I've got a trolley .

*P112: Ehm I've got space on my trolley here so # put your bag onto my trolley and don't be so silly stop trying to carry that big bag .

*P113: (I'd say):

D'you wan' a hand with that ? Stick it on here !

*P114: D'you wanna put that on the trolley ?

*P115: Here you go, let me give you a hand and pop it on here, make it ... life a lot easier .

*P116: Mr. John # please give me your bag # there's . . . more than enough room on here .

*P117: Dude are you moving in ? What did you pack in that ? Seriously ! Come and whack it on my trolley . . . serious . .

*P118: D'you want to pop that on here ? You look like you're struggling with that.

*P119: There's loads of room on the trolley let's . . . put your luggage on there .

*P120: Why don't you put your case on my trolley ?

*P121: Here you are Mr . John I've got a trolley . . . so you can put your bag on here if you need to.

The Window situation (the RED)

*P1:   stop stop stop !

*P1:   please do not do it !

*P1:   the window is broken .

*P2:   &ummm please don't do it !

*P2:   it will kill somebody .

*P3:   &ahem (.) please don't 0do it .

*P3:   because it's dangerous and useless here .

*P3:   because it's not [*] [doesn't] work properly .

*P4:   &ahem (.) be careful !

*P4:   the window is broken .

*P4:   &er (..) don't [//] please [!] don't open it .

*P4:   &er (..) let's &er (...) find some people who can &er [//]

       after the meeting we can find some people who can repair it .

*P5:   please don't open it !

*P5:   it'll just fall down .

*P5:   we can open the door .

*P5:   but don't touch the window &haha .

*P6:   stop doing this !

*P6:   [again] it's dangerous for you and for people outside .

*P7:   excuse me .

*P7:   · this window is [/] is broken .

*P7:   · you: shouldn't &er (.) open it .

*P7:   because it (.) will (.) fall down .

*P8:   &oh please don't touch !

*P8:   it's broken .

*P8:   and &er (..) you can (..) use it right now .

*P8:   [maybe like [/] like that] .

*MA: you can use it +/.

*P8:   you can't [!] use it .

*MA: you can't [!] .

*MA: yes .

*MA: right .

*P9:   · please don't open it !

*P9:   because &er (.) it will fall out .

*P9:   it's broken .

*MA: yeah .

*P10:   please don't open it !

*P10:   it's broken .

*P11:   · &ahem please don't (.) [smacks her lips] open it .

*P11:   because it's broken .

*MA: yeah .

*P12:   stop please !

*P12:   it is broken .

*P13:   &ahem you shouldn't do it .

*P13:   because it's broken .

*P13:   and it [coughs] just will fall apart in the street .

*P13:   [I think I'm too calm for your test] .

*MA: &hahaha .

*P13:   &hahaha .

*P14:   please &er (.) don't open 0the window .

*MA: yeah .

*P14:   [nothing more] .

*P15:   &ahem excuse me .

*P15:   it's broken .

*P15:   but we can (.) continue our meeting outside .

*P15:   in the garden maybe ?

*P16:   [exhaling and clearing the troat] please don't open !

*P16:   it's broken !

*P16:   [and (…) it's all &ha] .

*MA: yeah [/] yeah .

*P17:   &uhoh (.) I know that there is a problem with 0the window .

*P17:   please &er don't open it .

*P17:   because it &er will be broken &hehehe .

*P18:   boss !

*P18:   stop !

*P18:   don't open the window !

*P18:   · it's broken .

*MA: yeah .

*P19:   sorry sorry sorry !

*P19:   don't [!] open the window !

*P19:   it's broken .

*P19:   and: (.) if you just touch the window .

*P19:   it will fall down to the street .

*P19:   and maybe · hurt someone .

*P19:   so let's suffer a bit (.) for fifteen minutes more <&hahaha> .

*MA: <&hahaha> .

*P19:   and after that we can go to: (.) conditioning [//] to room

with aircondition [*] or to the street .

*P20:   · &ahem dear boss !

*P20:   &er · the window is broken .

*P20:   &er · if we open it .

*P20:   it [//] &er the glass will fall in [*] 0the street .

*P20:   · and &er (.) · maybe we can find another room for our meeting .

*P20:   if there is too hot .

*MA: yeah .

*P21:   please don't do it !

*P21:   it's broken !

*P22:   don't do it !

*P23:   &oh please don't do that !

*P23:   it's broken .

*MA: yeah .

*P24:   mr Carlsson .

*P24:   I kindly ask you to not [!] open the window .

*P24:   because (..) it get [//] it &coul [//] it would be +/.

*MA: yeah .

*P24:   +, damaged .

*P25:   stop !

*P25:   don't do it !

The Window situation (the RMTD)

*P26:   &xm_m_m da x_x_x · (…) Ivan Ivanyč &è_è_è na prošloj nedele · uže pytalis' ot kryt' èto okno zakončilos' očen' plačevno .

*P26:   prišlos' vyzyvat' mastera stavit' novoe okno .

*P26:   davajte ostavim ego v pokoe .

*P27:   Ivan Ivanyč k sožaleniju okno slomano .

*P27:   prijdetsja nam žiť v duxote .

*P28:   ostanoviteś požalujsta !

*P28:   okno slomano .

*P28:   možet upasť .

*P29:   Ivan Ivanyč ostorožno !

*P29:   eto okno slomano .

*P29:   ego neľzja otkryvať .

*P30:   Ivan Ivanyč minutočku .

*P30:   ne stoit ètogo delať .

*P30:   okno polomano .

*P31:   Ivan Ivanovič podoždite !

*P31:   &a_a_a ja xoču vam soobščiť čto naše okno slomano i esli vy ego

        otkroete my boľše ne smožem ego zakryť (.) ono prosto vyvalitsja na ulicu .

*P32:   ostorožno !

*P32:   ono ne ispravleno !

*P33:   Ivan [/] Ivan xxx ?

*OH: Ivan Ivanyč .

*P33:   akkuratnee .

*P33:   okno: (..) · [/] okno možet razbiťsja poetomu ja vam ne

        sovetuju ego otkryvatj .

*P33:   davajte lučše priotkroem dveŕ .

*P33:   [naprimer tak] .

*P34:   · Ivan Ivanyč okno slomano .

*P34:   ne trogajte ego požalujsta .

*P35: · Ivan Ivanyč vy znaete (.) okno slomano !

*P35: esli vy ego xotite otkryt' to: ja dumaju čto lučše vozderžat'sja i priglasit' remontnuju brigadu potomu_čto (.) ne izvestno čto možet slučitsja .

*P36: (..) akkuratnee .

*P36: ne nado .

*P36: &è_è_è ono polomano .

*P36: sejčas možet vypast' .

*P37: &è_è_è Ivan Ivanyč &è_è_è okno: slomano .

*P37: poètomu davajte kakoj_nibud' drugoj sposob pridumaem provetrit' pomeščenie .

*P38: [skazala] stojte [/] stojte !

*P38: podoždite .

*P38: [nu kak_to <zakričala> [//] povysila golos (.) čtoby privleč' vnimanie] .

*P39: [ja emu <govorju> [//] predupreždaju čto] .

*P39: Ivan Ivanovič .

*P39: izvinite požalujsta no vot (.) okno polomano i tol'ko poètomu ono ne otkryto .

*P39:   a esli by ono bylo v normal'nom sostojanii ja by davno uže ego otkryla .

*P40: stojte !

*P40: okno slomano !

*P40: ne trogajte ego !

*P41: net_net_net_net_net !

*P41: ne trogajte [!] ni v koem slučae èto okno !

*P41: &è_è_è inače sejčas vse <upadet> [//] &è_è_è ruxnet .

*P41: i · &è_è_è èto opasno .

*P42: [govorju] Ivan Ivanyč ja prinošu svoi izvinenija .

*P42:   no ja rovno [!] včera zabyla vyzvat' mastera čtoby on otremontiroval okno .

*P42:   esli vy ego otkroete èto črevato tem čto ono vypadet .

*P42:   davajte posidim nemnožko &è_è_è v ne očen' prijatnyx uslovijax .

*P42:   i ja posle soveščanija vyzovu mastera .

*P43:   Ivan Ivanovič stojte !

*P43:   minutu .

*P44:   Ivan Ivanovič (.) stop !

*P45:   [ja gromko ego oklikaju po imeni] .

*P45:   Ivan Ivanovič stojte !

*P45:   [i uže v bolee spokojnoj forme ob"jasnjaju] .

*P45:   [čto (..) delat' ne stoit na moj vzgljad] .

*P45:   [nu to est' otkryvat' okno] .

*P46:   Ivan Ivanovič [!] u nas nedavno proizišel kazus s ètim oknom .

*P46:   i: bojus' čto sejčas ne predstavitsja vozmožnym otkryt' ego častično.

*P46:   potomu kak ono ne ispravno .

*P46:   ja dumaju čto my kak_to &è_è_è smožem otkryt' okno posle togo kak ego počinjat .

*P47:   Ivan Ivanovič ostorožno !

*P47:   ono slomano !

*P48:   Ivan Ivan:yč ni v koem slučae ne delajte ètogo .

*P48:   tak kak okno lomano .

*P48:   i ono možet (.) · vyvalit'sja naružu .

*P49:   &è_è_è uvažaemyj Ivan Ivanovič ?

*OH: ugu .

*P49:   &è_è_è &nu_tam_nu_vernee Ivan Ivanovič èto opasno !

*P49:   podoždite .

*OH: ugu .

*P49: [nu kak_to ostanovit' nado bystro] .

*OH: ugu [/] ugu .

*P49: [nu i dal'še ob"jasnjaju počemu opasno] .

*P50: bud'te ostorožny !

*P50: delo v tom čto: okno slomano .

*P50: · &è_è_è (...) i: (..) &nu_ne_znaju možet proizojti kakoj_nibud' kazus .

The Window situation (the DED)

*P51: oh sorry!

*P51: but you can't [!] open the window .

*P51: it's broken .

*P51: so (.) we'll just have to open the door or anything else .

*P52: please don't open the win ¤ the window !

*P52: as it is broken .

*P52: so we cannot open it .

*P53: I really [!] don't think you should open the window .

*P53: maybe you don't know .

*P53: but it is broken .

*P54: please (.) watch out !

*P54: this window is very strange .

*P54: but we cannot open it .

*P54: there's something wrong with the glass .

*P54: and we have to open the door instead and get some fresh air .

*P54: but if we open it .

*P54: it will fall out and make damage to yourself .

*P55: Thomas!

*P55: Stop!

*P55:   [probably or whatever his name was]

*P56:   oh please don't !
*P56:   stop opening the window !
*P56:   it will break .

*P57:   please don't open the window !
*P57:   it's broken .
*P57:   and if you try to open it .
*P57:   it will fall to the street .

*P58:   &well # the ¤ the window is broken .
*P58:   so please [!] do not touch it .
*P58:   so it will [laughing] fall into the street .

*P59:   stop!
*P59:   please don't open the window .

*P60:   please don't open the window !
*P60:   please be careful !
*P60:   cos that's gonna fall out and hurt someone .
*P60:   it's broken .

*P61:   stop!
*P61:   don't open it .
*P61:   it's broken .

*P62:   stop !

*P63:   oh stop!
*P63:   the window is broken .

*P64:   sorry .

*P64:   th ¤ this one is broken .

*P64:   eh it's not meant to be opened .

*P64:   I don't know who forgot to put a sign on it .

*P64:   but we'll take care of that .

*P65:   the window is broken .

*P65:   and if you open it .

*P65:   it will # actually fall out .

*P66:   ehh please watch out !

*P66:   the window's broken .

*P66:   it will fall out .

*P67:   hey boss !

*P67:   don't-e open the window .

*P67:   it may-eh eh fall out and-eh # [yeah] . . . hit somebody .

*P68:   It will be better if you open this one over here .

*P68:   because that one is broken .

*P69:   Pono !

*P69:   you can't open that one .

*P69:   you need to pick another one .

*P69:   that one is broken .

*P70:   no !

*P70:   you can't open it !

*P70:   it's broken .

*P71:   Jim !

*P71:   please don't ¤ don't open this window !

*P71:   it's broken .

*P71:   eh we forgot to put a sign on .

*P71:   I'm sorry .

*P71:   but please don't open it !

*P71:   we know it's # not functioning .

*P72:   oh please [!] don't open the window !

*P72:   eh if we do .

*P72:   it falls out .

*P73:   stop !

*P73:   the window is broken .

*P73:   don't open it .

*P74:   boss !

*P74:   eh please be careful !

*P74:   the window is broken .

*P74:   it ¤ it actually may fall all out if you open it .

*P75:   sorry !

*P75:   just a sec !

*P75:   it's just # the wintow [sic] is ¤ the window is broken .

*P75:   nd # it will fall out if you # open it .

*P75:   but I'll look into yum ¤ look into it and see if we can do something else .

The Window situation (the DMTD)

*P76:   nej Martin !

*P76:   pas lige på med vinduet !

*P77:   nej [!] for guds skyld !

*P77:   du må ikke åbne vinduet !

*P77:   så falder det ud .

*P77:   det er ødelagt .

*P77:   det er i stykker .

*P77:   vi må holde varmen ud .

*P77:   åbne døren .

*P78:   vinduet er desværre i stykker .

*P78:   så hvis du åbner det .

*P78:   så går det (.) fra hinanden .

*P79:   du kan ikke åbne vinduet .

*P79:   det er gået i stykker .

*P80:   stop stop !

*P80:   vinduet det kan falde ud .

*P81:   ej !

*P81:   du kan ikke åbne vinduet .

*P81:   <det er:> [/] det er i stykker .

*P81:   hvis du åbner så (..) flader det ud .

*P81:   eller (.) sker et eller andet .

*P82:   stop !

*P82:   du må egentlig ikke røre det vindue .

*P82:   det ryger ud .

*P82:   <hvis du> [/] hvis du åbner det .

*P83:   stop stands &hahaha !

*P83:   vinduet er i stykker .

*P83:   vi: (..) [/] du må ikke åbne det .

*P83:   vi skal nok have set en seddel på .

*P84:   chef chef !

*P84:   ikke åbne det vindue !

*P84:   det er i stykker !

*P85:   nej !

*P85:   pas på !

*P85:   det er i stykker !

*P86:   pas lige på !

*P86:   vinduet &hahaha det er i stykker !

*P86:   altså (.) lad os prøve at se om vi ikke kan åbne døren i stedet for .

*P86:   eller (.) så lad os lige holde fem minutter for at lufte ud .

*P87:   stop !

*P87:   vinduet er i stykker !

*P87:   så (..) det nytter ikke noget du åbner det .

*P89:   Martin du må ikke åbne vinduet .

*P89:   det er i stykker .

*P90:   pas på ! .

*P90:   vinduet er (..) [/] er i stykker .

*P90:   så (..) det går i stykker hvis vi åbner det .

*P91:   hov pas på ! .

*P91:   vinduet er gået i stykker .

*P91:   så hvis du åbner det .

*P91:   så ryger det ud .

*P91:   [og så vil jeg nok også komme til at være lidt fysisk i at få ham stoppet, ikke] .

*P92:   Martin !

*P92:   vinduet det er i stykker .

*P92:   så du må ikke åbne det .

*P93:   nej nej nej !

*P93:   du må ikke åbne vinduet .

*P93:   det er i stykker .

*P93:   og det kan falde ud .

*P93:   og der er nogle der kan komme til skade .

*P94:   pas nu på med at åbne vinduet !

*P94:   det: [/] det risikerer at falde ned på gaden .

*P94:   så (..) du bliver nødt til at slippe .

*P95:   du må ikke åbne vinduet !

*P95:   &eh (..) det går i stykker hvis man åbner det bare en lille smule .

*P96:   vent !

*P96:   vinduet er i stykker .

*P97:   [siger] stop !

*P97:   vinduet er i stykker .

*P97:   pas på !

*P97:   <du kan komme til skade> [/] eller vi [!] kan komme til skade

The Window situation (the BED)

*P98:   Boss # don't open the window, it will fall out # like, it's pretty dangerous .

*P99:   Ooh don't open that window ! It's broken it'll fall out .

*P100: Don't touch it ! It's gonna' fall out .

*P101: Stop ! Don't open the window ! It's broken Ehm # if you open that then it could #
        hell could break loose so # do not open the window !

*P102: (Whatever his name is, shout] Dave, stop ! Don't open the window !
        [And then explain to him . . what the problem is with it] .

*P103: Don't open the window because the glass is damaged .

*P104: Wait !

*P105: Eh stop # eh # if you ¤ if you open the window # it

¤ it'll ¤ it'll fall out # eh # (and again probably be physical and try and get to him # get to him as quick as I could) .

*P106: Hang on ! Don't do that .

*P107: No no no # don't touch the window # if you do that it'll fall out (But loudly – re spondent means that she would say it loudly) .

*P108: Oh hang on boss the window is broken # eh # it could be dangerous eh someone could fall over # eh please do not open it .

*P109: Don't open the window .

*P110: The window's broken can't open it .

*P111: Eh # e ¤ excuse me # don't¤ don't touch that window it's-eh ¤ it's quite important it's not touched because it's broken and it'll fall and hurt somebody .

*P112: Ehm I know it's hot in here but please don't touch the window it's broken # if you touch it it will end up on the floor and damage somebody perhaps so you mustn't touch it .

*P113: [I'd say:]

Whoa ! Whoa ! hold on . . . that window's broken Paul . If you open that eh . . . it's gonna fall out . So . . . I know it's stuffed in here but . . . we can open the door, but we can't open the window .

*P114: Please don't touch the window it'll break .

*P115: Hold on ! The window's broken [laughing] don't touch [laughing] it, we'll just have to cope with the heat .

*P116: D' . . . don't open the window I know it's broken !

*P117: Bruce sit down don't . . . touch . . . the window. Step away . You do know that if you . . . touch it it will fall out and we will have a reliability insurance problem on our hands please sit down .

*P118: No ! Don't touch that ! It's gonna fall out ! We'll all fall out of the window ! walk away !

*P119: Ehm we can't open the window unfortunately it's broken .

*P120: No no no ! The window's broken . Please don't open it please don't touch it !

*P121: Leave that ! The window's broken . We could-e turn the air conditioning on instead .

Attached Documents

on

http://llk.dk/x8574u

Excel-file I (The Trolley situation)

Excel-file II (The Window situation)

Excel-file III (The Library situation)

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