

Two Nations Divided by Common Values

French National Habitus and the Rejection of American Power

Fich, Christian

Document Version

Final published version

Publication date:

2010

License

CC BY-NC-ND

Citation for published version (APA):

Fich, C. (2010). *Two Nations Divided by Common Values: French National Habitus and the Rejection of American Power*. Copenhagen Business School [Phd]. PhD series No. 15.2010

[Link to publication in CBS Research Portal](#)

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us (research.lib@cbs.dk) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 04. Jul. 2025



TWO NATIONS DIVIDED BY COMMON VALUES

FRENCH NATIONAL HABITUS AND THE REJECTION OF AMERICAN POWER

Christian Fich

PhD thesis

Centre for the Study of Europe
Department of International Culture and Communication Studies
Copenhagen Business School
2009

« Peut-être la sérénité est-elle impossible en France dès lors qu'il s'agit de juger les Etats-Unis : l'image qu'on a d'eux ne révèle-t-elle pas constamment l'image qu'on a de soi, qu'on a de l'avenir national tel qu'on le craint ou tel qu'on l'espère ? »

Alfred Grosser
Affaires extérieures.
La politique de la France 1944-1989
(1989)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	1
1	INTRODUCTION	3
1.1	MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	5
1.2	PLACE OF THE STUDY IN RELATION TO MAINSTREAM RESEARCH ON ANTI-AMERICANISM	10
1.3	THEORIZING ON ANTI-AMERICANISM AS A CULTURAL PHENOMENON IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	14
1.3.1	Propositions toward a theoretical framework for the study of anti-Americanism	23
1.4	STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY	26
2	ANTI-AMERICANISM: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE	29
2.1	ANTI-AMERICANISM: A UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON	29
2.2	THREE FALSE DISCOURSES ON ANTI-AMERICANISM?	31
2.2.1	Just another anti-ism?	33
2.2.2	A unique and largely irrational phenomenon?.....	36
2.2.3	A unique and complex anti-ism?	42
2.3	ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE POWER DIMENSION.....	47
3	THE REJECTION OF AMERICAN POWER	52
3.1	PERCEPTIONS ABROAD TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES	53
3.2	ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE PERCEPTION OF POWER	62
3.3	REJECTION OF AMERICA’S HARD POWER	65
3.3.1	The American Empire.....	69
3.3.2	Perceptions of hegemony.....	74
3.4	REJECTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF AMERICA’S SOFT POWER	82
3.4.1	Political values and exceptionalism	84
3.4.2	Cultural norms	104
3.5	CONCLUSION: THE REJECTION OF AMERICAN POWER	114
4	ANTI-AMERICANISM AND NATIONAL HABITUS	120
4.1	MODERNISM AND THE STUDY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY	121
4.2	NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE CREATION OF ‘WE’ AND ‘THEM’ IMAGES.....	128
4.3	NATIONAL HABITUS AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR	135
4.4	IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF FRENCH ANTI-AMERICANISM	141

5	TWO NATIONS, DIVIDED BY COMMON VALUES	145
5.1	THE IDENTITY DIMENSION OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND EUROPE	146
5.1.1	Narratives of a French tradition	148
5.1.2	More than a European specialty with a French ‘twist’?	153
5.1.3	Conclusion	157
5.2	ANTI-AMERICANISM AS A SUCCESSOR-PHOBIA?	158
5.3	THE CASE OF COMPETING UNIVERSALISMS	177
5.3.1	The republican ideal.....	178
5.3.2	The vanguard of civilization	195
5.3.3	Two visions of secularism: <i>Laïcité</i> versus religious freedom.....	217
5.3.4	Conclusion	231
5.4	CONCLUSION: IS AMERICA FRANCE’S SIGNIFICANT ‘OTHER’?	232
6	THE ANTI-AMERICAN REPUBLIC?	237
6.1	THE POLITICS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM	240
6.1.1	The heritage of anti-Americanism in modern French politics.....	242
6.1.2	National independence and the Gaullist legacy	254
6.1.3	The Western imperative.....	263
6.1.4	Balancing the hegemon: African and European policies.....	280
6.1.5	Conclusion	304
6.2	THE CULTURAL FRONT.....	316
6.2.1	The agents of cultural anti-Americanism.....	318
6.2.2	The Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture	333
6.2.3	Conclusion	358
6.3	CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM.....	364
7	CONCLUSION.....	370
7.1	A BRIEF SUMMARY	371
7.2	ANSWERING TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	374
7.3	IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH	378
7.4	CONCLUDING REMARKS	380
	NOTES.....	385
	DANSK RESUMÉ	399
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	406
	REFERENCES	410

Acknowledgments

This study has been a labor of love. Like any love affair, it has had its ups and downs. Progress has alternated with frustration, but fascination has prevailed throughout, guiding me through the past years. I have discovered a passion for the subject, which exceeded my initial expectations, already high, and which has rendered the process almost intoxicating at times. The study drawing to a close, it has been with a certain reluctance that I have forced myself to relinquish a number of aspects I would have liked to elaborate further upon. While some may find that my study thus omits essential features of French anti-Americanism, others will probably find that I have put too much emphasis on aspects, which they regard as of minor importance. They may very well be correct. In both cases, however, it will reflect that they share my fascination with the subject, and any criticism will be welcomed in that spirit.

This thesis could not have been completed without the advice and support I have received along the way. First and foremost, I wish to extend my profound thanks to my supervisor, Professor Michael Herslund. Michael is a true polyhistor, and the breadth of his knowledge has entailed that there were few if any parts of my study, on which he could not offer valuable advice. Just as importantly, Michael's unwavering belief in my ability to accomplish the task I had set before me has been a great comfort throughout. If anybody ever deserved the qualification *La Force Tranquille* (Mitterrand's slogan during the 1981 presidential campaign), it is Michael! I would also like to extend a sincere thanks to Vivi Rønne, the most pleasant and supportive administrator of the PhD program one could ever hope to meet. Vivi's contribution in ensuring that PhD students are guided safely through all bureaucratic quagmires can not be praised enough. Equally supportive have been my colleagues at the Center for European Studies, who have never let me doubt for one second that I was 'part of the family'. They have greatly contributed to rendering the many years I have devoted to this research project less solitary than it would otherwise have been. It has been and remains a pleasure and a privilege to work with you!

A great number of people have given me valuable advice either during the PhD courses I have attended or by commenting on early drafts of the thesis or parts thereof, and I have benefited immensely from their many pertinent observations. I would in this respect like to thank in particular Associate Professor Edward Ashbee, who also provided me with supplementary supervision during the last stages of my project, Professor José Casanova, Senior Researcher Manni Crone, Professor Søren Dosenrode, Professor Lars Bo Kaspersen, and Associate Professor Øjvind Larsen as well as Ulrik Pram Gad and the many other participants in our informal Culture and Discourse Study Network. Professor Richard Kuisel of Georgetown University deserves a special thank for taking time of from his busy schedule to meet me in Washington DC and to share from his extensive knowledge of French anti-Americanism. It has been extremely stimulating to discuss my thoughts on the subject with such experienced scholars, and it has undoubtedly helped me avoid several pitfalls along the way. Needless to say, any faults or shortcomings in the present study can be attributed only to me.

I have found it eminently rewarding to devote myself to this research project, and I am eternally grateful to the PhD program of Copenhagen Business School for offering me the opportunity to do so. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Centre for European Studies at New York University for welcoming me as a Visiting Scholar and for inviting me to present early drafts of my thoughts for well deserved criticism. I also wish to thank the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for prolonging my leave in order for me to finish this study. My family and friends too numerous to mention have given me much needed encouragement along the way while showing an extraordinary understanding for the neglect I subjected them to in the final phases of the project, and I look forward to seeing them much more than I have the past few years! Finally, I want to express my warmest thanks to my friend Marie-Louise Nosch, herself an accomplished scholar, who helped me getting started with my scholarship, and especially to Tanja Krabbe, without whose support and many sacrifices I might not have been able to finish what has, despite the fascination I have felt throughout, been the most challenging task I have yet undertaken.

Christian Fich

Copenhagen, March 2010

1 Introduction

“Nous sommes tous américains!” Such ran the headline of *Le Monde*’s famous editorial (Colombani 2001) following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Not much more than a year later, political relations between France and the United States were fraught with tension, and France was depicted as the vanguard of Old Europe, leading the political opposition against the American led invasion of Iraq. To many observers, the Franco-American fall out over the Iraq War seemed to validate the impression that France harbors a disproportionate political resentment vis-à-vis the United States (Wall, in O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:19). Regardless of the fact that France was but one of several major countries to voice its opposition to the war, it was singled out as the primary opponent to the American lead intervention and portrayed as the embodiment *par excellence* of European anti-Americanism (Adams 2007, Hoffmann 2004). In certain respects, this was a both unfair and untrue generalization, which showed ignorance as to the level of anti-Americanism in other European countries as well as to the heterogeneity of French displays of anti-Americanism. Yet, like many such generalizations, it contained an element of truth. French anti-Americanism often resonates louder and at times more strident than that of other European nations. In 2005, the *Economist* could in a decidedly unflattering portrait of then President Jacques Chirac safely write that the “French president has no rivals as global spokesman on anti-Americanism” (2005:35). This verdict was not just a repetition of the widely held beliefs concerning the supposedly anti-American policies of Chirac. The statement could equally be interpreted almost as a truism, confirming a relatively ingrained perception that French presidents are, more or less per definition, guided by a deep reluctance towards all things American. The fact that the current French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has been presented as an exception to this rule, and his rapprochement with Washington as a break with French traditions in this respect, is essentially a validation of the *Economist*’s claim that French presidents are, by and large, expected to be standard-bearers of European anti-Americanism. It is an impression that is not just confined to the political world; indeed it is a common impression that anti-Americanism runs deep in the French society at large. Neither is it an impression, which is confined to observers outside France, as it is shared by many influential

French commentators. Jean-François Revel, one of the most passionate critics of the French tradition of denigrating America, has described his native country as “le laboratoire privilégié où se rencontrent à l’état le plus poussé et le plus tranché des idées sur les États-Unis qui sont répandues sous une forme plus atténuée un peu partout en Europe et aussi ailleurs” (Revel 2002:164). Are we to believe Revel, France is the breeding house of European anti-Americanism, a prime mover in all things anti-American. Whether this is an exaggeration or not, it mirrors common verdicts on French-American relations such as those depicted in the *Economist’s* article.

As could be expected, the Franco-American controversy over the invasion of Iraq sparked a renewed interest in analyzing French anti-Americanism. In America, books were published with telltale titles such as *The French Betrayal of America* (Timmerman 2004) or *Our Oldest Enemy – A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France* (Miller and Molesky 2004). These works can be read mainly as examples of partisan demagoguery against an ally, who was scorned for not standing up for America in her hour of need. While they provide good insights into some of the grievances that the fall-out over the Iraq war gave rise to in America, they add little of substance to the analysis of French anti-Americanism. Of more interest were some of the books published in France when the transatlantic tensions were at their highest. Jean-François Revel’s *L’obsession anti-américaine* (2002) and Philippe Roger’s *The American Enemy, A Story of French Anti-Americanism* ([2002] 2005), both published before the fall out over the course to follow in Iraq led Franco-American relations to reach a new all-time low, were evidence of a renewed critical attempt to evaluate why anti-Americanism remains such a strong feature in France. Just as the particular French variety of anti-Americanism came in renewed focus at the dawn of the new millennium, so has the subject of anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon received accrued attention. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 “expressed nothing if not hatred of America” (Crockatt 2003:43), and this sparked a wave of interest in anti-Americanism throughout the world, leading some to argue that 9/11 “sharply punctuated the end of the American century”, heralding instead what “may well come to be recalled as the ‘anti-American century’” (Krastev 2004:5). Surveys revealing growing anti-Americanism in most of the countries polled gave rise to a substantial increase in the number of works and articles published on the phenomenon (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). Whether these works had anti-Americanism featuring prominently in the title, or contained

chapters or subchapters, in which anti-Americanism was depicted as a natural part of analyses of especially the deteriorating transatlantic relationship or the political turmoil in the Middle East, it has seemed as if in the first decade of the new millennium, no serious study of America was complete without some form of treatment of the phenomenon. Clearly, anti-Americanism is (or was until recently) a very timely subject. The reasons for this have largely been attributed to the global disaffection with America that was registered by pollsters under the presidencies of George W. Bush. The presidential candidate, who in his 2000 election campaign promised not to be the “ugly American”, ended up as president being “viewed globally as exactly that” (O’Connor, in O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1). Yet since January 2009, George W. Bush has left the White House and America’s allies have largely surrendered to ‘Obama-mania’ (Pew 2009). Surely then, the topic of anti-Americanism, at least in Europe, is today as interesting as yesterday’s newspaper? Not quite. First, though the election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States seems to have sparked a new wave of Americanophilia throughout most of Europe, anti-Americanism predates the election of the 43rd President by centuries. While the former president’s style and policies contributed toward galvanizing large segments of the global public opinion against official America, the contemporary factors promoting anti-American sentiments were present well before his election and are bound to linger on well after his departure from office. Second, while there is little doubt that the political actions of successive American administrations partake in shaping world opinion of the United States, anti-Americanism feeds on other sources beyond the practice of American foreign policy. Indeed, as will be shown in this study, anti-Americanism is as much if not more about a rejection of the perceived Americanization of the world as it is about opposition to specific American policies.

1.1 Main Objectives of the Study

This study will attempt to present an analysis of French anti-Americanism, which departs significantly from most of the accounts of the phenomenon to have been elaborated so far: The aim is to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. The main objective is to explore the constitutive factors most likely to prompt anti-American predispositions in France and to study how these predispositions influence the actions and policies of contemporary France. The overall research question to guide the thesis is: *What elements of the French national identity are particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American sentiments*

among the French elites, and to what extent can Franco-American relations under the Fifth Republic be regarded as influenced by these elements? Starting from the (rather contested) assumption that there is a structural dimension underlying the most common aspects of anti-Americanism, a further objective will be to develop a framework, within which anti-Americanism can be studied as a cultural phenomenon in international relations.

Anti-Americanism comes in many varieties depending on the countries observed. In this study, the primary focus will be on the particular French variety, which to this author's mind presents some unique and fascinating aspects. Yet it would be incomplete to analyze the French variety of anti-Americanism without presenting an attempt at exploring its universal dimension. The problem in this respect is naturally that some of the most virulent aspects of anti-Americanism are to be found especially in the Middle East (Akbarzadeh and Baxter, in O'Connor (ed.) 2007c), where the United States is frequently denounced as 'the Great Satan'. Many observers will probably share Abdallab's assessment that "One of the foreign policies of the United States that is a constant source of anti-Americanism in many parts of the world and especially in the Arab world is the U.S. economical, political and military support for Israel" (Abdallab 2003). A study of the most extreme varieties of anti-Americanism, including those potent enough to provoke acts of terrorism against the United States or U.S. interests abroad is, however, not the objective of this study. Therefore, this study will not attempt to answer Fareed Zakaria's question "Why Do They Hate Us?" (Zakaria 2001), as anti-Americanism henceforth will be analyzed in terms of rejection rather than hatred. One of the most intriguing features of anti-Americanism is not the hatred that America can attract in parts of the world, where the United States is seen as an almost unmitigated evil, but the rejection that it can fuel in segments around the world relatively sympathetic to the values and frequently also to a large number of the policies of the United States. Sylvia Ullmo has noted that it is doubtful whether anybody is interested in anti-Americanism in the regions of the world where hatred toward America is more or less a consensual affair (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:9). That might be something of an overstatement, yet though Americans may have woken up after 9/11 wondering why America's enemies hate it so much, they might find it even more bewildering to wonder "Why have we become so unpopular even among our friends?" (Moïsi 2009:121). This thesis will attempt to provide some answers to this last question. It will probe into the general manifestations of anti-Americanism and more specifically its particular French variety. It will on the one hand seek

to present an investigation into the causes of anti-Americanism, arguing that these can largely be analyzed in terms of a rejection of American power. On the other hand, it will analyze the French rejection of America, arguing that France and America are, due to the fact that both nations are deeply imbued with universalist aspirations, in fact ‘divided by common values’.

First, analyzing the most prominent theories on anti-Americanism, this study will propose an alternative model of interpretation building on the assumption that most displays of anti-Americanism can also be regarded structurally, namely in terms of a rejection of American power. Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt have rightly argued that anti-Americanism is an extremely broad concept, which “in its mildest form [...] is merely criticism of some American policies or social characteristics”, while “At the other extreme, it expresses a real clash of civilizations, the complete rejection of anything and everything ‘American’” (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:2). The present study will not, however, focus particularly on the intensity of the rejection, but rather on the more fundamental attributes of this rejection. As such, it is the ambition to present an alternative model of interpretation, which can explain the basic sources of anti-Americanism as a universal phenomenon rather than to present a typology of its more particularistic features within different societies. This study will argue that the standard definitions proposed so far fail to account for the more structural causes of anti-Americanism. Instead, it will propose the following definition, which will be developed in greater detail in chapter 2: *Anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon and the most universal of all nation-specific anti-isms. It reflects a general predisposition against the United States, its society and its policies. It is a complex phenomenon with many different attributes reflecting the beholders’ values and perceptions. To a large extent, these attributes are due to or enhanced by the perception that the United States wields disproportionate power over other nations and their inhabitants. As such, anti-Americanism can largely be interpreted as a reaction against the perceived threat of Americanization of other societies, both on a local and on a global level.*

Second, a general framework for understanding the structural forces that promote anti-Americanism on a universal level will only permit us to gain a deeper understanding of why America is rejected by segments of the global population. In order to address the main objective of the study, i.e. to analyze the forces that are particularly conducive toward promoting anti-Americanism in France, the study will explore the notion of national identity constructs with a view to presenting an analysis of the particular variety of

French anti-Americanism. Working on a set of assumptions regarding the central tenets of France's national identity, it will be argued that the French political and cultural elites, who are the primary agents of anti-Americanism in France, have predispositions toward the United States, which build largely on these tenets. These predispositions partake in coloring a significant proportion of the collective French mind, thus, it will be argued, influencing the behavior of the elites. A final objective will be to assess to what extent this behavior can be regarded in terms of anti-Americanism. While it will be argued that the actions and policies of the French elites vis-à-vis the United States can to a large extent be traced to the central tenets of France's national identity, it is much more difficult to determine whether they can be regarded as evidence of anti-Americanism among these elites. This will be no easy task, given that there exists no blueprint for how to differentiate adequately between displays of anti-Americanism, and actions and statements, which by some may be perceived as blatant examples of anti-Americanism, without that necessarily being neither the intent, nor the motive behind. Unable to develop some kind of litmus test with which to separate the two, this study will more modestly attempt to analyze to what extent such actions and policies can be said in all probability to be based on some form of rejection of America.

The study spans anti-Americanism over a large historic spectrum, from its beginnings prior to the establishment of the United States till the present day. Yet, as anti-Americanism has witnessed a spectacular rise in recent years (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008), it is natural to focus particularly on the developments that seem to have strengthened the phenomenon recently. There is no doubt that the "Bush administration's unilateralist assertion of American power" has prompted "a growing international resentment of American policy" (David and Grondin, in David and Grondin (eds) 2006:xiii), and as such, the policies and actions of the United States under the Bush years will receive particular attention in the first part of this study, which analyzes anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power. This does not mean that the rejection of America will be described primarily with reference to the policies followed by the Bush administration. Rather, it will be argued that the rise of anti-American sentiments has gone hand in hand with the rise of American power, culminating with the rejection of the perceived unilateralist use of this power under especially George W. Bush. Conversely, though the latest displays of France's rejection of American power are especially associated with the Chirac presidency, the study will focus on the constitutive origins of this rejection; origins which

with respect to the central tenets of the French national identity can largely be traced back to the French Revolution of 1789. In terms of the displays of political anti-Americanism under the Fifth Republic, there is no avoiding the foreign policy legacy, which General de Gaulle bequeathed to his successors, and this will feature prominently as a further reminder of the ideational structuring forces within contemporary French politics. Following the terminology developed by Joseph S. Nye (1990), this study will examine anti-Americanism both in terms of a rejection of America's hard power and its soft power. This terminology seems particularly appropriate when used in relation to the study of the causes of anti-Americanism, and perhaps even more so when the French variety of the phenomenon becomes the focus of attention. Here, it might even be the case that the French elites reject America's soft power more forcefully than its hard power. There is certainly no escaping that a prominent feature of French anti-Americanism is its cultural dimension, and it will be argued that the cultural rejection of America might prove even more structurally entrenched than the political ditto.

It was noted above that the aim of this study is to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. This might lead some readers to expect an almost mathematically stringent causal analysis of all the different factors weighing in on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, processed in a complex methodological framework, which can measure the impact of these factors. Those readers will most likely be disappointed, and I am doubtful as to whether such an analysis would provide the necessary insight into what is after all primarily a cultural phenomenon. Instead, I propose an analysis, which is ideationally structural, i.e. one which, inspired by the constructivist approach in International Relations theory (see below), seeks to identify the structural elements that are the most pervasive in association with anti-Americanism, both as a general phenomenon and as a particular French predisposition. This does not mean that the study should be regarded as a quintessentially theoretical study, nor as a study carried out primarily within the tradition of international relations. Rather, the study is carried out in the more eclectic tradition of Area Studies and more specifically European Studies; a cross-disciplinary tradition, which while focusing on a particular geographical area, draws inspiration from a number of scientific disciplines, most notably international relations, political science, sociology, history, philosophy, and cultural studies. This approach seems particularly appropriate for the analysis of a phenomenon such as French anti-Americanism, and I believe that the shortcomings associated with adopting a cross-disciplinary approach, namely that it necessarily entails a somewhat less rigorous

application of the multiple methodological tools offered by the different disciplines, are outweighed by the benefits it presents, namely that it allows to present a more complete and comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon, which if analyzed purely within one scientific discipline might only shed a partial light on its causes and attributes. This approach is furthermore in line with the one most commonly adopted by the many scholars, who have studied anti-Americanism in greater detail over the last decades.

1.2 Place of the Study in Relation to Mainstream Research on Anti-Americanism

In 1992, Paul Hollander, long the scholar most associated with the subject of anti-Americanism, remarked that “Although the foreign critiques of the United States have been with us for a long time and in great abundance surprisingly little has been written about them” (1992:7). This situation has clearly changed over the past decade. Anti-Americanism is a theme that has been explored in a vast number of works over the last years and especially since the election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). Also related subjects, such as the relationship between Europe and America, now routinely contain one or several chapters on European anti-Americanism. And while anti-Americanism has for obvious reasons primarily been a focus of study in America, it has increasingly found favor as a research topic in Europe, where a long history of anti-Americanism is now being unfolded by scholars keen to come to terms with a feature of European identity that has long been neglected.

Studies on anti-Americanism are carried out within a number of disciplines. Over the last decade, a substantive amount of literature on anti-Americanism has been presented by political scientists, scholars of international relations, historians, sociologists, and scholars in the tradition of cultural studies. The many different scientific approaches to the subject are naturally bound to influence the different studies, yet an interesting feature of most literature on the subject, and especially of the more particularistic analyses of anti-Americanism within specific societies, is that one can typically trace a relatively eclectic approach toward the subject, drawing inspiration from several academic fields. Surprisingly few of the many studies on anti-Americanism published over the last decade, however, offer any proper definitions of the phenomenon, and fewer still any kind of substantial theory related to anti-Americanism. This contributes to give the impression that as a research area,

anti-Americanism can still be said to be in its infancy¹. Given that it is on the one hand not a particularly well established research area yet on the other hand a subject, which has found increasing favor over the last decade, anti-Americanism is often treated either as an ‘appendix-phenomenon’ when analyzing the effects of American foreign policies, or, when analyzed more systematically, as a mega-concept exhibiting so many different country-specific features that studies of the phenomenon have typically taken the form of anthologies devoted to the subject (e.g. O’Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007, Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). Here, the causes and attributes of anti-Americanism have been parceled up in numerous subcomponents depending on the societies considered; an approach, which contributes to give the impression that anti-Americanism should be regarded not so much as one phenomenon, but rather as a wide range of related, yet distinct phenomena. Finally, while most studies of anti-Americanism treat the topic as a complex phenomenon (or several related phenomena), it is not uncommon even in serious studies to detect a tendency toward reducing it to largely irrational sentiments and prejudices (e.g. Hollander 1992 and 1995, Joffe 2001, 2006a and 2006b). This study will depart from these traditions by arguing that as a general, indeed universal phenomenon, anti-Americanism can be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power, the assumption being that among all the features of anti-Americanism, it is the power dimension, which best explains the structural forces that are at play regarding the rejection of America.

On anti-Americanism in France as a research topic

Whereas the study of anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon is characterized by a relative absence of common themes and methodologies, most mainstream accounts of anti-Americanism in France display a certain similarity as to the themes explored, offering roughly similar inventories of French displays of anti-Americanism. It is rare to encounter manifestly diverging views regarding the attributes of French anti-Americanism, although there are of course nuances of interpretation, for example regarding the degree to which de Gaulle can be said to have been motivated by anti-Americanism in his handling of Franco-American relations. This testifies to the fact that there exists among the scholars who have treated the subject a certain consensus regarding some of the most prominent attributes of French anti-Americanism; a consensus to which this author largely subscribes². Nevertheless, I do agree with Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt when they note that “What is often disappointing about the

existing literature on anti-Americanism is its repetitive nature: old stereotypes are endlessly reproduced as if nothing had changed for years, if not centuries, between the United States and its critics” (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:2). It is certainly a fact that though the numerous works devoted to the topic over the last decade offer valuable accounts of the many varied displays of French anti-Americanism or of the mechanisms shaping Franco-American relations, they rarely offer a more structural analysis of the ground forces shaping French anti-Americanism, leaving the reader with impressive overviews of some of its manifestations, but often rather clueless as to the deeper causes likely to prompt such manifestations. The reason why there has been no real attempt at presenting a more structural study of the phenomenon is probably due to the fact that most works on French anti-Americanism have a tendency to focus mostly on either its political dimension or its cultural manifestations. The latter is particularly evident in works focusing exclusively on France (Roger 2005, Strauss 1978). Those focusing on its political manifestations often highlight specific dimensions, such as foreign and defense policies (Harrison 1981, Hoffmann 1974, Grosser 1980 and 1989). Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia has noted that an evaluation of what Sophie Meunier has termed the “sedimented reservoir of anti-American arguments” requires

a distinction between two related but nonetheless distinct registers. The first one is cultural and relates to negative images of American values, negative stereotypes about personal characteristics of American, and contempt for American civilization. The second one is political and refers to the recurrent crisis between the US and French governments. (d’Appollonia, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:202)

The present study, however, contends that far from being distinct, the two dimensions are linked, indeed intertwined, and that a proper understanding of the structural nature of anti-Americanism as a phenomenon requires both dimensions not only to be included, but also regarded as building on the same origins. Though this study will for practical purposes present subchapters devoted to each dimension, a central argument will be that the two dimensions represent two sides of the same coin and as such cannot be dissociated if we want to achieve a proper understanding of anti-Americanism in France. Sophie Meunier is one of the few scholars to efficiently incorporate both dimensions in her analyses (2000 and in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007), yet as these have mostly been of a relatively succinct nature, I still believe that there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis coupling both dimensions. Rather than presenting another inventory of French displays of anti-

Americanism, I find it more fruitful to engage in an analysis of some of the ideational causes, which partake in predisposing the French national habitus against America. This approach sets the present study fundamentally apart from most mainstream analyses of anti-Americanism in France, which typically focus mostly on either the cultural or the political dimensions. In the present study, it will be argued that both dimensions can in fact be better understood as originating in the values and beliefs inherent in the French national identity and that in order to properly understand anti-Americanism in France, there is a need to probe deeper into the French national identity in order to expose why some of its central tenets appear particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American predispositions. Several scholars studying French anti-Americanism relate the phenomenon to matters of national identity (Kuisel 1993, Meunier 2000 and 2007), yet not all appear convinced that this is the case. Nettelbeck for example notes that “anti-Americanism should not be considered in any way a constitutive part of French identity [given] that the French people as a whole, over time, have perceived America as a different, but essentially benevolent, society” (in O’Connor 2007c:153). However, French anti-Americanism cannot be analyzed in terms of the perceptions and actions of “the French people as a whole”. Anti-Americanism in France is very much the project of the elites, a point frequently stressed by observers such as Alfred Grosser (Grosser 1978:403) and Sophie Meunier (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007), and it is largely the cultural and political elites, who have fashioned much of French national identity, sometimes even willfully, as can be seen not least through the construction of French history. One feature of French anti-Americanism, which is frequently overlooked (or seldom mentioned), is the dimension of how anti-Americanism feeds on centuries of Anglophobia. This is a dimension which is self-evident for many scholars studying France and the French (e.g. Theodore Zeldin and Jack Hayward), yet rarely mentioned by scholars studying French anti-Americanism. A second feature, rarely overlooked, but seldom treated in any great detail, is the extent to which France and America can trace their modern national identities as originating both from the same historical period and building on shared philosophical values. While numerous scholars make brief references to the universalist aspirations of both nations (e.g. Bourdieu 1998, Meunier 2000, Roger 2005, Hoffmann 2004, d’Appollonia, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008, Nettelbeck, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007c), mostly mentioning this as a further characteristic, which distinguishes anti-Americanism in France from the other varieties, I believe that it should be regarded as the *central defining characteristic*, through

which the Franco-American relationship must be viewed. Starting from the assumption that the core of anti-American predispositions in France can be identified as originating from within the central tenets of French national identity, this study will therefore present the hypothesis that a) anti-Americanism in France feeds on centuries of Anglophobia, and that as such anti-Americanism can (also) be described as a successor phobia, and b) that at the heart of more than two centuries of anti-American traditions in France (Roger 2005:449) is the fact that both France and America have offered the world each their universalist model. As such, French anti-Americanism can be regarded as the case of competing universalisms. While numerous studies on French anti-Americanism offer valuable descriptions of the contemporary examples of political and cultural anti-Americanism, this study will argue that a) these can largely be traced to the tenets of national identity, and b) that some of the supposed manifestations of anti-Americanism should be regarded not necessarily as dictated by a conscious wish to reject American power, but rather as an almost natural expression of the French national habitus, which c) contributes to the impression that America has come to be progressively regarded as France's significant 'other', i.e. a counter-image of what France is, and what it both wishes to distance itself from and in some respects emulate.

1.3 Theorizing on Anti-Americanism as a Cultural Phenomenon in International Relations

There is among scholars a certain consensus on treating anti-Americanism primarily as a 'cultural' phenomenon, albeit one which can influence the (political) behavior of nations toward the United States (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Meunier 2000, Mathé (ed.) 2000). The cultural nature of anti-Americanism is not so much linked to its manifestations, as to the perception that anti-Americanism can typically be regarded as a "prejudice" (O'Connor, in O'Connor (ed.) 2007a, Katzenstein and Keohane, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007) or a "predisposition" (Hollander 1992, 1995 and 2004) among the detractors of the United States, and one which has at its origins a plethora of causes, most of which can be characterized as more or less related to matters of identity (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007), or "culture, religion, ideology or psychology" (Ward, in O'Connor (ed.) 2007b:231); all eminently 'cultural' notions. While there is a general consensus on the cultural nature of the phenomenon, there is, however, a virtual absence of agreed methodology regarding anti-Americanism as a research object. There have been several attempts at presenting theories

related to anti-Americanism, and the most prominent (Hollander 1992 and 1995, Katzenstein and Keohane, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, O'Connor, in O'Connor (ed.) 2007a) will be presented and discussed in the following chapter. Yet though the subject of anti-Americanism has found increasing favor among students of international relations, it is rarely treated in relation to mainstream International Relations theory. The result is that as an academic topic, anti-Americanism is characterized by much research, but little theory. This is probably due precisely to the 'cultural' nature of the phenomenon, which renders it methodologically difficult to analyze on a more structural level.

First, as we shall see below, culture is a particularly murky concept, both vague and virtually all-encompassing, as it carries with it many different connotations. It is used within many different social sciences and accordingly defined in many different and not always altogether compatible ways (Hudson, in Hudson (ed.) 1997:2-4). Second, it is a concept, which is difficult to render operational given the enormous scope of attributes, which can be attached to it. This explains why, within the tradition of International Relations theory, the term typically "performs a largely catch-all function, its multiple meanings providing a convenient label by which to identify a variety of themes left over after all the other explanatory variables [...] have been dealt with" (Walker, in Chay (ed.) 1990:8). Thus all too often, culture becomes "the explanation of last resort" (Pye 1991:504). Third, even allowing for the necessary definitions and an adequate operationalization of culture as a factor in international relations, it has due to its very nature mostly been regarded as an eminently particularistic concept (Huntington, in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 1987), exposing the scholar who seeks to engage in a culturally based analysis to the supposed pitfalls inherent in a "reductionist" approach (Waltz 1979). In spite of these obstacles, culture has staged "a dramatic comeback" in IR theory since the end of the Cold War (Lapid, in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds) 1996:3) and new theories of International Relations have been put forward, which place culture at the forefront of the study of international relations.

On culture as a concept in International Relations theory

Culture has been characterized as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams 1983:87), a "hyper-complex" concept (Fink, quoted by Hauge and Horstbøll 1988:21), which defies precise definition (Duffield 1999:769, Iriye, in Hogan and Paterson (eds) 2004:242). It is certainly true, as Valerie Hudson reminds us, that the

elusiveness of the concept renders it difficult to define in a theoretical sense, the difficulty being “not so much centered on what to *include* in such a definition, but rather what to *exclude*” (in Hudson (ed.) 1997:2). John Duffield nevertheless finds that

Despite the absence of a definitional consensus, however, most of the cultural approaches put forward by students of international relations have a number of features in common. Above all, they treat culture primarily, if not exclusively, as an ideational phenomenon. Whether culture is described in terms of assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, conceptual models, feelings, ideas, images, knowledge, meanings, mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols, patterns of mental activity, or the habits of thought, perception, and feeling, that are common to members of a particular group. (1999:769)

It is the ideational dimension of the concept, which makes it particularly relevant for the study of anti-Americanism. Vertzberger describes culture as representing a “unified set of ideas that are shared by the members of a society and that establish a set of shared premises, values, expectations, and action predispositions among the members of the nation that as a whole constitute the national style” (Vertzberger 1990:267). He further notes that

At the core of a culture, in most cases, are broad and general beliefs and attitudes about one’s own nation, about other nations, and about the relationships that actually obtain or that should obtain between the self and other actors in the international arena. Very often the beliefs and attitudes take the form of nationally shared stereotypes (ibid:268).

It is evident that such nationally shared stereotypes regarding other actors are at the core of most anti-Americanism. Yet equally important is Vertzberger’s emphasis on beliefs and attitudes regarding one’s own nation, as these are constitutive of the nationally held stereotypes. To the extent that anti-Americanism should be regarded as a cultural phenomenon, it is thus essentially in relation to the equally problematic notion of national identity. As such, culture can be regarded in the sense invoked originally by Herder³: to designate the customs and values that have shaped a nation’s sense of identity, usually to such an extent that they are seen as natural, or given elements embodied in the nation’s *Volkgeist* or *Nationalgeist*, two words Herder used indiscriminately (Østergård 1992:88). In his trajectory of European societies, the sociologist Göran Therborn lists what he perceives as the most important aspects or dimensions of culture:

1. a sense of *identity*, a notion of an ‘I’ and of a ‘we’, which implies a boundary to the Other(s);
2. a kind of *cognition* or cognitive competence, a language in which to think and to communicate with the world, a vista, and a knowledge of the world;

3. a pattern of *evaluations* consisting of a set of values and norms, defining good or bad, what is and what is not to be done, and of a register of emotions expressing a specific mode of reactions to events in the world. (1995:10)

Although Therborn modestly notes that his view of culture is “not quite the textbook standard” (ibid.), his definition of culture is in reality very similar to Herders. Like Herder, he places much emphasis on the concept of identity as an important aspect of culture. And while he in 1995 can lament that the identity concept has often been neglected in handbooks on sociology (ibid:11), there is no doubt that some ten to fifteen years later, culture and identity have become key concepts in what he calls “the sciences of humankind” (ibid.), central to the study of the social psychology of groups.

Operationalizing culture as an analytical concept

Though the concept of culture, as defined above, is a promising point of departure for an analysis of anti-Americanism, it remains difficult to employ operationally in an analysis. Defining the concept in terms of (national) identity does not render the task any easier. As opposed to the traditional centers of attention among IR-theorists such as balance of power considerations, security dilemmas, the role of international institutions etc., culture and identity remain difficult concepts to pin down and elusive as objects of analysis. Within the tradition of foreign policy analysis, culture (and/or identity) has long been regarded as an essential, indeed indispensable, variable. Most foreign policy practitioners and theorists seem to agree that perceptions of identity are of importance as a psychological frame of reference in international relations (Prizel 1998:2). Already half a century ago, Ole R. Holsti remarked how the culturally based belief systems contribute in shaping national images:

A number of studies have shown that the relationship between “belief system,” perceptions, and decision-making is a vital one. [...] A decision-maker acts upon his “image” of the situation rather than upon “objective” reality, and it has been demonstrated that the belief system – its structure as well as its content – plays an integral role in the cognitive process. [...] Within the broader scope of the belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there has been a heightened concern for the problem of stereotyped national images as a significant factor in the dynamics of the international system. (1962:244)

This view has led generations of foreign policy analysts to explore the role of culture as a factor in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The bounded rationality approach has investigated the limitations facing policy makers due to misperceptions or wishful

thinking (Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985) and their effects on bureaucratic politics (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (eds) 1962, Allison and Halperin, in Tanter and Ullman (eds) 1972, Tanter 1990), while the conceptual frameworks approach has suggested a number of variables relevant to the explanation of foreign policy decision-making, an eminently important variable being culture (Rosenau, in Farrell (ed.) 1966). In his text-book classic on the sources of foreign policy, *The Study of Foreign Policy*, Rosenau described cultural factors and historical experience as “among the most enduring sources of foreign policy” (in Rosenau, Thompson, and Boyd (eds) 1976:22). According to Rosenau, “virtually every aspect of a society – its traditions, institutions and capabilities – becomes relevant [...] to explain its orientations and actions toward the world beyond its borders” (ibid:17). Michael Brecher has improved on the Rosenau framework by distinguishing between the operational and psychological environment of decision-makers, the latter consisting primarily of ideology, historical legacy, personality, and predispositions (1972:3), an environment which he finds of paramount importance given that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing images. Within the foreign policy analysis tradition, it has been a commonly held belief that

Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them. (Hill and Wallace, in Hill (ed.) 1996:8)

Over the years, the concept of culture has been decomposed, recomposed, renamed, and reframed, yet although it has proved its usefulness in a great number of foreign policy analyses, it continues to be viewed with a certain apprehension among IR theorists, especially outside the tradition of foreign policy analysis. There are two main reasons for this. First, there does not seem to be a consensus on the relationship between culture and behavior. While some regard culture as “a set of values and norms of behavior” (Der Derian 1987:33), others find that we need to distinguish culture from behavior (Duffield 1999:769). Duffield nevertheless proceeds to remark that in order to “be useful for purposes of explanation, a cultural theory must postulate causal mechanisms through which culture has an impact on behavior” (ibid:771), concluding that the “overall effect of culture is to predispose collectivities toward certain actions and policies rather than others” (ibid:772). Sampson

similarly notes that “culture can be appropriately regarded as incentives which have the effect of organizing the structuring behavior” (in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau (eds) 1987:386). It may be argued that the dichotomy between culture and behavior is largely artificial, given that to the extent that culture did not have a significant impact on behavior, it would hardly be of interest as a factor in international relations. Nevertheless, Duffield is right in reminding us that culture is only useful as an analytic concept to the extent that it can be related in some ways to behavior. This, however, does not mitigate the second reason why culture is still regarded with apprehension by some: how does one measure the influence of culture on behavior? The problem here is that the methodologies used when applying the concept of culture can, as Valerie Hudson rightly warns us, predispose “one toward potentially tautological inferences” (in Hudson (ed.) 1997). Samuel Huntington, although himself a long-time proponent of culturalist theories, has similarly admitted that “cultural explanations are [...] often imprecise or tautological or both, at the extreme coming down to a more sophisticated rendering of ‘the French are like that’” (in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 1987:23). This is a conundrum, which is not easily overcome. Duffield describes the effects of culture in terms of predispositions, which underlines the usefulness of the concept for a study of anti-Americanism such as the present. Yet in order to overcome possible tautological inferences, any analysis must attempt to present a comprehensive and balanced approach toward its subject. This entails that in order to present a convincing account of the causes and effects of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism within one national culture, a quintessentially particularistic approach is difficult to avoid. This, however, does not necessarily mean that such an analysis cannot be presented also as part of a more general study of a global phenomenon.

The return of culture in International Relations theory

Within IR theory, there has been a tendency among many scholars to regard cultural explanations as “unsatisfying [...] because they run counter to the social scientist’s proclivity to generalize” (Huntington, in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 1987:23). This has especially been the case within the realist tradition, which for long was the predominant school within the discipline of International Relations theory (Viotti and Kauppi 1990, Walt 1998, Snyder 2004). Realists – and even more so neorealists – have consistently argued that the actions of states are primarily subject to the defining (anarchic) characteristic of the international

system, which has traditionally led them to focus on balance of power considerations, levels of aggregate power, power projection capabilities etc. Yet within the early realist tradition, there was a marked culturalist tendency, as can be witnessed not least in Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*. Quoting Coleridge "that there is an invisible spirit that breathes through a whole people" ([1948] 1973:129), Morgenthau asserted that it was "incontestable [...] that certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another" (ibid.). He furthermore stressed that "National character cannot fail to influence national power" and that "The observer of the international scene [...] must take national character into account, however difficult it may be to assess correctly so elusive and intangible a factor" (ibid:132-134); a recommendation, which has followed by later prominent realists such as Kissinger (1994). Given that most IR-theorists have as an ambition to present if not "grand theories", then at least more systemic explanations transposable on the international system or parts thereof (Walt 1998, Snyder 2004), there has nevertheless been a notable reluctance toward engaging in the analysis of cultural phenomena, which are mostly regarded as eminently particularistic. Some (neo)realists have (following Waltz 1979) consequently characterized the approach employed by especially foreign policy analysts as "reductionist", and therefore not suited to present more general explanations of causality. The problems associated with a 'reductionist' approach are obvious: While it serves to explain a particular set of foreign policy actions, the number of variables that would have to be included to determine the foundations of a nation's foreign policy is legion, and several of them are bound to be particular to the nation in question, making generalizations difficult. The result has long been to render the "cultural dimension of international relations [...] one of the most neglected topics in the field" (Chay, in Chay (ed.) 1990:xi).

At least three important changes have taken place that give the study of culture in international relations renewed interest. First, the ending of the Cold War and the dismembering of the bipolar system have engendered new patterns of conflict and cooperation. Nations and peoples hitherto subjected to the bipolar logic have found new possibilities to affirm their identities. Liberated from the constraints of strict alliance adherence, they have rediscovered foreign policy as a vehicle for value promotion and for the remanifestation of national identities and policies. Ideological differences have largely given way to new forms of cleavages, some of them cultural in appearance and often also in nature (Hudson, in Hudson (ed.) 1997). Second, this development has forced a reappraisal of the

importance of culture among international relations scholars, leading among other to new disciplines of international relations theory that do not easily fall into the broad categories of realist or liberal/idealist thought (Wendt, in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds) 1996). As new fault lines have emerged between nations or civilizations, these have become the subject of academic interest, sparking new theories based on cultural considerations. Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993 and 1996) is but one, albeit probably the best known of them⁴. Third, the concept of globalization has received renewed impetus since the 1990s and has had the reverse effect of strengthening the attention brought upon domestic affairs and questions of national identity in a globalizing world (Eriksen 1993, Moisi 2009). Though many of the characteristics of globalization are not as recent as they are often portrayed to be (Held (ed.) 2000, Hirst and Thompson 2002, Baylis and Smith (eds) 2006), the focus on globalization has had the effect of galvanizing interest in the national "self" (Smith 2003). Unsure of what will become of national cultures and identities in an increasingly globalized world, there has been a rush to reaffirm values and buttress identities.

During the 1990s, culturalist explanations have found favor even within the more 'hardcore' area of security studies, where much of the recent literature dealing with culture in international relations has attempted to "take the realist edifice as a target, and focus on cases where structural material notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice" (Johnston 1995:41), maintaining that "cultural variables are more than epiphenomena to material factors and often explain outcomes for which realism cannot account" (Desch 1998:144, see also Katzenstein 1996, and Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, in Katzenstein (ed.) 1996). This has led some to argue that it is in fact the realist tradition with its emphasis on the territorial state and interstate relations, which is "reductionist", albeit "in a somewhat different fashion" than what is usually implied by the term (Ferguson and Mansbach 1999:1). The latest newcomer to IR theory, constructivism, has attempted to overcome the supposed dichotomy between systemic and particularistic traditions. This approach, which draws heavily from sociology and social psychology (Thies 2002:149), emphasizes the importance of identity in understanding international relations. The approach has also been termed "reflectivist" (Keohane 1988) or "culturalist" (Farrell 2002), but the most widely used label is, following Nicholas Onuf, constructivism (Onuf 1989). Alexander Wendt, whose 1992 article *Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, "firmly and

unequivocally transposed the question of collective identity away from the margins and into the mainstream of the discipline” (Neumann 1995:25), has defined constructivism as

a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. (1994:85)

It is the structural dimension, which sets constructivism apart from earlier approaches to have incorporated culture as an important dimension in their analysis. Farrell describes how for constructivists, culturally based ideas “operate ‘all the way down’ to actually shape actors and action in world politics” and that as such, they “constitute actors and enable action” (2002:50). Ted Hopf similarly notes that “A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice” (1998:175). To constructivists, identities are “inherently relational” (Wendt 1992:397), and by placing culture and identity at the center of attention as a defining factor shaping international relations, they claim that constructivist theory is in fact a “form of structural idealism” (Wendt 1994:385). The structural dimension lies in the fact that according to constructivists, “any social system” – and they characterize the international system as an eminently social system – contains three elements: “material conditions, interests, and ideas” (Wendt 1999:139). Arguing that realists have long focused primarily on the material conditions while ignoring especially the ideational factors, Alexander Wendt claims that in essence, it is the constructivist approach, which most effectively can present a structural methodology (1999), thus apparently evading the pitfalls of particularism inherent in a culturalist approach. This line of reasoning is compelling, but not altogether convincing. Though Wendt forcefully makes the case that “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992:395), tearing down the realist edifice is not sufficient to impose culture as the basis of a new systemic narrative within IR theory. Even when described as a systemic feature shaping the international system, culture (or identity) remains difficult to generalize about. As such, constructivism suffers from the same limitations as those characterizing foreign policy analysis: By adopting the concepts of culture and identity, eventually coupled with material components borrowed from the realist tradition, constructivists can, given enough time and space, account for virtually every aspect of international relations, but the result is bound to

end up so particularistic that its general power of explanation suffers as a result. Nevertheless, constructivists have convincingly presented the argument for the importance of culture as a central concept within International Relations theory, and though the constructivist approach seems better at making the case for the importance of culture than at providing us with the necessary analytical tools for culturally based analyses, it has contributed to lifting cultural explanations out of the purely particularistic realm. As such, there is no doubt that constructivism can contribute to the formulation of a theoretical framework for the analysis of a global phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, even if it can not altogether eradicate the shortcomings inherent in adopting a culturalist approach.

1.3.1 Propositions toward a theoretical framework for the study of anti-Americanism

This study contends that in order to achieve a proper understanding of the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, both a general and a particularistic approach is needed. A general approach is needed in order to analyze the forces that contribute to make anti-Americanism a universal phenomenon. A particularistic approach is needed in order to address the forces that predispose a nation or its inhabitants toward displays of anti-Americanism. In other words, we need to look at the object of rejection (i.e. the United States) as well as the subjects rejecting (in this case France). This also entails that we should strive toward presenting a theoretical framework able to encompass both, or, alternatively, supplementary frameworks, which in conjunction can provide us with the necessary conceptual tools, with which we can formulate an analysis of a phenomenon which, while being necessarily particularistic in its focus on anti-Americanism in one society, nevertheless can provide the basis for some general assumptions regarding the nature of anti-Americanism. It was noted above that anti-Americanism could in theoretical terms be regarded as an essentially cultural phenomenon in international relations. The two theoretical traditions to have most convincingly incorporated the concepts of culture and identity in their methodologies are the foreign policy analysis approach and constructivism, and they both offer valuable guidelines to how the concepts can be employed analytically. Yet none of them seems able to overcome the problems associated with a culturalist approach, namely the relationship between culture and behavior, the risk of tautological inferences, and the essentially particularistic nature of a proper analysis of cultural determinants. The present study will not postulate that this can be done, but it will attempt to minimize the shortcomings associated with studying a cultural phenomenon such

as anti-Americanism. This study will depart from the pattern of most studies of anti-Americanism by arguing 1) that anti-Americanism can in fact be regarded as an almost systemic characteristic of the contemporary international system, and 2) that an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon in a given country requires a much broader agenda than the one typically offered by the tradition of foreign policy analysis. In essence this approach is in line with constructivism, yet it will adopt other methodological tools than the ones usually proposed by constructivists in order to analyze the phenomenon.

First of all, it will attempt to present a relatively structural view of anti-Americanism as an inherent feature of the international system, arguing that anti-Americanism as a universal phenomenon can largely be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power. Given that many features of both historical and contemporary anti-Americanism fall outside the traditional definitions of power, it will use Joseph S. Nye's notions of hard power and soft power to demonstrate that even some of the rather disparate manifestations of anti-Americanism can in fact be regarded in terms of a rejection of American power. This will be the focus of chapters 2 and 3. It should be noted that such an attempt at presenting a general theory of anti-Americanism can only represent one side of the coin. It can contribute to suggest a relatively systemic framework, within which anti-Americanism can be analyzed, as well as to present a general explanation for why America has become the object of a universal anti-ism. It cannot, however, explain why anti-Americanism is more virulent in some societies than in others. In order to do so, a more particularistic analysis is needed. Here again, the constructivist emphasis on culture and identity as shapers of collective behavior (Wendt 1992, Farrell 2002, Hopf 1998) will prove useful, but in order to carry out such an analysis, it needs to be supplemented by other methodological tools, principally borrowed from the tradition of sociology. Chapter 4 will therefore present a more specific theoretical framework for the analysis of the interplay between national identity and anti-American prejudice, arguing that this can best be analyzed using the concepts of shared doxa, othering, and national habitus, the intention being to provide an alternative methodological perspective, which can bridge the supposed dichotomy between culture/identity and behavior. In dealing with anti-Americanism in one country – in this case France – it is necessary to go beyond the study of foreign policy attributes. As will be demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, though anti-American predispositions clearly partake in shaping foreign policy narratives and actions in France, the main impact of the phenomenon

may not be so easily confined to the realm of foreign policy. As such, anti-Americanism will not be systematically analyzed in relation to other variables of foreign policy in order to present an assessment of the degree to which it influences the outputs of foreign policy, but rather presented as a more or less isolated phenomenon, which partakes in shaping French actions and narratives. Digging into the confines of the French doxa, the study will explore the extent to which anti-Americanism can be regarded as a permanent (if fluctuating) component of the French national habitus, and as such as a silent partner in Franco-American relations throughout the times. Clearly, this approach exposes us to the dangers of tautological inferences. Paraphrasing Huntington, how do we avoid presenting just another “sophisticated rendering of ‘the French are like that’” (op. cit.)? The risk of tautological inferences is certainly present, and it might not be altogether possible to evade it. What is striking in most accounts of French anti-Americanism is that they virtually all present the same recurrent themes: the diatribes against the mythical Anglo-Saxon; the quest for political independence; the rejection of globalization (typically described in terms of Americanization, Hollywoodization, McDonaldization etc.); the zealous defense of the French language; the promotion of cultural diversity etc. (e.g. Nettelbeck, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007c, d’Appolonia, in Higgot and Malbašić (eds) 2008). The same themes can be readily found in the present study, but as opposed to most other studies, this study will attempt to present a detailed account of not just the displays of anti-Americanism in France, but also of the elements of the French national identity, which can be considered particularly prone to give rise to reactions of rejection or denigration vis-à-vis the American other. In other words, this study will attempt to look beyond the standard narratives in order to expose their origins. In line with Norbert Elias, who introduced the concept of national habitus well before Bourdieu made habitus a household term within sociology, I do not profess to present a detailed analysis of whether all the elements of French anti-Americanism that I will subsequently discuss can indeed be claimed as being embodied in the French national habitus. Rather, I will present a general analysis of the most important factors in French society and national consciousness, which to me seem particularly conducive toward forming some kind of anti-American predisposition among the most important segments of French society. I rely on the hope that through presenting these factors in association with the long historical “tradition” of anti-Americanism (Roger 2005:449), I can illustrate that there is within the French national habitus a persistent element, which can be regarded as particularly conducive toward

promoting anti-American predispositions. Finally, I believe, as the doyen of Danish political science, Erling Bjøl, that there is no clear and definitive boundary between political science and history, although there is a difference in objectives and thus in method (Bjøl 1966:11-12). Like Bjøl did in his doctoral study on the European policies of the French Fourth Republic, I will in the present study attempt to analyze the *significant elements* of French anti-Americanism rather than to present a history of French anti-Americanism, conscious of the fact that I risk falling into the same methodological dilemma as Bjøl:

Il entre dans la recherche de l'élément significatif, sans doute, un élément subjectif et même arbitraire. En perd-elle sa valeur scientifique ? Cela dépend de la prétention que l'on y met. Si l'on prétend à une science qui se propose de formuler des *lois*, la méthode est critiquable. Si, avec M. Duroselle, on pense que, pour l'instant, au moins, la science politique ne peut que chercher plus modestement à découvrir quelques *données fondamentales*, avec M. Manning qu'elle n'a pas à s'excuser si elle n'atteint que le *plausible*, la technique employée doit être permise. (Bjøl 1966:16)

Naturally, political science has developed considerably in the four decades since Bjøl laid out his methodology. Yet it still strikes me as a fundamentally sound approach to a study such as the present, and given the existing lack of more rigorous methodological frameworks for the analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, it is my hope that by applying this methodology, I may at least contribute with another piece to the puzzle of French anti-Americanism.

1.4 Structure of the Study

This study falls mainly in two parts: part one will attempt to present a general analysis of anti-Americanism focusing on the dimension of power, while part two will be devoted to a particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in France focusing on the constitutive parts of France's national habitus, which are deemed particularly conducive toward engendering anti-American predispositions. The structure is chosen in order to reflect the fact that anti-Americanism can be analyzed in two different ways: a general and a particularistic. Therefore, chapters 2 and 3 will, building in part on the theoretical framework presented above, present a general explanation of anti-Americanism as a universal phenomenon. More specifically, chapter 2 will probe into some of the most widespread definitions attached to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, arguing that as a general phenomenon, anti-Americanism should, contrary to what is frequently the case, neither be seen as just any other anti-ism, nor as an

inherently irrational phenomenon, nor as so complex that a primary source of rejection cannot be identified. Instead, the chapter will attempt to demonstrate that as a unique and universal phenomenon, anti-Americanism can in general terms be explained in terms of rejection of American power. Chapter 3 will proceed to demonstrate how this can be done, first by referring to different surveys in order to illustrate that much of the popular rejection of America can indeed be regarded in terms of power, second by adopting Joseph S. Nye's notions of hard power and soft power (1990) to illustrate why the many different forms of anti-Americanism typically identified by scholars such as Hollander (1992, 1995) or Katzenstein and Keohane (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007) can in fact be regarded also as largely originating from the rejection of the two forms of power identified by Nye. The fact that anti-Americanism can be presented also in general terms as a rejection of American power does not, however, mean that the different forms of anti-Americanism identified by various scholars are erroneous or irrelevant. Far from it, they contribute with excellent frameworks for understanding many of the different varieties of anti-Americanism, and as such provide a good basis for more particularistic analyses of anti-Americanism in specific countries or regions. And though there is a case for also presenting anti-Americanism in a more general perspective, there is no doubt that it is the particularistic analysis, which provides the deepest insights into why some nations are more prone to harboring anti-American predispositions than others.

The second part of the study will present such a particularistic analysis, taking the French variety of anti-Americanism under scrutiny. Building on and expanding the culturalist approach to the study of national identity presented above, chapter 4 will briefly attempt to formulate a framework for understanding the "othering" forces inherent in national identities and will further argue that these can best be understood as deeply embedded in the national habitus. The remainder of the study will be devoted to presenting a particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in one society, an analysis which, while particular to France, may hopefully also contribute to the understanding of some of the forces that can generate anti-Americanism in different societies. As such, chapter 5 will, building on the assumptions laid out in chapter 4, attempt to thoroughly investigate the deeply rooted factors in French national identity, which can be considered as particularly constitutive toward shaping anti-American predispositions in France, while chapter 6 will present an analysis of the more contemporary and much more familiar theme of anti-Americanism under the French Fifth

Republic, focusing both on its political dimension and cultural manifestations. In short, the United States becomes the object of study and analysis in part one (chapters 2 and 3), while France becomes the object of study in part two (chapters 5 and 6). Hopefully, the conclusion will succeed in demonstrating that French anti-Americanism can indeed be explained as a rejection of American power, although it is a rejection that is based as much on forces inherent in the French national identity as it is based on the attributes of American power as such.

2 Anti-Americanism: An Alternative Perspective

The first part of this study will attempt to demonstrate that anti-Americanism is a unique and complex phenomenon unlike any other anti-ism; where it differs from other prejudices is in its universal character and on the dimension of power. This has important consequences for any attempt to define the term properly, as many scholars have hitherto had a tendency to regard it as comparable to other anti-isms, focusing on the irrational aspects of the phenomenon and thus neglecting its more ‘explicable’ nature. This will be the focus of the present chapter. Chapter 3 will explore the perceptions abroad towards the United States, not least through the use of surveys, which indicate that there is indeed a strong rejection of American power and American policies in great parts of the world. Though polls can only present a partial picture of contemporary grievances towards the United States, they can furnish us with some clues as to the probable causes of much modern anti-Americanism. Based on the discussion in the present chapter and the findings of the surveys, an attempt will then be made to regard anti-Americanism in terms of rejection of, on the one hand, America’s *hard power* and, on the other, the attributes of its *soft power*. It is the contention of this study that far better than the often rather artificial attempts to differentiate anti-Americanism in terms of what America *is* as opposed to what America *does*, the distinction between the dimensions of hard power and soft power offers useful insights into the more structural causes of much anti-Americanism.

2.1 Anti-Americanism: A Universal Phenomenon

Although anti-Americanism has become a household term, it is typically used rather indiscriminately. Sylvia Ullmo rightly points out that the term “présente tout à la fois une évidence aveuglante, et un indiscutable flou conceptuel” (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:9). The term anti-Americanism itself may at first seem relatively straightforward to most users. In reality, the term covers a range of emotions and actions, which may have in common the object of their dissatisfaction – America – but which have a multitude of origins and expressions. It is doubtful whether most users ever pause to ponder on its meaning(s). A linguist might point to three different possible interpretations of the term anti-Americanism:

1. Animosity towards America, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of America or
2. Animosity towards Americans, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of Americans or

3. Fear of Americanization⁵, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of Americanization

If we follow this logic, we should be asking ourselves whether it is the country, i.e. the United States⁶ that is rejected, its inhabitants, or the influence that this country has on other societies, which is deplored. To many of what could be called (for want of a more adequate word) anti-Americans, this is probably an utterly meaningless distinction. While only the harshest of critics would admit that they loathe Americans *per se*, rejection of America and of Americanization will by many be considered as two sides of the same coin. But in essence, the two kinds of anti-Americanism are very different. Whereas typical French anti-Americanism is, as will be subsequently demonstrated, primarily, but not exclusively, a rejection of a perceived Americanization of other societies, and especially the French society, fundamentalist Islamic anti-Americanism is both that and more. It is first and foremost a rejection of America as the primary representative of the Western World and thereby the political epitomization of everything that is contrary to the politico-religious values that a fundamentalist Islamic party would want to promote. But it is also a rejection of America on the grounds that the United States is seen not just in opposition to the values of other nations, but also as a formidable enemy capable of projecting its power to all parts of the globe. In this respect, size matters. The rejection of Americanization might very well still be of relevance, even if the United States was a medium large nation among many others. But in that case it would arguably have much less impact. What has made anti-Americanism a universal phenomenon is precisely what has characterized the United States for more than a century: its continuing rise to preeminence among the nations of the world. And there is little doubt that the rise of the United States to the position of the world's most powerful nation has been paralleled by a rise in anti-Americanism throughout the world (Crockatt 2003:46).

The universality of anti-Americanism is perhaps its most interesting feature. Sardar and Davies have noted that in a postmodern world with hardly any universals left, "loathing for America is about as close as we can get to a universal sentiment" (2002:195). That might be overstating the case, but the argument has its merits. Anti-Americanism is not only universal, but unique by its universality. While some people, usually in neighboring countries, might harbor resentment towards for example historical enemies, nothing suggests that any other country is capable of attracting such widespread rejection on a global scale. This is of course not to say that the United States is universally disliked, as Sardar and

Davies' statement could be interpreted, merely that it is extremely unlikely that there should be a complete absence of anti-Americanism in any part of the world. Conversely, it is improbable that one could say the same for any other country than the United States. During the Cold war, one could arguably find anti-communism in most corners of the world. But anti-communism was a rejection of a political system perceived to be oppressive, not rejection as such of the nationalities associated with communism. Anti-communism did never really develop into anti-Russianism or Sinophobia. Likewise, the excesses of the Nazi regime during World War II are bound to have caused widespread Germanophobia in many of the countries that suffered as a result of the atrocities committed. Yet, though the acts committed in the name of the Third Reich are still in vivid memory in many parts of the globe, Germanophobia cannot be detected as a universal phenomenon. As for anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other forms of racism, they are, as opposed to anti-Americanism, based on the rejection of a race or religion not as such associated with a particular nation⁷. Compared with the animosity that other national anti-isms can give rise to, anti-Americanism clearly stands out as the only truly universal anti-ism, and as such as "a phenomenon that has no counterpart in other similar societies" (Guerlain, in Fender (ed.) 1996:127). It is furthermore an anti-ism, which as noted above has found particular favor as a research discipline over the past decades.

2.2 Three False Discourses on Anti-Americanism?

The current focus on anti-Americanism is illustrated not only by its prominence as a media topic, but also in the recent rise in scholarly works trying to analyze or even 'dissect' the phenomenon. Not all scholars make the attempt to define the term properly, probably relying on the assumption that anti-Americanism is a self-evident concept that needs analyzing, but not explaining⁸. Others define it in a more or less off-hand way, with the entailing risks of oversimplification. More comprehensive studies usually present a definition, or sometimes even several definitions (Hollander 1995), of the term. Though these definitions vary, they are typically built around the following three discourses:

- 1) Anti-Americanism depicted as a phenomenon that can be regarded (and analyzed) as other anti-isms. Writers who analyze anti-Americanism in relation to other anti-isms will frequently attempt to analyze anti-Americanism by decomposing it according to its psychological elements such as hatred, envy, rivalry, mistrust etc. This is a discourse used by only a small minority of scholars, and mostly in works that are of a

relatively polemical nature. Most research on anti-Americanism asserts that though some of the mechanisms and attributes of anti-Americanism can be compared to other anti-isms (anti-Semitism is the most frequently used comparison), the phenomenon presents some unique features that set it apart from other anti-isms.

- 2) Anti-Americanism viewed as a largely unique and mostly also largely irrational phenomenon. Scholars depicting anti-Americanism as largely irrational often dissociate criticism of what the United States *does* from what America *is*, claiming that only the latter can truly be qualified as anti-Americanism. This dissociation is based on two accounts. First, they argue that criticism against specific U.S. policies does not reflect anti-ism, but rather a difference of opinion, which hardly constitutes a deep-set predisposition against America or Americans. Second, some claim that references to critiques of what America *does* are in reality attempts to legitimize anti-American discourses as more rational than they truly are. Discourses falling into this broad category have previously dominated the field and are still frequently found in works on the subject.
- 3) Anti-Americanism viewed as a unique and complex phenomenon that comes in many guises and variations and that should be analyzed not just as one concept, but as a meta-concept covering a wide range of emotions that have specific origins depending on the beholder's political, historic, societal and cultural relations with the United States. Most scholars using this more comprehensive approach try to balance the elements of irrationality inherent in some manifestations of anti-Americanism with an assessment of the more or less legitimate grievances that nations or people might hold against the United States. Works following this type of discourse typically conclude that there are no identifiable common factors, which promote anti-Americanism, and that a deconstruction of the phenomenon into different types of anti-Americanism is necessary in order to proceed with a proper analysis of these. This line of reasoning has become prominent over the last decade, as the topic has come into renewed focus.

The categorization of the three sets of discourses on anti-Americanism does not necessarily cover all kinds of definitions given, but still highlights the more or less typical sets of definitions usually presented. In addition to studies on global anti-Americanism, numerous works have been published concerning anti-Americanism within specific societies or regions.

To the extent that they define the term, it is either done using broadly the same kind of discourses as those outlined above or by presenting definitions that focus on factors inherent in societies covering their specific area of interest.

This categorization of the typical types of discourses on anti-Americanism is of course merely an approximation. Few scholars would deny that anti-Americanism presents some unique features, or that anti-Americanism is a rather complex phenomenon, or that it cannot be attributed at least partly to real or perceived grievances towards the United States. As such, these sets of discourses should be regarded as very broad delimitations in a research area where definitions typically overlap. However, each of them portrays different faces of anti-Americanism, and each can contribute with clues to understanding many attributes of the phenomenon. As will be discussed below, they also each have their limitations. Some of these limitations are inherent in the definitions applied; others appear to be mainly limitations by omission. While the discourses are found in numerous studies (and in some cases several discourses appear to be present in the same analysis), they do not necessarily convey the essence of anti-Americanism. While providing good examples of the different attributes of anti-Americanism, and, though less frequently, also with the basis for an analytical framework, they often leave us wondering about the deeper causes of anti-Americanism. As such, these discourses are if not false, then at least likely to lead us partly astray. The first discourse is plainly guilty of oversimplifying the phenomenon of anti-Americanism. The second discourse reduces anti-Americanism to a mainly irrational phenomenon and thereby ‘demonizes the demonizers’. The third discourse, while providing good typologies of the different forms of anti-Americanism and often also presenting a coherent framework for analysis, paradoxically risks overcomplicating the phenomenon by rejecting the existence of common root causes to the various types of anti-Americanism.

2.2.1 Just another anti-ism?

Few writers seriously attempt to present anti-Americanism as ‘just another anti-ism’ like racism, anti-Semitism etc. Most concede that the nature and scope of anti-Americanism sets it apart from other anti-isms. Yet the temptation to analyze it analogically with other anti-isms seems hard to resist. Josef Joffe, otherwise a keen and provocative observer of especially European facets of anti-Americanism, has presented what he terms a “dissection of anti-isms” (2006a). He asserts that anti-ism consist of five elements:

1. Hostile stereotypization, a set of general statements attributing certain negative qualities to the target groups.
2. Denigration, the ascription of moral inferiority all the way to an irreducibly evil nature.
3. Demonization, moving from what the target group is to what it does or intends to do.
4. Obsession, the *idée fixe* that America (or “x”) is omnipresent and omnicausal, and hence the invisible force that explains all misery.
5. Elimination, be it by exclusion or extrusion. This is, writes Joffe, “where anti-ism assumes a quasi-religious quality, as in the ‘Great Satan’ motif of the Iranian regime” (2006a:4).

Joffe furthermore claims that these five elements are present “at all times and in all places” (ibid.). While Joffe has a keen eye for some of the psychological features that can be attributed to displays of anti-Americanism, or any anti-ism, this dissection must be rejected as an analytical tool on three accounts. First, it is highly doubtful whether it makes any sense at all to present an analysis of ‘all anti-isms’ with such sweeping generalizations. While it is probably true that all anti-ism can be characterized by stereotypization and denigration, the latter three points are more open to discussion: If for example racism is an anti-ism, it would not be wrong to regard it as discrimination based on misconstrued notions of superiority rather than on demonization. And racism would likewise not necessarily entail an obsession with omnipresence, but rather an obsession with racial notions of superiority versus inferiority. Second, Joffe risks ‘demonizing the demonizers’ by failing to acknowledge that anti-isms can be present on different levels and in different contexts. If for example the wish for elimination, whether by exclusion or extrusion, were an integral part of all anti-ism, surely most European anti-Americanism would fall short of such a definition. This will be discussed in greater detail below. Third, treating all anti-isms as characterized by the same elements, whether psychological or social, blurs the differences between phenomena, which have very different characteristics. It was discussed above that anti-Americanism was unique by its universality. Another aspect of anti-Americanism sets it apart from other anti-isms: the dimension of power. As will be argued subsequently, the power dimension not only gives anti-Americanism a certain ‘explicability’, but also almost systemic features in the international society. Joffe is far better at exemplifying aspects of anti-isms than at defining them, especially when considering European anti-Americanism:

On the level of stereotypization and denigration, three basic themes obey a single common denominator: Yahoo America vs. Superior Europe. [...] The first of these themes is that America is morally deficient. It executes its own people, which Europe does not, and it likes to bomb others, which Europe does only

when dragged along by the United States. [...] The United States also is a nation that will not submit to the dictates of global goodness; hence it will not respect climate conventions, or ratify the International Criminal Court treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty or the Land Mine Convention. Internationally, it is “Dirty Harry” and “Globocop” rolled into one – an irresponsible and arrogant citizen of the global community. America, in short, is “the world’s biggest rogue state” [...] The second theme is that America is socially retrograde. It is the land of “predatory capitalism” [...], a country that denies critical social services, like welfare and health insurance, to those who need it most. [...] The standard lore continues along these lines: Instead of bettering the lot of the poor and unskilled, the United States shunts millions of them, mainly dark-skinned minorities, off to prison. Europe, on the other hand, metes out rehabilitation, not retribution. America accepts – nay, admires – gross income inequalities, whereas Europe cherishes redistribution in the name of social justice. [...] The third theme is that America is culturally retrograde. [...] America gorges itself on fatty fast food, wallows in tawdry mass entertainment, starves the arts and prays only to one God: Mammon. Instead of subsidizing what is serious and high-minded, as do the Europeans, the United States ruthlessly sacrifices the best of culture to pap and pop [...]. (ibid:5-8).

This is clearly the voice of the editorial journalist rather than the detached analyst. Yet the themes he advances can readily be found, albeit in different guises, in academic literature as well. The problem is of course, that such ‘snap-shots’ from the transatlantic cultural front only conjure familiar images without offering much in way of explanation. Indeed, he identifies a set of themes typical of the denigration that America is frequently subjected to in Europe, and as we will see, these themes are advanced by more serious scholars as well. Paul Hollander readily asserts that he regards anti-Americanism “as an attitude similar to its far more thoroughly explored counterparts, hostile predispositions such as racism, sexism, or antisemitism” (1995:lxxviii). He finds support for it in selected texts by authors apparently all too willing to voice their dissatisfaction with the United States (1995). A further theme that Joffe introduces is the description of anti-Americanism as an altogether irrational sentiment:

Anti-Americanism [...] is not criticism of American policies, nor is it even an expression of dislike for particular American leaders or features of American life, such as gas-guzzling SUVs or five hundred television channels. It is the obsessive stereotypization, denigration and demonization of the country and the culture as a whole (2006a:4).

As we shall see below, this is a theme that resonates well among scholars of anti-Americanism. On the whole, however, Joffe’s definition of anti-Americanism and his exemplification of its attributes do not provide us with a proper framework for analysis.

Attempts to define anti-Americanism as any other anti-ism do not do justice to the specificity of a phenomenon that is first and foremost unique by its universality. An inventory of popular examples of anti-Americanism hardly provides a deeper understanding of its attributes and much less of its causes. And, as we shall see below, the emphasis on the irrationality of the phenomenon risks blurring some of its more fundamental causes.

2.2.2 A unique and largely irrational phenomenon?

The second type of discourse, much more prominent within the field, views anti-Americanism as a largely unique and mostly also largely irrational phenomenon. This depiction of anti-Americanism often dissociates criticism of what the United States *does* from what America *is*, claiming that since anti-Americanism constitutes an inherent predisposition against America or Americans, it is only the latter form of criticism, which can be regarded as anti-American. As will be shown below, this dissociation is highly problematic. Furthermore, the insistence on portraying anti-Americanism as primarily or at least largely irrational risks oversimplifying a global phenomenon, which certainly can present irrational attributes, but which nevertheless has such a magnitude that it becomes difficult to completely reject it as purely or mostly irrational. Whether anti-Americanism should be seen primarily as animosity towards America or rejection of Americanization is probably very much in the eye of the beholder. It is obvious that intense anti-Americanism, for example among the most fundamentalist Muslim extremists who see the United States as the ‘Great Satan’, can be regarded as hatred of not only everything that America stands for, but the very nation itself. This raises the question of whether anti-Americanism is about what America *does* or what America *is*. Paul Hollander has noted that:

[..] a proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by balancing two apparently incompatible perspectives or propositions. The first avers that anti-Americanism is a direct and rational response to the evident misdeeds of the United States abroad and its shortcomings and inequities at home. In other words, it is a set of attitudes created and stimulated by U.S. actions and policies and by the character of American social institutions, policies, and the defects and injustices thereof, even by the behavior of individual Americans [...] In the second and conflicting view, anti-Americanism is a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism), an expression of a deeply rooted scape-goating impulse, a disposition more closely related to the problems, frustrations, and deficiencies of those entertaining and articulating it – be they individuals, groups, nations, political parties, or movements – than to the real attributes of American foreign policy, society, or culture. (2004:7-9).

While these two views of anti-Americanism certainly do exist, they are hardly exclusive. More likely, they represent two poles on a wide spectrum, in which anti-Americanism can be observed and analyzed. While Hollander is right in assessing that a proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by balancing the two propositions, it seems that he casts his weights rather solidly in the scale of the second view. In his concluding remarks on anti-Americanism as a phenomenon, he emphasizes that:

The two views of anti-Americanism cannot be easily reconciled. It bears repeating that anti-Americanism is a deep-seated, emotional predisposition that perceives the United States as an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity and the source of all, or most, other evils in the world. Being critical of specific American institutions, policies, leaders, or cultural trends does not constitute the same mind-set (ibid:12).

If this is the yardstick by which anti-Americanism should be measured, most of the alleged charges of anti-Americanism would surely fall short of such a categorical definition. Only the harshest haters of America would acknowledge that the United States is “an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity”, and they probably could not be found on a global scale, at least not in large numbers. There is another problem with a definition of anti-Americanism that narrows it down to being effectively a demonization of those who demonize America. By reducing anti-Americanism to its most perverse manifestations, critics of the United States can provide themselves with an alibi intended to protect them against accusations of anti-Americanism. The French sociologist Emmanuel Todd is a good example of this. In the introduction to his *After the Empire*, he supposedly rejects the arguments of what he terms the “structural anti-Americans” who claim that “America is naughty by nature, the incarnation at the level of the state of the evils of the capitalist system” (2003:6). By dismissing anti-Americanism as solely the project of anti-Americans, he is free to establish his own credentials as a much more subtle, rational critic of America:

Before proceeding with our elaboration of a rigorous explanatory model of America’s international behavior, we ought to set aside the standard image of a musclebound America whose only problem would be its excessive power. The usual anti-American chorus will therefore be of no use to us, whereas Establishment thinkers will be our surest guides. (ibid.)

Yet Emmanuel Todd apparently finds it hard himself to set aside the image of an America “whose only problem would be its excessive power”. His book, far from being “a rigorous explanatory model of America’s international behavior”, is more akin to a vigorous attack on

the United States. In his conclusion, he remarks that: “Only one threat to global stability hangs over the world today – the United States itself, which was once a protector and is now a predator” (ibid:191). It may very well be that Todd does not see himself as anti-American but rather as the rational critic of an empire “engaged in a process of decomposition” (ibid:192). His words nonetheless should make us cautious of the uses of the label anti-American or anti-Americanism. And while many American readers will probably read Todd’s book as proof of a certain French intellectual animosity towards the United States, his views can be found readily on the other side of the Atlantic, not least in the writings of American intellectuals such as Gore Vidal and Noam Chomsky (see for example Vidal 2002, and Chomsky 2001). It may be that it is writers such as these that Hollander has in mind, when he asserts that:

anti-Americanism is a metaphor that stands for alienation, estrangement, radical social criticism, or an adversarial view of American society and culture; it usually entails the misperception and exaggeration of the flaws and failings of American institutions and values; it also leads or amounts to an unrealistic and inflated view of the responsibility that the (American) social system has for the problems and difficulties of particular groups and individuals (1995:xiii-xiv).

Though Hollander acknowledges that “Some of the discontents and criticisms stimulated by American cultural influences [...] are well founded” and as such “reflect legitimate apprehensions” (ibid:xii), he maintains that “I still believe that anti-Americanism, more often than not, *is* irrational and misdirected; it consists of attitudes and sentiments that reveal more about those displaying them than about the target of the hostile critiques” (ibid:xiii). The present study contends that anti-Americanism is much more substantial than what can be attributed to hardcore anti-Americans, whether they would accept such a label or not (and most probably would not). Anti-Americanism moreover cannot be reduced to its most extreme manifestations, and Hollander’s definitions of anti-Americanism seem in this respect almost akin to a hostile predisposition toward those who criticize America and its institutions. Therefore, if Hollander’s above mentioned two conflicting views on anti-Americanism are to be properly balanced, a first step would be to acknowledge that anti-Americanism is not necessarily just a groundless fancy that has no or little relation to the actions or perceived actions of the United States. If that were the case, surely anti-Americanism would have a much more reduced impact in societies that traditionally have close bonds with the United States. This is not to say that anti-Americanism is necessarily a “rational response to the evident misdeeds of the United States abroad” (op. cit.). That would be a reduction of anti-

Americanism to an absurd level whereby any articulation of opposition to specific U.S. policies could be dismissed as anti-Americanism. However, it would probably not be unfair to state that anti-Americanism is nourished by for example the actions carried out by U.S. governments. Shlapentokh, Woods and Shiraev have rightly pointed out that there is a tendency amongst those who write on anti-Americanism to focus rather exclusively on either the external or internal causes of the phenomenon:

Most discussions of anti-Americanism focus on two main topics: either the “nature” of the United States and its policies or on the particular political and cultural aspects of other nations. Authors who refer to the United States suggest that the causes of anti-Americanism are external and brought on by America itself. The authors highlight the deleterious effects of the U.S. foreign policy, military actions, and cultural expansion. [...] Other external factors such as the role of the United States in globalization and the expansion of capitalism have also been cited as a basis or root of anti-Americanism. [...] On the other side of the debate, many authors stress the internal, domestic factors underpinning attitudes toward the United States. In general, the strength of anti-Americanism depends less on U.S. actions than on the particular internal features of foreign countries. Three types of internal factors, namely, political, psychological, and cultural, are prominent in the debates. Addressing psychological reasons, some authors insist that certain critiques of the U.S. are irrational and even pathological. [...] This position is not new and a somewhat similar stance is found in an earlier collection of articles on anti-Americanism in which attitudes toward the United States were said to be based more on imagination and perception than on the actual experiences of most people. (2005:5-6).

Such conflicting views on the nature of anti-Americanism are due to the fact that many scholars have a tendency to focus on the critiques of what America *is*, dismissing critiques of what America *does* as attempts to legitimize anti-American discourses. Yet there are good reasons to reject the dissociation of the two. As Markovits notes, “anti-Americanism is a particularly murky concept because it invariably merges antipathy toward what America *does* with what America *is* – or rather is projected to be in the eyes of its beholders” (2007:11). As a consequence, “the separation of what America *is* – i.e., its way of life, its symbols, products, people – and what America *does* – its foreign policy writ large – will forever be jumbled and impossible to disentangle” (ibid:13). In order to get a proper understanding of the term, we must therefore look more closely at its different aspects. Though Hollander can be criticized for presenting much too narrow a definition of anti-Americanism, focusing primarily on the rejection of what America *is*, he is right in characterizing it as a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition” (op. cit.). He furthermore is right in pointing to the frustrations and

deficiencies of those who entertain anti-Americanism. But these frustrations have a cause, whether founded in realities or in misperceptions. Hollander implicitly acknowledges this when he remarks that:

The United States is likely to remain a symbolic scapegoat both for trends and developments which *can be* associated with it, and for which it bears responsibility as the major force for modernity in recent history, and *also* for the kind of alienation that emerges from the murkier depth of personal discontents and the refusal to come to terms with the imperfections and conflicts of the world, human nature, and social existence. (1992:xiii).

If anti-Americanism is indeed a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition” as Hollander has termed it, it obviously cannot be reduced to a catalogue of the perceived wrongs that can be attributed to the United States. Unless such an emotional predisposition is based on verifiable facts – and that would be a contradiction in terms – it seems impossible to present a set of rational factors that would tend to be inductive towards generating anti-Americanism. Yet it would be erroneous to perceive anti-Americanism as a totally irrational sentiment that has little or no relation to the realities of U.S. policies. Anybody attempting to discard anti-Americanism as a mere irrational phenomenon will be faced with the rather challenging task of explaining, why then anti-Americanism is so widespread. Short of arguing that anti-Americanism is the effect of some global bout of mental deficiency resulting in a xenophobic hatred of America; it will be very difficult indeed. Furthermore, this tendency to portray anti-Americanism as inherently irrational is likely to be found primarily in the works of American or pro-American authors, and sometimes gives the impression of an inability to accept that there might be ‘rational’ factors that can induce people into harboring anti-American sentiments. Some might even argue that this manifest preoccupation with branding anti-Americanism as irrational is related to national psychology. Already Tocqueville, who can hardly be accused of anti-Americanism, remarked how

In their relations with foreigners, Americans seem irritated by the slightest criticism and appear greedy for praise. The flimsiest compliment pleases them and the most fulsome rarely manages to satisfy them; they plague you constantly to make you praise them and, if you show yourself reluctant, they praise themselves. Doubting their own worth, they could be said to need a constant illustration of it before their eyes. Their vanity is not only greedy, it is also restless and jealous. ([1835-1840] 2003:710).

Could it be, following Tocqueville’s cue, that allegations of anti-Americanism are used to brand criticism of the United States as an irrational gut-reaction in order to denigrate the

critics themselves? Labeling them as ‘irrational’ certainly has that effect, and in those cases the notion of anti-Americanism becomes, as Pierre Guerlain has noted, “only an accusation directed at those who refuse to admire the American way” (in Fender (ed.) 1996:130). As Sylvia Ullmo notes, “Un des moyens les plus efficaces pour fuir un débat gênant a toujours été de faire passer l’adversaire pour plus ou moins fou” (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:19). Finally, the dismissal of anti-Americanism as an altogether irrational sentiment is akin to intellectual surrender: it may play well in politics and polemics, but it imposes serious limits on any attempt to analyze the phenomenon. The Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Charles Krauthammer undoubtedly scores some points with his audiences when he declares that:

The fact is that the world hates us for our wealth, our success, our power. They hate us into incoherence. [...] The search for logic in anti-Americanism is fruitless. It is in the air the world breathes. Its roots are envy and self-loathing – by people who, yearning for modernity but having failed at it, find their one satisfaction in despising modernity’s great exemplar (2003:156).

Yet by rejecting any kind of rationality in anti-Americanism, Krauthammer willfully rejects any attempt to address the problems associated with the phenomenon: “To Hell With Sympathy” is the telling title of his essay (ibid:155). Krauthammer’s reaction seems to validate Higgott and Malbašić’s claim that the American “political right tends to see every criticism of the US as anti-Americanism” (in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:3). Were we to follow Krauthammer’s lead, it would clearly lead us into a dead-end. Searching for the root causes of anti-Americanism does of course not imply that anti-Americanism does not contain elements of irrationality. But it does imply that at least some of the root causes can probably be identified as originating in the actions of the United States. In other words: what America *does* reflects what America *is* – and vice versa.

One should of course be careful not to fall in the opposite ditch, i.e. to accept critiques of what America does or has done as evidence of sinister intentions. No nation can convincingly present a history that exonerates it from guilt towards others (although the attempt is frequently made). Though past misdeeds and current mistakes contribute to the historical fabric of a nation, a nation cannot and should not be judged indiscriminately by such actions. Judging America – negatively – by what it does, or has done, is all too often an example of looking only at one side of the coin. Although I am not convinced by Hollander’s and Joffe’s attempts to pin the label of irrationality on all or most displays of anti-Americanism, they are not wrong in underlining that perceived wrongs are often elevated to

absurd stereotypization. The following assessment by Hollander may be somewhat lacking in nuances, but nevertheless acknowledges the link between anti-Americanism and both the actions and the nature of the United States:

The concept of anti-Americanism implies more than a critical disposition: it refers to critiques which are less than fully rational and not necessarily well founded. It usually alludes to a predisposition, a free-floating hostility or aversion, that feeds on many sources besides the discernible shortcomings of the United States. In the words of two commentators on the phenomenon, anti-Americanism “involves perceptual distortion such that a caricature of some aspect of behavior or attitude is raised to the level of general belief” [Doran and Sewell in Thornton ed. 1988:106]. Among the major sources of such anti-Americanism we find nationalism (political or cultural), the rejection of (or ambivalence toward) modernization and anti-capitalism (1992:7).

Though the definitions presented above have dominated the field for years, they seem to suffer from some of the same shortcomings as those presented by Joffe. The dissociation between opposition toward what America *is* and what America *does* is problematic. The tendency to define and describe anti-Americanism as largely irrational is highly dubious, as it risks obstructing attempts to look beyond the irrational. Anti-Americanism is indeed a phenomenon that presents worrying excesses, yet demonizing the demonizers is missing the point: around the globe, there are large numbers of people who reject the United States and its policies. Though this rejection at times appears either ridiculous or extreme (or both), it can hardly be experienced as irrational by its beholders. In the conclusion to his thorough analysis of French anti-Americanism in the interwar years, David Strauss makes it “clear that anti-Americanism is not necessarily an irrational position. It is an ideology, sometimes articulated with passion; but, given the values which the anti-American wishes to defend, it may be an entirely appropriate strategy” (1978:278). This alone should induce us not to be too flippant about its attributes or its possible causes.

2.2.3 A unique and complex anti-ism?

A third category of analysis presents a discourse, which typically is more nuanced, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its attributes, and offering a more comprehensive framework for analysis. To a large extent, such analyses draw on some of the elements presented above, not least the dissociation between opposition toward what America is and does. They do, however, present us with a set of very useful typologies that cover different forms of anti-Americanism. As noted above, irrespective of his charges of

irrationality, Hollander has identified three major types of anti-Americanism abroad, which he terms nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist (1992:7 and 1995:xxxvii). Moisés Naím has identified five “pure” types of anti-Americanism, namely politico-economic, historical, religious, cultural, and psychological (2002:104-105). More recently, Brendon O’Connor has identified five conceptions of how the term is mostly used, which he resumes to be “firstly, as one side of a dichotomised worldview; secondly, as a tendency; thirdly, as a pathology; fourthly, as a prejudice; and fifthly, as an ideology” (in O’Connor (ed.) 2007a:8). Analyzing these five conceptions in turn, he concludes that anti-Americanism can best be regarded as a prejudice (ibid:8-21), although one, which at times has “ideological overtones” (ibid:xiii). In reality, this differs little from Hollander’s characteristic of anti-Americanism as a “predisposition” (1992:7); if anything, predisposition seems a more fitting and certainly more neutral characteristic than prejudice. Among the recent studies on the phenomenon, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane have probably offered the most comprehensive definition of anti-Americanism to date. Starting from a distinction between unfavorable attitudes towards America that reflect opinion, i.e. unfavorable judgments about U.S. policies, and those that reflect bias, i.e. a predisposition to deeply distrust American intentions, they define anti-Americanism as “*a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general*. Such views draw on cognitive, emotional, and normative elements. Using the language of psychology, anti-Americanism could be viewed as an *attitude*” (2007:12). Yet, having presented this definition, they concede that:

On further examination, anti-Americanism becomes much more complex than this broad definition suggests. We distinguish below among opinion, bias, and distrust, any of which could be reflected in poll results showing “unfavorable” attitudes toward the United States. Bias is the most fundamental form of anti-Americanism, which can be seen as a form of prejudice. (ibid.)

Their main purpose, however, is not to analyze the strength of the different forms of anti-American feeling, but rather to present a typology of different types of anti-Americanism. They basically identify four major types of anti-Americanism. Ranging from least to most intense, these are:

- *Liberal anti-Americanism*, where the United States is criticized for not living up to its own ideals, which leads to charges of hypocrisy from people who share its professed ideals but lament its actions.
- *Social anti-Americanism*, based on value conflicts that reflect relevant socio-political differences and lead to a rejection of the American combination of respect for individual liberty, reliance on personal responsibility, and distrust of government.

- *Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism*, whose proponents focus on the importance of not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent importance of collective national identities.
- *Radical anti-Americanism*, built around the belief that America's identity ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of values, practices and institutions elsewhere in the world (2006:28-31, 2007:28-34).

This typology permits to distinguish between different types of anti-Americanism that appear rooted in different causes or political mind-sets. It is thus a useful categorization of a complex phenomenon that allows the authors to gauge anti-Americanism at different levels in different societies. Stating that the “fundamental dimension along which these four types of anti-Americanism vary is the normative one of *identification*” (2007:28), Katzenstein and Keohane employ their typology to identify different forms of anti-Americanism. They add that whether “these identifications translate into anti-Americanism, or into very active anti-Americanism, depends, we conjecture, on an emotional dimension: the extent to which the United States is feared” (ibid:34). Coupling their typology with the level of identification with the United States and the amount of fear that America inspires, they obtain the matrix reproduced below in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Identification, fear, and anti-Americanism

<i>Degree of fear that the United States will adversely affect one's own society</i>		
	Low	High
<i>Identification with the United States</i>		
Positive: subject associates herself with what she considers U.S. practices	I. Pro-Americanism	II. Critique of hypocrisy <i>liberal anti-Americanism</i>
	III. Ambivalence <i>latent social anti-Americanism</i>	IV. Severe criticism <i>intense social anti-Americanism</i>
	V. Negative feelings, but not intense; unlikely to lead to action <i>latent sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism</i>	VI. Intense negative feelings; more likely to lead to action <i>intense sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism</i>
Negative: subject opposes what she considers U.S. practices	VII. Negative and more intense than V but less than VI and VIII due to lack of fear <i>latent radical anti-Americanism</i>	VIII. Very negative and intense; likely to lead to action, violent or nonviolent <i>mobilized radical anti-Americanism</i>

Source: Reproduced from Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007:29.

They note that the “schemas, emotions, and norms that provide the basis for anti-American attitudes are as varied as the different types of anti-Americanism” and that as such, table 2.1 is “cast in terms of the attitudes of individuals” (ibid:35). What the table does not take into account is “the particular experience of a society with the United States, which may condition the attitudes of its people” (ibid.). Acknowledging that not all forms of anti-Americanism fit neatly into their four major types, Katzenstein and Keohane introduce two more specific forms of anti-Americanism, which they find “are both historically sensitive and particularistic” (2006:32):

- *Elitist anti-Americanism*, which arises in countries in which the elite has a long history of denigrating American culture. France is mentioned here as an example – indeed as the only example.
- *Legacy anti-Americanism*, which stems from resentment of past wrongs and misdeeds committed by the U.S. towards another society. (2007:35-37, 2006:32-33).

These four (or six) different types of anti-Americanism may at first seem a fitting description of the different forms of anti-Americanism that can be encountered around the globe. Under their overall very broad definitional heading, Katzenstein and Keohane present a nuanced and yet succinct conceptual framework for analysis. They have employed this framework to present a thorough analysis of anti-Americanism in different societies (2007) that seems to broadly validate their main arguments. Their focus on the different varieties of anti-Americanism entails, if we accept the premises of their arguments, that there can hardly be a core factor that is conducive to the rejection of America. Indeed, according to Katzenstein and Keohane, “The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that what is called anti-Americanism varies, depending on who is reacting to America [...] The variety of anti-Americanism helps us to see [...] the futility of grand explanations for anti-Americanism” (2006:26). This is a view, which is widely shared among scholars who have studied the phenomenon. Crockatt notes that since “anti-Americanism assumes many forms and has many different roots”, he finds it “more useful to think of it as a family of related attitudes rather than as a single entity” (Crockatt 2003:44). Higgott and Malbašić take as the starting point of their analysis the assumption that “anti-Americanism cannot be defined using simple, overarching explanations, which would indeed fail utterly to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon” (in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:5). Hollander agrees: “Since anti-Americanism has many forms and originates in many disparate conditions and parts of the world it would be unrealistic to attempt to propose a single theory or explanation” (1995:389).

Yet can it really be so? Is it possible that a global phenomenon, albeit presenting different varieties from society to society, does not have some common root cause? According to Katzenstein and Keohane, there is no “grand explanation”, but does this exclude the possibility of at least a ground explanation? One dimension is oddly downplayed in their conceptual framework: the power dimension. It is a dimension on which Katzenstein and Keohane seem strangely hesitant. While analyzing individual attitudes toward the United States using the dimension of fear, which must presuppose some kind of power dimension, they view the extent to which the United States is feared as an “emotional dimension” (2007:34). This emotional dimension seems to borrow more from social psychology than from political science. As such, it conjures images of irrationality resembling those used by among others Paul Hollander. Yet far from being just an emotional dimension, surely fear must be rooted also in perceptions of power and powerlessness. In this case, American power, and the relative powerlessness of other societies, their military, economies, cultures, traditions etc. Katzenstein and Keohane do note that the “different types of anti-Americanism can, however, also be manifested at the level of the polity in the form of collective beliefs, reflected, for example, in appropriate discourses, tropes, and acceptable rhetorical moves” (ibid:35). This is undoubtedly true and readily observable, and as such one would expect some more solid arguments relating to the amount of fear that the United States can inspire at the level of the polity. On this level, fear cannot simply be reduced to an emotional dimension. Yet the global dimension of U.S. power only gets a passing comment. At the onset, Katzenstein and Keohane declare that “If anti-American expressions were simply ways to protest policies of the hegemonic power, only the label would be new” (2006:26). They justify the exclusion of the power dimension by reasserting the difference between rejection of what America *does* and what America *is*, concluding that anti-Americanism is largely a reaction to what America is (ibid.). But what is America, if not powerful? The most important feature of the United States, indeed the feature that sets the American nation apart from all other nations in the world is precisely power. American power looms large and probably larger than that of any power in history. Surely, it can hardly be a coincidence that global anti-Americanism has been a steady companion of rising American power throughout the twentieth century. Though Katzenstein and Keohane present us with a relevant typology to identify different forms of anti-Americanism, this typology alone is not enough to explain neither the global dimension of anti-Americanism nor its embedment in world politics. There

is little doubt that this third type of definition or definitional framework for analysis is much more comprehensive than the previous two, yet it too suffers from some shortcomings. Though it offers a useful typology, it nevertheless fails to explain adequately some of the root causes of anti-Americanism, focusing instead on its attributes in different societies and social strata. As such, there might be good cause to supplement these definitions with regard to the power dimension, which appears to have been downplayed in most previous definitions.

2.3 Anti-Americanism and the Power Dimension

The United States has been termed the first “universal nation” (Joffe 2006b:110). As we shall see in chapter 5, France might also feel it natural to compete for the title. Nevertheless, the impression of America as a universal nation is widely shared today, and it logically entails that it should not be surprising that anti-Americanism has become a universal anti-ism. There is another reason however, which is both related and relatively straightforward. According to Markovits, where anti-Americanism differs from other prejudices is on the dimension of power (Markovits 2007:13). This observation might seem a truism, yet it is a fact, which inexplicably is often overlooked, especially by scholars who seek to analyze anti-Americanism in relation to other anti-isms, as was discussed above. The power dimension and the universality dimension are twin brothers: the power dimension feeds the universality dimension (could anti-Americanism conceivably be analyzed as a global phenomenon if the United States was not a superpower capable of global power projection? Most likely not.), and the universality dimension mirrors the power dimension (surveys indicating rising anti-Americanism often correspond with an identifiable rejection of the use of American power in specific conflicts). Both the power dimension (which will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter 3) and the universality dimension set anti-Americanism solidly apart from other anti-isms. There is, however, a widespread reluctance to accept the power dimension as constitutive in relation to anti-Americanism. Katzenstein and Keohane reject what they term the “Mr. Big” hypothesis as they find no positive correlation between levels of anti-Americanism and levels of American power:

Resentment at the negative effects of others’ exercise of power is hardly surprising. Yet this explanation runs up against some inconvenient facts. If it were correct, anti-Americanism would have increased sharply during the 1990s; but we have seen that outside the Middle East, the United States was almost universally popular as late as 2002. The Mr. Big hypothesis could help account for certain forms of liberal and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism [...] But it

could hardly account for social, radical, elitist, or legacy anti-Americanism, each of which reacts to features of American society, or its behavior in the past, that are quite distinct from contemporary hegemony. (2006:33)

Their opposition toward the Mr. Big hypothesis rests mainly on the observation that American power was rejected less vehemently in the 1990s than before (and after!). At closer scrutiny, this argument does not hold quite as tight as Katzenstein and Keohane would have it. First, it is not reasonable to expect a clear correlation between levels of anti-Americanism and levels of American power. The actual level of military or economic power may be calculated at any given time using a number of indicators; the perception of power, however, is not as easily calculated. Second, the 1990s were for large parts of the world a decade of upheaval, but also hope following the end of the Cold War. American leadership of the Free World was not regarded in terms of oppression or potential oppression, but largely in terms of liberation, at least in Europe. The promise of a “new world order”, to use George H.W. Bush’s term, was perceived by many as the promise of a new international system, in which bipolarity was replaced not by unipolarity or American tutelage, but by multilateral cooperation, although it soon came to be associated more with “unilateral American leadership” (Hippler 1994:89) in a post-Cold War era characterized by first and foremost by a globalization process spearheaded by the United States (Falk 1999:11-12, Hanahoe 2003:9-11). The Clinton administration’s initial reluctance to engage militarily in the Balkan crisis of the 1990s was seen as a confirmation, however welcome or unwelcome it may have been in European capitals, of Washington’s refusal to wield its power and act as a global policeman (Hirsh 2003). Third, though there is no doubt that anti-Americanism reached an all-time high under the presidency of George W. Bush, surveys conclusively show that it was on the rise even before his election (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008, Moisi 2009), undermining the argument that the United States was “almost universally popular” until 2002, though it is true that the personae and politics of Bush played well into the anti-American narratives (O’Connor, in O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1-18), widening the transatlantic “chasm that had begun to open with the collapse of the Soviet empire” (Moisi 2009:119). Fourth, and perhaps most surprising given especially Robert Keohane’s close partnership with Joseph S. Nye⁹, the notion of power around which they build their argument, is precisely the notion of power primarily used by realists and neorealists, i.e. power measured purely or mainly in terms of military or economic power. Yet there are other notions of power, much

more relevant in this respect. Joseph S. Nye has presented a useful distinction between hard power and soft power (1990), which, as will be explored further below, provides an interesting framework for analyzing anti-Americanism in relation to various dimensions of power. It is thus not just in terms of military force or economic might that the United States can be perceived as Mr. Big. In their critical study of anti-Americanism, Sardar and Davies have noted that:

America is not just the lone hyperpower – it has become the *defining* power of the world. America defines what is democracy, justice, freedom; what are human rights and what is multiculturalism; who is a ‘fundamentalist’, a ‘terrorist’, or simply ‘evil’. In short, what it means to be human. The rest of the world, including Europe, must simply accept these definitions and follow the American lead [...]. But America defines all these things in singular terms – in terms of American self-identity, history, experience and culture, and, more often than not, in terms of American self-interest (Sardar and Davies 2002:201).

As opposed to what Katzenstein and Keohane state, this perception of power should be able to account for the social, radical, elitist, and legacy anti-Americanism that they have identified, as well as for the liberal and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism that they concede may feed on the dimension of power. A final argument should be put forward: surveys gauging the level of anti-Americanism in different societies present overwhelming arguments for a correlation between levels of anti-Americanism and perceptions of U.S. power. Some of these surveys will be presented and analyzed below. By and large, they validate the claim that anti-Americanism can be regarded also in terms of a rejection of U.S. power. This is the case especially as regards the attributes of hard power, but to a large extent also as regards elements of soft power. On both accounts, these surveys give the impression that there is both opposition toward American power and the way in which it is wielded – a further testimony to the fact that perceptions of power cannot be dissociated from the use of power.

Katzenstein and Keohane’s refusal to accept “grand arguments” such as the power dimension should not be interpreted as a complete rejection on their behalf of the power dimension as a source of explanation. They concede that such explanations contain a “grain of truth”, but they deny that they can form the basis for a “general explanation of anti-Americanism” (2006:34). To a large extent, this is due to their adopting a notion of power, which is probably too narrow. As a curiosity, it should be noted that others, using basically the same notion of power as Katzenstein and Keohane, see power not as a source of anti-Americanism, but rather prescribe power as a remedy against the spread of anti-Americanism.

Charles Krauthammer, as always ready to deliver a refreshingly politically incorrect commentary, offers this assessment:

The elementary truth that seems to elude the experts again and again – Gulf war, Afghan war, next war – is that power is its own reward. Victory changes everything, psychology above all. The psychology in the region [Middle East] is now one of fear and deep respect for American power. Now is the time to use it to deter, defeat, or destroy the other regimes in the area that are host to radical Islamic terrorism. (2001b)

The power that inspires fear (or admiration, depending on the point of view) is certainly available to the United States, but equally important is the potential for soft power that the United States disposes of. Power can be portrayed as “the ability to produce the outcome you want” (Nye 2003:74). According to Nye, typical hard power instruments imply the use of “sticks and carrots”, whereas soft power is “the ability to secure those outcomes through attraction rather than coercion” (ibid.). These dimensions of power will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. It does, however, seem clear that if one applies a broader definition of power such as the one proposed by Nye, a logical observation could be to wonder on the relationship between the two dimensions of power. If soft power is primarily about attraction, it would be tempting to regard anti-Americanism as to a large degree being a case of dis-attraction. Furthermore, it is interesting to wonder, whether attributes of hard power become more repellent as a nation’s soft power (i.e. the ability to attract) decreases. Nye’s broader definition of power allows us to escape the Mr. Big stereotypes when analyzing anti-Americanism in relation to American power. In his path-breaking work, *Man, the State and War*, Kenneth N. Waltz concluded that the permissive cause of war is the condition of anarchy characterizing the international political system of states. The efficient causes of any given war could, however, be found at other levels, individual or what he termed state and societal levels (1959). It might be overstating the case to regard American power as the *permissive* cause of anti-Americanism. Yet it could be argued that American power is the most structural of the different causes of anti-Americanism.

This chapter has argued that some of the most common definitions of anti-Americanism are flawed, as they are constructed around discourses, which either oversimplify the phenomenon, exaggerates its attributes of irrationality, or rejects the possibility of fundamental causes that are conducive to anti-Americanism. It has furthermore been argued that the dimension of power is central to the understanding of anti-Americanism abroad and

that much anti-Americanism can be analyzed using a broad concept of power such as the one suggested by Joseph S. Nye. That will be the endeavor set forth in the next chapter. Before turning to an analysis of anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power, it is time to present the definition of global (i.e. non-domestic)¹⁰ anti-Americanism that will be used throughout the rest of this study:

Anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon and the most universal of all nation-specific anti-isms. It reflects a general predisposition against the United States, its society and its policies. It is a complex phenomenon with many different attributes reflecting the beholder's values and perceptions. To a large extent, however, these attributes are due to or enhanced by the perception that the United States wields disproportionate power over other nations and their inhabitants. As such, anti-Americanism can largely be interpreted as a reaction against the perceived threat of Americanization of other societies, both on a local and on a global level.

This definition is rather broad. It does not attempt to differentiate between rational or irrational attributes of anti-Americanism, neither does it attempt to delineate the different varieties of anti-Americanism, which one might to a certain degree identify, depending on the societies examined. Rather, it attempts to offer a single model of explanation, the power dimension, which can be used to analyze elements of anti-Americanism. Though some readers may at this stage be ready to accept the contention that the power dimension can explain, at least partially, several varieties of modern anti-Americanism, it takes more imagination to accept that it can explain the historical anti-Americanism that predates the superpower status of the United States. Yet power can be defined not just in terms of hard power versus soft power, but also in terms of actual power versus potential power. It has been amply documented that anti-Americanism in certain societies predates not only America's rise to superpower status, but even the creation of the United States (Roger 2005). Yet, as Rubin and Rubin have noted, anti-Americans have thought that "the United States would become the main force to shape the human civilization [...] back as far as 1750" (2004:221). Though early anti-Americanism had other causes besides the power dimension, the promise of American power has been present since the nation's creation. Here, the French example is particularly appropriate, as will be discussed in chapter 5. But first, in order to properly gauge the importance of the power dimension, and thereby to assess whether the above definition holds up to closer scrutiny, it is necessary to turn our attention more closely to the relation between anti-Americanism and the power dimension.

3 The Rejection of American Power

It was argued in chapter 2 that it is first and foremost the power dimension that sets anti-Americanism apart from other prejudices. While to some, it might seem a banal observation, it is a contention, which is discarded by the majority of prominent writers on anti-Americanism. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate first that there are fact-based grounds to assume that there is a correlation between contemporary opposition toward the United States and perceptions abroad of disproportionate or even excessive American power. This will be demonstrated by analyzing some of the many surveys gauging the level of opposition toward America that may be regarded as evidence, however partial, of anti-Americanism. These surveys can clearly only provide us with an impression of some of the causes of anti-Americanism today. An obvious criticism of the use of such surveys is that they only record an image of possible anti-Americanism as presented to them by interviewees who react to their perception of current affairs. Though the surveys can thus only give an indication of the impressions of individuals, however large in numbers, they nonetheless give valuable indications as to the perceptions of the populations of large parts of the world. The *vox populi*, however, does not differentiate between different notions of power, and as such, a more thorough analysis of the different attributes of power is needed. This brings us to the main part of this chapter, namely the part that analyzes the rejection of the United States based on the elements of power associated with it. This will be analyzed by decomposing the notion of power into its dimensions and subdimensions as introduced by Joseph S. Nye. This decomposition will address the two dimensions of hard power versus soft power as well as their resources and attributes. It will be argued that the various notions of power can explain the most common examples of anti-Americanism, including the major types identified by Hollander (nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist) or by Katzenstein and Keohane (liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical, as well as the more particularistic varieties such as elitist and legacy anti-Americanism). Furthermore, an attempt will be made to demonstrate that the power dimension is as relevant as regards the promise of American power as regarding the actual existence of American power.

3.1 Perceptions Abroad Towards the United States

There is no shortage of polls to illustrate the perceptions towards the United States abroad¹¹. Though these polls do not in all cases inform us about causes of anti-Americanism, the surveys show a remarkable consistency in the view of inhabitants of different countries towards the United States over the last decade. The U.S. 'fact tank' Pew Research Center regularly issues worldwide public opinion surveys as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project¹². The Pew Global Attitudes Project is the largest ever series of multinational surveys focusing on global attitudes toward the United States (Kohut 2007) and provider of the most comprehensive quantitative data on the subject. Their surveys make interesting reading: First, the reports allow us to broadly gauge the level of opposition towards the United States in selected countries. Second, the reports use a number of parameters to qualify some of the reasons for the dissatisfaction with the United States over the years. In his March 2007 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs, Andrew Kohut, the President of the Pew Research Center, presented the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project since 2002 concerning the perception of America abroad. In his presentation, he enumerated a number of factors driving anti-Americanism around the world. Considering that the polling started following September 11th 2001, it is not surprising that some of the factors identified by the surveys as driving anti-Americanism, especially among Muslims, were related to specific issues such as American policy towards Israel (seen as too supportive), the U.S.-led war on terrorism (seen as an American campaign targeted specifically at Muslim governments), and the widespread opposition to the war in Iraq (seen by many as an American attempt to control Middle Eastern oil and/or to impose its military and political domination of the region) (Kohut 2007:4-5). Though the polls confirm that the image of America deteriorated particularly in the Muslim world in the first decade of the new millennium, the Pew Global Attitudes Project documented that this was part of a global tendency. In his testimony, Kohut highlighted four aspects of American power and American policy, which he reckoned were central to the rising anti-Americanism that could be witnessed (Kohut 2007:5-7):

- A general perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally in the international arena, failing to take into account the interests of other countries when it makes foreign policy decisions.
- A broad discomfort with unrivaled American power.

- A perceived disproportionate willingness to use military force, and especially preemptive force.
- A rejection of “Americanization” – the wide diffusion of American ideas and customs fueled by globalization.

The surveys provide some interesting clues as to the magnitude and nature of the recent deterioration of America’s image in the world. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the developments in favorability ratings of respectively the United States and of Americans as reported by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2009.

Table 3.1: U.S. Favorability Rating (<i>in %</i>)									
	1999/ 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009								
U.S.	--	--	--	83	76	80	84	88	
Canada	71	72	63	59	--	55	--	68	
Britain	83	75	70	55	56	51	53	69	
France	62	62	42	43	39	39	42	75	
Germany	78	60	45	42	37	30	31	64	
Spain	50	--	38	41	23	34	33	58	
Poland	86	79	--	62	--	61	68	67	
Russia	37	61	37	52	43	41	46	44	
Turkey	52	30	15	23	12	9	12	14	
Egypt	--	--	--	--	30	21	22	27	
Jordan	--	25	1	21	15	20	19	25	
Lebanon	--	36	27	42	--	47	51	55	
Pal. ter.	--	--	--	--	--	13	--	15	
Israel	--	--	78	--	--	78	--	71	
China	--	--	--	42	47	34	41	47	
India	--	66	--	71	56	59	66	76	
Indonesia	75	61	15	38	30	29	37	63	
Japan	77	72	--	--	63	61	50	59	
Pakistan	23	10	13	23	27	15	19	16	
S. Korea	58	52	46	--	--	58	70	78	
Argentina	50	34	--	--	--	16	22	38	
Brazil	56	51	35	--	--	44	47	61	
Mexico	68	64	--	--	--	56	47	69	
Kenya	94	80	--	--	--	87	--	90	
Nigeria	46	76	61	--	62	70	64	79	

Source: Pew 2009:1.

Table 3.2: Favorable Views of the American People (<i>in %</i>)									
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Canada	77	75	--	66	--	76	--	74	
Britain	82	80	72	70	69	70	70	73	
France	71	58	53	64	65	61	64	75	
Germany	70	67	68	66	66	63	55	64	
Spain	--	47	--	56	37	46	41	52	
Poland	77	--	--	68	--	63	70	72	
Russia	67	65	64	61	57	54	57	57	
Turkey	32	32	32	23	17	13	13	14	
Egypt	--	--	--	--	36	31	31	40	
Jordan	54	18	21	34	39	36	36	39	
Lebanon	47	62	--	66	--	69	74	69	
Pal. ter.	--	6	--	--	--	21	--	20	
Israel	--	78	--	--	--	75	--	74	
China	--	--	--	43	50	38	38	42	
India	72	--	--	70	67	58	63	73	
Indonesia	65	56	--	46	36	42	45	54	
Japan	73	--	--	--	82	75	65	70	
Pakistan	17	38	25	22	27	19	20	20	
S. Korea	60	74	--	--	--	70	77	83	
Argentina	32	--	--	--	--	26	24	38	
Brazil	54	44	--	--	--	45	51	62	
Mexico	56	--	--	--	--	52	44	57	
Kenya	79	--	--	--	--	86	--	87	
Nigeria	72	67	--	--	56	66	62	76	

Source: Pew 2009:17.

The tables show that though there was a steady decline in the image of both the United States and Americans in the countries polled especially throughout the period from 2002 to 2006 or 2007, the respondents have broadly been more positive towards Americans than towards the United States. To the extent that the polls can be taken as an indication of anti-Americanism, it would seem that though there is a clear correlation between the fluctuating levels of animosity towards the United States and towards Americans in the various countries, anti-Americanism still has more to do with animosity towards America than towards Americans. Nevertheless, the fact that negative perceptions regarding the United States are reflected also

on the perception of Americans, led Kohut to emphasize in his 2007 testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, that “it is no longer just the U.S. as a country that is perceived negatively, but increasingly the American people as well, a sign that anti-American opinions are deepening and becoming more entrenched” (Kohut 2007:3). This interpretation of the polling data, seemingly valid in 2007, was seriously challenged just two years later. Whereas the image of America had been deteriorating rapidly during the presidency of George W. Bush, it is clear that election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States coincided with a massive increase in the favorability ratings of America. Judging by the latest surveys produced by Pew, this was in fact anything but coincidental. Table 3.3 shows that there is a spectacular difference regarding the confidence expressed abroad toward President George W. Bush in 2008 and his successor in 2009. Table 3.4 furthermore demonstrates that the high level of confidence in President Obama contributed to give populations around the world a more positive impression of the United States. The figures are noteworthy, both because they are so unambiguous and because they reflect a near-universal tendency. Yet they are hardly surprising. Throughout the presidency of George W. Bush, polls confirmed that the 43rd President was viewed rather unfavorably by the rest of the world. In a 2005 Pew survey with the subtitle “American Character Gets Mixed Reviews”, European respondents massively replied “that the Problem With the U.S.” was “mostly Bush” (Pew 2005:16). This was the case in France, where 63 pct regarded Bush as the problem and ‘only’ 32 pct America in general. The assessment in France, however, did not differ from that of the other

Table 3.3: A (Nearly) Worldwide Gap (% confident)

	Bush 2008	Obama 2009	Diff
Germany	14	93	+79
France	13	91	+78
Britain	16	86	+70
Spain	8	72	+64
Canada*	28	88	+60
Japan	25	85	+60
Brazil	17	76	+59
Argentina	7	61	+54
S. Korea	30	81	+51
Indonesia	23	71	+48
Mexico	16	55	+39
U.S.	37	74	+37
Nigeria	55	88	+33
China	30	62	+32
Egypt	11	42	+31
Turkey	2	33	+31
Jordan	7	31	+24
India	55	77	+22
Kenya*	72	94	+22
Poland	41	62	+21
Palest. ter.*	8	23	+15
Russia	22	37	+15
Lebanon	33	46	+13
Pakistan	7	13	+6
Israel*	57	56	-1

*Bush confidence from 2007.

Source: Pew 2009:31.

Table 3.4: Did Obama’s Election Change Your Opinion of the U.S.?

	More fav %	Less fav %	No change (Vol) %
Canada	84	6	6
France	93	3	4
Germany	91	1	7
Britain	77	6	14
Spain	75	5	16
Poland	48	11	33
Russia	40	10	44
Turkey	38	25	25
Israel	40	40	17
Egypt	38	23	34
Pal. ter.	37	30	32
Lebanon	34	25	34
Jordan	29	18	44
Japan	77	6	14
Indonesia	73	12	8
S. Korea	67	3	24
India	60	21	5
China	47	10	26
Pakistan	9	23	26
Brazil	77	6	14
Argentina	61	5	26
Mexico	51	15	25
Kenya	84	7	8
Nigeria	81	11	5

Source: Pew 2009:35.

polled European countries; if anything, France could be said in this respect to represent an almost median position. Outside of Europe it seemed that the blame was cast more or less equally on the Bush administration and America in general (ibid.). In his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, Andrew Kohut nevertheless found that one should not over-emphasize the Bush-factor: “Clearly, President Bush and his administration’s policies have been lightning rods for U.S. criticism. At the same time, however, it is clear that this problem seems bigger than the feelings people may have about President Bush and his administration” (Kohut 2007:6). While the 2009 survey might appear to challenge this assessment, it also indicates that there remains a substantial global reservation regarding the amount of power and influence wielded by the United States. Table 3.5 shows that even at a time when U.S. favorability ratings have increased dramatically, there remains a persistent impression that the United States influences other countries, and a substantial proportion of those polled characterizes this influence as negative.

Polling data also suggest that there is a widespread impression among majorities of the polled that the United States does not consider the interests of other nations (Pew 2009:19), and though there is a fairly significant expectation among especially America’s European allies that President Obama will strive to act more multilaterally, only a minority of these countries describe the actual policies of the Obama-administration as multilateral (Pew 2009:6). Though the favorability figures for 2009 are in general far more positive than those of the preceding years, it is clear that there remains a certain global apprehension regarding the most potent attributes of American power and the way it is wielded. Table 3.6 depicts the extent to which U.S. foreign policy was seen in 2005 as considering others and

Table 3.5: U.S. Influence Widely Felt

	U.S. influences your country*	** U.S. influence is a...		
		Good thing	Bad thing	Neither/ DK
	%	%	%	%
Canada	88	22	27	40
Britain	81	15	31	35
France	74	16	15	43
Germany	83	19	24	40
Spain	66	13	33	20
Poland	63	13	27	23
Russia	62	7	39	17
Turkey	58	6	45	7
Egypt	74	16	42	17
Jordan	74	7	53	14
Lebanon	91	32	48	11
Palest. ter.	84	6	70	9
Israel	91	20	34	37
China	65	21	31	12
India	85	51	25	8
Indonesia	62	20	21	21
Japan	92	19	37	36
Pakistan	55	5	43	7
S. Korea	91	30	30	31
Argentina	72	8	48	16
Brazil	77	21	38	19
Mexico	79	18	38	23
Kenya	73	52	12	10
Nigeria	73	43	22	9

*% of total sample saying U.S. influences their country a great deal or fair amount.

**% of total sample saying U.S. influence is good thing, bad thing, neither, or don’t know. Question asked only of those who say U.S. has great deal/fair amount of influence.

Source: Pew 2009:26.

responses to the question of whether it would be better, if U.S. military power was rivaled¹³.




Table 3.6: Opinions of U.S. policies. *Source: Pew 2005:23 and 30.*

The most striking conclusion to be drawn from this survey is naturally that even among its closest allies, it would seem that there was just a few years ago a massive rejection of what can well be described as a perception of U.S. unilateralism. Furthermore, the rather overwhelming wish for a rival to U.S. military power can only be interpreted as a testimony to the fact that the U.S. military hegemony was deplored, even among its allies within NATO. Though the figures regarding the degree to which the U.S. considers the interests of other countries have improved slightly since the election of President Obama (Pew 2009:19), there is no escaping that America's preeminence as the world's foremost military power contributed to foster resentment, even among its allies. Military might is one of the two most salient attributes of traditional notions of (hard) power; the other is economic power. Despite the impact of the financial crisis and the growing impression of China as a rising economic power, surveys show that the United States remains in the eyes of most of the world the leading economic power (Pew 2009:25). However, there is also a widely shared impression

that America's economic influence is negative (table 3.7). Though the survey registers a certain improvement in the assessment following the election of Barack Obama, the figures remain high, especially among the United States' European partners. These surveys indicate that while the way American power was wielded by George W. Bush may have been the primary reason for the disenchantment with the United States registered during his presidency, there is no escaping that the two most prominent attributes of American (hard) power, namely its military pre-eminence and its economic preponderance give rise to resentment around the globe. To the extent that such surveys can be said to indicate reasons for anti-American prejudices, it would seem that these prejudices have as their structural base a perception of disproportionate American power; a perception which appears to be magnified whenever this power is furthermore perceived as being wielded in a unilateral way. As such, polling data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project seem to validate the contention made by this study that anti-Americanism can, at least to a certain extent, be viewed also in terms of a rejection of American power. Yet power should not be reduced just to its hard power attributes, and though the surveys conclusively show that there is a certain global apprehension regarding American (hard) power and the way it is wielded, the same surveys show that other factors are at play regarding the rejection of America. A 2007 poll for example shows that critiques of the U.S. are not confined to neither American hard power nor its policies:

In much of the world there is a broad and deepening dislike of American values and a global backlash against the spread of American ideas and customs. Majorities or pluralities in most countries surveyed say they dislike American ideas about democracy – and this sentiment has increased in most regions since 2002 (Pew 2007:5)

Table 3.7: U.S. Economic Influence Is Negative

	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>Change</u>
	%	%	
Canada	--	78	--
Britain	72	62	-10
France	70	63	-7
Germany	72	72	0
Spain	56	47	-9
Poland	24	37	+13
Russia	31	50	+19
Turkey	70	55	-15
Egypt	49	43	-6
Jordan	45	52	+7
Lebanon	41	47	+6
Pal. ter.	--	68	--
Israel	--	63	--
China	18	27	+9
India	25	23	-2
Indonesia	37	27	-10
Japan	63	67	+4
Pakistan	30	40	+10
S. Korea	41	37	-4
Argentina	50	55	+5
Brazil	45	49	+4
Mexico	49	58	+9
Kenya	--	23	--
Nigeria	18	46	+28

% of total sample saying U.S. economic influence is negative. Asked only of those who say U.S. economy has great deal/fair amount of influence.
Source: Pew 2009:8.

Table 3.8 provides us with a rather eerie image of the critics and supporters of American ideals. Whereas several Western allies, including France, seem to be among the harshest critics, the list of potential new political bedfellows that are polled as supporting the American ideals come, with the exception of Israel, from countries with a rather dubious record in terms of democracy, human rights and transparency. Though it is encouraging that the public opinion in these countries admires American ideals, it is with the countries that are critical that the U.S. has the most important relationships, indeed a number of them are among its closest allies. The poll can well be criticized for presenting the polled with questions, which are vague. It is for example not clear whether the pollsters are referring to

American domestic ideas about democracy or the Bush administration's policy to promote democracy in the Middle East by force. Nonetheless, it is an interesting indicator of the disenchantment, not least in the West, with the American ideals that were once shared by many developed nations.

Until 2007, the Pew Global Attitudes Project presented their surveys as evidence of rising anti-Americanism. The magnitude of the criticism directed towards the United States in the period makes it difficult to disagree with that assessment. One should however be careful not to overemphasize the point: A decrease of 23 percentage points in favorability ratings of the U.S. in France over a five-year period is in no way an indication of a proportionally similar increase in French anti-American sentiments. At best, the surveys give us indications of an increasing *malaise* vis-à-vis the United States, which in all evidence also corresponds with rising anti-Americanism in large parts of the world. Furthermore, by uncovering some of the areas in which this *malaise* is most noticeable, the surveys furnish us with partial clues as to the causes of disenchantment with the United States. Other surveys may provide us with further clues. A 2004 Harris Interactive survey of Western European perceptions of the U.S. focuses more broadly on a number of issues that not only relate to foreign policy. The results are reproduced in table 3.9 below:


Table 3.8: Critics and Supporters of American Ideals

American Ideas about Democracy			
<u>Like most</u>	%	<u>Dislike most</u>	%
Ivory Coast	81	Turkey	81
Nigeria	75	France	76
Ghana	73	Pakistan	72
Kenya	72	Palest. ter.	71
Ethiopia	65	Argentina	67
Mali	63	Brazil	67
Israel	61	Spain	66
Uganda	60	Germany	65

American Ways of Doing Business			
<u>Like most</u>	%	<u>Dislike most</u>	%
Kenya	79	Turkey	83
Nigeria	78	France	75
Ivory Coast	78	Argentina	67
Ghana	74	Germany	64
Kuwait	71	Brazil	61
Israel	70	Canada	59
Lebanon	63	Pakistan	56

Source: Pew 2007

Table 3.9: Western European attitudes to various aspects of the U.S.



Source: Harris Interactive: *What Do Europeans Like and Dislike about the United States*. Released March 24, 2004.
 Note: Excludes those who said "neither positive nor negative" or "not sure."

The findings confirm that it was primarily issues associated with the foreign policies of the Bush administration, which caused resentment among the five largest Western European countries at the time. Though the figures were not representative neither for Europe *per se* nor for the rest of the world, they indicate that there might be other reasons for rejecting the United States than those based on U.S. policies or perceptions of unrivaled American power. Just as is the case with the surveys carried out by Pew Global, this poll cannot be taken as evidence of anti-Americanism as such. Just as it is no indication of pro-Americanism to be fond of American films, it is not necessarily a sign of anti-Americanism to dislike American food. Though such polls are often presented in the press as evidence of anti-Americanism, they can be used in this respect only to illustrate some of the many attitudes that individuals abroad might have towards aspects of the United States. Polls gauging the level of world opinion of U.S. policies might give us a snap shot of the level of frustration with U.S. administrations at the specific moment when the polls are carried out, and polls such as the Harris poll reproduced above may confirm stereotypes either about America or about how

America is viewed globally. But only by comparing polls over a long period of time could we acquire any basis for using these polls as evidence to the development of anti-Americanism. The ambition here is not to measure the level of anti-Americanism over time but to explore some of the root causes of anti-Americanism as a phenomenon. The above-mentioned polls may have shown a remarkable consistency in the views of the polled regarding their views on not least U.S. foreign policy. While the surveys do not offer us a complete or comprehensive picture of the grievances held towards the United States, as the interviewees have responded mostly to ‘closed-end questions’, they do offer us some clues. Chief among them is the dimension of power, where there is a widespread perception that America holds and wields excessive power over other nations and their inhabitants. It is naturally an open question whether such polls can really be taken at face value. Josef Joffe has argued that what he terms “policy anti-Americanism” (which is basically the kind of anti-Americanism that is measured in polls such as those reproduced above) is not really a gauge of real anti-Americanism:

in polite Western society it is usually *infra dig* to say, “Yes, I hate the Americans”. But one is a thousand times more likely to hear, “I hate this American president”. At this juncture, Professor Freud would begin to muse about “displacement”, about the human habit of clobbering one object or person but actually targeting another that is protected by fearsome power, be it because of taboo or real clout. Lashing out at specific American policies and leaders doesn’t risk the raised eyebrows that demonizing the country as such would do. In a post-racist age, collectives usually are protected; individuals are not. Freud might also invoke another standby of his craft: the patient who is in denial. [...] The denial mechanism offers a clue as to why opinion surveys, though they deliver much harder evidence than voyages through the unconscious, tell only part of the story. (2006a:3)

Joffe undoubtedly has a point here, yet while he is right in asserting that there is a limit to how much we can use surveys to gauge the level of anti-Americanism, they nonetheless provide us with some clues. The above-mentioned surveys have shown us that there was at the beginning of the 21st century a real sense of dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policies. And while, following Joffe’s lead, we should be wary of over-interpreting the results of such polls; a common complaint seems to be the perceived hegemonic status of the United States as well as the policies that are carried out. Yet, though the most frequent attacks are directed at the use of American hard power, popular denigration of elements of the American society such as its food and culture are precisely attacks on its soft power, since American products have to a large extent acquired global status. The surveys presented above clearly corroborate the

argument that anti-Americanism is to a very large extent a reflection of perceptions of excessive American power. Though the surveys focus primarily on the dimension of power that Nye has labeled hard power, there is good reason to believe that the soft power dimension is in the process of being rejected as well.

3.2 Anti-Americanism and the Perception of Power

The above-mentioned surveys from Pew Global Attitudes Project give us an indication that there is a case for linking negative perceptions of America with tendencies toward a rejection of American power. It transpires that in many parts of the globe what can best be described as the United States' role as an international hegemon or near-hegemon is (or was) rejected. The power dimension, clearly, can not be ignored, and it is doubtful whether anti-Americanism would be equally strong if the United States was a relatively weak power. Without the power dimension, anti-Americanism might still exist in certain countries, but it would hardly be a universal phenomenon and it certainly would have a much smaller impact. Anti-Americanism based on the rejection of America's unparalleled ability to wield power cannot be labeled 'rational'. That would be going too far. Yet it would probably not be completely erroneous to describe such anti-Americanism as at least partially 'natural', in the sense that it is a human trait to fear and envy the 'number ones' of this planet – especially when they are perceived as bullying. Indeed, Barry and Judith Rubin have portrayed it as an “explicable unpopularity” (Rubin and Rubin 2004:219). Anti-Americanism however, is not exclusively about opposition to American 'hard power'. It is just as much a reflection of the rise and fall of America's 'soft power'.

“Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure”, Joseph S. Nye noted in 1990 (Nye 1990:25). This did not prevent him from analyzing power transitions and the transformation of power at the end of the twentieth century in a study that came to be classic. His study, which can be read as a gentle rebuke at the notion of power employed by Paul Kennedy in his *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1988), has one argument that is central in this respect: that power cannot just be measured in military or economic terms. “Although force may sometimes play a role, traditional instruments of power are rarely sufficient to deal with the changing issues in world politics” (Nye 1990:187). Evaluating the leading states in the period 1500s-1900s by their major power resources (ibid:34), he demonstrates that in an era of transnational interdependence, traditional hard power has been

supplemented by what he terms ‘soft power’. In a study devoted entirely to this notion, he describes soft power as:

[..] the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. [...] When you get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive. [...] But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values (Nye 2004a:x).

Nye has given a useful graphic description of the two dimensions of power, which is reproduced below. The figure offers a good overview of both the spectrums of behaviors that can be associated with the two dimensions of power, and the resources most likely to be utilized.

	Hard	Soft
Spectrum of behaviors	<p>Coercion Inducement</p> <p><i>Command</i> ← → <i>Co-opt</i></p>	<p>Agenda setting Attraction</p>
Most likely resources	<p>Force Payments</p> <p>Sanctions Bribes</p>	<p>Institutions Values</p> <p> Culture</p> <p> Policies</p>

Hard and soft power. Source: Nye 2004a:8.

Writing on the relationship between power and anti-Americanism, Nye observes that:

Opposition to American politics is not the same as general opposition to the United States. Reactions to policies are more volatile than underlying reactions to culture and values. [...] Unpopular policies are the most volatile element of the overall image, and there seems to be more stability in the reservoir of goodwill that rests on culture and values. Nonetheless, there has also been anti-Americanism in the sense of a deeper rejection of American society, values, and culture. It has long been a minor but persistent strand in the image, and it goes back to the earliest days of the republic [...] Another source of anti-Americanism is structural. The United States is the big kid on the block and the disproportion in power engenders a mixture of admiration, envy, and resentment. [...] Size may create a love-hate relationship, but since in recent decades size is a constant, it cannot explain why anti-Americanism is higher or lower at some times than at others. (Nye 2004a:35-39).

The distinction between hard and soft power with respect to sources of anti-Americanism can to a certain extent be compared with the distinction between what America *is* and what America *does*. As many of the parameters of hard power are more or less given (military supremacy, economic advantages), a rejection of America's hegemonic or near-hegemonic status in these realms borders on a rejection of what America *is*: powerful, because it has the means to be so. Similarly, if soft power is goodwill based on positive agenda setting and attractiveness, it is tempting to regard mounting rejection of what America *does* as evidence of the fact that America's soft power is in decline. The comparison should, however, not be stretched too far. Large parts of the rejection of what America *is* have just as much to do with values and culture as with hard power. But the distinction between opposition towards what America *is* and *does* is good to bear in mind when analyzing anti-Americanism as a rejection of American hard power and the way the soft power is utilized. Analyzing anti-Americanism with respect to rejection of U.S. hard power and frustration with U.S. soft power may not be altogether faithful towards Nye's concepts. Soft power is in Nye's version primarily a term with positive connotations¹⁴. Taking his cue from Machiavelli, who almost five centuries ago advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved, Nye remarks that "in today's world, it is best to be both" (2004:1)¹⁵. In this respect, hard power can be seen as inspiring fear (or admiration, depending on the point of view), whereas soft power has the capacity to win the hearts and minds, if it is wielded wisely. Yet if what characterizes anti-Americanism over other anti-isms is the power dimension, we need to address hard and soft power more or less distinctively. Bearing in mind that it can at times be just as difficult to dissociate hard power from soft power as it is to distinguish between animosity towards what America *is* from what it *does*, it nevertheless allows us to differentiate between several causes of anti-Americanism.

As mentioned previously, the focus on power is important, as it is the dimension, which gives anti-Americanism a specificity that sets it apart from other anti-isms. Together with its twin brother, the universality dimension, it can account for some of the causes of anti-Americanism. However, another factor needs to be taken into account: the cultural or national/nationalistic factor. While anti-Americanism can be conceived as unique by its universality, i.e. the global nature of its manifestations, it is also characterized by great divergences in the different countries where it manifests itself. While present in all societies,

anti-Americanism is markedly stronger in some countries than in others. While the causes of anti-Americanism that can be related to the power dimension are to be found in virtually all societies, each society has its own brand of anti-Americanism based on its own historic relationship with the U.S., its own values, its own worldview, aspirations and perceptions. Scholars of anti-Americanism frequently highlight this dimension, which we can term national, nationalistic, or cultural. This is the dimension, which is typically associated with the notion of ‘irrationality’, as it borders on national psychology with all its connotations of envy, jealousy, or misplaced vanity. It is also the dimension that is most difficult to generalize about. If each nation can present its own specific version of anti-Americanism, a proper in-depth understanding of the phenomenon would entail a detailed analysis of the cultural dimension in all countries. That would be a massive undertaking, and in this study, the focus will be on the analysis of the phenomenon in France. Yet in spite of the particularistic traits characterizing anti-Americanism in different societies, it is not inconceivable that these are to a large extent domestic reactions to perceptions of disproportionate American power. This will be discussed in chapter 5. The more fundamental causes of anti-Americanism can, however, be summed up as rejection of American hard power and rejection of the attributes of American soft power. These two dimensions will be analyzed in greater detail below.

3.3 Rejection of America’s Hard Power

Hard power has two main attributes: military power and economic power. These are the two attributes around which Paul Kennedy elaborated his impressive chronicle of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* in 1988. The two can hardly be dissociated. Admitting that it sounded “crudely mercantilistic”, Kennedy remarked on the relationship between military and economic power that “wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth” (Kennedy 1988:xvi). The conjunction of these two attributes is also central to the understanding of much modern anti-Americanism. The power dimension associated with military and economic might is where anti-Americanism acquires almost systemic features. Some regard systemic variables as belonging exclusively to the interaction of states in an international system with properties such as its inherent anarchy, where values and belief-systems are regarded as of minor importance (see for example Waltz 1959). Many would probably reject the idea that a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism could be described in systemic terms. Yet the hard power attributes of anti-

Americanism can be considered nearly as systemic as the notion of balance of power that realists and neorealists usually conjure as the defining characteristic of the international system. Most realists would agree with Morgenthau's classic description of balance of power as not just a policy, an objective state of affairs, or an approximately equal distribution of power, but also as a mechanism associated with any distribution of power whereby the international system will tend to react in such a way that power is balanced (Morgenthau 1973:167-169). Though similar theories of balance of power precede the realist and neorealist schools of international relations by several centuries¹⁶, the notion of balancing has come to be connected with these schools to such an extent that it became a virtual paradigm during much of the Cold War, when realists reigned almost supreme within both the study and the practice of international politics. Moreover, the balance of power policies that were carried out often seemed to confer on their architects a status of cool-headed custodians of a *realpolitik* that was legitimized by the upholding of the balance between the two poles. Even if the balance of power was not recognized as the driving force of the international system by all, it was at the very least considered its real fundament by most.

Yet there have been times in history, when power was unbalanced or so unevenly distributed that one state was able to impose its will on large parts of the known world that it controlled. Present day talk of a Pax Americana harks back to the times when the world seemed subjected to a Pax Britannica or a Pax Romana (Hippler 1994). Although there have throughout history been other powers enjoying a preeminent position in the international system, albeit for a relatively shorter period (Duroselle 1982, Kennedy 1988, Nye 1990), these two empires probably offer the best comparison to America's role in the international system today. And just as perceptions of American hegemony today generate resentment, the same was the case for previous empires (Duroselle 1982:343-348). Anti-ism against the dominant state is by no means a modern phenomenon. As Raymond Aron noted, "It is quite normal for the leading nation to be blackguarded by the others" (Aron [1955] 2001:222). Eliot Cohen has similarly observed that the "logic of contemporary international politics is that of predominance and its discontents" (2004:56). Drawing on the lessons that can be learned from the British and Roman examples, he further asserts that:

The universal enmity that hegemonic power breeds presents another, and perhaps graver, challenge to imperial statesmen. Empires have no peers and precious few friends. Indeed, to the imperial mind, "friendship" means a relationship in which clients render services and patrons provide protection. The result, as Great Britain found out at least twice during its heyday [...] is

diplomatic and military isolation. An empire's opponent always looks like the underdog, the imperial power always the bully. [...] The empire's claims to act for the good of the international system will always be dismissed (often rightly) as the mere exercise of self-interest. [...] The inevitability of anti-imperial sentiment may help explain the tide of anti-Americanism that has swept much of the world since September 11, 2001. (ibid:57)

In this respect, anti-ism based on rejection of a dominant power can be considered a systemic feature of any international system. It is a logical supposition that anti-ism and the notion of balance of power are connected, since the absence of a working balance of power is – if we follow Cohen's lead – more conducive to anti-ism than the presence of one. It is furthermore important to bear in mind that the balance of power situation that characterized the bipolar system during the Cold War was historically unique. Previous balances of power in the western world have in modern times, that is since approximately the late seventeenth century, revolved around a number of great powers either trying to achieve territorial gains in order to bolster their position in the international system or attempting to limit such advances in order to maintain the stability of the system (especially when the status quo was in their interest). Though Fénélon's assessment in 1835 that "the aggrandisement of one nation beyond a certain limit changes the general system of all the other neighbours" (quoted by Sheehan 1996:2) was widely shared in most European capitals, the temptation to overcome the restrictions that a relatively stable balance of power presented were never fully squelched. Yet, while serious challenges to the established balance of power system may have provoked changes in the system and the advancement of the position of some states at the expense of others, the fundamental nature of the system was not altered until the onset of the twentieth century. Two world wars resulted in the effective dismantling of a multipolar world dominated by a number of great powers of roughly equal size. The balance of power characterizing the ensuing bipolar world was very different in both meaning and mechanisms. The image associated with the term 'balance' no longer referred to a situation in which states would more or less constantly seek to act in order to insure that the balance was not fundamentally upset. Rather, it came to represent a stalemate situation, where the two superpowers sought to maintain the balance by not upsetting it too much. In this respect, the bipolar balance of power was both stronger and more delicate than previous ones. Stronger, because the balance rarely reared out of equilibrium, as the superpowers were understandably reluctant to risk upsetting the balance. More delicate, because a challenge to the balance was

perceived as carrying the risk of mutual destruction. Though it would be tempting to see bipolar balance of power and anti-ism as progressively opposite phenomena, it would be utterly unverifiable. However it is hardly a coincidence that anti-Americanism came to be on the rise soon after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whereas anti-Americanism did certainly exist during the Cold War, not least among the American allies in the West, it was to a certain extent kept at bay by the realities of bipolarity. It has been convincingly argued that the Cold War was characterized by a balance of threat rather than a balance of power (Walt 1987), as the states that were free to choose more often than not opted for an alliance with the West, arguably the strongest pole in both military and economic terms, as the opponent bloc was deemed to be more threatening. Opting for the stronger of two poles might be conceived as bandwagoning in balance of power terms, but was most likely a balancing strategy in balance of threat terms. The fact that the American-lead alliances were regarded as less threatening by most at a time with a high level of tension has undoubtedly mitigated much of the anti-ism that might otherwise have been directed against the world's most powerful nation.

The logic behind an increase in anti-ism as a consequence of the erosion of bipolarity is thus twofold: First, the end of bipolarity has led to a reduction of the threat associated with a potential war between the superpowers and their allies. This has engendered new possibilities for states who hitherto felt forced to pledge allegiance to a superpower in order to attain its protection as well as those that professed to be non-aligned but who nevertheless maintained a certain reservation towards criticizing a superpower whose favor they might seek if threatened. These states have not necessarily turned away from the dominant superpower as such, but rather permitted themselves (and their subjects) to voice either long-held or new criticisms towards the United States. Second, and most importantly, anti-ism in the guise of anti-hegemonism has achieved a greater legitimacy, as the dominant power comes to be seen increasingly as a potential oppressor if not outright threat. The above-quoted surveys from the Pew Global Attitudes Project show not only that an overwhelming number of respondents in many parts of the world would favor a balancing of U.S. power, but also that the combination of massive U.S. power and mistrust in the Bush administration were considered a potential threat to world peace. Anti-Americanism is just the latest of a series of anti-dominating-nation-isms: it is based on a rejection of America's hard power in the sense of rejection of one nation's dominating status as unchallenged empire or even hegemon.

3.3.1 The American Empire

There is a certain irony to the fact that while Americans have generally been reluctant to regard the United States as an empire, it is often perceived abroad as just that – a vast empire capable of dictating its will in most areas of policy. In Jim Garrison's words, "the United States has become what it was founded not to be. Established as a haven for those fleeing the abuse of power, it has attained and now wields nearly absolute power. It has become an empire" (2004:11). The reluctance to view America as an empire certainly has historical roots¹⁷, yet charges of American imperialism are not confined to developments in the twentieth century. In his study of the United States' role as an imperial power in the Philippines, H.W. Brands rightly points out that though Americans have been beneficiaries of the first successful anti-imperial revolution of the modern era, much in the American experience has belied the nation's anti-imperial tendencies:

Only on rare occasions did significant numbers of Americans express compunctions about dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants of North America. In annexing Louisiana, the Floridas, Texas and California, Americans scarcely paused to consider the wishes of the French and Spanish populations involved. Americans would have snatched Canada had Britain not blocked the way, and perhaps Cuba and all of Mexico if not for the divisive influence of slavery. To some extent the slave system itself exhibited features of imperialism, with the object of conquest being not land but labor, and the conquered residing within the metropolis rather than abroad. [...] In the war with Spain the United States acquired an overseas empire, of which the most significant part was the Philippine archipelago. Americans took the Philippines for the same reason men have long taken wives (and women, when given a choice in the matter, husbands): they were attractive and available (1992:v-vi).

Though to many this description would certainly fit the notion of imperialism, to others imperialism is associated primarily with the race for empire commonly connected with nineteenth century Europe. The negative connotations of imperialism – colonialism, *mission civilisatrice*, and chauvinism, all glorified in Kipling's poem, *The White Man's Burden* – has made it an opprobrious term. With the scramble for Africa and great parts of Asia at the close of the nineteenth century, imperialism became synonymous not just with territorial expansion but also with colonial oppression (Gildea 1987:333-350). It is no wonder that Americans resent being associated with a phenomenon that is the contradiction of the values on which the United States was founded. Unable to reject that U.S. history has been one of expansion, both in terms of territory, economic power and military presence, other formulas are typically applied:

Of course, the United States never had a large, formal overseas empire as did Britain. Its overseas empire has been mostly an informal one: a neo-colonial rather than a colonial empire. This has meant that while the United States has generally not sought to bring distant territories under its legal control, it has tried to preserve and extend its economic domination over as many countries as it could (Shalom 1993:8).

It might be that the adjectives neo-colonial or neo-imperial are useful to nuance the notion of America as empire. The fact is that it has become *en vogue* to describe the United States in terms of empire. Whether depicting it as having “been long time in the making” (Johnson 2004:2) or as a relatively more recent transition from republic to empire (Garrison 2004:4-5), scholars are queuing up with works describing contemporary America as an empire, either using the word itself (Bacevich 2002, Gardner and Young 2005, Garrison 2004, de Grazia 2005, Johnson 2004, Petras and Morley 1995) or metaphors such as Colossus (Ferguson 2005, Nye 2002) or hegemon/hegemony (David and Grondin 2006, Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno 2003). And one might well ask: in today’s world, if America cannot be described as an empire, which nation can? Indeed, Garrison has argued that the two World Wars were in reality “wars for the British succession”, out of which America emerged as the victor (Garrison 2004:76), demonstrating that regardless of whether America is a new kind of empire or not, it can be written into the list of dominant powers to have shaped history.

While it seems difficult to escape the notion of empire, there remains a complete lack of consensus concerning the *nature* of the American Empire. Many historians have long tried to avoid the negative connotations associated with the term by resorting to hyphenated notions such as “quasi-American Empire”, “empire by invitation” or “consensual” empire (Maier, in Gardner and Young (eds) 2005:xii, Lundestad, in Hogan (ed.) 1999:52). Those who decry it typically see American supremacy in world affairs as the result of successful imperialistic strategies carried out by successive U.S. governments to achieve an unparalleled global position. Others analyze it as the consequence of deep structural factors imbued in the international system which have favored the advent of the United States as the world’s only true superpower. Ernest May’s oft quoted assessment that “some nations achieve greatness, the United States had greatness thrust upon it” (1961:270) ¹⁸ has often been echoed by scholars possibly keen to demonstrate that American supremacy is not the result of an imperial design or will to dominate world affairs. Watt, for example, is skeptical of the image, or label, as he terms it, of “U.S. globalism” (in Kimball (ed.) 1992:37), arguing that the

United States did not have any manifest aspirations towards becoming a global power in the first decades following the end of World War II (ibid:37-53). In his view, American foreign policy and American involvement in global affairs in that period can be explained to a large extent as reactions to external factors. Others, such as Bacevich, have rejected this interpretation, quoting Theodore Roosevelt's words "of course, our whole national history has been one of expansion" (2002:7), as evidence to the contrary. Bacevich acknowledges that few contemporary scholars specializing in American diplomatic history accept the description of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century as being carried out solely or primarily in response to aggressions or potential threats emanating from outside its borders or outside its control. However, he finds that "in practice, the myth of the 'reluctant superpower' – Americans asserting themselves only under duress and then always for the noblest purposes – reigns today as the master narrative explaining (and justifying) the nation's exercise of global power" (ibid:8). The debate about the nature of the American Empire is important to the analysis of anti-Americanism because it is a good example of the different perceptions regarding what America *is* and what America *does*. In this respect, there is, as Hardt and Negri have noted, an important distinction to be made between empire and imperialism:

Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. [...] In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a *decentered* and *deterritorializing* apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers (2000:xii).

It stands out that while Hardt and Negri's definition of imperialism is rather traditional, confining it to a specific period in history and even centering it on a specific continent of origin, their definition of empire is modernist, virtually stripping it of imperialist overtones. While such a clear-cut distinction is not necessarily altogether convincing, it helps us understand the American reluctance towards being associated with imperialism. The modernist version of empire may befit the United States much better. The fact that most scholars, irrespective of whether they are American or not, now concede that America can be considered an empire is also an indication that the modernist version of empire is widely employed¹⁹. Garrison's alternative term "imperial republic" (borrowed from Aron ([1974] 2009)) is a useful corrective to the notion:

The very essence of *empire* is one nation's control over other nations. Although America remains a republic inside its own borders, it has become an empire in

relationship with the rest of the world. In this sense, America is an *imperial republic* (Garrison 2004:4).

Yet shortly after, Garrison states that:

Whatever qualms people may have about it, America *has* become an empire, and there is no turning back. [...] The transition from republic to empire is irreversible, like the metamorphosis from caterpillar to butterfly. Once power is attained, it is not surrendered. It is only exercised. (ibid:5).

Garrison proceeds to demonstrate that “Britain taught America the ways of empire” (ibid:74) and that following Britain, “the United States has been motivated fundamentally by resources and trade, not territory” (ibid:79):

Indeed, it has been characteristic of American imperialism that it took territories only reluctantly, preferring to use its military might to open markets and ensure commercial advantage rather than administer foreign states (ibid:80).

Regardless of whether the modernist version of empire is used or whether a more traditional approach is maintained, it nonetheless seems indisputable that in terms of hard power, the United States fits the description of an empire. It has developed into the world’s foremost global power, capable of wielding power to a much higher degree than any other nation. The American Empire reigns supreme in the three dimensions of power usually associated with empires: military power, economic power and cultural dominance. Measured in military terms, the United States simply dwarfs all other nations: it is responsible for 43 percent of the global total defense expenditures, spending more than eight times as much on defense as the second biggest spender, Britain (IISS 2009:447-452)²⁰. U.S. military spending is greater than all the military expenditures of the next twenty countries combined (ibid.). Of these, at least eight can be counted as not just formal U.S. allies but as members of either military alliances led by the United States or countries whose national security strategies are based on U.S. military support (ibid.)²¹. As Garrison has noted, the primacy of American military power is one of the few undisputed truths of international affairs:

The United States dominates the world militarily with 436 bases in North America and Europe, 186 in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, 14 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 in the Middle East, and 1 in South Asia, 647 altogether. It has bases or base rights in over forty countries around the world and a navy with an array of aircraft carrier task forces that dominate every ocean. The U.S. Air Force has a presence on six of the world’s continents. [...] The United States has developed an unrivaled mastery of high-technology weaponry that has radically redefined the meaning of modern warfare and includes a massive nuclear arsenal

on hair-trigger alert, capable of destroying any enemy completely and the world several times over. It has the military capability of fighting on several fronts simultaneously and is building a national missile defense system to protect the American mainland from sneak missile attack. It almost certainly will weaponize space within the next decade, giving the United States essentially complete military control over global communications (Garrison 2004:25).

It is thus not just the level of defense expenditures that assures the United States an unrivaled primacy in military matters. America's technological primacy is no less daunting, and the presence of American forces overseas, although presented in the U.S. national security strategy as "one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends" (NSS 2002), assures it an absolute military preponderance over the rest of the world (Johnson 2004:151). Indeed, Chalmers Johnson has termed the permanent deployment of U.S. troops in great parts of the world "the Empire of Bases" (2004:151-185). In terms of military supremacy over other nations, the only historic parallel is the Roman Empire at its heyday, though it has become almost a cliché to mention it.

The U.S. economic supremacy may by comparison seem somewhat less formidable at first, but is nonetheless a key factor in understanding the nation's primacy on the global stage. Even despite the current economic crisis, the United States remains the most performing economy in terms of gross domestic product, exports and foreign direct investments. As such, the American domination of the global economy remains "extensive and deep-rooted" (Guyatt 2003:34), even if nations such as China or conglomerates such as the European Union seem to be closing in. Though a well-performing economy is central to the imperial dimension of the United States, more important than its "flourishing economic base"²² is its ability to control the world economy:

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States patiently built a world system of control, first in Latin America and the Philippines and then in Europe, Japan, Korea, and the Middle East. Its superior army, weapons systems, and intelligence networks have been an essential part of this system, but an equal if not more important role has been played by its control of the world economy. The principal weapon for this economic control has been the position of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve economy. [...] Dollar hegemony thus has always been strategic to the future of American global dominance, in many respects more important than America's overwhelming military power (Fouskas and Gökay 2005:13).

The dollar hegemony that gave the United States the control over the economy of the Western World (and large parts of the rest of the world as well) during the Cold War has if anything

increased. Garrison notes that while the U.S. military dominance is more obvious, its corporate dominance is more pervasive: “Of the one hundred largest economies in the world, fifty-one are corporations. Of these corporations, forty-seven are American” (Garrison 2004:189). It is not just by numbers that America dominates the world economy. No nation has been more successful in shaping the twentieth century international economic system than the United States. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent expansion of market economy and the principle of liberal democracy to erstwhile foes, the Western mode of capitalism spearheaded by the United States seemed to have achieved the ultimate victory. What Fukuyama has termed “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992:xiii) was in fact heralding a new global beginning in economic terms. As Thomas Friedman has remarked, globalization has become “the international system that has replaced the cold-war system” (1999:42). Bacevich has even termed the post-Cold War era “the Age of Globalization” (2002:38), noting that the implications for the U.S. as the primary custodian of the globalized economy are profound:

Though in an immediate sense about profit, globalization ultimately was about power. On the surface it promised a new economic order that would benefit all. Beneath the surface it implied a reconfiguring of the international political order as well. Globalization established the rules for the latest heat in the long-standing contest to decide which nation – and whose values – would predominate (Bacevich 2002:39).

Both Bacevich and Friedman contend that in practice, globalization means Americanization, both in economic and cultural terms (Bacevich 2002:40, Friedman 1999:43). Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz agrees: “Globalization should not mean the Americanization of either economic policy or culture, but often it does – and that has caused resentment” (Stiglitz 2006:9. See also Falk 1999). The American Empire is thus not just a formidable entity; its dominating position gives it an almost hegemonic position in the world that is unrivaled in terms of hard power.

3.3.2 Perceptions of hegemony

While the notion of empire in association with the United States has more or less ceased to cause a stir, it may be that it is not as much the perception of America as an empire that fuels modern anti-Americanism as the perception that this empire has become what Ferguson has termed a “colossus” (2005) with near-hegemonic powers. It is not unnatural for a dominating

world power or near-hegemon to be universally rejected in some way or the other. No country and no people take kindly to the idea that it is subordinated to another that can readily dictate its terms on the rest of the world. And the United States is not the only country that historically has been first among equals – or not so equals, as it has turned out. This was the case for the Roman Empire at its highest and to a lesser degree, at least in the western world, for Spain in the 16th century, for France in the 18th century and for Britain in the 19th century (Kennedy 1988, Nye 2002:13). And in all these cases, history tells us that while imperial fashions and practices have often been envied by other states to the point of being frequently copied, domination has been opposed by those fearful of losing influence on world affairs (Garrison 2004:109-126). Geoffrey Gorer has termed this “megaloxenophobia”, described by Cunliffe as the process whereby “Top dog nations, wielding power on a gigantic scale, attract to themselves a comparably sizeable jealousy and disapproval” (1991:399). Or, as Kenneth Waltz has remarked, “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it” (1991:669). In this sense, anti-Americanism can be seen as an almost natural phenomenon, sparked by a rejection of the overwhelming might that the United States exudes. Anti-Americanism could in these terms just as easily be termed anti-hegemonism and analyzed as opposition to a dominating political force which, however benign its intentions might be, imposes serious limits on the ability of other states to pursue policy actions that are viewed unfavorably in Washington DC.

It is naturally a matter of dispute, whether the United States can be termed a hegemon, however frequently the word is used in that connection. Goldstein has defined a hegemony as “being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conducted [...] Economic hegemony implies the ability to center the world economy around itself. Political hegemony means being able to dominate the world militarily” (1988:281). To a large extent, this definition of hegemony in international affairs mirrors the impact that the United States has in the world today. Nye’s assertion that “Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others” (2002-3:545) is shared by most. Yet he has attempted to soften up Goldstein’s definition, arguing that if “hegemony is defined more modestly as a situation where one country has significantly more power resources or capabilities than others, then it simply signifies American preponderance, not necessarily dominance or control” (2002-3:558). Nye can rightly point to a number of occasions over the last decade, where the U.S. has been unable to dictate or

control events to its liking. Yet there is an oft-expressed perception in several countries that the United States has both the capability and the will to dominate if not dictate world affairs. Regardless of whether the U.S. can be characterized as a hegemon or not by academic standards, it is regarded as precisely that by large parts of global opinion.

Though American economic supremacy can be described as relatively stronger in 1945, when it controlled half the world's economic production (Nye 2002-3:558) than it is today, the perception of hegemony is not linked exclusively to the distribution of power or the attributes of power. It is linked as much to two other factors: the absence of present or potential counter-powers and the manner in which power is wielded. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Empire, American supremacy in world affairs was beyond question. While the Gulf War in 1990 gave rise to aspirations for a new multilateral era, indeed, as then president George H.W. Bush termed it, a new world order²³, the international system itself seemed less multipolar than ever. Charles Krauthammer was among the first to introduce the concept of unipolarity in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, arguing that "the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western Allies" (1990-91:23). Though the international mood in the early 1990's might have been for multilateralism, Krauthammer repudiated the notion:

What we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshipping at the shrine of collective security, recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen (ibid:25).

Krauthammer is undeniably right in assessing that the realities of the early 1990's were that U.S. supremacy was becoming firmly embedded in the international system. But did this unipolar moment, if Krauthammer's term is to be used, last beyond the first few years? It would seem not. Already by the mid-1990's, the "Pax Americana" seemed to be fading. The post-Cold War still resembled "a unipolar one with the United States as its sole superpower, yet the United States no longer commanded the broad unconditional support characteristic of a unipolar system" (Rahman 2002:41). Samuel P. Huntington argued that the international system could neither be characterized as unipolar, nor as multipolar:

A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so. [...] A *multipolar* system has several

powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. (1999:35-36)

Huntington instead proposed to view the contemporary international system as a hybrid, “a *uni-multipolar* system with one superpower and many major powers” (ibid:36). A few years later, Hulsman, Polansky and Prager used the same term, arguing (2003) that “in the nature of the world they found themselves in, post-Waterloo Great Britain eerily mirrors the conditions facing the United States at the dawn of the twenty-first century”. Their argumentation is based on a simple analysis:

The Britain of Castlereagh and the United States of Rumsfeld share a staggering number of similarities: a historical experience of defeating a revolutionary power over many years; military might centered around speed of reaction time; a common geopolitical position of being an “island” off the Eurasian landmass; inhabiting a “uni-multipolar” world in which they are the preeminent powers; possessing the world’s most dynamic economies; and serving as the repository of most of the world’s soft power. (ibid.)

The comparison of the United States of today and early nineteenth-century Britain is at first glance compelling. And it is a fact that in strictly territorial terms, the British Empire in the heyday of its power was even more impressive than the United States of today, as it covered approximately 23 percent of the world’s land surface (Ferguson 2005:15). But hegemonic power does not reside as much in the amount of square miles controlled, but in the capacity to wield power whenever it is deemed necessary. In this respect Hulsman, Polansky and Prager seem to underestimate the scale of the supremacy characterizing the United States at the start of the twenty-first century. As opposed to Great Britain, the United States is undeniably the most powerful nation that has ever existed in the world. At best, Great Britain had an advantageous geopolitical position as an insular nation and a hitherto unparalleled mastery of the seas, but nowhere near the same level of political, military, economic, or cultural supremacy over its rivals that the United States possesses some two hundred years later (O’Brien, in O’Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:44-56). In military terms alone, Britain was seriously rivaled by other major powers²⁴. Furthermore, the victor at Waterloo soon became sidelined in the Concert of Europe and thereby lost any real capability of dominating events on the European continent (Kissinger 1994:88-92). In short, while Britain in the nineteenth century may have been what Sellar and Yeatman in their best-selling pastiche on a Victorian British history schoolbook called “top nation” (Sellar and Yeatman 1930:v), it never came

near having hegemonic status. Even at the pinnacle of its power, Britain never enjoyed a “unipolar moment”. The United States is, in this respect, in a league of its own. Zbigniew Brzezinski has claimed that the United States is and will remain “the first, only and last truly global superpower” (1997:215). And there can be no doubt that the international system at the turn of the millenium is decidedly more unipolar than it was in the years following 1815. Furthermore, there are no indications that the current U.S. supremacy might for the foreseeable future be seriously challenged. The assessment made by Brzezinski some ten years ago is still valid:

For some time to come – for more than a generation – America’s status as the world’s premier power is unlikely to be contested by any single challenger. No nation-state is likely to match America in the four key dimensions of power (military, economic, technological and cultural) that cumulatively produce decisive global political clout. (1997:195).

Since the implosion of the Soviet Empire, the international system has seen what can arguably be described as a tendency towards unipolarity emerge for the first time in modern history. Yet it is clear that this relative unipolarity is mitigated by the failures of the dominant power to achieve its objectives. Since Huntington coined the term uni-multipolar in 1999, the difficulties of the U.S. led coalition in Iraq have highlighted the limits of unilateral or near-unilateral action, even when undertaken by the world’s sole remaining superpower. Hulsman, Polansky and Prager on their part wrote their essay in the coalition building phase that marked the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, when U.S. foreign policy did indeed seem to have some resemblance with nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy. At the same time, Krauthammer revisited the notion of unipolarity, arguing that if anything, the dominance of the United States since 1990 has “dramatically increased” (2002-03:6). He argues that “those denying unipolarity can do so only by applying a ridiculous standard: that America be able to achieve all its goals everywhere all by itself. This is a standard not for unipolarity but for divinity” (ibid:6). Quoting Brooks and Wohlforth (2002), Krauthammer asserts that

Among mortals, and in the context of the last half millennium of history, the current structure of the international system is clear: “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will” (2002-03:6).

Krauthammer’s observation might be correct, but the logic is decidedly less so: the fact that it would be impossible to imagine a more unipolar situation than the present does not in itself validate the claim of unipolarity. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the failure to bring peace to

the region has highlighted two factors, which make it more than questionable, whether the international system can be described as unipolar or even uni-multipolar. First, the unipolar feature of the international system tends to be exaggerated. It is true that there is a marked absence of any likely coalition capable of balancing the U.S. as a dominant power for the foreseeable future, at least in military terms. However, the political price of unilateral or near-unilateral action in Iraq has clearly been to weaken the dominant power's political and diplomatic supremacy to the point where it risks being seriously rivaled by other powers. Second, if the premise for a multipolar international system is that its major powers are, as Huntington terms it, "of comparable strength", it becomes difficult to identify which powers today can be termed major powers²⁵. Is France, the world's fifth largest economy²⁶ and third largest military force²⁷, one of these major powers? Or should it be considered merely in this respect as part of the European Union? And if so, will the European Union ever acquire the capability of decisive foreign-policy action? Which power is the nearest potential rival to the supremacy of the United States, China or a semi-united Europe? Is India, predicted to overtake China's role as the world's most populous nation within decades, one of the major powers already, and could it possibly in time become a rival to American – or Chinese – supremacy? Given that there are as yet no clear answers to these questions, it seems obvious that it would be absurd to view these major powers as of 'comparable strength'. Besides, as Martin Griffiths notes, "neither China nor India represents a body of political ideas and social values which acts as a source of attraction towards other countries" (in O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:266). This study largely agrees with the assessment made by Michael Hirsh:

While some authors see the rise of a rival great power in the European Union and others project that China will play this role, the evidence is to the contrary: there is virtually no evidence these societies are gearing up to challenge American primacy. (2003:12)

Even if the economic supremacy of the United States is slowly being eroded, not least as a result of the financial crisis starting in 2008, America is still "likely to remain the preeminent global power for decades to come" (O'Connor and Griffiths, in O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:xx, see also Gelb 2009:73-90). Lately, Richard Haass has argued that the international system can neither be described as unipolar nor multipolar. Instead, he offers the image of a nonpolar world, "characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power" (2008). Arguing that "Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity", he finds that

today's nonpolar world is "an inevitable consequence of globalization" (ibid.). But since globalization is, as was shown above, frequently described as – and no less frequently perceived as – tantamount to Americanization, it seems odd to depict the contemporary international system as nonpolar, given that one pole clearly has been able to shape that system more than any other, while simultaneously drawing huge advantages from its role as primary shaper of the system. Haass admits that "the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system" (ibid.), and that alone should make us wary of notions such as nonpolarity. If one nation is uniquely more able than any other to influence the international system, it seems unlikely that the system could be characterized as "nonpolar". As Griffiths notes, "any viable international order is bound to reflect the prevailing power structure" (in O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:264). In this respect labels matter, and clearly neither unipolarity, multipolarity, uni-multipolarity, nor nonpolarity seem to properly fit the bill. Dominique Moïsi's notion of "asymmetric multipolarity" is interesting, but as he uses the term in order to describe how the key actors in the international system are unequal not just "in terms of power and influence but also differ dramatically in their views of the world" (Moïsi 2009:10), the concept reflects much more than the current distribution of power. It is clear that the international system today appears less than unipolar, yet more than nonpolar. The preponderant power and influence of the United States means that it can clearly not be termed multipolar, and Huntington's hybrid of unipolarity and multipolarity, while being the best description offered to this day, also seems problematic, given that it resembles neither of the two. A more adequate term might be *primopolarity*. Primopolarity would indicate that while the international system is characterized by the relative fragmentation common to a multipolar system, though without its leading powers being any longer properly comparable, there still exists one remaining superpower more capable of acting as *primus inter pares* than any other. This notion corresponds with what Chinese geopoliticians call "many powers and one superpower" (Zakaria 2008:43) and seems well placed to capture the current configuration of the international system, which is, as Leslie Gelb has argued, "decidedly pyramidal — with the United States alone at the top, a second tier of major countries (China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Brazil), and several tiers descending below" (Gelb 2009:xv). As will be discussed below, there are other reasons why especially the American public might feel that primopolarity would be an appropriate description of the role

of the United States in the world. Primopolarity would indicate that one nation is better able at shaping and influencing the international system than any of the others. It would also indicate that though this state of affairs might be temporary, it is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Primopolarity implies preponderant influence, but, as opposed to unipolarity, not hegemony as such.

There is no doubt that in the absence of a truly unipolar international system, it becomes difficult to describe the dominant power as a hegemon in the proper sense of the word. Samuel P. Huntington for one rejects the term *benign hegemon* to qualify the United States at the turn of the 21st century. While he has no doubts that the United States would “clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a system existed” (1999:37), he finds that the term *hegemon*, benign or otherwise, does not correspond to realities. Though he undoubtedly has a point, what matters in this respect is perhaps more whether the United States is perceived, by its own officials as well as by those in other nations, as a hegemon, whether, as Thomas McCormick terms it, as an “imperial hegemony” (in Gardner and Young (eds) 2005:94), or as a “reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized – or in a word, liberal” hegemony (Ikenberry 1998-1999:77). And there is no doubt that the perception of America acting as a hegemon certainly exists. The figures presented in table 3.6 show a relatively high level of opposition to an American empire able and apparently willing to ‘go it alone’ on the international scene. America’s imperial or near-hegemonic dimension is crucial for the understanding of modern anti-Americanism. Not just because such overwhelming power generates frustration among those who feel threatened or intimidated by it, but also because this unprecedented dominance in hard power terms is not necessarily perceived as securing effective global leadership. Garrison has rightly noted that:

The great irony confronting the United States is that while it has more military power than any empire in history, it also is more constrained in the use of that power than any empire has ever been. This is not only because of the growing body of international laws and procedures within which it must act, but because the very nature of violence and politics has changed. [...] The United States is exercising its military power in a world system in which there are now *two* superpowers: the United States and world public opinion (2004:186-188).

Though the causes of anti-Americanism that can be associated with America’s position as a near-hegemon might be termed systemic, it is clear that opposition to the proverbial 800 pound gorilla in itself is not enough to explain neither the historic dimensions of anti-Americanism nor its vehemence. The nature of power – and the perception of power – owes

as much to the way in which power is presented and wielded. That America is a formidable superpower is beyond questioning. That America can be perceived as an empire with near-hegemonic features is highly arguable. Both factors can account for some of the animosity leveled against the Mr. Big of the international system, to use Katzenstein and Keohane's expression. Yet these factors alone can only explain the part of antipathy that any leading world power can expect. In this sense, Katzenstein and Keohane are correct in stating that insofar as anti-Americanism is depicted as rejection of overwhelming (hard) power is concerned, only the label is new. Yet what is at stake is probably more related to the perceptions associated with this overwhelming power than to the power itself. As Ian Clark reminds us,

style and content matter, just as much as do any crude power differentials. Power does not directly translate into anything else, except in so far as it is mediated through policy and actions. [...] As we have been aptly reminded, 'there are ways and ways of hegemon exercising power', and the root cause of today's malaise is not simply the power disequilibrium, but rather the fact that 'many people outside the United States simply do not trust America to use its enormous power wisely or well' (2005:230).

The question of legitimacy clearly is crucial. As Hurrell has noted, "even the most powerful need to legitimize their power" (2002:188-189), and part of the rejection of American power probably resides, at least among America's allies, in the fact that it is not perceived as being wielded in a wise or even legitimate way. This sensation is aggravated by the impression that the United States is perceived as being the world's foremost "norm entrepreneur" (Clark 2005:232), a position it has held since the end of the Second World War, but which became further consolidated after the end of the Cold War. In this respect, Anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power must be interpreted as much, if not more, in terms of a rejection of the attributes of American soft power, as in association with the dimension of hard power outlined above.

3.4 Rejection of the Attributes of America's Soft Power

Joseph S. Nye has observed that "Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power – its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them – is in decline as a result" (Nye 2004b:16). Stanley Hoffmann has equally asserted that "the Bush Administration has reduced America's soft power

drastically” (2004:18). Only the hardest skeptics of soft power would disagree with this. Yet could it not equally be said that the increase in anti-Americanism is also a reaction to how especially the Bush administration has used its soft power tools? A little flexibility as to the use of the term soft power is needed here. Soft power is used by Nye as well as by those taking their cue from his works primarily in positive terms. Yet the instruments of soft power (institutions, values, culture and policies) may be used unwisely with the effect that they repel more than they attract. Indeed, it seems to be Nye’s assessment that this has been partially the case following the September 11 attacks, although his main criticism is that the Bush administration has relied too much on wielding hard power, neglecting the benefits that soft power might entail (2004b16-20). Whereas distributions of hard power are frequently analyzed critically, i.e. as potential causes of conflict, soft power is often used more or less normatively, i.e. as a prescriptive for an alternative to the use of hard power. Yet if one accepts Nye’s definition of soft power, it clearly represents different attributes compared with those of hard power. Indeed, in a modern post-Cold War period, these attributes seem as important, if not more, than the attributes of hard power. It might even be, as Josef Joffe states, that:

America’s “soft power” [...] looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire – but with a novel twist. Rome’s and Soviet Russia’s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America’s soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets (2001:43).

In short, it would be a fallacy to regard soft power as exclusively imbued with positive characteristics. Soft power is still power, however frequently the term is associated with positive connotations. If hard power can repel, so can soft power, at least if it is seen as overwhelming or insensitive to the wishes or values of other nations.

Nye identifies four major sources, or resources, as he terms them, of soft power: values, policies, institutions, and culture. Paul Kennedy remarked that it can be difficult to dissociate the typical attributes of hard power, military might and economic power. When it comes to soft power, it becomes even more difficult. As these sources of power feed on each other, it would be a rather artificial exercise to attempt to disentangle these power resources into separate subcategories of soft power. It is especially clear that values must underpin the other elements; neither policies, nor institutions, nor culture can be regarded as separate or

separable from the values on which they build. In relation to anti-Americanism as a rejection of America's soft power, it therefore seems more useful to focus on the broader notions of political values and cultural norms. The political values can be considered as the values that form a nation's political and institutional fabric as well as provide the basis for its political actions. The cultural norms, although impossible to dissociate completely from the political values (and vice versa) are typically to a larger extent the result of forces in civil society that have shaped the imaginary of its inhabitants – and in the case of America also increasingly of those in other countries. America's political values and cultural norms have simply had a tremendous impact on the rest of the world, frequently leading to charges of Americanization of the political and cultural institutions of other nations.

3.4.1 Political values and exceptionalism

There is a fundamental dichotomy between how Americans typically view their own nation and how others increasingly view it. Inherent in the American national identity is the sentiment that America is a special nation, endowed with high values and morals, which put it on a special level. The Puritans' vision of the shining 'city upon a hill' has led to notions of American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. The idealistic trait has been present throughout most of American political history and it has shaped its policies and not least its foreign policies. American political institutions have set a powerful example, especially to citizens in other Western societies, and as such America's power of attraction has been important. Yet by in several instances failing to live up to the high moral levels on which the American nation was built, successive American administrations have eroded some of the goodwill it enjoyed in especially liberal circles around the world (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007). Furthermore, while the notion of American exceptionalism can account for some of the main recurrent themes in American foreign policy, there is a rejection of the thought that some nations can bestow exceptional rights on themselves. America might present itself as a universal nation, but tendencies toward unilateralism have met with disapproval and rejection, especially following the end of the Cold War. As such, America's soft power attributes of institution-building and diplomacy have been tarnished by perceptions of hegemonic intentions. Such perceptions increased during the presidency of George W. Bush, leading to rising anti-Americanism worldwide.

The great nation of futurity

Though the United States can trace back its history over just a few centuries, which compared with at least most European states is an extremely short period, it nonetheless commands a powerful imaginary for its citizens. America's Founding Fathers created the first representative democracy known to man. This was a novelty in terms of political organization and representation. The political values on which the new republic was founded were not of purely American origins. They were inherited in large parts from the European philosophers of the Enlightenment, not least inspired by the writings of John Locke (Himmelfarb 2008:191-203), modeled on the Roman Republic (Skillen 2005:67), and indebted to British parliamentarism and the Athenian democratic heritage (Garrison 2004:73), as well as the Dutch and Swiss experiences with federal government (Skillen 2005:67). They also built to a large degree on the unique American colonial experiences such as the 1629 Charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company (Benedict 1996:8-10) and the writings of the post-revolutionary essayists, most notably those in the Federalist Papers (later assembled in *The Federalist*, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 2006). The result, however, was a nation built on unique political premises providing freedom and democracy to its (white, male) inhabitants to a degree hitherto unseen. It would take several decades before the promise of democracy and government "of the people, by the people, for the people" to use the notion later immortalized by Abraham Lincoln (quoted by Basler (ed.) 1953-1955:22), spread to other nations. Great Britain, in some ways the most democratic European nation at the time²⁸, allowed barely 2 percent of its population to vote prior to the Reform Act of 1832, and only in the late 1940s did most Western European countries become full-fledged democracies (Zakaria 1997:137).

The nation's political identity, however, came not just from its constitutional democratic republicanism; more important was the fact that the new republic from the onset saw itself as an exceptional polity, unlike any other in the world (Skillen 2005:72). This perception was first and foremost due to the millenarian legacy of the Puritans. John B. Judis, although highly critical of America's contemporary political system, has no qualms in stating that "Since the seventeenth century, the attempt to create a "new Israel" and a "city on the hill" in America has inspired the finest moments of our politics" (2000:257). As James Skillen has remarked, this Puritan vision, although naturally inspired by biblical stories, was also indebted to both medieval European Christianity and the later English Protestant extension of Christendom (2005:72-73). Yet though the idea of a "new Israel" or "new

Jerusalem” was not original with the American Puritans, it was in New England that the Puritans found their promise fulfilled. This settlement of a community of faith was “intended not as a retreat from ordinary society but as a light for the nations” (Skillen 2005:73). Anatol Lieven asserts that:

This sense of America not just as an unfulfilled dream or vision, but also as a country with a national mission, is absolutely central to the American national identity and also forms the core of the nation’s faith in its own “exceptionalism”. It was inscribed on the Republic’s Great Seal at America’s birth as a united nation: *Novus Ordo Seclorum*: A New Order for the Ages (2005:33)

In political terms, the United States indeed represented a new order for the Ages. It would not be an exaggeration to state that from the onset, American political institutions heralded a political modernity, not just in the sense of a novel polity, but as the precursor for a development that was soon to spread to a large number of European states. As Robert Palmer has argued, many Europeans saw in the American Revolution a lesson and an encouragement for mankind. “It proved that the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment might be put into practice” (1959:239). Indeed, the French philosopher Condorcet declared in his 1786 essay on *The Influence of the American Revolution on Europe* that “it is not enough that the rights of man be written in the books of philosophers and inscribed in the hearts of virtuous men; the weak and ignorant must be able to read them in the example of a great nation. America has given us this example” (quoted in Muravchik 1992:83. See also Churchill 1957:221). In this respect, the United States had a tremendous attribute of soft power long before it acquired any dimension of hard power comparable to that of the great European powers of the day, namely the power of attraction. Though this power of attraction was by no means universally accepted, as will be shown in chapter 5, it was soon confirmed both by the waves of immigrants fleeing the Old World in search of the American Dream and by the increasing calls for democratization of the European societies. And though the United States remained underdeveloped in terms of hard power during the first many years of its existence, informed observers clearly saw its potential for hard power early on. America’s superpower status had been predicted long before it acquired any semblance of hard power attributes. Already during the negotiations for the Paris Peace Treaty which established the United States as an independent nation in 1783 John Adams had asserted that America was destined to “form the greatest empire in the world” (quoted by McCullough 2001:395). The best known prediction is probably the one made by Tocqueville, who in 1835 concluded his first volume of

Democracy in America with the prophecy that some day, America and Russia were destined each to “hold in their hands the fate of half the world” ([1835] 2003:485).

From the onset, America was born as a universal nation with a messianic quest to spread its values. This notion of being a universal nation, “summing up the best in mankind and also embracing the whole of mankind with their universally applicable values”, has, as Lieven rightly points out (2005:34), been present in all great powers in history. Yet, whereas this sense of purpose has to a large extent abated in other nations, in the United States it has shown a remarkable continuity and resilience over the last two centuries. In this respect, the messianic streak indeed makes “Americans exceptional in the developed world”, (ibid:33). The notion of an American exceptionalism originates from Toqueville’s description of the collective character of American society and its polity (Shafer 1999:447). Far from being the reserve of politicians or philosophers, this notion of exceptionality and the idea that Americans are God’s chosen people can be found as well in the popular imagination and in American literature, as here in Herman Melville’s *White-Jacket*:

We Americans are the peculiar chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear. We are pioneers of the world; the advance guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a path into the New World that is ours. (1967:150)

The journalist John O’Sullivan coupled the sense of exceptionality with the modernity that it promised in his famous description of the United States as the Great Nation of Futurity:

[..] so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity. [...] America is destined for better deeds. [...] We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can. [...] The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles [...] We must onward to the fulfilment of our mission [...] For this blessed mission to the nations of the world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America been chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings, hierarchs, and oligarchs [...] Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to be *the great nation of futurity*? (1839:426-430)

O’Sullivan’s words highlight that the year 1776 saw more than the foundations of a new nation and a new polity. It marked the beginning aspirations to found a new civilization,

inspired by ideas of the Enlightenment, indeed incorporating the Enlightenment theme into its creed (“the life-giving light of truth”). The progressive promise of the American polity was however from the onset mitigated by its exclusion of large parts of the American population, most notably the Indians and the slaves. As Himmelfarb has noted, already the Founding Fathers “were well aware that the Constitution failed to carry out the bold affirmation of the Declaration [of Independence] that ‘all men are created equal’ and endowed with the ‘unalienable rights’ of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’” (Himmelfarb 2008:222). The racism leveled against the non-white population and the at times willful persecution of Indians is indeed a moral stain on the lofty aspirations that guided the founding of the United States. Yet it should be remembered that the notions of racial and civilizational superiority displayed in eighteenth and nineteenth century America could be found readily on the other side of the Atlantic as well. The difference naturally lies in the fact that the discourse surrounding the establishment of the United States became vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. Political philosopher Herbert Storing’s assessment that the creation of a union represented the “greatest instrument of liberty ever made” (quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:225), clearly only held true for part of the population. The charges of racism and discrimination in the American society have been a constant feature of especially much European anti-Americanism for two centuries. Neither the outcome of the American civil war, granting the last slaves their freedom, nor the formal end to segregation in the 1960s have succeeded in completely removing the impression that the United States is a society founded initially as much on notions of racial superiority as on enlightened ideas of freedom and democracy. Especially to large parts of the European public, and most notably on the political left, the promise of a new American civilization has simply been too tarnished by the blood of Indians and the sweat of slaves to be accepted with the same enthusiasm as the one typically presented in American discourses. The soft power of attraction to American political values was and is still present in large parts of the world’s population, but it has been seriously mitigated by the policies of exclusion that have figured prominently in American history²⁹. It is reflected by exactly the kind of anti-Americanism that Katzenstein and Keohane have labeled liberal anti-Americanism, which “feeds on perceptions of hypocrisy” (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:30).

The policies of exclusion are, however, only one side of the coin. While they were decried by the ‘progressive’ political environment in especially Europe, America’s

policies of immigration have conversely attracted not just millions of emigrants, but also widespread admiration by the very progressives who lament the racist tendencies of the United States. “*Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore*”, as the inscription on the Statue of Liberty reads³⁰, is a powerful testimony to the promise offered by one nation to the rest of the world. It is in this promise that American soft power has probably been historically most manifest. The power of attraction of the United States has literally attracted people from all parts of the globe to the nation seemingly offering the best promise of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States remained in the eyes of many Europeans the distant utopia where man was free to pursue his dreams and shape his own destiny. In Frederick Jackson Turner’s memorable words, “Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for opportunity” (Turner [1894] 1966:227). A cliché in many ways, but a cliché that nevertheless highlights the appalling social conditions under which millions of Europeans lived at the time. Anti-Americanism was then almost purely the project of the elites. While it was, as will be seen, fashionable in certain milieus to denigrate ‘America’, the country attracted millions of Europeans eager to pursue *the American dream*. Probably very few of them had read Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*. Though eager to live as free men, they were attracted as much by the prospect of prosperity. In the European countries they emigrated from, they were nominally free men. But freedom in poverty offers few rewards, and probably more than any other nation, America gave people with few resources the hope of a better future. Also in this respect one might, as Freedom House does, “consider the United States to be the world’s first truly globalized nation, given the origins of its people” (Puddington and Melia 2008). The U.S. policy of open borders could not, however, in the long run live up to the famous words inscribed on the Statue of Liberty. Like other developed societies, American administrations fearing that the levels of immigration were leading to a saturation point decided that rather than admitting the tired and poor, priority should be given to the more resourceful immigrants who could bolster the national economy. America and the pursuit of the American Dream nonetheless remains a potent symbol for the many thousands of people who still each year decide to break up from home in order to try their luck in what has euphemistically been referred to as ‘the land of milk and honey’³¹.

America's historic power of attraction cannot be denied. Yet the nation that sees itself as a model to others, and the nation that indeed throughout much of the past two centuries has been a source of inspiration to many, is increasingly perceived to have lost much of its former luster. What was once the only true democracy in the world, even if based on the exclusion of large parts of its population, is today seen by many as a political anachronism. The political system of the United States has changed little since its establishment compared with those of virtually all other Western nations; a fact that would probably have surprised the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention greatly (Berkin 2002:209-210). Aron argues that the fact that the American constitution has been preserved intact for two centuries has given it "an almost mystical prestige" (Aron [1957] 2001:41). However, the bipartisan model characterizing the American political system excludes a more proportional representation in which political minorities can voice their opinions within the legislative system, unless they submit to the tutelage of one of the two big parties. In some ways, the system of checks and balances invented by the Founding Fathers is frequently perceived to have hindered the modernization of a political system that at times, such as for example during the Monica Lewinsky affair³², seems locked in a bitter bipartisan strife that to many observers, both domestic and foreign, negates the spirit of democracy by attempting to undermine a democratically elected president (see for example Fabbrini in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:9-10). Other common points of criticism are the importance of money in political campaigns, and the disproportionate political impact of the American Supreme Court. Zakaria for example remarks that:

What is distinctive about the American system is not how democratic it is but rather how undemocratic it is, placing as it does multiple constraints on electoral majorities. Of its three branches of government, one – arguably paramount – is headed by nine unelected men and women with life tenure. Its Senate is the most unrepresentative upper house in the world, with the lone exception of the House of Lords, which is powerless. (1997:149)³³

Especially the Supreme Court is regarded by many abroad as evidence that the American institutions are seriously flawed. The essence of democracy is that policy is determined by the peoples' elected representatives. Yet the American Supreme Court is in many respects what Churchill called "the most formidable part of the Federal machinery" (Churchill 1957:212). It can determine not just important policy matters such as whether abortion should be legal (the famous *Roe versus Wade* case), but also the outcome of a presidential election, as was the

case in 2000, when the Court declared against a recount of the ballots in Florida. Though these incidents contribute to an image that the most mature of all democracies displays signs of political immaturity, such observations are mainly the reserve of political aficionados. They demonstrate that developments in American politics are a source of fascination to many and worry to some, but they hardly constitute an important source of anti-Americanism, although they might diminish the soft power that is associated with the attractiveness of America's political institutions.

Much more serious is the growing impression that successive American administrations, and especially the Bush administration, have infringed upon the civil liberties that were once the promise of a nation. The frequent use of the death penalty in America, even for juvenile offenders or offenders with mental retardation (see for example the reports Human Rights Watch 1995, 2001 and 2003), has been a source of liberal anti-Americanism for decades (Death Penalty Information Center 2008). With the exception of Japan, all other Western nations have abolished capital punishment, considering it inhuman and barbaric (Amnesty International 2008a and 2008b). Together with successive governments' 'liberal' attitude toward the purchase of firearms and the perceived trigger happiness of law enforcement officers, the death penalty was long a major source of anti-Americanism in Western Europe and especially on the political left (Singh, in O'Connor (ed.) 2007a). The notion that a society has the right to execute its inhabitants has become anathema to large parts of the western world. The fact that the only western nation to uphold the capital punishment bar Japan presents itself as a champion of human rights is a source of deep puzzlement and resentment among especially the populations in nations of Western Europe. These issues have refueled the liberal anti-Americanism that previously built on rejections of for example the policies of exclusion mentioned above. If anything, the liberal rejection of American political practices has increased recently. The incarceration at Guantánamo Bay without prior trial of what has euphemistically been termed 'illegal combatants' and the evidences of serious physical and psychological abuse of prisoners of war at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq have seriously undermined America's political soft power in liberal communities around the globe (Puddington and Melia 2008) by reinforcing "the belief that the United States does not abide by its own ideals" (Walt 2005). The nation that invented the term "rogue state" is increasingly referred to by that very designation abroad (Garrison 2004). And though, as Walt notes, "Americans may dismiss these accusations as false, misleading, or

exaggerated [...] the issue is not what American's think of their nation's conduct; the issue is how that conduct appears to others" (2005). What is beyond doubt is that this has fuelled a liberal anti-Americanism that is not just to be found on the fringes of the left wing of European public opinion; it has raised widespread critiques even from traditionally pro-American quarters who had otherwise granted the United States a long leach following the September 11th attacks. There was in Europe, at least during the Bush era, a widespread feeling that such practices were "rapidly draining the reservoir of international goodwill" (itself almost a synonym for soft power) "that makes the United States' status as a superpower acceptable to the world" (ibid.). The fact that this was a sentiment shared by many Americans did not mitigate the uneasiness abroad significantly. These perceptions have, no doubt, had an impact on the negative polling of attitudes toward the United States that were presented in the start of this chapter. The political achievements of which the Americans are rightly proud have been eroded in the opinion of many foreign observers by impulses that appear to contradict the fine ambitions on which the Great Nation of Futurity was built.

The nature of the beast: Leader or bully of the Free World?

Though the application of political values on domestic matters might cause the disapprobation of foreign observers who regard some of the more dubious practices as infringements upon the moral dignity of man, the application of these political values on American foreign policy is probably a greater source of anti-Americanism. The idea that America is somehow special and the missionary zeal to preach American values to the rest of the world can be found on all sides of American politics and has been a constant source of influence for American foreign policy. This pervading view of the United States as what former State Secretary Madeleine Albright termed an 'indispensable nation' is a central element of American national identity. It also explains why so many Americans are truly surprised when confronted with anti-American sentiments. Exceptionalism and the feeling of representing a model to the rest of the world lies so deep in the national conscience that it has become one of the defining premises for regarding the rest of the world – as nations and populations eager to adopt the same values and embrace the same virtues as the great nation of futurity:

America's purposes were never understood by its people and its leaders to be those of any ordinary state. To the contrary, Americans have believed from the beginning that their nation has a divine mission to fulfill, to bring light to the world, a light that was subsequently defined as the light of freedom, democracy, and prosperity rather than the light of biblical righteousness. But America was

and remains, in its citizens' minds, a nation that is both righteous and right to be marching at the vanguard of history, leading all nations to their true destiny, to the true end or goal of earthly history. (Skillen 2005:78)

The messianic political values inherent in the American creed have been present in American foreign policy since the creation of the United States (Ellis 2000:3). As Skillen notes, there "can be little doubt that American exceptionalism included the conviction that the American state structure and the historical process of achieving it were the model for all peoples of the world" (Skillen 2005:84). To the term American exceptionalism can be joined the notion of America's *manifest destiny*, originating from John O'Sullivan, who used it to advocate the territorial expansion of the United States over great parts of the North American continent, and specifically the annexation of Texas in 1845 (Pedersen 2006:36-37). As Tuveson has noted, the notion of manifest destiny incorporates "a vast complex of ideas, policies, and actions" (1968:91). There is no doubt, however, that to some, it came to entail the missionary view that America should endeavor to export its political values to the rest of the world. The great American historian Frederick Jackson Turner concurred with O'Sullivan in believing that the frontier had shaped the American people's worldview of a manifest destiny and further concluded that in this could be found the meaning of America in world history, impelling the United States to move beyond its continental borders ([1894] 1966:199-227. See also White 1996:2-8).

American foreign policy is often portrayed in terms of different historical phases, each corresponding to shifts in perception following upheavals in the international system. Yet in essence, there are good reasons to assert that a number of value-based constants have given American foreign policy a remarkable continuity in terms of goals and aspirations. Regardless of whether the foreign policy has been isolationist, internationalist or interventionist³⁴, the belief that America was somehow different from other nations, and indeed a model society for others to follow, has been a constant. While isolationists might have favored the expansion of American values solely on the North American continent, their vision of America having a manifest destiny was by no means less fervent:

If we take seriously the American civil religion as a national identity and a mission that established the terms of America's role in the world, we can see that the tendency toward isolationism, on the one hand, and toward internationalism, on the other hand, are two sides of the same coin. In order for America to retain its identity as light to the world, it must, above all, survive and protect its position on the hill: thus, isolationism. But insofar as the American witness and

influence manage to extend farther and farther into the world, then America must follow up to protect the fruits of the success of its messianic calling: thus, internationalism. (Skillen 2005:82-83)

If Skillen's assessment is correct, it would entail that retreat from isolationism would primarily be a question of timing. As America reluctantly got dragged into the First World War, it seemed that the moment had come for America to export its values. When President Woodrow Wilson announced to the House and Senate on April 2, 1917 his decision to enter the war, he called on America "to make the world safe for democracy" (quoted by Gamble 2003:149), a phrase reminiscent of Emperor Constantine's aim in the fourth century "to make the world safe for Christianity" (Cochrane 1944:197). According to Lloyd Ambrosius, Wilson, confident that the American model was what the world craved,

projected his conception of American nationalism onto the rest of the world, presupposing its universal validity [...] Viewing the United States as the vanguard, he expected other nations to follow its example and develop in the same way. His vision of the future consequently combined both universalism and unilateralism. While proclaiming a new era of internationalism, the president actually expected others to conform to his particular understanding of American ideals and practices. (Ambrosius 2002:33)

The Presbyterian president believed that "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scriptures", which enabled him to define the First World War as "a crusade" (ibid:36). The establishment of the League of Nations was defined in terms of a "worldwide expansion of the Monroe doctrine" (ibid:41); it was, as Skillen remarks "the expression of a hope that America's example would draw people throughout the world to share the same faith and desire for freedom, leading them to develop democratic states like the American republic", although "Wilson was either unconscious of, or simply unwilling to acknowledge publicly, the dependence of the entire system on American hegemony of the League" (2005:85). As such, the League of Nations failed to make the world safe for democracy, not least due to the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty (Judis 2004:96).

The opportunity was to present itself again some decades later, when another World War raged. America was slowly retreating from the interwar period of isolationism, when in 1941 Henry Luce published his famous editorial *The American Century* in *Life* magazine. His text could be read as an affirmation that the promise set forth by O'Sullivan was finally about to be delivered upon. Not only was the United States an exceptional nation

with a manifest destiny, but the time to fulfill that destiny had arrived. “It now becomes our time”, Luce wrote, “to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beast to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels” (reprinted in Hogan (ed.) 1999:28, see also Judis 1992:5). President Truman later embraced the notion, stating that indeed “this is America’s century”, adding that it should however “be more than that. We want it to be humanity’s century” (quoted by White 1996:9). The creativity of the Truman administration must have satisfied Luce. The American post-World War II strategy to ‘make the world safe for democracy’ came to rest mainly on three pillars: Containment of the Soviet bloc, deemed out of democratic reach; export of the American model through the Marshall plan to friendly states in especially Europe; and the establishment of international organizations based on the same dual notions of democratization and American influence that had characterized Wilson’s earlier designs. In spite of its overwhelming political, economic and military power at the end of the war, the United States still rejected the notion that it had become the heir and successor to previous empires (Garrison 2004). Ferguson has noted that “For an empire in denial, there is really only one way to act imperially with a clear conscience, and that is to combat someone else’s imperialism. In the doctrine of containment, born in 1947, the United States hit on the perfect ideology for its own peculiar kind of empire: the imperialism of anti-imperialism” (Ferguson 2005:78). The policy of containment of the communist bloc was but one of many policies favored in Washington that had imperial overtones. The Marshall Plan seemed almost modeled on the Roman example of extending Pax Romana to the satellite states that it controlled. Olivier Zunz has noted that though there was originally domestic political opposition to the Marshall Plan, most policymakers were convinced that

the “American century” and the new world order were becoming one and the same, for American prosperity would continue to expand only if Americans looked outward. Moreover, the time had come to applaud the American blend of democratic institutions and managerial capitalism and to credit them for victory. (Zunz 1998:185)

The Marshall Plan may have presented commercial benefits to the United States as well as to the receivers of the vast funds that were handed out³⁵, but its main political mission was to bolster the democratic and pro-American character of the recipients’ societies (Pells 1997:52-57). The final pillar of this strategy (or series of strategies) was the establishment of international institutions that were created if not in America’s image (although highly

indebted to it), then at least according to its wishes. The Bretton Woods system comprising both the establishment of the United Nations as a successor to the ill-fated League of Nations and a host of financial regimes such as the World Bank and the IMF gave Washington eminent tools for shaping the global democratic discourse. Meanwhile, seemingly relinquishing the policy of shunning ‘entangling alliances’ that had been a constant since the presidency of George Washington, the United States created a series of military alliances such as NATO and ANZUS that secured its military stronghold on a world wide scale. This process of institution building was in effect an internationalization of the American universalism that greatly strengthened America’s soft power. These organizations were not set up as an alternative to American leadership, but as a way of exercising and preserving it (Judis 2004:204-5, Daalder and Lindsay 2005:9).

American exceptionalism had come of age on a global scale, and America had established itself as the leading western nation. The new primacy was not deplored though, but rather welcomed, at least by the inhabitants of Western European nations fearing both their own historical demons and the rising Soviet threat. When Arthur Schlesinger described American leadership of the Western World under the Cold War as “the brave and essential response of free men to Communist aggression” (1967:23), it may have been an eminently American phrase, but its essence was to a large extent shared by America’s allies. While Schlesinger’s phrase today has a rather *démodé* ring to it, there is little doubt that the underlying assumption – that the United States is a nation that acts as a force of good in a dangerous world – builds on the notion of American exceptionalism. During the Cold War, ideological anti-Americanism based on the rejection of the liberal capitalist economic and political systems might have been *en vogue* among the more left-wing political factions in especially the Western European nations, but the vast majority of Western Europeans saw America as not only a liberator from the horrors of Nazism’s bid for preeminence in Europe, but also as the provider and protector of peace on the European continent. The United States may have been portrayed as a ‘reluctant superpower’; it was nonetheless a superpower whose status was morally legitimized not only domestically by the feelings of exceptionalism and manifest destiny, but also to a large extent by its allies, who shared the commitment to upholding democracy. The price America’s allies paid for their security was an increasing hegemonization of the security arrangements guaranteeing their freedom. With reference to the international situation characterizing the Cold War period, Fabbri has noted that

Never before in history has a victorious power undertaken so strongly, as the US has, to constitutionalize its own hegemony (in the Western sphere), setting in motion relations of reciprocal recognition between the interests of the leading hegemon (namely the US) and those of the hegemonized (countries of Western Europe, but also Japan). This has given life to an American hegemony defined by commentators as benign or reluctant. (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:8)

American hegemony over the West was, however, both a structural reality and to a large extent also a convenience for the hegemonized who, secure under America's protective military and nuclear umbrella, could undertake the development of their welfare states and even, for the Western European states, engage in the establishment of a post-national European polity that was later to become an increasing source of concern for Washington, frequently wondering about the nature and ambitions of the European Union.

Whereas the element of anti-Americanism based on its perceived hegemony can in large parts be considered a rejection of what America *is*, the way this near-hegemonic power is used by U.S. administrations can clearly fuel rejection of what America *does*. To the myth of the reluctant superpower can be added the portrait frequently put forward of America as a benign or benevolent hegemon. The notion of primopolarity that was introduced above is especially interesting when the primary pole in the international system is the United States. The long American history of presenting the United States as an *exceptional* country or indeed an *essential* or *indispensable* nation gives the notion of *primus inter pares* an extra dimension. The international system now reflects the belief that Americans have traditionally held of their own nation as superior compared with other nations. While American exceptionalism entailed a perception of superiority primarily in terms of values and aspirations, the realities of power have imbued these perceptions with a heightened sense of destiny. It is no wonder that the idea of American exceptionalism in conjunction with the country's rise to near-hegemonic status at the dawn of the twenty-first century is to many Americans a final validation of John O'Sullivan's description of the United States as the Great Nation of Futurity, where "The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles" (O'Sullivan 1839:429-430). When shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall Francis Fukuyama wrote his essay on *The End of History*, it was a celebration of not just the triumph of "the Western *idea*" (Fukuyama 1989). His assertion that the Western mode of liberal democracy is the ultimate

destiny in terms of ideological aspirations was fundamentally a validation of the key premise of American exceptionalism: that the values on which America was founded represent the pinnacle of human political aspirations³⁶. Whether his celebration was premature or not, it was nevertheless firmly molded as “an essentially American vision of the world disguised as an internationalist theory” (Crockatt, in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:75). In this respect, the end of the Cold War represented a dawning of U.S. moral and political supremacy – a supremacy that had not just been foretold by the visions of the Puritans and the Founding Fathers (Ellis 2000), but indeed a supremacy that was philosophically and ideologically the highest attainable, and, if Fukuyama is to be believed, the culmination of humanity’s political aspirations.

The uses and misuses of political soft power

The hard power attributes of this perception of hegemony and possible neo-imperialism were described above. It was noted that there is a long historic tradition of rejecting any dominant power and that as such, rejection of American hegemony could be seen in almost structural terms as a predictable feature of international politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The soft power dimension is, however, probably much more important in generating anti-Americanism, at least among the inhabitants of nations who otherwise share most of the political values of the United States. It is when these political values are transformed into foreign policy aims and diplomatic practices that the American quasi-hegemonic might becomes a source of dissatisfaction among its allies. Among the resources of soft power identified by Joseph Nye are policy and diplomacy. In light of the growing anti-Americanism registered over the last decade (see 3.1), it is obvious to enquire about the potential link between how America wields its soft power resources and the rejection that the United States is subjected to among both friends and foes. It could be, as Skillen argues, that

What requires explanation is why the American people and leaders are blind to the imperial characteristics of their colossal global hegemony. The peculiarity originates in the earliest self-interpretation of the nation as a city on a hill, whose calling is to exemplify the political truth of universal history. America’s calling is not to achieve that goal by military conquest. Yet insofar as the civil-religious calling bears witness to a universal goal, the whole world must always be kept in American sights as both a field of opportunity for freedom’s expansion and as a potential threat to freedom’s survival. (2005:87)

The fact that previous American hegemony over the West was to a large extent accepted by its allies was probably very much due to its internationalist nature. Yet among America's allies, there was during the Bush administration an increasing perception that the earlier American internationalism was abandoned in favor of a neoconservative unilateralism (see for example Fabbri, in Fabbri (ed.) 2006:3-26). The decision to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003 against the express wishes of the United Nations Security Council was but one, albeit the most prominent example of the unilateral policies of the Bush administration. The list of perceived infringements upon the internationalist tradition is well known: the repudiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the nuclear test-ban treaty, a new protocol to the biological weapons treaty, and the International Criminal Court (Holsti 2004:249-253). And though, as Judis has argued, the administration might have had a rationale for each of these actions, taken together, they cast doubt on President Bush's support for "a fundamental principle of Wilsonian internationalism: that to create a peaceful, prosperous, and safe world, the United States would have to commit itself not simply to ad hoc coalitions but to enduring international organizations and treaties" (2004:165). Furthermore, the United States has an ingrained "tendency to play the Lone Ranger with the trading system", which added to "America's tendency to extend the long arm of its laws to other countries is a practice that unites even its natural allies against it" (Buchan 1993:144-145). The *Economist* has called this approach a "parallel unilateralism", a "willingness to go along with international accords, but only so far as they suit America, which is prepared to conduct policy outside their constraints" (quoted by Fabbri, in Fabbri (ed.) 2006:12). This mounting unilateralism has been almost universally deplored by other nations, fearing that it threatens to undermine the very foundations upon which international diplomacy has developed since the Second World War (ibid:3-26). Edward C. Luck has shown that in the context of international organizations, four related characteristics stand out that make a member state exceptional:

1. A willingness to go it alone on a variety of issues, along with apparent immunity to the pressures and criticisms of others;
2. An assumption that its national values and practices are universally valid and its policy positions are moral and proper, not just expedient;
3. A strong tendency to look inwards, to domestic political considerations and processes, when determining how to act in international forums, in some cases coupled with a willingness to adopt national legislation that contradicts the rules and responsibilities imposed by international arrangements; and
4. A belief by national policy-makers and legislators that they have other options for pursuing their nation's interests and that acting through multilateral

institutions is only an option, not an obligation. (in Foot, MacFarlane and Mastanduno 2003:27)

In this respect, America has reaffirmed its exceptionality. This reaffirmation, however, does not meet with the approval that the more internationalist variety of exceptionalism did. The trademark description of Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy, "speak softly and carry a big stick"³⁷, is an early reminder that diplomacy, one of the attributes of soft power, is often best exercised with a certain amount of sensitivity towards the feelings of others – although according to Roosevelt it may need to be backed up with hard power in order to be really efficient. Eliot Cohen has remarked that

U.S. power is so obvious a fact, particularly to non-Americans, that there is no need to remind anyone of it. If the United States intends to exercise its power effectively, even against the wishes of its allies, it should do so with a bland smile, not boastful words. Weaker states will inevitably view the strongest power as arrogant, inconsiderate, and demanding. There is no need to make it any worse than it must be: Roman discretion offers as important a historical example as Roman assertion. (2004:59-60)

Fukuyama, using another analogy, agrees: "The United States cannot avoid provoking fear and resentment given its de facto power any more than Bismarck's Germany could, but it can try to minimize the backlash by deliberately seeking ways to downplay its dominance" (Fukuyama 2006:190). Crockatt has correctly argued that independence is a political culture with deep historical roots in America and among the prime values in American foreign policy (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:87-88). The neoconservative unilateralism is therefore, if regarded in terms of independence, hardly a paramount break with the traditions of American foreign policy:

Whatever the reigning orthodoxy or slogan, at whatever time in its history, whether it be non-entanglement, isolationism, manifest destiny, making the world safe for democracy or ensuring the survival of liberty, the notion of independence has never been far from the surface (ibid:88).

Crockatt further asserts that "America's will to independence – independence *absolute* – is visible not only in its separate declarations but also in the manner in which it enters into arrangements with others" (ibid: 87). The American policy of internationalism during the Cold War was in this optic not a reduction of American foreign policy independence as such, but rather self imposed limitations in an "institutional bargain [...] between the hegemon and the hegemonized which structured the Western world during the Cold War period" (Fabbrini,

in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:24). The point here is neither that the foreign policies of George W. Bush were a complete reversal of traditional American foreign politics (they were not), nor that such tendencies toward unilateralism will necessarily sap America's soft power in the long term (previous examples have at times ended up having virtually the opposite effect). Other presidents have traveled down the unilateral or semi-unilateral road without incurring the wrath that the Bush administration has been subjected to. The Vietnam debacle was a prominent cause for displays of anti-Americanism among especially European publics, but it rarely really led to official reactions from their governments to the extent seen during the unfolding of the Iraq crisis. President Reagan's posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 1980s was followed with apprehension in most European capitals, who feared an escalation of the Cold War, yet his policies were to a large extent vindicated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet empire. The difference between the former unilateral or semi-unilateral measures and the ones employed by the Bush administration is twofold: First, on a structural level, the end of the Cold War also signaled the end of a threat against the survival of America's allies as independent states. The American tutelage that they had (mostly willingly and by their own accord) been subjected to, at least in terms of security matters, no longer looked neither as necessary nor as desirable as previously. This fundamentally led to a change in how American foreign policy came to be seen in European capitals. Whereas previous examples of American unilateralism had grudgingly been accepted by America's partners, unwilling to 'rock the boat' in spite of deep reservations toward these policies, this restraint has largely been lifted following the dismantlement of the Soviet threat. Second, on a political level, there has been a perception that unilateralism became the norm during the Bush presidency rather than the expedient exception. There has also been a widespread perception that the new American unilateralism was of a more nationally selfish nature than the previous ones. Previous U.S. unilateral measures such as the CIA-backed toppling of the democratically elected government in Chile in favor of a military dictatorship were vehemently rejected by the public opinion in large parts of the world. America's official partners, while highly opposed to such measures, accepted them, at least partly, as evidence of a (misconstrued) American willingness to secure the interests of the West as such. The Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto protocol, the ICC etc. had only one aim: to protect short term American interests. And while the Iraq war may be the exception to this rule, the moral arguments for waging war turned out to be seriously flawed. No weapons of mass

destruction were found, there was no evidence of a link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaeda, and the attempts to create a democracy in Iraq became bogged down by feuding between the different religious communities (Walt 2005). John Lewis Gaddis' observation following the invasion of Iraq that "within a little more than a year and a half, the United States exchanged its long-established reputation as the principal *stabilizer* of the international system for one as its chief *destabilizer*" (2004:101), is probably shared by many foreign observers.

Opposition toward these policies has frequently been presented as opposition toward the neoconservatism supposedly characteristic of the Bush administration rather than as anti-Americanism as such. Critics of American foreign policies in the years 2001-2008 keen to avoid the label of anti-Americans have instead directed their opposition toward the conservative nationalist ideology that they associate with neoconservatism, hoping that neoconservatism only represented an exception to the tradition of liberal internationalism that is often portrayed as having been the 'normal' American basis for foreign policy. Yet, as Fabbrini has noted,

In America it is possible to be nationalist and universalist at the same time, because America is perceived by its citizens as the *universal nation*. It is against this conservative nationalism, which conflates the national interest of America with the interests of the world, that the European anti-American mood [...] has developed. (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:4).

The notion of American exceptionalism may be unconsciously felt by the public opinion abroad witnessing the foreign policy actions of the United States, even if they do not acknowledge its existence. While the United States may feel that large part of their legitimacy lies in precisely this notion, it is clear that were it to be presented to a foreign public, it would be rejected on the grounds that no nation can claim to be endowed with special rights that do not apply to others. Although the more realistic foreign observers will acknowledge that the larger powers have more influence and clout on the world stage than do the smaller, the notion that this gives the larger nations a higher moral legitimacy would most likely be rejected by most. Francis Fukuyama, an erstwhile neoconservative later turned into a prominent critic of American unilateralism, has noted that an important reason why the Iraq war provoked a surge in anti-Americanism was "built into the *National Security Strategy* doctrine of preventive war: its implicit recognition of American exceptionalism" (Fukuyama 2006:101). According to Fukuyama, "The fact that the United States granted itself a right that

it would deny to other countries is based, in the *NSS*, on an implicit judgement that the United States is different from other countries and can be trusted to use its military power justly and wisely in ways that other powers could not” (ibid. See also Hirsh 2003:xvii). Holsti concurs, describing it as “the most important example of American exceptionalism” (2004:253). George W. Bush’s famous post-9/11 line about being either “with us or [...] with the terrorists” (Guyatt 2003:237) was, while intended for those inclined to support rogue states “heard in Europe as a challenge to get with the Bush administration’s agenda in the take-it-or-leave-it fashion, which they naturally resented” (Fukuyama 2006:105). In sum, Fukuyama finds that

Benevolent hegemony rests on a belief in American exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find not credible. The idea that the United States behaves disinterestedly on the world stage is not widely believed because it is for the most part not true and, indeed, could not be true if American leaders fulfill their responsibilities to the American people. (ibid:111)

Conclusion

America’s soft power resources of policy and diplomacy are prominent, unique and considerable. They have had an important power of attraction in the West, but have frequently also been objects of concern if not outright opposition. As Crockatt rightly concludes,

The biggest and most potent idea among the many big ideas which have been spawned since the end of the Cold War is the idea of the American nation and its peculiar destiny. Americans need to understand this as well as others. They will then understand why American power is so fiercely contested (in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:88-89).

The contestation of American power has been particularly fierce during the presidency of George W. Bush. And there is no doubt that since the election of President Barack Obama, much of the criticism has abated. As Timothy Garton Ash notes, if soft power means power of attraction, then Obama is the personification of America’s soft power to most Europeans (2008); an assessment which seems validated by the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand Index 2009, in which the United States improved its ranking from 7th to 1st position, an improvement, which its authors describe as “astonishing”, while adding that “There can’t be a more illustrative example of the American Dream” than the election of “a mestizo and the son of an African immigrant” (Anholt-GfK Roper 2009). In truth, he has the potential to represent much more than that. Given his background, he is the first president to embody in his persona America as a universal nation. Yet the endemic features of American political values, and not least those transposable on American foreign politics, suggest a possible recurrent source of

anti-Americanism: a perception that in spite of the affirmations of universalistic values, the United States, seeing itself as an exceptional nation, pursues primarily a nationalist foreign policy agenda according to which the interests of other nations are not just subordinate to those of America (all nations pursue first and foremost policies which are deemed to be in their own interest), but much more seriously of lesser moral value. In this respect, a system of foreign policy attitudes built on notions of exceptionalism and higher moral standards is the antithesis to realist, value-free notions of diplomacy. Though no nation or polity is value-free, the combination of overwhelming American hard power and the massive use of soft power resources in order to fulfill the promise of manifest destiny is a cocktail that is becoming increasingly hard to swallow for not just America's political partners, but for their publics as well. It was noted in chapter 2 that several scholars of anti-Americanism, and not least Paul Hollander, typically stress that opposition toward aspects of American policies do not constitute anti-Americanism. Yet if these aspects are seen increasingly as a pattern of behavior, it is bound to lead to increased rejection. Joseph Nye has noted that the influence of example can repel as well as attract, and that "the arrogance, indifference to the opinions of others, and narrow approach to [...] national interests advocated by the new unilateralists are a sure way to undermine [...] soft power" (2002:11). The surveys quoted in 3.1 suggest that in the early twenty-first century, this is already to a large extent the case. Joseph Nye concurs: "Polls show that [America's] soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy" (Nye 2004c:255). He further remarks that there is good evidence to suggest that "unpopular foreign policies might be spilling over and undercutting the attractiveness of some aspects of American popular culture" as well (ibid:256). That is indeed a strong possibility, yet there is also a case to be made for the argument that America's massive soft power in terms of its dominating influence on global cultural norms might, irrespectively of the foreign policies carried out, be rejected by societies fearing an erosion of their own cultural norms.

3.4.2 Cultural norms

Just as the United States has heralded a political modernity, America has become largely synonymous with what one might call a cultural modernity: American cultural products and norms have become global to an extent far more important than those of other countries. The American Century was not just an affirmation to some of the fulfillment of America's political destiny; it could just as well describe America's enormous cultural impact: "The

United States came to represent modernity because many of the trends associated with the Western world in the twentieth century occurred first in America” (Pells 1997:270). As America’s preeminence in military matters is an undisputable fact, so is its ubiquitous prevalence within the cultural sphere. Indeed, the “American era conjures up images of military might and political power, but from abroad the most immediate and pervasive point of contact with the United States is often at the intersection of globalization and culture” (Lieber 2005:96). Lieber further states that “Primacy and influence in the cultural arena are more difficult to gauge than in the economic or military realms. Many of the criteria are less specific and more subjective, but here too American preponderance is evident” (ibid:101). This is the case both on a material and a nonmaterial level. American cultural products are consumed worldwide and often set the norm for consumer preferences, regardless of whether the products in question relate to popular culture, food consumption or the information society. These products are typically products of mass consumption, and as such, it is not just the products themselves that are associated to America, but the way they have been manufactured and promoted as well. The notions of Americanization, modernization and globalization are increasingly being used to denote the same process, namely one whereby one particular model of production and consumption has imposed itself on a global scale (Ritzer and Stillman, in Beck, Sznaider and Winter (eds) 2003). The charge against this perceived Americanization is that traditional norms and customs are being challenged by a new mindset and that this has largely been imported from America. As such, the dimension of American soft power that can be related to culture is important. Almost two decades ago, Nye termed American culture “a relatively inexpensive and useful soft power resource” (1990:193), though he added that “Obviously, certain aspects of American culture are unattractive to other peoples, and there is always a danger of bias in evaluating cultural sources of power. But American popular culture embodied in products and communications has widespread appeal” (ibid:193). That is to a large extent still the case. Yet the 1990s saw a rising movement against both certain types of American cultural products and the effect that globalization was having on culturally related preferences worldwide. The kind of anti-Americanism that is directed at American cultural products and icons has a long history, especially among members of the European cultural elites, but has become more pervasive under the sensation of a growing, “predatory” globalization (Falk 1999). The soft power dimension of cultural norms has two main components: the norms and products themselves

and their spread to all corners of the world. A culturally based anti-Americanism feeds on both, rejecting the nature of America's cultural exports and deploring their attractiveness to the world's populations.

*The Republic of Mass Culture*³⁸

The United States is widely seen as the embodiment *par excellence* of mass consumption and mass culture. Popular culture – the fast food industry and its products, popular music, films, television, advertising, web sites and other computer-based media – is America's most visible and one of its most pervasive exports. There is an enormous American trade surplus in cultural matters. In countries without strong cultural protection laws, American music, films, and television programs appear far more frequently than other countries' music, films, and television programs appear in the United States, or for that matter, than do domestic productions³⁹. Even countries that heavily subsidize their national film industry repeatedly complain about 'unfair' competition from Hollywood on its home turf. Though other nations, not least in East Asia, have overtaken America in terms of mass production, and though the Indian Bollywood industry seriously rivals Hollywood in terms of output⁴⁰, mass consumption and mass culture are seen as quintessentially American in origin. There are different opinions as to when consumer culture started, but there is widespread agreement that the flowing of consumer culture dates from the 1920s (Kammen 1999:53) and that it was, to a large extent, first and foremost an American phenomenon (ibid:55-69). This consumer culture was made possible by new modes of mass production, most famously pioneered by Henry Ford in the automobile industry⁴¹, but present within a wide range of economic sectors and increasingly available to large parts of the American public. Culture became an industry in the early twentieth century (Denning 1996:xvii), and though there is disagreement among scholars as to when mass culture was born⁴², or what exactly it encompasses⁴³ (Kammen 1999:3-26), it early on became associated with America more than with any other nation (ibid:62-69, and Pells 1997:205-262). Mass culture, having first seduced the American people, quickly became tempting to the European citizenry (Pells 1997:238) and later to populations worldwide. The soft power of cultural attraction was evident from the early twentieth century. Already in the interwar period, Hollywood caught the imagination of millions of European movie spectators and projected images of glamour that sharply contrasted with the lingering economic difficulties during the Depression. This was where

America exerted its greatest cultural influence, as cinema gradually became synonymous with Hollywood: “The United States dominated every facet of popular filmmaking, and with it the power to “Americanize” the imaginations, if not the behavior, of audiences throughout the world” (ibid:14). Jazz music, a quintessentially American phenomenon, excited new generations of Europeans and frequently met with the disapproval of older generations. During the 1930s, European intellectuals migrating to the United States had contributed to “Europeanizing” American culture (Fermi 1971:383-388, Pells 1997:22-31), but by the end of the Second World War, cultural supremacy had irrevocably passed from Europe to America (Leclerc 2000:444). It was however in the period following the end of the Second World War that American cultural products and norms began to seriously make an impact in Western societies. The Marshall Plan not only boosted the weak postwar European economies, it had a less publicized but no less significant cultural component as well. The Marshall Planners, writes Richard Pells, “functioned as evangelists on behalf of the American way. Their mission was to make Western Europe resemble the United States” (1997:54), convinced that the European public was keen to emulate the American way. And though many European governments were skeptical, assuming “that the United States intended for them to become not only loyal allies in the conflict with the Soviet Union, but also faithful consumers of American merchandise and American culture” (ibid:56), they accepted the premises of the recovery plan, “while they grumbled about its arrogance” (ibid:57). The Marshall Plan was an example of deliberate and targeted soft power intended to enhance the attractiveness of America and its values. The U.S. State Department was acutely aware that culture constituted “an essential part of America’s total international effort” and “an aspect of American foreign policy” (Kellermann 1978:8). This was obvious to contemporary observers as well. Raymond Aron noted without resentment that it “accelerated a historically significant trend – the spread in Europe of American products, customs, and ideas”, while adding that “Even without the Marshall Plan, this would certainly have occurred” anyway (in Burnham (ed.) 1953:197).

In the 1950s, a host of American products gradually emerged as true products of mass culture. Coca Cola had long been sold from coast to coast, and with Ray Kroc’s aggressive franchising of McDonald’s and the adoption of blue jeans as the universal dress code of the young, an industry of mass culture was created (Kammen 1999:182-183) that was to spread worldwide in the following decades. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, such products have become household brands worldwide, achieving almost iconic character. As

Richard Pells has noted, each European “generation after World War II did seem more Americanized than its predecessor” (1997:240). The insurrection in some quarters against American culture is not limited to products that can be characterized as ‘cultural’ in the strictest sense of the word. Alongside the fight against *Hollywoodization*, there is widespread rejection of what has been termed the *McDonaldization* (Ritzer 2000), *Disneyfication* (Zukin 1995), *Disneyization* (Bryman 2004), *coca-colonization* (Kuisel 1991, Wagnleitner 1994, Howes 1996) or even *McDisneyization* (Ritzer and Liska 1997) of societies. Fast-food franchises like McDonald’s are seen as symbols of the American way of life substituting the traditional local businesses and threatening local gastronomic traditions, leading to charges against an emerging McWorld (Barber 2001). Though much of the resistance to American products is dictated by economic fears of lagging too far behind the United States in trade exchanges, there is a conservative bias to much of the charges against American culture as well: that it entails a risk of erosion of the cultural values and norms of the importing societies. As Lieber notes,

Culture, in the broadest sense, can evoke deeply emotional responses because of the way in which it encompasses both identity and beliefs. Contact with American culture and Western values often serves as a trigger for social resentments, especially in troubled regions where modernity is suspect and suppressed. At times, these bitter feelings are deflected from domestic and systemic causes and redirected at the United States as a convenient symbolic target. Under these circumstances, the root causes of anti-Americanism [...] lie within the societies and identities of those who promote them. (2005:96-97).

Though Lieber has mostly non-Western societies in mind, the argument is valid for much European opposition to American cultural norms as well. It may well be, as Richard Pells argues, that the charges of Americanization in the cultural sphere are greatly exaggerated, especially in Europe. He convincingly describes how Europeans have “resisted the standardization and homogeneity allegedly inflicted on them by their American masters”, having instead frequently domesticated and “Europeanized” the items and images they received from America (1997:279). He states that in essence, transatlantic cultural relations have been characterized more by cross-fertilization than by Americanization (*ibid.*), and that in this respect, the notion of Americanization of Europe is a myth, a “powerful and enduring myth, often cherished by the Europeans themselves because they can use it to explain how their societies have changed in ways they don’t like, but a myth nonetheless” (*ibid.*:xiv). He is correct in the sense that though modernization is frequently associated with America,

sometimes to the extent where the terms modernization and Americanization are used synonymously, modernization of societies would to a large extent have taken place anyway without the example of America, although probably with different characteristics. However, the fact remains that there is an ingrained perception among many Europeans that their local cultures are becoming bastardized by the massive import of American cultural products. Irrespective of whether the prolific consumption of mass culture is due to the impact of Americanization or not, it is often perceived to be just that. Pells is nonetheless right in warning us against the simplistic assumption that mass culture has converted consumers world wide “into a collection of zombies, docile and passive, too drugged to discriminate between art and trash, too hypnotized to switch off the television set or get off the information highway” (1997:279). And though “Sometimes a movie is just a movie and a cheeseburger is just a cheeseburger” (ibid:282), there is especially among what is referred to as cultural elites an innate feeling that a Hollywood movie or a cheeseburger are symptoms of cultural degeneration, and that this degeneration originates from America. Already in 1955, Raymond Aron noted that

The feeling that the ‘American way of life’ – with the *Reader’s Digest*, mass entertainment, loud and vulgar publicity – is guilty of aggression against superior forms of culture is [...] widespread among [...] intellectuals. [...] At the same time, there is a reluctance to invoke the cultural argument, which might sound reactionary. It is easier to attribute all the evil to ‘capitalism’. [...] In fact, [intellectuals] hate Americanism not because of McCarthy or the capitalists, but because they are humiliated by American power and feel their cultural values threatened by the masses whose advancement, in the name of their ideologies, they are bound to applaud ([1955] 2001:252).

America’s vast exports of cultural products and norms have furthermore been significantly helped along by the pervasive impact of the English language – and vice versa. At least since the end of World War II, English has become the most important vehicular language, often referred to as the world’s lingua franca (Dovring 1997)⁴⁴; a powerful testimony to the influence of both colonial Britain in its heyday and its twentieth century successor, America (Garrison 2004). The languages of leading states have expanded throughout history, usually at the expense of other languages, yet the expansion of English worldwide has been unique compared with previous *lingua francas* (Phillipson 2005:5): “Languages are the medium through which communication takes place in politics, commerce, defence, academia, the

media, technology, the internet, and most aspects of life” (ibid.), and as such the primacy of the English language gives advantages to English-speaking nations. According to Lieber,

The growing linguistic globalization based on English as the common international language not only poses cultural questions, but also provides intrinsic advantages to the United States and other English-speaking countries. For example, the most skilled individuals from lands where the national language is not English tend to look abroad for education, career advancement, and better pay, and America has benefited from this “brain drain”. (2005:103)

The worldwide impact of films in English might be a source of discontent to cultural anti-Americans, worried about the effects of *Hollywoodization* on their national film industries, but the impact of the internet and, as Lieber suggests, of English as having become the language of commerce, science, and academia, is probably a much more powerful testimony to its embedment as what has been termed “the language of power” (Phillipson, 2003:1 and 5). This issue of language dominance invariably leads to the broader issue of cultural imperialism: “the idea that a global culture is in one way or another liable to be a hegemonic culture” (Tomlinson 1999:79).

Perceptions of hegemony are no less rejected because they are related to the cultural sphere than when they are related to the military, economic, or political sphere. But the perception of American cultural dominance not only leads to a rejection of this dominance *per se*, but also frequently to a rejection of the nature of this dominance. A common nineteenth century criticism of America was that it lacked culture (see examples in chapter 5). The same criticism is advanced today, albeit in almost the opposite meaning: that though America is arguably the world’s largest exporter of cultural products, it is the wrong kind of culture that they promote. Their perceived lack of culture is no longer a lack *of* cultural products, but a lack of culture *in the* products that they export. These cultural exports are commonly attacked for having profound homogenizing effects on societies, limiting opportunities for diverse and original perspectives. Coupled with this is the concern of the sheer volume of American cultural exports, irrespective of any specific concerns with content. In this context, cultural anti-Americanism joins hands with opposition to the globalization process which is seen by some as another manifestation of America’s bid to world hegemony.

Anti-Americanism as anti-globalization

The last decades of the twentieth century saw an increasing apprehension concerning the emergence of a global economy and a global culture. Globalization, “a vague and, to some, a

terrifying concept” (Pells 1997:325), was perceived by its critics as an insidious threat to the nation state and its cultural identity (ibid:326-331). Complaints about the near-hegemonic nature of some cultures are not new. Historically, they can be traced back as far as to the impact of Hellenic culture and *koine* (common Greek language) on other Mediterranean cultures. In modern times, charges of cultural imperialism have frequently been leveled against the West and especially colonizing nations such as Britain and France. Critics have argued that Western nations have not only exported their notions and standards of culture to others (sometimes even by force); their incapacity to comprehend the diversity of other cultures has led them to maintain an essentially imperialist stance long after their policies of colonialism had been formally abandoned (e.g. Said 1993 and [1978] 1995). There is, as was noted above, widespread disagreement among scholars as to the nature and scope of globalization and whether it constitutes a new phenomenon or rather the latest phase in a long process of internationalization that has characterized the world since the late nineteenth century. Herman Daly has in this respect argued that although the terms internationalization and globalization are often used interchangeably, there is a formal difference. The term internationalization refers to the importance of international trade, treaties, and relations; globalization on the other hand entails the erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes where international trade, governed by comparative advantages, becomes interregional trade, governed by absolute advantages (1999). Irrespective of whether globalization does in fact constitute a new phenomenon, the popular perception of a rapidly globalizing world is, however, mainly a phenomenon that dates from the late 1980s, when the word entered the political agendas and indeed the global vocabulary (Friedman 2005). While most of the debates surrounding globalization are centered around its effects on local economies, seemingly threatened by the specter of out-sourcing, the cultural effects figure prominently as well. The anti-globalization discourse has two main features: economically, it centers on what is typically a badly veiled opposition to the capitalist market economy while culturally, it breeds on the fear of an erosion of national and local identities.

The strong anti-capitalist undertones in the kind of anti-globalization rhetoric forwarded by movements such as ATTAC⁴⁵ are evident. Here again, America is targeted as the world’s capitalist nation *par excellence*, the embodiment of money-grabbing entrepreneurs with their eyes firmly set on amassing wealth without regard for its social consequences. Already Max Weber noted that “in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its

religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport” ([1904-05] 1992:181-182). The economic anti-globalization discourse that presents America as its prime target of attack feeds on a powerful legacy of opposition toward both capitalism and its main symbol: the almighty dollar. And it is not just the influence of the dollar abroad that is opposed. The American society itself is depicted as a society dominated by the forces of speculation and exploitation, where low wage workers, bereft of a welfare system that can provide them with basic medical care, struggle to make ends meet. This American society, decried as characterized by ‘jungle capitalism’, is presented as an anti-model, even by many otherwise sympathetic toward the United States. The term ‘American model’ is today rarely meant positively. Quite the contrary; it is often used by politicians and opinion makers in Europe to denote a society that fails to properly care for those of its citizens that have been marginalized by the forces of raw capitalism⁴⁶. This discourse frequently borders on anti-Americanism, mixing the two kinds of rejection that Katzenstein and Keohane have termed respectively social and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism. Anti-globalization protesters have turned many of the factors that have traditionally fostered anti-Americanism into a political movement that is critical of the work and trade patterns associated with globalization. In this way, anti-globalization and anti-Americanism have become two sides of the same coin. Though America may be the primary target of rejection, most economic anti-globalization discourse, however, opposes a wide range of Western practices and institutions. The European Union and its policies of (relatively) free trade are increasingly rejected as much as America and perceived American clientelism. With the strong euro seriously rivaling the weakening American dollar and the increasing level of European foreign and direct investment in third countries, including the United States, economic anti-globalization discourses are directed as much against the West as such, or at least against Western economic institutions and practices, as they are directed against the United States, although ‘America’ still remains a powerful image of resentment to many protesters⁴⁷.

But it is first and foremost in the cultural sphere and in the cross-section between culture and economy that anti-globalization becomes almost synonymous with anti-Americanism. The *soft politics* of cultural policy have increasingly become *hard politics* of trade relations and foreign policy. Though America’s exports of products of mass culture have, as noted above, been a highly visible part of America’s soft power since at least the late

1950s, American cultural norms have increasingly been adopted by others, to an extent where the forces of globalization are viewed as much as a process whereby cultural norms and values are becoming steadily more global in nature:

In an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of conflict. Other issues on the globalization agenda, especially economic ones such as trade, aid, and investment, are more readily subject to negotiation and compromise, but culture in its various forms serves as a primary carrier of globalization and modern values. Cultural issues are so fraught precisely because of their impact on both individual and national identity, and because culture has become a signifier for other more deep-seated and intractable issues, the problems it poses are harder to resolve (Lieber 2005:120).

Cultural globalization has accelerated the sensation of what has been termed delocalization (Thompson 1995) or deterritorialization (Canclini 1995, Featherstone 1995, Latouche 1996, Tomlinson 1999, Lull 2000). Canclini defines it as “the loss of the ‘natural’ relation of culture to geographical and social territories” (1995:229). Tomlinson sees it as “something like a general cultural condition which proceeds from the spread of global modernity” (1999:148). Coupled with the unequal “power geometry” of globalization, in which “some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are more effectively imprisoned by it” (Massey 1994:149), globalization is experienced by many as an uneven process, where certain cultures impose themselves on societies unable to protect their local identities from being if not supplanted then at least watered down by the new impulses and norms. And where there is deterritorialization, there is, according to Tomlinson, attempts at reterritorialization, which can be witnessed in various attempts to re-establish a cultural “home” (1999:148). Such attempts frequently present their own cultural identities as “original” or “authentic” and therefore in need of preservation, while adversely depicting the forces of uniform modernity as devoid of deeper, or original, qualities. As the primary representative of modernity, not least in the cultural sphere, America becomes the antithesis to the authentic and a challenger to local identities. Benjamin Barber’s claim that the American mode of capitalism has turned into not just consumerism but also infantilism⁴⁸ (2007) is probably shared by many. Perceptions of the degenerating nature of mass culture abound, and Americanization is blamed for its impact on both societies and hearts and minds. The soft power of attraction has turned into a sense of repulsion among those who most fervently oppose the effects of cultural globalization.

Conclusion

America's soft power in terms of culture is impressive and important. There is no doubt that American cultural norms and products are highly attractive to large parts of the populations worldwide. This is an undeniable fact, as can be witnessed by the high level of demand for these products and the image they are thought to bestow on their purchasers. The Republic of Mass Culture, in other words, has loyal citizens throughout the world, eager to acquire the icons of American life and given the choice more than willing to pursue the American Dream. However, it also has numerous detractors, rejecting its nature and impact on other societies. And though these detractors represent a minority, even in their own societies (where the citizenry at large seem to embrace American culture), their discourse is carrier of both elitist and a national-sovereign anti-Americanism. With the advent of globalization, the opposition to the Americanization of world culture has received further impetus. Anti-globalists marching against 'the evil effects of world capitalism' or 'cultural imperialism' typically display an ill-concealed animosity toward the United States as the primary agent of globalization. American culture is highly visible in all corners of the globe; it is a symbol of American power and as such rejected by those who oppose either the modernity it represents or the Americanized variety that dwarfs the cultural impact of other societies, keen to export their products and values as well, but unable to rival America's cultural juggernaut. America's soft power of culture is a double-edged sword: it is truly a testimony to America's hegemonic status within the realm of culture, yet it is also an important area of contention for those who fear an erosion of their local cultural norms and values. It breeds anti-Americanism among those levels of societies who feel their national or local identities threatened by an Americanization that they feel powerless to oppose.

3.5 Conclusion: The Rejection of American Power

In this chapter, it has been argued that there is a strong correlation between contemporary opposition toward the United States and perceptions abroad of disproportionate or even excessive American power. This was illustrated first by surveys gauging the level of opposition toward America; a key component in much of the criticism directed at the United States was the perception of disproportionate American power and the ways in which this power has been wielded. The surveys reproduced in 3.1 showed a remarkable consistency in

the views of the polled regarding their views on not least U.S. foreign policy. While the surveys do not provide a complete or comprehensive picture of the grievances held towards the United States, they do offer some rather conclusive clues. Chief among them is the dimension of power, where there is a widespread perception that America wields excessive power over other nations and their inhabitants. While one should be wary of over-interpreting the results of such polls, a common complaint seems to be the perceived hegemonic status of the United States as well as opposition to some of the policies that have been carried out over the last decade. Yet, though the most frequent attacks are made with reference to the attributes associated with American hard power, popular denigration of elements of the American society such as its culture are attacks on another power dimension, namely that of soft power, as American cultural products have to a large extent become synonymous with globalization. On an overall level, it is fair to assume that the polls show a clear indication that America's power of attraction has been in decline over the past decade.

The second part of this chapter sought to analyze the rejection of the United States in terms of the elements of power associated with it. This was analyzed by decomposing the notion of power into its dimensions of hard power and soft power as introduced by Joseph S. Nye. It was argued that the various notions of power can explain much of the anti-Americanism, including the major types identified by Hollander (nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist) or by Katzenstein and Keohane (liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical, as well as the more particularistic varieties such as elitist and legacy anti-Americanism). Furthermore, an attempt was made to demonstrate that the power dimension is as relevant as regards the promise of American power as the actual existence of American power. It was argued that the focus on power is particularly important, as it is the dimension which gives anti-Americanism a specificity that sets it apart from other anti-isms. Viewing anti-Americanism in terms of rejection of American power presents a simple, yet to this author's mind convincing, explanatory cause for most, if not all, facets of anti-Americanism. This does not mean that anti-Americanism can be reduced to mere opposition to American power, or that America's power domination can explain all aspects of anti-Americanism, and the typology delineated by Katzenstein and Keohane (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007) gives a good indication of the many different types of anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, this study contends that at the heart of most of the different displays of anti-Americanism lies a rejection of facets of American power, and that even to

the extent that there are other, more psychological or ideological forces at play, these are “multiplied by simple jealousy of American power” (Revel, quoted by Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:4).

In terms of hard power, what has been called by some the American Empire reigns supreme in the dimensions of power mostly associated with empires: military power and economic power. While American historians previously rejected the association of notions of empire with the United States, this association has more or less ceased to cause a stir. It is, however, probably not as much the perception of America as an empire that fuels modern anti-Americanism as the perception that this empire has become a ‘colossus’ with near-hegemonic powers. It is not unnatural for a dominating world power or near-hegemon to be universally rejected in some way or other. No country and no people take kindly to the idea that it is subordinated to another that can readily dictate its terms on the rest of the world. And the United States is not the only country that historically has been first among equals and as a result also the primary target of rejection. Anti-Americanism could in these terms just as easily be termed anti-hegemonism and analyzed as opposition to a dominating political force which, however benign its intentions might be, imposes serious limits on the ability of other states to pursue their policy actions. This perception of hegemony is not linked exclusively to the distribution of power or the attributes of power. It is linked as much to two other factors: the absence of present or potential counter-powers and the manner in which power is wielded. As such, American political, military, and economic primacy has become a defining feature of the international system to the extent where it was argued that the current international system is primopolar in nature. Primopolarity would indicate that while the international system is characterized by the relative fragmentation common to a multipolar system, there still exists one remaining superpower more capable of acting as *primus inter pares* than any other. It was argued in this respect that under such circumstances, the hard power attributes of anti-Americanism could be considered almost a systemic feature of the current international system.

The notion of soft power mostly carries positive connotations. Joseph S. Nye’s observation that “Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States’ soft power – its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them – is in decline as a result” (Nye 2004b:16) is a telling example: Basically, his premise is that soft power is being eroded by rising anti-Americanism. This study, however,

contends that such an assertion may very well be a case of confusing cause and effect, that is, if a more dualistic reading of the notion of soft power is accepted. In 3.4 it was argued that soft power can repel as much as hard power, at least if it is seen as overwhelming or insensitive to the wishes or values of other nations, and that in this respect, it would be erroneous to regard soft power as exclusively imbued with positive characteristics. Soft power is still, however soft it is presented, power. In relation to anti-Americanism as a rejection of America's soft power, it was suggested that it could be useful to analyze it in terms of the notions of political values and cultural norms. America's political values and cultural norms have had a tremendous impact on the rest of the world, frequently leading to charges of Americanization of the political and cultural institutions of other nations. In this respect, the United States had a substantial amount of soft power long before it acquired any dimension of hard power comparable to that of the great European powers of the day, namely the power of attraction. From the onset, America was born as a universal nation with a messianic quest, or manifest destiny, to spread its values. American exceptionalism and the feeling of representing a model to the rest of the world lies so deep in the national conscience that it has become one of the defining premises for regarding the rest of the world – as nations and populations eager to adopt the same values and embrace the same virtues as the great nation of futurity. The power of attraction of the United States has literally attracted people from all parts of the globe to the nation seemingly offering the best promise of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'. Yet the values on which America were founded have progressively ceased to be as exceptional as the American creed would have it (large parts of the world are now democracies, obeying human rights often far more diligently than the United States). As such, the soft power of attraction (and admiration to some) has been supplanted by the perception that the most exceptional feature of the United States is, its size and hard power attributes apart, its insistence on an exceptionality that allows it to submit to international rules and regulations only when it sees fit. The long American history of presenting the United States as an exceptional country or indeed an essential or indispensable nation gives the notion of primopolarity an extra dimension. The international system now reflects the belief that Americans have traditionally held of their own nation as superior compared with other nations. While American exceptionalism entailed a perception of superiority primarily in terms of values and aspirations, the realities of power have imbued these perceptions with a heightened sense of destiny. It is when these political values are transformed into foreign

policy aims and diplomatic practices that the American quasi-hegemonic might becomes a source of dissatisfaction among its allies. The inherent features of American political values, and not least those transposable on American foreign politics, suggest a possible recurrent source of anti-Americanism: a perception that in spite of the affirmations of universalistic values, the United States, seeing itself as an exceptional nation, pursues primarily a nationalist foreign policy agenda.

Just as the United States has heralded a political modernity, America has become largely synonymous with what one might call a cultural modernity: American cultural products and norms have become global to an extent far more important than those of other countries. The notions of Americanization, modernization and globalization are increasingly being used to denote the same process, namely one whereby a particular model of production and consumption has imposed itself on a global scale. The charge against this perceived Americanization is that traditional norms and customs are being challenged by a new mindset and that this has largely been imported from America. As such, the dimension of American soft power that can be related to culture is important. The soft power dimension of cultural norms has two main components: the norms and products themselves and their spread to all corners of the world. A culturally based anti-Americanism feeds on both, rejecting the nature of America's cultural exports and deploring their attractiveness in the eyes of the world's populations. Perceptions of hegemony are no less rejected because they are related to the cultural sphere than when they are related to the military, economic, or political sphere. But the perception of American cultural dominance not only leads to a rejection of this dominance *per se*, but also frequently to a rejection of the nature of this dominance. In this context, cultural anti-Americanism joins hands with opposition to the globalization process, which is seen by some as another manifestation of America's bid to world hegemony. The soft politics of cultural policy have increasingly become hard politics of trade relations and foreign policy. Perceptions of the degenerating nature of mass culture abound, and Americanization is blamed for its impact on both societies and hearts and minds. The soft power of attraction has turned into a sense of repulsion among those who most fervently oppose the effects of cultural globalization.

Another factor needs to be taken into account: the national or nationalistic factor. While anti-Americanism can be conceived as unique by its universality, i.e. the global nature of its manifestations, it is also characterized by great divergences in the different countries

where it manifests itself. While present in all societies, anti-Americanism is markedly stronger in some countries than in others. While the causes of anti-Americanism that can be related to the power dimension are to be found in virtually all societies, each society has its own brand of anti-Americanism based on its own historic relationship with the United States, its own values, its own worldview, aspirations and perceptions. Scholars of anti-Americanism frequently highlight this dimension, which we can term national, nationalistic, or cultural. Yet in spite of the particularistic traits characterizing anti-Americanism in different societies, it is not inconceivable that these are to a large extent domestic reactions to perceptions of disproportionate American power. This will be discussed in the second part of this study.

4 Anti-Americanism and National Habitus

It was noted at the onset of the study that the ambition was to present a structural analysis of an eminently cultural phenomenon. The first part of the study attempted to do this with regard to anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon, arguing that as a universal phenomenon, it could largely be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power, both hard and soft. Yet though it seems relatively straightforward to analyze the global rejection of America in terms of a rejection of American power, at least if the ambition is to outline the premises for a structural interpretation of the phenomenon in general terms, it becomes much more difficult to use such a basic concept as the sole framework of analysis for a particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in one country. As opposed to the first part of this study, which focused on the general forces partaking in promoting anti-Americanism worldwide, the second part will focus more particularly on the forces, which can be regarded as predisposing the French mind against America. This does not mean that as a general phenomenon, anti-Americanism should be regarded in terms of rejection of American power, but that as a particularistic phenomenon, other explanations are more pertinent. It remains the contention of this study that by and large, the notion of a rejection of American power offers the best overall explanation for the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, whether in its general or in its more particularistic forms. However, the fact that anti-Americanism is a universal phenomenon does not entail that the United States is uniformly rejected by the world's nations or their inhabitants. The substantial body of literature on the phenomenon shows that there is clear evidence that America, and by extension American power, is rejected differently within different societies, both as regards the vehemence of the different anti-American narratives and the attributes associated with American power. Any particularistic account of anti-Americanism in one society is therefore bound to enter into a discussion of why the society in question harbors its specific form of anti-Americanism, i.e. why particular attributes of American power are perceived as especially oppressive or objectionable by the propagators of anti-American narratives in that society.

Before progressing with an analysis of the particular and, as will be argued, constitutive elements, which contribute to engender anti-American emotions and actions in France, this chapter will attempt to sketch a conceptual and methodological framework,

through which a particularistic variety of identity-related anti-Americanism such as the French can be analyzed. It was noted in chapter 1 that anti-Americanism could best, at least within the IR tradition, be analyzed as a cultural phenomenon. It was further suggested that the cultural nature of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism could best be understood in terms of identity, as the identity dimension is conducive to producing images of othering and that these can lay the foundations for subsequent (anti-American) behavior, an argument which will be expanded further upon in the present chapter. Paul Gilbert has noted that there is “a distinction between culture as what guides people’s behaviour, and culture as what makes them, in one supposed sense of the term, the particular people that they are” (Gilbert 2000:33). This chapter will focus on both, arguing that the latter, which can for the purposes of this study be referred to as national identity, partakes in predisposing people sharing the common cultural identity associated with their belonging to a nation toward a certain shared *Weltanschauung*, which in turn affects their behavior. Beginning with a general discussion of national identity constructs, the present chapter will turn especially to the discipline of sociology in order to explore the notion of othering, arguing that perceptions regarding the Other can be regarded as deeply embedded in a nation’s national habitus, to use another eminently sociological term. The relationship between national identity and national habitus will subsequently be used in chapter 5 as the conceptual linchpin for an analysis of the constitutive core of French anti-Americanism, i.e. the essential values which can be regarded as promoting anti-American predispositions in France, while chapter 6 will relate these to the situational factors in modern France, which have contributed to prompt the activation of anti-American mechanisms and reactions.

4.1 Modernism and the Study of National Identity

The study of national identities has, as is the case for the study of culture as a factor in international relations and the admittedly more marginal research area of anti-Americanism, been subjected to renewed interest over the last decades (Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000)⁴⁹. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm succeeded in firmly imposing their modernist⁵⁰ perspective on nationalism and national identity as the dominant paradigm in the field (Smith 2003:72), arguing that national identity should in essence be regarded as constructed through the mechanism of nationalism (Gellner 1964 and 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983). Gellner early

on remarked that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist” (1964:168), a point he maintains two decades later by reaffirming that “It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round” (1983:55. See also Hobsbawm 1990:10 for similar claims). As opposed to the traditions, which emphasize the primordial or perennial nature of national identity (for example as developed by respectively Geertz 1973, and Seton-Watson 1977), modernists claim that nations and national identity have originated essentially as a result of the industrial society (Gellner 1964 and 1983), and that as such, they are “very recent newcomer[s] in human history” (Hobsbawm 1990:5). Hobsbawm specifically traces the origins of national identity to the socio-political forces which were released by the French and American Revolutions (Hobsbawm 1990). Numerous scholars have taken their cue from this tradition, without however necessarily subscribing to all its elements. The latest challenge against the dominant modernist perspective comes from the alternative tradition of “ethno-nationalism” (Smith 1995) or “ethno-symbolism” (Smith 2003). The sociologist Anthony D. Smith is usually seen as the primary representative of this relatively recent school (Treanor, in Gettel and Dunning (eds) 2004), and he has raised especially two points of contention against what he calls “structural modernism” (Smith 2003:72), both of interest to this study: the association between national identity and modernity, and the emphasis on the largely constructed nature of national identity, not least as represented by Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented traditions” (in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983)⁵¹. Smith distances himself from the modernist perspective, although without embracing the perennial or primordial standpoints, arguing instead that the character of modern nations and thus of national identity should also be explained in terms of their antecedent popular ethnic memories, myths, and symbols, the conclusion being that nations and national identities have pre-modern origins (1991, 1995, 2003). Building much of his argumentation on the notion of *ethnies*, which he defines as “named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites” (1995:57), Smith stresses, and therein lies his principal dissociation from those within the primordialist tradition who focus on the objective, i.e. biological dimension of ethnicity (see for example Van den Berghe 1981 and 1995), that his focus on *ethnies* is essentially related to their subjective elements such as those related to memories, values, feelings, and symbols (Smith 1995:57). It is highly probable, as Smith argues, that the

mainstream modernist approach with its tendency to dismiss the pre-modern facets of national identity as largely the result of invented traditions, is vulnerable to criticism of constructing a theoretical case, which is highly Euro-centered in its approach, while frequently ignoring historical evidence found elsewhere (2003). Nevertheless Smith's own ethno-symbolist approach raises a number of questions, at least when applied to the present study. First, while there has admittedly been, as will be further discussed below, a strong tendency among the primary shapers of national identity to focus on the mythical past as evidence to a prolonged historical sense of belonging, as can be witnessed especially in the classical tradition of regarding national identity in terms of national genius, national spirit, or national characteristics (Karlsson 1997:93, Smith 1991:85-90, Jenkins and Sofos, in Jenkins and Sofos (eds) 1996:22-23), there is no escaping the fact that though there are undoubtedly pre-modern origins to many of the central tenets of modern national identity, these have largely been if not constructed, then at least reconstructed and remodeled in a willful attempt at forging a sense of national community among the members of modern nations. This is not least clear as regards the French national identity, as we shall see in chapter 5. Second, Smith's emphasis on *ethnies* appears problematic, even when referred to in a subjective sense. Though there can be no doubt that the perception of ethnicity features strongly in certain national cultures – and this is particularly prominent when we observe for example the German national identity⁵² – it nevertheless remains an inherently ambiguous notion, especially when applied to nations, which see themselves as universal nations, theoretically open to new members willing to share their values and aspirations. Two prime examples of such universal nations are, as will be argued in chapter 5, France and the United States. Smith is clearly attentive to this problem, and he attempts to solve it by stressing that for example the American national identity, although undeniably incorporating both several *ethnies* and multiethnic and universalist identity components, nonetheless builds largely on “Anglo-Saxon culture” (1995:108, see also 1991:149). This is neither a controversial, nor a particularly convincing argument, if the intention is to highlight the importance of *ethnies* as constitutive of national identities. Greenfeld has for example made the same observation, yet nevertheless finds that “The American case illustrates the essential independence of nationality from geo-political and ethnic factors and underscores its conceptual, or ideological, nature” (1992:23). The same argument can, although perhaps with less emphasis, be transferred to France, where there undoubtedly is a perception of Gallic ancestry (largely constructed, as has been demonstrated

especially by Citron 1991) and Latin affiliation (less constructed, but equally problematic, as it largely refers to a much wider linguistic and cultural community than the one made up by territorial France, i.e. one incorporating several *ethnies*). The social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen has rightly stated that “The question which must be asked pertains to whether or not ethnic identities are by default more ‘basic’ than others. Some would say yes, others would say no – and that is the state of the art” (1993:154). Smith would seem to say yes, Etienne Balibar clearly says no:

No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are ethnicized – that is, represented in the past or in the future *as if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions. (in Eley and Suny (eds) 1996:140)

Basically, the perception of ethnicity may be an important component of national identity if it is felt as important, yet this does not imply that it can be imposed as the constitutive element of national identities as such⁵³. By and large, I am inclined to agree with Greenfeld when he emphasizes that

“ethnicity” in itself is in no way conducive to nationality. “Ethnic” characteristics form a certain category of raw material which can be organized and rendered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements of any number of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an organizing principle applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity. (1992:13-14)

Third, the fact that there may be pre-modern origins to the modern nations (but even the most ferocious of the structural modernists accept that: Gellner describes how nationalism “sometimes take pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures” (Gellner 1983:49), Hobsbawm talks of “proto-nationalism” to denote certain pre-modern variants of feelings of collective belonging (1990:46)) does not mean that Smith succeeds in convincing at least this reader that we need to antedate the birth of the modern nation. Smith argues that the analysis put forth by modernists is “elite-oriented” (2003:83), i.e. that the constructivist notion of invented traditions implies that the elites are the primary forces, which construct, shape, or invent such traditions. Yet the same could be said for Smith’s ethno-symbolic school given that he concedes that the notion of solidarity, which he associates with the *ethnies*, may be especially

found “among their elites” (1995:57). Furthermore, by remarking that 1789 “marked the moment of transition from ‘nationalism as a form of culture’ [...] to ‘nationalism as a form of politics’” (1991:94), Smith effectively validates much of the modernist assertion about the birth of the modern nation. This does not mean that the reservations he raises are not valid, and he has made a compelling case for including the symbolist dimension to national identity and for focusing also on alternative explanations for extra-European nationalism. However, he has neither persuaded this reader that *ethnies* should be regarded as the constitutive part of national identity, nor that the pre-modern origins of the nations invalidate the modernist claims regarding the essentially modern nature of national identity, at least as regards Europe and North America. This, however, does not mean that the modernist explanation should be subscribed to part and parcel. A central modernist claim is that nationalism and by extension national identity is a feature of the “age of nationalism” (Gellner 1983:39-52), an age which is perceived as having both a starting point (typically attributed to industrialism and/or the French Revolution) as well as an end. Hobsbawm predicted in 1989 that the age of nationalism was drawing to a close, with nationalism and national sentiment “retreating before”, or even “being absorbed or dislocated, by the new supranational restructuring of the globe. Nations and nationalism will be present in this history, but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles” (Hobsbawm 1990:182). That turned out to be a rather premature assessment. The last decade of the twentieth century saw, as George Schöpflin has noted, a “sudden return of nationalism”, reemerging “as a significant political force in the world system” (in Kupchan (ed.) 1995:37). In an era of globalization, there is little doubt that nationalism is still very much alive and kicking – one can tell by the kicking.

Though the modernist claims for associating national identity with modernity are strong, the modernist approach, especially in what Smith has termed its “structural” form, nonetheless needs to be qualified. Although Smith describes ethno-symbolism as the fourth paradigm within the study of nationalism and national identities (2003:83), his emphasis on the subjective nature of identity build around the notion of *ethnies* and his acceptance and reformulation of relatively many of the core assumptions presented by the modernists, leads me to wonder whether ethno-symbolism should not be seen as a modified version of modernism rather than as a fourth independent tradition. Smith acknowledges that so far, ethno-symbolists have not developed a theory of nationalism, but only an alternative approach, which can act as a necessary corrective to the existing traditions (2003:88). This

would imply that some of the relevant observations raised by the ethno-symbolists could well be applied also in a largely modernist analysis of national identities, which could benefit from a softening of some of its more dogmatic notions regarding especially the constructed or ‘invented’ nature of national identities. This is in essence the approach taken by another modernist, Benedict Anderson, who has presented us with a more nuanced reading of national identity, which he analyzes through the notion of “imagined communities” (1991). To Anderson, the nation can best be described as an “imagined political community”, which “is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991:6). Anderson’s emphasis on the imagined nature of the nation and thus of national identity is clearly an attempt at softening the determinist dimension of structural modernism. As opposed to Gellner and Hobsbawm, “who concentrate on the political aspects of nationalism”, Anderson is more concerned with understanding “the force and persistence of national identity and sentiment” (Eriksen 1993:100). While subscribing to the pervasive modernist view that nations were born in the age of “Enlightenment and Revolution” (Anderson 1991:7), he nevertheless finds that there is a drawback to the “ferocity” with which some modernist scholars have stressed the invented origins of nations:

Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’. [...] In fact, all communities larger than the primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. (ibid:6)

Anderson’s approach is compelling, as it maintains the largely imagined dimension of national identities, without necessarily attributing them with the label of falsity commonly associated with the modernist tradition. It is certainly a fact, as David Miller notes, that “because of the historical dimension of the nation, together with the idea that each nation has its own distinct character, it is uncomfortable to be reminded of the forced nature of one’s national genesis” (Miller 2000:31). Yet it should be borne in mind that this notion of construction or imagination of a national identity has far older antecedents than the theories proposed by modernists. In his *Projet Corse*, Rousseau famously declared that “The first rule which we have to follow is that of a national character: every people has, or must have, a character; if it lacks one, we must start by endowing it with one” (quoted by Smith 1991:75).

The modernist approach to the subject of national identity is of particular interest for the study of French anti-Americanism, as it highlights three important factors in relation to national identity: First, the association between the birth of the nation and modernity, which is typically dated to the French and American Revolutions. Second, the assertion of the largely constructed nature of national identities. Third, the role played by the elites in shaping or influencing this construction. As we shall see in chapter 5, these three factors seem particularly validated when applied to the French national identity, a fact which many modernists would probably consider a tautology, given that Republican France in their view represents the first modern nation (Hobsbawm 1990)⁵⁴. Yet for there to be an imagined community, there must be, as Michael Billig argues, “acts of collective imagination, which ‘invent’ the national society” (in Breakwell and Lyons (eds) 1996:185). I would argue that such acts of collective imagination can be regarded as typically being built around what one might call the major vectors of national identity. While there are, as Renan already noted in his famous lecture on the subject, no firm criteria of nationhood (Renan 1882), it should nevertheless be possible to define a number of vectors, around which narratives regarding the national self are most commonly constructed. Anthony D. Smith has defined five interrelated components, on which he claims that national identity is constructed, and these he names as “ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political” (1991:15). Though these five components are indeed important, the latter three can largely be regarded as essentially political (and geo-political) in nature, while a religious component is strangely absent, given that religion plays an tremendously important role as a major component within some national identities⁵⁵. Instead of adopting Smith’s five components, this study will argue that the narratives surrounding national identity typically evolve around four major vectors, which can be termed political, cultural, religious, and ethnic, and that perceptions of national identity are constructed and developed along these major vectors, which in turn can give rise to four archetypical ideational narratives:

- The political narratives surrounding national identity, typically centered on the historical nature of the geographical entity associated with the nation (whether in the form of a state or not), its political traditions, socio-economic practices etc.
- The cultural narratives, which relate to the determining cultural characteristics, including language, habits, cultural outputs, symbolic artifacts etc., which contribute to give a nation its cultural distinctiveness.

- The religious narrative, which concerns the place (or non-place) of religion in society or among the different ethnic groupings comprising society.
- The ethnical narratives, which relate to perceptions of ethnicity among the members belonging to a nation. These perceptions may be inclusive, i.e. not necessarily considered as limited to any original *ethnie*, as long as the other identity variables are subscribed to, or exclusive, in the sense of being inherently associated with one dominating *ethnie*.

It is the contention of this study that narratives surrounding national identity can largely be traced somewhere along these four vectors. There will undoubtedly be numerous overlaps, just as some of the vectors will have a stronger impact in some nations than in others. In some cases, the religious and ethnical vectors may largely be seen as one (for example if we consider Judaism in relation to the state of Israel), whereas in other societies, the religious or the ethnical vector might be fairly weak. Conversely, in a number of societies, especially in the Muslim world, the ethnic or religious vector appears to be stronger than the political, whereas in some tribal societies, the political – and indeed the national identity itself – seem to be wholly subordinated to the ethnic (tribal) identity. Yet I would argue that these four vectors constitute the four lines of demarcation, along which narratives concerning national identity typically evolve. Even if one finds that for example the ethnic or the religious narrative can largely be regarded as subcomponents situated somewhere along the cultural vector, there is little doubt that in some nations, these narratives play such an important role in relation to the primary dimensions of (national) identification that they warrant special attention. One can further argue that these four vectors represent the lines according to which people typically differentiate their national identity from that of others.

4.2 National Identity and the Creation of ‘We’ and ‘Them’ Images

There is, regardless of the academic tradition subscribed to, a broad consensus among scholars of national identity on the fact that national identity – like any other identity – largely evolves around the demarcation from others. Identity stems from the post-classical Latin word *identitas*. The prefix stems from *idem*, meaning ‘same’, and *identitas* is thus traditionally translated in the meaning ‘sameness’. Linguistically, it is operative only dialectically in relation to its opposite, ‘otherness’, as nothing can be the same as something without at the

same time being distinct from something else (Therborn 1995:229). Anthropologists such as Fredrik Barth have taken this a step further, arguing four decades ago that groups are defined by their boundaries (Barth 1969:15), leading to the assertion that there can be no “us” without “them” (Billig 1995:78), and that “Alter is primary to Ego” (Therborn 1995:229)⁵⁶. This gives the notion of identity a divisive as well as a uniting dimension: One nation or group of people which feels united by shared beliefs or practices will feel different from others precisely because they perceive that these values and beliefs demarcate them from others (Gilbert 2000:38). Ideational and cultural values are at the core of image-building, and the self that constitutes national identity is closely related to the ‘Other’ to which it is opposed: “national identities are constituted in relation to *others*; the very idea of the nation presupposes that there are other nations, or at least other peoples, who are not members of the nation” (Eriksen 1993:111), and as such, “delineation of a self from an other is an active and ongoing part of identity formation” (Neumann 1995:28). Borrowing from George Herbert Mead’s notion of “Significant Others” (1934), Triandafyllidou takes this argument a step further:

Indeed, for the nation to exist, it is presupposed that there is some other community, some other nation, from which it needs to distinguish itself. The nation thus has to be understood as a part of a dual relationship rather than as an autonomous, self-contained unit. [...] The identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence. (1998)

If we apply this to the modernist notion of the nation as a constructed or imagined community, it becomes clear that national identity is largely constructed *also*, and perhaps even *primarily* in relation to other communities (Stråth, in Stråth (ed.) 2000). In the eighteenth centuries, historicism, “the belief in the birth, growth, efflorescence and decay of peoples and cultures”, became, as Smith has noted, “increasingly attractive as a framework for inquiry into the past and present and as an explanatory principle in elucidating the meanings of events, past and present” (Smith 1991:87). It was around such historicist narratives, with their imbued “essentialist understandings of ‘national character’”, that images of the Self and of Others became constructed (McDonald, in MacDonald (ed.) 1997:231). As the age of dynastic rivalries was being replaced by the age of nationalism, these narratives became elevated from an intellectual pastime among the elites and formed into a common national narrative imposed on the people in order to instill them with a shared sense of national identity. The narratives of national identity, which gained in momentum from the

nineteenth century onwards (Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000), can, as argued above, be regarded as evolving along a number of main vectors, yet it should be emphasized that these vectors are not just related to perceptions of the national Self. Rather, they should be perceived as having a dialectical nature, promoting a sense of national self-identification while simultaneously contrasting this self-identification with perceptions regarding the Others in what Anna Triandafyllidou has called the “Janus-faced” process of national identity (2002:26): “Through signifying Otherness, members of the ingroup also define who they are and which are the specific features that render, in their view, their community particular and unique” (ibid:32). This study will argue that this dialectical demarcation of the national Self from the Other primarily takes place on three overlapping, yet distinguishable levels, all inherently present in narratives surrounding national identity:

1. Differentiation from the Other, i.e. by emphasizing the uniqueness and authenticity of the national Self,
2. Preservation from the Other, i.e. by promoting narratives regarding the importance of protecting the nation (and the national Self) from being dominated by the other,
3. Denigration of the Other, the aim being to contrast the national Self with stereotypes regarding the Other, typically of a negative nature.

First, the literature on national identity is unanimous in emphasizing the importance of differentiation as a key element in the imagining (or construction) of national identities. Nations have throughout attempted to stress their uniqueness both by endowing themselves with national symbols perceived as particularly representative of their distinctiveness and by promoting a distinct national narrative, typically articulated with reference to the mythological past. The nation state is, as Gutiérrez notes, “committed to fulfilling three basic goals: the standardization of practices, the construction of homogeneity and the delimitation of cultural originality” (in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:9). Since the nineteenth century, nation states have attempted to fulfill these goals by actively promoting the use of a common national language wherever applicable (Gellner 1983, Karlsson 1997) and not least by promoting nationally oriented curriculums in schools and universities, in order to forge a collective identity built around notions of past and present national glories. The impact of national historiography on the construction of national identity is well documented (Citron 1991, Smith 1991, Weber 1979, Zeldin 1977). Uffe Østergård has even argued that

“professional historiography owe[s] its existence to precisely the formation of the national states” (in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:453). According to Therborn, collective identities have, like other constructions, “their architects, their entrepreneurs and their builders” (1995:229), and as such, we may attribute the primary role as regards the construction of images of the national Self to the “intellectuals and [...] the political will of the state” (Tishkov 1997:21), i.e. to the “social elites” (Nieguth 1999:259), keen to forge a sense of national consciousness among the newly invented concept of “people” (Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:456). This national consciousness was early on essentially centered on what was previously termed the “national genius” (Smith 1991:87), which Ernest Renan eminently described in his lecture *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*

Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j’entends de la véritable), voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale. Avoir des gloires communes dans le passé, une volonté commune dans le présent ; avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore, voilà la condition essentielle pour être un peuple. [...] Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constituée par le sentiment des sacrifices qu’on a faits et de ceux qu’on est disposé à faire encore. (1882:26-27)

This was the sense of national sentiment, which nineteenth century historiography attempted to impose, and though Renan shrewdly added that to get one’s history wrong is “un facteur essentiel de la formation d’une nation” (ibid:7), there is no doubt that national glorification was (and frequently remains) an essential part of the national identity discourse. This national glorification was simultaneously meant to demarcate the nation from other nations, lacking the virtues on which this glorification was supposedly built. With time, the emphasis on past glories may have somewhat faded, to be replaced by for example pride in the nation’s political, socio-economical traditions or cultural features, which have come to be represented as “emblems of difference” (Triandafyllidou 2002:30). As such, national identity has continued to provide “a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture” (Smith 1991:17).

Second, inherent in all notions regarding national specificity is the perception that the nation and its distinctiveness need to be preserved and protected. Depending on the historical period, the perceived challenges or threats against a nation have changed, and so has as a consequence the identification of the Other, against whom protection was needed (Said 1995:332, McDonald, in Macdonald (ed.) 1997:228-233). Triandafyllidou distinguishes

(2002:39-42) between four types of “external Significant Others”: 1) the dominant nation, against which the in-group seeks to liberate and/or distinguish itself, 2) neighboring nations, which might pose a direct territorial threat to the in-group, 3) nations, which do not necessarily contest territorial boundaries or pose a military threat, but which threaten the in-group’s sense of uniqueness and authenticity, and 4) transnational entities, which might indirectly challenge the territorial and political identity of the nation⁵⁷. She further notes that these four types typically relate to different phases of a nation’s history, although there might be considerable overlaps. The first type she finds particularly relevant for the initial stages of state formation (ibid:39), and to this corresponds the core of nationalist myths according to which, “the nation is born, or arises from a painful rite of passage where it has to fight its adversaries” (Eriksen 1993:112). The second type corresponds to the standard notions of the hereditary enemy inherited largely from the age of dynasties, where close geographical neighbors were frequently engaged in territorial disputes. The driving force behind geopolitical considerations before the nineteenth century was not ethnic or linguistic unity, but rather the ambition to achieve a territory, which was geographically coherent and easy to defend (Herslund 2002:99). Yet with the advent of modernity, dynastic rivalries were transformed into national rivalries through the workings of national historiography. The nations’ elites promoted the notion of a national genius largely with reference to the past glories of the old dynasties, complete with the baggage of historic rivalries and enmities with other dynasties, which was now elevated to the national level. Even as some of the dynasties fell, the rivalries lingered on, as ancient grievances were transformed into claims regarding national destinies and the protection of the nation from foreign influence or domination. This competition among nations typically had, as had been the case in the age of dynasties, a geopolitical component, yet could exist equally well without one, as protection of the nation increasingly came to be regarded not only as a protection of its borders or citizens, but also of its values and distinctiveness. This corresponds to the third type identified by Triandafyllidou. “Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel”, affirmed Renan (1882:26), and as the nineteenth century progressed, the cultural fabric of a nation became not just an underlying variable that determined the perception of the world; its preservation became an end in itself. Today, safeguarding the national identity and cultural autonomy has become not as much a matter of preserving the nation’s borders intact as increasingly in the modern world a matter of preserving a matter of life that has been labeled national (Eriksen 1993).

Third, archetypes about the national Self, seen as condensing the essence of the national genius, are typically contrasted with stereotypes about the Other, usually of a much less flattering nature: “While archetypes reinforce a sense of cultural pride by encouraging emulation and admiration, stereotypes convey prejudices and derogatory meanings towards other[s]” (Gutiérrez, in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:13). At the core of the othering impulses inherent in national identities, we find not only a case of demarcation from the Significant Other, we also typically (though not exclusively) find one of perceptions of superiority. The national identity components are not just presented as authentic or distinctive to the nation in question; they also typically enter into what Østergård has called an “asymmetric relationship” (in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:462) with the images bestowed on the Other, whereby the national genius is contrasted to the stereotyped attributes associated with the Other. While these are typically of a negative nature, this needs not always be the case. The stereotypical Other “can involve looking either up or down at an idealised or denigrated object” (Pickering 2001:71), and as such “identity should not be conceived as just a blank negation of the Other” (Therborn 1995:230). Triandafyllidou emphasizes that though the Significant Other always poses a challenge to the nation, this challenge is not necessarily seen as constituting a threat, but can also be of a positive nature, as when the Other is “perceived as an object of admiration and esteem, an exemplary case to be imitated, [...] a higher ground to be reached by the nation, in brief, an *inspiring* Significant Other” (2002:34). Alexander Wendt has similarly suggested that “Identification is a continuum from negative to positive – from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self” (1994:386). But given that the Significant Others “are by definition groups that share with the nation some common features”, the inspiring Significant Other may for a number of reasons turn into a “*threatening* Significant Other” (Triandafyllidou 2002:34). This may for example come about either because the virtues formerly associated with the Other have ceased to be admired, or because they have been so successfully emulated by the nation that it now perceives the Other as a rival with respect to these virtues. This is especially the case as regards what Rainer Emig terms the “cultural Other”, who is typically perceived as “at once an ideal worthy of emulation and a bogeyman that must be distrusted. To complicate matters further, what represents the bogeyman in the Other generally displays close affinities with what a culture perceives as negative and threatening in itself” while at the same time

representing “a slyly externalized suppressed element of the cultural self-image” (in Emig (ed.) 2000:8). Emig further notes that

While stereotypes [...] teach us little about the Other, they teach us a great deal about ourselves, our dreams, ideals, but also about our anxieties and fears. [...] They function as structures of demarcation, but also assimilation. They assert a problematic selfhood through imagining a different Other – who is both strangely attractive (creating the narcissistic desire of emulation) as well as threatening and objectionable (bringing out tendencies of abjection or straightforward bedevilment). (ibid.)

In the end, “the Other is always constructed as an object for the benefit of the subject who stands in need of an objectified Other in order to achieve a masterly self-identification” (Pickering 2001:71), and stereotyping contributes by homogenizing “this or that stereotypical attribute or trait” to bolster the legitimacy of the Self “by its symbolic exclusion of the Other” (ibid:74). This contributes to a process, where even a “positive definition of national identity ultimately rests on exclusion and negative characteristics” (Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:462).

This clearly is of interest for the analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism. The role of stereotypization in relation to anti-Americanism has often been raised (Joffe 2006a and 2006b, Hollander 1995), and if we accept the contention made here that the more particularistic causes of anti-Americanism can be regarded as linked with key elements of national identities, the role of the Self and perceptions regarding the Other become crucial to such an analysis. Furthermore, the literature on othering and stereotyping seems particularly interesting when we examine the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in France. As will be argued in chapter 5, France and the United States share a number of essential values, around which their national identities can be said to evolve. Social psychological research on group behavior shows us that we may typically expect the strongest competition between two groups to occur when the groups closely resemble each other (Turner 1975, Volkan 1985 and 1988), given that they will have a particular tendency to perceive their distinctiveness and uniqueness as threatened by the Other (Johnston and Hewstone, in Abrams and Hogg (eds) 1990). As will be argued below, this seems a particularly relevant observation when we analyze how the constitutive elements of French national identity can be considered as rivaled by some of the core American ideals. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the combination of national archetypes and stereotypes regarding the Other is bound to influence not just the mind, but also the behavior

of people. This will be of particular interest when we turn to chapter 6, which will look more specifically on the actions and narratives, which may be perceived as influenced, at least to a certain degree, by anti-American predispositions. Though there is a certain hesitancy among some toward relating national identity with behavior, this study contends that there is a clear link, and that this can best be conceptualized by interpreting the impact of national archetypes and stereotypes regarding the Other in relation to the notion of *habitus* – as an ingrained part of national perceptions that has become so embedded in the national identities, that it partakes in shaping behavior.

4.3 National Habitus and Collective Behavior

Alex Inkeles finds that national character “must be defined conceptually as a *determinant* of behavior rather than concretely as a *form* of behavior” (1997:14). This is undoubtedly true, yet at the same time, collective identities provide a system of orientation for self-reference and action (Ross, in Lichbach and Zuckerman (eds) 1997:42). Notions of who ‘we’ are contribute to guide our perception of the world and thus our political actions (Jönsson 1984, Little and Smith 1988), and in this perspective, identities “shape the behavior of people” (Huntington 2004:22). Nevertheless, there is a need to conceptualize how identity can influence behavior. Inkeles’ preference is “to define national character as having reference to personality patterns” (Inkeles 1997:11), arguing that they can be analyzed using a “modal personality” framework. As opposed to Inkeles’ approach, which has as its point of departure a psycho-sociological perspective, this study focuses not so much on the individual psychological traits as on the more or less institutionalized ideational and cultural repertoires. Yet there is a case for operationalizing the notion of national identity in order to assess how it can contribute to promote not just a certain image of the Self in relation to the Other, but also how it can be regarded as laying the foundation for subsequent behavior. This study will argue that this can best be done by linking the notion of national identity with the concept of *habitus*.

In sociology, the term *habitus* is today connected especially to the works of Pierre Bourdieu, and though the term has a long prehistory⁵⁸, it has become so associated with his terminology, that this arguably provides the most straightforward starting point for an analysis wishing to use the concept. In Bourdieu’s terminology, it denotes socially acquired, embodied systems of dispositions and/or predispositions. It refers not to character,

identity, or socialization per se, but to ‘deep structural’ classificatory and assessment propensities, socially acquired, and manifested in among others outlooks and opinions (Bourdieu 1977). While Bourdieu does not use the term in relation to questions of national identity⁵⁹, it might be an interesting path to follow in the attempt to get a better grip of how predispositions stemming from the core of national identities can be seen as inductive toward a certain form of behavior. Bourdieu reintroduced the concept in order to make sense of why people in the same or similar social classes, economic status and cultural affiliations behave in remarkably alike ways. To Bourdieu, “the habitus contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning without subjective intention” (1999:114), and he holds that an individual’s actions are as much a product of his or her conditioned perception of the world as they are stimulated by individual intent. In his terminology, the concept of habitus is inextricably linked to the concept of *doxa*, i.e. an ingrained perception of the world surrounding us⁶⁰. According to Bourdieu, the doxa constitutes a system of values and acknowledged preconceptions which forms the basis of a group’s action and communication. It is at the same time a system of perception and misperception: Stereotypes allow us to comprehend what we perceive as reality while at the same time being an obstacle for a deeper and more elaborate comprehension of the world surrounding us. The doxa facilitates communication by reproducing the dominant collective belief-representations and is legitimated by its beholders as it is accepted at large as true, while at the same time being unverifiable (Bourdieu 1979:72-73). This almost unquestionable orthodoxy operates as if it was the objective truth and affects, indeed forms the perceptions of individuals and permeates the practices and perceptions of the social groups to which individuals belong. In association with all the stimuli – social experiences, whether of one’s own making or inflicted, whether conscious or unconscious – that we are subjected to, it becomes part of our habitus, acting as some kind of second nature and guiding our behavior (Jerlang and Jerlang 1996:365-9). Bourdieu makes the case that the process of socialization is a continuous line of experiences gained within a certain class, status or social group, which help to define the way one sees the world (1999:113). The habitus is inescapable, for once one is born into one group, that group’s habitus becomes ingrained or socialized into that person. Because people in the same social group, class or economic situation share similar experiences, it is likely that these people will share a similar understanding of the world. In other words, the environment produces the experiences that form that person’s view of the world. This does not mean that

individuals are forever locked into a firm, unchangeable habitus. The habitus might be inescapable, but it will evolve as the individual progresses in life and acquires new experiences, aspires to become included in new social groups etc. Bourdieu furthermore suggests that perhaps the predictability of behavior that is instilled in humans by the habitus is its greatest hidden effect (ibid.). Put differently, because the habitus frames the way certain groups of people see the world, it contributes to reproducing behavior within the groups to which they belong: It is a “structuring structure”, which generates action (Swartz 1997:102).

It is tempting to analyze national stereotypes and processes of othering with respect to the notion of habitus, as this allows us to link identity with behavior. Norbert Elias, who used the term ‘habitus’ long before its popularization by Bourdieu (Dunning and Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix), has described national character as “a habitus problem *par excellence*” (Elias 1991:182), remarking that “the traits of national group identity – what we call the ‘national character’ – are a layer of the social habitus built very deeply and firmly into the personality structure of the individual” (ibid:209). Though there has been an increased tendency lately to refer to habitus also in relation to matters regarding national identity or international relations, typically with a focus on how the practical consciousness of the individuals who comprise a nation play a powerful role in the foundation of cultural relations, identity politics and the construction and representation of national identities (see for example Maguire & Poulton 1999, Kauppi 2003), it is, however, rare that we encounter the notion of ‘national habitus’. Indeed, Elias is among the very few to have used the term national habitus in his works. In their preface to his last major work, his translators note that Elias uses the term “in large part to overcome the problems of the old notion of ‘national character’ as something fixed and static” (Dunning and Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix). There is little doubt that Elias’s notion of national habitus can also be related to national identity constructs, given, as Elias notes, that “The fortunes of a nation become crystallized in institutions which are responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same characteristics, possess the same national habitus” (1996:18). Hereby, Elias implies that this collective identity has a place not just in the hearts and minds of the citizens, but also in the workings of institutions that make up the nation as a political and ideational entity. To Elias, the habitus replaces the false dichotomy between individual actors and societies (Tuck 2003:179): Individuals bear in them the habitus of the group to which they belong, and with which they share personality characteristics. Though individuals belong to several “social

survival groups”, Elias finds that as a group, the nation “usually has special prominence” (Elias 1991:182-83). Nations are related to powerful we-images and have the potential to affect individual images, especially by offering strong contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’, with the self-image of the we-group being “modeled on its exemplary, most ‘nomic’ or norm-setting section”, while the characteristics attributed to the outsider group are typically “the ‘bad’ characteristics of that group’s ‘worst’ section – of its anomic minority” (Elias, in Elias and Scotson 1994:xix). The contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are sedimented in the “national habitus codes”, and in that location they can be easily connected to personal images, whereby the nation becomes the individual and vice-versa (Tuck 2003). National habitus is not essentialist (Dunning and Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix), i.e. as opposed to the image of an almost “invariable national character”, national habitus has the propensity to develop reflecting the fortunes and experiences of a nation, though it nevertheless remains characterized by a certain social inertness, which entails that change will occur only slowly and gradually with time (Gundelach 2001:74).

It is the contention of this study that the notion of “national habitus” offers a good conceptualization of how identity can influence behavior, a point which Elias eminently illustrated in *The Germans* (1996), wherein he explained how features of the German national habitus had contributed to produce the rise of Nazism (Dunning and Mennell 1998:346-347). As such, it may prove especially useful in a context such as the present. For the purposes of this study, national habitus can be characterized in two ways. On an individual level, it can be defined as:

1. a shared set of nationally based and nationally oriented dispositions or predispositions, which partake in shaping our outlooks as well as our actions;
2. these predispositions are largely based on a sense of belonging to a nation (national identity) and an adoption of national values and outlooks (akin to a common national doxa) that may or (more often) may not be conscious,
3. and they are shaped or reinforced by the actions of the nation over time,
4. allowing the citizens not only to share a notion of a national ‘we’, but also giving them a sense of a common heritage and common national aspirations that usually – as a result of the shared doxa – results in support for the political paradigms on which the nation relies,
5. and which contribute to forging stereotyped images regarding other nations and their inhabitants.

This definition does of course not imply that all inhabitants of a nation share the same national habitus. Some immigrants for example often find it hard to integrate into societies in

which they neither share the national doxa nor as a consequence the national habitus. And most individuals regardless of their ethnic origin will more often than not find that they do not share large portions of the ‘generally held beliefs’ that their compatriots are portrayed as having. They may even question the paradigmatic dogmas around which the mainstream political parties have built their platforms. Social struggles within societies also mean that different groups will constantly challenge what dominant groups are portraying as national values. Nevertheless, national identities are rooted in the belief-systems of the nation’s citizens and as a consequence will shape their outlooks and behavior. In short, national identity is bound to entail some degree of national habitus. The importance placed by Elias on national habitus in relation to questions of international relations and foreign policy is of particular importance in this context and is worth recalling *in extenso*:

The majority of people who form with each other differentiated industrial nation-states have no direct experience, no specialized knowledge and, indeed, no opportunities for gaining any specialized knowledge about problems of inter-state relations and politics, except the knowledge communicated to them indirectly, often in a highly selective or muddled and biased form, by public media. A deeply felt belief, an individual conscience-formation embodying in one of its layers one’s own state as the highest value, thus performs in the large and populous nation-states of the twentieth century, *mutatis mutandis*, a function similar to what could be achieved in dynastic state-societies by practical and comparatively rational considerations of self-interest on the part of small ruling elites. Such a national belief creates in the mass of the members of a nation-state personality dispositions which make them inclined to exert all their strength, to fight and if necessary to die in situations where they see the interests or the survival of their society threatened. In this way, dispositions are created to which actual or potential ruling elites of these large sovereign collectivities can appeal by the use of appropriate releaser symbols when they judge the integrity of their collectivity to be in danger. [...] And being all-pervasive, such dispositions color thinking; they create blockages and biases. [...] The preservation, integrity and interests of the state-society, of their own sovereign collectivity and all it stands for, are assimilated by each individual as part of his or her habitus, as a guiding principle of action which in certain situations can and must override all others. (Elias 1996:157)

While Elias does not offer any clear and unambiguous definition of national habitus, using instead the term in a more or less off-hand way to denote a human second nature (van Krieken 1998:47), identifiable on the national level and which partakes in the state formation process and the civilizing process (Elias 1991 and 1996), it seems that he uses it first and foremost in relation to the individuals grouped in a nation rather than to the nation itself, as when for example he writes that “people’s habitus, the dominant pattern of their self-regulation, is

focused on identification with sovereign states” (in Goudsblom and Mennell (eds) 1998:224, see also Elias 1996:19). Nevertheless, it seems obvious to interpret national habitus also as a collective phenomenon that can be analyzed on a state level. Instead of being seen as a national element in the individual’s habitus, i.e. the citizen dimension of the habitus, national habitus can be seen as a collective or institutionalized habitus that can be identified as part of a nation’s workings. In that case, the definition could be:

1. a national disposition or predisposition that partakes in shaping the outlooks and actions of a nation or state;
2. this disposition is a result of historical and cultural events and developments that have shaped the national identity,
3. and given the nation’s successive rulers and ruling elites, both political and cultural, a common national doxa that has an effect on their actions, creating powerful belief-systems that in some respects have become paradigmatic in nature;
4. these belief-systems will tend to sediment into society at large, in turn reinforcing the national habitus of the nation’s citizens;
5. while offering both the nation and its citizens a sense of identity and purpose of action that will often imply a demarcation from the Other(s).

This second definition of national habitus as a national predisposition inherent to the state or nation thus departs somewhat from the way in which the term has been used by Elias and others taking their cue from his works. Yet if one accepts the existence of a national habitus embodied in a nation’s citizens, it seems obvious that one can analyze it also as a collective phenomenon in the process of national identity formation. As opposed to the term national identity, the concept of national habitus allows us to bridge the supposed gap between identity and behavior: using a term that both denotes a system of collective dispositions and explains the forces through which these dispositions can shape behavior, it offers us new ways of analyzing the process whereby other nations become viewed by a nation as significant ‘Others’. In relation to the study of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, it helps us conceptualize how stereotypes regarding the Other will necessarily contribute to promote actions and narratives shaped to a certain extent by these stereotypes. As Elias notes,

Even in the most powerful countries, national pride is and remains a sore spot in the personality structure of the people concerned. This is particularly true of countries which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the pyramid of states. (1996:17)

Of special relevance to the present study, Elias further notes with respect to the self-image of such nations that:

A striking example in our time is that of the we-images and we-ideal of once-powerful nations whose superiority in relation to others has declined. Their members may suffer for centuries because the group charismatic we-ideal, modeled on an idealised image of themselves in the days of their greatness, lingers on for many generations as a model they feel they ought to live up to, without being able to do so. The radiance of their collective life as a nation has gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally understood as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior value of these others, is irretrievably lost. Yet the dream of their special charisma is kept alive in a variety of ways – through the teaching of history, the old buildings, masterpieces of the nation in the time of its glory, or through new achievements which seemingly confirm the greatness of the past. For a time, the fantasy shield of their imagined charisma as a leading, established group may give a declining nation the strength to carry on. In that sense it can have a survival value. But the discrepancy between the actual and the imagined position of one's group among others can also entail a mistaken assessment of one's power resources and, as a consequence, suggest a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one's own greatness (in Elias and Scotson 1994:xlili-xliv).

As will be argued in the following two chapters, this observation seems particularly relevant, when we attempt to assess why and how the United States seems with time to have acquired the role of France's Significant Other.

4.4 Implications for the Study of French Anti-Americanism

There is among the scholars who have studied anti-Americanism in some depth a consensus on the fact that anti-Americanism has a clear identity dimension (Markovits 2007), which is typically described as national or nationalistic (Hollander 1995, Katzenstein and Keohane, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007). Regarding the particular French variety of anti-Americanism, Philippe Roger has offered substantial evidence to support his claim that the phenomenon can be described as an established tradition in France (2005:449). The second part of this study will attempt to formulate how this established tradition can be viewed as originating from some of the most central elements of France's national identity. This chapter has advanced a methodological framework, which hopefully can provide us with the conceptual basis for studying the particularistic phenomenon of anti-Americanism in one nation by analyzing it in relation to the concept of national identity and, more specifically, national habitus. Though it is my belief that this approach can be applied to most particularistic analyses of anti-Americanism in any particular country, I nevertheless find the case for analyzing French anti-Americanism using this optic particularly strong. Given its

research objectives, this study will focus on the elements of national identity, which partake in shaping the public imagery in relations to other nations and their inhabitants. Needless to say, there may be numerous dimensions to for example the French national identity, which are not so easily transposable to France's relations with Others, and these will largely be left out in the present study.

Much of the scholarly debate surrounding national identity has, as was noted above, typically centered around the contentious issue of the birth of the modern nation, yet there is ample evidence to suggest that even if the date of birth is set to coincide with the French Revolution (the latest date proposed with some authority), it was only in the course of the nineteenth century that a sentiment of shared national identity emerged among the inhabitants of most Western nations. And though France might have been the first modern nation (Hobsbawm, 1990), France was still a "largely meaningless concept" for most of the inhabitants of the *hexagone* until well into the nineteenth century (Gibson, in Bjørn, Grant, and Stringer (eds) 1994:177). Both Theodore Zeldin and Eugen Weber have conclusively shown that there was outside of the elites a widespread failure to identify with France until the beginning of the Third Republic, i.e. as late as until the 1870s (Zeldin 1977, Weber 1979). It is in this respect, as Ralph Gibson notes, plausible to assume that "in order to identify with a country, people needed to be *told* that it was there that they belonged" (in Bjørn, Grant, and Stringer (eds) 1994:184). Nevertheless, chapter 5 will attempt to demonstrate that the core of modern French national identity can be traced to the values and beliefs inherited largely from the French Revolution and that some of the most constitutive elements of French national identity drawn from this period can in fact be regarded as predisposing the French against America, although there is no doubt that these predispositions have only sedimented into the broader French national habitus with time.

This chapter has argued that narratives regarding national identity can largely be regarded as evolving around four vectors of national identity; namely the political, cultural, religious, and ethnic vectors. It has further been argued that national identities are dialectical, i.e. that they must be regarded not only as promoting images of national archetypes, but also of stereotypes regarding the Other(s), and that this Other is typically seen as a challenge or a threat to the nation in question. Anthony D. Smith has provided us with the following example of how French national identity expresses itself "negatively", i.e. in relation to a perceived Other:

This was expressed in [...] France's Gaullist opposition in the 1960s and 1970s to NATO and American hegemony, its opposition to American cultural demands in the Uruguay round of the GATT discussions, and the antipathy entertained [...] towards 'les Anglo-Saxons' and their cultural hegemony. (1995:43)

As can be seen, Smith's assertion reads like a (very) condensed history of modern anti-Americanism in France, and it is significant that he relates these events so closely to the French national identity (without, however, offering more than a basic reading of the "positive" national feelings, *ibid.*). It is also noteworthy that this account of a French expression of its national identity primarily focuses on the need for protection against the Other, seemingly validating Lipiansky's assertion that "the defense of French identity" has become an increasingly central theme in public debates during the second half of the twentieth century (1991:255). The rest of the second part of this study will attempt to demonstrate that this notion of a defense of French identity has far older antecedents, and it will analyze French anti-Americanism using the conceptual framework delineated above, first by analyzing the core values of French national identity as especially conducive toward presenting the United States as France's primary Significant Other, an impression which, it will be argued, seems embedded in the French national doxa; second by analyzing French policies and actions toward the United States as (at least partly) determined by an anti-American predisposition, which one might conceive of as a part of the French national habitus. Smith has argued that "national identity comprises both a cultural and a political identity and is located in a political community as well as a cultural one" (1991:99). Therefore, chapter 6 will look more closely at these two communities in the attempt to evaluate the degree to which French political and cultural behavior is influenced by ideational predispositions against the United States.

Before progressing with the rest of our analysis, a word of caution might be in order: There is no doubt, as Chapman reminds us, that "The danger with national identity as an analytic category is the [...] temptation of projecting into the past our own *fin de siècle* preoccupations with and understandings of national identity and, more generally, identity politics" (1999:293). Therefore, we should, as Gutiérrez notes, "bear in mind that national identity is, first and foremost, the self-identification of the peoples of the nation-states" (in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:7). These are relevant observations, which should be borne in mind throughout. Yet the impression that national identities can be regarded as largely constructed does not entail that we can dismiss them purely with the argument that

since they are constructs, they are not real. Regardless of the degree to which national identities are constructed (and I largely agree with Gellner, Hobsbawm and others in believing that they are), they are felt as real and pervasive by many citizens, who feel bonded by the *Volksggeist* perceived to be shared by the citizens of the nation to which they belong. Max Weber has described the nation as “a community of sentiment” (in Hutchinson and Smith (eds) 1994:25), and though there is enough evidence to suggest that there are societal forces, which have contributed toward the construction of national identities, I do believe that these identities can largely be regarded precisely as sentiments. This does not mean that everybody shares such identities in equal terms or necessarily has the same conception of the essential characteristics, which should be associated with them, or that they are contextually independent of change or external developments. As Ignatieff notes, “National identity is not fixed or stable: it is a continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of convenient fables about who ‘we’ are” (1998:18). The same applies to the images we bestow on others. Yet given that these images provide powerful sources of identification and self-identification, they are likely to partake in shaping our behaviour, indeed, as was argued above, to become sedimented into our national habitus. To avoid the risk of (too much) tautological inference, it should finally be stressed that national habitus should in relation to the present topic be interpreted as either predisposing toward anti-American behavior or predisposing toward behavior which might be perceived as anti-American in nature. The point here is naturally, as noted also in chapter 1, that actions and narratives may carry with them the ‘mark of anti-Americanism’, even if the motives for such actions are not necessarily dictated by anti-Americanism as such. Though it is my belief that the conceptual framework delineated above provides us with a solid point of departure for analyzing French anti-Americanism as originating largely from within the core values on which France’s national identity rests, it is conceivable that I may not be able to fully escape presenting fanciful arguments claiming that “the French are like that” (cf. Huntington op. cit.). I nevertheless hope that I will be able to give at least a reasoned argument as to why “the French are like that”.

5 Two Nations, Divided by Common Values

A central feature of French anti-Americanism is its longevity. The fact that French anti-Americanism has existed since well before America became a world power, dwarfing French aspirations of playing a leading role on the world stage, is a reminder that other forces, bar the rejection of power discussed in chapter 3, play an important role in shaping notions of anti-ism. This chapter will seek to analyze the deeper factors which are at play regarding French anti-Americanism. Though some of the standard discourses on anti-Americanism have had, as was discussed in chapter 2, a tendency to demonize the demonizers and as such to portray anti-Americanism largely as manifestations of an irrational psychological complex suffered by its beholders, there is no escaping that a proper understanding of anti-Americanism cannot just focus on the nature and actions of the United States as such. While it seems obvious to analyze the fundamental causes of anti-Americanism in relation to general perceptions of America, an analysis of anti-Americanism in one society needs to focus as much on the specific national features that are potentially conducive to anti-Americanism. Several historical accounts of anti-Americanism in France have been published recently, the most thorough and ambitious being without doubt Philippe Roger's *The American Enemy* (2005). The present study is by contrast not an attempt at presenting a history of French anti-Americanism in a new form or with new details. I have no pretensions of being able to compete in the slightest way with Roger's study. Rather I propose, instead of a historical account of the manifestations of anti-Americanism throughout the times, such as Roger's, an altogether different approach, focusing on the elements of French national identity – or more specifically of what was termed above France's national habitus – which to my mind are carriers of a predisposition against America.

In order to give an impression of the nature and longevity of the phenomenon in France, this chapter will begin with a short overview of some of the archetypical anti-American narratives in France. The intention is to present the reader with a rudimentary overview of the main anti-American discourses in France as they have unfolded over the span of more than two centuries, rather than a history, however brief, of French anti-Americanism. It will be argued that though these narratives are echoed throughout most of Europe, there is a particularly French 'twist' to most of these discourses, indeed that in some respects they have

distinctive features, which set them apart from other European narratives. Such anti-American narratives, however, have older antecedents. When depicting anti-Americanism in France, there is often a tendency to portray the phenomenon as more or less isolated from the dealings that France has, and has had, with other nations. Yet if, as was suggested in chapter 4, nations need to have enemies, or ‘Others’, against whom they can mirror themselves, it seems obvious that preceding the tradition of French anti-Americanism, at least one other anti-ism must have been in force. It is the contention of this study that anti-Americanism can largely be regarded as a successor-phobia, which, while presenting also some unique features, builds to a considerable degree on centuries of Anglophobia in France. As will be shown below, one of the most fascinating features of French anti-Americanism is that America largely came to be vilified for much the same reasons that France previously had (and to some extent still has) a tendency to reject the ‘perfidious Albion’. Finally, in the main body of this chapter, the particularistic French facets conducive toward a nationally tainted anti-Americanism will be analyzed as having at their origins the most essential values on which the French national identity has been built. These values, republicanism, civilization, and secularism, can be regarded as largely situated along three of the four major vectors of national identity identified in chapter 4, namely the political, cultural, and religious vectors⁶¹. These values do not just constitute the core of French national identity; they are simultaneously testimonies to the universal aspirations of both the French and American nations. They should not be regarded as manifestations of anti-Americanism as such, but rather as underlying factors on which anti-Americanism feeds in France. It is this last part of the present chapter, which will seek to demonstrate that France and the United States can be described as two nations divided by common values, concluding with a discussion of whether America can, indeed, be represented as France’s significant Other.

5.1 The Identity Dimension of Anti-Americanism in France and Europe

Philippe Roger has showed how anti-Americanism was a favorite French intellectual pastime well before the creation of the United States: “French anti-Americanism not only has a history, but also a pre-history – one that has been overlooked, forgotten, and buried under the successive layers of collective depiction” (2005:1). While anti-Americanism has indeed been present in France throughout centuries, the impact it has had has been highly diverging depending on both circumstances and the degree of contact between French and American

societies. Broadly, French anti-Americanism is centered around four types of discourses: A naturalist narrative, today mostly a historical curiosity, in which the New World was presented as a degenerate continent; a cultural narrative, originally lamenting the artistic sterility of the New World, which later turned to decrying the nature and influence of America's cultural products worldwide; a socio-economical narrative, in which the impact of Americanization on other nations is deplored and the 'American model' is rejected; and finally a political narrative, in which the increasing power of the United States is deplored and not infrequently contrasted with largely unfulfilled French political aspirations. These narratives, which will be exemplified below, have fed on each other and are highly overlapping. They have in essence remained the repository of most French discourses on anti-Americanism to this day.

Such discourses are frequently presented as 'typically French', i.e. as evidence that the French harbor some quintessentially Gallic aversion to America, which set them apart from other Europeans, if not by the degree of their perceived anti-Americanism, then by the special incantations of their anti-American rhetoric. Yet the same narratives can be found readily in most European, or at least Western European, nations. The four major narratives mentioned above have in fact been part of what Markovits terms the "identity dimension" of European anti-Americanism for centuries (2007:81-82), and they have by and large been as present in Britain and Germany as in France (ibid: 38-80). It has been argued that they represent a specific European anti-Americanism, one which focuses primarily on the identity dimension (what America *is*), rather than on the conduct dimension (what America *does*), and as such has become "pervasive and not at all country-specific" (ibid:81-82). There is some truth to this, as some of the most familiar anti-American themes present many similar features throughout Europe. Yet it could equally be argued that the identity dimension works both ways. It might be, as Markovits argues, that there exists a common "pan-European" anti-American discourse; it is, however, a gross exaggeration to suggest, as he does, that "anti-Americanism features no country-specific tropes and thus indeed is totally pan-European" (ibid:28). Jean-François Revel has suggested that France is a prime mover in European anti-Americanism (2002:164). This is probably as much a stereotype as those he seeks to combat. The contention of this study is that French anti-Americanism, while representing many of the same features and narratives as those found in other European countries, has both distinctive

origins, and characteristics which relate to a large extent to some of the core elements of French national identity.

5.1.1 Narratives of a French tradition

In the prologue to his study of French anti-Americanism, Philippe Roger describes how, from 1749 onwards, the zoologist Georges de Buffon succeeded in constructing a naturalist base for anti-Americanism that would prove difficult to overcome for many years to come (2005:1-29). Buffon's image of America was of a continent where everything was small. Species were smaller than in the Old World. The animals were more timid. Even the human beings were more modest in size. Buffon based his observations on comparisons that today strike us as profoundly unscientific: The American tapir was less impressive than the African elephant. Though he could not ignore that they did not belong to the same family, he coined the term *voisinage*, suggesting that they were "neighbors, not relatives", implying that it was the nearest thing one could come if one wanted to find the elephant's American counterpart (ibid:9). Another intellectual of the day, the Abbé Raynal, took Buffon's arguments even further and argued in 1770 that the degenerate American climate corrupted the mind. Therefore, Native Americans as well as those transplanted from Europe were as feeble-minded as they were feeble-bodied. Their intellectual inferiority was no less certain than their physical weakness was "visible" (ibid:23. See also Diner 1996:7). However risible these 'observations' may appear today, they had a profound impact on the view the French elite had of the New World, as few other descriptions made their way to a larger public. Zeldin remarks that at "the beginning of the nineteenth century the French still had rather elementary ideas about America. They relied on such books as those of the abbé Raynal (1770), Volney (1802) and Chateaubriand (1827)" (1977:127, see also Furet 1982:199-202). A small minority, intrigued by the Franco-American alliance that had led to the independence of the United States, turned to books and travel accounts published in England, hoping that these, given England's linguistic and historical ties with America, could contribute with reliable first-hand accounts. René Rémond describes how the French readers discovered a different America than the one they had expected: Hoping to read about the novel American example, what they found was an almost uniform denigration of the former British colony, one which he largely attributes to the resentment following the British defeat in the two wars of American independence (1958:268-275). Though anti-Americanism may have, as Roger argues, a

particularly long pedigree in France, other nations were clearly road companions in this respect.

As the naturalist attacks on the continent gradually lost their bite, a new discourse rose up against America in the nineteenth century: an aesthetic anti-Americanism, which in the twentieth century would give way to a cultural anti-Americanism. Building on the older notions of the degenerate nature of the American continent and its inhabitants, cultural elites in France more or less uniformly lamented America's artistic sterility. The perceived lack of literary, philosophical and artistic output was decried as proof of a democracy that was obsessed with material wealth, but impervious or even hostile to culture (Roger 2005:36). The novelist Stendhal described Americans as "incapable of subtle ideas" (ibid:52) and the poet Baudelaire would take it several steps further. "The world is about to end", he wrote in 1855. America was tolling the bell of sterile decline, man had become "Americanized" (his term), reduced to commercial enterprise without genius or spirituality (ibid:59-63). The core of this cultural anti-American narrative was on the one hand that America was a young nation, lacking history and culture. On the other hand, this nation heralded a new era, where materialism was the order of the day. The case against America became one of idealism versus materialism. Already, the fear of American 'mass culture' threatening to prevail over French 'high culture' was beginning to take root. The growing impact of American culture in Europe described in chapter 3.4.2 was particularly rejected by French intellectuals as being culturally and socially degenerative. When jazz music filled the dancing halls and Hollywood films entered the cinemas in the early twentieth century, the French got their first real taste of the *American way of life*. Embraced by many, it was rejected vehemently by large sections of the cultural establishment. In the interwar years, the intellectual anti-Americanism of the nineteenth century became integrated in a reactionary rejection of the erosion of traditional values and customs (Kuisel 1993:2). In an era of economic uncertainty and growing nationalism, this new form of anti-Americanism reached a much larger audience than it had previously, and the cultural narrative came to represent America as "the antithesis of France" (Pells 1997:155, see also Strauss 1978). As opposed to the naturalist attacks, the cultural anti-American discourse remains, as we shall see below, highly present today, where notions of French cultural exceptionalism have largely centered on the need to protect French culture and the French language from American incursions.

The American materialism so anathema to the intellectuals did not frighten the many immigrants crossing the Atlantic in the pursuit of the American dream. What they sought was precisely the promise of material wealth and comfort, which the social rigidity in nineteenth century Europe denied them. Of all the significant close-knit groups of European immigrants of the period, one is conspicuously absent: Though tens of thousands of French people settled in the United States, they all came over as individuals; nowhere was a French community established which could present itself as a Franco-American voice capable of exerting influence (Duroselle 1978:48)⁶². Lacking a substantial body of naturalized ‘advocates’ in the States, the French were relegated to having the American socio-economic model presented to them primarily by the established elites at home (Pells 1997:154-155), which by and large were more than critical of the ‘materialistic’ republic. Tocqueville and his fellow traveler, de Baumont, had given another, altogether more positive description of America. But their works met mixed approval in Paris. A critical reviewer of their studies wrote in 1835 that “America is socially organized egotism and systematic and legalized evil. In a nutshell, it is the materialization of the human destiny” (Bucheze, quoted by Sorman in Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990:214). This narrative would prove enduring. In his 1930 bestseller, *Scènes de la vie future*, Georges Duhamel presented his vision of tomorrow’s world, in which America sets the tune for the rest of the world to follow. It is an apocalyptic vision, where mankind will soon be forced to follow into the footsteps of the Americans, bowing to the dehumanizing force of “industrial and commercial dictatorship” in the “Cathedral of Commerce” (1930:9-21 and 219-232). Word by word, such statements could be pronounced today by an anti-globalization protestant. The image of America being the world’s leading capitalist nation, not just in terms of size, but in nature as well, is predominant in large parts of French society, where anti-globalization movements are tacitly approved of even by conservatives (see 5.2). Richard Kuisel remarks how “The French response to America in the twentieth century derives, in large measure, from an assumption that the New World is a social model of the future” (1993:ix). It is a social model, which many French instinctively oppose, fearing the twin forces of liberalism and globalization more than any other Western European nation. As will be seen below, the fear of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model, more often than not a euphemism for the American social and economic model, and the supremacy of this model in world business and politics have been constantly resurfacing in France for close to a century.

The fourth major narrative, building to a large degree on the cultural and socio-economic narratives, typically presents America as politically immature, hypocritical, and unresponsive to the wishes of its allies. The rapid rise of the United States to pre-eminence in world affairs has simultaneously resulted in the erosion of political influence of the former great powers, and as such also of France. In this respect, political narratives of anti-Americanism frequently become tainted with symptoms of lingering phantom pains. The political anti-American narrative is probably the one which presents the most original features compared with corresponding narratives in other European nations. This is largely, as will be exposed in greater length in chapter 5.3, a result of the fact that both modern France and America due to their unique heritage have presented themselves as universal models for others to follow. Many of the standard attacks on American policies in France take their cue from the forms of rejection of American power, and especially of soft power, which were presented in chapter 3, lamenting the historical oppression of the Native American Indians and the practice of slavery, the later policies of segregation, the practice of capital punishment, the unilateralist policies of American administrations etc. These examples of political anti-American narratives can be found in all European societies. Yet French political narratives of anti-Americanism contain a further streak, which today could be termed Gaullist (Ash 2004:64-68), though it has older antecedents. Whereas political anti-Americanism in most other significant European countries is primarily, although not exclusively, a left-wing phenomenon, it has in France been virtually evenly divided between both the right-wing and the left-wing since the interwar period (Pells 1997, Revel 2002, Tinard 2001). The roots go back primarily to the historical circumstances following the peace negotiations leading to the Versailles Treaty. Here, President Wilson preached moderation, while leading French politicians called for revenge on the German aggressor. To the French nationalists, Wilson's policies threatened to surrender the fruits of a victory that had cost them so dearly. French Premier Georges Clemmenceau dryly remarked that "God gave us his Ten Commandments, and we broke them. Wilson gave us his Fourteen Points – we shall see" (quoted by Kennedy, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:53). This perception of American political immaturity and naiveté laid the foundations for a conservative anti-Americanism in France that has lasted to this day. Though American soldiers were greeted as liberators after their landing in Normandy, the honeymoon of public pro-Americanism, then at an all-time high, was short. When the former leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle, returned to power in

1958, relations between the two countries soured. Few individuals have fuelled the cause of political anti-Americanism in France as effectively as de Gaulle. His antagonism of the U.S. can easily be traced back to his wartime experiences, where President Roosevelt was long more than reluctant to acknowledge de Gaulle as an ally and as the leader of the Free French (Chuter 1996:207-213), although, as will be discussed below, it had other, altogether more political reasons. Unwilling to accept France's role as a weaker partner of the United States, de Gaulle set out to create a 'third force' to balance U.S. and Soviet dominance. Though his attempts failed, they contributed to reinvigorate French foreign policy with a sense of national mission, one which often seemed to the public at home as well as abroad as being more or less inherently in opposition to America. As will be discussed in chapter 6, this was not necessarily its primary objective, yet there is no doubt that it gave rise to an anti-American narrative, which has contributed to the perception, exemplified by *the Economist's* portrait of Jacques Chirac cited in the introduction, that French politicians, and especially French presidents, are motivated by a deep reluctance toward America and especially the impact of American power. Following the Gaullist tradition, France has attempted to present itself first, though largely unsuccessfully, as a Western alternative to the United States, most notably in Africa and among other non-aligned countries, and later, somewhat more successfully, as the leading spokesman of a Europe, which sought to establish itself as a potential counterweight to American dominance. Though former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine's description of the United States as a "hyperpuissance" (2000:81) in reality could be interpreted as an innocent statement of facts, far less opprobrious than the oft-heard characteristic of America as a hegemon, it has entered this political narrative as yet another example of French anti-Americanism.

These narratives are archetypical of French anti-Americanism in the sense that especially the latter three have set the tone for not just anti-American discourses, but also most of the literature on French anti-Americanism, which more often than not tries to analyze anti-Americanism largely in relation to one or several of these discourses (see for example Strauss 1978, Kuisel 1993, Markovits 2007, Roger 2005, Winock 1990). And while the same four narratives, or derivatives of such narratives, can be found in most other European countries as well, they appear particularly vibrant in France.

5.1.2 More than a European specialty with a French ‘twist’?

Pierangelo Isernia has noted that “anti-Americanism in Europe has taken the form of a recurrent set of themes, some of them going back to the American Revolution, that have been played out over and over again in different tunes and rhythms” (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:57). The narratives presented above are archetypical of such themes and, as Markovits asserts, they can be found throughout Europe. The three common themes of European anti-Americanism listed by Josef Joffe (see 2.2.1), in which America is presented as morally deficient, socially retrograde, and culturally retrograde (2006:5-8) are in reality but variations over the four archetypical narratives delineated above. Quoting among others Friedrich Nietzsche (“The faith of the Americans is becoming the faith of the European as well”), Sigmund Freud (“Yes, America is gigantic, but a gigantic mistake”), Frances Trollope (describing Americans as ill-mannered hypocrites), and Charles Dickens (mocking the notion that America should arouse envy throughout the world) as evidence (2007:56-73), Markovits argues that what is at play is in reality a pan-European discourse of anti-Americanism (ibid:28), rather than a country specific one, “in terms of its form and content, as well as its analytical foundation, concepts, and political and social functions” (ibid:46). The argument is not without merits. First of all, it is evident that Europe has historically enjoyed relations with America – itself to a large degree an offspring of Europe – that no other part of the world has experienced in a similar manner. The whole concept of the New World versus the Old World, irrespective of any values attached to either, originates from Europe and is as such inscribed in the deeper narratives of European anti-Americanism (see for example Kennedy, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:39-48, and Pells 1997:2-7), to the point where the “contradictory trope of modernity as barbarism [has been] a constant of negative European perceptions of America” (Markovits 2007:46). In this respect it is true that all four narratives, including the naturalist narrative (Rémond 1958:268-275, Markovits 2007:39-56), have found common ground in Europe, as they build on experiences with America, which are both shared by most European nations and particular to Europe. Second, as regards the more contemporary anti-American narratives, Europe has during the past decades witnessed a resurgence of pan-European ideals, both as a result of the European unification process and of the perception of growing transatlantic tensions, whether political or value borne, which have given ground to common narratives borrowing from the domestic narratives of the leading European nations. Jürgen Habermas’ and Jacques Derrida’s open letter to the European

publics following the 2003 invasion of Iraq was presented precisely as a pan-European rallying call to form a new sense of Europeaness, one which in essence they opposed to American values (Habermas and Derrida 2003, see also Ash 2004, Levy, Pensky and Torpey (eds) 2005, and Fich, in Ammitsbøll and Boel (eds) 2007). In this respect, it makes perfectly good sense to analyze European anti-Americanism as a particular feature of anti-Americanism; one which focuses as much if not more on the rejection of America's soft power as on its attributes of hard power. It has even been argued that one of the few values shared by Europeans is opposition to America, indeed that to some, the essence of Europe can be described as being "Not-America" (Ash 2004:54-94).

Following Melvin and Margaret DeFleur's methodology (DeFleur and DeFleur 2003), Markovits has described European anti-Americanism as "surplus" anti-Americanism, one which focuses on the "identity dimension" of America rather than the "conduct dimension" (2007:81-82). Rob Kroes has similarly attempted to distinguish between cultural and political anti-Americanism (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:105-106), implicitly describing the former in ways which appear fairly 'European' in nature. Both concur that the two dimensions are highly overlapping and difficult to disentangle, while nevertheless arguing that they present distinctive features (Markovits 2007:13, Kroes, in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:106). One of the reasons for attempting to distinguish between the two dimensions of anti-Americanism probably rests on the assumption, to some degree validated by European narratives, that the cultural, or identity borne, anti-Americanism seems particularly present in Europe compared with elsewhere. Indeed, the most defining feature of European anti-Americanism may be that it has consistently been a project of the cultural elites. Philippe Roger has described how, in contrast to the widely held image of the New World being linked to the ideas of the Enlightenment, "anti-Americanism was born and prospered in philosophical circles. Not only was it contemporary with the Enlightenment at its brightest, it was forged and disseminated by men who were unquestionably associated with the program and progress of the 'philosophical spirit'" (2005:2). This was the case in France as well as elsewhere (Kroes, in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:105-106). Markovits notes how "The allure of America, generally succumbed to by the European masses rather than elites, remained a permanent mystery and thorn in the side for European critics of the United States" (2007:46). Katzenstein and Keohane similarly remark that elitist anti-Americanism "has always been centered in Europe, particularly on the Continent" (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds)

2007:36), although they especially single out France as bearer of elitist anti-Americanism, remarking that “French intellectuals are the epicenter of anti-Americanism” (ibid:36). Revel certainly agrees (2002). Is this a validation of Markovits’ assertion that there is in essence just one pan-European discourse of anti-Americanism, and by implication that French narratives merely represent a Gallic ‘twist’ to a European tale, whether due to the fact that France has been, as Revel claims, the breeding house of European anti-Americanism, or due to the mediatization which has surrounded French narratives in specific periods? Or could it conversely be argued that French anti-Americanism, while representing many of the same features and narratives as those found in other European countries, has both distinctive origins and characteristics, which justify that they are analyzed as country-specific in their own right? This study contends that the latter is the case for two main reasons.

First, there is ample evidence to suggest that French anti-Americanism in several respects deviate from anti-Americanism in other European societies, both as regards its strength, its particular features, and the political bias of its beholders. Regarding the strength of French anti-Americanism, Pierangelo Isernia has convincingly documented, using a large number of polls and surveys covering half a century, how France has been particularly critic of the United States compared with Germany, Italy and Great Britain (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:58-92). Kroes similarly notes that the French, compared with other European nations, have been “more consistently adamant in making the case for a defence of their national identity against a threatening process of Americanization” (in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:106). Strauss concurs, stating that “While both the opposition to the United States and the defense of traditional values were the common concerns of the European elite, the French may be said to have led the way by articulating these positions with a special clarity and vigor” (1978:282). Regarding its particular features, there is ample evidence to suggest that although the four major narratives singled out above can be found in other European societies as well, they acquire characteristic ‘French overtones’ in French political discourses, not least with respect to the frequent denunciations of liberalism, capitalism and globalization, associated more often than not with the United States (Tinard 2001, Revel 2002, Roger 2005, Kroes in Fabbrini (ed) 2006, Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007). It is, however, especially with regard to the particular political bias of its beholders that French anti-Americanism stands out from most other European countries. Rob Kroes has noted that cultural anti-Americanism in Europe is typically to be found on the conservative right wing,

whereas the political anti-Americanism typically has occurred on the left (in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:105). Yet in France, the two dimensions appear virtually indistinguishable. Cultural anti-Americanism is as manifest on the left wing as on the right wing, while political anti-Americanism, to be found readily on both sides of the political divide, has historically been associated much more with the Gaullist right wing than with any other political force bar the Communist Party (Ash 2004). Furthermore, cultural and political anti-Americanism in France appear to be reinforcing each other, achieving almost symbiotic dimensions in French political discourses, which have long been focused on the protection of France's *exception culturelle* vis-à-vis the perceived threat of Americanization (Pells 1997, Revel 2002, Roger 2005). These characteristics will be developed further below, yet they seem to indicate that there are indeed good reasons to assume that French anti-Americanism displays some distinctive features, which merit a more particularistic analysis of the phenomenon.

Second, it is important to acknowledge that narratives are just that – narratives. One of the problems of a study such as the present is that it is all too tempting to portray specific anti-American discourses as evidence of more widespread anti-Americanism in a given society. Markovits for example attempts to make the point that the anti-American themes he identifies in the works of British, French, and German writers are “also present in other European cultures” (2007:78). To highlight his point, Markovits recounts how Knut Hamsun, the Norwegian Nobel laureate who later became a supporter of Nazism, “viewed America as a land of tasteless and avaricious materialism bereft of cultural or artistic achievements” (ibid:79). With this one example – the only one he provides of an anti-American narrative in Norway – and similar quotes from Maxim Gorki and José Ortega y Gasset to illustrate narratives in respectively Russia and Spain, Markovits asserts that they “serve to highlight the fact that the common themes constituting anti-Americanism existed in many European cultures, and that they have remained constant and consistent in their emphases to this day” (ibid:80), a line of argumentation, which can also be found in other works on the subject (e.g. Hollander 1995:391-393). Yet the narrative of one lone Norwegian writer, and especially one as politically marginal as Hamsun, does not warrant claims that such discourses are in anyway typical of the cultural elite in Norway, nor by implication that anti-Americanism can readily be found throughout Norwegian literary circles and much less throughout society at large. The same applies to Markovits' Russian and Spanish examples, where he also seems to regard the narrative of one writer as evidence to the established

presence of such narratives in each country. And while Markovits' ambition is to reflect on the uniformity of European anti-Americanism rather than on its particularistic features in any given society, the use of random quotations does not validate his point sufficiently. Indeed, such narratives can probably be found in all European societies, but in reality, that tells us preciously little. Without a far more thorough investigation of how such narratives are shaped by deeper, more structural narratives, or how such narratives shape actual policies, such quotations merely give us (a highly partial) insight into the mind of its authors, but hardly new knowledge on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism as such. There is, as mentioned in the introduction, a serious question of epistemology when attempting to make a qualitative analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism in a particular society. Quantitative surveys may provide us with valuable information as regards the level and degree of anti-Americanism (that is if one accepts the premises), yet they fail to inform us of the roots of these sentiments. Qualitative studies frequently attempt to present anti-American narratives as evidence to widely held beliefs among the cultural, social, or political elites, the implication being that while these can hardly be considered the *vox populi*, they can be viewed as the primary agenda setting agents. Though there is much truth to this, it is not solid enough grounds on which to construct an analysis of the deeper forces that contribute to promote feelings of anti-Americanism in a society. Even as impressive an inventory of national anti-American narratives as Philippe Roger's only give us a partial insight into why these narratives have proved so enduring. In order to get a better understanding of the deeper forces at play, we need to relate these narratives to the core elements of the national identity in the country we seek to analyze in order to assess why these themes resonate so strongly in a given society.

5.1.3 Conclusion

The narratives depicted in 5.1.1 are often presented as evidence of French anti-Americanism, indeed as revealing the inner workings of French mentality vis-à-vis America. Yet depicting these narratives only provides an overview of the different aspects of anti-Americanism, but not to a sufficient degree an understanding of the deeper, more imbued forces, which have contributed to mould French anti-Americanism into being, as this study contends, an integral part of France's national habitus. Narratives are just narratives, and even narratives as enduring as the abovementioned have at their origin some deeper sources. In order to

understand the processes that lead to the formation of such narratives, it is not enough to amass quotations from literary works or political speeches in order to prove the proliferation of these narratives in society. We need to go deeper and analyze the sources which have given rise to these narratives. We need, in other words, to explore the inner workings and aspirations of French national identity in order to assess why these narratives have found such fecund an environment in France. The remaining part of this chapter will attempt to do this, first by arguing that French anti-Americanism builds on centuries of Anglophobia with which it shares many characteristic features, and second by seeking to determine how the central tenets of French national identity may be considered as at least partly conducive to anti-American sentiments.

5.2 Anti-Americanism as a Successor-phobia?

French anti-Americanism is not only older than the creation of the United States, it feeds on centuries of antagonism between France and England (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:140) or even Anglophobia, and it has in some respects merged into a rejection of what is 'Anglo-Saxon', a term used to describe a cultural and political heritage that continues to influence Britain and the United States (Mead 2007:13, Cunliffe 1991:400). Like anti-Americanism came to be, Anglophobia was both a result of political rivalry and a question of bolstering a sense of national identity by delimitating France and its inhabitants from the norms, values and habits, which characterized their first 'significant other', namely England⁶³. As will be shown below, England was rejected in France first and foremost on the grounds of historical clashes between the two nations that have spanned almost a millennium. Antagonism on the front bred another kind of animosity, based on French perceptions of the excessive commercialism of the English and their perceived disinterest in finer culture. Such charges against the English were later transferred to the Americans, largely seen as successors, albeit unworthy successors, to the English. The similarities between the vilifications of first the English and later the Americans suggest that French anti-Americanism is, both in nature and in practice, to a large extent a successor phobia to centuries of Anglophobia.

The heirs of Joan of Arc

It is no wonder that the long history of Anglo-French military rivalry, starting with the Norman conquest of England in 1066 and culminating with the battle of Waterloo in 1815⁶⁴, has given rise to a strong and long-lived Anglophobia in France. Just as France has perceived the proverbial *perfidious Albion* with mistrust, contempt, envy, or even hatred, so has England (later Britain) for centuries engaged in denigration of its closest mainland foe and rival (Gibson 1995, Tombs and Tombs 2006). During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, insular Britain had but one foe who could seriously threaten its territory: France. Yet France, who throughout its history has had several enemies to choose from depending on which of its borders it looked towards (Horne 2004:1, Tombs and Tombs 2006:211), has cultivated a special love-hate relationship towards *les rosbifs*. Though France has faced many other enemies throughout history, the rivalry with England stands out. Germany may later have become the chief hereditary enemy (e.g. Visby 1992:11-18 and Kedward 2005:50-52), starting with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, yet Germany never acquired the same role as significant other that England did. Partly this has to do with the longevity of the mutual antagonism, the two nations' prolonged struggle for supremacy, and the fact that inhabitants in both countries have had a tradition of regarding each other as cultural antipodes. In one of Guy de Maupassant's short stories, *Le Rosier de Madame Husson*, published when French *revanchisme* against the Germans was at another high, his narrator declares:

Malgré ma rancune contre l'Allemand et mon désir de vengeance, je ne le déteste pas, je ne le hais pas d'instinct comme je hais l'Anglais, l'ennemi véritable, l'ennemi héréditaire, l'ennemi naturel du Normand, parce que l'Anglais a passé sur ce sol habité par mes aïeux, l'a pillé et ravagé vingt fois, et que l'aversion de ce peuple perfide m'a été transmise avec la vie, par mon père. (1888:14-15)

For the great French historian Michelet, historically "the war, of all wars, the struggle of all struggles" was that between France and England (quoted by Fontaine, in Johnson, Crouzet and Bédarida 1980:351). In his *Histoire de la France* (1833, revised in 1861) he further asserted that:

The struggle against England has done France a very great service by confirming and clarifying her sense of nationhood. Through coming together against the enemy the provinces discovered that they were a single people. It is by seeing the English close to, that they felt that they were France. It is the same with nations as with the individual: he gets to know and defines his personality

through resistance to what is different from himself. He becomes conscious of what he is through what he is not (from the 1861 edition, quoted by Bell 1996:1).

Another French historian, Ernest Lavisse, later remarked more crudely that it was by fighting the English that the French learned to love France (Citron 1991:35 and Boll-Johansen 1992:204). There is some truth to this. No foe has checked French ambitions more systematically and over a longer period than England. Historically, England has been France's bad omen until well into the nineteenth century. From the execution of Joan of Arc on the stakes in Rouen to the downfall of Napoleon, England has been the sole opponent able regularly to achieve an upper hand in its opposition to French bids for hegemony in Europe.

The antagonism started long before England became a great power compared with other European states. The Hundred Years War (1337-1453) was a bitter dynastic strife between France and England over the control of France. Though the English won most of the major battles, the war ended with a double French victory: it consolidated the French king's control of his realm and gave France its most enduring national figure, Joan of Arc. A successor to the English leaders who brought about her downfall, Winston Churchill, magnanimously describes Joan of Arc as "an Angel of Deliverance, the noblest patriot of France, the most splendid of her heroes, the most beloved of her saints, the most inspiring of all her memories, the peasant Maid, the ever-shining, ever glorious Joan of Arc" (1956:328). Joan of Arc is not only a potent national heroine; she became with time a symbol of French resistance to England, a symbol that was revered as a unifying figure for the French people to rally around. Churchill even states that "Indeed, the whole conception of France seems to have sprung and radiated from her" (1956:331)⁶⁵. As the British John Bull is portrayed as the essence of what is British, so is Joan of Arc regarded as embodying France's soul: Courage in face of the threat of foreign domination, spirit and devotion in contrast with brute force and oppression, civilization as opposed to tyranny. Joan of Arc is feminine, just as *la France*, *la patrie* and the national symbol, Marianne⁶⁶. Her sacrifice on the fire in 1431 is to some equal only to that of Jesus on the cross. He died for the sins of mankind – she died for France. The nationalist historian Jacques Bainville has noted that once her mission completed, all that was left for her to acquire was martyrdom (1924:100), although he omits to add that it took over a century before she was adopted by French historiography as a heroine (Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:528-529). The popular imaginary surrounding such symbols is strong, and ever

since the nineteenth century, Joan of Arc has become a rallying call for a multitude of political and ideological factions wishing to promote more or less nationalistic policies (Winock 1990:145)⁶⁷. Lavissee states that in “Dans aucun pays, on ne trouve une aussi belle histoire que celle de Jeanne d’Arc” (quoted by Citron 1991:46). Indeed, as Bell has noted, Joan of Arc has become the “universally recognised symbol of French nationalism”, adding that “the enemy she fought was of course the English” (1996:6).

Though the following centuries gave France (and England) other enemies to worry about, England proved throughout to be France’s most tenacious foe. Louis XIV saw his bid for European hegemony thwarted by Churchill’s ancestor, the duke of Marlborough, at the battle of Blenheim in 1704 (Gibson 1995:82). The Seven Years’ War (also referred to overseas as the French and Indian War) has been described as essentially the first war to be global in nature, as it spanned three continents (Europe, North America and Asia). It led to a virulent state-sponsored Anglophobia (Tombs and Tombs 2006:98) that remained a staple of conservative political discourse for years. During the Napoleonic Wars, England alone proved to be consistently undefeatable, remaining the linchpin for the successive alliances that were finally to bring about Napoleon’s downfall. Some have even called the period from 1689 to 1815, in which France and England were directly at war for fifty-six years, the “Second Hundred Years’ War” (Meyer and Bromley, in Johnson, Crouzet and Bédarida (eds) 1980:139-172). England’s role in the demise of the Napoleonic Empire contributed further to make a deep negative imprint in the memories of the French. Victor Hugo was later to describe the British led victory at Waterloo as “le triomphe complet, absolu, éclatant, indiscutable, définitif et suprême de la médiocrité sur le génie” (quoted by Demetz 2004). As if British victory on the battlefield was not enough, the deportation of Napoleon to the remote Atlantic island of Saint-Helena was seen as a further affront by his admirers, both contemporary and those who later rejoiced in the illusions of grandeur that the *Empire* had nourished better than any other French regime. While to most of the British, Napoleon was a tyrant, to many Frenchmen, he remained throughout the nineteenth century a hero (Bell 1996:3, Cronin 1971)⁶⁸, and he continued to be revered as a savior figure by many French (Tulard 1991:328-336). Moreover, his status as hero is not just confined to his exploits in the battlefields of Europe, which he succeeded in dominating for more than a decade. He arguably shaped French society more profoundly than any other single person, at least until the advent of Charles de Gaulle (Agulhon 2000, Lindqvist 2005, Schom 1997, Tulard 1991).

But what probably gave rise to much nineteenth century interest in his life was the perception that he was a romantic hero. In the century of Romanticism, Napoleon and Josephine were favorite subjects for authors in France and elsewhere on the continent, even in countries that he had invaded (Tulard 1991:331, Said 1993:117-118, Horne 2004:202-203). He had surrendered to his staunchest, and therefore most respected, foe with the words:

Altesse royale, [...] j'ai terminé ma carrière politique et je viens, comme Thémistocle, m'asseoir au foyer du peuple britannique. Je me mets sous la protection de ses lois que je réclame de votre altesse royale comme du plus puissant, du plus constant et du plus généreux de mes ennemis. (Quoted by Regenbogen 1998:217)⁶⁹

But Napoleon was not to receive the clement treatment of the Athenian (Hamilton-Williams 1994:271). The English treatment of Napoleon during his exile in Saint-Helena was seen in France as petty revenge, unfit for a great nation. Stendhal, one of the great Napoleon-worshippers in French literature, described Saint-Helena as “the reef on which English honour has foundered” (quoted by Gibson 1995:171). Once more, martyrdom had been created (Tulard 1991:330-333), and once again, it was the English who brought about the downfall of a French savior myth.

Rome versus Carthage

But after the Napoleonic wars, the age-old rivalry between France and England became supplanted by something else. While many French would probably at the time concord with Montesquieu's view that “the French cannot make friends in England” (quoted by Zeldin 1977:107), the Anglophobe sentiments were relegated to a more secondary position. Zeldin has argued that “there grew up, from around 1815, a notion that England and France represented liberalism in a world threatened by the despotic governments of Russia, Austria and Prussia, and that there was therefore an ideological cause in which they were, more or less, brothers.” (ibid:101). This was at best only partly the case. France and Britain were subsequently to refrain from waging outright war against each other, although numerous incidents, such as the Fashoda crisis in 1898, provided good opportunities (See for example Bell 1996:9-15, Gibson 1995:230-231, Meredith 2006:493)⁷⁰. To the extent that both France and England represented liberalism, it was two very different kinds of liberalism. Napoleon once famously called the English a nation of shopkeepers (Paxman 1999:2)⁷¹. His remark built on a common lamentation regarding England: that it was a nation obsessed with material

wealth and impervious to finer, more mundane passions. Already Louis XV's Foreign Minister, the Marquis d'Argenson, had declared the English system of government corrupt, because "with them, everything is a matter of money: people there think of nothing else" (quoted by Gibson 1995:89). England was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century denounced as 'Carthage' to France's Rome: "materialistic, insatiable and duplicitous" (Tombs and Tombs 2006:99); a "vampire, tyrant of the seas, 'perfidious' enemy and bearer of a corrupting commercial civilization – contrasted with 'Rome', bearer of universal order, philosophy and selfless values" (ibid:211). The French idea of the English state as "a materialistic conspiracy aiming at economic domination" was widely shared by other countries, and it became France's historic mission "to lead world resistance against the power of English gold" (ibid:451):

The 'Carthage' or 'nation of shopkeepers' theme, powerful before 1815 as we have seen, was adopted by the mid-nineteenth-century French Left, and inherited by late-nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalists. As early as the 1830s it was linked with anti-semitism and anti-Americanism. (ibid:451-452)

This theme of English materialism was recurrently stressed, until it was transferred as an accusation against the Americans. In line with Tombs and Tombs, Zeldin notes in this respect that "it is striking that the two countries were disapproved for the same reasons" (1977:108). It is not the only cause of anti-Americanism that can be traced to its Anglophobic origins. Just as France and America were later to represent two versions of civilization (see below), there was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century an ingrained perception that England and France represented each their civilizational role: "Both were tending towards the view that they were the joint leaders of civilization, even if they were trying to lead it in different directions" (Tombs and Tombs 2006:99). Also in this respect, the two nations presented different forms of liberalism, both originating from their respective periods of Enlightenment. The English Enlightenment was in essence a highly liberal affair and, as Himmelfarb has noted, "a very different Enlightenment from that of the French" (2008:3). The English variety of Enlightenment concentrated on virtue and rights, the French on reason (ibid:5-6). As such England and France also saw each other as philosophical rivals: Both nations claimed to be the birthplace of The Age of Enlightenment⁷², yet their roads to modernity (to borrow Himmelfarb's phrase) took very different courses. The English, inspired by John Locke, favored enlightenment based on empiricism, while the French favored rationalism Descartes-style. It has been crudely, but effectively, summed up as if "Britain stood for freedom, France

for order. Or, [...] that Britain stood for nature, and France for civilization” (Tombs and Tombs 2006:99-100). In essence, this dichotomy reveals two different ways of thought and modes of perception. In 1814, Joseph de Maistre remarked that “In philosophy, wisdom begins with the contempt for English ideas” (quoted by Zeldin 1977:108). John Stuart Mill more tolerantly, yet equally disillusioned, remarked in a 1843-letter to his friend Tocqueville that: “It is only natural that the English should not be able to understand France, just as the French are unable to understand England” (quoted by Bédarida 1980:361). The dichotomy between the two strands of thought may reveal something about the nature and beliefs of the two peoples. Yet it has an impact way beyond the realm of philosophy, and its consequences can be felt even today, not least within the legal sphere. British Common Law, based on prejudication, empiricism and inductive reasoning fundamentally differs from French Civil Law, based on codification, rationalism and deductive reasoning. While the British system of Common Law has been exported to most of its former colonies, including the United States, the French Code Civil, from 1807 also named the *Code Napoléon*, has been exported to a number of European countries and former colonies. As such, the two ways of reasoning have partaken in shaping each their part of the world. Himmelfarb notes that the American Enlightenment, which she attributes to a large extent to *The Federalist Papers*, was in essence an “offspring” of the English Enlightenment (2008:5). In this respect as well, America can be presented as a successor to England.

Along with the anti-materialist theme and the perception of the nations’ different civilizational roles, another prominent feature of French Anglophobia in the nineteenth century was the opposition to cultural imports from Britain. Gibson describes how Anglophilia and Anglophobia alternated in France during the nineteenth century (Gibson 1995:178- 234). To the extent that there existed in that period a certain Anglo-French brotherhood, as Zeldin argues (1977:101), it was mitigated by the virulent opposition in some quarters against the Anglomania that had seduced much of the French population. The poet Pierre-Jean Béranger deplored the arrival of the latest British fashion, boxing, in his sarcastic poem *Les Boxeurs*:

And now we’ve got *boxers* in Paris. Let’s rush to place our bets – if need be, in the presence of a lawyer! In boxing, it’s a one-to-one contest – which makes a change for the English. No, a thousand times no! We don’t want those punches in the face which are all the rage in England. [...] Ah you English! We have to copy everything you do: your laws, your fashions, your tastes, even the way you wage war. We go on applauding your diplomats and your racehorses. But no, a

thousand times no, we don't want those punches in the face which are all the rage in England. (quoted by Gibson 1995:181)

The familiar material theme became commonly associated with another theme that can also be found in French anti-Americanism: that of a lack of interest in culture. Facing the evidence of England's unquestionable cultural contributions to the world, the claim was projected on the English society as such rather than on the abilities of English artists. Victor Hugo, after praising Shakespeare as "England's greatest glory", cannot resist a snide comment: "When you arrive in England, the first thing you look for is its statue to Shakespeare. You find a statue to Wellington" (quoted by Gibson *ibid*:214-215). In France, culture is regarded as inseparable from civilization and often presented as the highest manifestation of a nation's inner qualities. The charge made against the supposed lack of culture in the English society thereby implicitly became a charge against England's form of civilization as well: that the English civilization might have produced a political system envied by many on the continent, even by some of France's greatest thinkers such as Voltaire, most notably in his *Lettres philosophiques* (Boll-Johansen 1992:202), but which nevertheless lacked the refinery of culture, rendering it incomplete and to some even sterile. If culture is one of the great halos of civilization, language is another. Here again, a predominant source of modern French anti-Americanism has its source in Anglo-French rivalry. After French bids for political and military supremacy had once again been thwarted by the English, Joseph de Maistre remarked that France may not have succeeded in dominating the world by force of arms, but it enjoyed "another kind of domination, much more honourable, that of opinion [...] and to exercise this, it has a domination language [...] which, even before it made itself illustrious by masterpieces of all kinds, was recognized as supreme by Europe" (quoted by Zeldin 1977:18).

The supremacy of the French language was, however, not to last long thereafter. Already in 1859, a French critic, J. Lemoine, remarked that "in our generation, dominance is passing more and more to the English language" (quoted by Zeldin, *ibid*:20), apparently even influencing the French language as such: In 1845, François Wey complained of "L'invasion des mots anglais dans la langue française", and in 1855, Marcel Viennet complained of the way French was being corrupted by English (Thody 1995:14. See also Hagège 1987:17-23). In the age of the Enlightenment, the most educated people in Europe were expected to speak French, and Antoine Rivarol's somewhat Anglophobic (Boll-Johansen 1992:203) *Discours sur l'universalité de la langue française* (1784) was not regarded as just Gallic posturing, but

also as a fairly accurate description of the fact that French had become accepted as the most prominent international language. Rivarol claimed that the sentence structure and grammar of French made it more logical and hence purer than any other language (Phillipson 2003:47). His essay includes the famous sentence “*Ce qui n’est pas clair n’est pas français, ce qui n’est pas clair est encore anglais, italien, grec ou latin*” (quoted by Phillipson, *ibid*:47-48). Yet, the advent of democracy ironically revealed French to be very much a minority tongue. In diplomacy, French retained its supremacy as an international language until well into the twentieth century, but in other fields, notably in commerce and industry, English became an “easily successful rival” (Zeldin 1977:19-20). The success of English in these spheres owed much to England’s industrial revolution, and especially the second industrial revolution which, in association with Britain’s rule of the seas, brought merchants throughout the world in contact with the English language, making proficiency in it a necessary prerequisite for commercial prosperity on a larger scale. What started as what one might call a British linguistic victory would later become an attribute of American soft power and as such an element of contention in France, jealously defending its language against encroachments from abroad, fearing *le franglais* (Étiemble [1964] 1991) or “its insidious offshoot, *framéricain*” (Rosenblum 1988:418) as the ultimate affront to the national tongue.

America as the new England

The long history of armed conflict between France and England easily explains why the two nations long regarded each other as hereditary enemies. On the battlefields of Europe as in their colonial rivalry, they were, in fact, just that: two nations engaged in a century-long struggle for supremacy; a struggle that ended with Britain emerging victorious, able to ascertain itself as the preeminent world power of the nineteenth century. As such, French Anglophobia contains a dimension of historical explicability that seems to elude French anti-Americanism. Far from having waged war against each other, France and the United States are bound together by their mutual sacrifices during the American war of independence as well as two world wars. In spite of the two nations being nominally allies since the first hour, French anti-Americanism nonetheless builds on centuries of inherited French Anglophobia. Anti-Americanism as a successor phobia to Anglophobia builds largely on two dimensions. First, the nature of the charges most frequently leveled against England and which have consistently engendered and nurtured French Anglophobia. These charges relate to the

perceived commercialism of the English, their lack of culture and the encroachment of their language on what had hitherto been an undisputed bastion of French influence in the world. Such charges were soon transferred to America, vilified by much the same segments of society who had denigrated England (Rémond 1958). In these spheres, Anglophobia may precede anti-Americanism, but as issues of contention, they have been magnified by the formidable power of attraction that America turned out to be, dwarfing French aspirations at presenting a viable counterculture. As such, the element of Anglophobia illustrated by the Carthage versus Rome theme resembles an almost harmless philosophical predisposition, while the same theme applied to the American superpower is more reminiscent of an uneven struggle between two models of society; a struggle that in some respects has far greater implications for France than its prolonged rivalry with England, namely that of economic and cultural irrelevance in the face of American domination. Second, after the euphoria following the joint French-American victory over Britain in the American war of independence, there quickly settled the impression among French elites that America was turning out to become a new England – and a more ‘modern’ and thus more daunting adversary (Hayward 2007:15-24). For some, such as Condorcet, the juxtaposition of England and America was an innocent statement of facts, referring to a community of interest and outlook that was wholly laudable. In his *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* 1794, *Dixième époque*, he optimistically predicted that “Should not all nations one day aspire to that level of civilisation which has been reached by the most enlightened, free, liberated and unprejudiced peoples, the French and the Anglo-Americans?” (quoted by Francois Bédarida in Johnson, Crouzet and Bédarida (eds) 1980:364). Such sentiments were not shared by all his contemporaries. Talleyrand, later to become French foreign minister under the Directorate, Consulate, Empire, and Restoration, fled the radicalizing French Revolution in 1794 and found refuge in the United States. Philippe Roger recounts how Talleyrand took an immediate dislike to his new sanctuary:

His voluminous correspondence gave him the chance to communicate his disgust to numerous friends and acquaintances back in Europe. [...] he complained to Madame de Staël about America being a place where *everything* annoyed him. [...] [La Rochefoucauld-] Liancourt noted that it was “impossible to have a worse opinion of [Americans] in all regards, or to speak worse of them” than Talleyrand. The explanation Talleyrand found for this personality clash transformed his personal aversion into a political issue: he discovered the Englishman hiding inside the American. [...] Talleyrand discovered with surprise and alarm [...] that even with all the resentment toward England that had built up

during the American Revolution, “America is nonetheless utterly English” (2005:39-40).

In essence, Talleyrand was right. Not only was the core language used in America English, but independent America built on a strong British heritage:

American law grew out of, and is still largely rooted in, the English common law. American political institutions and ideas – including representative government, the limited state, the right of revolt, the stress on individualism, the tradition of civil liberties – came largely from the British. They were an organic part of the American mind because they grew out of the political struggles in England during the Tudor-Stuart period, when America was still part of the British Empire. The American Revolution itself made the Americans more British, since they were fighting for the “true British” order and heritage that were (they felt) being lost in the mother country. (Lerner 1987:20)

It is little surprise that during his two years in America, Talleyrand became persuaded that the young United States remained at heart more English than not. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, he would later urge Napoleon to prevent America from falling further into the English camp, advocating among other the transaction of the Louisiana Purchase, which would double the size of the American nation for a mere 15 million dollars – by far the best bargain in American history (Horne 2004:196). While it seems obvious to view anti-Americanism as at least partly a successor-phobia to Anglophobia, and one that, given the lingering suspicion between France and England throughout the nineteenth century, was perhaps not so much a successor-phobia as a parallel, phobia-by-extension, Roger cautions us not to overestimate the similarities:

[...] if some of the clichés French travelers brought back from America still showed traces of a long tradition of French Anglophobia, it cannot be said that at the end of the nineteenth century the United States was only an “extension of England” to them. During the Second Empire, [...] warnings about the Anglo-Saxons made a very clear distinction between Great Britain, an old and sensible country, and the United States, a wild and unpredictable power (2005:175).

Beware of the Anglo-Saxons!

The critiques against America are frequently formulated as a rejection of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model (see for example Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:146), elegantly joining opposition towards America with opposition towards Britain. The French use of the term carries connotations that are much more profound than the mere reference to a geographical entity comprising the English-speaking Western nations. Philippe Roger has

observed how the term “Anglo-Saxon” made its entry into the French language in the more or less opprobrious way it has remained ever since:

[...] the French discovered in the 1870’s that the Anglo-Saxon myth had changed, not so much in nature as in function: that, after having been “racialized”, it had been globalized; that it was no longer a simple excuse for dividing and classing the different ethnic groups within the United States, but laid the groundwork for a planetary redistribution of roles in which the Anglo-American couple would evidently be the star (2005:171).

Roger notes that the term Anglo-Saxon also has “Teutonic” connotations, and further remarks that

it is not hard to understand why, in France’s diplomatic isolation following its 1870 defeat, the Anglo-Saxon stopped being a colourful and provincial barbarian and turned into the terrifying spectre of a community based on blood, customs, and language, one from which France would be excluded and by which it would soon be victimized. (2005:171)

In this respect, references to the Anglo-Saxon have become an indication of a particular French frame of mind – one that acknowledges the existence of an alternative model of society, while deploring its success worldwide. John Bowen has remarked that “the trope is less a theory about the United States and Britain than it is a shorthand way to refer to features that would be, or are, undesirable in France” (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:234). “If ever there was a mythical beast that stalked the minds of the French in the twentieth century it was the ‘Anglo-Saxons’”, writes Keiger. “They continue to be the most ‘imagined’ of ‘communities’” (2001:160). Bell describes the “triangular relationship” between Britain, France and the United States, in which “the French certainly believed in an Anglo-Saxon combination against them, in politics, economics and not least cultural matters” (1996:2, see also Keiger 2001:161). In all three domains, this Anglo-Saxon axis is perceived as rivaling France, yet there are great differences as to why its different dimensions have left the French elites deploring its impact. Whereas the political dimension can rather easily be explained by the relative decline of French power vis-à-vis first Britain and later the United States, and the cultural dimension somewhat less easily by a mixture of feelings of cultural superiority and a growing realization that this perceived superiority is not adequately translated into cultural impact worldwide (both these issues will be treated at greater length in 5.3 and 6.2), the economic dimension reveals a fundamental difference in the French national habitus as opposed to its Anglo-Saxon counterparts. American cultural imperialism is often decried in

France alongside the “Americanization” of consumers and spectators worldwide. It is rare that such lamentations are directed against the Anglo-Saxons as such (except when reference is made to the, arguably important, domains of language, music and higher education; see for example Horne 2004:389-392, and Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:129-156). Likewise, in spite of numerous points of political disaccord between France and Britain, it is first and foremost the United States that is considered the political other, rather than Britain, not to mention some of the other, in this respect oft forgotten, Anglo-Saxon nations. It may be that de Gaulle’s repeated rejections of Britain’s entry into the European community, fearing that Britain would act as an American “Trojan horse” (Fontaine, in Johnson, Crouzet and Bédarida (eds) 1980:350), could be described as political opposition towards Anglo-Saxon influence, or indeed fear of Anglo-Saxon “hegemonism” (Horne 2004:363 and 381). In that case (if, indeed, that was the case) it was probably one of the latest demonstrations of a deliberate attempt to keep the Anglo-Saxon political model at bay. In spite of frequent French frustrations regarding the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and America, it has since the 1970s been a consistent French policy to bind Britain as much to the European project as possible – not least with a view to present a viable alternative, however much under construction, to American hegemony (see chapter 6.1). When it comes to economic matters, however, it is as frequently the Anglo-Saxon as the American influence that is deplored. This would seem to implicate that it is not just America’s massive influence in the world economy that is deplored, as much as the nature of this influence, namely the Anglo-Saxon mode of liberal capitalism.

It was shown above that the materialistic theme was familiar in the denigration of both England and America. The case against materialism is often crudely presented as one of culture versus money, not least in France (see for example Roger 2005:36-39). This could lead us to believe that faced with a choice between whether to engage in cultural or commercial activities, the French would be more likely to choose the former, while the more materialistic English and American would opt for the latter. Such a generalization would be both absurd and erroneous. First of all, this is not a choice that seriously presents itself to the inhabitants in the three nations. In all societies, some engage in culture, some in commerce, and some in both – not to mention the multitude of other domains belonging neither to the world of culture nor the world of commerce. Regardless of the proportions of the population in the respective countries that choose either, it is hardly conceivable that they see it as a

choice between culture versus money. Second, this false dichotomy builds on the misconception, still prominent even today, that opposed to materialism, we find culture. Clearly, that is not the case: opposed to materialism, we find anti-materialism, i.e. opposition toward the importance and the use of money. Anybody who has visited France, a wealthy nation and still the world's capital of fashion and luxury products, would with good cause object to the notion that the French were anti-materialist in the sense just described. Yet it is a commonplace assessment that the French are uncomfortable with money (more so, arguably, than with other material possessions). Alain Plessis describes how, throughout the nineteenth century, novelists decried the domination exercised by money on society (in Burguière (ed.) 1993:226) and how late in the same century, French travelers to the United States were appalled by the lack of tact displayed by American *nouveaux riches* bragging about the fortunes they had amassed (ibid:229. See also Roger 2005:157-158). As opposed to many Anglo-Saxon countries, in France, it is considered bad taste to talk about money as such (Carroll 1987:132); there is in France a strong tradition of regarding money as “estimable que s’il a été acquis de manière honnête, dans des conditions honorables” (Plessis, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:229). Inherited money in this respect provides an unimpeachable source of material comfort, while moreover testifying to a successful lineage, whereas speculation is considered suspect, carrying connotations of stock jobbing or worse, exploitation (ibid:229). Apparently, money's bad reputation in France dates back to at least the Ancien Régime, where it was seen in opposition not so much to culture, but to honor (ibid:232), to such an extent that the aristocracy were forbidden to engage in commerce, deemed beneath their dignity (Brunet 2007:28). Plessis recounts the following priceless dialogue between two noblemen prior to their engagement in a duel: “Moi, Monsieur, je me bats pour l’honneur. Vous, vous vous battez pour de l’argent”. To which the other replies: “On se bat pour ce dont on manque, mon cher” (in Burguière (ed.) 1993:232). This notion of an antithesis between money and honor was later echoed by Stendhal, who noted that “L’argent est le dieu des Etats-Unis, comme la gloire est le dieu de la France” (quoted by Grosser 1978:20).

Far more important than taste and tact in how to speak of money is, in this respect, how to make use of it. In his *L’identité de la France*, Fernand Braudel describes how, already in the late Medieval period, France became disconnected from the main routes of a dawning capitalism that by its modes of transportation and proliferation encircled France rather than penetrated it (1986b:146-148). It would seem that this left an important imprint on

French society. If money was not an object of conversation, as we have seen, it remained for centuries an object of conservation. Conservation in this respect entailed immobility rather than circulation. According to the great classic economist Jean-Baptiste Say, in the eighteenth century, the monetary mass in France was divided evenly between circulation and immobility, and in 1810, Napoleon's minister of the Treasury, François Mollien, assessed that "at most", a third of the monetary mass was circulated (Braudel 1986c:357). The French preferred to save their gold, mistrusting paper money, banks, and investments with almost equal fervor, favoring instead literally to bury their savings in the soil (ibid:349-359). In 1756, Ange Goudar deplored how gold and silver coins in France had the "vice" of transforming itself into expensive tableware rather than being put to use (ibid:358). The result was that in the nineteenth century, France alone detained approximately half of Europe's monetary mass. Around 1905, economist Alfred Neymarck rejoiced in France's latent richness: it had become the world's largest capital reserve (ibid:352). Under other circumstances, this might have been a cause for celebration, but the reality behind the huge amount of capital lying dormant in France was precisely that: it was dormant and not put to use. This situation contrasted markedly with the one in England, where ever since the reign of Elizabeth I, nascent capitalism proved to have important beneficial effects on society (ibid:369-370), a development that was reinforced later with the establishment of the Bank of England and the introduction of bonds and paper money. These policies played an important role in promoting the circulation of the monetary mass and in engendering investments throughout England and abroad. France would have to wait until the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte before a *Banque de France* was created in 1800 (see for example Horne 2004:197, and Braudel 1986c:408), and even then, monetary circulation remained limited compared with other European countries (Braudel 1986c:346-421). This was in part due to the fact that the *Banque de France* frequently became an instrument of political infighting between different factions in the French society, all of which, scorning the *laissez-faire* approach then characterizing, at least to some extent, the Anglo-Saxon countries, demanded that the state exercised its influence to favor one or other segment of society, at the detriment of both transparency and economic liberalism (Zeldin 1977:1040-1120). Alain Peyrefitte has remarked that the whole conception of economy separates, and has long separated, France and Britain: For the French, commerce and industry are means for the power of the state, for the English, it is the opposite: the state is at the service of commercial and industrial power (1998:208). The fact that the Anglo-

Saxon states, which have given their commercial and industrial powers relatively free reins compared with the French tradition of dirigisme, have become more powerful as a result, has not seriously altered the French skepticism toward liberal capitalism (Tinard 2001:92-99 and 256-278).

Braudel concludes that France has not even now become fully penetrated by the capitalist model, “par les passions nécessaires, par le goût éperdu du profit sans quoi le moteur du capitalisme ne tourne pas” (1986c:420). It may be, as Braudel further writes, “à la fois le charme et le malheur de la France” (ibid.), but it is certainly a situation that sets France fundamentally apart from especially the Anglo-Saxon countries. French fears of Anglo-Saxon dominance resemble a fight against demons, which have haunted the French society for centuries, investing it with deeply rooted suspicions against liberal capitalism – the essence of the term Anglo-Saxon to most contemporary French. French companies have in the twentieth century become highly competitive in a world economy that is first and foremost characterized by the Anglo-Saxon mode of capitalism. Indeed, corporate France is one of the largest investors and largest foreign sources of jobs in America (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:151). Yet this does not alter the fact that by and large, great parts of the population – on both sides of the political divide – share a deep-set reluctance toward the liberal mode of economy. The strong anti-globalization movement in France, not least the one represented by ATTAC (see 3.5.2 and 6.2) is frequently presented as a protest against the Anglo-Saxon mode of capitalism and draws widespread support even among conservative audiences and opinion makers (Revel 2002:72). The French alternative to Anglo-Saxon economic liberalism is not anti-capitalism as such, but rather borrows on centuries of state intervention, or *dirigisme*, inherited from Richelieu and especially Colbert, the powerful first ministers of Louis XIII and Louis XIV (Horne 2004:115-117 and 135-140, Tinard 2001:256-257), perfected during the Jacobin and Napoleonic traditions of state power (Kedward 2005:468), and attaining in the twentieth century distinctively corporatist dimensions (Tinard 2001:236-241). Over the last half century, France’s overall most powerful political party, the *Gaullist* party⁷³, has been particularly successful in, despite it being predominantly a right-wing party, avoiding a liberalization of the national economy (Revel 2002:72 and Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv). Even the most economically liberal French President of the Fifth Republic hitherto, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, did not attempt to significantly alter the tradition of dirigisme (Kedward 2005:467-468). This reluctance to

allow the free market to operate in relative freedom is not a uniquely French phenomenon. It is found in all societies, indeed also in Anglo-Saxon societies. It is, however, a predominantly French phenomenon when compared with most other Western nations (Aron 1969:262, and Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv), perhaps even, as Tinard argues, the central characteristic of a French “exception” in economic matters, dominated by a large “anti-liberal consensus” (2001:15). This can be testified to by especially France’s European partners, who frequently have to engage in discussions relating to among other the independence of the European Central Bank. In spite of the Bank having since 2003 had a French President, successive French governments (not least those headed by Gaullist prime ministers) have, although largely unsuccessfully, criticized the Bank’s independence and attempted to impose political conditionalities on the its dealings (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:253). In first GATT and later WTO negotiations, France has consistently presented itself as a prime defender of special interests (not least with regard to negotiations on the sensitive elements of agriculture and cultural products), while denouncing free trade within these fields as insensitive to the social and cultural cohesion of societies – and especially, of course, of the French society (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:193-206, and Revel 2002:63-98 and 291-293). In his 2005 television address to arouse support for the French referendum on the European Constitution, President Chirac

kept playing the anti-American card, arguing that only by being part of a united European Union could France have a chance to stand up to the United States and that only a united Europe could protect France from the “Anglo-Saxon” socioeconomic model. (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:148)

The combination of dirigisme, suspicion of the free market, and the extensive French welfare state with its generous social benefits and high level of protection for the employed (paid for mostly by the employers), contribute to make France a country that finds itself permanently beleaguered by the Anglo-Saxon logic of economic liberalism (Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv). It may even be that in this respect, if we are to believe Jean-François Revel, the principal function of anti-Americanism becomes, “has always been, and still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its supreme incarnation” (quoted by Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:147). In her neo-marxist (and rather apologetic) analysis of French anti-Americanism, Kristin Ross deplores that “Free-market positions and the most inegalitarian values become systematically identified with modernity” (in Ross and Ross (eds) 2004:144). Such lamentations are shared by many French. In this

respect, culture does perhaps after all become the opposite of money and materialism. Not culture in the sense of artistic production, but culture as a deep-set predisposition, “the totality of values, beliefs and traditions inherited from the past, which the specific traits of industrial civilization” cannot eradicate (Aron 1969:263). As such, numerous French find their economic-societal doxa challenged by a modernity, which they reject while grumpingly having to acknowledge the fact that this modernity, so much at odds with their own version, has established itself as incontrovertible on a global scale. The virulent French opposition to the *pensée unique* in economic matters (Ross, in Ross and Ross (eds) 2004:152, Meunier 2000:111) certainly seems to validate this claim.

Conclusion

In its manifestations as well as its workings, Anglophobia and anti-Americanism in France present such profound and enduring similarities that it seems obvious to regard them as related. Anglophobia came first, being to a large degree the result of many centuries of mutual antagonism between the two nations. Anti-Americanism gradually succeeded Anglophobia, as the United States increasingly seemed poised to overtake Britain’s role as leading empire, politically, economically and culturally. The most prominent similarities are, however, of a more ideological or cultural nature, indicating that the themes advanced to denigrate the other correspond to deep-set differences in out-look and opinion, indeed to competing civilizational models. Sophie Meunier has remarked that “the United States has replaced England as the inimical friend against whom to forge a French national identity” (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:146), and Jack Hayward similarly notes that

Just as Britain had been *par excellence* the counter-identity that enabled the French elites to define a partly imagined, changing, contested, self-conscious sense of their exceptional identity, after the Second World War the USA became the reference point for expressing French hopes and forlorn fears about their shrinking prestige and diminishing distinctiveness. (2007:24)

If opposition to England was instrumental in clarifying France’s sense of nationhood, as Michelet asserted almost two centuries ago (see above), opposition to America seems to have become an essential confirmation of French national identity in a post-revolutionary era. Robert and Isabelle Tombs have remarked on Britain and France that “each country offered the other a mirror in which to examine itself” (2006:663). The same can to some extent be said for France and America, although with one important qualification: that Americans have

long ceased to look in that particular mirror, leaving the French to mirror themselves in a nation that sees France neither as particularly kindred nor as a rival.

While France and Britain have largely reconciled after almost a millennium of mutual antagonism, Anglophobic (and on the other side of the Channel, anti-French) sentiments persist, although now mostly relegated to the sphere of popular imaginary. Stereotypes about English lack of civility and manners have prompted the French to refer to *filer à l'anglaise* when they mean to take French leave, itself an English idiom intended to mock the French. Likewise, when the French say *capotes anglaises*, the English reciprocate with *French letters* (Paxman 1999:25-26, Zeldin 1983:76, Boll-Johansen 1992:193), obviously referring to an item that neither wants to take credit for. The profusion of popular ways to name people living on the other side of the English Channel, based on their food habits, such as *froggies* or *frogs* to designate the French, or *rosbifs* to designate the English, have acquired an air of folklore. Such pejorative expressions are like fossils, traces of times past, reflecting the ideological look that the two nations once cast on their former enemies and that have been kept in the language without, many times, any thought of seriously offending anyone anymore (Garreau 2002). In 1973 Maurice Druon, novelist and then French Minister for Cultural Affairs, observed regarding Anglo-French sym- and antipathies that “The elites tend to admire one another and the peoples to despise one another” (quoted by Gibson 1995:313). Bell seems to agree:

British and French elites [...] each admired something different in the other country; but they shared a sense of belonging to a common civilisation, a cultured and liberal society, believing in progress and humanity. [...] Outside the elites there prevailed other stereotypes and persistent ideas, mainly of a sombre hue. The antagonism between the two countries had been long and bitter, and has left its mark on the history books (not least those used in schools), and often on popular opinion and folk-memory. (1996:2-3).

In this respect, French Anglophobia contrasts markedly with French anti-Americanism, where there tends to be almost the opposite tendency, where in spite of the non-negligible anti-American rhetoric used by leading members of the political and cultural establishments, the French as such do not seem overly antagonistic toward the United States compared to the inhabitants in other European countries (see the surveys reproduced in chapter 3.1). As was hinted in 5.1 and as will be elaborated further in chapter 6.2, anti-Americanism in France has throughout the times been very much the project of the elites. Though French anti-Americanism feeds on the Anglo-Saxon legacy bequeathed by centuries of Anglophobia and

shares many of its distinct features, there is nonetheless an important difference between the two, notwithstanding the fact that England has been a traditional foe, while America has been a historic ally: Anglophobia was to a large extent a reaction to a rival nation exposing and promoting values that were in many ways radically different, or at least perceived as such on the other side of the Channel, from those of the French. Anti-Americanism, by contrast, is, as will be discussed below, in many ways as much a reaction to the only nation that has successfully embraced many of the same values as France, although with highly different outcomes. George Bernard Shaw once famously remarked that England and America were two nations separated by a common language⁷⁴. It may be that one could just as poignantly remark that France and America are two nations divided by common values. Indeed, that was the message given by then presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy while delivering a highly pro-American speech in Washington in September 2006; a message that was shortly thereafter rectified to fit with the wording of the original manuscript, which read “united by common values” (The European Institute 2006). This Freudian slip, baffling as it must have seemed to the audience at the time of delivery, nevertheless contains an essential truth: that France and America given their historical heritage share some values that are uniquely rare in the world, that these values set them apart from virtually all other nations, and that the two nations’ individual promotion of these values – related, even kindred in nature, and yet utterly distinct in their manifestations – have led not just to mutual suspicion, but also to an uneven competition to present the world with each their universalist model of modernity.

5.3 The Case of Competing Universalisms

The slogan “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*”, i.e. liberty, equality, fraternity⁷⁵, is often referred to as the motto for the French Revolution of 1789. Although its legacy goes back to the Age of Enlightenment and is associated especially with the writings of Fénelon, it became one of several mottoes in use during the Revolution⁷⁶. This motto has been adopted by the series of “Republics”, i.e. constitutions with republican values, that have succeeded each other (or other, less republican) constitutions⁷⁷, although it was first formally established under the Third Republic. Keiger describes how, “For 200 years the French nation has imagined and projected itself as the custodian of the universalist principles of the French Revolution encapsulated in the revolutionary triptych liberty, equality and fraternity and radiated by the French language” (2001:1). Yet were we to find a motto that could serve to characterize the

essence of French national identity, the notions of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* might at best give us an indication of the willful aspirations of France as a nation. Although this motto is formally inscribed as that of the French Republic in article two of the current French constitution, a far more appropriate motto would be ‘*république, civilisation, laïcité*’, i.e. republic, civilization, secularism. Indeed, this would correspond better to the text in article one of the constitution, which states that “La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.” (Formerly 2000:7). Better than any other words, *république, civilisation, and laïcité* capture the true nature of French national identity as it has been constructed (see chapter 4) since the days of the Revolution. It is hardly an overstatement to claim that modern French national identity relies on these three central tenets: its revolutionary heritage, which has formed its republican present, its perception of representing the national embodiment of universal civilization, and a specific view of secularism that sets France apart from most other nations. In all three domains, albeit to various degrees, America stands out as both a likeminded nation, founded on principles that were also to inspire the leaders of the French Revolution, and a challenger in the making to French aspirations to be a model for other nations to follow.

5.3.1 The republican ideal

The birth of modern France can be dated quite exactly: it took place on July 14th, 1789, when an angry mob stormed the Bastille, a symbol of royalist repression, and liberated its seven remaining prisoners, thus sparking the French Revolution⁷⁸. Though France can boast of a long and impressive history, the French society today is marked more by the Revolution than by any other historic event. Already Taine remarked that the Revolution was the origin of contemporary France (Julliard 1999:177), just as centuries later, Jean-Jacques Chevallier could safely state that “the French Revolution founded a society” (quoted by Conac in Chevallier and Conac 1991:xxvi). From its administrative structure with more than 36,000 communes and 100 départements to the very values that lie at the core of the current Fifth Republic, they virtually all originate from the rebirth of the French nation that took place slightly more than 200 years ago. Roger Chartier and Madeleine Rebérioux have convincingly argued (in Burguière (ed.) 1993) that many of the deeper mental structures in France were inherited from the Ancien Régime. Indeed that was one of the central arguments made by

Tocqueville in his *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397, Furet, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:1072-1083), yet with the benefit of two centuries of hindsight, the events of 1789 undoubtedly augured a new era in France. In Raymond Aron's words, the Revolution cut France's history in two (1945:209). Naturally, even such an ambitious break with the past as the one represented by the French Revolution⁷⁹ could not eradicate all the traditions that had previously governed the French society. It is certainly true that though Revolutionary France rebelled against the two major institutions and sources of power of the *Ancien Régime*, the society of privileges (of royalty as well as of nobility) and the Church, it inherited a number of major bequests: the territory of France, the French language(s), a long and rich history, a tradition for *dirigisme*, a penchant toward Anglophobia, and a philosophical doxa most recently expounded in the writings of the French *philosophes*. The most obvious physical bequest was naturally the French territory, a territory that was populated by inhabitants with highly heterogeneous identities (Braudel 1986a:72). Though the revolutionaries inherited the French territory as such, it was, as Theodore Zeldin has remarked, "only in 1789 that the unity of the country was proclaimed, after the different estates and regions renounced their privileges in 'a heroic suicide of particularism'" (1977:5). As regards the French language, this was by no means a common language of the French. Though highly influential in the circles in Paris, where the Revolution started, it was, as will be discussed in 5.3.2, minoritarian on the French territory as such. And though revolutionary France inherited a long and rich history, its teaching became virtually banned during the Revolution with the argument that "une histoire des rois" would serve nothing, save maintaining the remains of "barbarie féodale" (Joutard, in Burguière 1993:539). Even when order was restored during the *Consulat*, it was asserted that "Nous n'avons à proprement parler une Histoire de France que depuis la Révolution" (ibid.), and throughout the nineteenth century, there has been a tendency to look for inspiration in the ideals inherited from the Revolution whenever there has been attempts at installing more liberal political regimes in France, scorning the inherited traditions of the *Ancien Régime* as reactionary (Miquel 1976:5-6). Also in this sense was 1789 considered the birth of modern France. A further bequest was the notions of centralized government and dirigisme. As was seen in 5.2, the tradition for *dirigisme* in the French state apparatus can be traced back to Richelieu and especially Colbert. Indeed, the term *colbertisme* is frequently used to characterize the tradition for state intervention in economic affairs, still highly visible in modern day France. This tradition was

if anything strengthened under the influence of the Revolution's quest for a unitary republic. Furthermore, the age-old rivalry with England and later the British Empire described above did not end with the Revolution that deposed the king of France, endemically the representative of England's staunchest enemy throughout centuries. Quite the contrary. In spite of its liberal traditions, England persistently opposed both the nature and form of the revolutionary republic that grew up across the Channel, offering refuge to the many noblemen and others who fled from the excesses of the Revolution. Finally and probably most importantly in this respect, the revolutionary ideals that were to shape both the first years of the Revolution and later the notions of universality that the Revolution reinforced and remodeled, built, as we shall see below, on a philosophical doxa shared by the intellectual elites throughout France, originating (at least) with Descartes and later expounded especially by the *philosophes* in the decades prior to the Revolution. With the Revolution, these mental structures did however acquire a new form and especially a sense of purpose. The new France that was born out of the ravages of the revolutionary period is, in this respect, not older than the United States. As the Americans revere their founding fathers, so can the French celebrate, if not with equal admiration their revolutionary leaders (who had a tendency to condemn each other to the guillotine), then at least the principles on which their Revolution was based.

The idea that the French Revolution was indeed a break with the past and the beginning of a new era was meant quite literally. Not only was the deposed king, Louis XVI, beheaded in January 1793 in a highly symbolic gesture that demonstrated the commitment to building the new republic on a *tabula rasa*. The leading French revolutionaries were so determined to break with the past that they had taken to calling 1789 'year 1 of the era of freedom' (*an 1 de la Liberté*), as opposed to the previous, 'common era' (*l'ère vulgaire*). Subsequently, they even created a new calendar, *le calendrier républicain* or *calendrier révolutionnaire*, whose starting date was September 22nd 1792, the day when the Republic was officially proclaimed, which became renamed the 1st *vendémiaire* year I⁸⁰. The decision to create a new calendar was quite literally the expression of the idea that the Revolution leading to the republic was a new starting point on which the new nation was born (Horne 2004:179). Though this calendar, with the names of the months beautifully named after the changing seasons, was given up in 1806, it was a magnificent testimony to the urge to distance the new republic from not only what would later be termed the *Ancien Régime* (Tocqueville [1856]

1928), but also the majority of the European states, who were characterized by the twin all-pervasive forces of more or less enlightened absolutist rule and obedience to the Church.

The importance of the French Revolution for the construction of modern French national identity cannot be overestimated. Indeed, as Raymond Aron has remarked, “The French Revolution belongs to the national heritage” ([1955] 2001:42) and is as such revered as the constitutive moment of modern France. In the context of this study, it is furthermore of special interest for three reasons: First, the Revolution that marked the rebirth of the French nation took place at virtually the same time as the United States was born as an independent American nation. In their origins, modern France and the United States have more in common with each other than with any other nation. This is an important point for the understanding of French anti-Americanism: that it is in many ways a reaction to the only other nation to have successfully taken a path similar to that of France. Second, the American and French Revolutions gave rise to the first two major republics in modern times. In the minds of the founding fathers on both sides of the Atlantic (although the term naturally applies best to the American Founding Fathers), these republics represented political modernity – the political fulfillment of the most radical promises of the Enlightenment, and the revolutions have since remained “at the heart of the Western representation of modernization” (Touraine, in Featherstone (ed.) 1990:121). Third, these unique revolutionary origins and the sense of representing modernity in a world otherwise ruled essentially by more or less ancient dynasties imbued the two nations with aspirations that are if not similar, then at least comparable. These aspirations are of a universalistic, messianic nature, which has had the effect of installing in the two nations the belief that they are examples for others to follow. As such, much French anti-Americanism has at the core a competition of universalisms; a competition which is frequently not acknowledged, but nevertheless quite pervasive.

Common revolutionary origins

Over the span of just twenty years, the world witnessed a major upheaval that was to change both the course of world politics and the destinies of many nations. From the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed in 1776 over the 1783 Treaty of Paris, in which Britain formally accepted the terms of secession of the United States to the election of George Washington as the first president of the United States in 1789, the same year as the French Revolution broke out, the international system of the late eighteenth century became

fundamentally changed. The mighty British Empire lost one of its most promising colonies while the most populous European nation and strongest military power challenged the age-old norms of dynastic rule on the continent. Seen from the perspective of the monarchies of the day, France and America had become *rogue nations* well before the term was coined (though the later American policy of non-entanglement with European affairs relegated it to a somewhat lesser threat to international peace than France). There is an eerie similarity to the establishment of the United States and modern, revolutionary France. Yet though, as will be shown below, there was clearly evidence of elements of mutual inspiration – the Founding Fathers having been influenced by French enlightenment philosophy (Lerner 1987:364) and the revolutionary leaders in France having been at least partly inspired by the American example (Greene 1993:135-161 and Furet and Ozouf, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993:7-16) – the two revolutions were distinct in both origin and nature. The American quest for independence came in reaction to a British rule that was regarded as distant and aloof, perhaps even oppressing to some. “No taxation without representation” was the rallying call of the settlers who objected not so much at first to the British colonial rule *per se* as to the way this rule was enforced upon them, denying them the right to political representation that they felt they deserved as free men (Berkin 2002:12). The French Revolution had more fundamentally social origins, coming after periods of famine and neglect from the royal authorities (Furet 1988). Though the causes of the French Revolution were very different from those that prompted the American Revolution, they resembled each other in one respect: both revolutions were rebellions against a king who was seen directly or indirectly to neglect his subjects (Fredrickson, in Kastoryano (ed.) 2005:44).

It is common schoolbook knowledge that France was the only ally of the American colonists fighting for independence. French support was instrumental in the creation of the United States as an independent nation⁸¹, and the two nations were destined to, within slightly more than a decade, becoming the two only revolutionary powers in a world otherwise reigned almost exclusively by kings and emperors. By the time George Washington was elected the first president of the United States in 1789, France was embarking on its own Revolution. When, on 14 July, the people of Paris stormed the Bastille to seize arms to use against the royal troops, they formed militias that took the name National Guard. Lafayette, the young French marquis and general who had fought alongside Washington even before the 1778 treaty, was immediately named commander-in-chief of this National Guard. Lafayette

had personally urged George Washington, in a letter written in January 1788, to accept nomination as the first president of the United States, “in the name of America, of all mankind, and of your own fame” (Duroselle 1978:35). Now he was eager to import the spirit of the American Revolution to France. Not opposed to monarchy as such, he wanted to rally the king to the cause of the Revolution and the Constituent Assembly to the idea of a powerful and active executive (Lefebvre, in Lefebvre, Guyot and Sagnac 1930:42). At the end of August 1789, a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was adopted. The document was partly inspired by the American Declaration of Independence, although, as will be shown below, it would lead to fundamentally different notions of human rights. For the drafting, Lafayette had consulted its author, his friend Thomas Jefferson, American envoy to France since 1784 (Duroselle 1978:33). Just before he left France in October, Jefferson wrote to James Madison assuring him that it would not be possible to wish for a friendlier attitude toward the United States than that expressed by the Constituent Assembly. At every turn, he wrote, the Assembly was adopting actions taken in America as its models (ibid:35). Never have the two nations been closer. At that precise moment in history, France and the United States could count only each other as true allies. They were united by strong military, political and cultural ties. Men such as Lafayette, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine were revered in both countries as favorite – or at least affiliated – sons (Vincent, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993). When Benjamin Franklin died in 1790, the French Constituent Assembly went into mourning (Duroselle 1978:35, Schiff 2005:403).

One might think that such similar national destinies would lead to close political co-operation. Yet that was not the case. The ruling federalists in the United States mistrusted France and favored closer ties with Britain, which remained the most important trading partner (Schiff 2005). The French Revolution succumbed to internal divisions culminating in the *Terreur* and ultimately in the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte as Emperor of the French. The revolutionary spirit once shared took different directions. Throughout the nineteenth century, the two nations drifted further apart. The United States retreated into isolationism. France, while suffering from numerous regime changes throughout the century, sought primarily to consolidate its great power status on the European continent and in its African and Asian possessions. Its remaining possessions on the North American mainland, Louisiana and French Canada, had been either sold or lost to Britain. Though the American Revolution sparked genuine interest in France, where many philosophers saw it as the manifestation of

the reason of mankind that they had preached throughout the eighteenth century, it would be a delusion to romanticize France's siding with the colonists during the War of Independence. King Louis XVI was no believer in revolutions. Rather, France's support was motivated by power-political considerations. Since the loss of large parts of its American possessions in 1763, France had waited for an opportunity to strike a blow at Britain. The American Revolution was the ideal opportunity. Likewise, while Thomas Jefferson's early positive attitudes towards the French Revolution were undoubtedly motivated by idealism, the early American governments hardly went out of their way to come to the aid of their old ally.

The common revolutionary origins did not lead to a Franco-American alliance of republics against the forces of monarchical rule which they had rebelled against. A treaty of friendship between the two nations was signed in 1801, its preamble reading: "There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace and a true and sincere friendship between the French Republic and the United States of America" (quoted by Lofts and Weiner 1968:41), but though the treaty has remained in force to this day, it had little practical effect, as the two nations progressively drifted apart. Yet though the romance between the two revolutionary powers might only have lasted the time of a short honeymoon, the implications of their shared aspirations were to determine their future fates. Hannah Arendt has remarked that "the French Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local importance" (1965:56). It is true that when regarded with the distance of two centuries, the American Revolution has come to represent the legitimate, enlightened uprising against a colonial power, an uprising that would furthermore come to be seen as a model for other colonized people to follow and as such as the first successful manifestation of a collective wish for independence and self-government. The French Revolution in comparison presents pictures of a violent, internecine struggle in a deeply divided society – a struggle which would lead to further ideological, political and military clashes throughout most of the nineteenth century. In this respect, the French Revolution in reality came to last a century (Furet 1988), ending "somewhere between 1871 and 1905" (Duhamel 1993:22). The reason why the French Revolution, according to Arendt, made history is probably that it seemed at the time to a much larger extent than the American Revolution to represent a watershed in European politics: "It was the French and not the American Revolution that set the world on fire" (1965:55). The French Revolution gave birth to a new concept in Europe, the nation-state,

which replaced the traditional dynastic state of the *Ancien Régime*⁸². “In political terms, France was one of the first ‘nation-states’ in Europe”, Zeldin notes, though he adds that “for long its unity was felt consciously more by its rulers than by its people” (1977:4). As such, the French Revolution came to be seen as a precursor to the monumental changes that were to transform the European political landscape in the nineteenth century. By contrast, the creation of the United States was not regarded by the largely Eurocentric observers across the Atlantic as nearly as path breaking; to the European courts of the day, its foremost impact must have seemed to be the weakening of the British Empire. More lucid observers, such as Tocqueville, would later display a keen eye for the long term implications of the American experience (see chapter 3), yet their voices would long prove to have a relatively limited impact within the Eurocentric teaching of history where, as the contemporary critic Manfred Henningsen noted, “The ‘rising of the sun’ in France led to a total eclipse of America” (quoted by Diner 1996:9). In spite of the difference in importance attached at the time to the two revolutions in contemporary Europe, there is little doubt that they both fundamentally represented a break with the world of established monarchies, heralding a new era, which to some must have seemed a threatening erosion of the values on which societies throughout the ages had been built, to others, the promise of modernity.

The end of history and the promise of modernity

To some contemporary observers, the French Revolution must have seemed to augur “the end of history” (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:102-107). The events of June 1789, in which King Louis XVI attempted to side with the aristocracy to counter the growing demands of the Third Estate, “effectively discredited the thesis of a natural alliance between king and commoners – and with it the reading of French history as illustrative of that alliance” (ibid:105). The King’s actions had, to the revolutionaries, discredited the royal institution as such – an institution which had ruled and formed France for eight hundred years⁸³. The 1789 Revolution marked the willful attempt to end that history. Exactly two hundred years later, Francis Fukuyama would use the same notion of the end of history, this time in an altogether positive way to describe the triumph of liberal democracy at the eve of the peaceful revolutions which sparked the fall of the Berlin Wall (1992:xiii, see also the discussion in chapter 3). It is tempting to assume that to the revolutionary leaders of the day, it must have seemed as if the French Revolution indeed did herald ‘the end of history’ of the Ancien

Régime as well as the beginnings of a new era. French history was, in the hopes of the revolutionary leaders, henceforth to be shaped by the people, rather than by the kings, by the ruled rather than the rulers (essentially, although it is an admittedly simplistic parallel, this was to some extent the same Hegelian vision presented by Fukuyama two centuries later). In a contemporary liberal perspective, it would probably not be an exaggeration to regard the Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 as ‘the beginning of the end of history’. Hegel, who reacted strongly against the excesses of the Revolution, nevertheless described it as “a superb sunset” in universal history, as it heralded subjectivity and reason in the political sphere (Ferry, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:974).

Both the French and American Revolutions heralded a new ‘modernity’, erecting republics to supplant feudal or pseudo-feudal monarchies. Though the philosophers might have illuminated what Gertrud Himmelfarb has termed “the roads to modernity” (2008), it was with the establishment of republics in America and France that this modernity acquired its proper political manifestation. To Condorcet⁸⁴, America had given the world an example of how the modern ideals of the Enlightenment could be carried out (Muravchik 1992:83). Turgot described in 1778 how Americans, by setting themselves up as the champions of liberty and enemies of oppression, had made themselves “the hope of the world” (quoted by Greene 1993:139). The American example was in the words of Benjamin Franklin “a great political experiment” with global consequences, and it would be perceived among progressives on both sides of Atlantic as Utopia and realization combined (Rémond 1958:532-533), an argument, which is still echoed today, even by those relatively critical of the “utopia achieved” (Baudrillard 1988:77). The French Revolution at first seemed the fulfillment of the same promise in Europe. In terms of political, cultural, and philosophical aspirations of modernity, the French Revolution represented the “archetypical modernistic action” (Boll-Johansen 1992:117):

Giving us the notion of a total and decisive break with the past, the French Revolution virtually invented the related notions of “nation” and the “citizen”, adopted and discarded four of the world’s first written “constitutions,” and promulgated three sets of declarations of rights. (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6)

The inscription on the Republic’s Great Seal at America’s birth as a united nation: *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, A New Order for the Ages (Lieven 2005:33), could just as easily have been formulated in France. For those yearning for an end to more or less authoritarian monarchical

regimes, the French and American republican experiences represented the manifest proof that the old order did not rest on divine providence and that alternative models of society were readily available to eschew. And though the “myth of the revolution”, as Raymond Aron asserts, “benefited from the prestige of other ideas and fetishes more often borrowed than authentic”, it certainly also “benefited from the prestige of aesthetic modernism” ([1955] 2001:43). In spite of the later excesses of the French Revolution, the image of the republic as a new political vision (although admittedly one with ancient roots, see 3.4.1) was to spread as an image of modernity in large parts of Europe.

Yet it was not just the republican ideal that became associated with modernity as a result of the revolutions. Indeed, Paine described the new times as the *Age of Reason*, implying that the time had come for the liberation of man from the oppression of yesterday’s dogmas, not least those imposed by the Church (Himmelfarb 2008:93 and 102-103). In France, the notion of reason had long been elevated by the *philosophes* as the essence of what should found a new era of modernity (ibid:149-163). With the French Revolution, these aspirations became part of the revolutionary quest to reshape society. Tocqueville later described the ideal set forth by the French Revolution as “not merely a change in the French social system but nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race” (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid:185-186). Mona Ozouf notes that this idea of regeneration was a key concept of revolutionary discourse: “bientôt on ne parlera plus que de *la* régénération, un programme sans limites, tout à la fois physique, politique, moral et social, qui ne prétend à rien moins qu’à créer un « nouveau peuple »” (in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:821). This French modernity had essentially two inaugural sources: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century they would both come to haunt France leaving deep imprints that have lasted to this day (Julliard 1985:17-18 and 241-247). Whether these aims at regenerating the people were successful is highly doubtful. In one respect though, did the regime that propagated the concept of nationhood more than any other present a novel interpretation of the national citizen: that the citizen was he (or she) who adhered to the values and principles of the nation. Whereas nationhood became in most nineteenth century countries of Europe associated primarily with descendency through bloodlines (*jus sanguinis*), the perception of nationhood in France following the Revolution was very similar to the practice in the United States: citizenship was the privilege of those born in France or those who by a willful act chose to settle there permanently (*jus soli*). The effects of this are still felt today:

Whereas the German, Italians or Spanish recognize each other first and foremost in terms of race or language, the French are not so much *born* French as they *become* French via culture and education⁸⁵. The same applies to the Americans, which is a natural result of the nation's history as a society built largely on immigration. As opposed to most other nations, France and the United States are, in this respect, two nations founded on social contracts (Sorman, in Lacorne et al. 1990:213). Far from introducing the regeneration of man, the Revolution introduced something different, yet totally compatible with the revolutionary aspirations: a universalist conception of nationhood, in which citizenry was in principle open to those embracing the nation as the embodiment of their aspirations. A central tenet of the political nation-state established under the Revolution became the concept of France as “la terre d’asile”, the land of asylum for political refugees irrespective of their ethnic or national origins (Holm 1993:19-21). This universalist notion clearly had an American parallel. Prior to the French Revolution, Condorcet had remarked how the American emphasis on natural rights made it possible for “any man, whatever may be his religion, his opinions, or his principles [...] to find refuge” in the new nation (quoted by Greene 1993:141). Likewise, to Turgot, “The asylum they open to the oppressed of all nations should console the earth” (ibid:140). At the end of the eighteenth century, mankind had in theory two universal nations to which they could choose to belong.

Competing universalisms

Right from the beginning of their Revolutions, the universalist aspirations of the two nations were visible. It was described in chapter 3.4.1 how America was born as a universal nation with a messianic quest to embrace the whole of mankind with universally applicable values (Lieven 2005:34). The same applies to the new France that was born out of the 1789 Revolution (Lévy, in Finkielkraut and Lévy 2006:84). From the onset, the revolutionary leaders were persuaded that they were legislating on behalf of humanity itself, since their actions were inspired by “la perspective des progrès de l’esprit humain” (Chevallier and Conac 1991:xx). In this sense, they were “les missionnaires de la philosophie des lumières” (ibid.). Zeldin has noted that the notions of *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité* progressively became transferred onto the world to span humanity as such (1983:475). Certainly, the word *fraternité* carries connotations of a brotherhood that is not necessarily exclusive to the French nation. As such, the universalist pretensions were visible right from the beginnings of the

Revolution. Just as the American Revolution started in earnest with the proclamation of the American Declaration of Independence with its assertion that “all men are created equal”, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 – “the French Revolution’s best known utterance” (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6) – gave the French Revolution a universal dimension right from the onset. Or rather, it gave France a new universal dimension: Yesterday, “fille aînée de l’Église depuis le baptême de Clovis en 496”, since 1789 “patrie des Droits de l’Homme [...], proclamant même, par la voix de Danton, à la face de l’univers, la liberté universelle” (Gilder and Salon 2004:22). The French Declaration is certainly the Revolution’s most universalist project, one purporting to liberate not just the citizens of France from oppression, but potentially also mankind. Indeed, the Declaration “was specifically intended to be universal in its application” (Chuter 1996:19). As was noted above, the French declaration had foreign sources of inspiration to draw from. Both the Magna Carta and the American Declaration of Independence “were already there for the French to emulate, eschew, or surpass in 1789” (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6). Yet Van Kley notes that

Very conscious of breaking from the American experience [...], the French deputies of the Estates General reborn as the National Assembly of 1789 tried hard, in the words of one of their number, not to receive lessons from others but rather “to give them” to the rest of the world, not to proclaim the rights of Frenchmen but those “for all times and all nations”. (ibid.)

The universal dimension of the American Declaration of Independence was not acknowledged by several of the revolutionary leaders most involved in the drafting of the French declaration. Keith Michael Baker’s reading of the papers of the Abbé Sieyès, the French Revolution’s most influential constitutional theorist, provides interesting insights into what Baker terms “the history of declarations of rights before 1789” (Baker, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:158). In Sieyès’s analysis, the American Revolution might have been

the first to break with the traditional pattern in that it overthrew the entire yoke of despotism rather than merely alleviating it. But the break was not complete. In drawing up their bill of rights, the Americans continued to regard the governments they were establishing in the same spirit of suspicion with which they had confronted the power they had overthrown: they wished, above all, to guard themselves against abusive authority. [...] It was a profound mistake, Sieyès thought, for the Americans to persist in conceiving a declaration of rights in the traditional manner, as a direct response to immediate injuries. Declarations drawn up on this assumption could only be particular in their articles, as each people recalled its most bitter grievances. But particularistic declarations of this kind, insisted the French theorist, must ever be the symptom of incomplete

revolutions. A people regaining its complete sovereignty needs only the universal. (ibid:158-159)

That was exactly what the drafters of the French declaration set out to produce: a universal declaration of the rights of man. “Unlike the American declarations”, i.e. the American Declaration of Independence and the individual states’ various declarations and bills of rights, “concerned above all to make individual rights and civil society immune to power, the French Declaration’s main purpose was to use abstract individuals and their rights as the constituent elements of a new and unlimited power” (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:9)⁸⁶. As such,

the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen refers only once to “the French people” [in its opening sentence, describing the National Assembly as constituting the “representatives of the French people”], only once to “the nation”, and several times, but only in an abstract generic sense, to “society” (or its members). The collectivity from which the document is ultimately held to derive is virtually effaced by the abstract form of its appeals to universality. (Baker, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:160)

The *Constituants* drafting the French Declaration were conscious of what Marcel Gauchet has termed “la contrainte de l’universalité” (in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:689) and declared that only a “déclaration des droits pour tous les homes, pour tous les temps, pour tous les pays” (Duport, quoted by Gauchet, ibid.) would give it the necessary universal authority. And though there is little doubt that to the drafters of the French Declaration “le modèle américain est dans toutes les têtes, [et] c’est explicitement ou implicitement *par rapport à lui* que les Constituants français se posent et pensent” (Gauchet, ibid:686), the French Declaration was in reality inspired as much by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as by the American example. Indeed, as Himmelfarb has noted, the Declaration “included references to the social contract taken almost verbatim from Rousseau’s book” (2008:183)⁸⁷. Rousseau, described by Robespierre as “the precursor” of the French Revolution (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid:186), was by far the most influential of the Enlightenment *philosophes* at the time of the Revolution. His “refiguration of natural rights theory in terms of the ‘general will’” (Wright, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:232), had an important impact on his disciples⁸⁸. Sieyès, who revered Rousseau, declared in his famous pamphlet *What is the Third Estate?*, published at the eve of the Revolution, that “The nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed it is the law itself” (quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:183). This emphasis on the common will sets the French Declaration fundamentally apart from the American.

Whereas in America, leading Federalists “saw the principal dangers to individual rights coming from the tyranny of the majority” (Bell, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:239), in revolutionary France, many deputies

saw the principal danger to individual rights coming not from government *per se*, but from self-interested *minorities*, whether aristocracy or “agents of despotism”. From this point of view, the democratic legislature itself, incarnating the nation, and not simply a faction, logically represented the best safeguard of individual rights. Thus the two tendencies detected by the French theorists in the Declaration of Rights – on the one hand the protection of individual rights, on the other the *strengthening* of state authority – did not necessarily contradict each other. The more powerful the state, it could be reasoned, the less chance for any malicious minority to usurp its authority and violate individual freedoms with impunity. (ibid.)

Bell further notes that the Declaration of Rights thus came to have “as a principal aim the strengthening, not the weakening of state power” (ibid:238). It is little surprise then, that the French Declaration led to “the construction of a sovereignty so collective as to effect an identification of citizenry with their government archaically reminiscent of the virtual identity of Old Regime nation with its king” (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:9).

This account of the creation of the French Declaration prompts two observations of importance for this study. First, though both America and France may compete for the title of the first nation to present a universal declaration of human rights to mankind (Fredrickson, in Kastoryano (ed.) 2005:44), their respective declarations differ significantly. The American Declaration is first and foremost concerned with endowing citizens with rights, which are “unalienable”, confirming its status as a liberal document born out of especially the British Enlightenment tradition with its focus on natural rights guaranteeing “the negative freedoms of classical liberalism” (Wright, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:233). Though the French Declaration is unquestionably also imbued with liberal aspirations announced both in the preamble and several of its articles, in fact to such an extent that it can be read as an axiomatic document, which takes as its point of departure the notion of *liberté* (Herslund *et al*, forthcoming), it nevertheless balances the freedom of its individuals with the concept of ‘general will’, a notion which confers a significant role on the state as the embodiment of this general will. The importance accorded to the state in France has, as was also mentioned earlier in this chapter, been a constant feature of French history since well before the Revolution. The preeminent role attributed to the state also explains the somewhat more limited emphasis placed on the individual as compared with the tradition in Anglo-Saxon nations. According to

Himmelfarb, all the *philosophes* had in common the tendency to elevate “the whole of mankind” over the “individual” (2008:174). Diderot for one decidedly placed less emphasis on the individual than the general will:

Individual wills are suspect; they can be good or evil. But the general will is always good. It is never wrong, it never will be wrong [...] It is to the general will that the individual must address himself to know how far he ought to be a man, a citizen, a subject, a father, a child, and when it is suitable to live or to die. It is for the general will to determine the limits of all duties. (Quoted by Himmelfarb *ibid*:168)

Himmelfarb notes that following Diderot’s lead, “the theory of the general will was a surrogate for the enlightened despot”, having “the same moral and political authority as the despot because it, too, was grounded in reason, a reason that was the source of all legitimate authority” (*ibid.*). This certainly applied to the Revolution’s leading despot, Robespierre, who declared that “The people is always worth more than individuals [...] The people is sublime, but individuals are weak” (*ibid*:184). If the American and French Revolutions with each their sets of declarations of human rights can be regarded as the origins of the two nations’ claim to offering a universal vision for the world to embrace, it seems obvious to conclude that their visions differ in nature. As such, the case of two competing universalisms is indeed one of two *different* universalisms. This was already clear to one of the earliest and staunchest critics of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke. Although highly sympathetic toward the American Revolution, which he approved on the grounds that its emphasis on rights gave it a moral legitimacy (*ibid*:79-85), he was fervently opposed to the Rousseauian notion of general will extolled by the leading French revolutionaries⁸⁹. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* ([1790] 1986), he scorned the abstract notions of reason and rationality central to the new political edifice being erected following the Revolution, which he found to be oblivious to the complexities of human nature. Though Burke did not explicitly compare the two Revolutions (as Himmelfarb notes, “to the great regret of historians”, 2008:85), his writings implicitly contrast the two: “Unlike the American Revolution, which was a political revolution, the French Revolution, he insisted, was nothing less than a moral revolution, a total revolution, a revolution of sentiment and sensibility penetrating into every aspect of life” (*ibid*:91)⁹⁰. Tocqueville’s later assessment of the ideal set forth by the French Revolution as “nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race” (quoted by Himmelfarb *ibid*:186) essentially follows the same Burkean logic. If we accept these premises, it seems clear that the

two universalisms were not just different in kind, but also in their aspirations. The American universalism was one in which a new model of political society was presented to the world; the French universalism had a higher ambition: to present the world with a new perception of mankind itself, or as revolutionary leader Billaud-Varenne wrote in his 1794 report on the theory of democratic government, to “recreate the people in order to give it its freedom” (quoted by Julliard 1985:148). As Pierre Chaunu comments, such notions of “the universal man”, which continued to be put forward well into the nineteenth century, were essentially a euphemism for the Frenchman pure and simple (in Chaunu and Mension-Rigau 1996:284).

Second, while the American Declaration precedes the French by more than a decade, Americans rarely portray themselves as the inventors of either the concept or the specific content of human rights. The American Declaration of Independence is rather seen as part of a vast complex of American values, to which also the Constitution of the United States belongs (see Lerner 1987:442, on what he terms the “Constitution cult” in America), which makes America an exceptional nation and indeed a universal republic (see chapter 3.4.1). French political and cultural elites by contrast frequently refer to France as *la patrie des droits de l’homme*, “the most popular of political slogans” (Furet, in Furet, Julliard and Rosanvallon 1988:58), seemingly oblivious to the fact that also America could contend for the title. Dale Van Kley has reported how, facing a largely Anglo-Saxon audience in 1975, French historian Jacques Godechot described the French Declaration of Rights as “the principal vehicle of the ideas of liberty and equality around the globe” (in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:7). Though such claims may seem somewhat preposterous given the audience, it is a fact that the French Declaration’s universal pretensions have been fulfilled, at least in part, by the imprint it has made on numerous declarations and constitutions in Western Europe as well as in former French colonies of Africa and Asia and, most importantly, the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights (ibid.). That, however, is hardly justification enough for the title of *patrie des droits de l’homme*. It is a fact that the American Declaration of Independence is frequently referred to by many as the first human rights declaration in the world (Hansen 2005:195), and alongside the French Declaration, it too was a source of inspiration for the UN Declaration (ibid. p. 205). It was described above how leading constitutional theorists in France, chief among them Sieyès, did not consider the American declarations properly universal, and it is certainly true that apart from the preamble, the Declaration of Independence reads as a rather particularistic document, framed in a specific historic and political context. Yet there is no

doubt that the American Declaration was a source of inspiration to the drafters of the French Declaration. One of the French *Constituants*, Montmorency, clearly stated that the goal should be to “perfectionner le grand exemple de l’Amérique”, though he claimed for “cet hémisphère l’avantage sur l’autre d’invoquer plus hautement la raison et de lui laisser parler un langage plus pur” (quoted by Gauchet, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:687). Though both declarations have clearly been inspired by thoughts and actions from the other side of the Atlantic (see for example Raynaud, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:847-870), leading forces among the French elites soon attempted to discard the universal importance of the American Declaration. Similarly, references to the American republican example have among the French political elites primarily been made in order to oppose the American democratic tradition, “imprégnée d’esprit religieux et juridique”, to the French ditto, “tout entier dirigé vers la recherche de l’intérêt général” (Raynaud, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993:57). As the French revolutionary heritage became consolidated as a central part of the French national identity, the American example was discarded, and there grew up, according to François Furet, the belief that the French Revolution incarnated “elle et elle seule, la liberté et l’égalité, le grand commencement de l’émancipation des hommes. Il n’y a pas de place dans la pensée jacobine pour deux nations pilotes” (1982:209). It is an impression that has to a large extent survived until this day.

Conclusion

The common revolutionary ideals of the two nations have to a large extent entered into their peoples’ “social imaginary” as Charles Taylor terms it, i.e. the “common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (2004:23). This sense of legitimacy is used frequently and extensively by the political leaders of the two nations and usually taken at face value by their citizens precisely because they represent shared values, inherited over the centuries. Building on these values, “both nations preach a credo of universalism” (Thouaille, in Neumann *et al* 2006:62). In 2001, Condoleezza Rice, then foreign affairs adviser to President George W. Bush, stated that “The rest of the world is best served by the USA pursuing its own interests because American values are universal” (quoted by Phillipson 2003:75). Quoting from President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, that “America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere”, Sardar and Davies note that the President “takes it for

granted that American ideas of liberty and justice are the only ones that there are” (2002:201). Their criticism reflects an exasperation common to many foreign observers of the United States, one which feeds on the perception of American aspirations toward a hegemony of values. Yet that is the essence of universalism: that certain values, while purportedly originating in one pilot nation, are perceived by their proponents as common for mankind to expound, as sublime manifestations of the wishes and aspirations of all men. As has been shown above, this phenomenon is by no means unique to America. In a 1967 New Year’s Eve address, President de Gaulle declared that “Our action is directed toward goals which are connected and which, because they are French, reflect the desire of all men” (Grosser 1980:184). In reality, both the American and the French universalisms are testimonies to an essential part of their national habitus: the aspiration of presenting mankind with each their model of civilization.

5.3.2 The vanguard of civilization

From the days of the Enlightenment, French philosophers associated the notion of civilization with Europe and *in finis* with France. In this respect, it is only befitting that the word *civilisation* itself was a product of both the Enlightenment and of a French writer, the Marquis de Mirabeau⁹¹ (Elias [1939] 2000:33-4, Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 1993:63). Like *nation*, it was a new word, first used in 1766, and admitted into the dictionary of the French Academy in 1798, the same year in which the word *nationalisme* was first used in France (Zeldin 1977:6, see also Febvre, in Rundell and Mennell (eds) 1998:160-183). From then on, it quickly caught on. Though neither Montesquieu nor Voltaire used the word, preferring the adjective *civilisé*, their works did in effect center on this very notion. Voltaire’s *Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations* was probably the first attempt to produce a general history of civilization (Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 1993:63). Civilization became associated with the belief in social, cultural and political progress made popular during the Enlightenment. Elias has remarked that the term civilization was “at the moment of its formation, a clear reflection” of the enlightened ideas of the Physiocrats ([1939] 2000:38). The concept of civilization essentially fused two ideas: On the one hand, it was a counter concept to the notion of barbarism. On the other, it was seen as a process that was to be taken further:

That was the new element expressed in the term *civilisation*. It absorbed much of what had always made court society believe itself to be, as compared with those living in a simpler, more uncivilized or more barbaric way, a higher kind of

society: the idea of a level of morals and manners, including social tact, consideration for others and many related complexes. But in the hands of the rising middle class, in the mouth of the reform movement, the idea of what was needed to make society civilized was extended. The civilizing of the state, the constitution and education, and therefore the liberation of broader sections of the population from all that was still barbaric or irrational in existing conditions, whether it were the legal penalties or the class restrictions on the bourgeoisie or the barriers impeding a freer development of trade, this civilizing must follow the refinement of manners and the internal pacification of the country by the kings (ibid:41-42)

The rising French bourgeoisie originally saw civilization as a process as well as a state, and though it inherently contained a challenge towards ancient notions regarding socially inherited privileges, the aristocracy's cultural norms were largely upheld. Civilization was in this respect from the onset imbued with notions of a both restraint and the familiar emphasis on culture versus material wealth. Elias describes how, according to Mirabeau, genuine civilization "stands in a cycle between barbarism and a false, "decadent" civilization engendered by a superabundance of money. The task of enlightened government is to steer this automatism so that society can flourish on a middle course between barbarism and decadence" (ibid:39). Here, as he further remarks:

the whole range of problems latent in "civilization" is already discernible at the moment of the concept's formation. Even at this stage it was connected to the idea of decadence or "decline", which has re-emerged again and again, in an open or veiled form, to the rhythm of cyclical crises. (ibid.)

Contrary to popular folklore surrounding the French Revolution, complete with images of *sans-culottes* and Phrygian bonnets, it was by and large a middle-class project led by a relatively small intelligentsia, although it fed on widespread dissatisfaction throughout society (Furet 1988). And though the term civilization never became a revolutionary slogan, it soon after became a rallying cry as the Revolution grew more moderate and the bourgeoisie cemented their stronghold on power. During the Napoleonic era, it was used to justify French aspirations to national expansion (Elias [1939] 2000:43). In the early nineteenth century, others followed suit. Elias notes that:

Unlike the situation when the concept was formed, from now on nations came to consider the *process* of civilization as completed within their own societies; they came to see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to others, as standard-bearers of expanding civilization. (ibid.)

As such, the concept quickly became tinged with notions of French, or at least European, cultural superiority. Considering the Eurocentric nature of the Enlightenment's call for universal values, this was hardly surprising. Indeed, Nicolas Baudeau, another French Physiocrat, used the expression "European civilization" as early as in 1766 in a work on French colonies in North America. Here, Baudeau recommended that the American Indians be converted "non seulement à la foi chrétienne, mais encore à la civilisation européenne" in order to "en faire à peu près de vrais français par adoption" (Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 1993:64). Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1794, published posthumously in 1795) articulated the revolutionary aspiration to liberate the oppressed outside France and to eradicate the backwardness beyond Europe's borders. Condorcet's theory of social development was essentially linear, and accordingly, one could "trace humanity's advance from simplicity and moral backwardness to technical sophistication and ever greater humanity and moral and aesthetic subtlety" (Pitts 2005:169). To the elites of the time, it was France, more than any other nation, which had achieved the highest level of civilization: "The French were agreed about civilization: they owned it" (Johnson 1996:142). Indeed, at the time, "The first and most influential theory about France was that it stood for 'civilisation'" (Zeldin 1977:6, see also Chuter 1996:22 for a similar assessment). It was a theory that would engender another: that France had a mission to civilize the world.

France's mission civilisatrice

The Swiss-Italian theorist Roberto Michels has suggested that every nation has two dominant myths: the myth of origin and the myth of mission (Lerner 1987:26. François Furet has made similar claims, see Lipiansky 1991:169). For the nineteenth century historian Michelet, it was thanks to the Revolution that France became a chosen nation and its endeavors those of mankind itself (Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:543). Keiger asserts that

unlike other powers, with the possible exception of the USA, France has had a unique way of looking at the world based on the notion that it had a mission to extend the fruits of its superior civilization and values, borne of the Revolution, to other nations – the 'civilizing mission'. (2001:2)

Though such assertions prompted the novelist Gustave Flaubert to ironically define the French as the "premier peuple de l'univers" in his *Dictionnaire des Idées reçues* (Flaubert [1881] 1966:79, 127 and 277), this notion of civilizational superiority was by and large shared

by the elites of nineteenth century France. During the Second Empire, every instance of progress in society became depicted as proof that France was “the advanced sentinel and first soldier of civilisation” (Zeldin 1977:8). In truth, this notion of civilizational superiority had ancient antecedents. David Chuter recounts how it built on pre-revolutionary myths of origin and mission, not least a long tradition of depicting the King of France as “the most Christian King” and by association the French nation as “the Chosen people of the New Testament era, as the Israelites had been of the Old” (Chuter 1996:16), or even, borrowing from Antiquity, to depict the Frenchman as the “son of Hector”, implying that the French were in fact descendents of Troy (ibid:18)⁹². The Revolution, Chuter further notes,

did not sweep all these theories away: rather, its theorists, practitioners and hagiographers took all these themes and remodelled them for a secular world. This is why the special sense of France did not disappear with the coming of the Republic: the soldier of God simply became the soldier of Humanity. (ibid.)⁹³

To Michelet, post-revolutionary France was the new universal fatherland and French history essentially the history of the world. France had “continued the work of the Romans and of Christianity, and the Revolution had performed what the church had only promised, in the Second Coming of 1789” (ibid:21, see also Citron 1991). Though such thoughts were advocated more forcefully by Michelet than by any other, they were far from original to him. A contemporary historian, Guizot, declared in his 1828 Sorbonne lectures on *The General History of Civilization in Europe* that “France has been the centre, the home of civilisation in Europe” (quoted by Zeldin 1977:7). It is from France, he further remarked,

as from a second, more fecund and richer fatherland, that [civilizing ideas] have launched themselves to conquer Europe. There has been hardly any great idea, any great principle of civilization, which, seeking to spread everywhere, has not first passed through France. (ibid.)

The example of the Revolution and the military and political domination of Europe attained under Napoleon gave the French elites a consciousness of their own superiority, and especially, as they became colonial conquerors, came to serve “as a justification of their rule” (Elias [1939] 2000:43). This “certainty that French values were so superior that they had to be communicated to others” possessed even, according to Zeldin, “the most liberal thinkers” (1977:9). The republican Edgar Quinet for example asserted in 1832 that France alone had

the instinct of civilization, the need to take the initiative in a general way to bring about progress in modern society. [...] It is this disinterested though imperious need [...] which makes French unity, which gives sense to its history

and a soul to the country. This civilizing force, this desire for external influence is the best part of France, its art, its genius, its happiness (ibid.).

Zeldin further remarks how civilization came to imply a whole “social, economic and political programme, to be carried out in co-operation with like-minded citizens and, inevitably, against those whom one would label as obscurantist and reactionary”; a program, which “was egalitarian, but also elitist. It was universal, but also nationalist” (ibid:8). This civilizational program, reminiscent of what Winock has termed “republican nationalism” (1990:13-17 and especially 37-40), was intended for both internal and external use and reached its apogee during France’s heyday as colonial empire. In 1906, Etienne Clémentel asserted that “Among all nations, France seems predestined [...] her mission imposes itself so clearly, so imperiously, that she sees it less as the work of her own genius than as the expression of eternal laws” (quoted by Chuter 1996:22). This notion of *mission civilisatrice* can be easily found in other colonial nations of the day, yet it would appear that in France, it remained a central feature of French thinking, inspiring all succeeding generations. Thus, for the last two centuries, France has, as Godin and Chafer note,

seen itself as the depository of values inherited from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Its mission is to diffuse them universally. From the Napoleonic conquests to colonial expansion, from the Gaullist refusal of the cold war divide to the development of *Francophonie*, France has presented itself as a model to follow for the rest of the world. (in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xv)

Mette Zølner similarly states that “a common string” of the Republican narratives of France throughout the times is the depiction of

a France that, as carrier of civilisation, has a messianic mission to liberate the world from oppression and ignorance by bringing, to the rest of the world, values that have universal bearing, such as liberty, freedom, equality, fraternity, human rights and democracy. Thus, French specificity and *grandeur* is to be the carrier of a universal civilisation, believed to be the only one to all times and for all peoples. (2001:5)

It is certainly a narrative that can be readily found in the declarations made by successive French presidents. One of the best known advocates of France’s modern day *mission civilisatrice*, Charles de Gaulle, once described France as “*la lumière du monde*”, the light of the world, and following his creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, declared that

France must fulfill her mission as a world power. There is no corner of the earth where, at any given time, men do not look to us and ask what France has to say.

It is a great responsibility to be France, the humanizing power *par excellence*.
(quoted by Rosenblum 1988:4-5)

Although such rhetoric is first and foremost associated abroad with de Gaulle, his successors have largely followed suit. Though the more liberal Giscard d'Estaing preferred to speak of France's *rayonnement* rather than using the noun *grandeur*, too associated with de Gaulle, Giscard's successor, the socialist Mitterrand – a longtime political opponent of de Gaulle and yet arguably in style and manner the most *Gaullian* of his successors – characteristically returned to expounding France's *grandeur* in numerous speeches (Boll-Johansen 1992:63-64). Following the postwar decolonization process (particularly painful for France who fought, and lost, two bitter wars of independence, first in Indochina (Vietnam) and then in Algeria; see for example Horne 2004), the *mission civilisatrice* became imbued with notions of culture and value promotion rather than with the increasingly problematic notions of conquest and colonization. It became, in short, a purposeful attempt to use and if possible augment France's soft power, not least vis-à-vis the threat of "Anglo-Saxon" cultural hegemony (Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxi). Two tenets of French civilization have as such remained central to the French identity since well before the Revolution: culture and language. These have been at the forefront of France's postwar *mission civilisatrice*.

As was seen in 5.1 and 5.2, the importance put on culture – and not least the way in which France has throughout modern times portrayed itself as the world's cultural nation *par excellence*, has had a profound influence on how the French see themselves and not least how they perceive others. Since at least the days of Louis XIV, the political powers ruling France "have established themselves as patrons of the French arts", and in the following century, "the philosophers of the Enlightenment, by their attempts to democratise the arts and culture and encourage enlightened despotism, made a significant contribution towards linking the political and social development of the nation and the development and acquisition of 'culture'" (Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:170). Throughout the nineteenth century, these practices were carried on by the successive regimes, whether imperial, royalist, or republican. Meanwhile, the artist, formerly employed and admired almost exclusively by the social elites, became revered as the embodiment of the national genius, as culture progressively became a common feature of social life (Prochasson, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:453). There is often a tendency to regard France's cultural hegemony, which lasted well

into the nineteenth century, as primarily a result of its artistic and architectural accomplishments. Yet as Christopher Coker reminds us,

Like the United States in the twentieth century it was rated almost as highly for its technical know-how. And in an age in which nations still held each other in respect in terms of their military proficiency one of the things for which it was most respected was its military art. (in O'Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:327)

France's preponderant soft power at the time was clearly linked to its hard power, a point which Coker further stresses when he recounts how France's cultural predominance began to wane immediately after its defeat to Prussia in 1871: "Almost overnight, France ceased to be la Grande Nation [...]. It lost its reputation as a warlike nation for good and also that long certainty of national greatness, which had possessed it since the late seventeenth century" (ibid:328). Under Napoleon III, Paris had reached its apogee as the cultural capital of the world. It was, however, "a strange centre of culture [...] for it was both modern and unmodern at the same time – it was both populist and elitist" (ibid:326). Paris itself had under the direction of Baron Haussmann undergone a complete overhaul, thoroughly modernizing the old city and turning it into "a splendid testament to the Parisian architectural style that was to dominate the continent's cityscapes for the next 30 years" (ibid:327). Paris was not just culture, it was also modernity, and under the Second Empire, the two would go hand in hand. When in 1852, *Le Bon Marché* was transformed into the first department store in the world (Miller 1987, Brunet 2007, Coker, in O'Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002), it set new standards for mass consumption, standards which would soon be copied throughout the western world, as in 1858 with the opening of *Macy's* in New York. Clearly, at least part of the modern phenomenon of mass consumerism originates as much from France as from America. As Wagnleitner notes, although "modernization and consumption [...] have taken on an increasingly American look in twentieth-century Europe, they are mostly of European origin" (in Hogan (ed.) 1999:473). In his *Au Bonheur des Dames*, Zola described *Le Bon Marché* as 'une cathédrale de commerce' ([1883] 1970), an epitaph which was meant absolutely positively. This sense of French modernity was echoed by the French writers, who were considered the avant-garde throughout most of Europe. Yet the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war entailed an erosion of Paris' and by extension France's eminent position as the world's cultural capital. As the nineteenth century was drawing to an end, Paris increasingly became seen by foreign observers as "a museum of the *ancien régime*, the close of a particular era in European history" (Coker, in O'Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:327). This impression was

concealed to most by the fact that France was still occasionally able to demonstrate its capacity for bold modernity, as with the construction of the Eiffel Tower for the Universal Exhibition in 1889. The Eiffel Tower, which would remain the highest man-made structure in the world until it became dethroned by the Chrysler Building in New York in 1930, was an impressive display of engineering, know-how and not least boldness, and it became vilified by large sections of the more traditional establishments as a hideous example of everything that esthetically seemed to augur modernity. The boldness of French engineers such as Gustave Eiffel was matched by that of the new school of impressionism, which set new standards in painting, predictably provoking large segments of the strong bourgeoisie. Yet as the world's capital of culture, France's days were numbered. It was not so much a case of one ascending cultural hegemony dethroning another, as it was – at least for the coming decades – the case of a dilution of France's hitherto cultural hegemony, in which the most important nations of the day, France, Britain, and increasingly America, interchanged in setting the standards in art and culture. French culture still had a powerful attraction on other European nations, yet as the era of mass culture approached, France's cultural stronghold began to wane. From the beginnings of the twentieth century, the luster of French culture increasingly became associated with yesterday's culture – the imposing palaces of the Ancien Régime, the magnificence of Haussmannian Paris, the writings of the philosophers, the French school of impressionism, the art of gastronomy etc. Though the century would see the inauguration of several large-scale cultural and especially architectural projects, frequently imposed by the head of state in person (Boll-Johansen 1992:75-77), France's self-proclaimed status as the world's cultural nation acquired an air of adjuration. The pretense of cultural eminence was essentially one that built on a glorious past, in which France had arguably been the leading cultural nation in the Western world. As such, though French designers may continue to reign supreme in the world of fashion (although they, too, are today facing increasing competition from abroad), France's cultural hegemony has long been relegated to the past. Still a powerful cultural nation, able to attract visitors from afar, France is but one cultural nation among several – albeit a considerable one. France, however, still finds that it has an important *mission civilisatrice* in cultural matters and often points to its cultural heritage as evidence of its cultural *grandeur* (Morrison 2007). Though this *grandeur* is essentially inherited from the time when France was indeed the cultural capital of the world, it is a heritage that continues to impress and inspire way beyond France's borders. There is a real mission in preserving and

restoring some of mankind's most illustrious works of art and cultural achievements, and it is a task that France has embraced with pride and admirable efficiency. The French Minister for Culture disposes of a budget that is the envy of his European colleagues, and he or she usually enjoys a very high standing within any French government. Indeed, France was the first nation in the world to establish a Ministry of Culture, when in February 1959 President de Gaulle appointed the novelist André Malraux as his Minister of Culture. The rationale behind was not least to boost France's cultural *grandeur* abroad, a mission that was only, however, partly successful (Todd 2005:347-380). In reality, France had had "une politique culturelle extérieure avant d'avoir une politique culturelle intérieure" (Kessler 1999:370), a tradition which dates back to the Ancien Régime, and which was even more forcefully pursued after the Revolution, as exemplified in General Bonaparte's expedition in Egypt (ibid.) Yet while France has consistently cast itself as a great cultural nation, it has in reality had a relatively limited cultural impact in the second half of the twentieth century. While for example French cinema set new standards in the 1950s and 1960s with *la nouvelle vague* (Haberski 2001:109-111), these were largely highbrow films unable to attract large audiences outside of France. This naturally does not provide solid evidence as to the erosion of France's former status as a cultural Leviathan, yet it indicates that France is challenged on two cultural fronts: First in terms of mass appeal. To the extent that modern France has been able to enhance its soft power by promoting its culture abroad, French cultural products may have been enthusiastically adopted by social and cultural elites, but rarely by the masses world wide. Second in terms of artistic quality. Though modern French culture has many fans, both within and outside the *hexagone*, France no longer seriously represents a cultural avant-garde on a global scale. An article in the American Time magazine entitled *The Death of French Culture* caused furor in France in 2007 when it remarked that though "nobody takes culture more seriously than the French", France, "Once admired for the dominating excellence of its writers, artists and musicians" is today "a wilting power in the global cultural marketplace" (Morrison 2007). The article clearly hit a raw nerve in France. Novelist and former Minister of Culture Maurice Druon dismissed it as the result of "une fièvre antifranaïaise", which supposedly hits the United States at regular intervals (2007), and remarked that

La culture n'est pas déterminée par le box-office de la semaine. La culture s'exerce sur la durée. Il n'y a pas dix ans que Buffet est mort, et ses tableaux sont dans tous les musées de la planète. Sartre et Malraux sont encore nos contemporains. Et que tous les créateurs du monde soient accueillis par la

France n'est pas un fléchissement, mais la preuve que cette terre est, depuis des siècles et, espérons-le, pour des siècles encore, celle de la culture. (ibid.)

There is no doubt that the tendency to measure the impact of culture in terms of revenues is deeply noxious to the French elites, as the debate in France over Morrison's article showed. Yet it is noteworthy that in his defense of French culture, the former minister could name only dead artists and authors as testimonies to its continued influence (ibid.). This of course does not validate Morrison's assessment, and it remains a fact that France compared with other nations can still be termed an eminently cultural nation, which can boast more Nobel laureates in Literature than any other nation⁹⁴, the latest being Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio, who was awarded the prize in 2008. Yet there is no escaping that French culture does not have anything remotely reminiscent of the dominating position it used to, a fact which should be attributed not so much to a perceived artistic decline in France, but rather to the fact that other nations have proven equally successful. In the domain of culture, France is quite simply no longer the superpower it used to be.

Unable to impose its cultural values and products to the world, France has instead practiced a protective cultural policy centered on the notion of *exception culturelle*, a notion which is only few decades old. Faced with the growing impact of American cultural products worldwide and not least their penetration in France as well as in other French-speaking countries, France has (as will be developed further in chapter 6) asserted itself as the main opponent to what is perceived as American cultural hegemony. As such, the French *mission civilisatrice* within the realm of culture has largely given way to a new, protective mission that seeks to promote a counter-model to the cultural dominance of the Anglo-Saxon world. Michael Kelly has noted that the emphasis on cultural exceptionalism has become so firmly embedded in French political discourses that by the turn of the millennium, "the notion of *l'exception*, cultural or otherwise, had become an established feature of French national identity" (in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:194). And while it is certainly a fact that the notion of French exceptionalism can be applied to a wide range of domains, not least within the sphere of global economy (see for example Tinard 2001), most of the importance put on *exception culturelle* relates to the protection of the French language.

According to Guizot, France was at the head of European civilization, "because its instincts for sociability, its sympathy for generous ideas, the clarity of its language, made it best capable of understanding its goals and explaining them to others" (Zeldin 1977:8). If it is

true, as Elias notes, that “Language is one of the most accessible manifestations of what we experience as ‘national character’” ([1939] 2000:94), then France’s national character may appear to the outsider both excessively proud and zealous. Zeldin has remarked on the almost “divine status” accorded domestically to the French language (1983:326). Indeed, Fernand Braudel asserted that “France is the French language” (quoted by Rosenblum 1988:8). Alfred Grosser has similarly noted that “l’ambition mondiale de la France est prioritairement culturelle, la langue devant constituer le support indispensable de la culture” (1989:221). It is certainly a fact that few other nations guard their language with the diligence of the French, for whom the language is “à la fois le moyen et le symbole de l’unité nationale, [...] et le témoin de l’universalisme français” (Gilder and Salon 2004:85). Since 1635, the *Académie Française* has been the foremost preserver of the French language⁹⁵. Over the last decades, its main function – to edit the official dictionary of the French language – has attracted somewhat less attention than its role as guardian of the French language against foreign encroachments. Here, the chief enemy has been the Anglicization of the French language, where the Académie has been diligent to combat the use of loanwords from English, proposing instead – with mixed success – alternatives derived from French linguistic origins. This diligent mission to combat *le franglais* has not been the exclusive domain of the ‘immortal’ *Académiciens*; successive French governments have attempted to legislate to safeguard the national language from outside contamination. This should come as little surprise: “de François I^{er} au général de Gaulle en passant par Louis XIV, c’est une tradition solidement établie, en France, que de voir dans la pureté de la langue l’image de la grandeur de l’État” (Hagège 1987:109). The best known contemporary example is that of former French Minister of Culture and Francophonie Jacques Toubon, whose attempt to ban the use of foreign (and especially English) words and idioms in official communication (*la loi Toubon*) was widely ridiculed, even in France, earning him the nickname Mr. Allgood (tout bon = all good). The Minister nevertheless insisted that language was “une affaire d’Etat” (quoted by Brulard, in Perry and Cross (eds) 1997:37). In a 1996 conference, a former counselor to Jacques Toubon at the time of the 1994 drafting of the law, remarked on its background that French was a minority language and as such in need of protection so as to resist the “most oppressive language, I mean English” (quoted by Phillipson 2003:46).

The impression that French is a minority language is very much a recent phenomenon. As Robert Phillipson notes, French has, compared with other European

languages, “a longer, richer history of celebration of past glories, and a more elaborate ideology of linguistic superiority, than other languages” (2003:47). Already at the end of the thirteenth century, a Venetian chronicler remarked that “la langue française court le monde” (quoted by Hagège 2006:17), and since then, although the position of French as the preeminent language in Europe was occasionally rivaled by that of other rising powers, it was never seriously challenged until well into the nineteenth century (ibid:16-25)⁹⁶. A 1926 textbook for fourth graders declared that “French is the auxiliary tongue of all civilized peoples. Among Europeans, it remains the preferred language of cultivated society” (reprinted in Rosenblum 1988:9). The influential linguist Antoine Meillet noted in 1918 that French may have derived essentially from Latin, but reflected “universal reason” (quoted by Phillipson 2003:48). Yet it is a fact that the French language was by no means a unitary language in France proper until well into the nineteenth century. Braudel asserts that though there was “without any possible discussion” certainly at the highest levels of society “one” elitist French “civilization”, the local French communities were divided into at least two large civilizations, each with their linguistic realm: the civilization of *langue d’oil*, “victorious”, and the civilization of *langue d’oc*, which became “relegated almost to the destiny of a colony” (1986a:72). In this respect, France’s *mission civilisatrice* as regards the spread of the French language has as much been a matter of an internal civilizational process intended to unite a nation divided “physically, economically, and socially” (ibid.) as well as linguistically. This background explains the diligent protection of the French language, as well as the efforts to expand its usage, far better than the incessant trepidations about the incursions of the *franglais*: French linguistic policies have been an instrument in forging a common French identity, centred not just around republican values, but indeed around the promotion of a unitary language. The importance attached to this unitary language can be witnessed by the fact that it is inscribed in the French constitution that “La langue de la République est le Français” (Loi constitutionnelle du 25 juin 1992, see Formery 2000:8), an article which would seem superfluous were it not for the background of linguistic rivalry that characterized the nation until well into the nineteenth century⁹⁷. With the Revolution of 1789, a unified system of administration was established throughout the nation, in which the use of (Parisian) French was imposed. The revolutionary leaders saw regional languages as undermining the newfound unity of the Republic and furthermore argued that the use of *patois* was keeping the peasant masses in obscurantism. These views were expounded in the Abbé Grégoire’s 1794 report

“sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française”, in which he deplored that in the most advanced country in the world, less than half of its 25 million inhabitants in fact spoke French (Hagège 2006:214, Phillipson 2003:42). His report resulted in the adoption of two laws stating that the only language tolerated in French public life and in schools was French. The French language had become the symbol of national unity as well as of the universal potential of the new republican tradition (Holt, in Gubbins and Holt (eds) 2002:104, Phillipson 2003:42). It would however take almost a century to impose French as a language spoken by the vast majority of the nation’s citizens, due to an ineffective implementation of the language policies until Jules Ferry’s school reforms of the 1880s, and it was in reality only after the First World War that French became thoroughly implanted as a common language throughout the whole nation (Hagège 2006:214). As Phillipson has noted, states have frequently “tended to consolidate their political power by codifying and standardizing a single language within their territory” (Phillipson 2003:25), yet the French diligence in the matter stands out: even after French had been imposed as a common language throughout the nation, the use of regional dialects and languages remained forcefully discouraged. In 1925, Anatole de Monzie, Minister of public education, stated that “pour l’unité linguistique de la France, il faut que la langue bretonne disparaisse” (Abalain 2000:44-45). As late as in 1972, President Georges Pompidou declared that “Il n’y a pas de place pour les langues et cultures régionales dans une France destinée à marquer l’Europe de son sceau” (Breillat 2001:697). The reluctance to recognize the existence, or at least the status, of regional languages and dialects on the French territory has been a constant for more than two centuries⁹⁸. In this respect, Raymond Aron’s remark that the homogeneity of a people has always been the work of centuries, which, more often than not, equals the work of force (1969:201), clearly holds true with respect to language as well (ibid:277).

The universalistic aspirations attached to the French language seem as present today as they were at the time of the Revolution, at least rhetorically. In France and some Francophone countries, it is customary to refer to French as not just a language with a global reach, but indeed as a universal language, enjoying a position in the world surpassed only by the English language in terms of “political importance” (Laval University 2008). Such claims are justified by the frequent assertion that Francophones are the only which, together with the Anglophones, are present in all continents (Poissonnier and Sournia 2006:13)⁹⁹. Yet, as

Olivier Milhaud has noted, the impact of French in Latin America, Asia and Oceania is rather “residual” (2006a). Even if the argument of the presence of French on all inhabited continents is accepted, the numbers of Francophones worldwide is somewhat less impressive than it is often presented as. According to *Ethnologue*’s reference work on the languages of the world, some 65 million people speak French as a first language and some 50 million as a second language (Gordon 2005)¹⁰⁰. Though such estimates are by nature somewhat inaccurate, especially concerning the number of secondary speakers, they point in the same direction: that although French by some accounts may hold the title as the ninth most used language in the world (according to La documentation Française 2008)¹⁰¹, it is still only spoken, whether fluently or partially, by around 200 million people worldwide, totaling roughly 3% of the world’s population. And though such figures exclude the large number of people worldwide with very limited, meaning extremely rudimentary, knowledge of French (Valentin (ed.) 2007:15-20), it is clear that the claims for universality do not lie in the number of Francophones as such, at least not compared with languages such as Mandarin, Hindi, Spanish, and Arabic, not to mention the ever looming English, frequently, though incorrectly, described as the globalized world’s *lingua franca* (see 3.5.1). As a language used on the internet, French comes in fifth after English, Chinese, Spanish, and Japanese (Internet World Stats 2009). The pretence at universality might resemble wishful thinking when confronted with such statistics. Yet it is not wholly unfounded. French enjoys the status of an official or co-official language in some 34 countries (Laval University 2008), and is one of six official languages of the United Nations, although, as Jean-Marc Léger notes, “c’est à une voix de majorité que le français fut choisi comme l’une des langues officielles des Nations Unies, en dépit de l’opposition de Washington” (1987:164). It should furthermore be stressed that as opposed to French, languages such as Mandarin, Hindi, or Japanese are still eminently regional languages. While the impact of French on several continents might, following Milhaud, be characterized as rather residual, it still enjoys a substantive impact on especially two continents: Europe and Africa. The prominence of French in Europe, although today dwindling in comparison with the increasing impact of English, is due primarily to the importance attached to the language at the time when France was at the peak of its cultural influence in Europe:

Throughout Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, French served as an elite link language. It was spoken at courts from Spain to Russia. It was unchallenged as the language of ‘unity’ of a continent plagued by dynastic

rivalries, wars and domestic uprisings, and competition over territory, colonies, and markets. French was the sole language of international diplomacy until the end of the First World War, when the presence of the Americans at the conferences elaborating the peace treaties ensured that parity was given to English. As recently as 1971, the President of France, Georges Pompidou, declared in a BBC interview that ‘French is the natural language of the peoples of Europe, English that of America’. (Phillipson 2003:47)

President de Gaulle’s immediate successor might here have echoed a familiar French refrain (ibid.); it was, however, sadly out of tune with realities. As will be explored further in chapter 6, the post-war process of European integration may have given the French language a renewed impetus in Europe, at least within the European institutions, yet it is doubtful whether it seriously increased the number of Francophones in Europe as such. On the contrary, the influence of French in Europe has been in decline throughout the twentieth century, especially compared with the *bête noire* of the most impassioned Francophiles, English.

Phillipson further notes that revolutionary languages such as “French of republicanism” came to be regarded “as instruments of empire and conquest with a clear cultural mission” (ibid). Zeldin describes how, following the nationalist phase, in which the unification of the French nation, complete with the will to create the French citizen as opposed to the regional populations of the multilingual French state, came an internationalist phase, where the notions of *liberté*, *égalité*, and *fraternité* were transferred onto the world as a model of a civilization that was deemed to span humanity as such (1983:475). It is certainly a fact that once France’s unitary language had been firmly established within the *hexagone* of metropolitan France, the linguistic *mission civilisatrice* was transferred overseas to the territories ruled or dominated by France. A central tenet of French colonial policy became to spread not just French values, but especially the French language. Even the early twentieth century socialist leader Jean Jaurès could still describe language as “the necessary instrument of colonization” (Milhaud 2006a). Phillipson notes that the “*mission civilisatrice* of the French, at home and abroad, was inconceivable in any language other than French” (2003:49), while Edward Said, commenting on the cultural dimension of France’s imperial designs, remarks that it “perfectly reflects the social structure of French knowledge” (1993:118). After the demise of the French colonial empire, this mission was carried out under a new banner: that of *la francophonie* or *la Francophonie* with a capital F, as its institutionalized version is termed. The notion was first coined by the geographer Onésime Reclus in 1880 during

France's expansive colonization process to name the space where people speak French as a linguistic and geographical group (Milhaud 2006a, Degn 2003, Tétu 1988). Yet the term did not achieve much attention until well into the 1960s (Degn 2003:5-6) when it became equivalent with a new, more modern, version of France's *mission civilisatrice*, namely that of post-colonial clientelism based on linguistic ties (see also chapter 6.1). It was, incidentally, at the initiative of several former French colonies that the notion of Francophonie again took hold. Poet-President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, one of the most influential African leaders to have embraced and promoted the creation of *la Francophonie* (ibid:10-11), felt that in order to construct Africa in the twentieth century, "the best of the European spirit, and especially the best of the French essence" was needed (Senghor 1972:95). After some initial hesitations (Salhi (ed.) 2002:14, Wauthier 1995:77-81), French leaders came to the conclusion that such thoughts rhymed well with the French sense of purpose that had been somewhat lacking since the German occupation and the painful process of decolonization that marked the early post-war years. Though the project of Francophonie originated in former French colonies, Paris did not hesitate long before taking the notion as well as its implied potential in possession. In a world, which had become increasingly Americanized, the notion of Francophonie carried the promise of offering once more a message of French universalism. Addressing leaders from the French-speaking world in a festival of Francophonie in February 1986, President Mitterrand had no qualms in reminding his audience that together, they were "carriers of a culture that can have the ambition of being universal" (quoted by Rosenblum 1988:13). As will be seen in 6.1.4, the policies of both francophonie and Francophonie soon became instruments in upholding France's international grandeur vis-à-vis the threat of expanding American influence.

Two models of civilization

While the French *mission civilisatrice* had few serious European rivals, it soon came at odds with the growing influence of an America, which by its history and competing universal values challenged the exclusivity of the French civilizational identity. Already the 1776 American Declaration of Independence with its 'self-evident truths' regarding mankind may by some be perceived as undermining the French pretension of being '*la patrie des droits de l'homme*', a self-image inherited from the first days of the Revolution, which would prove to be one of the most enduring bequest in terms of France's *mission civilisatrice*. In the early

nineteenth century however, America was not seen in France as a rival in civilizational terms, but rather to a large extent as devoid of a proper civilization (see also 5.1), an assessment that was to endure well into the twentieth century. Commenting on “the smug tone of French cultural superiority” as late as in the interwar years, Kuisel has remarked that “In its most extreme form America was denied a civilization of its own” (1993:11). French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau once observed that “America is the only nation in history which miraculously has gone directly from barbarism to degeneration without the usual interval of civilization” (quoted by Mead 2007:66). To the extent that the term civilization was used in relation to America, it was frequently used to denote the “barbarian image” of the young nation (Lerner 1987:937). Yet in the nineteenth century, the image of America in France “changed from being the land of the eighteenth-century noble savage into one of commercial power. But as it was studied more, criticism increased and people began to see the two nations as representing opposing kinds of civilization” (Zeldin 1977:128-129). There came a dawning realization that America was a nation born out “of the three shaping forces of the modern Western world – *industrialism* as a technology, *capitalism* as a way of organizing it, and *democracy* as a way of running both” (Lerner 1987:39). What accentuated the fears of this rising civilization was the extraordinary dynamism of the American experience (ibid:47). Charles and Mary Beard, authors of *The Rise of American Civilization* later wrote that “No idea, such as democracy, liberty, or the American way of life, expresses the American spirit so coherently, comprehensively, or systematically as does the idea of civilization” (quoted by Lerner ibid:59-60). Yet to nineteenth century French elites, and indeed this was the case well into the twentieth century as well, the notion of “American civilization” was largely an oxymoron, “the absolute negation of the values humanity was founded on” (Roger 2005:374). Needless to say, these values were believed to be of uniquely European origin, originating from a continent which had assigned to itself the virtue of representing the highest level of civilization yet achieved. To the European nations at the time, the American example represented an unprecedented historical phenomenon: Never in history had a civilization risen to world power in so short a span (Lerner 1987:36), and never before had a civilization outside Europe successfully presented an alternative, or even higher, vision of modernity¹⁰². The rise of American civilization had not only been extraordinarily swift, it was also a civilization, which had at its origins and “part of its mythology” the rejection of Europe, one which could be described, as Lerner does, as “the rebellion against the father” (ibid:26).

Philippe Roger recounts how, whereas France's *mission civilisatrice* was never considered as seriously threatened by the mighty British Empire, "the same was not true of 'the descendants of her sons'! If Great Britain represented the good side of the Anglo-Saxon 'civilization lever,' North America embodied its aggressive propensity to destroy other civilizations" (2005:88). Already in 1782, Hector de Crèvecoeur had asked "What then is the American, this new Man?" (in his *Letters from an American Farmer*, quoted by Lerner 1987:62, see also Kroes, in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:106 and Schiff, 2005:1). In the following century, there arose on both sides of the Atlantic a growing sense that the American represented indeed the New Man. This notion that the American was "the New Man", or, if not new, then "there was at least in him the densest distillation of universal humanity" was, according to Max Lerner, present in the American mind from the origins of the birth of America (1987:29). On the other side of the Atlantic, the New Man born out of the New World, seemingly poised to acquire increasing influence throughout the world, was however widely rejected by the social and cultural elites. The revolutionary French ideal of "regenerating" man described in 5.3.1 had been largely unsuccessful. To the French elites, the New Man represented not the regeneration, but the degeneration of man. It was a degeneration, which signaled the abandonment of the norms and traditions on which older civilizations were built in favor of a materialistic promise devoid of historical and cultural ties. Baudelaire's 1855 lamentation that Man had become *Americanized* (see 5.1) expressed in essence the fear that European civilization was about to be overtaken and as a result deeply marked by the rising American civilization. The vision "of America as a cornucopia of well-being and freedom" was, according to Lerner, imbedded in the minds of European immigrants "from the first settlers to the latest" (1987:23). This "metaphysic of promise" was a crucial element in the American civilization (ibid:24), and it attracted millions of Europeans. Whereas the French *mission civilisatrice* built on notions of exporting France's civilizational values such as language and culture, America originally did not need to export its values: they were readily subscribed to by the many immigrants eager to pursue the American Dream. It was, in Max Lerner's somewhat lofty prose "a conquest of the world's imagination, never before achieved without arms and colonization"; a "proof of an inner harmony between America and the modern spirit" (ibid:62). The promise of modernity represented by the French Revolution had by comparison long been dwarfed by the American experience, carrier of a vision of modernity whose tangible symbols at the start of the twentieth century became a

seeming abundance of material wealth and technical innovation. The American civilization indeed represented the new ages; its rise also summoned the decline of the European civilizations. The fact that the decline of European civilizations in the twentieth century was as much a result of two world wars, which in essence started as European civil wars (Leclerc 2000:284), did not necessarily mitigate the European rejection of the victorious American civilization. In 1933, Daniel-Rops and Denis de Rougemont described it as “the worst degradation a ‘civilization’ has imposed on man” (quoted by Roger 2005:374). As late as in 1947, novelist Georges Bernanos described the “abominable” American ‘civilization’ (in inverted commas, naturally) as “machine civilization – which one might well call ‘Anglo-American’ without offending anyone”; a civilization that “threatens not only the works of man but man himself” (quoted by Roger *ibid.*). How offending it must have been to especially the French elites that this “machine civilization” would throughout the twentieth century come to embody the triumph of American universalism.

Conclusion: From universalism to exceptionalism

The notion of *mission civilisatrice* represents the willful attempt to universalize a nation’s values. The French mission in this respect has been manifest since at least the Revolution. The American mission may have been less manifest, at least at the onset, but no less present and certainly no less successful. It is an irony of history that France, which since the Revolution has attempted to present itself as a universal nation, has retreated into protection of its exceptionalism, while America, born as an exceptional nation, has presented the world with the most successful version of universalism to date.

There appears at first to be a fundamental dichotomy between the notions of universalism and exceptionalism. Whereas universalism entails the belief that values and ideas can be exported to benefit mankind, indeed that these are universal in nature and as such not particular to any society, exceptionalism denotes exactly what differentiates one society from others. As Michael Kelly rightly notes, exceptionalism is an “inherently ambiguous notion, located within the interplay between identity and difference. An exception can only exist if there is some rule or norm with which it is identified, but from which it diverges in some significant respect” (in Godin and Chafer 2004:195). Naturally most, if not all, nations can claim to be ‘exceptional’, given that they can present a unique history and characteristics that are particular to their own nation (Zølner 2001:4, Chuter 1996:13). Yet the

exceptionalism commonly associated with America (though primarily by Americans themselves) is of an altogether different nature than the unique features one could associate with every nation of the world. In this respect, though inhabitants of every nation might feel that their nation stands out from the rest in one way or the other, it would be wrong to imply that each nation has its own version of exceptionalism. Exceptionalism should be conceived as not just some features that are proper to a nation, but as a phenomenon whereby these features set the nation in question fundamentally apart from other nations. In some cases, the notion of exceptionalism carries with it the promise of universalism. The American exceptionalism, with its image of the United States as the nation of futurity, does this. The French *mission civilisatrice*, born (or reborn) largely out of its unique revolutionary experience and the ideals it engendered, is a rival contender to the aspirations of speaking on behalf of the rest of the world. As such, both France and America have their own version of exceptionalism, and for both nations, their exceptionalism is imbued with notions of universalism. There are, however, great differences in how they see themselves as exceptional. American exceptionalism carries with it pretensions of a special legitimacy that makes the American nation *primus inter pares* compared with other nations (cf. chapter 3). Jack P. Greene has rightly insisted that any analysis of the concept of American exceptionalism should recognize that it rests on two important propositions. First, the idea that America is an “*exempt* nation”, i.e. “born modern without a deeply entrenched traditional socioeconomic and political structure and [that it] did not, therefore, ever have to undergo a wrenching transition to modernity” (1993:201). This was in essence what Tocqueville referred to, when he observed that “the position of the Americans [was] quite exceptional” (quoted by Greene *ibid*:4). Second, the assumption of an “American ‘national superiority’ contained in the idea of the United States as an ‘*exemplary* nation’” (*ibid*:201). This second proposition, which arose after the American Revolution, represented America “as a social and political model and thereby, always implicitly and sometimes even explicitly, to claim for it superiority over the Old World” (*ibid*:207). This exemplary nation, it was hoped, would serve “as a model for Europeans, the first step in a process that would transform the Old World into one resembling the New” (*ibid*.). As such, American exceptionalism and American universalism are inseparable, representing two sides of the same coin: America, the *great nation of futurity*, is carrier of a universal mission because of its exceptionality. It is precisely America’s exceptionalism which is the nation’s prime claim to presenting the world with its

vision of universalism, a universalism which is not in itself presented as exceptional as much as originating in an exceptional nation. It is furthermore a claim, which has been present ever since the creation of the American nation (ibid:6).

French exceptionalism, by comparison, is a relatively new notion and has altogether different connotations. One might regard the revolutionary experience as giving birth to notions of French exceptionalism, but that would most likely be subsequent rationalization. The Revolution was imbued with universalist rather than particularistic connotations. The notion of French exceptionalism was advanced only when it became clear that the universalist aspirations of the French nation had failed to be fulfilled. Whereas the American universalist ambitions have to a large degree been fulfilled, the French universalist ambitions have been challenged by the Anglo-Saxon model; a model which, under American leadership, has been largely victorious. French exceptionalism in this respect represents not the basis for universalism, but rather the tacit admission that France's universalist designs have been thwarted by those of America. In his war memoirs, Charles de Gaulle described how France had "*une destinée éminente et exceptionnelle*" (1954:1), but by then, France's exceptional destiny was in reality no longer to lead, and much less to fashion, the world. De Gaulle's own destiny became to lead France from political chaos and lethargy to a nation with a highly centralized and efficient executive. A central tenet of his design, evident already in his Bayeux speech of 1946 was that in order for France to regain its "rank", a powerful executive was needed (Duhamel 1993:27). He succeeded more than a decade later in establishing the Fifth Republic according to his wishes, yet it proved impossible for him as well as for his successors to regain 'France's rank', at least compared with the role France had played previously (see chapter 6). Though de Gaulle proved a forceful advocate of French universalism (Cerny 1980:33), reality was that France had become relegated from previously enjoying the position as a 'universal nation' to having to content itself with the role of being an 'exceptional nation' – a nation which, while still purporting to represent a universal vision, no longer enjoyed neither the geopolitical nor the psychological means to do so. France's hard power attributes were dwarfed by those of the superpowers and its soft power attributes were much less considerable than they had previously been. At some point in the twentieth century, whether one dates it to the interwar years or the post-war years, France in essence became an ordinary power. Still a world power, doted with a relatively strong military, a relatively important role as an industrial nation and not least one of the five permanent seats on the U.N.

Security Council, France nonetheless became relegated to second position in the international system. After the Second World War, France was simply no longer, for the first time in centuries, a nation able to convincingly portray itself as Humanity's soldier. As such, modern day French exceptionalism can be explained to a large degree by the fact that France, unable to impose its universalist mission in a world that has largely succumbed to the American model, presents an alternative, minoritarian, indeed exceptional, version of universalism. To borrow from Jack P. Greene's description of American exceptionalism, one might say that France has never felt *exempt*, but always *exemplary*. This feeling of being an exemplary nation did not originally lead to feelings of exceptionalism, but rather to notions of civilizational superiority, indeed to almost militant universalism. To Michelet, France was the embodiment of the universal revolution, of "living brotherhood", even in itself "a religion" (quoted by Winock 1990:14-15). Modern day French exceptionalism is the realization that French universalism, while still present in the French mind as an ambition to strive for, is seriously rivaled by another universalism, one which has been far better at imposing itself on the world stage. French exceptionalism therefore becomes not just the protection of French values, but indeed becomes heavily tainted in all domains, whether political, economic, cultural or linguistic, in opposition to the victorious Anglo-Saxon model (Tinard 2001). When Garrison portrays the United States as the successor to the British Empire as the preeminent global power (2004:76), it borders on the understatement, as he refers primarily to the attributes of hard power. The United States can just as well be said to be the successor to the France that was previously the undisputed cultural capital of the world. The global *rayonnement* that France could boast of previously, has largely been supplanted by an American hegemony in terms of promotion of values, cultural impact and language. The republican ideal, once shared, is now promoted more forcefully by America, while the notion of representing a *mission civilisatrice* to the world has been overtaken by the largely material success of America. Only in one respect can France still claim to hold the vanguard with respect to America. The French *mission civilisatrice* may have been overtaken in most respects by the American steamroller. The notions of republicanism, democracy, and human rights might all be challenged by the praxis set forth by the United States. Yet France has one remaining civilizational ace up its sleeve, which is being produced now and again: the notion of secularity. A central feature of French notions of having a *mission civilisatrice* is the notion of breaking with the un-illuminated past of non-scientific theological doxa. This sets France

and America fundamentally apart. The French emphasis on reason, irrespective of the fact that France is itself a nation deeply imbued with Catholic traditions, gives it a claim to representing modernity and a new *mission civilisatrice* as opposed to an America seemingly besotted with religious cults. While to some, as Rauhut has argued (1953:83), civilization has come to be considered in certain respects as a secularized form of the concept of Christendom, to many French, secularism has become the last vanguard of if not civilization, then at least modernity.

5.3.3 Two visions of secularism: *Laïcité* versus religious freedom

Whereas the other legacies of the common revolutionary past, i.e. republicanism and messianic universalism embodied in the term *mission civilisatrice*, are tributes to values and aspirations once partly shared in nature, the third tenet, secularism, sets France and the United States firmly apart. The French notion of *laïcité* and the American notion of *religious freedom*¹⁰³ are both expressions of secularism and have as such shaped the two societies profoundly. As Gunn has noted, the two terms “are often described in effusive language as founding principles of the republics, as unifying principles that bring citizens together, and as exemplifications of the admirable characteristics that make the nations role models for the rest of the world” (2004:422). Yet, though the first two modern republics in the world were also the two first nations to separate the church from the state¹⁰⁴, both the premises and the effects were very different.

The American secularism is limited to the formal separation of church and state and is as such inscribed in the Constitution of the United States¹⁰⁵. This separation was from the onset intended to protect religions and religious practitioners from both state interference and the preferential treatment of one religion over the others. José Casanova states that “the United States was born as a modern secular state, never knew the established church of the European caesaro-papist absolutist state, and did not need to go through a European process of secular differentiation in order to become a modern secular society” (2006). As such, America’s colonial history was almost from the beginning one of religious pluralism. There were essentially two sources that gave rise to the pluralization of religious life in early America: the ethnic diversity in the colonies and the evangelical activism that both transformed existing churches and led to the formation of new ones. The effect was to make a classical church-state pattern such as that of the Church of England outmoded, progressively

leading to a pattern of religious “disestablishment”, although it was by no means self-evident to the American colonists at the time (Wilson and Drakeman (eds) 2003:1, 37, and 53). Furthermore, with inspiration from the philosophers of Enlightenment, many federalists increasingly came to see religion as a private matter. This was not least the case for Founding Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who advocated strongly for an independence of church and state (ibid:53-54). In Madison’s *Memorial and Remonstrance*, he argued against “attempts on the rights of conscience” and declared freedom of religion a “natural right”, implying that the establishment (of an Anglican) church would be “a signal of persecution” (ibid:63-66):

We hold it for at fundamental and undeniable truth, “that Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence”. The Religion, then, of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated in their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him; this duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of civil society. (Madison 1785, quoted by Wilson and Drakeman (eds) 2003:64)

The codification of religious freedom as an unalienable right has had a profound influence on the American society. Yet while the effect of American secularism has been to lay the foundations of a society where the diversity of religions and cults have thrived to such an extent that the nation can be termed a deeply religious society (albeit characterized by a multitude of religious practices), the French version of secularism has had the almost opposite effect.

Founding myths

France is not just a secular nation: it is *laïc*, a term that is virtually impossible to translate, but which couples the formal separation of church and state with the idea that religion should be relegated to the private sphere and thus virtually absent from the public domain. Zylberberg notes that as a doctrine, *laïcité* is a phenomenon exclusively linked to French republican history and the unitary production of a citizenship informed by a rational and republican

project (1995:37). As René Rémond has noted, both the meaning of the notion of *laïcité* and its role in the French society have changed profoundly over the last two centuries (1995:7-16). Though the term *laïcité* only entered the French vocabulary around 1871 (Gunn 2004:420, Laborde 2002:167-183), the first revolutionary republic quickly became in effect as *laïc* as the modern Fifth Republic, albeit with different connotations (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397-398, Gunn 2004:432-433). A highly symbolic testimony to this fact was the establishment of the republican calendar. It was born out of a wish to distance the New France from not just *l'ère vulgaire*, but also from the Gregorian calendar installed by the Catholic Church. The new calendar abolished Sundays, the naming of days after saints and all Christian holidays in favor of new holidays celebrating Reason, science, nature, poetry, ideology and utopia. Indeed, Philippe Ardant has argued that the official republican values should rightly be a quartet rather than a trilogy, reading: *liberté, égalité, fraternité, laïcité* (1995:5). The first building block of what would shape the French tradition of *laïcité* was the notion of religious freedom advocated by philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire in his *Lettres philosophiques* (Rémond 1995:8). But whereas America was characterized precisely by a religious pluralism that rendered the establishment of a state church difficult (and undesirable for many), France was at the time of its Revolution a society where the Catholic Church held a dominant position. For the revolutionaries, this posed a twin problem: First, the church was firmly associated with the monarchy. Indeed, the motto of the French monarchy was *un roi, une foi, une loi* (one king, one faith, one law). As such, the subjects of the king were required to a double allegiance, irrespective of their own beliefs: to the king as well as to the church. The church, in this respect, was the church to which the king paid allegiance, i.e. the Catholic Church¹⁰⁶. Disposing of the monarchy was not just a challenge to the established social classes of the *Ancien Régime*, but also to the church (Bergounioux 1995:19). Second, the presence of a strong, established church was rightly considered a rival to the authority of the republican state. Philosophical notions of religious freedom here clashed with concerns over the unity of the state. Whereas religious freedom can be considered to have been essential for upholding the unity of an America characterized by its plurality of religions; in France, national unity became perceived as threatened by the Catholic Church (Rémond 1995:8-11). As such, *laïcité* quickly came to contain strong elements of anti-clericalism, whereby secularism not only entailed the formal separation of church and state, but also the exclusion of the church as a factor in public life. A good

example of this is the non-recognition by the French State of religious rites such as for example marriages. According to French law, whose origins in this respect date back to 1792, marriages only acquire legal status when registered by the civil authorities (ibid:12 and Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:404). In many cases, the practice of *laïcité* goes further than the non-recognition of the church: while religion is denied any formal influence over public life, the state is not denied the right to interfere in the activities of the church. Already during the Revolution, steps were taken to force the clergy not just to recognize republican values, but indeed to actively support them (Gunn 2004:433-437). Sometimes, these steps were carried to extremes, as when priests became “systematically” forced into marriage by the republican authorities (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:398). In short, while both France and the United States are secular nations, their versions of secularism are, if not opposed in nature, then at least very different in meaning as well as in effect: America’s version of secularism, religious freedom, was and is intended to protect religion from state interference. France’s version of secularism, *laïcité*, has formally the same aim, that is to grant religious freedom to its inhabitants, but also reflects a strong wish to protect the state from religious interference¹⁰⁷. As Gunn reminds us, *laïcité* did not in its formative phases “embody the high principles of tolerance, neutrality, and equality; rather, it emerged from periods of conflict and hostility, most of which targeted the Roman Catholic Church” (2004:419).

It may be, as Gunn further argues, that irrespective of popular beliefs, France’s notion of *laïcité* and the American version of religious freedom operate more “in ways that are akin to founding myths” rather than as actual founding principles that have united the citizens (2003 and 2004:422). Gunn is certainly right in asserting that “neither doctrine originated as a unifying or founding principle” (2004:422). Although Jefferson would later rank his *Act for Establishing Religious Freedom* (1786) as one of his most significant achievements, it was only adopted after years of intense debates in the Congress (Wilson and Drakeman (eds) 2003:68). And though the principle of religious tolerance might not be seriously challenged in modern America, the place of religion in public affairs, and not least within the public educational sector, continues to be an issue of contention (Baker 2005; Green, Guth, Smidt and Kellstedt 1996; Hunter 1991, and Zylberberg 1995). Noah Feldman even argues that “no question divides Americans more fundamentally than that of the relation between religion and government” (2005:5. See also Kaufmann 2002). In France, *laïcité* only became firmly codified in 1905 as a cornerstone of the republic after more than a century’s

ideological strife, and even then, it did not emerge as a unifying principle but was rather the case of an anti-clerical ideological victory. Indeed, it has been argued that *laïcité* is the only value to have durably separated two Frances, each with its conception of the world (Bergounioux 1995:17). Hervieu-Léger has noted that it was only after the Second World War that “laïcité of compromise” replaced “laïcité of confrontation” (in Berger (ed.) 1998:46). As such, *laïcité* has retained an almost militant dimension in the French society: religious symbols are banned from the public realm and relegated to the private domain. In public schools, overt displays of religious symbols such as the Muslim veil or conspicuously large Christian crucifixes are banned¹⁰⁸. In politics, references to the personal adherence of politicians to religious communities are rare¹⁰⁹. Defense of the principles of *laïcité* is a virtual prerequisite for a public career within mainstream political parties. This does not entail that religion is not debated publicly or that it is actively discouraged by the state. But it is virtually always debated in connection with the protection of the principles of *laïcité*. Like in many other European countries, France is currently experiencing strong public debates on the nature of Islam and the integration of Muslims in the French society. But whereas in many countries Islam is regarded as a challenge to the established religious communities, in France, which has a considerable and increasing number of Muslim inhabitants, Islam is seen not so much as a challenge to traditional values, originating at least partly from Christianity, but much more to the republican values of secularism and equality of the sexes (Roman, in Dewitte (ed.) 1999)¹¹⁰. It should however be stressed that France is not as such anti-religious. Large numbers of Frenchmen are still practicing members of a religious community, although the number of avowed atheists is substantial compared to the small proportion of avowed atheists in the States (Norris and Inglehart, in Banchoff (ed.) 2007:34-45. See also Franchi 1995, and Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Prominent members of the religious communities, such as for example the Abbé Pierre¹¹¹, are often referred to as voices of compassion and have been given substantial and privileged access to both media and politicians. Official France is nonetheless thoroughly skeptical of religion. While some of the skepticism can be attributed to the long tradition of anti-clericalism and the historical opposition to a Catholic Church deemed too powerful (and meddlesome) in French society, the skepticism has subsequently been enlarged to covering a large number of religious movements and not least the growing number of sects. France has Europe’s strictest anti-Sect law, purportedly enacted in order to protect potential members from mental manipulation (loi n°2001-504 du 12 juin 2001, article 1)¹¹². This

legislation, which has attracted sharp criticism from abroad and not least from the United States, has been highly applauded by both sides of the political divide in France, where it has been regarded as the modern expression of the philosophical ideal of emancipating minds “from the influence of beliefs deemed to be in stark contradiction to reason and autonomy” (Hervieu-Léger 2001:252). The French anti-Sect law is probably the most manifest example of *laïcité* with a strong anti-American bias. In the first annual report of the Interministerial Mission to Combat Sects (MILS), an organ which acted as a precursor to the anti-sect law, the United States was described as a “sanctuary” for dangerous sects, and the actions of the Church of Scientology depicted as “clandestine operations launched against France from a foreign nation” (LeBlanc 2001). In its next report, the Interministerial Mission went further, insisting that France’s Declaration of Human Rights, “voted on two years prior to the adoption of the First Amendment in the American Constitution”, is superior to the First Amendment, since as opposed to the latter, it truly “protects human rights which are threatened by modern forms of obscurantism” (ibid.)¹¹³. There is no doubt that the anti-sect law, by banning religious movements such as Scientology, has presented the practice of French *laïcité* as not just different from, but even fundamentally opposed to, the American version of religious freedom.

The French tradition of *laïcité* may be a founding myth rather than a founding principle, but it is nevertheless a myth that resonates so deep in modern French society, that it “has itself become a kind of religion” (Moïsi 2009:85). Like Thomas Paine did more than two hundred years ago ([1794] 2003:246), the French today by and large reject “the adulterous connection of church and state”¹¹⁴. They have also grown accustomed to rejecting expressions of religious beliefs in matters related to public affairs. In this respect, the myth has become a principle. Though it is a principle that sets France apart from most of the world (Bergounioux 1995:17; Zylberberg 1995:37), this only serves to bolster a feeling of French avant-gardism or even exceptionalism (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:404-406 and 416). Like the notions of republicanism and civilization, *laïcité* has acquired defining proportions that relate to the aspiration for modernity that characterizes part of the French national identity. In a widely publicized speech, former President Jacques Chirac described *laïcité* as a “pillar” of the French Constitution, adding that: “Its values are at the core of our uniqueness as a Nation. These values spread our voice far and wide in the world” (quoted by Gunn 2004:428). Irrespective of the fact that the French version of secularism has been copied by precious few

nations¹¹⁵, there is in France a genuine perception that *laïcité* is a universal ideal, which France should promote. This perception also opposes French universalism to American universalism.

While for France, their universalism is virtually devoid of notions of religion, focusing instead on the philosophic arguments that were at the core of the Declaration of Human Rights, American universalism merges the values on which the American nation was founded with a religiously tainted messianic streak, which to some is akin to new millennialism. Whereas France portrays itself as a role model based on it being not just a vanguard of civilization but also of reason, many Americans believe that their nation is blessed by God, indeed that it is, as it is sometimes crudely put, “God’s Own Country” (Galtung, in Chay (ed.) 1990:123). The notion of American exceptionalism has distinctly religious connotations, endowing America with a moral mission, in prolongation of its *manifest destiny*, to spread its values to the world. Reinhold Niebuhr once described how Americans have “a religious version of our national destiny which interpreted the meaning of our nationhood as God’s effort to make a new beginning in the history of mankind” (1949:31). That is still largely the case (Schlesinger 1986, Lipset 1996, Baker 2005). In this respect, as Chesterton observed, America is “the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed” (quoted in Lipset 1996:31). Nonetheless, José Casanova argues that it would be “ludicrous to argue that the United States is a less functionally differentiated society, and therefore less modern, and therefore less secular, than France or Sweden” (2006). Yet this charge is often advanced against America, not least in France. The strong role of religion in American society is frequently vilified in France, where Jakobsen and Pellegrini’s assertion that “the religion/secularism opposition is fundamentally implicated in claims about reason” (2000) holds particularly true. In this respect, the two opposing visions of secularism presented by France and the United States highlight that their competing universalisms are not just a matter of *whose* vision should be a model for futurity, but also *which* model should predominate.

Science and sensibility

The French secular tradition may stem from the Revolution but, as the Revolution itself, it has older sources of inspiration, not least those originating from the Enlightenment period (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397-398). Tocqueville later remarked that the French

philosophers of the Enlightenment, following Descartes' lead, had one penchant above all other: reason (Himmelfarb 2008:152). This has had a profound influence on the way religion is viewed by some in France. For the *philosophes*, the "idea of reason had as its converse the idea of religion" (ibid.). Diderot defined the *Encyclopédie* as the instrument of "a reasoning age", declaring that "Reason is to the philosopher, what grace is to the Christian. Grace moves the Christian to act, reason moves the philosopher" (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid.). As Himmelfarb comments,

reason was not just pitted against religion, defined in opposition to religion; it was implicitly granted the same absolute, dogmatic status as religion. [...] And reason illegitimized not only the Catholic Church but any form of established or institutional religion, and beyond that any religious faith dependent on miracles or dogmas that violated the canons of reason. (ibid.)

Some entries in the *Encyclopédie* were thoroughly anti-religious, such as those by the Baron d'Holbach on "Priests" or "Theocracy", which suggested that "religion was an invitation by clever clerics who imposed it on the ignorant and intimidated masses" (ibid:153). Voltaire similarly remarked that "Le plus absurde des Despotismes, le plus humiliant pour la nature humaine; le plus contradictoire, le plus funeste, est celui des prêtres; et de tous les empires sacerdotaux, le plus criminel, est sans contredit celui des prêtres de la religion chrétienne" (Voltaire 1762:4-5). In a letter written to Diderot, he argued that religion "must be destroyed among respectable people and left to the *canaille* large and small, for whom it was made" (quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:155). Later, *laïcité* came to be seen as a vehicle for the liberation of the ignorant masses to the virtues of reason (ibid:154-155), while religion increasingly became presented as contrary to both reason and science (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397-412). While America has in the course of the twentieth century overtaken France (and virtually every other nation) in terms of scientific achievements, the notion of science itself does probably not command the same awe throughout the American society as it does in France. According to Madeleine Rebérioux, post-revolutionary France is deeply imbued with a "scientistic culture", in which "reason" is rated much higher than "faith" (ibid:406-412). Especially during the nineteenth century there arose a strong reaction among leading scientists such as Lamarck against the Christian version of the origins of the world (ibid:407-408), and as the disputes between clericalists and anti-clericalists ravaged society, Charles Darwin's *Origins of the Species* and August Comte's notions of scientific positivism became the preferred arguments of the anti-clericals, scorning the Biblical version

of Genesis as obscurantist while expounding science as the harbinger of modernity (ibid:406-412). The opposition between not just religion and science, but also religion and modernity was confirmed from a unexpected source when Pope Pius X in 1907 condemned modernity as the “synthesis of all heresies” (quoted by Rebérioux, ibid:409). The dichotomy between religion and science or religion and modernity has endured in France to this day. As *laïcité* gradually came to be accepted during the second half of the twentieth century as a fundamental value uniting the French (or at least the vast majority of them), it has consistently been presented as yet another proof of achieved modernity and thus as a testimony to the mental maturity of the French (ibid:409-412). It is therefore no surprise that the interest for Intelligent Design or Creationism, prominent in religious circles in America, is, while largely rejected throughout most of Europe, especially vilified in France. The religiously based rejection of what is considered scientific evidence, most prominently of course Charles Darwin’s theories of the origins and development of species, is often presented as yet another proof of American ‘immaturity’, leading to a widely shared perception that the United States is more ‘backwards’ in terms of rationality than France¹¹⁶. In this respect, France does not deviate significantly from most Western European nations; if anything, France represents the purest or most extreme form of European secularism. Dislike of religious extremism, conservatism, or religion in general has contributed to anti-American attitudes in Europe based on a perception that in this respect, the United States is generally more ‘regressive’ than other First World nations, in the sense that it has kept old attitudes and values alive which are largely being phased out in Europe as belonging to another age. Katzenstein has remarked how

A secular liberalism is deeply ingrained in the self-understanding of most Europeans [...]. Not long ago it was an article of faith, so to speak, among most scholars of religion and of Europe that secularization was the dominant trend in modernization. (Katzenstein, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:7)

Stark and Bainbridge similarly note how “comparisons of ‘secularized’ Europe with ‘still-pious’ America too often seem intended primarily to reaffirm European claims to greater cultural maturity and enlightenment” (1985:476). Casanova likewise asserts that “the general secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact” (in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:83), and describes how

secularization became a self-fulfilling prophecy in Europe, once large sectors of the population of Western European societies, including the Christian churches,

accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization: that secularization is a teleological process of modern social change; that the more modern a society the more secular it becomes; that “secularity” is “*a sign of the times.*” (ibid:84).

There is no doubt that religion, especially in its more conservative forms, is much stronger in America, this “the most religious country in Christendom” (Lipset 2000), than in most of Europe. A 2002 survey by the Pew Research Center noted that among wealthy nations, the United States stood alone in its embrace of religion. With 59% answering that “religion plays a *very* important role in their lives”, the survey concluded that in terms of religion, “Americans’ views are closer to people in developing nations than to the publics of developed nations” (Pew 2002:2). The survey also showed that secularism was particularly prevalent throughout Europe and not least in France, where only 11% found religion to be very important (ibid.). It may be, as Casanova argues, that it is Europe, which in this respect is both exceptional and distinctive compared with the rest of the world (in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:83-90). Scott Thomas has similarly argued that the notion of secularization as an inherent feature of modernity applies to Europe, but hardly to the rest of the world, and that in religious matters Europe stands out as exceptional (2005:49-50). Wayne Baker on the other hand, has argued that a comprehensive “religiosity scale”, analyzing different measures of religious beliefs and practices, “demonstrates that America remains one of the most religious nations on earth” (2005:41). Yet, while the different emphasis on the importance of religion on the two sides of the Atlantic are marked, it is not so much America’s devotion to religion itself, which is decried in Europe, as the role played by religion in politics. It is a fact that religion, and even religious fundamentalism, has long played and continues to play a prominent role on the American political scene, first under the banner of the Moral Majority and later by the Christian Coalition (Feldman 2005:13). Lipset notes that a majority of Americans report that “God is the moral guiding force of American Democracy” (1996:63). The theory of Intelligent Design mentioned above would probably draw only little interest among most Europeans, were it not for the impact of religion on politics in America. Kevin Phillips, an erstwhile Republican strategist, has deplored how the

mingling of theology, popular culture, and theocracy has already brought about aspects of an American Disenlightenment, to employ a descriptive antonym. Effects can be seen in science, climatology, federal drug approval, biological research, disease control, and not least in the tension between evolution theory and the religious alternatives – creationism and so-called intelligent design. Some commentators have pictured the greatest religious threat to science since

the Catholic Church in 1633 put Galileo under house arrest for heresy in stating that the earth revolved around the sun. (2006:217).

It is when this European secularist perception of American “immaturity” becomes coupled with the impression that policy decisions are or risk being based on religious beliefs rather than on scientific evidence or rational reasoning, that the importance put on religion in the United States becomes regarded as less than harmless, and even as potentially dangerous. This is especially the case in France, where what finally cemented the victory of the anti-clericalists after more than a century’s infight with the clericalists was not so much the triumph of rationalist arguments in favor of Darwinism or notions of modernity, as it was the growing opposition toward the continuous influence of the Church on political affairs, culminating during the vehement polemics surrounding the Dreyfus affair¹¹⁷ (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:402, 405 and 420). The role played by the Church during the Dreyfus affair delegitimized it as a political factor in the eyes of the republicans just as effectively as the trial of Galileo had centuries earlier discredited the Vatican (ibid:412). Seen from Europe, and especially from France, religious arguments play a role in American politics which has long been abandoned in most of Western Europe. The continuing political and religious strife in America over the famous *Roe vs. Wade* ruling of 1973, in which the Supreme Court held that women had a constitutional right to abortion, on the basis of citizen’s right to privacy in their personal lives (Lockhart 2003:106-107), is a source of puzzlement to many Europeans for two main reasons. First, abortion is seen in most of Europe largely as the result of technical progress, facilitating the surgical or chemical removal of a fetus without undue hazardous risks. It is also, to the vast majority of European women, seen today as an established right. To many Europeans, technical modernity here meets societal maturity, providing women with the right to choose and thus providing liberation from unwanted motherhood. Second, irrespective of the views harbored toward abortion, it is hardly considered in Europe (except in highly religious societies such as Ireland and Poland) an issue of such importance that it justifies being one of the main topics of politics. Noting that the “issue of abortion is almost as prominent today as it was thirty years ago”, Feldman argues that “the main reason the controversy has not faded [in America] the way it did, for example, in Europe, is that [it has been] raised [...] to the level of a central American moral-political question” (2005:194). The fact that an American presidential election may be decided largely as a consequence of whether the candidate is ‘pro-choice’ or ‘pro-life’ is seen by many

Europeans as exaggerating an issue, which to them would hardly be among the most important political issues. This view naturally underscores the largely secularist character of European politics, but to Europeans it is both a source of wonder and of concern given the importance on world affairs of any American president. In France, abortion became legalized shortly after *Roe vs. Wade*, in 1975, and though originally highly contested, the virtual elimination of religious argumentation in the political sphere has ensured that this legalization hardly risks being overturned once passed¹¹⁸.

Regardless of religious faith, Europeans by and large feel that religion and politics mix badly. No country probably feels so strongly about this as France. In a 2005 Pew survey, France ranked highest among the polled countries who felt that America was “too religious” (61% of the respondents, Pew 2005:6). And it is a fact “a supermajority of Americans (70 percent) in 2004 claimed it was important to them that their presidents possess ‘strong religious beliefs’” (Berggren and Rae, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007a:92). Former President George W. Bush’s displays of active religiosity in his conduct of foreign policy were deeply disturbing to many Europeans, who generally resent hearing Americans preach an American moral superiority over the rest of the world, especially when it is imbued with religious connotations such as when President Bush describes himself as a ‘messenger from God’ carrying out ‘God’s will’ (Woodward 2004). This is not just a matter of different rhetorical styles on the two sides of the Atlantic; such statements were regarded by many Europeans as revealing the inner motivations driving American foreign policy. There is in France as elsewhere in Europe a fear that especially the religious right has far too much influence on the policies of especially Republican administrations. This has led some to decry America as a “theocracy”, in which theology has “moved from church pulpits into the decision-making circles of the nation’s capital” (Phillips 2006:236); a process far removed from the ideals of separation of Church and State that the founding fathers advocated. Johan Galtung has described U.S. foreign policy as “manifest theology” (in Chay (ed.) 1990:119-139), arguing that there is a strong tendency in America to see the United States as the “country closest to God [and] God’s representative on earth”, sharing the same three characteristics: “omniscience, omnipotence, and beneficence” (ibid:127). He further remarks that

If the United States is similar to God and the guiding light for other nations, then Americanization, meaning making other nations similar to America, would be the logical way of implementing the world order of which the United States is already emblematic. (ibid:134)

In foreign policy, the French may deplore *raison d'Etat*, especially when it runs counter to French interests, yet it is essentially accepted as a policy based on notions of reason. Ronald Reagan's policies toward the Soviet Union were, in spite of the surrounding rhetoric of combating an 'evil empire', by and large accepted as legitimate in France, even if they were frequently deplored as dangerous. The impression that the administration of George W. Bush led a crusading foreign policy, neo-conservative in name, yet essentially also religious in nature, was shared by some Americans as well: "By 2001 theology – the yardstick of belief, not judgement – began to displace the logic and realpolitik in official Washington, especially within the Republican party" (Phillips 2006:237). This has led to a massive rejection of such policies, especially in Europe, leading Katzenstein to remark that "important religious undercurrents [have] exacerbated an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism spreading across Europe in the aftermath of the Iraq war" (Katzenstein, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2005:32). Though a 2005 survey showed a striking affinity between the opinions of people who attended religious services frequently (irrespective of their religion) and the foreign policy positions of the Bush administration (Yankelovich 2005:10), Scott Thomas argues that whatever "the personal religious views of President Bush or even the foreign policy positions of the religious right", most Americans do not rely on religion "for their views on foreign affairs" (in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:198). Nevertheless this remains an impression, which can frequently be found in Europe, and not least in France, where the modernization theory, i.e. the belief that modernization and secularization go together (see for example Davie 2002), is particularly present. The combination of an American President who described himself as a "born again Christian" at the head of a deeply religious society was a far cry from French notions of sensible modernity (Adams 2007:72), even if, as O'Connor argues, an "over-reliance on stereotypes about Bush's evangelism overshadows debate on the reality that Bush's religious views are projected into his politics" (in O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:6).

Conclusion

While the effect of American secularism has been to lay the foundations of a society, where the diversity of religions and cults have thrived to such an extent that the nation can be termed a deeply religious society, secularism in France has had the almost opposite effect. Grace Davie has remarked that France "is the European society where the Enlightenment has been

most obviously configured as a freedom from belief”, while in “the United States, the Enlightenment becomes something very different: a freedom to believe” (2006:32, see also Berggren and Rae, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007a:93). In terms of evaluating the two versions of secularism as universal models, the results are mixed. As was seen above, there is no doubt that the two versions differ fundamentally. Though European secularism has historically been at least partly influenced by the French example, it has other sources as well, especially in Protestant countries, and is anyway – a fact that cannot be stressed enough – far from homogenous (ibid.). The European religious situation has been characterized as “believing without belonging” (Davie 1994) or conversely as “belonging without believing” (Hervieu-Léger 2003:101-119), both befitting descriptions of the practices in different countries. In this respect, European secularism, to the extent that it can be referred to in singular terms, might indeed represent an exceptionalism when compared with attitudes toward religion worldwide (Casanova 2006, Davie 2006). However, the same can be said for the American tradition of religious freedom, much more liberal than the one practiced in the majority of highly religious societies around the globe, yet deeply religious, indeed sometimes even fundamentally so, when compared with the situation in most First World countries (Pew 2002, Baker 2005). José Casanova has remarked that “When it comes to religion, there is no global rule” (in Beyer and Beaman (eds) 2007:114), while Raymond Aron has argued that the “heterogeneous” nature of values between societies is a serious obstacle to any universalist aspiration, not least those seeking to promote secularity (Aron 1969:249-280). As such, attempts to portray secularism as a universal value are bound to encounter serious limits. As was seen above, France has consistently attempted to present its version of secularism, *laïcité*, as universal in both inspiration and practice, while the American version, religious freedom, is not presented as much as a specific model of secularism (indeed, it is rarely presented as an example of secularism at all), but rather as an integral part of the vast complex of American freedoms which are part and parcel of American notions of universalism. Yet as Aron reminds us, regardless of which version of secularism we contemplate, it remains the weakest tenet of the two nations’ claim at representing themselves as universal nations. Religion, in this respect, is simply too divisive to be fertile ground for universalism – and the same goes for secularism. This does not imply that the attempt is not made, and that the two versions of secularism cannot be presented as competing philosophical notions. Though Katzenstein is probably right in asserting that “Religion continues to lurk underneath the veneer of European

secularization” (in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:33), there is no escaping that Western European elites have frequently described America as “the religious Other to Europe” (Jakelić 2006:138). This is, however, as much a testimony to the growing religious rhetoric in American politics over the last few decades as to the secularization of Europeans. It does however confirm a sense of otherness, deeply felt by the still very Cartesian French, in their perceptions of America.

5.3.4 Conclusion

Did the Revolution stand father to modern France? The argument has been opposed by for example Tocqueville, writing after the Restoration of the monarchy, when the Revolution might be regarded as a disruptive interlude in the long history of France, and the argument still has some, though probably few, opponents (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397). There is however no escaping that the political influence of the Revolution has been momentous, and it keeps being referred to by many as the origin of a rebirth of the French political and institutional society, a society which as a result of the Revolution became fundamentally and durably transformed (Chevallier and Conac 1991, Julliard 1999, Keiger 2001). In terms of mentality and national identity, the Revolution likewise occupies a massive role as the constitutive event, which more than any other has fashioned French society for two centuries, irrespective of the periods of monarchical restoration or imperial rule. Yet as was shown above, there is no doubt that another prominent agent of change has been the inheritance from the French Enlightenment philosophers. Though the Enlightenment precedes the Revolution by decades, it was only with the Revolution that the Enlightenment ideas – or at least some of them – became adopted as constitutive elements of modern France on a broader level. This chapter has argued that as a result of Enlightenment ideas being put (at least partly) into practice following the Revolution, the central tenets of France’s national identity could be analyzed in terms of republicanism, civilization and *laïcité*. In conjunction, these have formed the core of France’s universalist aspiration of presenting itself as a role model for the world to follow. This argument is naturally debatable. Chartier and Rebérioux (in Burguière (ed.) 1993) as well as Braudel (1986a-c) have rightly pointed to a number of elements anterior to the Revolution, which have had a constitutive effect on modern French mentality as well. It is the contention of this study, however, that these were either

refashioned or largely overshadowed by the sense of purpose given to the French nation as a result of the Revolution.

It has furthermore been argued that these universalist aspirations can be regarded as both rivaling and rivaled by similar aspirations held by the *great nation of futurity*. In this respect, France and America might be regarded indeed as two nations, divided by common values, though as was shown, these values differ greatly when contrasted more thoroughly. These values have been presented above as largely competing values. It should be stressed though, that this competition has primarily been of a subconscious nature, frequently pitting perceptions of national identity against each other without necessarily acknowledging the similarities in the universalist pretensions of both nations. When Serge Halimi notes that “Seldom has the development of the whole of humanity been conceived in terms so closely identical and so largely inspired by the American model” (1998), it is a reflection of not just victorious American universalism, but also the fact that modern France has failed to inspire the world with similar success in spite of its competing universal model. If France and America have been engaged in an unacknowledged competition of presenting the world with each their set of universal values, it seems plausible to characterize anti-Americanism as the unacknowledged companion of modern French national identity. As such, it has become embodied in France’s national habitus; a habitus, which builds on the more conscious elements of the national identity while being imbued unconsciously with a set of predispositions relating to how the elements of national identity can best be fulfilled. The fact that France’s claim to have a competing *mission civilisatrice* is largely ignored in the United States (and, increasingly, elsewhere) does not mitigate its impact on French national identity; if anything, it is, as Richard Pells has pointed out (2007), a further factor contributing to French anti-Americanism.

5.4 Conclusion: Is America France’s Significant ‘Other’?

This chapter has attempted to present one main argument concerning French anti-Americanism: that it can be analyzed as originating essentially from within the central tenets of French national identity. The French tradition of anti-Americanism, as Roger terms it (2005:449), builds solidly on the foundations of the core values of the Republic, values which are both largely shared by the United States and yet so distinct from the American creed that the two nations can be described as being divided by common values. It was asserted that

French anti-Americanism could be regarded in this respect as the reaction to a nation, which not only has presented the world with a competing universalism, but indeed with a universalism which has proved more successful than the French ditto. The anti-American narratives presented in 5.1 may at first resemble similar narratives in other European countries, yet given their origins, they have acquired a quintessentially French dimension, which sets them apart from most other narratives. It was noted in 5.2 how centuries of Anglophobia have revolved around some of the same themes that would later be raised against America and that in this respect, French anti-Americanism could be regarded also as a successor-phobia to Anglophobia. However, while Anglophobia and anti-Americanism in their French versions present striking similarities, so much that the two phenomena are sometimes merged into a rejection of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’, what has most likely fashioned the French tradition of anti-Americanism more than anything else is the revolutionary heritage, which has been elevated as the founding myth of modern France. The core values inherited from the Revolution and the Enlightenment have consistently been presented as embodied in France’s national identity, and they have formed a narrative which has been venerated throughout two centuries. It is a narrative, which has consciously been nurtured by those agents best poised to influence the public mind: the educators, who have over the centuries presented a version of France and French history, which have proved both enduring and consistent in its main themes (see chapter 4).

History is no mere innocent recapitulation of past events; it can act as a powerful agent shaping the social imaginary of a nation, i.e. the “common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (Taylor, *op. cit.*). Keiger has described history as “a reflex of the collective consciousness of the French” (2001:2). Suzanne Citron has showed in her highly critical study how the nineteenth century republican elites in France used history to construct a sense of Frenchness, making works by historians such as the revered Michelet and the less revered, but no less influential Lavissee¹¹⁹ compulsory reading in schools with the intention to invent history as a “catéchisme d’une religion de la France” (1991:25). This France was indiscriminately the France of first kings and emperors and later the French people, yet France was throughout depicted as an entity of almost holy dimensions. In this France, “good kings”, regardless of any personal characteristics, were those achieving an expansion of French territory and who thereby came to embody France and French aspirations, while the rulers that were criticized (usually for

losing their wars) were presented as damaging France by their failure to defend or expand its territory. Throughout, however, France as such remained beyond reproach (ibid:33-40). As Zeldin has noted, the idea of France having a common personality and interest – as distinct from its all being the possession of one king – did not emerge till the eighteenth century, when the word nation first came to be used in a combative sense, to mean the sovereign people, as opposed to its despotic rulers (1977:4). The major theme of these history school books, however, is the defense of the realm against the enemy and against ‘foreigners’ (Citron 1991:45 and 266-267). As such, French national history has largely, according to Citron, become a “une manipulation du passé par les élites au service ou à l’appui des différents pouvoirs” (ibid:279), and “Une historiographie apologétique de l’État est devenue le substrat de notre imaginaire national” (ibid.). Though similar constructivist complaints regarding the role of history in framing national identities are raised by critics in most Western nations, Citron’s argument is that the French example is particularly telling given the centralized nature of the education system and the large impact of a highly standardized curriculum (ibid:254-287. See also Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:516-567). As such, history has left an imprint in the popular French conscience that has contributed enormously to shape the outlook of not just its inhabitants, but also generations of its leaders such as de Gaulle, “intellectuellement formé [...] à la grande époque de[...] Lavisser” (Agulhon 2000:126). The central tenets of French national identity depicted above, republicanism, civilization, and *laïcité*, have consistently been presented as both French in their origins and simultaneously universal in their aspirations. To nineteenth century positivists such as Auguste Comte, the universality of the French ideational values represented nothing less than the scientific proof that these values were bound to become exported to the rest of the world (Todorov 1989:44-49). It is hardly surprising that a national creed as strong as the French will find it difficult to be subjected to competition, especially when the rivaling creed appears so eminently successful and if not admired, then at least highly emulated.

As was seen in 5.2, Michelet remarked almost two hundred years ago that England had “done France a great service by confirming and clarifying her sense of nationhood” (quoted by Bell 1996:1). It would seem that also in this respect can America be described as a successor to Britain: as the nation against which France measures itself – indeed, and not least because of America’s successful universalism, as the only nation that it falls natural for France to measure itself against. Which other nation, bar the *great nation of*

futurity, could contest with the universal aspirations of France? Kuisel has remarked how, during the middle and late twentieth century,

America functioned as a foil that forced the French, especially after the Second World War, to assert what was distinctively French. Beginning in the interwar years and reaching a climax in the first postwar decades, America served as the other that helped the French to imagine, construct, and refine their collective sense of self. (1993:6)

In his reading of the works of some of the most influential French novelists of the twentieth century, Lipiansky similarly remarks that it is the English and the Americans, which are used as “pole of comparison” with the French, and rarely the Germans (1991:248). Markovits has remarked how “For hundreds of years now, Europeans and Americans have created imagined versions of each other that have served all kinds of purposes, not least of which was to delineate a clear ‘other’ for themselves” (in Levy, Pensky and Torpey 2005:199). It can naturally be debated whether it is the Anglo-Saxon which is France’s significant other or the American. In some respects, it is a largely meaningless distinction. Whenever the Anglo-Saxon model or the Anglo-Saxon world is rejected, it is its prime representative, America, which is the favorite target. One might say, following Triandafyllidou (2002), that whereas England has historically been France’s significant neighboring Other, America has in a later phase of French history become that other type of significant Other, namely the one who is perceived as threatening France’s sense of uniqueness and authenticity (see chapter 4.2). The observation that the United States can be regarded as France’s significant Other is not in itself particularly original and has been advanced before (e.g. by Marcussen and Roscher, in Stråth (ed.) 2000:329), just as others have noted that not just the French, but Europeans as a whole increasingly consider America as their ‘Other’ (Ash, in Lindberg (ed.) 2005:129). The concept may, as Timothy Garton Ash further notes, belong to the “dread jargon of identity studies” (ibid.), but a sensitivity to the forces of othering still strikes me as a fundamental prerequisite for understanding the forces which participate to promote anti-Americanism in France. If it is true, as Volkan states (1988), that the ‘enemy’ has to resemble us, it makes sense to see America as France’s ‘chosen enemy’: They share a revolutionary past and universalistic aspirations that set them apart from all other nations with whom they can compare themselves. But whereas America’s influence has been steadily rising, France’s has been waning. Borrowing from René Girard’s notions of mimetic rivalry, Scott Thomas argues that the United States can largely be viewed as “the mimetic model of modernity” (in Fabbrini

(ed.) 2006:206). To France, this presents a dilemma: The French national creed has at its core the same aspirations as America at presenting a model of modernity for others to imitate, yet its aspirations in that respect have remained largely unfulfilled. On the other hand, France is among the Western European nations probably the one, which most adamantly rejects to imitate the political, socio-economic, and cultural model put forward by the United States (Tinard 2001). Perhaps then, America really has become France's 'other' – the nation against which it perpetually measures itself, knowing that it is fighting a losing battle and rejecting Americanism even more ferociously for it. In his 1796 farewell address, George Washington remarked that "The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection" (quoted by Roger 2005:453). If America is indeed France's other, one might wonder whether the French have become slaves of their anti-Americanism. It would seem, as will be shown in the next chapter, that France has throughout the last half century developed policies, which can be characterized as at least partly directed against the United States.

6 The Anti-American Republic?

The seeds which would ferment into an anti-American tradition have been a constant companion of France's national habitus for more than two centuries. Yet it would be erroneous to suggest that anti-Americanism in France has been a constant as such. As both René Rémond and Philippe Roger have showed, periods of enchantment have alternated with periods of disaffection throughout the centuries, reflecting moods, political developments or personal relationships between the leading political and cultural forces of the two nations (Rémond 1958, Roger 2005). Chapter 5 presented an attempt at identifying the parts of French national identity that were most constitutive of France's national habitus and present various proposals as to why, in relation to these elements of national identity, one might claim that America came to be regarded early on as France's other. Though the underlying premise is that the French national habitus embodies a predisposition toward the United States due to the values on which both nations are built – values, which are both shared and yet through their different implementation opposed to each other – this does not entail that France can be described as inherently anti-American. A predisposition is just that, and not evidence of neither manifest anti-American sentiments nor conscious political rivalry as such. It would therefore be wholly inaccurate to depict France over the last two centuries as a nation profoundly characterized by anti-Americanism, although this claim has sometimes been advanced (e.g. Miller and Molesky 2004). Rather, the rise of America as a world power has presented a challenge to especially France, since America's universalist mission has rivalled that of France. Though some manifestations of French anti-Americanism carry with them a deep imprint of ill-will toward the United States, the predisposition is more akin to a lingering, yet powerful, uneasiness that at times may or may not erupt into rejection of the various attributes of American power. Conversely, there have been times, when the shared revolutionary origins and universal aspirations led to Ameriphilia rather than Ameriphobia, to use Simon Schama's term (2003). In the years leading to the revolution of 1848, progressive political and intellectual circles in France regarded the young America as the "continent de l'avenir" and its political institutions as a "grande expérience de république démocratique" (Renouvin 1954:246-247). René Rémond even describes how the French revolution of 1848, much more so than the revolutions of 1789 or 1830, saw the attempt at remodelling France's

political institutions on the American example, an attempt that was openly and proudly admitted to by the revolutionary leaders (1958:832-835), and probably due largely to the fact that Toqueville as member of the expert commission, which elaborated the new Constitution, forcefully extolled the virtues of the American model (Mélonio, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993:394). Lady Liberty, arguably the monument which best captures the ideals and promises inherent in the American national credo, was a gift from the French people, and large parts of the bourgeoisie were so eager to subscribe to these very ideals that they contributed economically to give it a potent monument. Yet such events, significant as they were at the time, cannot hide the fact that throughout most of the nineteenth century, the two nations had little or scant contact (Kuisel 1993:1-2). This left the playing field of anti-Americanism open to influential forces within the intellectual elites such as Stendhal and Baudelaire, who were eager to denounce the materialist, cultureless republic (Roger 2005, Strauss 1978), which seemed to augur the new modernity. The watershed in French anti-Americanism came for real with the Spanish-American war, which had massive reverberations in France. “If we were to give French anti-Americanism a baptismal certificate, it would have to be dated 1898”, writes Roger with reference to that occasion (2005:130). He describes it “as a threshold, in that from this moment on, French anti-Americanism was stabilized” (ibid.). Antoine Deram concurs, and his reading of the key diplomatic correspondence from that period demonstrates that it was characterized by a Gallo-centric intellectual debate, which centered on “la hantise du déclin” vis-à-vis the rising American power (Deram, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:36). As we shall see below, 1898 also represented the advent of the *intellectuel* in France, soon to be an ardent advocate of anti-Americanism.

It has been noted by several observers that especially the inter-war years saw a noticeable rise in anti-American outbursts in France (Kuisel 1993:2, Roger 2005:339-371), indeed that it marked the apogee of French anti-Americanism to this day, at least measured by its virulence. Yet to the contemporary observer, it is first and foremost with the advent of Charles de Gaulle as President of France that French anti-Americanism acquired a forceful political potential. Michel Winock has noted that anti-Americanism as a specifically political phenomenon is fairly recent, emerging as a major force only during the Cold War (1990:51). In this respect, regardless of the long pedigree of anti-Americanism in France prior to 1958, the Fifth Republic installed by de Gaulle might almost be termed ‘the anti-American Republic’, as anti-Americanism came to be regarded by many, especially on the other side of

the Atlantic, as an integral and almost institutionalized element of French thinking, whether in politics or in cultural life. Writing in the aftermath of the French opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Timothy Garton Ash notes that “You can’t begin to understand the emotions behind the French position in the early twenty-first century crisis of the West unless you appreciate the full trauma of [their] loss of political and cultural centrality” (2004:68). This trauma originates from well before General de Gaulle was recalled to power in 1958, but the core of his legacy has been precisely to resist the erosion of France’s political and cultural standing. If the Fifth republic can be characterized as the anti-American Republic (and as will be shown below, this can only be done by stretching the notion of French political anti-Americanism), France can equally be characterized as the Republic of High Culture, perpetually engaged in a stand-off with the Republic of Mass Culture. In terms of the perceived anti-American bias of de Gaulle’s foreign policy – as well as that of his successors – it is rooted in a particular Gaullist vision of national sovereignty that with time has come to be regarded as a quintessentially French tradition in Europe (Ash 2004). On the other hand, notions of French particularism in terms of foreign and security policy need to be balanced with what one might call the Western imperative, i.e. the realization that regardless of a marked French preference for political independence vis-à-vis the United States, the logic of *realpolitik* dictated that there were limits to the degree of independence that France both could achieve and wanted to pursue. Unable to rival American dominance of the West by itself, France has instead attempted to retain Africa as a zone of special French influence and to construct Europe as an instrument to challenge American hegemony. The ambition from de Gaulle to his successors has not been so much to rival the United States, but rather throughout to present France as a power of the first order; i.e. to achieve a degree of parity with America rather than to oppose it as such. On the cultural front, the situation has been markedly different. While political anti-Americanism in France has been largely motivated by a desire to be treated as an equal to the United States, cultural anti-Americanism has, while simultaneously lamenting the predominance and impact of American culture, rejected that American culture could claim parity with European, and especially French, culture. It is highly conceivable, as Alfred Grosser suggests, that the French emphasis on cultural superiority vis-à-vis the United States is an attempt to compensate for French notions of inferiority in the political and economic spheres (1989:222). This would explain why the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism seems to have acquired renewed impetus over

the past decades, while the political dimension, bar sporadic resurgences due largely to situational factors, has decreased in importance as the Fifth Republic has increasingly had to come to terms with its position as an important, but not pre-eminent, power in the international system.

6.1 The Politics of Anti-Americanism

With the Fifth Republic, anti-Americanism came of age as a political factor of the first order in France. Richard Kuisel has remarked how, unlike the preceding Fourth Republic, the Fifth “adopted an overtly anti-American foreign policy” (1993:134), both in substance and in style (ibid:136). This is a view that is widely shared, yet the politics of anti-Americanism in France are not so easily reduced to the Fifth Republic set up by Charles de Gaulle, although the General would largely come to personalize the difficulties in the Franco-American relationship for his generation and beyond. The first part of this chapter will seek to analyze to what extent the Fifth Republic can be characterized as the anti-American Republic in terms of political anti-Americanism. In this respect, it is important first of all to acknowledge the importance, which the cultural and political discourses on America had in the interwar years, as these laid some lasting foundations for the anti-American discourses in the follow decades. Also, the relationship between the Fourth and the Fifth Republics is complex, and though the Fifth Republic is often perceived as a radical break with the Fourth Republic, this apparently was mainly the case regarding the rearrangement of the French political institutions. As will be shown below, the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic would largely come to build on those pursued by the leaders of the Fourth Republic, although they received an added sense of purpose and direction under de Gaulle. There is, in short, a large degree of continuity in the foreign policies conducted by successive French regimes; a fact which should be borne in mind when assessing whether the Fifth Republic has been particularly motivated by anti-American considerations. Second, while the policies of national independence pursued by de Gaulle have frequently been presented as some of the most potent examples of French political anti-Americanism, there is good evidence to suggest that while they were undoubtedly dictated by a strong wish to reject American political hegemony, they were nevertheless carried out with a keen eye for the strategic international environment, consistent with de Gaulle’s political realism in international affairs. Though de Gaulle undoubtedly acquired the status as the most reluctant of Washington’s partners and as such frequently

became regarded as the primary spokesman for political anti-Americanism in the West, there are good grounds to question the extent to which his actions and statements were motivated by anti-Americanism as such. As will be shown, de Gaulle rejected American power whenever he deemed this power to undermine French national independence or to run counter to French national interests, yet it would appear that he never sought to undermine American power when this could have seriously upset the delicate East-West balance. However reluctant, he would prove a dependable ally in all major crises during the Cold War. Third, though the heritage of de Gaulle would prove to leave its overwhelming mark on his successors, they too would seek to balance the ambitions for French political *grandeur* with the constraints of the international order, while advancing towards a subtle rapprochement with the United States. As such, there is an irony to the fact that among the successors to Charles de Gaulle, the one who attempted most forcefully to bridge the transatlantic gap and restore France's position as an unequivocal American ally by promoting France's full reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance, namely Jacques Chirac, would later be presented as a "global spokesman for anti-Americanism" (The Economist, op. cit.). This shows that though the years under de Gaulle might have marked the apogee of French political anti-Americanism, the tendency to present French foreign policies as dictated at least in part by anti-Americanism remains strong. Even the advent of the openly pro-American Nicolas Sarkozy as president of France may not be enough to quell the impression that France will remain for years to come a difficult, if not reluctant partner to the United States. Fourth, though the core of France's rejection of American hegemony might have been focused on the predominant role of the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, France has consistently attempted to find arenas in which it could unfold its universalist ambitions. Unable to achieve equal status with the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, France has attempted to build on its considerable influence in Africa and its preeminent role in Europe in order to establish if not an alternative to American hegemony, then at least a vehicle in which it could carry out its downscaled ambitions of limited universalism. Throughout the history of the Fifth Republic, a dual concern has thus been at the core of French foreign policies: The quest for independence and the wish for national *grandeur*. These two considerations, eminently linked, may be regarded as evidence to a deep-set resistance to American hegemony; there is no doubt that they frequently took the form of opposition to American power. While it is, as will be shown below, doubtful whether the Fifth Republic can be termed the anti-American

Republic in political terms, the policies carried out by the successive presidents of the Fifth Republic nevertheless frequently contributed to nourishing that impression.

6.1.1 The heritage of anti-Americanism in modern French politics

Anti-Americanism in France has not only a history, but a pre-history as well (Roger 2005). The same can be said for de Gaulle's rejection of America. The prehistory is not just the oft quoted history of de Gaulle's wartime experiences with President Roosevelt, although as we shall see below they undoubtedly played an important role. Probably as important were his experiences from the interwar years, experiences which were shared by many in France and which contributed to fertilize the grounds for anti-Americanism in post-war France. Culturally, the interwar years had been characterized by the most virulent anti-Americanism to date. Philippe Roger has described how, in the interwar years, "French anti-Americanism produced a decisive reference base: the intellectual Americanophobia of the 1920s and 1930s remains, even now, the unsurpassed crest of French anti-Americanism" (Roger 2005:273). Though many prominent agents of French anti-Americanism during the interwar years such as Céline and Brasillach would later fall into disrepute due to their open or tacit support for either Nazism, the Vichy-regime or both, they had sown the seeds of a value-based conservative rejection of the United States which was largely shared, although for different reasons, by the growing left wing movements in French politics. A further aspect, today largely irrelevant as a factor in modern French anti-Americanism, was the importance attributed to notions of race in the interwar years. In France, the interwar years saw a resurging preoccupation with the 'Anglo-Saxon threat'. French critics of the United States argued that the contrast between France and America was as much a contrast between Latin and Anglo-Saxon orientations; orientations which were depicted in terms of race and which, given their nature, could difficultly be reconciled (Strauss 1978:244-249). The roots had been laid already with the rising nationalism of the nineteenth century, in which "anti-Americanism, expressed in the form of the antithesis between French and American experiences" had come to the fore (ibid:37). In the interwar years, such notions of antithesis acquired racial overtones. André Siegfried deplored how as a result of a crusade by the Anglo-Saxons, "the individual of Latin origin suffers in the United States from constant persecution of his personality" (quoted by Strauss ibid:168). This emphasis on racial and cultural differences became translated into preconceived ideas regarding political differences.

Bernard Faÿ for example regarded America as the cultural expansion of England and remarked of its President that “Franklin Roosevelt is Anglo-Saxon. [...] he is the descendent of a race in which the Anglo-Saxon element has been dominant. The American people elected him because he was an Anglo-Saxon” (quoted by Strauss *ibid*:246.). On the other side of the Atlantic, racial explanations found equal resonance, dividing the nation between those ready to accept Israel Zangwill’s 1908 play *The Melting Pot* as a befitting image of the United States, and those who demanded tighter immigration laws in order to protect the inhabitants of Anglo-Saxon origin from degeneration (Johnson 1996:203-208). In a letter from F. Scott Fitzgerald to Edmund Wilson, the celebrated novelist wrote:

God damn the continent of Europe. It is merely of antiquarian interest. [...] The Negroid streak creeps northward to defile the Nordic race. [...] Raise the bar of immigration and permit only Scandinavians, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons and Celts to enter. France made me sick. Its silly pose as the thing the world has to save. [...] I believe at last in the white man’s burden. We are as far above the modern Frenchman as he is above the Negro. Even in art! [...] We will be the Romans in the next generations as the English are now. (Quoted by Johnson *ibid*:215)

Such was the predominance of the notions of a Franco-American antithesis and a schism between Latins and Anglo-Saxons among interwar France’s cultural elites that they are bound to have influenced their generation profoundly (Chuter 1996:62). It is certain that for de Gaulle, the specter of Anglo-Saxon dominance, whether culturally, economically or politically, was never far away (Newhouse 1970).

While the virulent manifestations of cultural anti-Americanism in the interwar years contributed to foster a climate of ambivalence or even animosity toward the United States, the isolationist nature of America’s foreign policies in the interwar years compounded such feelings by America’s omission to participate in combating the rising tides of authoritarianism in Europe. At the time when European democracies felt increasingly threatened by authoritarian dictatorships blossoming on the continent, whether labeled communist, fascist or national-socialist, America chose to remain distant from the dangers facing the Old World (Grosser 1980:4-11) in what the French still refer to as *le splendide isolement* (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:23), a further testimony to the perseverance of the link between Anglophobia and anti-Americanism. Grosser describes how these factors “left a profound impression on men who would play a leading role in the political and intellectual life after 1945 [...] Americans will never truly understand the force which even after 1945 emanated from this current of the 1930s” (1980:9). A prevalent view

among French political and military leaders was that during the First World War, “France had sacrificed herself massively and bled herself white, not just for her own sake but for the sake of Western civilisation as a whole” (Chuter 1996:53). This sacrifice, it was felt, was repaid with ingratitude. It was bad enough that American administrations following the signature of the Versailles Peace Treaty had consistently refused to support French demands for further German reparations while simultaneously maintaining that French war debts toward the United States should be settled¹²⁰, thus both weakening France economically and politically and with time allowing a revanchist Germany to rearm. This left little room for French gratitude for America’s (late) involvement in the First World War: “What an injustice if now, after the money to clothe our soldiers has been lent us, we should be asked to repay the price plus interest for every single coat in which they died” was a common lamentation (quoted by Grosser 1980:6). American tourists visiting Paris were even harassed by an angry mob in 1926 after yet another attempt at settling outstanding French war debts to America had failed (Costigliola 1984:135-136), and the debt disputes prompted a French writer to assert that “Uncle Shylock and American imperialism look so strangely alike as to appear to be one and the same person” (Chastanet, quoted by Strauss 1978:93). When the consequences of these policies, as seen from Paris, later materialized in the advent of Adolf Hitler as leader of a belligerent Germany (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:26-29, Chuter 1996:59-64), Washington refused to offer more than token support to their erstwhile allies. Henry Kissinger has described the Versailles Treaty as a “fragile compromise between American utopianism and European paranoia” (1994:240), which in geopolitical terms left vanquished Germany better placed to dominate Europe than she had been prior to the war (ibid:245). The latter was certainly a feeling shared by the French political and military elites, who ever since France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 had felt that its geopolitical position was so vulnerable that they had relentlessly sought to bring about alliances, which could secure France from what they feared was an imminent military threat from Germany. The 1904 Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale* had only partly assuaged French fears in this respect, and following the Allied victory in 1918, the French found themselves once again yearning for a British or American commitment to maintaining peace and security in Europe. France was, as David Chuter has noted in this respect, “less conscious of having won a great victory than of narrowly avoiding a catastrophic defeat” (1996:61). With regard to any such commitments from its former allies, the French largely yearned in vain. The only American attempt to

contribute to security assurances to its ally was linked to the ratification of the Versailles Treaty by the U.S. Senate, where it was defeated by a majority of the senators (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:28, Chuter 1996:70-73). America's interwar retreat into isolationist policies contributed to promote an ingrained distrust of America's commitment to European peace and security. France simply felt that it could no longer count on its erstwhile ally, indeed that far from having engaged in a common cause in 1917, "the United States had waged the war in its own interest" (Grosser 1980:6). Even as threatening clouds gathered over Europe in the 1930s, America remained largely detached from the preoccupations of their old allies, delivering only the smallest of aid and invariably with severe conditionalities:

Between 1935 and 1937, Congress passed four neutrality acts which forbade the shipment of arms to any warring country. And while other material could be sold, it was on the twofold condition that it be paid for in cash (within three months, at the latest) and that American ships not be used for its transport. On November 4, 1939, a fifth act was passed which, while lifting the embargo, retained the cash-and-carry demand. (ibid:12)

By then, it was virtually too late for France. As the French army suffered defeat in face of the German panzer divisions advancing through northern France in the spring of 1940, Charles de Gaulle, a two-star general and former Undersecretary of State for War, took upon him to continue French opposition against the German foe from London. As victorious German troops paraded through Paris following the French capitulation, adding insult to humiliation, de Gaulle launched his *Appel du 18 Juin*. As self proclaimed leader of the Free French, he urged his compatriots to continue the resistance against the occupying forces. Readily accepted by Prime Minister Winston Churchill as the legitimate representative of France, it would take de Gaulle years to obtain the same recognition from President Roosevelt (Aglion 1988, Hoffmann 1974, Grosser 1989, Keiger 2001). De Gaulle's wartime experiences with the American President have been extensively analyzed and are frequently referred to as laying the foundations for de Gaulle's later supposedly anti-American policies (see for example Jouve 1967:596-601). Even Eisenhower, highly sympathetic toward de Gaulle, was convinced that the treatment the General had received from Roosevelt had given him an "anti-American complex" (Ferro 1973:432). Raoul Aglion, uniquely well placed to judge in the matter, as he served as one of General de Gaulle's first representatives to the United States, has noted that it

was astonishing that the relations between Roosevelt and de Gaulle began as badly as they did. It is still more surprising, however, that the relations between

the leader of the free world and the leader of a national movement of resistance against totalitarianism worsened instead of improved, even as the war progressed toward an Allied victory. (1988:x)

The accounts of the relationship between de Gaulle and Roosevelt make fascinating reading. It is no secret that de Gaulle on numerous occasions was exasperated by Roosevelt's continuous reluctance to accept him as the legitimate leader of Free France and not least his maneuvering in favor of de Gaulle's rival in that respect, general Giraud, "an escaped war hero of no general appeal whatever, but with the advantages of being malleable and not being de Gaulle" (Chuter 1996:210. See also Aglion 1988, Grosser 1980, Keiger 2001). Even after President Roosevelt had given in and *de facto* recognized de Gaulle as France's moral leader, the American President made it during a 1944 meeting clear to de Gaulle that

France was not to share in the postwar responsibilities assigned to the Big Four (Britain, China, Russia, and the United States), that she was to lose her overseas empire, and that some French territory would have to serve as United Nations bases under American military control. (Dallek, in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:59)

De Gaulle responded that if those were the circumstances, "France must count only on herself", which Roosevelt conceded was true (ibid.). Roosevelt's subsequent opposition toward inviting de Gaulle to participate in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences that were to settle the fate of Europe following the Allied victory soon to come (Clemens 1970, Grosser 1989) confirmed de Gaulle's impression that France was treated as less than an equal ally. It left such a large imprint in the Gaullist heritage that French political leaders have since felt free to denounce the mythical *l'ordre de Yalta* as evidence to the Manichean nature of the future superpowers, and – albeit to a much lesser extent – of the perfidious Albion: "Yalta demeurera en France le symbole et la référence d'un système mondial dominé par les deux Supergrands" (Grosser 1989:30. See also Grosser 1980:40).

It is thus highly conceivable that de Gaulle's wartime experiences left him even more opposed to the United States than he had been before. It does not take much psychological insight to accept that the treatment he was subjected to at the time by the American administration (or rather felt he was subjected too – by all accounts, de Gaulle himself was no easy customer) could have left him with a strong *préjugé*, even animosity, toward the United States. Keiger is probably right in asserting that the wartime legacy "soured de Gaulle's long term view of the USA" (2001:177). Yet in spite of what has frequently been

seen as de Gaulle's anti-American posturing, the General remained throughout a realist in international affairs (Hoffmann 1974:191, Aglion 1988:212). His grand design was to recreate France's *grandeur*, which she had lost in 1940 and under the Vichy regime (Hoffmann 1974, Vaïsse 1998). "It was the nature of de Gaulle's design that led to his misunderstanding with Roosevelt, who mistook his emphasis on the political essence of his action for petty personal ambition" (Hoffmann 1974:188). The American president never fully understood the political imperatives driving de Gaulle's posturing. Hoffmann further notes that

Roosevelt's blindness to this fundamental goal, his willingness to deal with the Vichyites, his assumption that France was finished and was anyhow more adequately represented by her easygoing prewar leaders than by this General who "had nothing of a usual Frenchman" – this is what so infuriated de Gaulle. As he told [Roosevelt's chief diplomatic advisor] Harry Hopkins [...] America's policy, whether it was right or not, could not but alienate the French. (1974:192)

André Béziat takes a similar line, arguing that it "was Roosevelt's greatest failure to have generated a climate of suspicion between his country and France for the years to come" (in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:85). This suspicion was not without foundations. The American administration initially opposed de Gaulle's attempts to set up a provisional French government after the Liberation, believing instead that "France was to be treated not as a liberated nation, but as a former adversary, to be occupied and run by an Allied military government" (Chuter 1996:210). Even worse, American objectives for France appeared not just to the French, but also to the more sympathetic British, to be to "reduce it from the status of a great power and to impose various indignities, such as forcible disarmament, the creation of a Flemish bufferstate on her territory and the loss of much of her empire" (ibid:211). Anthony Eden was persuaded that Roosevelt "wanted to hold the strings of France's future in his own hands so that he could decide that country's fate" (quoted by Clemens 1970:43). No wonder if de Gaulle was somewhat apprehensive regarding the motives of his American ally.

Duff Cooper once famously described how de Gaulle in his relations with Roosevelt as well as with Churchill was "ever on the look-out for an insult" (1953:317). It is certain that Roosevelt on numerous occasions offended de Gaulle's vanity, which was not negligible, and at times even left him somewhat estranged, confirming de Gaulle's perception that he – and by extension France – did not see eye to eye with America on a number of foreign policy issues, chief among them France's role in the international system (Aglion 1988). Yet it would be a banal overstatement to conclude that de Gaulle's perceived anti-

Americanism stems primarily from his wartime experiences with a President Roosevelt who was disinclined to accept him as the voice of France in her hour of need. First of all, as was shown above, the interwar years had installed in many French leaders a reluctance toward the United States and a suspicion toward the motives guiding its policies, which may well be characterized as at least partly anti-American. De Gaulle's difficult relationship with Roosevelt can in this respect largely be seen in terms of a continuation of two decades of awkward Franco-American relations. During a meeting in Paris in early 1945 between de Gaulle and Roosevelt's closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, the latter deplored that Franco-American relations had turned sour since 1940. In response, de Gaulle proceeded to give a detailed analysis of how the United States had failed to understand French motives and aspirations since 1917 (de Gaulle 1959:389-392). It was France, which to de Gaulle had been misunderstood by successive American administrations, and therein laid in his view the major cause of discord between the two nations. Second, though de Gaulle would as leader of the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946 miss few opportunities to deliver a rebuff to the American presidents¹²¹, the core of his policies at that time can hardly be characterized as inherently anti-American. De Gaulle's allegiance was to France first; the interests of allies, and even of the higher allied war objectives, took second place. On more than one occasion, he declared that "Free France intends to march alongside her allies with the express understanding that they in turn will march alongside of her" (quoted by Aglion 1988:207). Given France's precarious position (as a nation first humiliatingly defeated in war, then under the Vichy regime collaborating with the occupying forces, and finally accepted *in extremis* as an allied power), this dictum was hardly surprising, though it met with intense opposition from Roosevelt (ibid.). Third, it is true that Franco-American relations during the Fourth Republic were manifestly less problematic than they would later become under de Gaulle's Fifth Republic. Yet de Gaulle's acknowledged opposition to American supremacy during his years in power has had a tendency to overshadow the many contentious issues characterizing Franco-American relations prior to his return to power in 1958.

The prehistory to the supposedly anti-American policies of the Fifth Republic is not just confined to the interwar experiences with an America seen as indifferent or even hostile to the needs of its erstwhile ally, nor to de Gaulle's personal wartime experiences in dealing with a reluctant President Roosevelt. Though the Fourth Republic as such proved relatively loyal toward the United States – indeed, given the importance of the Marshall aid to

the reconstruction of France, it had little choice but to do so – French anti-Americanism nevertheless reached a new threshold in the years following the liberation. As will be discussed below, much of it was due to a resurgence of cultural anti-Americanism in France in the postwar years. However, there were clear political causes as well. Harrison has remarked how the leaders of the Fourth Republic “tenaciously pursued the role of the most recalcitrant and dissident of the United States’ major Western partners” (1981:6), reacting “to its own blunders and incompetence with a sullen and sometimes spiteful resentment that confirmed the impression of France as an unstable, unruly, and ungrateful ally that was not worthy of American confidence and support” (ibid:45). It is true that there were monumental blunders which contributed to souring relations between France and the United States. The most important of the Fourth Republic’s blunders was no doubt its actions leading to the Suez crisis of 1956, which would come to leave a deep imprint in the minds of French political leaders over the coming decades. When Egypt’s president, Colonel Nasser, as a reaction to America’s reversal of its previous decision to participate in the construction of the Aswan dam, in July 1956 announced his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal, France and Britain saw it as a direct attack on their interests, legitimizing their intervention in a part of the world, which had only shortly before been under their tutelage. Since 1888, *La Compagnie internationale de Suez*, owned almost exclusively by the two nations, had had a concession on traffic through the canal; a concession, which would expire in 1968 (Grosser 1989:135). In secret conjunction with Israel, France and Britain launched a military operation against Egypt, ostensibly to separate the two parties of the escalating Israeli-Egypt crisis. The operation was carried out without pre-consultation with the United States, where President Eisenhower was in the final stages of his reelection campaign, and it met with forceful American disapprobation and even “brutal financial pressure” from the American government (ibid:135-137). Eventually, France and Britain were forced to pull back their troops in favor of a UN peace keeping force. The Suez crisis gave a severe lesson to both Britain and France: The two erstwhile imperial powers, who just decades before had ruled in conjunction over the vast majority of the globe’s territories, could no longer act independently of the United States in an increasingly post-colonial world. Though the two nations shared the same painful lesson in 1956, they drew opposite conclusions. Britain concluded that it could no longer act alone without American political support; France concluded that it could not trust its American ally

(Lloyd 1980; Keiger 2001, Gordon and Shapiro 2004). For the French, the analysis was simple:

Les Américains, responsables du déclenchement de la crise par le retrait de leur offre de financement du barrage d'Assouan, ont ensuite abandonné leurs alliés engagés dans le même combat contre le dictateur égyptien. Cette absence de solidarité, manifeste au cours de la phase diplomatique de l'affaire, est devenue un véritable "lâchage" lors de la crise ouverte et guerrière. Un diplomate français le remarque: "Au cours de cette crise, ils ont choisi de nous faire échouer". (Vaïsse 1998:17)

In Britain, the Suez crisis led to the fall of Anthony Eden as Prime Minister, whereas in France, where the operation had been massively approved by the National Assembly as well as in polls (Grosser 1989:137), it would complicate attempts to resolve the unfolding Algerian crisis even further. As such, the American reactions of 1956 came to be seen also as hampering France's attempts to maintain the unity of her national territory (Lloyd 1980). Most importantly, the Suez crisis persuaded the leaders of France that it was vital that she regained her ability to act independently.

Apart from the blunders of the Fourth Republic, there were, however, also clear differences of opinion with the United States on a number of policy issues of importance for France. The most contentious of them invariably related to France's role in the international system and in the Western alliance. With respect to the latter, France had initially embraced the new security structures set up in Europe with the establishment of NATO in 1949. Though conscious of the fact that the military strength of the new transatlantic security structure reposed primarily on the deterrence of America's formidable arsenal and not least its nuclear deterrent, French leaders hoped, even expected, that their nation would acquire a prominent position as co-leader, reminiscent of the role which France, along with the United States and Britain, enjoyed as an occupying force in the parts of Germany not under Soviet control. The French expected "to receive acknowledged first rank within the Alliance and, more specifically, they anticipated an expansion of the Anglo-American duumvirate into a triumvirate bearing responsibility for the global management of Western security interests" (Harrison 1981:12). In Washington, such expectations met with little understanding. The attitude here was that the French had "basically only European and North African responsibilities and inadequate strength to play any role in other theaters and therefore [were] not entitled to participate in consideration of global strategy" (ibid:13); an attitude which, as Harrison notes, "would determine American policy throughout the Fourth and Fifth Republics

and be the source of much discontent” (ibid.). To the extent that the ruling oligarchy within NATO was not purely American, it remained, much to the dismay of France, “Anglo-Saxon”, as the United States consistently preferred to privilege Britain over its other partners (Vaisse 1998:112). Added to – and related to – this serious impediment was the question of France’s nuclear ambitions. For the leaders of France, whether de Gaulle or the leaders of the Fourth Republic, France had a legitimate role as a nuclear power, either in its own right or in conjunction with its allies: Was it not, after all, Henri Becquerel who had discovered radioactivity in 1896, Pierre and Marie Curie radium two years later, and not least Frédéric Joliot and his wife Irène Curie who discovered artificial radioactivity in 1934, thus marking the true starting point toward realizing nuclear fission? Was it not a French team, who in March 1940 managed to transport heavy water from Norway to first France and later Britain, an ingredient which would prove decisive for the later manufacture of the first nuclear armaments? Had French scientists not contributed in the final years of the war to produce the first atomic device? (Grosser 1989:28). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was France not an equal allied power to the United States, Britain and Canada, the three powers who jointly controlled the development of this new technology, which seemed full of promise in the non-military field as well? Not according to the American administration, which flatly rejected France’s pleas (ibid.), determined, as it was seen in France, to retain an Anglo-Saxon nuclear monopoly as long as possible. The Fourth Republic’s promotion of the nuclear question was both an attempt to reap the rewards of a labor in which France had participated, to ensure that it finally acquired proper means of military protection – means which it had felt lacking in sufficient nature for almost half a century – and to achieve the status so dearly coveted of equal partner. American opposition to share the nuclear technology with France was a severe blow, and it was felt that “Rather than being in a position to enhance control of her own security, a nonnuclear France seemed bound to sink further into dependence as a mere protectorate of the United States” (Harrison 1981:37).

Finally, there was the contentious issue of France’s colonies. The history of the Fourth Republic can be read as that of an interim regime faced with many challenges, of which one took precedence over all other. It would turn out to be a challenge, which it could not effectively meet, and one which would eventually seal its fate (Bernstein 1993:243). A fundamental fact about the Fourth Republic “was that it was constantly at war, first in Indo-China and then in Algeria” (Chuter 1996:275). Its “determination to avoid decolonization was

a problem that dominated its internal and external politics, finally destroying the regime and ushering in the Gaullist era” (Harrison 1981:37). All the other issues dominating Franco-American relations during the Fourth Republic had a connection to this one overriding determination. The Suez crisis was linked to the war in Algeria, as the French government was persuaded that Colonel Nasser was supplying arms to the FLN, the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (Grosser 1989:135). French discontent within the Atlantic Alliance was crystallized by the reluctance of its allies to back France’s engagement in first Indo-China and later Algeria (Harrison 1981:37). France’s insistence on acquiring either its own nuclear deterrent or co-decision on the use of NATO’s deterrent was seen as a necessary prerequisite for strengthening France’s standing internationally and thus also vis-à-vis the territories formally subjected to French rule (ibid.). These ambitions all ran into one major stumbling block, or so it seemed from Paris: Washington. France had come out of the Second World War with its empire formally relatively intact, but with neither the authority, nor the means to preserve it as such. As soon as victory over the Axis powers had been achieved, France faced the problem of the status of its colonies and overseas territories. The first crisis occurred in French Indo-China. Already in 1943 Roosevelt had “expressed the opinion that Indo-China should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship [...] France has milked [Indo-China] for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that” claimed Roosevelt (quoted by Grosser 1980:21). To the French leaders of the Fourth Republic, the United States in this respect became “an ally that outmaneuvers an ally in the name of anti-colonialism; [...] a power that intervenes in other regions of the globe and thus again exposes itself to the reproach of wishing to replace an old by a new rule” (ibid.). After a prolonged war culminating with the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the situation was almost reversed. A new French government headed by Pierre Mendès-France became the first one since de Gaulle’s resignation in 1946 “to place French interests before the question of relations with Washington” (Wall 1991:304), and it swiftly negotiated a peace which would terminate French rule in Indochina. Washington deeply opposed the resulting Geneva accords, and especially the principle of free elections, which they feared would bring the Communists to power. In the end, “Washington had no choice, and found itself in the unusual situation of playing second fiddle to an ally [...] The gap between France and the United States yawned much wider as a result” (Chuter 1996:286). Bad as the situation in French Indo-China had been, it was nothing compared to the debacle

that would hit France as the Algerian crisis unfolded. Whereas Indo-China was undoubtedly regarded as a colony, Algeria was in the minds of the leaders of the Fourth Republic an integral part of *la France métropolitaine*. In his capacity as Minister of the Interior, François Mitterrand asserted in 1954 that “Algeria is France” (quoted by Chuter *ibid*:288). The following year, French Governor General Jacques Soustelle pronounced in the Algerian Assembly that “La France ne quittera pas plus l’Algérie que la Provence ou la Bretagne. Un choix a été fait par la France. Ce choix s’appelle l’intégration” (quoted by Grosser 1989:131). It was a choice, which would prove impossible to implement. The crisis escalated considerably over the life of the Fourth Republic and ended traumatically with first the fall of the regime and subsequently the granting of independence to Algeria under the Fifth Republic. To the leaders of the Fourth Republic, they were engaged in a struggle to defend not just the integrity of the national territory, but also “on behalf of the whole world” (Chuter 1996:289) in a fight against advancing communism, which was engaged in a vast flanking movement through “China, the Far East, the Indies, the Middle East, Egypt and North Africa, with the aim of encircling Europe”, as General Allard, then French commander in Algeria, told SHAPE in 1957 (quoted by Chuter, *ibid.*). The French did not receive the backing of their allies, and they “complained bitterly that their support for the United States over Berlin and Korea was not being reciprocated” (*ibid*:291). The Suez crisis was the final blow to French aspirations for American support for its activities in North Africa, and it “propelled French distrust for the United States to even greater heights” (*ibid.*).

It is hardly an exaggeration to state that Franco-American relations during the decades that preceded the birth of the Fifth Republic were both complicated and characterized by a high degree of mutual mistrust, frequently leading to misunderstandings, and often to outright exasperation, especially in France. If the Fifth Republic can be regarded, as Kuisel asserts, as more or less inherently anti-American (1993), then there is no escaping that it build on a massive legacy of contentious relations with the United States. It may be that both sides where equally to blame for this sorry state of affairs, the United States never fully realizing the precariousness of the French position, and France never acknowledging that the United States was forced to pursue policies, which were not necessarily in line with French interests. In terms of analyzing these developments as evidence of, or contributing factors toward the growth of political anti-Americanism in France, it matters little whether the policy actions of the two nations were sensible or even defensible at the time. What matters is how the

relationship was perceived and what intentions were attributed to the other, rather than what the ulterior motives of the other in reality were. Edgar Furniss remarked soon after the fall of the Fourth Republic that

The influence of anti-American sentiments on the political operations of the Fourth Republic was not a negligible one. At crucial moments French governments used anti-Americanism to create sympathy and rally support within the National Assembly. Weak governments were more prone to invoke the slogan of French independence from “American dictation”. [...] The deliberate manipulation of this antagonism for domestic political purposes sometimes verged on irresponsibility and irrationality, especially since France was simultaneously looking to the United States as its *deus ex machina*. France sought equality with the United States and wanted to lessen its dependence in order to attain this status, yet it deliberately confused hostility with independence, while looking to the United States to rescue it from the consequences of its own actions. (1960:302-303)

As the Fourth Republic was drawing its last breaths and de Gaulle prepared himself to once more come to the rescue of his beleaguered nation (Teyssier 1995:10), the Algerian War, controversies over nuclear weapons, and Alliance strategy had exacerbated French discontents toward America, contributing to an insecurity and antagonism that would set the stage for future French dealignment (Harrison 1981:37).

If the Fourth Republic had been a troublesome ally to the United States (Furniss 1960), the Fifth would prove an even more reluctant ally (Harrison 1981). As opposed to the leaders of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle would set out to develop an integrated French foreign policy design; one which often would be at odds with the interests of the American ally. De Gaulle’s ambition of recreating France’s *grandeur* invariably entailed an emphasis on greater independence vis-à-vis the United States. It was these aspirations, which more than anything contributed to the anti-American image of Gaullist policies. Yet, as we shall see below, though France may under de Gaulle have acquired the reputation of a reluctant ally, it was not necessarily disloyal, in spite of frequent accusations to the contrary from the other side of the Atlantic.

6.1.2 National independence and the Gaullist legacy

Throughout his public life, General de Gaulle had one overreaching ambition, which took precedence over all others: to restore France to her proper rank and to recreate her *grandeur*. It is the concept most associated with de Gaulle, and frequently the most misunderstood. On the first page of his *Mémoires de guerre*, de Gaulle refers to France’s *grandeur*:

la France n'est réellement elle-même qu'au premier rang; [...] notre pays, tel qu'il est parmi les autres, tels qu'ils sont, doit, sous peine de danger mortel, viser haut et se tenir droit. Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur. (1954:1)

To de Gaulle, France was a “great people, made for example, enterprise, combat, always the star of History” (quoted by Hoffmann 1974:231). He saw “France both as *the* nation par excellence, and as the servant of what during the war he called ‘*la querelle de l’homme*’ – the cause of freedom, equilibrium, generosity in a world threatened by mechanization” (ibid:231-232). For de Gaulle,

Grandeur meant an attitude of the will and soul rather than a specific doctrine, and *grandeur* for France meant a state of mind and resolve, a rejection of pettiness, an ambition rather than a specific program. It was an ambition, more cultural and moral than political, to preserve certain values that are like a blend of Christianity's and the Revolution's. (Hoffmann 1974:232)

This notion of *grandeur* bears an unmistakable reference to the core values of French national identity and not least France's universal mission described in chapter 5. Daniel Mahoney describes how de Gaulle regarded France as an “elected” people “whose destiny is of universal significance” (1996:16). His rhetoric of *grandeur* “in fact constituted a kind of national cement, joining together in determination and sentimental belonging a morally disillusioned and internally torn nation” (de Méné 1977:178). Far from representing a break with French traditions, de Gaulle on the contrary embodied their continuity and turned them into the central tenet of his policies. As such, though the notion of *grandeur* has more connotations than is often assumed, it has become “a condensation symbol for a wide range of stimuli and responses which form a complex value system”, and it has been “used by supporters and critics alike as a shorthand for summarising the ideological content of Gaullist foreign policy” (Cerny 1980:3). Not that the substance of French foreign policy changed fundamentally with the advent of the Fifth Republic – as Harrison notes, the continuity in goals and policies between the two regimes is remarkable (1981:46) – but the nature and world view underlying it changed profoundly (Grosser 1980:183). With de Gaulle, French foreign policy gained a sense of purpose, which had hitherto been either lacking or overshadowed by the tremendous difficulties that the leaders of the Fourth Republic had to face. Due not least to de Gaulle's incessant insistence (and Churchill's active support), France had eventually come out of the Second World War with the “formal, if not effective

recognition of her Great Power status” relatively intact (DePorte 1968:280): She was counted among the Allied powers, recognized as one of the “big five” with a permanent seat on the United Nations’ Security Council, where French was retained as an official working language with the same rights as English (Grosser 1989:29). Yet France had undeniably lost its moral and political standing as one of the truly great nations, at fact which became painfully clear as the Fourth Republic stumbled from defeat to defeat. One of the prime attributes of France’s rank after the Liberation had been its colonial empire, which although under intense pressure still gave France a world role. Yet the loss of Indo-China and the morass in Algeria had greatly diminished the political and economic advantages offered to France of retaining an empire. De Gaulle, who had previously strongly maintained that the colonies were an essential tribute to France’s grandeur, understood when he returned to power in 1958 that “the old benefits of colonization had turned into burdens” (Hoffmann 1974:286. See also Chuter 1996:297). This explains his unsentimental solution to the Algerian problem: the granting of full independence to France’s former possession. De Gaulle’s ambitions to recreate France’s *grandeur* were instead translated through the two primary objectives of his foreign policy: “pour la France d’abord, elle vise à l’indépendance nationale, fondée sur un État fort et un outil militaire adapté; à l’extérieur, elle se propose de changer le *statu quo* international” (Vaïsse 1998:35). Inherent in the Gaulle’s attempt to recreate France’s *grandeur* was what Stanley Hoffmann has termed “a global revisionism of a special kind” (1974:287):

What was special about de Gaulle’s revisionism can best be understood by following Arnold Wolfers’ distinction between possession goals and milieu goals. Ordinarily, a revisionist power aims above all at increasing its possessions – for instance, at recovering territories lost in war, or gaining areas that can supply it with raw materials and markets, or annexing populations of the same ethnic origin. [...] When de Gaulle came to power, a radical redefinition occurred. Possession goals were not discarded but were, so to speak, moved from outside France to inside France. Security was now sought through purely French efforts (cf. the nuclear deterrent) rather than through NATO. [...] A growing economy and the end of financial dependence on allies would give France another prize possession – a strong currency and a vast stock of foreign reserves. The attempt to hold on to colonies would be abandoned. Possession goals were important as bulwarks of independence, secondarily as means with which to weigh on the international milieu. But the originality of de Gaulle’s revisionism was his emphasis on milieu goals: his ambition was to transform the milieu. France was greedy for a role; the reshuffling he sought, ironically enough, was one that would have increased France’s role by depriving others of *their* possessions. (ibid:287-288)

De Gaulle did not waste any time in pursuing these goals. In September 1958, he sent a secret memorandum to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, in which he demanded complete equality with Great Britain and even with the United States. Stating that the “indispensable cooperation in the taking of decisions and the bearing of responsibilities does not correspond to the solidarity in the risks that have been assumed”, he asserted that

The French Government finds itself in a position to draw certain consequences and to make certain suggestions. [...] It is true that we originally agreed that the unquestionably decisive nuclear weapon would remain a monopoly of the United States for a long time, and this may have appeared as justification for practically conferring on the government in Washington all decisions concerning questions of national defense. But here also it must be recognized that such a state of affairs, though accepted in the past, no longer corresponds to the actual situation. [...] It therefore seems to France that an organization comprising the United States, Great Britain and France should be created and function on a world-wide political and strategic level. [...] The French Government considers such an organization of security indispensable. As of now, it will make all further development of its present participation in NATO contingent on it and intends, should that become necessary, to invoke the revision procedures of the North Atlantic Treaty (quoted by Grosser 1980:187).

The gauntlet had clearly been thrown. Naturally, the American answer proved less than forthcoming (Bernstein 1993:162; Grosser 1980:187-188; Dreyfus 1982:198), but de Gaulle had unmistakably stated the course he was embarking on. As can be seen, his demands were in essence similar to those advanced by the leaders of the Fourth Republic more than a decade before. De Gaulle had scorned the Fourth Republic’s “heritage of renunciation and dependence”, yet it is clear that he would “borrow a surprising number of its aspirations, themes and ambivalences as unattributed material for his own grand designs” (Harrison 1981:46). It was not a question of turning France into a superpower. De Gaulle was a realist; he knew that she did not have the necessary means to do so (Vaïsse 1998:51). It was rather a forceful attempt at enhancing France’s relative power by acquiring the means necessary for weighting sufficiently on the international stage. The most symbolic of such means was nuclear capabilities: “Le Général était pressé d’avoir la bombe parce qu’elle constituait un instrument diplomatique qui devait lui permettre de s’asseoir à la table des Grands” (ibid:47). His reaction after the successful first French nuclear explosion in 1960 was characteristic: “Hourra pour la France! Depuis ce matin, elle est plus forte et plus fière” (quoted by Vaïsse, ibid.). In truth, the groundwork toward acquiring a nuclear device had been carried out under the Fourth Republic, but it bolstered de Gaulle’s prestige that the first explosion took place

out less than two years after his return to power: France had finally joined the exclusive club of nuclear powers (Bernstein 1993:167-170). *La bombinette*, as it was derogatorily called, was a powerful symbol of France's political revival under de Gaulle, but it was also much more than that. For the first time since 1870, it was felt that France was henceforth in a position to defend itself independently of the goodwill or resolution of its allies, a position which had so painfully eluded it in 1940 (Chuter 1996:310). The status as a nuclear power thus permitted France to embark on a course of relative independence from its western partners and not least from the United States. Once the Algerian crisis solved, de Gaulle felt free to challenge the status quo and to pursue a set of policies that would increasingly estrange Paris from Washington. France's departure from NATO's integrated military structures in 1966 would arguably prove the greatest Franco-American crisis since the Second World War¹²² (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:31), yet it followed after a prolonged period with both mounting differences of opinion between the two nations and the progressive distancing of France from the military structures of NATO (Bernstein 1993:160-164); a distance, which was further augmented in 1967, when France adopted a nuclear doctrine called *tous azimuts*, meaning that its nuclear arsenal could be targeted in all directions, i.e. theoretically including American interests (Miller and Molesky 2004:220). There were no doubt real divergences between the two powers, yet it is probably right as Hoffmann asserts that what separated France and America under de Gaulle related as much to perceptions as to more tangible political issues:

Shapers of American policy perceived the United States as being, by necessity and by vocation, the one nation that carried world responsibilities in [the] battle for order. Only the United States had the combination of power, values, institutions, and interests that made for leadership all over the globe [...]; they saw the United States as the secular arm of an ideal of universal value, and they considered America's involvement in world affairs to be a necessary and proper substitute for the frequent failure of other nations to share the burden. [...] French perceptions of international affairs clashed with America's at every point. French leaders – and especially de Gaulle – saw world politics as a *multiple* contest in which efforts to divide the contenders into two camps were both dangerous and futile [...] In such a world, the French expected the dominant powers to seek to preserve and extend their sway, and to rationalize or disguise it under a cloak of ideological Messianism or altruistic universality. (1974:334-335)

One might add that France, with its long history of messianic universalism, was uniquely well placed to make such an assessment, especially after having failed to impose itself as the

primary universal power. The result, however, was that American administrations came to regard French actions under de Gaulle “as wicked, measured against the kind of world order it deemed in the interests of humanity” and French foreign policy “as a capricious if systematic demolition of everything that seemed promising in postwar Western policy” (ibid:336). It is easy to see how such perceptions can lead to the impression that behind every policy act there are more sinister, anti-American intentions at play. De Gaulle’s recognition of mainland China in 1964, his tour of Latin America the same year (where he stressed their Latin cultural superiority and called on them, without naming the United States, to reject hegemony), his open criticism of America’s involvement in Vietnam, his siding with the Arabs during the Six-Day War, and not least his public proclamation of “Vive le Québec libre!”, all these events contributed to reinforce the perception that the nature of the policies of the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle were in essence anti-American (Keiger 2001:181; McMillan 1992:166). Some of his criticisms of the United States were shared by other European leaders. As Grosser argues, “de Gaulle often merely said out loud what his partners did not dare express” (1980:228. See also Hoffmann 1974 and Giauque 2002). It is certainly the case that the Kennedy administration’s commitment to abandon the strategy of massive retaliation in favour of a flexible response strategy was controversial throughout Europe, where the motives of the American administration were deeply distrusted as an effort to “de-nuclearize” Europe (Gavin, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:104, see also Keylor 1992:345-348). Other criticisms were motivated by a particularly French wish to reduce the hegemonic impact of the United States on the West, and they were not confined to matters of security policy. France resented the privileges the Bretton Woods system bestowed on the dollar much more than other European nations (Gavin, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:103), and de Gaulle actively, but unsuccessfully, initiated a “war against the supremacy of the dollar [which] aimed at nothing less than a drastic reform of the Bretton Woods system and a rejection of the gold exchange standard”; a standard which de Gaulle felt had developed into a “dollar standard” (Hoffmann 1974:303). Throughout, de Gaulle pursued a policy of national independence and forcefully resisted any attempt by others to encroach on what he considered France’s national sovereignty. It was, however, a policy of relative, rather than absolute, independence, a fact which, as Chuter rightly points out, has often been overlooked:

There is a tendency in Anglo-Saxon criticism of de Gaulle to argue that he pursued some kind of ideal and purist notion of national independence that simply refused to acknowledge the influence of other states at all, and that his

influence on France, and on the Alliance generally, was correspondingly damaging. It would be surprising if de Gaulle, with his experience in the 1940s, ever thought like this. What independence means in this context is the greatest independence of decision-making possible. (1996:326)

De Gaulle's ambition to transform the milieu was bound, as Hoffmann remarked, to entail the deprivation of the acquired possessions of others, and in this respect most notably of the United States. This French revisionism could not but anger and frustrate Washington, yet as Francis Gavin argues, "when it came to fundamental issues, Franco-American differences may not have been as sharp as we have been led to believe" (in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:103). First of all, France was not alone in feeling that the United States enjoyed an overwhelming political superiority, largely at the detriment of its partners, although, as Grosser notes, the French desire not to be tied down was usually "considered a creative attitude neither by its allies in Europe nor by its American partner" (1980:329). Second, in spite of the high-profiled opposition de Gaulle on numerous occasions displayed toward America, France remained loyal toward the Western Alliance whenever it was deemed seriously threatened. During the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, de Gaulle had unequivocally supported the American ally (Giauque 2002). In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalls how after a difficult exchange about the U-2 incident in 1960, de Gaulle touched him on the elbow and said "Whatever happens, we are with you" (Grosser 1980:185). The Kennedy administration found out during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that among all the major European powers, France had been most unwavering in its support (ibid.). Even at the height of the Franco-American discord, when de Gaulle announced his decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military structures, his letter began with the assurance that France would remain an active member of the western alliance determined "to fight at the side of her allies in case one of them will be the object of unprovoked aggression" (quoted by Schwartz, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:154). This was the essence of de Gaulle's notion of independence: unwavering commitment to the allies in case of severe crisis, freedom of action whenever the international situation permitted it. As Serge Bernstein notes,

an attitude that spoke to the desire for national independence in no sense marked a reversal of alliances. Though France withdrew from the military organisation of the Atlantic Alliance because it did not treat her as an equal partner, she stayed firmly within the political alliance. While refusing to be a protectorate of the United States, she agreed to be their ally. And de Gaulle showed himself in this sphere a partner of exemplary firmness. (1993:163)

The importance placed on national independence would remain the guiding principle of successive French administrations, even if they each defined independence in ways, which seemed less absolute and certainly less strident than under de Gaulle. Until the end of the Cold War, all successive French administrations have, independently of their political affiliations, been forced to balance the Gaullist heritage with what one might call the Western imperative. The Gaullist heritage described above was institutional, political, and national, if not nationalist: Institutionally, the constitution of the Fifth Republic was largely designed by and for de Gaulle, and it gave and continues to give the president the prerogative of shaping and conducting foreign policy. In terms of the powers conferred to the president, it easily matches the American constitution¹²³. Even in periods with *cohabitation*, where the president, unable to dispose of a majority in the *Assemblée Nationale*, is forced to appoint a government that is hostile to him, he continues to have overall responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy, a charge, which he carries out in concertation with, but not political subordination to, the government¹²⁴. Foreign policy may under such circumstances be not quite the president's *domaine réservé* as it was during de Gaulle; it nonetheless remains one of his most important prerogatives. As such, French presidents under the Fifth Republic have all been foreign policy presidents, able and willing "to dominate the foreign policy arena" (Sampson, in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (eds) 1987:399). Much like their American counterparts, French presidents have embodied their nation's foreign policy. The political heritage, with its dual focus on independence and a relatively strong defence, has largely been continued by the General's successors. What de Gaulle bequeathed to his successors was in fact nothing less than a national paradigm in terms of foreign policy; a paradigm, which although largely in line with French aspirations since at least the Liberation, was heavily marked by the General's imprint. It took the form of a set of foreign policy orientations, which commanded broad support among the French, and from which no French president could seriously depart. These policy orientations had one aim, which was rarely acknowledged publicly, but which nevertheless provided a *leitmotiv* for successive presidents and administrations: to combat any notion of France's relative decline in international affairs. This notion of decline has haunted French leaders for a century, and it is frequently linked to its perceived antithesis, i.e. the simultaneous rise of American power:

Sans cesse affirmées, la puissance et le rang de la France dans le monde sont une source permanente d'angoisse pour les responsables. Si Washington craint l'excès, la France est terrorisée par le manque ; et si les Etats-Unis ne veulent

pas être le gendarme du monde, la France regrette de ne pouvoir remplir ce rôle.
(Boniface 1998:11)

Here, the political heritage and the nationalist heritage become one. The policy of *grandeur* advocated by de Gaulle and his successors contains a strong nationalist streak in the sense that is a reaffirmation of the notion of France's national genius; a manifest desire to bolster the impression of France's *mission civilisatrice* at home and abroad. It was intended as a project to galvanize "national ambition" (Hoffmann 1974:231), and though the purpose was essentially political – for de Gaulle as well as for his successors, foreign policy remained essentially an instrument of domestic policy (Teyssier 1995:333) – the nationalist overtones were clearly present. As Stanley Hoffmann argues, French political leaders consistently "showed the will to preserve freedom of action for the nation-state in the world and considered it the supreme form of social organization, which is the essence of nationalism" (Hoffmann 1974:403). Maurice Duverger has argued that this nationalism was neither special nor abnormal, and that despite appearances to the contrary, France under de Gaulle was no more nationalistic than other Western states and certainly no more so than the United States. Rather, its "nationalism is expressed in a different manner because it has to be so expressed – that is all" (Duverger, in Macridis 1966:xxiv).

At the same time, and this was increasingly the case after the departure of de Gaulle in 1969, French leaders, aware that they were operating in an increasingly interdependent international system, could not act independently of its allies and partners. While France continued to promote a policy of relative national assertiveness, the logic of the Cold War dictated that France was forced to acknowledge the 'Western imperative', namely that France as a quintessentially occidental power had its natural place among the other western nations and that the leadership of the Western Alliance had befallen unequivocally on the United States. It was argued above that de Gaulle's France, while asserting its national sovereignty, remained a fundamentally loyal partner of – if not always within – the Atlantic Alliance, in the sense that France's commitment to safeguarding Western Europe from a military onslaught remained unchanged in spite of France's vocal rejection of American tutelage. De Gaulle might not have been quite the "implacable ally", which Roy Macridis portrayed him as (Macridis 1966)¹²⁵; he nevertheless remained fundamentally loyal, if not always unwaveringly faithful, to the West. His successors would largely follow suit.

6.1.3 The Western imperative

The General's successors may not have possessed his demeanour, yet the basic tenets of Gaullist foreign policy remained largely unchanged over the following decades (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005). There were, however, important shifts, not just in style, but also in policy. President Pompidou, elected partly on a mandate to repair Franco-American relations (ibid:104 and 122), initially attempted to normalize relations with NATO and the United States, removing "unnecessary points of friction in Alliance matters" (Harrison 1981:170) and establishing an unexpectedly cordial relationship with President Nixon (Kissinger 1979:989). Yet Franco-American tensions resurfaced when U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger launched his "Year of Europe" initiative in 1973, rekindling "moribund fears of unwarranted American interference in European affairs" (Harrison 1981:171). What Washington had envisioned as an imaginative updating and refurbishing of the NATO alliance, capped with a new Atlantic Charter, instead became the year in which Washington's relationship with its European partners struck a new low. To its main instigator, the initiative "foundered on the old rock of Gaullist opposition" (Kissinger 1994:618) though France was not the only European nation to consider the Kissinger-Nixon initiative inappropriate. As Harrison notes, the notion "seemed to raise the possibility of enhanced European independence and a new relationship of equality between the two Atlantic poles", but in reality, the exercise was "designed to insure that the rhetorical American vision did not materialize into a serious West European [...] challenge to the United States in vital issue areas" (Harrison 1981:172). Pompidou's sarcastic response that "for Europeans, every year is The Year of Europe" highlighted the patronizing connotations inherent in the American phrase (Morewood, in Wakeman (ed.) 2003:21), and reconfirmed the impression that France remained if no longer a reluctant, then at least a "partial" ally to America (Harrison 1981:164-193). Relations improved under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who enjoyed a close personal friendship with President Gerald Ford. Yet Giscard d'Estaing, "the leader of the pro-American part of the French *bourgeoisie*" (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:105), was dependent on a Gaullist party to which he did not belong, and was neither able nor willing to fundamentally alter the orthodoxy of the Gaullist foreign policy orientations, which remained in force with only small alterations.

Until the French presidential elections of 2007, which resulted in the election of the openly pro-American neo-Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy, it would be a Socialist president,

François Mitterrand, who was to prove the most forthcoming of French presidents vis-à-vis the United States, at least on a continuous basis. There is a certain irony to the fact that at a time when *détente* was drawing to an end and ideological tensions between East and West came once again to the fore, Socialist-led France and Republican-led America should find more common ground than under the previous administrations, which at first glance seemed to have more in common. Not only was Mitterrand presiding over a government, which included four ministers from the still very Moscow-friendly French Communist party; his American counterpart, Ronald Reagan, had campaigned on a staunchly anti-Communist program. On a personal level, the two leaders seemed to have virtually nothing in common: Mitterrand has typically been depicted “as a sphinx-like figure, mysterious, obscure and ancient” or even “a Machiavellian prince” (Cole, in Maclean (ed.) 1998:248). Conversely, Reagan, frequently derided in France at the time as a second-rate Hollywood actor turned politician (Brunet 2007:169), showed no particular intellectual capacities and no penchant toward ‘European style thinking’. As opposed to Mitterrand, who “At gatherings of heads of state, [...] loved to explain with examples how history could help us interpret current events” (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:76), “Reagan knew next to no history, and the little he did know he tailored to support his firmly held preconceptions. He treated biblical references to Armageddon as operational predictions” (Kissinger 1994:734). Nevertheless, Franco-American relations improved markedly during their presidencies in spite of the fact that the two men were never close (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:74). While it is true, as Lawrence Kaplan notes, that Mitterrand’s Socialist governments “lacked the anti-American glue that bound the Gaullist party” (in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:259), the most obvious reason for the improvement of the bilateral relationship was probably due to the international developments occurring in the 1980s. With the end of *détente* and faced with a more assertive Soviet Union vis-à-vis developments in Europe, Mitterrand felt compelled to change French attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In a private meeting with George H.W. Bush in June 1981, Mitterrand assured the American vice-president that French relations with the Soviet Union would be “cooler than under his predecessors – not only because the objective situation called for it, but also because a Left government with Communist participation had a point to prove to its domestic opposition and its allies” (Friend 1989:198-199; see also Teyssier 1995:330). The point to prove toward its allies was, however, not motivated by ideology as much as by *realpolitik*:

Gaullist foreign policy since the mid-1960s had operated on the unspoken premise that since West Germany was utterly loyal to the United States, France could afford to dance out of line, remaining loyal to the Atlantic alliance but in its own independent and idiosyncratic way. In the early 1980s a distant prospect of a possibly neutralist West Germany appeared as a new nightmare to the French. [...] Mitterrand's basically pro-American line can thus be explained by the major changes in the international situation since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when Gaullist principles were formulated. Gaullist thinking had thereafter made light of the Soviet threat – until it appeared in the late 1970s as a renewed menace. (Friend 1989:199)

It was under the dual impression of a mounting Soviet threat directed at Western Europe and uncertainty regarding the position of the German SPD government that Mitterrand chose to align France more closely with Washington (Wiznitzer 1991:53-61). During the heated debates regarding the stationing of American missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet deployment of SS 20 missiles in Eastern Europe, “Mitterrand emerged unexpectedly as the chief European supporter of the American plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles” (Kissinger 1994:777). In a widely publicized speech in the German Bundestag, Mitterrand declared that “Anyone gambling on uncoupling the European continent from the American would, in our view, jeopardize the balance of forces and therefore the maintenance of peace” (quoted by Kissinger *ibid.*). Mitterrand's active support for Washington on such a delicate matter was instrumental in maintaining Alliance unity over an issue, which clearly was straining transatlantic ties (Teyssier 1995:330). It has been noted that when Mitterrand entered the Elysée in 1981, few would have “anticipated that a new policy would be characterized by a more supportive stance toward NATO” (Cameron, in Keeler and Schain (eds) 1996:334). Yet Mitterrand's position should not have been altogether unexpected: A careful reading of French foreign policy during the Fifth Republic reveals that beneath the veneer of Gaullist and post-Gaullian rhetoric, successive governments have adopted consistently pragmatic, even realist, positions with regard to the delicate balance of power between the two superpowers. Mitterrand did not depart from that pattern – on the contrary, it is highly conceivable that de Gaulle might have acted in much the same way. It was the circumstances, which had changed, not the basic tenets of French foreign policy. This was confirmed during the first Gulf War against Iraq. After some hesitation, in which Paris – consistent with its role as the most pro-Arabic Western nation – attempted to impose itself as a mediator between Washington and Baghdad by marking out “France's special role in the crisis in some way and [thus ensuring] that its weight was evident in international relations” (Bell 2005:148),

Mitterrand concluded that the intransigence of Saddam Hussein left him no alternatives, and he forcefully aligned France with the American-led operation to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, arguing that France as one of the great powers of the world had to live up to its obligations (Boniface 1998:10). France not only participated, it provided the second largest European contingent, 18,000 troops, which initially operated independently under French national command and control, but in January 1991 were placed under the tactical control of the US XVIII Airborne Corps (Crocker 2006:386). Compared with the American contingents to the 500,000 troops strong allied forces, French participation was, however, largely symbolic (Bell 2005:149). Mitterrand's decision to support the American led war was not without domestic reverberations, as he faced some opposition both from the dwindling number of arch-Gaullists and from within his own government, where Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement was forced to resign in opposition to the war (Cole 1994:135, Teyssier 1995:455). French participation in the First Gulf War was nonetheless a confirmation that in spite of the occasional outbursts of anti-American rhetoric from both sides of the political spectre, Franco-American relations had if not normalized, then at least substantially improved since de Gaulle's days (see for example the very positive account by Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:338-339). At the same time, France's participation in the Gulf War and its subsequent military frustrations in Bosnia "demonstrated to the world just how small a colossus France really is" (Howorth, in Keeler and Schain (eds) 1996:384, see also Lacorne, in Cohen (ed.) 1998:321-346) and repudiated any thought that Europe might in the near future be able to provide an alternative to American power.

As such, the quest for national independence in foreign policy and defence matters remained balanced with a recognition of the Western imperative, but the paradigmatic nature of French foreign policy inherited from de Gaulle was subtly recalibrated to the changed international circumstances of the times, without Mitterrand thereby accepting any notion of French political decline vis-à-vis the United States. The same applies to Mitterrand's policy of gradual *rapprochement* to NATO in the early 1990s, which has been characterized as both "circumstantial (when it became impossible to do otherwise) and conditional (when French autonomy was not impeded)" (Boniface 1997). There is no doubt that Washington was well aware that in spite of the improved relationship, "the US and France had significantly differing views of the future of Europe and [America's] role in it" (Scowcroft, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:268). During Mitterrand's second term, primarily

devoted to promoting European integration, including in security and defence matters, Paris nevertheless came to realize that it was increasingly difficult to advocate the necessity of a European defence identity without investing in the Alliance itself, although, as Pascal Boniface probably rightly asserts, the idea throughout remained “not to reinforce American influence but to contain it” (Boniface 1997). Mitterrand was in fact rather attached to the Atlantic Alliance; his political roots were “undeniably to be found in the Fourth Republic”, and he had been a staunch critic of de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to leave the integrated structures (David, in Maclean (ed.) 1998:113). He initiated a policy of measured rapprochement between France and NATO, while simultaneously remaining faithful to the basic tenets of the Gaullist logic of independence. The result was that by the early 1990s a broad political consensus emerged in France on NATO; a consensus, which rested on the principle that on the one hand, France would work actively within the Alliance to improve cooperation with its allies, and not least with the United States, with a view to developing a European defence pillar, while on the other hand, the option of full reintegration into the military structures remained discarded (Boniface 1997). Stanley Hoffmann once described the foreign policies pursued under Mitterrand’s first term as “Gaullism by any other name” (in Ross, Hoffmann and Malzacher (eds) 1987:294). As the Mitterrand years were drawing to an end a *septennat* later, it nevertheless seemed that Mitterrand and the Socialist party had become even more attached to the Gaullist tradition than the Gaullist party itself (David, in Maclean (ed.) 1998:117). As France’s rapprochement with NATO accelerated under the second period of *cohabitation* in 1993-95, Mitterrand scoffed from the sidelines at what he perceived as the Gaullist-led government’s tendency to “fall into line” with NATO (Balladur 1995:82).

Though Mitterrand on several occasions asserted the familiar Gaullist penchant toward foreign policy independence, often to the annoyance of Washington, as for example in 1986, when he refused to give “permission for American bombers to overfly France to bomb Gaddafi’s headquarters in Libya” (Bell 2005:121), there is no doubt that he had initiated a subtle, but durable softening of France’s stance toward its American ally. His successor, Jacques Chirac, in contrast seemed at first to present a much more radical break with both the arch-Gaullist tradition and the newly established consensus on France’s relations with NATO. Whereas nothing in the manner or style of Mitterrand would have seemed to predispose him favourably toward the United States, Jacques Chirac at first appeared to personalize a French president who was much less Gallic than the intellectual Mitterrand and much more in tune

with his American allies (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:76). He had first hand experiences of the United States, having studied and worked there in his youth (Frémy 1987:623), and on several occasions professed a deep admiration for the country (Ward (ed.) 2003). There is a certain irony to the fact that this president, culturally much more inclined toward the United States than any of his predecessors, should later come to be regarded as the standard-bearer of global political anti-Americanism. This is even more surprising given the fact that Chirac from 1995 to 1997 attempted to perform a much more symbolic *rapprochement* with the United States than the ones undertaken under Mitterrand: the full return of France into NATO's integrated military structures. No political decision could better illustrate a break with Gaullist orthodoxy and the image of French political anti-Americanism, and Chirac predictably attracted much criticism for his manoeuvring, both from within his own neo-Gaullist party as well as from the Socialist party, now converted into the staunchest defenders of the Gaullo-Mitterrandist heritage (Boniface 1998). Chirac's attempts were motivated by essentially two considerations: first, as will be further explored below, French attempts at establishing a distinct European defence and security identity outside NATO had proved largely fruitless; and second, Paris had come to realize that the benefits of being able to operate forcefully with its close-knit allies in military operations such as the first Gulf War outweighed the costs of insisting on the formal independence and full control of its armed forces (ibid:74-75). In fact, French participation in the Gulf War had "revealed the ill-adapted nature of the largely conscript French army and its lack of equipment, as well as stretching the professional section of the army to its limits" (Bell 2005:149). Furthermore, "the 'nuclear ace' of the Cold War years [had] been substantially devalued, and along with it the diplomatic 'rank' to which all French presidents have attached such importance" (Howorth, in Keeler and Schain (eds) 1996:384), though, as was seen during the debacle over France's resumption of nuclear tests, Chirac long "failed to realize that the possession of nuclear weapons no longer conferred either grandeur or (still less) respect" (ibid:393, see also de Wailly 2004). In return for France's reintegration into the military structures, Chirac expected NATO to reform so that a European defence identity could be created inside of the Alliance structures as opposed to outside. Washington had hitherto successfully opposed French attempts at creating a distinct European defence identity (Kissinger 1994:820), yet under the Clinton administration, a major foreign policy change occurred in this respect, and the United States turned to supporting the creation of a stronger Europe, "including in the defence and security

sphere, which had long been seen by Washington as the sole preserve of NATO” (Daalder 2001:6). Chirac realized that were a European defence identity to see the light of day, it would have to be established in such a way that the other European allies were not forced to choose between a Transatlantic security structure, which had provided them with tangible security guarantees throughout the Cold War, and a new European security structure, which, lacking effective military means and structures, as yet had little to offer but declarations of mutual solidarity. In view of the highly symbolic nature of an eventual French re-entry into NATO’s integrated military structures, Chirac could find ready support in a white paper on national defence, commissioned by the Gaullist-led Balladur Government just a year prior to Chirac’s election. The *Livre blanc sur la défense 1994*, the first such document to be elaborated since 1972, provided the necessary alibi: It clearly stipulated that in order to create a viable European Security and Defence Identity, France would have to “rénover le lien transatlantique, en poursuivant l’adaptation de l’Alliance au futur contexte stratégique et à ses nouvelles missions, afin d’assurer la nécessaire permanence de l’engagement américain en faveur de la sécurité et de la stabilité de l’Europe” (Gouvernement français 1994:59). It furthermore reminded its readers that “the highest authorities” of France “n’ont jamais manqué de rappeler le souhait de notre pays, lié aux Etats-Unis depuis toujours, que l’engagement américain en Europe soit maintenu” (Gouvernement français 1994:65). Chirac’s ambition to reintegrate France into NATO at first seemed to come at a propitious time. In January 1994, the NATO-summit in Brussels had adopted a Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, which stipulated that they gave their

full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which [...] will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. (North Atlantic Council 1994, paragraph 4)¹²⁶

The heads of state and government had furthermore declared themselves “ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for [...] operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy”, while underlining that their support encompassed “the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security” (ibid, paragraph 6).

Although both Washington and Paris thus looked poised to embark on a renewal of their strategic alliance, Chirac subsequently overplayed his hand. Attempting to achieve what he felt would be a position equal to France's weight; he demanded that France be given one of NATO's major commands, preferably the command of the South European sector, located in Naples (Kaplan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:261; Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:112, Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:268). Could it not come under French command, Chirac alternatively suggested that it could be rotated between France, Italy, and Spain. This command had always been held by an American, and with the southern theatre also covering access to the Middle-East, Washington promptly refused (Boniface 1997). What originated as a bold attempt at improving Franco-American relations and normalizing France's position within NATO ended in acrimony, with Paris even at one point threatening to link their demands for a reform of NATO's structures to their acceptance of an enlargement of the Alliance (ibid.). This issue was a top priority for Washington, but one which Paris only gave its most lukewarm support, fearing that an enlargement would diminish France's influence (Kaplan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:260). Instead of representing a renewal of France's transatlantic policies, Chirac's botched attempt at promoting the reintegration into the military structures became his first major foreign policy defeat. The defeat was further compounded when in 1997 he called and lost a snap general election, leaving him to *cohabit* with a Socialist government after just two years in office. Chirac spent the next five years as essentially a lame-duck President, or as the then editor of the influential daily *Le Monde* sarcastically termed him, "Resident" of the Republic (Colombani 1998). Meanwhile, the notion of a presidential *domaine réservé* in foreign policy matters had come to be regarded as increasingly antiquated given the precocity of the president's popular legitimacy and the relative inactivity he displayed in this domain compared with his predecessor (ibid:163-184, Boniface 1997). The new government, more faithful to the Gaullo-Mitterrandist heritage, was thus able to halt any further progress with regard to France's reintegration into NATO for the remaining of Chirac's first term (Boniface 1997).

In view of later developments, it is however interesting to note the degree to which Chirac was portrayed at the time as an Atlanticist, indeed almost pro-American French political leader even well before he succeeded Mitterrand as president. Already during the first difficult cohabitation of 1986-88, where Chirac served as Prime Minister under his political opponent, Chirac consistently pursued Atlanticist positions, while Mitterrand, in a

successful attempt at destabilizing his neo-Gaullist prime minister, countered such policies with increasing Gaullist orthodoxy (Bell 2005:119-125). 1995-1997 had provided Chirac with a window of opportunity for transforming Franco-American relations, although the attempt failed. After his re-election in 2002, the situation had changed markedly. President Clinton, generally well liked by the European public, had been succeeded by a George W. Bush who, even before the transatlantic relationship turned sour, was regarded with a certain apprehension in Europe (Daalder 2001). And though 9-11 had prompted *Le Monde* to publish its famous editorial, “Nous sommes tous américains” (Colombani 2001), it soon transpired that there were serious transatlantic differences of opinion concerning the handling of the ‘war on terror’. It is ironic that Chirac became so vilified on the other side of the Atlantic for opposing the Iraq War, while George W. Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, would later owe much of his presidential election to his steadfast opposition to the very same war. A banal observation in this respect, which does not make it any less true, is that in politics, timing is everything. More interestingly for the purposes of this study is, however, to note how it was France and Chirac, which became castigated as the main opponent to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, irrespective of the fact that several nations, including Germany and Russia, were as adamant in voicing their dissent as France. Let us briefly recapitulate the reasons for the fall-out: In 2003 France refused to endorse a follow-up resolution to UN Security Council resolution 1441, which had called on Iraq to “comply with its disarmament obligations”¹²⁷. The second resolution was intended to provide the international community with a clear mandate to invade Iraq on the charges of its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Other nations were also openly opposed to the plan, notably Germany, Russia, and China. France and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, warned as the negotiations unfolded that they would oppose the proposed new UN resolution authorizing a preemptive strike against Iraq. Since it is probable that a majority of other members of the Security Council would have opposed the plan in case of a vote, the proposition was cancelled (Rubin 2003). The United States, backed by a handful of countries, most notably Britain, had to carry out the invasion without the legitimacy offered by a Security Council resolution. The disagreements over the course to adopt toward Iraq led to intense antagonism between the Bush administration and those foreign leaders, who refused to back an invasion of Iraq, chief among them Jacques Chirac and his Minister for foreign affairs, Dominique de Villepin. Although there was a general feeling in the West that Iraq did

not in full live up to the conditions laid out in UNSCR 1441, there was disagreement as to the solution (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:8) as well as a substantial amount of scepticism in Europe toward the motives driving the U.S. campaign to secure a second resolution. This scepticism was compounded by a

sense that Washington was determined to go to war regardless of what Saddam did. Perhaps this suspicion was due to Bush's shifting justifications for war; perhaps it was due to his failure to engage comprehensively and consistently enough with key friends and allies. (Rubin 2003)

Furthermore, "the Bush administration's rhetoric and style alienated rather than persuaded key officials and foreign constituencies, especially in light of Washington's two-year history of scorn for international institutions and agreements" (ibid.). According to Elizabeth Pond, "The rupture was a real test of the new *Pax Americana* and the new hegemonic style of the United States – but that style itself was the biggest single variable in the schism" (2004:1). The decision of George W. Bush to define the war as "part of a struggle between good and evil and as an example of a new American doctrine of 'preemption' changed the debate from one about how to deal with Iraq to a debate about international order and America's management of it" (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:10. See also Landau 2003 and Hanahoe 2003). This could only increase the already substantial apprehension among America's allies. To many of America's allies, the war in Iraq came to look less like a way to uphold UN Security Council resolutions than like the manifestation of the new American approach of preemptive strikes; an approach, which had featured prominently in last September's National Security Strategy, where the concept had been broadened to encompass not just the use of force in order to prevent an imminent attack, a notion accepted as legitimate under international law, but also preventive war, in which "force may be used even without evidence of an imminent attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not 'gather' or grow over time" (O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg 2002). As James Rubin rightly notes:

If gaining support for action against Iraq was truly Washington's highest priority in the fall of 2002, it is hard to imagine a more counterproductive step than to initiate a debate over whether the United States has the right to attack whomever it wants, whenever it deems it necessary. (2003)

The American emphasis on its right to launch preemptive strikes combined with the abrasive new hegemonic style of diplomacy clearly stood in the way of negotiating a second resolution. According to James Rubin, a second resolution would have "required some

compromise on substance”, yet Washington was not willing to endorse such an approach (ibid.): “Had the Bush administration shown some flexibility in early March, however, it would have been France that ended up on the losing side of the tally, not the United States” (ibid.). In Washington, the conclusion was that it was Chirac, who had “embarked on a determined campaign to undermine American power” (Ward (ed.) 2003):

from the White House’s perspective, Chirac had already crossed the line. In a phone call with Bush, Chirac told him, “I am convinced there is no immediate or urgent threat,” but Bush insisted that Iraq “threatens the American people.” Rightly or wrongly, the administration believed that vital U.S. interests were at stake and thus regarded Chirac’s veto threat as profoundly unfriendly. (Rubin 2003)

Yet contrary from what was the prevailing view in Washington at the time, France’s motives for threatening to veto a military action against Iraq was most likely “not the inevitable result of reflexive French resistance to American hegemony”, nor, as was widely alleged (see for example Timmerman 2004) “the results of French commercial interests” in Iraq (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:11):

Rather, the fierce French opposition to the war resulted from a combination of factors that all pushed France in the same direction: a genuine belief that the war was a strategic mistake, an unwillingness to give the United States a blank check for the management of world affairs, and a desire to reestablish Franco-German leadership of the EU by taking a stand that was highly popular with public opinion throughout Europe. (ibid.)

As foreign minister de Villepin put it, “the struggle was less about Iraq than it was between ‘two visions of the world.’ The differences over Iraq were not only about policy. They were also about first principles” (Kagan 2004:1). Irrespective of the motives prompting Paris and Washington to head for confrontation over how to address the potential Iraqi threat, the clash was also a result of the poor statesmanship displayed by both sides. The difference in how the two Gulf Wars were handled by the involved presidents of both countries is glaring: During the first Gulf War, Washington felt that it was important to secure the backing of its main allies in drafting a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force were Iraq not to leave invaded Kuwait before a specified deadline. At a private dinner at the Élysée Palace between Presidents George H.W. Bush and François Mitterrand, the latter remarked that “Such a resolution is hard to draft, [...] but we will take part in the process and vote for it if it is well drafted” (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:406). Mitterrand subsequently suggested

some changes to the text, which the White House included, prompting Mitterrand to remark to Bush that “France remains totally committed to moving in the same direction that you are” (ibid:475). Had George W. Bush displayed the same kind of diplomatic endeavour in order to secure the support of America’s allies as his father had done little more than a decade before, it is doubtful whether the Second Gulf War would have had as one of its main casualties a deeply divided transatlantic community following “the worst US-European clash in half a century” (Pond 2004:1). There is no doubt that the diplomatic style of the Bush administration, and especially that of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, bears a lot of the blame for the developments in early 2003 (Pond 2004, Rubin 2003). Rumsfeld’s “blunt language may have won him a few laughs in domestic settings, but his every gaffe and insult was greeted with disgust throughout Europe. Public diplomacy is supposed to persuade, not infuriate” (Rubin 2003). Yet French diplomacy was far from adroit either. Especially the flamboyant performance by Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin at a crucial meeting of the Security Council was considered particularly unhelpful and contributed to further acerbate relations between the two countries (ibid.). Chirac, not content with just opposing the war, “launched a high-profile campaign to try to stop it” (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:11), seriously misjudging “how long American anger toward him would last” (Rubin 2003). The fact that France had until then cooperated closely with Washington in the war on terrorism after 9-11 (Ward (ed.) 2003) and that even “during the height of the name-calling in the two camps, France and the US continued to cooperate deeply on the most pressing issues, above all counter-terrorism” (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:244) mattered little in that respect. Irrespective of whether French positions toward resolving the Iraq problem hardened during the debacle, leading France to renege on commitments previously given to its American ally (as suggested by for example Trachtenberg 2004:2), the reaction of Washington to the opposition experienced from France over the Iraq issue was unexpectedly harsh. Even more so was the reaction among the American media and public (Boniface 2003, de Wailly 2004).

France was easily singled out as the main opponent to America over the Iraq issue, and American criticism of France took surprising forms. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously denigrated France and Germany as “Old Europe” while referring to the many Central European countries which pledged diplomatic backing of the U.S.-led war as “New Europe” (Rubin 2003). T-shirts and bumper stickers were produced which jokingly

called for the United States to invade: “Iraq first, France next!”, and “First Iraq, then Chirac!” On March 11, 2003, the cafeteria menus in the three United States House of Representatives office buildings changed the name of French fries to freedom fries in a culinary rebuke of France. French toast was also changed to freedom toast (Loughlin 2003). During the First World War, in a similar move, attempts were made to replace the word sauerkraut with the term liberty cabbage, hamburger replaced with Liberty Sandwich, and frankfurter with hot dog, in menus and in popular speech; only the latter was successful. Most Europeans, and a sizable number of Americans, dismissed these name changes as gimmickry. Nevertheless, between “February 2002 and Spring 2003, the number of Americans with favorable views of France fell from 79 to 29 percent” (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:3). These reactions have an air of folklore about them. Yet the wave of French-bashing in America seemed oddly out of proportion with the French ‘offence’ of not supporting a war that they deemed dangerous and misguided (Hoffmann 2004). Chirac was castigated as the arch-typical French anti-American and French opposition to the Second Gulf War was presented as an essentially anti-American action. It is highly doubtful whether Chirac’s policies were motivated by anti-Americanism as such (see for example Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy 2008:246); the reaction on the other side of the Atlantic to the French position on Iraq was, however, pure anti-French (Ash, in Lindberg (ed.) 2005). French opposition to the Iraq War sparked the publication of a number of books, especially in the United States, on the “disastrous” Franco-American relationship (see for example Timmerman 2004, and Miller and Molesky 2004). Not even de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated structures in 1966 had given rise to the same level of American vilification of France and vociferous charges of French anti-Americanism (Hoffmann 2004).

Whereas Chirac has frequently been portrayed as the arch-Gaullist anti-American (see for example the portrait given by the Economist, quoted in the introduction), his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, has been characterized as the rarest of things, an openly pro-American French president. This became clear already during the presidential campaign, when the opposition Socialist Party issued a much debated publication entitled *Les inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy*, whose opening lines were: “La France est elle prête à voter en 2007 pour un néo-conservateur américain à passeport français?” (Besson, in Besson (ed.) 2007:4). The tract alleged that this crypto-American presidential candidate in reality represented an “ultra-liberal, communitarian, Atlanticist, and neo-conservative” break with

French political traditions (Besson (ed.) 2007, title page). The publication could be read as a catalogue of both all the well-known grievances against the United States and its political system and all the ills that would befall France were Sarkozy – “the clone of Bush” (Bayard, in Besson (ed.) 2007:115) – to be elected president. In the foreign press, it was described as an atavistic piece of pure anti-American propaganda and a reaffirmation that anti-Americanism still played an important role in a country that presented the United States as “anti-France” (Cohen 2007). Reality was, naturally, more complex. First, denouncing Sarkozy as a Bush-clone was neither a very imaginative piece of political attack, nor exclusively French in nature. In the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign, the Democrat candidate, Senator John Kerry, was frequently referred to by Republican leaders and commentators as “the French candidate” (Fritz and Nehan 2004, Adams 2007). In the first televised debate between President Bush and his challenger, the President denigrated Kerry’s proposal to submit future decisions to invade foreign countries to a “global test” with these words: “The use of troops to defend America must never be subject to a veto by countries like France” (Zakaria 2004, Adams 2007). The choice of France in this context was hardly accidental. It naturally referred to the debacle over Iraq, but it was also meant to oust Kerry as pro-French. Kerry was, as John Moser notes, most “likely the first American presidential candidate since Thomas Jefferson to be attacked as pro-*French*” (in O’Connor (ed.) 2007c). Ever since one of George W. Bush’s advisors remarked to a New York Times reporter that John Kerry “looked French” (Neier 2004:1018), Republicans tried to link Kerry to France and to present him as a “French” candidate. Commentator Mark Steyn from Chicago Sun-Times wrote in a review of a spring election rally that “Kerry sounded awfully much like America’s first French President” (Fritz and Nehan 2004). It would seem that during presidential elections, each of the two nations can readily offer the other as an example not to be followed. Second, as Stéphane Rozès noted at the time, the attack on Sarkozy’s supposedly pro-American sympathies largely went amiss, since “America is an ambivalent rather than negative image for many in France” (quoted by Cohen 2007). Sarkozy’s own reaction to the allegation was a characteristic “Je m’en fous” (Fich 2007). Like all serious contenders to the highest office in the Fifth Republic, Sarkozy had previously published a book laying out his visions for France. In this *Témoignage*, Sarkozy also presented some rather banal statements on the necessity to cultivate the close bonds between France and America, and he concluded with the words: “I am not fascinated by the American example. But if I had to choose, I feel closer to American society than to

many others across the world” (2006:182). Hardly a statement likely to raise many eyebrows in most Western nations, yet in France, it made headlines. Characteristically, it was the last sentence, which became highlighted by pundits as evidence to Sarkozy’s pro-Americanism and ultra-liberalism, and not the reservations inherent in the first part of the statement. It would seem that if America is an ambivalent image for most of the French, Sarkozy did little to quell these ambivalences. Third, and most important, if the French voters reacted to these charges in any way, it did not reflect significantly on the results. In the first round of the presidential election, Nicolas Sarkozy obtained 31.2 % of the vote, and easily beat his opponent, the Socialist Ségolène Royal, in the second round with a comfortable 53.1 % of the vote (Cautrès and Cole, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:30-37). The 2007 elections were thus an affirmation both that the anti-American card could still be used to denounce a political opponent, and that this trump card had lost any significant value it might have had previously. If anything, the attacks backfired. *Les inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy* came to be regarded as largely anachronistic, displaying a Socialist Party bent on fighting yesterday’s fights. This became even more blatant when its editor and main author, Éric Besson, shortly after defected from the Socialist Party and subsequently was appointed to serve in the new government by none other than the object of his defamation, Nicolas Sarkozy.

The newly elected president nevertheless did seem to augur a more pro-American line, and he wasted little time in mending the cracks in the Franco-American relationship seemingly caused by his predecessor. In a speech to the United States Congress on November 7, 2007, the French President professed his eagerness to present an “ambitious, clear-sighted France [...] A France that comes out to meet America to renew the pact of friendship and the alliance that Washington and Lafayette sealed in Yorktown”. Acknowledging the bilateral difficulties of the past, he stated that

At the same time, and equally forcefully, since I'm well aware of my country's political history, I want to affirm my attachment to NATO. I say it here before this Congress: The more successful we are in the establishment of a European Defense, the more France will be resolved to resume its full role in NATO. I would like France, a founding member of our Alliance and already one of its largest contributors, to assume its full role in the effort to renew NATO's instruments and means of action and, in this context, to allow its relations with the Alliance to evolve concurrently with the development and strengthening of a European Defense. (Sarkozy 2007)

Nicolas Sarkozy's speech to the Congress was hailed as that of a true friend of the United States, receiving standing and enthusiastic acclamation from the members of Congress. Yet despite the numerous references to examples of past solidarity, the French president did not depart from the basic tenet of French foreign policy throughout half a century: "Finally, I want to be your friend, your ally and your partner. But I want to be a friend who stands on his own two feet, an independent ally, a free partner" (ibid.). In reality, the proposed *rapprochement* to NATO differed little from what his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, had proposed a decade earlier, and neither did the necessary *sine qua non*. Even the method, commissioning a white paper on national defence to give his political design an aura of impartial necessity (Gouvernement français 2008), seemed by now to have become an almost standard operating procedure. It has been argued that in view of the fact that France could already boast "an extensive presence in NATO structures, from commanding operations to contributing actively to the NATO Response Force", reintegrating into NATO amounts "to an important political symbol, but a modest reality" (Vaisse 2008:6). Yet, as Stanley Hoffmann has reminded us, perceptions are of essence in foreign policy (1974:332). The fact that Sarkozy seems to take pride in being labelled pro-American or Atlanticist, regardless of the fact that he is basically following a path largely charted to him by his predecessors, and perhaps even more so the fact that he seems to openly delight in maintaining a very cordial relationship with the White House (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:253) is evidence to the importance of perceptions: Sarkozy is pro-American primarily because everybody says so – himself, his opponents, his allies, and especially medias eager to present another picture of French foreign policy than the rather stale one characterizing Chirac's last years in office. As Justin Vaisse notes,

So why the hype about Sarkozy breaking with French Gaullist tradition and aligning himself with Washington? The first reason is that the French president himself has spoken of it, as part of his posture of 'rupture' with the past. Another reason is simply that Sarkozy is not Chirac: in the minds of many observers, Jacques Chirac's foreign policy has been reduced to his 2003 opposition to the Iraq War, while his wide-ranging 2004-07 *rapprochement* with America has been underestimated or ignored. (2008:7)

Yet symbols and perceptions matter. It may be true, as Vaisse asserts, that many of Sarkozy's beliefs can be described as inherently Gaullist and that like the General, he is a pragmatist at heart (ibid:5). In this, he does not significantly differ from any of his predecessors. There is no doubt, however, that by openly professing admiration for the United States to a much larger

degree than any of his predecessors, he has come to symbolize a break with the French tradition of political anti-Americanism – whether that too, was a matter of perceptions or not.

Yet as Sophie Meunier notes,

deep down, the objectives of French foreign policy are still the same. The main goal is to get France to be taken seriously again and to enable it to project its power and values throughout the world, like in de Gaulle's time. Sarkozy declared to the *New York Times* in September 2007, 'if France doesn't take the lead, who will?' Like so many presidents before him, Sarkozy believes that France is in a unique position to steer world affairs, that French values are universal and therefore ultimately destined to radiate throughout the world. (in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:257)

While Sarkozy has, in the first two years of his presidency, demonstrated a hitherto unprecedented wish for Franco-American rapprochement, culminating with France's decision to reintegrate into NATO's military structures prior to the Alliance's 60th anniversary summit in April 2009, this does thus not suggest that France has abandoned all pretensions at universalism. Sarkozy can be said to have followed the course toward a gradual normalization of the bilateral relations, which had been charted to a large degree by his predecessors, although as opposed to Sarkozy they failed to pursue this course to its logical conclusion. There is, however, no indication that he has any intentions of abandoning the central foreign policy tenets of the Fifth Republic as they were formulated by de Gaulle in the late 1950s. Sarkozy may be more Atlanticist than his predecessors, yet as Vaisse noted above, he is not necessarily any less Gaullist. Rather, Sarkozy seems to have come to the same conclusion as Chirac did before him: that France no longer has anything to gain by remaining partly detached from a political and military alliance, which has come to span a large part of Europe. De Gaulle may have nurtured dreams that France could act as a third force between the two superpowers. With one of these superpowers gone and the other elevated to the rank of hyperpower, any such aspiration is evidently a thing of the past. Therefore, France no longer has any interest in pursuing its universalist aspirations by remaining aloof from the world's most important military alliance. This, however, does not mean that France has given up its universalist ambitions, but rather that they have been scaled down to more modest size and transferred to other arenas.

6.1.4 Balancing the hegemon: African and European policies

Though the strategic transatlantic partnership has often set the scene for political clashes between France and the United States, these clashes seem to have been motivated essentially by clashing interests and perceptions regarding their respective roles. This does not entail that France has not sought to challenge or even balance the American hegemon, but rather that this has primarily been carried out in other arenas than the transatlantic one. Unable to acquire the coveted equal status with the predominant power of the transatlantic alliance, France has instead attempted to use the African and European, and to a lesser extent Middle Eastern, arenas to promote its universal aspirations. These universal aspirations have, as was shown in chapter 5, been a constant companion of French national identity. Yet ever since the fall of Napoleon III, “France has lacked the power to impose the universalist aspirations it inherited from the French Revolution, or the arena to find an adequate outlet for its missionary zeal” (Kissinger 1994:120). While the universal aspirations have remained intact, France has increasingly felt compelled to downscale its ambitions, adopting a strategy of limited universalism in the geographical areas where its influence remained strong. According to Kissinger, “a constant factor in French foreign policy” has been “France’s penchant for associating with countries ready to accept its leadership” (ibid.). This has led France to intensify its endeavours to create more limited networks of influence as substitute arenas for the universal arena that France once aspired to mark. Kissinger sarcastically remarks that “considering junior status incompatible with its notions of national grandeur and its messianic role in the world, France has sought leadership in pacts with lesser powers” (ibid.). This, according to Kissinger, explains why France did not ally itself more closely with the United States, as “geopolitical logic” should have dictated: “French pride, however, prevented this from happening, leaving France to search, sometimes quixotically, for a grouping – occasionally almost *any* grouping – to balance the United States” (ibid.). The choice of arenas is however not coincidental, and Africa and Europe can hardly be described as “any grouping”; rather, both arenas were obvious choices given on the one hand France’s strong presence in Africa as a result of its past as a colonial power ruling over large parts of the continent, and on the other hand France’s previous position as the strongest and most influential European power. Furthermore, both arenas have presented France with different opportunities for exerting an important influence as a world power: Its influence in Africa has through the policies of Francophonie bolstered both France’s physical presence in the world

and the linguistic predominance of French over vast parts of the continent. Yet however considerable French political influence in Africa has been and remains, it hardly permits France to acquire the status of superpower or near-superpower capable of balancing American hegemony. The construction of Europe, on the other hand, has permitted France as one of the leading European nations to present itself if not as a superpower, then at least as the representative of a superpower in the making. These two arenas remain the most prominent outlets for French universalistic aspirations; aspirations which are frequently presented as the only ones capable of rivaling the dominant American hegemony: “[Les États-Unis] découvrent progressivement maintenant l’existence d’universalismes autres que le leur, tels, en particulier, l’universalisme européen et l’universalisme francophone qui est nord par son héritage français et sud par l’apport des pères fondateurs de la Francophonie politique” (Guillou 2005:119). In Africa, France has consistently attempted to impose itself as the primary spokesman, arbiter, and sometimes even policeman, and it has resisted any notions of American encroachment on what Paris has seen as its *‘pré-carré’*. In Europe, France has attempted to impose itself as the natural leader of a continent engaged in a unification process, which could well render it a potential rival to American hegemony.

France as an African power

Among all other former colonial empires, France enjoys a uniquely strong position in Africa. In line with their strategy of limited universalism (whether acknowledged or not), successive French governments have undertaken to graft a domain of foreign policy in which France could maintain a leading role and present itself as spokesman for a large part of the world’s population: Using its influence in post-colonial Africa, France has come to consider the French-speaking African nations as its *pré-carré*, “an African version of the Monroe doctrine, claiming that francophone African states belong to the French traditional sphere of influence” (Huliaras 1998:600). Here, France has acquired the role as an “African power”, enjoying a dominant position politically, economically, historically, and culturally (Bagayoko-Penone 2003:11). The aspirations that led to the establishment of France’s colonial empire are in essence similar to the justifications given for the extensive French presence in Africa today. Both are tangible manifestations of France’s *mission civilisatrice*, and both have sought to enhance France’s power on the world stage. Jules Ferry, best known as the founding father of the French tradition of *laïcité*, was also an ardent advocate of French colonial expansion. He described how the duty and responsibility of the “Grande Nation” was to “réveiller au sein des

autres races les notions supérieures dont nous avons le dépôt” (quoted by Ageron 1978:66), or even “qu’il y a pour les races supérieures un droit, parce qu’il y a un devoir pour elles. Elles ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures” (quoted by Girardet 1983:13-14). This was not an uncommon justification for colonialism in nineteenth century Europe, neither in France, nor among the other colonizing powers, as was famously illustrated by Kipling’s notion of ‘The White Man’s Burden’. Yet as the process of decolonization began in the 1950s, such references to a *mission civilisatrice* became abandoned by the former colonial powers – except by France, which not only fought long and hard to retain its empire, but which also regarded the empire as an essential part of its universal identity. Even after the colonial empire had been dismantled, France did not give up its mission to civilize. In 1984, Jean-Pierre Cot, briefly a deputy Minister in charge of Co-operation and Development in the first government appointed by François Mitterrand, declared with reference to France’s role in Africa that

Que nous le voulions ou non, toute notre Histoire et le génie propre de notre nation nous portent à l’idéalisme. La France n’a jamais été mieux écoutée, mieux respectée, que lorsqu’elle adressait un message et s’élevait par-delà ses intérêts immédiats pour atteindre l’universel. (1984:218)

There are no racial overtones in Cot’s statement, yet he has essentially the same *mission civilisatrice* in mind as Jules Ferry had a century before: that France, with its universal creed, has a duty to export its values to other nations and that herein lie its chief claim to world power status. In this respect, France’s engagement in Africa has persistently been presented in terms of altruistic messianism, and embraced as such by both sides of the political divide, as here the same year in the Gaullist Party’s program regarding North-South relations:

Notre tradition républicaine des droits de l’homme nous oblige plus que d’autres à une attitude généreuse, qui seule peut s’identifier au profil qui est le nôtre à l’extérieur. [...] L’impact, l’influence de la France à l’étranger sont bien supérieurs à son poids économique ou démographique dans le monde d’aujourd’hui. Cela est probablement dû au rayonnement de notre culture, mais n’est certainement pas séparable du fait que nous soyons la patrie de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme. Dans le domaine de la politique vis-à-vis du Tiers monde, et plus qu’en d’autres peut-être, « France oblige ». (Guillou 1984:25)

France’s historic engagement in Africa was however motivated as much by power considerations as by idealism. The *mission civilisatrice* soon became a mission of expansion, and the empire created by means of colonization contributed greatly to giving France a role as

a global power, long rivalled only by that of Great Britain. Like its colonial rival, it faced the difficult task of managing an empire in decomposition after the Second World War. But unlike Britain, who unquestionably emerged from its wartime experience as one of the victorious great powers with a leading, if increasingly waning, role in shaping the post-war international system alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, France had but one serious trump card to play in order to impose itself as a power of the first order: its empire. The empire not only allowed France to present itself as an important power in terms of its geographical presence in Africa, Indochina and Oceania, it had also permitted Free France to present itself as one of the allied powers engaged in the common fight against the Axis-powers. This was based on the fact that not all of France had been occupied or otherwise subjected to German rule. In his *Appel du 18 juin*, de Gaulle had as leader of the Free French stressed that the French defeat was neither total, nor definitive: “Car la France n’est pas seule! [...] Elle a un vaste Empire derrière elle. Elle peut faire bloc avec l’Empire britannique qui tient la mer et continuer la lutte” (1954:267). Though a large number of France’s overseas territories remained loyal to the Vichy regime, enough sided with de Gaulle for him to present himself as not just a moral leader in exile but indeed as the acknowledged leader of a de facto government with authority over both territory and its inhabitants (Wauthier 1995:20-24). As such, le ‘recours à l’Afrique’ gave the French empire an important dimension other than the purely colonial: It became a vital temporary substitute for the lost homeland, and one which furthermore allowed Free France to make more than a token contribution to the allied war effort. In a speech in Brazzaville following the Liberation, de Gaulle, now formally the leader of the Liberation government, justly remarked that it was “dans ses terres d’outre-mer et dans leur fidélité [que la France] a trouvé son recours et sa base de départ pour sa libération” (1956:184). General de Gaulle’s exasperation when faced with Roosevelt’s plan that France should be stripped of its empire following the end of the war is thus fully understandable, just as Roosevelt’s preference for dealing with first the Vichy regime and second the malleable General Giraud rather than with the troublesome de Gaulle was undermining the general’s credibility in the parts of the empire, which had acknowledged him as the legal representative of France (White 1979:80-91). This contributed, as was noted above, to souring relations between de Gaulle and Roosevelt, and it instilled in successive French leaders a deep suspicion regarding the motives of the United States in relation to its support for the decolonization process, a suspicion reminiscent of the one directed toward Britain in the years

leading up to the Liberation: the fear that one empire might take advantage of the situation to take over the possessions of another (Wauthier 1995:22-24).

Following the Liberation, the empire was formally replaced by the Union française, modelled on the British Commonwealth, yet the empire essentially remained intact, the most noticeable change being the abolition of the 'indigenous' status of the colonies. As such, the destinies of France and its overseas possessions remained closely linked. And though de Gaulle would later claim that the establishment of the Union française "s'est produit du seul gré de la France, au moment où sa puissance renaissante et sa confiance ranimée la mettent en mesure d'octroyer ce que nul n'oserait encore prétendre lui arracher" (1956:185), the decolonization process soon gained in momentum, forcing France to relinquish its former empire little by little. Following de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, the Union française was abolished in favor of the short-lived Communauté française, which held out the prospect of future independence for the colonies. But though France could not long uphold a penchant to the British Commonwealth, in which the French President was formally the head of state in the associated states, France proved eminently able at retaining a much less symbolic, yet far more substantial presence in its former colonies (White 1979:188-258). The loss of France's colonial empire did not signify the loss of French influence in especially Africa. The newly independent post-colonial nations soon found themselves dependent on the good offices of their erstwhile colonial master. In the Élysée palace, Jacques Foccart had been appointed by de Gaulle to head a small unit responsible for African affairs. This "man of the shadows" (Péan 1990), sometimes even referred to as the second most powerful personality of the republic (Verschave 2000a, Péan 1990) would over the following decades build an extensive network of influence with especially West African leaders, which contributed to give France a preponderant influence in its former colonies. At times, it even seemed as if a number of African leaders were dependent on French support in order to stay in power (Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000a and 2000b, Wauthier 1995, White 1979). As Gérard Prunier notes, "Alone among the former colonial powers that once ruled Africa, France has kept the will [...] to use military power whenever it feels the need to add muscle to its policies" (1995:102). In essence, this allowed France to continue to play the role as an African power based on clientelism, instrumentalizing it into a system which has derogatorily been termed *la Françafrique* (Verschave 1998, Durand, in Melandri and Ricard 2003:118).

There is no doubt that in spite of the numerous references to France's historic and moral obligations based on its universal values, France's African policies were just as much motivated by national interests. These national interests were both material, giving France privileged access to supplies of vital raw materials such as oil (Lonsi Koko 2007:131-136), and immaterial, as they contributed to bolstering France's policies of national *grandeur* (Verschave 2000b:557). In this respect, they also became an issue of contention between France and the United States. De Gaulle had initially been hesitant toward the establishment of a community of French-speaking states, fearing that it could be interpreted as a sign of neo-colonialism (Salhi (ed.) 2002:14, Wauthier 1995:77-81). He nevertheless soon came to the conclusion that a French-speaking movement could be "conçu comme un instrument du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et du refus de l'hégémonie américaine" (Gallet 1995:7). De Gaulle's successors would even more warmly embrace the institutions of *la Francophonie* (see 5.3.2), which allowed them, long after the decolonization process had been completed, to retain "une certaine prééminence, voire une tutelle déguisée" (Wauthier 1995:646) in Francophone Africa and thus enhancing France's world role. In line with traditions inherited from the heydays of the French colonial empire, the presidents of the Fifth Republic have both regarded Africa as their privileged presidential domain (Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000b) and adopted an eminently geopolitical approach toward the continent (Marchal, in Marchesin (ed.) 1995, Wauthier 1995, Verschave 2000a). In December 1998, Georges Serre, advisor on African affairs to Minister for foreign affairs Hubert Védrine declared that "De même que les États-Unis ont leur arrière-cour en Amérique latine, la France a besoin d'avoir son arrière-cour en Afrique" (quoted by Verschave 2000a:17). It was, furthermore, a backyard into which France would not accept interference by the United States. During the Cold War, a division of labor between France and America had essentially ensured that France retained relatively free hands in Francophone Africa (Bagayoko-Penone 2003:27-51, Huliaras 1998:603), even if the two nations frequently disagreed as to which means should be taken (Adda and Smouts 1989:13-14, Bagayoko-Penone 2003:595-598). Sometimes, the Franco-American truce over Africa was barely visible, as in the 1960s, where the two nations clashed violently over Gabon, an episode which the then American ambassador to Gabon described as "a little cold war" between France and the United States (Durand, in Melandri and Ricard 2003:119-121). It was a cold war, in which France systematically – and given its preeminent influence in the country, successfully – sabotaged the American political and economic presence in Gabon; a

sabotage which was so effective, that it eventually led to the expulsion of the American ambassador (ibid:117-138). Though Gabon proved the most extreme case of the worsening Franco-American relations during de Gaulle's presidency spilling over on the two nations' dealings with Africa, the United States soon discovered that this was far from an isolated case. In several African countries, they found that France was systematically, "sometimes in little scheming ways and sometimes in ways not so little, [...] working against the United States, to frustrate and diminish American policies and influence" (ibid:117). It is no exaggeration to state that a constant fear in Paris long remained that of an American encroachment on France's African *pré-carré*:

L'influence anglo-saxonne a toujours en effet été perçue par les Français comme une menace pour leur propre influence dans leurs anciennes colonies africaines : symptôme d'un véritable « syndrome de Fachoda », la mobilisation face à cette menace anglo-saxonne en Afrique est une constante de la diplomatie française. (Bagayoko-Penone 2003. p. 29)

The most visible – and infamous – example of this is probably the role played by France during the events that led to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. According to Gérard Prunier, the motivation driving France's support for the regime of then Rwandan President Habyarimana, whose assassination in 1994 prompted one of the worst genocides on the African continent, was the fear that Anglo-Saxon countries were attempting to force French influence and especially the French language out of the African continent (1995). In this respect Prunier has remarked that: "the casual observer imagining that money is the cement of the [Franco-African] relationship would have the wrong impression. The cement is language and culture" (ibid:103). The ruling Hutus were Francophones, whereas the leaders of the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) were trained and organized in English speaking Uganda.

In the eyes of the Mitterrand regime, this Ugandan support assumed the dimensions of an Anglophone conspiracy to take over part of francophone Africa, and the defence of Habyarimana [...] became part of a more general defence of *francophonie* and the French role in Africa, to an extent that to an anglophone observer seems quite bizarre. (Clapham 1998:199)

Prunier has described France's policies in Africa as a result of the deeply embedded Fashoda syndrome: "According to the Fashoda syndrome, the whole world is a cultural, political and economic battlefield between France and the 'Anglo-Saxons'" (1995:105):

From that point of view, the invasion of Rwanda on 1 October 1990 by a group of rebels coming from Uganda was a typical test-case – an obvious 'Anglo-

Saxon' plot to destabilise one of 'ours', and one we needed to stop right away if we did not want to see a dangerous spread of the disease. (ibid:106)

When in 1996, "the scene of 'anglosaxon invasion' moved to Zaïre, Franco-American rivalry reached a new peak" (Huliaras 1998:595). It would seem that the disease had spread in spite of the French efforts, and Paris came to see the new developments as "evidence of an 'anglosaxon conspiracy', part of a plot to develop an arc of influence [... with] a hidden agenda 'to oust France from Africa'" (ibid:594). Like Prunier, Huliaras asserts that the Fashoda syndrome "significantly contributed to French misperceptions of events" (ibid:603). These misperceptions were apparently dominant on both sides of the political spectrum. Shortly after his election, Jacques Chirac denounced "the Anglosaxons [who] dream of pushing France out of its position in Africa" (The Economist 1995:37). Huliaras concludes that "French policy towards post-genocide Rwanda and Zaïre was mainly determined by pre-constructed beliefs, psychological insecurities and bureaucratic resistance. Only to a minor extent was it the result of rational calculations" (Huliaras 1998:609). The fear of mounting Anglo-Saxon influence in Africa clearly seems to have played an important part in the French political imaginary in the 1990s (see for example Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 1999:51). Even if this fear cannot necessarily be characterized as a manifestation of anti-Americanism as such, it nonetheless underlines another dimension of France's rejection of America's power and influence. In its African policies, France has throughout remained determined to defend its African turf against any threat of 'Anglo-Saxon' and lately especially American encroachment. In 1998, former Minister for Cooperation Bernard Debré came close to acknowledging that France's modern day *mission civilisatrice* builds on little more than the defense of French national interests in the face of France's losing battle with the increasing influence of the United States, when he lamented that

In less than ten years, Africans will speak English, the technology they use will be American, their elites will be educated in the United States, and we will be cut off from our African roots, huddled up over a Europe which feels the cold and is incapable of being a power that anyone listens to. (Quoted by Kom 2000)

For long, its presence and influence in Francophone Africa permitted France to present itself first as a world empire and later as the political leader and benefactor of a continent, which otherwise had but a relatively limited voice in world affairs. This gave a certain credibility to French claims of being an alternative to American universalism. As late as in 2005, Michel

Guillou could still claim that France needed not only a “Europe-Puissance pour marcher à l’équilibre et affirmer son identité et ses valeurs: c’est une « Francophonie-Puissance » qui lui manque pour enrayer le déclin” (Guillou 2005, back cover). Yet in reality, France seems to have discovered the limits of even limited universalism. France’s role in Africa is in decline, not necessarily as a result of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, though it is a fact that English is spreading on the continent, but largely because the benefits of the French policies of clientelism no longer outweigh the costs (Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000a). On a moral level, the actions of France in especially Rwanda have led to condemnation even by prominent French intellectuals. In a resounding critique of French policies toward Africa under the Fifth Republic, Erik Orsenna, a member of both the *Académie française* and the *Haut Conseil de la francophonie*, concluded that “Avec tout l’argent du monde, on ne s’achète pas un visage” (quoted by Wauthier 1995:644. See also Verschave 2000a and 2000b). On an economical level, the benefits are seriously mitigated by the subsidies offered by Paris, and on a political level, the status enjoyed by France as an unofficial spokesman for the non-aligned world during de Gaulle’s presidency is unquestionably a thing of the past (Wauthier 1995). France still retains important influence and leverage in Francophone Africa, and this undoubtedly contributes to France’s political power on the world stage, but the system of *Françafrique* is slowly decomposing as France progressively becomes a more ‘normal’ world power. The days of French tutelage over Africa are slowly drawing to an end and with them the limited universalism it once offered France.

Europe: a potential counter power in the making?

French presence in Africa has certainly bolstered France’s universal aspirations, yet in spite of the fact that the Francophone community encompasses more than sixty nations on five continents (Guillou 2005), it does not have the potential to balance the American hegemon in any terms of power and influence. Europe on the other hand, throughout centuries by far the dominant continent, doubtless has that potential. Henry Kissinger has noted that France has had a propensity to act at times “as a kind of parliamentary opposition to American leadership, trying to build the European Community into an alternative world leader and cultivating ties with nations it could dominate, or thought it could dominate” (1994:120). Just as France’s African policies build on both France’s *mission civilisatrice* and power political considerations, France’s European policies have build on both an earnest desire to unite the

European continent after the ravages of two world wars, and the assumption that only a united Europe under French leadership could assert itself as a power of the first order, capable of balancing first the two superpowers and later what former Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine famously termed the American *hyperpower*.

The idea of European unity and integration has been a recurrent theme for several centuries, chiefly among French intellectuals and political leaders (Gladwyn 1969:11-12). Already in 1620, the Duc de Sully launched the idea, or “Grand Design” as he termed it, that Europe should form a political union of states (Pagden, in Pagden (ed.) 2002:14 and 54). In 1867, Victor Hugo predicted that in the twentieth century, an “extraordinary” nation would see the light of day: “The name of this extraordinary nation will be Europe, and its capital will be Paris” (New York Times 1867). As such, the notion of European unity and integration has gathered in momentum as America rose to become a world power, and though undoubtedly also influenced by the rapid rise of America, it was rarely presented as a necessity borne out of rivalry with the United States, but rather as the fulfilment of Europe’s cultural and political destiny (Pagden, in Pagden (ed.) 2002). Pan European projects proliferated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but rarely acquired neither public nor political attention of much importance. In the interwar years, Austrian Count Coudenhove-Kalergi made some headway with his Pan European Movement, and from 1925, French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot had openly spoken about the need to create a “United States of Europe” (Dinan 2004:3, Duroselle 1965:275). The first serious political attempt at promoting European integration by peaceful means occurred in September 1929 when French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand launched his project for European Union (d’Appollonia, in Pagden (ed.) 2002:173-186, Duroselle 1965:274-280, and Rocard, in Vercors 1993:xvi). This project, intended to coordinate economic policies and promote political union (Dinan 2004:3), failed in the end, due both to especially British opposition and not least bad timing, with the Wall Street crash of October 1929 effectively sealing its fate (Duroselle 1965:275-280). It would take another world war for the project of European unity to gain the momentum needed to set up durable institutions of integration. Once again, the impulse came primarily from France. The 1950 Schuman Plan, elaborated essentially by Jean Monnet, would subsequently prove the starting point of the European integration process, though this outcome at the onset looked highly uncertain (Grosser 1989:83-85). Under the Fourth Republic, the integration process would accelerate in spite of serious setbacks, such as the French National Assembly’s refusal to

ratify the European Defence Community in 1954 (ibid:87-89, 98-99 and 106-117, and Mahoney 1996:130). While the European policies pursued under the Fourth Republic were motivated both by a wish for reconciliation with Germany (and an accompanying fear of future German rearmament and reassertion) and by a desire to augment France's role in Europe as well as on the international stage (Bjøl 1966), it was only with the advent of de Gaulle as leader of the Fifth Republic that France's European designs came to be regarded as seriously aimed at presenting Europe as a world power in the making and possibly even a counter power to the two superpowers (Giauque 2002). If the alliance policies of the Fifth Republic can be largely seen as a continuation of the policies carried out under the Fourth Republic, albeit with an added purposefulness, which reached its almost logical conclusion with the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated structures in 1966, French policies toward European cooperation underwent a fundamental shift after de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. On four important dimensions of French policies toward European cooperation, de Gaulle came to represent either a radicalization of objectives, which had only been timidly adhered to by the successive leaders of the Fourth Republic, or a *volte face* vis-à-vis the positions held by his predecessors. These dimensions were 1) France's role as the leader of continental Europe; 2) the construction of European cooperation as a potential counter power to American hegemony over the West; 3) the contentious issue of Britain's role in European integration, and 4) the nature of the European project as such. Developments within these four dimensions were interlinked, and French repositioning on these issues came to have an important impact on both the development of the European integration process and on the Franco-American relationship.

First, regarding the dimension of France's role in Europe, it is important to realize that when Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet launched their project for closer European cooperation, France was not particularly well placed to present itself as leader of Europe. In reality, the first phase of European cooperation took place under British leadership and with strong backing and sponsorship from Washington, resulting in the establishment of the OEEC, later transformed into the OECD, whose main task was to coordinate economic recovery plans for Europe and not least the implementation of the Marshall Plan (Gladwyn 1969:14-15, Giauque 2002:11-46). The 1950 Schuman Plan essentially attempted to carry the cooperation further, by merging the supervision of the coal and steel production of the six participating nations under one supranational authority and thus removing the use of these

strategic resources from national control (Gladwyn 1969:15-16). Though Paris may have cultivated hopes that this deepening of European cooperation could with time result in an enhanced position for France in Europe, the leaders of the Fourth Republic consistently attempted to persuade Britain to join the new structures in order to balance what they perceived as the threat of potential German supremacy in continental Europe (Giauque 2002:11-46). As such, though notions of French leadership of Europe were far from absent from the minds of the leaders of the Fourth Republic, any aspiration towards French pre-eminence was subdued by the perceived need for broad and viable European structures capable of leading Europe towards recovery. It should come as no surprise that de Gaulle's vision of France's role in Europe lacked any such notion of national restraint. Although de Gaulle had originally been opposed to Monnet's supranational vision of Europe, he was in favour of building a "united" European community (Mahoney 1996:131), believing that in a Europe of Nations, France could impose itself as its natural leader. David Chuter has described the unity of Europe as

a consistent objective of de Gaulle's thinking since the 1940s, and in this he was typical of his time. Typical also was the assumption that there was no conflict between European unity and French national interest, since France was, and had been for hundreds of years, the natural leader of Europe. European interests were, by definition, French interests, and as Europe became stronger and more united, France would benefit accordingly. (1996:316)

From 1942 onwards, the European theme had been evoked in the General's public speeches, although it long remained unclear as to which form closer European cooperation should take (Jouve 1967:5-8). It was however clear that France should play a leading role: In July 1948, the national committee of the Gaullist RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français) declared that "Dans l'Europe organisée, la première place doit revenir à la France grâce à sa position géographique, sa tradition historique, son idéal, ses amitiés". As such France had "un droit au leadership" in Europe (ibid:92). There was real truth in Harold Macmillan's 1961 remark after his conference with de Gaulle: "He talks of Europe and means France" (quoted by Mahoney 1996:132). Kissinger has remarked that what de Gaulle had in mind was "a Europe organized along the lines of Bismarck's Germany – that is, unified on the basis of states, one of which (France) would play the dominant role, with the same function that Prussia had had inside imperial Germany" (1994:606). In post-war Europe, France could find but one serious contender for the role as *primus inter pares*. With divided Germany suffering from less than

full sovereignty and haunted by the guilt complex as a result of the Nazi-era, the only possible other short-term contender for the role was the United Kingdom. Though it was Churchill, who in his famous 1946 Zurich speech had called for the establishment of a United States of Europe (Mahoney 1996:130), Britain had refused the invitation to participate in the Monnet-Schuman project on the grounds of its supranational structure, most likely to the great relief of not least Gaullist circles in Paris (Grosser 1989:84). As will be seen below, de Gaulle was as opposed to the supranational dimension of the European project as the British, yet rather than finding common cause across the Channel, he persistently opposed Britain's entry into the European structures, thereby ensuring that France retained the role as primary spokesman for Europe. As Giauque notes, "Unlike previous French leaders, who had envisioned France exerting its influence as part of some larger European concert, de Gaulle's France would maintain its identity and represent the rest of Europe" (2002:35).

Second, there has been a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to forget that the project of European cooperation was from the onset designed within the framework of broader transatlantic cooperation, and that as such, it had received the enthusiastic support of especially the Eisenhower administration (Giauque 2002). It was American demands for the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had led to the ill-fated attempt at establishing a European Defence Community (Grosser 1989). The Eisenhower administration recognized that "Western Europe had the economic and human resources to become a global superpower alongside the United States and the Soviet Union", and though the American president "believed that a unified Europe would inevitably act with a high degree of independence from the United States [he] welcomed this prospect", convinced that Europe "would remain a close American ally, if for no other reason than the weight of common interests" (Giauque 2002:14). This vision was broadly shared by the leaders of the Fourth Republic who, while keen to advance European cooperation also in order to escape what was perceived as American tutelage over Western Europe, remained convinced that maintaining the Atlantic partnership was a necessary *sine qua non* (or, as Lord Gladwyn put it, "a slightly disagreeable necessity" 1969:19) for any move toward the rearmament of Germany. As such, the early 1950s saw strong American support for the European integration process accompanied by a consistent American preference for French policies vis-à-vis the institutional set up of European unity over British manoeuvrings in favour of looser structures (Giauque 2002). The 1956 Suez crisis, compounded by the resurgent Soviet threat against

Western Europe caused by the brutal repression of the uprisings in Budapest the same year, led to a reappraisal in Paris of the need for a more autonomous organization of European cooperation. Though France had been the main proponent of European integration under Schuman, successive leaders of the Fourth Republic had proved reticent as to the creation of especially a Common Market. Suez meant, in the eyes of then Prime Minister Guy Mollet and most French leaders, that in “order to protect their interests on the continent and beyond, the Europeans needed to organize” (ibid:26). Suez and Hungary thus provided the impetus needed to overcome the sense of *immobilisme* in the European integration process provoked by the French National Assembly’s rejection of the European Defence Community in 1954, and eventually paved the way for the Rome Treaty (Giauque 2002, Gladwyn 1969). The American State Department described the newfound European unity as “not directed toward the creation of a neutral third force or really a third force at all, but rather directed toward increasing Europe’s strength and voice within the Atlantic Alliance [and] European influence in the United Nations and in other areas of the world where the Europeans feel they must be heard with some authority” (quoted by Giauque 2002:32). The author of this somewhat condescending assessment could not have foreseen either the advent of de Gaulle or the impact he would have on the European integration process. Though the seeds of future French designs for European integration as a vehicle for greater autonomy vis-à-vis the United States had been sown in the minds of French political elites largely as a result of the impact of the Suez crisis, these designs were present to General de Gaulle from the onset. Deploing the fact that Europe was subordinated to the United States both “economically” and in terms of “defence matters” (Jouve 1967:588-596), de Gaulle felt that in order to put an end to this subordination, it was necessary for Europe to acquire a common project (ibid:602):

In July 1958 he informed his subordinates of his intention to build up Europe as the foundation for France’s global power to replace its crumbling empire: “The primary objective of French policy is the construction of a solid Franco-African political and economic bloc. This bloc must be solidly linked to a Western Europe where France plays a major, if not preponderant, role”. [...] De Gaulle hoped to use this European power base not only to maintain French influence in Africa, but also to force the United States and Britain to reform the Atlantic alliance and establish a tripartite leadership arrangement (Giauque 2002:34)

As we saw above, Washington rejected any notion of such a triumvirate, and de Gaulle in turn set out to promote European integration as an alternative to American hegemony. From the onset, de Gaulle had “planned to use European unity to reduce American predominance”, but

faced with the American refusal to grant France a special status within the transatlantic alliance, de Gaulle elevated the goal of reducing American influence “from a long-term goal to an immediate priority” (ibid:44-45). Over the coming years, it would become clear that de Gaulle saw himself, and by extension France, as the proponent of “a united, politically vigorous Europe [which] would be an ally of, but not subservient to or dependent on, the United States” (Mahoney 1996:137).

Third and intrinsically related to the two former dimensions, de Gaulle went to great lengths to keep Britain out of the European cooperation process. This marked a complete reversal of the policies pursued by the Fourth Republic. The leaders of the Fourth Republic had consistently attempted to engage a reluctant United Kingdom in the European integration process, pursuing an ‘open door’ policy vis-à-vis Britain even in the face of the consistent British attempts at obstructing the whole process (Giauque 2002, Bange 2000). In the close of Franco-British collaboration during the Suez crisis and under the impression of the slow progress in the negotiations of the Six, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet even

made a breathtaking offer to the British. Mollet called for the formation of a Franco-British union of the sort proposed in 1940 by Winston Churchill to prevent France from signing an armistice with Nazi Germany. [...] The 1956 Mollet proposal called for common citizenship, economic union, French admission to the British Commonwealth, and close Franco-British cooperation all over the world. (Giauque 2002. p. 29)

This attempt at reviving the Entente Cordiale met with little interest in London, but it shows how desperate the leaders of the Fourth Republic were for entering in a political constellation, which would both offer them securities against future German rearmament and a proper platform for maintaining a world role. It also shows that the Fourth Republic continued to regard Britain as an essential partner for the European project. De Gaulle, who incidentally had supported Churchill’s 1940 proposal as the best means of securing France from its ignominious defeat in 1940 (ibid.), had a very different conception of Britain’s place in Europe. De Gaulle had never forgotten Churchill’s words, spoken in 1944: “Sachez, général de Gaulle, que chaque fois qu’il nous faudra choisir entre l’Europe et le grand large, nous serons toujours pour le grand large” (quoted by Jouve 1967:186). As such he never considered the English properly European, and he felt confirmed in this by Churchill’s statement (Schlesinger 1966:192). In his memoirs, de Gaulle described how Europe could only regain its balance and influence through closer cooperation between “Slaves, Germans,

Gaulois et Latins” (Schlesinger 1966:191). Though de Gaulle thus had a wider geopolitical conception of Europe than the one confined to the Six, it seemed to exclude the British. The exact scope of another of de Gaulle’s famous phrases, in which he called for a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural’ has often been questioned, especially as the General himself remained rather vague on whether this incorporated Britain, situated in the Atlantic, or the Soviet Union, in which the Ural Mountains were. In essence, de Gaulle sought to remind his audience that Europe 1) was divided as a result of the Yalta agreement between the great powers – and as such without neither the participation nor the approbation of France, and 2) would not, and could not, remain indefinitely divided (Jouve 1967:146-171, Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:90). What is clear, however, is that de Gaulle consistently sought to exclude Britain from the European integration process. On two accounts did de Gaulle veto British membership of the European Community. De Gaulle’s first no to Britain came in January 1963 shortly after the Anglo-American accord at Nassau, which paved the way for British-American nuclear cooperation, while simultaneously aiming “at preventing any separate Franco-British nuclear arrangement” (Giauque 2002:115, see also Grosser 1989:190). Though a similar arrangement was offered to France, de Gaulle rejected it and instead used the Nassau agreement as a pretext for both a frontal assault on the Kennedy administration’s idea of an Atlantic Community (Giauque 2002:117, see also below) and Britain’s entry into the European Community (Bange 2000, Prittie 1972:293-297). The logic behind de Gaulle’s veto against British entry into the European Community, repeated in 1967, in essence sought to consolidate both the primacy of France within the Community by preventing a potential rival for European leadership into the organization and to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe; a motive which he openly acquiesced to with his famous denouncing of Britain as an American “Trojan horse” in Europe (Jouve 1967:185-188, Gozard 1976:183). In a press conference in January 1963, in which de Gaulle both rejected nuclear cooperation and British entry into the EEC, he also delineated how he foresaw Europe’s future:

it would be less dominated by the Americans; made more powerful by economic and political cohesion; it would thus become more independent and on a more equal footing with the two superpowers; it would also have to be a smaller Europe, and a Europe led by France as the guardian of its political spirit, in order to prevent any watering down of that goal; last but not least it would be a confederal Europe, because the nations – at least for the time being – were the prime source of allegiance, and a strong allegiance of the people was needed to build this powerful Europe. (Bange 2000:234)

De Gaulle's consistently intergovernmental approach to European integration constitutes the fourth major dimension of France's repositioning vis-à-vis European cooperation. Though the leaders of the Fourth Republic were either divided or ambivalent regarding the desirability of the elements of supranationality inherent in the structures of both the ECSC and to a lesser extent the EEC, they had largely accepted it as the only possible way forward (Bjøl 1966, Giauque 2002). De Gaulle was however staunchly opposed to any notion of supranationality, which to his mind contravened the primacy which he attributed to the nation state. For him, the Common Market was nothing but the concrete basis for another European project; one which he had been the proponent of since the early 1950s: "celle d'une 'Union des Etats européens' affirmant peu à peu son identité face aux Américains" (Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:96). As such, he consistently rejected any further move toward supranationality, most famously through the use of the "Empty Chair" tactics (Calvocoressi 1991:209), though this did not prevent him from justifying his obstruction of British entry into the European structures with the argument that Britain was not ready to accept the supranational elements of the European Community (Bange 2000, Giauque 2002). As opposed to the three other dimensions, de Gaulle's emphasis on intergovernmentalism did not *per se* carry any anti-American connotations, yet often became merged into a discourse, which sought to link the process of European unity with notions of independence from the United States. De Gaulle frequently stressed that

Une Europe soumise aux règles de la supranationalité ne serait pas seulement une menace intolérable pour l'indépendance du peuple français. Elle serait une Europe sans intérêt, parce qu'y triompherait le point de vue de partenaires pour lesquels la protection des Etats-Unis restera encore longtemps la considération prioritaire. A une telle « Europe atlantique », le Général a toujours témoigné une opposition systématique (Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:89)

The French repositioning on these four dimensions would come to fundamentally influence the European integration process over the coming decades and simultaneously underline a basic ambiguity inherent in the Gaullist design for Europe; an ambiguity, which would prevent Europe from seriously acquiring the potential to balance the notion of American hegemony. This can best be illustrated by comparing the two "Grand Designs" for Europe set forth by respectively the United States and France (Keylor 1992:347-348); these rival versions "reflected their wider struggle over the future shape of Western Europe and its

relations with the United States” (Giauque 2002:99), and both would in the end fail to materialize in the forms originally intended. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, growing fears of an independent European “Third Force” prompted Washington to gradually develop the idea of an “Atlantic Community”, which could contain and channel European unity, while enabling the United States to intervene more effectively in European affairs (ibid:98). After prolonged negotiations characterized by French opposition throughout, President Kennedy presented these thoughts in a more consolidated form, stipulating that they should include

the establishment of a political and economic partnership between Western Europe and the United States, a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), the creation of a wider Europe via expansion of the Common Market to include Britain, American trade liberalization legislation, and a round of GATT tariff reductions to check protectionism and isolationism on both sides of the Atlantic. (ibid:113-114)

The Kennedy administration’s proposals met with fierce French opposition on every account. Rightly assessing that the proposed Atlantic Community failed to offer an equal partnership to the Europeans (ibid:124), de Gaulle acted as the main spoiler of the proposals, which he viewed as means to “camouflage” the American hegemony (Peyrefitte 1994:282). The only major part of Kennedy’s design to be enacted would be within what came to be known as the ‘Kennedy Round’ of the GATT negotiations. De Gaulle’s own ‘Grand Design’, the Fouchet Plan, did not fare much better. The 1961-62 Fouchet Plan, named after its chief French negotiator, has been characterized as “the ultimate expression of de Gaulle’s vision” (Giauque 2002:126). The plan consisted in establishing on the basis of the EEC a political union between the participating Western European nations, which according to its first draft should, on an intergovernmental basis, formulate common foreign, defence, economic, and cultural policies (Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:96, Grosser 1989:189). At first, de Gaulle remained vague as to the possible participation of Britain as well as to whether this new arrangement could co-exist with the existing European and transatlantic structures, but as the negotiations proceeded and a compromise seemed within reach, his positions hardened, and he torpedoed his own design rather than risk a watered down version, more palatable to his European partners (Giauque 2002, Calvocoressi 1991). Both ‘Grand Designs’ were characteristic of how France and America each sought to consolidate their predominance in Europe in the early 1960s, and both were, as a result, flawed:

de Gaulle’s political union had shifted from an innovative means to provide the Six with greater cohesion in foreign policy and other areas into a crude attempt

at French hegemony, and de Gaulle's smaller partners rejected it as a result. Similarly, the Atlantic Community failed in large part because American leaders ultimately interpreted it as a means to isolate France and cement American predominance in Europe rather than to make Europe a more equal partner of the United States. (Giauque 2002:226)

There is no doubt that the French repositioning on Europe would come to have an important impact on the development of the European integration process over the following decades, yet ironically, it also had as an unintended consequence that de Gaulle's aims at transforming Europe into a potential 'Third Force' to balance the United States and the Soviet Union was essentially bound to remain unfulfilled. There are two main preconditions for understanding the logic driving de Gaulle's actions with regard to Europe: First, it is important to remember that at the time, the European integration process was in its infancy and that as a consequence, there was no fixed blueprint for how to proceed. A number of organizations competed for the role as institutional frameworks for European cooperation. Chief among them were the Council of Europe, the OEEC, the WEU, the EEC and the rival EFTA; all of these organizations had, at one point or another, an ambition to provide Europe with the unity that the leaders of the European nations called for in public (Giauque 2002). The European integration process in the late 1950s and early 1960s was characterized by intense manoeuvrings among the leading nations, chief among them France, Britain, Germany, and the United States, the latter actively leaning on the various European powers in order to achieve the kind of European cooperation favoured in Washington. There was disagreement over the geographical, political, economic, and institutional scope of European cooperation, each of the four countries favouring their own particular 'blend', and each fearing above anything else to be left isolated from the rest. As such, the road toward European integration came to resemble a traditional balance of power game for domination over Europe. It is in this light that the events occurring in the first years of de Gaulle's presidency should be viewed. De Gaulle's approach to European unity was essentially geopolitical, and as such it became a consistent goal of his policies to exclude Britain from participating in the European cooperation structure, which Paris felt it could dominate. Second, de Gaulle's European policies can be viewed also as to a large extent a fall back position given his earlier failure to obtain the coveted status as part of a tripartite leadership within the Atlantic Alliance. There is ample evidence to suggest that de Gaulle's early European policies were in fact designed primarily to force the United States and Britain into granting France a co-leadership role in

the Atlantic structures (*ibid.*). As such an invitation proved less than forthcoming, de Gaulle instead turned to refashion the EEC as an instrument for achieving his aims of presenting France as a power of the first order: could France not be accepted as an equal partner, it would have to carve out a role for itself as spokesman for Europe. As Nicolas Sauger notes, France's support for European cooperation has throughout "derived from a strong sense of a lack of an alternative" (in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:62). It is on the basis of these conditions that we should assess the young Fifth Republic's subsequent European policies. With regard to France's relations with the United States and the French aspirations to minimize American influence in Europe and promote Europe as a potential balancing power, the Gaullist policies nevertheless contained some important ambiguities, which would handicap French designs for decades. First, by excluding Britain, France limited the geographical scope of the Europe it intended to create as a counterforce to America, thus seriously weakening its potential to acquire any sort of power or influence necessary toward achieving those aims. Though it is true that Britain was closer to America than to continental Europe on a number of issues, the French veto to British accession simultaneously meant a halt to all further expansion of the EEC (Giauque 2002), which could theoretically have rendered it an important balancing power. Second, de Gaulle's rejection of supranationalism had the effect of limiting the formulation of common policies to the lowest common denominator, as any participating nation – usually France – would be able to veto the process towards new and more fruitful areas of cooperation. Third, though de Gaulle's heavy handed tactics of cajoling both partners and adversaries initially proved a success in the first years of his presidency, it eventually backfired, leaving France relatively isolated even among its European partners. For the European Community, this meant that institutional progress remained extremely limited from 1963 until the General's resignation in 1969. For de Gaulle, it meant that he was forced to find other outlets for his attempts at giving France a predominant international role:

With his efforts to transform the Atlantic Alliance frustrated by the United States and his plans for reorganizing Western Europe blocked by Britain and the Five, and with no realistic prospect for change in either area, de Gaulle gradually turned to a unilateral foreign policy designed more to irritate the United States and demonstrate French freedom of action in the world than to lead any constructive developments in European or Atlantic relations. Consciously or unconsciously, de Gaulle seems to have realized that there was no longer any prospect for new arrangements in the Western camp as long as he remained in power. As a result, he turned toward the developing world and the Soviet bloc in the hope that he could facilitate movement in both and that changes outside of Western Europe would eventually lead to movement there as well. By promoting

improved relations with the East, de Gaulle hoped to break up the bipolar world and reduce American influence in Europe indirectly. (ibid:231-232)

Though de Gaulle's European policies far from achieved their aim, his legacy has, as in all other dimensions of French foreign policy, left its mark on his successors. Despite the setbacks his policy caused, European integration continues to be viewed "as the only available means of reaching France's primary foreign policy objective, i.e. *grandeur* on the international scene" (Sauger, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:62). The means to achieve these aims would change under his successors, more eager to pursue concrete advances in the European project, which could bolster European unity internally and externally, than to pursue a particular 'Grand Design' along the lines of de Gaulle, yet essentially the General's "ambition to use Europe as a multiplier of French power and to develop a bloc that would match US power was shared by his successors" (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:260, see also Giaque 2002:233). For decades, France remained the politically most important power in the European Community and was, thanks to the close relationship with Germany established under de Gaulle, able to "shape the trajectory, scope and form of integration" (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:261). Georges Pompidou, under whose presidency Britain was finally welcomed as a new member of the EEC along with Denmark and Ireland, championed European political cooperation, while Valéry Giscard d'Estaing took further steps toward greater foreign policy coordination and became a key factor in establishing first the Economic Monetary System and later the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008). Though both presidents talked enthusiastically of Europe and the need for greater European unity, it was only under the presidency of François Mitterrand that France again started to seriously present Europe as a potential power in the making and claiming a "significant world role" for the continent (Meunier 2000). Mitterrand was, for sure, helped by circumstances. As noted above, he had proved a relatively loyal ally to the United States with regard to stressing France's position as firmly committed to the Atlantic alliance during the period of renewed superpower tension characterizing the 1980s, thereby assuaging possible American fears of France's allegiances. With the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall, he seized – although after some hesitation (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:262) – the opportunity offered by the possibility of German reunification to advance the notion of European cooperation to new dimensions. The prospect of German reunification had ever

since the end of the Second World War featured amongst the worst nightmares of French political leaders, though they were loath to admit it. Mitterrand was no exception, yet wisely realizing that the tides could hardly be turned, he instead set out to contain German reunification within the European structures (ibid.). For decades, French politicians had been fond of recalling former Chancellor Willy Brandt's characteristic of Federal Germany as "an economic giant, but a political dwarf" (Trouille, in Ingham and Ingham (eds) 2002:59, James (ed.) 1998:x), a characteristic, which has since been bestowed on the EU (Allen 1992, Edinger and Nacos 1998). With German reunification looming over the horizon, it was only a matter of time, before the economic giant would turn into a political ditto. Mitterrand, refraining from the cajoling methods employed by de Gaulle a quarter of a century before, convinced the Kohl government that it was necessary to renegotiate the European structures in order to accommodate an enlarged Germany (Bell 2005:138-142). The price paid by Germany was chiefly to give up the Deutschmark in favour of the Euro, but the designs proposed by Mitterrand and largely carried out by his compatriot, President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, was for Europe to advance from a Common Market with limited cooperation in other spheres, such as foreign policy, into a fully fledged European Union with the potential to act as an unavoidable world power, including in the domains of foreign and security policy. Though historically a main opponent of de Gaulle, Mitterrand had taken up "virtually the entire body of Gaullist theory and practice" (Giauque 2002:233), and as such it is no surprise that his late 1980s designs for Europe bear a substantial resemblance to de Gaulle's ill-fated Fouchet Plans. With admittedly more modesty than de Gaulle, Mitterrand nevertheless had as one of his ambitions to refashion Europe so that it under Franco-German leadership could present itself as a world power capable of achieving parity with the remaining American superpower. Though Mitterrand did not present the project for a European Union as opposed to the United States, it clearly was meant as an indication that Europe had come of age as a nascent world power for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Under Chirac, the security and defence dimension inscribed in the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, but never properly realized, received a further boost with the bilateral Saint-Malo agreement with Britain, which represented "a major milestone in the development of the EU's military capacity" (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:269). Similarly and characteristically, Sarkozy made advancement on the EU's security and defence policies one of the major themes of France's presidency of the EU

in 2008, the fulfilment of which he made conditional upon his eventual move toward full French reintegration into NATO's military structures in 2009.

With respect to the four dimensions, on which de Gaulle altered France's European policies half a century ago, they remain fundamentally in place as underlying premises for French actions, although they have lost much of their lustre over the years. In reverse order, there is no doubting that even after the departure of de Gaulle, France has consistently and successfully favoured a "strong Community with weak institutions" (Menon 1996). This was evident in Pompidou's preference for summitry, in Giscard d'Estaing's support for the institutionalization of the European Council, in Mitterrand's commitment to preserving intergovernmental decision-making in the second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty (foreign policy and home affairs), and in Chirac's negotiation of the Nice Treaty, which strengthened the role of the Council largely at the expense of the Commission (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:261). Yet during the early 1990s, "the constraints imposed by the EU became increasingly visible, and it became ever more apparent that the Union was not an intergovernmental system" in spite of French reservations (ibid:265). Though France accepted Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973, it continues to take "advantage of British hesitations, [as for example] its refusal to participate in the common European currency, to ensure that all real initiative in the community remains in the hands of the Franco-German tandem" (Giauque 2002:233). With regard to France's ambitions to turn Europe into a potential counter power to the United States, there is no doubt that "French efforts to organize Europe remain at least implicitly aimed at reducing U.S. influence over the long term, although they have generally been much less stridently anti-American than under de Gaulle" (ibid.). In spite of the advances made under Mitterrand toward turning Europe into a political force of the first order, "France's long-standing policy of building up Europe as a counterbalance to American power had no more success under Mitterrand than under previous presidents" (Bell 2005:147). His successor Jacques Chirac would in his hapless attempt at ensuring a "yes" during the French referendum on the project for a European Constitution, characteristically insist as one of his main arguments that the Constitution would enable "France, through Europe, to counterbalance American power and stand up more forcefully to the US when needed" (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:248). Similarly, French leaders have "shown considerable ingenuity in developing mechanisms that are designed to combat the perceived excesses of Anglo-Saxon liberalism,

which Brussels is spreading” (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:273), while simultaneously attempting to present the EU as a bulwark against the forces of globalization (ibid:265-266). The anti-globalization discourse may have “renewed the old rhetoric of anti-capitalism” (Sauger, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:63), yet the primary target of attacks remains the same: the United States. Finally, as regards the consistent French attempts at presenting France as the primary spokesman for Europe, these have prevailed throughout, though with diminishing success over the last few decades. French influence on the European integration process has historically been paramount from its early beginnings over de Gaulle’s towering posture to Mitterrand’s and Delors’ Maastricht edifice. As such, France has undoubtedly bolstered and fashioned ‘Europe’ more than any other power, and Europe has presented France with the most potent outlet for its zeal towards achieving international *grandeur*. “Until the early 1990s, rhetoric that presented ‘Europe’ as a vehicle for French ambitions and the interests of the two as the same seemed plausible” (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:265). Yet France’s predominance within Europe culminated at the exact time when its construction efforts reached their apogee. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty, intended in great parts to contain a reunified Germany and thus to buttress France’s role within the EU, coincided with the reunification of Europe as the Union began slowly to enlarge to the north and east. After almost half a century, history seemed to have vindicated de Gaulle when he called for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals: the enlargement process has entailed that the European Union now spans virtually the whole continent, from the Atlantic including Britain and Ireland and well into the borders of the former Soviet Union (with the Baltic states). Ironically it has been France, which among the western European nations has been the most hesitant to embrace this enlargement, rightly fearing that it would lead to loss of influence (Trouille, in Ingham and Ingham (eds) 2002:54-55 and 59-63). A more assertive Germany and the shift in the political and geographical centre of gravity away from Paris occurring in the 1990s has undermined “France’s privileged status and its influence” over Europe (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:262). As a consequence, Europe has now finally acquired the size and influence rendering it capable of presenting itself as a rival superpower to the American hegemon in all aspects save the military one, yet this superpower status so dearly coveted by France throughout half a century may not necessarily lead to increased independence from the United States, as the expanded Europe has become almost entirely dominated by ‘Atlanticist’ nations.

6.1.5 Conclusion

There is little doubt that the French emphasis on independence in foreign policy and security matters has been a source of frustration in Washington. Yet the nation that once shunned ‘entangling alliances’ should be better placed than most to appreciate the need for national independence and autonomy in these matters. It is a political imperative that the United States itself has maintained throughout its history. When in 1918 French Maréchal Ferdinand Foch was named supreme commander of the Allied forces – “pour ainsi dire le premier SACEUR” – U.S. General Pershing insisted that he would only receive advice, not orders, from the French general (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:26). Following the terrorist attacks of 9-11, America’s NATO allies invoked the Treaty’s article 5, which stipulates that an attack on one member state is an attack against the Alliance. The irony that this article, known also as the Musketeer oath (one for all and all for one), originally intended to reassure the European allies, should first be invoked after an attack on the American homeland, did not go amiss among Europeans (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). Yet when it came to retaliation against the Taliban, the United States preferred initially to act independently of NATO (Clark 2005:232), declining French offers as well as those of other NATO allies, to deploy troops in Afghanistan. Only a British contingent was at first accepted by Washington (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:31), even though France had enthusiastically backed the U.S. led operation (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:132). America’s propensity toward unilateralism and independence has, as was shown in chapter 3, been an important part of America’s foreign policy tradition. The continued American opposition to becoming subjected to decisions made by such multilateral bodies as the International Criminal Court is as much an example of a zealous commitment to retain a high degree of independence and freedom of action in foreign affairs as any French preference toward conducting military operations primarily under national control and command. In this respect, the quest for foreign policy independence is far from a uniquely French aspiration. The real difference is that the United States has never had to submit its independence to any institution it could not dominate, even if it has frequently accommodated the views of its allies to ensure alliance cohesion (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). This being said, there is no doubt that among its European allies, France continues to be the nation which most strongly resists “the US-centered imperial order” (Wæver, in Le Gloannec and Smolar (eds) 2003:159), a position

typically attributed to the Gaullist heritage. As a result, this heritage has largely become associated with political anti-Americanism, given that both de Gaulle and his successors have on several occasions taken the role as the outspoken critic of the United States in matters of foreign policy. The label “Gaullist” in particular has come to epitomize French (and by extension European) rejection of American power (Ash 2004:64-68), yet there has no doubt been a tendency to oversimplify what “Gaullist” or “post-Gaullist” foreign and security policy is all about:

In particular, it leads to a cartoon-like creation, ‘Vulgar Gaullism’, which is no more than a policy of gratuitously insulting NATO and the United States, of being different from these parties for the sake of it, and pursuing a narrow-minded and warped policy of extreme nationalism. By this interpretation, of course, friendly references to the United States, good-tempered behaviour at NATO summits, or support for integration in Europe can be labelled ‘Atlanticist’, ‘post-Gaullist’ or ‘European’ respectively, when they usually represent either a small modification to rhetoric or a reaction to a completely changed situation. Similarly, there is an excessive tendency to see every detail of French defence policy as part of a specifically ‘Gaullist’ design. (Chuter 1996:328)

As such, there is good reason to question the notion of whether de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic can be characterized as inherently anti-American. There is no doubt that under de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic proved to be a uniquely outspoken critic of the United States and its policies compared with all America’s other allies. On the basis of the character, the frequency, and the magnitude of de Gaulle’s rejection of what he perceived as America’s attempt at imposing hegemony, it is difficult to outright dismiss the impression of the Fifth Republic, not least in the most problematic years from 1963 to 1968, as an anti-American Republic. No other U.S. ally has so persistently or so outspokenly objected to American power, neither then nor since. If the actions of an ally can be described as anti-American, surely no one fits the bill better than de Gaulle? Yet there are good reasons to question whether the driving force of French foreign policy in those years was essentially anti-Americanism. Is the wish for independence a sign of anti-Americanism? Not necessarily, although France’s quest for independence was in essence as much a rejection of dependence, in this respect dependence on what de Gaulle perceived as American domination. Under the first formative years of the Fifth Republic, independence acquired “almost a mythical value”; indeed there were times when it seemed “that the mere existence of American power [was] perceived as a constraint on French independence” (Grosser 1980:328-329). French wishes for increased independence were thus

bound to run counter to American interests in preserving the Western Alliance as a solid block under American leadership. To the Americans, France's posturing was weakening the Alliance. To France, American unwillingness to relinquish its leadership monopoly was making it impossible to retain the Alliance as a coherent unit. The opposition against American hegemony was by most accounts not motivated by anti-Americanism as such, but by a fervent desire for independence and freedom of action befitting a great nation. Had the roles been inversed, it is highly likely that the United States would have acted in a highly similar way, albeit probably with a less Gallic – or indeed Gaullian – rhetoric.

The anti-American image of de Gaulle's Fifth Republic is not just confined to its foreign policy actions. De Gaulle himself has frequently been portrayed as harboring a disproportionate resentment toward the United States and its leaders, typically attributed to his wartime experiences with Roosevelt mentioned above. Yet upon Roosevelt's death, de Gaulle, who always preserved the signed photo he had received by the American president prominently on display in his private home, wrote to President Truman that France "loved and admired" the late president (Béziat, in Mathé (ed.) 2000:81). De Gaulle respected President Truman for his efficiency (Frémy 1987:44), and though he at one point characterized him as "le marchand des bretelles", it was Truman, who by far was the most acerbic in his declarations regarding the other (Wall, in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:118-119). Conversely, de Gaulle enjoyed close and cordial relations with President Eisenhower, whose visit to France shortly after de Gaulle's return to power "was a meeting of long-lost friends" (Grosser 1980:186). President Kennedy, while favoring relations with especially Britain's Harold Macmillan, found it much easier to establish good relations with de Gaulle than with Germany's Konrad Adenauer (Grosser 1980:192-199), and even, according to his biographer, considered him one of his "heroes", independently of the fact that Kennedy frequently failed to understand the motives driving the French President (Schlesinger 1966:194). Even President Johnson, much more than any of his predecessors or his successor on the receiving end of opposition from de Gaulle, who once characterized him as a "cowboy-radical" (Peyrefitte 1997:48), showed more understanding for de Gaulle's motives than his advisors and proved a rather deft manager of the difficult Franco-American relations (Schwartz, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:139-167). President Nixon, who arguably took office at a time when Franco-American relations had somewhat improved, professed that he had much sympathy toward de Gaulle (Ferro 1973:441). Charles Bohlen, well placed to judge in the

matter, as he served as U.S. ambassador to France during the most troublesome years in the mid-1960s, did not think that de Gaulle was “anti-American at all” (quoted by Hess 1968:2). It nonetheless remains that de Gaulle’s declarations, frequently strikingly ambiguous, have contributed to foster the impression of his ill-will toward the United States. In his War Memoirs, he described how “The United States brings to great affairs elementary feelings and a complicated policy” (quoted by Grosser 1980:24). Compared with the virulent attacks on America expounded by the French intellectuals at the time, such a statement borders on the benign. David Chuter for one asserts that if anti-Americanism

means a gut dislike of American politics, society, and culture, then de Gaulle can, with confidence, be pronounced not guilty. Like many men of progressive opinions at the time, he was, if anything, rather favourable: he saw in America desirable features of modernism, individual freedom, a working political system and an activist government. By contrast, Vichy tended to identify America with the worst aspects of progress, democracy, individualism and modern popular music. It is true, on the other hand, that de Gaulle sometimes perceived the Americans to be doing things that were wrong, or misguided, or things that threatened what he saw as French interests, and he spoke or acted accordingly. But presumably this is in any case a right – or even a duty – of any national leader in such a situation. (1996:207)

The outline of Gaullist foreign policy given in this chapter may seem somewhat apologetic toward the General and his legacy. There is no doubt that de Gaulle’s abrasive style must have led many of his contemporaries to wonder whether the confrontations he engaged in were not rooted in more than the pursuit of a wish for French independence. Kissinger, who like Chuter asserts that de Gaulle “was not anti-American in principle” (1994:605), qualifies this by describing how, in the 1960s,

at the height of his running controversy with the United States, it became fashionable to accuse the French President of suffering from delusions of grandeur. His problem was in fact the precise opposite: how to restore identity to a country suffused with a sense of failure and vulnerability. (ibid:602)

To Stanley Hoffmann, Franco-American relations under the early years of the Fifth Republic present “a fascinating example of the importance of perceptions in foreign policy” (1974:332). He adds that “Perceptions are more than a part of political reality: they mold it, they are the springs and fuel of action. And, of course, they are themselves shaped by reality” (ibid.). Kissinger would seem to concur. He describes how the “conflict between France and the United States became all the more bitter because the two sides, profoundly

misunderstanding each other”, had fundamentally different positions in the international system and not least different styles of negotiation: “The interaction of the American leadership’s personal humility and historical arrogance, and de Gaulle’s personal arrogance and historical humility, defined the psychological gulf between America and France” (1994:603). The essence of de Gaulle’s rejection of American domination was in this respect not just a rejection of America’s hard power nor even a rejection of its soft power as such, but rather an attempt at bolstering France’s own power vis-à-vis America. De Gaulle’s France knew that it could not achieve parity with the United States, but it was felt as essential that it could present itself as independent from American tutelage. As Alfred Grosser notes,

Domination refers to having and doing but also to being which is so closely tied to seeming. The weak may desire what the strong considers good for him. Perhaps the strong takes nothing from the weak. But when the strong does not respect the dignity of the weak, what he has and what he does nourish resentment of his domination. From Roosevelt to Johnson, only a few American leaders have understood in their confrontation with de Gaulle that prestige can be as tangible, as respectable a goal of policy, as power or wealth. (1980:328)

It may thus be that de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic was not anti-American as such and that de Gaulle himself was not manifestly motivated by anti-Americanism in his conduct of foreign policy. According to Serge Bernstein, de Gaulle himself denied any allegation of anti-Americanism, claiming that “his only objective was to defend the national interest by stopping France from resembling a mere American colony” (1993:167). This does not mean that de Gaulle by his actions and statements did not promote anti-Americanism in France. On the contrary, his legacy carries a heavy anti-American imprint. First of all, his fervent assertion of France’s independence was primarily directed against the United States. Even if the motivations driving these policies may not have been anti-American, that is how they frequently appeared, not least as seen from Washington (Hess 1968:1-2). That is also how they appeared to the political circles most supportive of de Gaulle’s actions. The fact that most serious studies of de Gaulle’s foreign policy raise the question of whether it was motivated by anti-Americanism or not (most of those referred to in the present study conclude that it was not) is a testimony to the fact that it was and remains an issue frequently raised. Second, his rhetoric borrowed from some of the imaginary often associated with French anti-Americanism, such as the rejection of the Anglo-Saxon, thus adding impetus to the general anti-American discourse in France at the time. Among Western European leaders, de Gaulle easily acquired a singular position as the most outspoken critic of the United States, a fact

which caused much frustration in Washington (Schlesinger 1966:188-207). Yet as Stanley Hoffmann notes,

More serious, because more lasting, were the illusions de Gaulle may have created among the French. His message bred its own misunderstandings. It was pride that he wanted to restore in the French, but it was vanity that he may have encouraged. (1974:242)

As such, assertions of independence vis-à-vis the threat of hegemonic dominance from across the Atlantic and the growing impression of the desirability of a French *sonderweg* in foreign policy often became translated into a rejection of the American Other by a large proportion of the political and cultural elites, possibly oblivious to the finer nuances of de Gaulle's real intentions. It is most likely an exaggeration to argue, as McMillan does, that de Gaulle's politics of grandeur, and "in particular his symbolic anti-Americanism", was designed primarily for domestic purposes (1992:167), but there is no doubt that it had and was meant to have an important impact on the French population. The culturally based anti-Americanism of the times, which will be discussed further below, was already strong and seemed under de Gaulle to acquire an almost official approbation from the highest political office of the nation. This had the strange side-effect of forging a bond between the presidency and some of the cultural elites supposedly in opposition to the policies of de Gaulle and his successors, irrespective of their political affiliations. Furthermore, the General's policies and declarations in relation to the United States were massively approved by the French public, where clear majorities in polls carried out in 1964 and 1965 responded that de Gaulle's American policy was neither too harsh nor too conciliatory, but correct (Bernstein 1993:167; Kuisel, in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:197). To Richard Kuisel, these polls reflect the fact that "If America was generally liked, it was the president who shaped and mobilized opinion to adopt a more anti-American stance in the mid-1960s" (in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:197). As we shall see below, other agents of anti-Americanism however contributed as much, if not more, to mobilize public opinion, yet Kuisel undoubtedly has a point. Raymond Aron has passed a similarly harsh judgment on the consequences of de Gaulle's rhetoric:

It was General de Gaulle who legitimated anti-Americanism. In moments of crisis, he demonstrated his solidarity with the West, but more often than not he represented France to be threatened equally by the two Great Powers. [...] He gave the French the habit of seeing the wrong enemy, of taking the Soviet Union as an ally and the American Republic as a Great Power threatening French independence. Today [...] French diplomacy remains partially paralyzed by this

inversion of roles, by a vision of the world that I consider contrary to reality. (1990:289)

Third, de Gaulle's legacy would prove so immense, not least with respect to foreign affairs (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:103), that his successors were more or less forced to follow suit, albeit largely without the Gaullian panache:

De Gaulle's images of international relations, alliance and defense matters, and France's prescribed role in international politics take on additional importance because his ideas and policies seem to have established a standard, or model, that constrains his successors and has proven irresistible even for leftist opponents of the Gaullist regime's domestic policies. The emergence of a broad consensus on security policy has been possible because de Gaulle was able to synthesize the often incoherent goals of the Fourth Republic and organize them into a compelling vision of strategy and status that has a wide appeal in France. (Harrison 1981:49)

Most importantly, Gaullism remained a powerful political force in French politics for decades, and successive Gaullist parties did little to eradicate the impression of anti-Americanism associated with them. Already in 1958, Alfred Grosser noted that during the past decade, anti-Americanism in France had "passed from the Left to the Right" (quoted by Furniss 1960:301), as the yearning for more independence, primarily a right-wing issue, "commingled with a more general sentiment of anti-Americanism" (ibid:302). De Gaulle's prominent opposition to aspects of United States foreign policy in this respect had the effect of cementing political anti-Americanism as primarily a right-wing phenomenon, if not in virulence (the French Communist Party, very loyal to Moscow, missed few opportunities to denounce the great exemplar of capitalism), then undoubtedly in importance, as the right wing in France has traditionally been the most powerful.

To the extent that the Fifth Republic can be termed the anti-American Republic – and, as was noted above, this can only be done by stretching the notion of anti-Americanism rather far – it is largely due to the ingrained perception at home and abroad that de Gaulle's policies were to some extent directed against the United States. It might not have been his intent, but it was an impression widely shared. The element of anti-Americanism associated with the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic became much more subdued after the General's departure from power, yet it did not disappear. Georges-Henri Soutou remarks that there has been "a widespread view that Franco-American relations have been consistently difficult at least since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle", yet he rightly asserts that the "reality is more

complex: the state of relations between France and the United States has not been a stable quantity but has instead oscillated over time, with a series of rifts and reconciliations” (in Andrews (ed.) 2005:102). Franco-American relations certainly improved after de Gaulle’s departure, but the image of France as a rather reluctant ally largely remained.

Even after de Gaulle’s departure from power, Franco-American relations remained characterized by friction, regardless of the numerous attempts at reconciliation initiated from both sides. This is especially the case as regards the contentious issue of the role of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe and not least the role of France within the Alliance. This has prompted some to conclude that the Franco-American rift has become “a structural rather than a cyclical problem within French politics” (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:123), yet there is reason to be cautious as regards the degree to which this should be interpreted as driven by political motives as such. First of all, the allegation that the political heirs of Charles de Gaulle are particularly prone to anti-Americanism clearly needs to be qualified. Though there is no doubt that as opposed to the majority of other European nations, political anti-Americanism can be found as easily on the Right as on the Left in France, the history of the Fifth Republic shows that, at least as far as Alliance policy is concerned, positions have shifted markedly between the two camps in terms of whether to strengthen transatlantic bonds or not. The Gaullist heritage – which itself built, as was shown above, on a long tradition of balancing independence with security – has certainly left its deep mark on all successive presidencies and governments. Yet when it comes to determining how this heritage has been administered, it seems that the Left has at times been more Gaullist in their approach than the Gaullists themselves – hence the term “Gaullo-Mitterrandism” (Boniface 1998:10). This was witnessed during especially Mitterrand’s last years in office as well as under Chirac’s *cohabitation* with the Jospin Government in 1997-2002. Conversely, the pro-American Giscard d’Estaing could not prevent relations from souring in the late 1970s (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:107), as indeed could not Jacques Chirac in the early 2000s in spite of the fact that he had previously attempted to bridge the transatlantic gap more forcefully than any of his predecessors. As was noted above, it is doubtful whether de Gaulle’s policies could be described as inherently anti-American, at least in their intent. Analyzing the policies of his successors, it becomes even more difficult to pass such a judgement. All of his successors attempted to improve transatlantic relations when they first came to power. Though relations have improved, at times even substantially, one is left with the impression that they all failed

in the end. Mitterrand might be the one of de Gaulle's successors, who most adroitly succeeded in durably improving relations, yet he never seriously diverged from Gaullist orthodoxy; his rapprochement with America was primarily dictated by circumstances, and after de Gaulle he was the one French president, who most successfully sought to erect Europe as a potential counter-power to the United States. Chirac's open rupture with the Gaullo-Mitterrandist heritage and his attempts at reintegrating France in NATO ended in acrimony and charges of anti-Americanism. Sarkozy, another supposedly pro-American president, has no doubt contributed to improving transatlantic relations not least by his decision to reintegrate France fully in NATO, yet he shows strong signs of the same kind of pragmatism characteristic of de Gaulle and Mitterrand (Vaisse 2008). Which of these presidents can best be characterized as bearers of Gaullism's torch? In style, Mitterrand is without doubt the strongest contender, but in substance, the picture becomes more muddled. Though there is no doubt that the Gaullist heritage remains present in French foreign policy, it would seem that it has largely come to transcend the political factions.

Second, improvement of Franco-American relations cannot be regarded as solely the responsibility of the representatives of France. Also American leaders bear their share of the responsibility for the state of relations between the two nations. The reading of the history of Franco-American relations since the Second World War might at first suggest that Republican presidents have overall been more successful in dealing with their opposite numbers in Paris than presidents from the Democratic Party: Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan and George H.W. Bush seem to have had better success in this respect than Roosevelt, Johnson or Carter. Yet as the presidencies of Truman, Kennedy and Clinton were marked by relatively good relations and the two-term presidency of George W. Bush by disastrous relations, such a reading is rather inconclusive. That the election of Barack Obama has been enthusiastically greeted in France as elsewhere in Europe is probably more due to the fact that he represents a radical change from the Bush-years than him being a Democrat, although the Democratic Party usually receives better media treatment in Europe than the Republican. A better suggestion is probably that those presidents who have showed understanding of the motives and aspirations driving French foreign policy have had an easier time treating with their French counterparts. Yet, though Johnson showed a rather good understanding of French motives (Schwartz, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:139-167), he endured more opposition than most from the Élysée, and while nothing suggests that Reagan

showed any special comprehension of French foreign policy traditions, he nevertheless presided over an America, which could count on France as a reliable ally in virtually all the major crises characterizing the 1980s. Though it seems obvious to conclude that the interpersonal dimension plays an important role in the bilateral relations between the two nations, the personal dimension probably has more of a multiplication effect, helping to improve or conversely contributing to worsen these relations, which remain primarily characterized by the degree of mutuality or complementarity of the two nations' national interests. This does not mean that the personal style of conducting foreign policy cannot have serious repercussions. Gordon and Shapiro have noted that though there were "clearly powerful structural, cultural, and historical factors that led America to launch a war on Iraq while most of Europe opposed it", it was "the philosophies, personalities, decisions, and mistakes of the leaders who happened to be in office in 2001-2003 that led to the depth of the transatlantic clash over Iraq" (2004:11). This is undoubtedly true, yet the first part of the statement is essentially as important as the second: Irrespective of personal styles, party affiliations etc., what seriously risks impairing a bilateral relationship is first and foremost the perception that the other part is engaged in policies which are regarded as misguided, dangerous, or contrary to one's own national interests. With respect to the Iraq war, it is clear that France and the United States were profoundly divided over the path to follow. As France's then Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, put it, the difference over Iraq was a struggle between "two visions of the world", and as such not only about policy, but also about first principles (Kagan 2004:1). Poor statesmanship, however, led this to develop into a serious strain in the bilateral relations.

Third, the very notion of French political anti-Americanism at times seems to have become the essential prism through which Franco-American relations are viewed. The advent of any new president in France immediately prompts the question of whether he is essentially Atlanticist or Gaullist, pro- or anti-American. This is a question rarely asked, at least not with the same natural ease, regarding other allied leaders. This suggests that from the onset, there is an expectation of difficult transatlantic times ahead – or the reverse, an optimism regarding the possibility of a 'normalization' of Franco-American relations, whatever that might entail. There is a risk that this apprehension may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, if expectations are not met. Throughout the last two decades, the question of France's position within the Atlantic Alliance has almost become a symbol of the current state

of Franco-American relations. Though no doubt fed by the at times rather shifting messages originating from Paris, it has become almost a kind of litmus test for how Atlanticist, and therefore pro-American, any new French administration could be regarded. Yet there are good reasons to question whether the issue of France's role within the Atlantic Alliance can be related to notions of French anti-Americanism. Georges-Henri Soutou has correctly argued that "the lack of a real solution to deep-seated Franco-American differences, including coming to grips with the relationship between NATO and a European foreign policy and defense identity, greatly contributed to the transatlantic break over Iraq in 2002-3" (in Andrews (ed.) 2005:112). Nevertheless, a strong political heritage of national independence and a wish for France to play a leading role in Europe and the wider world does not equal anti-American as such. Pascal Boniface has described the "Gaullo-Mitterrandist" heritage as

reposant sur la vision d'une France présente et active dans le monde, membre non soumis à un leader dans le camp occidental, indépendante grâce à sa puissance nucléaire et dont les nombreux atouts, le poids de l'histoire et son génie propre permettent de jouer un rôle important et original dans la gestion des affaires mondiales. (1998:10-11)

To the extent that the United States is seen as an obstacle toward achieving these goals, French foreign policy is bound to clash with America's designs. These goals, building on the central tenets of French national identity as it has developed over the last centuries, are not inherently motivated by anti-Americanism, though as was shown in chapter 5, they may certainly have contributed to a predisposition toward political (and cultural) anti-Americanism. Yet because these goals lead to a rejection of American dominance or tutelage, they are often perceived as directed against the United States. In terms of the strategic transatlantic relationship, the French policy of independence has in reality been a default position adopted gradually following the post-war realization that the United States was reluctant to treat France as an equal partner. Similarly, the French attempts at promoting a united Europe as a potential counter power to the United States essentially originated as a default position in order to achieve recognition of France's international role. At times the rhetoric surrounding this policy of relative independence has led to charges of anti-Americanism, just as the foreign policy actions of France, most notably the retreat from NATO's integrated structures in 1966 and the opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, have been interpreted as directed against the United States. With regard to the latter, there is no doubt, as Sophie Meunier notes, that "the escalating war of words with the United States triggered

atavistic reflexes of distrust” (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:133). Yet it would be an exaggeration to view France’s alliance policies primarily through the lenses of anti-Americanism. France has certainly been a difficult, at times even a reluctant, ally to the United States, but it has throughout remained an ally, steadfast in its commitment toward their common cause.

As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the ambition of the Fifth Republic has been throughout not so much to rival the United States, but rather to present France as a power of the first order; i.e. to achieve a degree of parity with America rather than to oppose it as such. Once it became clear that this parity could not be attained through the transatlantic cooperation within NATO, France attempted to use its influence in Africa and Europe to present itself as both an important political force on the international stage and a potential counter force to the United States. In this respect, there is a degree of rivalry, which can be seen especially in France’s African policies, but it is far from rivalry between equal opponents. Rather, while it is undoubtedly a rivalry born also naturally out of the two nations’ competing universalist ambitions, it is a rivalry, which has as its core a huge disparity of power. As such, French foreign policy under the Fifth Republic can be regarded in terms of rejection of the notion of American hegemony rather than as a serious aspiration toward erecting a new hegemony. In this respect, French efforts to present not least Europe as a potential counter power to the United States should be translated as an ardent desire for recognition of both France’s and by extension Europe’s will to influence world affairs as an (almost) equal to the United States. These efforts, however, have frequently been presented as rejection of not just American hegemony, but at times even of American power as such. Successive French presidents and governments may have attempted to resist American power, yet this can, as was argued above, only be partly explained in terms of political anti-Americanism. Though the actions and statements of successive political leaders make it difficult to altogether reject the frequently levelled charges of political anti-Americanism, it would appear that another dimension of anti-Americanism plays a much more important role within French society, namely cultural anti-Americanism. While it thus seems somewhat of an exaggeration to portray the Fifth Republic as the anti-American Republic at least in terms of political anti-Americanism, there may be better grounds to do so when we turn our attention to the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism.

6.2 The Cultural Front

While the political anti-Americanism of the Fifth Republic can largely, as was seen above, be traced to specific divergences between France and the United States and to a political rivalry between two nations eager to present themselves as leaders of the world or parts thereof, the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism presents some features, which set it apart from the political dimension. As will be shown, cultural anti-Americanism can be described as much as political anti-Americanism in terms of rejection of American power. As de Gaulle's policies regarding security and economic affairs were to a large degree motivated by a wish to escape being subordinated to American power, so has French cultural anti-Americanism throughout set out to contest America's (soft) power, both its power of attraction and its cultural and linguistic pre-eminence. There is, however, another side to French cultural anti-Americanism, one which is largely absent from the political ditto: the complete rejection of the most prominent examples of American culture. Richard Kuisel has noted how America in the interwar years was frequently denied a civilization at all (1993). With respect to cultural anti-Americanism, this is still often the case. As opposed to politically motivated anti-Americanism, which more often than not can be traced to a set of foreign policy attitudes which, while hardly subscribed to by France's allies, not least on the other side of the Atlantic, present a relatively coherent world view, cultural anti-Americanism also displays some baffling features, which border on the grotesque. When for example Alain de Benoist asserts that "Je préférerais encore être sous le joug de l'Armée Rouge que d'avoir à manger des hamburgers" (quoted by Bruckner 2002:82), one is inclined to agree with Paul Hollander and Charles Krauthammer (see chapter 2) that much anti-Americanism is indeed utterly irrational. Apart from the obvious fact that nobody forces the French to eat hamburgers (as we shall see below, they do it quite voluntarily – and in great numbers), the sense of disproportion displayed in the utterance is simply mind-blowing. Nevertheless, it is an utterance, which well captures the essence of the most virulent cultural anti-Americanism in France, in which the rejection of American culture is linked to the perception of the hegemony of American power, both hard and soft. Alfred Grosser has noted how the French denigration of American culture inherently contains a strong political dimension, as "la supériorité culturelle supposée doit compenser l'infériorité économique pour rétablir l'égalité" (1989:222). This explains why French cultural anti-Americanism at times seems stronger and more deeply embedded than the political ditto, and there is no doubt, as Pierre Guerlain

reminds us, that France more than any other country has come to be associated with a culturally based opposition to America (in Fender (ed.) 1996:135).

It was noted above how the leaders of the Fifth Republic, realizing that they could not achieve political power parity with the United States, instead attempted to design policies, which could enable France to achieve the maximum degree of independence possible in order to reduce the hegemonic influence of the United States. It was also suggested that the French leaders increasingly came to the realization that they were essentially fighting a losing battle, although they were mostly loath to admit so in public. As such, they have been forced toward a gradual reappraisal if not of the central tenets of their policies, which have remained largely unchanged, then of the means to accommodate them to the realities of power in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. On the cultural front, however, such a reappraisal, although present among some, does not seem to have acquired the same degree of unavoidability. Therefore, as political anti-Americanism in France has, bar sporadic resurgences due largely to situational factors, diminished over the years, cultural anti-Americanism has acquired the resemblance of the last stronghold against American power.

Cultural anti-Americanism in France builds largely on the same central tenets of French national identity identified in chapter 5, which also provide a base for French political anti-Americanism, and it often takes its cue from the standard stock of anti-American narratives delineated in 5.1.1. The remainder of this chapter will seek to explore how this cultural anti-Americanism has developed into what can almost be described as a stand off between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture and how, by extension, the agents of cultural anti-Americanism in France have attempted to depict this battle in terms of a defence of European cultural, moral, political, and economical values confronted by the threat of encroachment from across the Atlantic. But whereas the agents of political anti-Americanism in France have mostly, though not exclusively, been the leading political forces, and under the Fifth Republic especially the presidents, enjoying wide powers to formulate and conduct foreign policy, a prominent shaper of cultural anti-Americanism has been the relatively small group of *intellectuels*, who have been eager to balance France's decline in terms of power with an affirmation of the uniqueness of French culture. In truth, both the political and the intellectual elites have frequently found common cause in their rejection of American power and have thus acted as the primary agents of anti-Americanism in France. As Grosser notes as regards French attitudes toward the United States, "Il est

difficile de déceler les attitudes des Français autres que ceux qui composent le milieu politique et intellectuel” (1978:403). Max Weber has eminently described the agenda-setting role played by the intellectuals within the sphere of culture by characterizing them as “a group of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be ‘cultural values,’ and who therefore usurp the leadership of a ‘culture community’” (in Hutchinson and Smith (eds) 1994:25). As we shall see below, there is no doubt that Weber’s characteristic holds particularly true for the role played by the intellectuals in France. Before progressing with an analysis of the phenomenon of French cultural anti-Americanism, we therefore need to take a closer look at the primary agents of cultural Ameriphobia in France: the intellectuals.

6.2.1 The agents of cultural anti-Americanism

A singular specificity of French anti-Americanism is the role played by the intellectuals. Raymond Aron has noted that “In most countries, the intellectuals are even more anti-American than the man in the street” ([1955] 2001:224), yet it would seem that this is particularly the case in France, where the intellectual enjoys a privileged position. In her short, but highly informative study of French anti-Americanism, Sophie Meunier argues that “France has the deepest reservoir of intellectual argumentation against America of any country in Europe” (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:140). Her analysis leads Katzenstein and Keohane to include *elitist anti-Americanism* as one of two particularistic types of anti-Americanism in their broad typology of the varieties of anti-Americanism (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:35-36). Though, as was discussed in chapter 2, I am convinced that this variety of anti-Americanism can be explained also in terms of rejection of American power, Sophie Meunier is right in drawing our attention to the specific, elitist nature of much French anti-Americanism. As was shown in chapter 5, the long tradition of anti-Americanism in France began with the attacks of philosophers such as Georges de Buffon and the Abbé Raynal on the New World and later developed into critiques of the ‘American civilization’ – to the extent of course that the existence of any such civilization was acknowledged at all (Kuisel 1993:11). As France came increasingly to see America as a rival to their own *mission civilisatrice*, anti-Americanism came to the forefront of the preoccupations of France’s cultural elites and not least what came to be known in the dawning century as *les intellectuels*.

Although one can trace their antecedents to (at least) the philosophers of the Enlightenment, there is a “general consent” that the French intellectual as such was born out of the Dreyfus case that started in 1898 (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:198, see also Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397, Julliard 2008:225, and Sartre 1972:25). Though the noun ‘intellectual’ can be found sporadically in earlier writings such as those by for example Saint-Simon, Balzac or Renan (Julliard and Winock 1996:14), it was popularized during the vehement polemics surrounding the trial and imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus on charges of spying (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:198-199). The Jewish Captain Dreyfus had been framed in an attempt to cover up for the real culprit, the nobleman Colonel Esterhazy, an attempt that had the support and backing of the more traditional sectors of the French society, while a group of prominent writers such as for example Emile Zola rose in defense of the wrongly accused Dreyfus ([1896-1901] 1969). The Dreyfus case was not so much about the fate of one man but represented a battle between two visions of France: one traditional, supported by powerful institutions such as the military command and the clergy, and one eager to expound the values on which the republic was formally built. As such, it was a successor battle to the battle which had decades earlier been waged between supporters and opponents of *laïcité* (see chapter 5), and *in finis* to the struggle between the opposing forces of the Revolution, where the *Tiers État* had been pitted against the traditional pillars of pre-revolutionary French society. In the minds of these new intellectuals, it was a battle between the old conformist practices of yesterday, complete with bigotry and anti-Semitism, and the promise of a new century in which the constraints of the old order were discarded for good (Winock 1990:161-168). Though the Dreyfus case gave rise to the intellectual as a prominent voice in society, it was by no means a uniform group sharing the same opinions, but rather akin to a new caste of the highest order, consisting primarily of writers and philosophers – a caste, which felt that it had a natural and evident role in forming public opinion on moral, social, political, and cultural issues. Raymond Aron has described the intellectual as “the man of ideas and the man of science: He subscribes to a belief in Man and in Reason” ([1955] 2001:210). Perhaps this explains the fondness for intellectuals in “this Cartesian country which likes clarity of thought” (Imbert 1989:60): Rather than relying on the analyses provided by social experts or the declarations of politicians, the French have taken a fondness toward having the big debates eschewed by “a man of the cultural sphere, a creator and mediator, put in the position of the man of politics, a producer or consumer of ideology” (Ory and Sirinelli

quoted by Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:197). To Sartre, the intellectual was a “technicien du savoir pratique” or even a “technicien de l’universel” (1972:20 and 49). Though all societies can present a body of people specialising in defining norms and producing values (Julliard and Winock 1996:13), France can, as Aron noted already in 1955, easily be considered “the paradise of the intellectuals”¹²⁸, in which “Writers with no authority whatsoever can obtain large audiences even when they treat of subjects about which they quite openly boast of knowing nothing” ([1955] 2001:218 and 220). Jean-Paul Sartre, more than any other French intellectual at the receiving end of Aron’s sarcastic remark, actually seems to concur, as he himself has characterized the intellectual as someone who meddles in what does not concern him, namely politics (1972:12). To him, however, this was clearly a badge of honour.

Though the advent of the intellectual as a prominent group coincided with the Spanish-American war of 1898, which according to Roger gave French political anti-Americanism its “baptismal certificate” (2005:130), the heterogeneity of this new group meant that they frequently divided into several camps, either defending or vilifying the modernity, which America seemed to augur (Johnson 1996:143). And though this new caste of intellectuals participated toward the promotion of anti-American ideas at the dawn of the twentieth century (Roger 2005:130), it would be in the interwar years that the intellectual assault on America reached its apogee. At that time, according to Philippe Roger, “French anti-Americanism produced a decisive reference base: the intellectual Americanophobia of the 1920s and 1930s remains, even now, the unsurpassed crest of French anti-Americanism” (ibid:273). Building on the ideas expounded in works such as those by Baudelaire and Stendhal in the nineteenth century (see chapter 5), the primary line of assault on America would come not so much from the progressive intellectual forces, who had defended Dreyfus a quarter of a century before, but essentially from a new group of intellectuals, prominent in the interwar years: the traditionalists. They were “usually staunch French nationalists who believed in republican institutions [and were] drawn to the debate on American civilization by their concern for the future of Europe” (Strauss 1978:66). According to Stanley Hoffmann, an

important source of the intellectuals’ protest [had] been the decline of France’s role in the world since the turn of the century and particularly since the 1930s. To men who believed with almost equal fervor in the universality of France and civilization, who thought, with Durkheim, that French culture was the culture of civilized man everywhere and that France’s conception of patriotism reconciled

the nation with mankind, this decline could not but provoke new drives into utopias, in an attempt to regain lost universality. (1974:131)

Raymond Aron has similarly described the “attitude of the French intellectuals [as] determined by national pride and nostalgia for a universal idea” (2001:318). As such, it is not surprising that the “re-emergence of ‘intellectuals’ as an acknowledged category dates from the mid-1930s, when organisations of the left and right intensified their campaigning around the issues of war and peace” (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:200). Neither is it surprising that the focus of attention among some of them should turn toward the rising American power. As such, envy of American power and not least its successful universalism soon became what Fouad Ajami would later describe as “the ruling passion of French intellectual life” (2003:57). David Strauss has traced the modern origins of the traditionalist intellectual version of anti-Americanism to “the publication in 1927 of three major studies of the United States by André Siegfried, André Tardieu, and Lucien Romier” (1978:67). To Strauss, these works presented relatively “sober accounts” (ibid.) of the differences between French and American societies, whereas to Philippe Roger, they contributed to prejudice the French mind against America (2005:270-276). Roger nevertheless seems to agree (ibid.) with Strauss’ statement that the ideas of these writers “were disseminated in a somewhat more colourful and emphatic manner by other French intellectuals”, such as Georges Duhamel, Luc Durtain, and Paul Morand (Strauss 1978:67). What unites these writers and sets them apart from earlier contributors on life in the United States is essentially, reflecting Raymond Aron’s remarks reproduced above, the politicizing nature of their work: “The organizers of American imagery were no longer (or not principally, in any case) experts from all disciplines: the economists, political scientists, psychologists, or protosociologists whose views had overwhelmingly directed the late-nineteenth-century French gaze”, writes Roger (2005:270). Instead, the “great French purveyors of American images were now writers or “philosopher/writers” and were the most famous of them” (ibid:270). As such, “The triumphant anti-American discourse was no longer in need of expert authority” (ibid:271). This underlines the important role, which the intellectuals in France acquired with regard to the dissemination of images from America while reflecting their influence on French public opinion as such. Especially Georges Duhamel’s 1930 *Scènes de la vie future*, depicting “the horrendous transatlantic way of life as France’s ‘future’” (ibid:275), would prove influential as one of the most widely quoted works on whether American civilization threatened France

(Strauss 1978:69, Gordon and Meunier 2002:80) and bestow on its author the position “as the key anti-American spokesman of his generation” (Strauss 1978:70). Strauss further notes how the impact of these intellectual “authorities” was immense: “By 1931, it was virtually impossible for a French traveller or commentator to think about the United States without reference to one or more of the six authorities who had emerged in the period between 1927 and 1930” (ibid:69). The same year witnessed another publication, *Le Cancer américain*, whose title alone speaks for its content, ending with a portrait of the French as “prostitutes to the new Rome”, which America represented: “Submission, humiliation, assimilation: such was the plan for enslavement that the French anti-Americans would now unflinchingly denounce” (Roger 2005:274). To its authors, it almost seemed as if the plan had already been fulfilled. *Le Cancer américain*, “probably the most violent tract of the period, was also the most defeatist, the one that stated the most brutally that the American enemy had already won the fight, that the world already was his” (ibid:275). As can be seen, these works propagated the same cultural and socio-economic narratives (see 5.1.1), which would later constitute the essence of French cultural anti-Americanism. As the early establishment of anti-Americans was soon joined by writers and novelists such as Céline, whose 1932 *Voyage au bout de la nuit* would lend further credence to the anti-American discourse of the 1930s (ibid:184), the notion of an antithesis between France and America became so well entrenched in the French mind that it remained highly present even after the American participation in the liberation of France a decade later (Strauss 1978:269).

Though the 1930s marked the apogee of French cultural anti-Americanism in terms of virulence, it was arguably following the Second World War that the world began to take notice of the intellectual assault on America. The virulent anti-American attacks of prominent French writers in the interwar years were mostly for domestic consumption and rarely gave cause for much attention abroad. They were to a large extent one among many expressions of a bitter internal debate characterizing a deeply divided society in an age of extremes (to borrow Eric Hobsbawm’s phrase) in which conflicting ideologies based on notions of hate and superiority had captured the imagination of many leading thinkers. The situation following the liberation was very different indeed. The fascist ideology had been discredited in a France eager to erase the stain of the Vichy-years as much as possible, and open supporters or sympathizers such as Céline had been ostracized from all prominent intellectual circles, and with them had the most staunchly nationalist attitudes displayed by

the earlier traditionalist thinkers fallen into disrepute. This, however, by no means meant that the status of the intellectuals in France had been tarnished. Quite the contrary. In the period following the Second World War, the legend arose “that France has always been the privileged homeland of the intellectual” (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:193), and the postwar intellectual came to acquire a near-mythical status in France, giving them “a privileged role in articulating national identity” (ibid:205). This national identity was, as was illustrated above, beset by *la hantise du déclin*, especially vis-à-vis the rising American hegemony over the Western world, both politically and socially. The warnings against the Americanization of Europe issued in the 1930s seemed to have been confirmed by the postwar situation, where America set the standard in political, economic, social, scientific, and, increasingly, cultural matters. In this respect, as Alfred Grosser has noted, “Il n’y a ainsi rien de paradoxal dans la simultanéité de l’ « américanisation » et de l’antiaméricanisme” (1989:220). These anxieties were widely shared by the French public, and

Anti-Americans spoke for a large audience when they addressed three concerns. Injured national pride was one root of popular, but not necessarily visceral, anti-Americanism. [...] Second, American economic success inevitably attracted jealousy and resistance. [...] Third, at least for the elite, was the danger that America would export its mass culture, threatening the French conception of humanistic and high culture with adulteration by the technical values and products of mass culture. (Kuisel 1993:16-17)

Whereas the intellectual assault on America in the 1930s had been led by the traditionalists, the post-war elitist anti-Americanism united virtually all segments of the French literati, irrespective of their political affiliations (Roger 2005). On the eve of President Eisenhower’s visit to Paris in September 1959, a politically rather sympathetic observer as François Mauriac wrote of his admiration for the American President, “although nothing in me responds to the civilization he represents, against which I struggle, although it invades my own life and although each day I depend a little more on its techniques” (quoted by Newhouse 1970:7). Yet in the first decade following the liberation, the main criticisms against America would come from leftist writers. As Georges Duhamel had been the standard-bearer of his generation of anti-Americans, Jean-Paul Sartre would be the standard-bearer of his. To Sartre, the American man was “a man devoid of individuality who has risen to a universal impersonality” (quoted by Strauss 1978:261). In a diatribe against the new intellectual elites, Raymond Aron described early on how “No intelligentsia suffers as much as the French from the loss of universality, none clings so obstinately to its illusions, none would gain more from

recognising its country's true problems" ([1955] 2001:316). Among the illusions was the existence of an alternative to American hegemony. This alternative was not just a French or European counter model, although the notion of an antithesis between the New and the Old World continued to exist (Strauss 1978), but also the Communist experiment, which to some seemed well placed to combat the excessive materialism promoted by the United States (Wall 1983). The unfolding Cold War marked a clear ideological divide between left and right, between communism and capitalism, which led many intellectuals throughout Europe to sympathize with the Soviet Union and the emerging Eastern Bloc. The communist regimes were inherently anti-American by nature: they seemed to negate everything that characterized the United States, namely political, economic, intellectual, and spiritual freedom. Yet the intellectuals, always ready to decry any abuse of power in America vis-à-vis minority groups such as the Black communities in America, mostly failed to criticize any similar tendencies in communist countries, although they were plainly there to see. This was noted even by contemporary observers such as Raymond Aron, who decried the tendency of his fellow intellectuals of being "merciless toward the failings of the democracies but ready to tolerate the worst crimes so long as they are committed in the name of the proper doctrines" (quoted by Lieber 2005:194). Perhaps the postwar intellectuals found justification for their pro-communist stance in Sartre's denunciation of the false intellectuals, who did not side sufficiently with the real intellectuals in their defence of the oppressed of the world: As opposed to the "faux intellectuel", the real intellectual has "qu'un moyen de comprendre la société où il vit: c'est de prendre sur elle le point de vue des plus défavorisés" (1972:61). Thus,

Le véritable intellectuel, étant *radical*, ne se trouve, par là, ni moraliste ni idéaliste : il sait que la seule paix valable au Viêt-nam coûtera des larmes et du sang, il sait qu'elle commence par le retrait des troupes américaines et la cessation des bombardements *donc* par la défaite des Etats-Unis. En d'autres mots, la nature de sa contradiction l'oblige à *s'engager* dans tous les conflits de notre temps parce qu'ils sont tous – conflits de classes, de nations ou de races – des effets particuliers de l'oppression des défavorisés par la classe dominante et qu'il se retrouve, en chacun, lui, l'opprimé conscient de l'être, du côté des opprimés. (ibid:58)

The postwar leftwing intellectual, engaged in a struggle against the oppressive nature of the dominant class, namely the bourgeoisie with its "inhuman" goal of profit (ibid:59), was apparently prepared to side with, and thereby legitimize, a violent and repressive regime,

believing quite literally that the means justified the ends¹²⁹. Sartre attempted early on to justify this in a particularly twisted piece of rhetoric: Both the deportation of millions by the Russians and the lynching of a Black man in Alabama were “blâmable”, but the former was “un moyen d’arriver à une fin”, which, while not excusing it, nevertheless explained it, whereas the latter was a clear example of oppression, and thus much more objectionable ([1946] 1998:54-56). America naturally became the preferred enemy in this combat against oppression, and the leftwing intellectuals were helped by the rise of McCarthyism in America and the subsequent trial and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in 1953. These events played directly into the hands of the French communists, who as a result attracted such a growing number of intellectuals that the PCF came to think of itself as the “parti de l’intelligence” (Kuisel 1993:40). Conversely, America was represented as a “conspiracy against intelligence” in cultural terms as much as in political terms (Roger 2005:431). It was in those years that Sartre became the most prominent “*compagnon de route* of the PCF” (Kuisel 1993:50), and in a response to what he termed the “legal lynching” of the Rosenbergs, he declared in a notorious attack on the United States: “Watch out, America has rabies! We must cut all ties with it or else we shall be bitten and infected next” (quoted by Kuisel *ibid.*). Though McCarthyism and the Rosenberg trial provided an opportunity for the intellectuals to take to the polemic barricades in much the same way as their spiritual predecessors had done during the Dreyfus affair, there was a deeper, more structural logic behind the leftwing intellectual assault on America in the first years of the Cold War. First, it should be noted that at the time, much of the intellectual opposition to America was frequently coordinated by communist bodies such as the French Communist Party (PCF) and syndicates such as the CGT (Kuisel 1993), and as such the left wing literati let themselves become part of campaigns, which had clear political motives, as when the Marshall Plan was denounced as “a Trojan horse for French economic vassalization and above all as the first stage of a total war operation against the USSR” (Roger 2005:321). Second, by coining “such phrases as *marshallisation* or *coca-colonisation* to suggest the United States was trying to colonize France” (Kuisel 1993:38, see also below), communist propaganda successfully revived the interwar fears of American economic, political, and especially cultural domination of France. “The Communist use of the cultural self-defense discourse recycled, on the Left, an argumentative arsenal that had been stockpiled mostly on the Right before the war: cultural anti-Americanism became a patriotic duty” (Roger 2005:432). Borrowing from the anti-

American narratives which now became part of the standard repertory, French intellectuals, whether of the left or the right, voiced their opposition against this mounting threat. Sartre depicted the “oppressive character of modern America” as “due not only to the rise of mass society, but also to the persistence of Anglo-Saxon, Puritan hegemony” (Strauss 1978:261). In a piece called *Defending French Culture by Defending European Culture*, Sartre invited “France to abstain from all cultural relations with a country that has potential ‘superior’ to its own: namely America” (Roger 2005:440). To Roger, Sartre’s “anti-Americanism sprang from the affirmation of a now irremediable inequality between France and the United States” (ibid.), and the retaliation he proposed was retreat and abstention. This, according to Roger, “made Sartre a *systematic* anti-American, rather than an emotional one, and even more than he was a political one” (ibid.).

While the solution proposed by Sartre was more extreme than the one ascribed to by the majority of his fellow intellectuals, there is no doubt that the theme of cultural colonization, whether termed cultural imperialism or cultural Americanization, would prove the enduring core of the intellectual anti-American narrative throughout the twentieth century. At times, circumstances would dictate that other issues would come to the forefront, such as the denunciation of the American practices of segregation or the War in Vietnam, much as was the case with the earlier diatribes against McCarthyism. Sometimes, an intellectual work would prove agenda-setting as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s bestseller, *Le Défi américain*, which warned that American business in Europe was emerging as a new economic power, seriously threatening the independence of Europe’s economic and social systems (1967). The recurrent notion of the threat of the “American model” would frequently lead a number of French intellectuals to decry America as a “social dystopia”, fearing that this “American model” with its “predatory economy” was encroaching on the French society (Wacquant, in Bourdieu *et al* 1999:130-139). Nevertheless, the most enduring and most tenacious rejection of America would remain the rejection of its cultural impact in France. As we shall see below, the narratives typically centred on a denunciation of America as the Republic of Mass Culture, allegedly corrupting the mind of the masses. Seen from the viewpoint of the intellectuals, this was perfectly logical. The intellectual sees himself as a defender of cultural and political virtues. Politically, there has always been an intellectual inclination to take side in favour of the have-nots against the haves, as the former have typically been regarded as the oppressed and the latter as the oppressors (cf. Sartre *op. cit.*). As capitalist America clearly

represented the haves, the intellectual preference for supporting the political left and even the Communist Party had a certain logic, irrespective of the fact that by extension, they were supporting a political system, which seemed to negate everything else they stood for. Culturally, given the intellectuals' self-proclaimed role as "gatekeepers of culture", they were bound to react to "the vulgarities and excesses of mass culture [by contrasting] them with the moderation, good taste, and aesthetic values of *civilisation*" (Kuisel 1993:120-121). Even when intellectuals actually seemed to enjoy some of the cultural outputs from America, such as jazz music, "Validating these forms in France [was] inseparably linked to the fact that they [...] appeared [...] dissident or subversive within American culture" (Roger 2005, 443). Ludovic Tournès convincingly explains how jazz, massively adopted by the French in the wave of Americanophilia, which briefly swept the country following the liberation, increasingly came to be regarded as expounding counter-Americanism:

L'implantation du jazz en France s'accompagne en effet d'une réinterprétation de ce phénomène musical dont les qualités soulignées par la critique française vont se révéler autant d'arguments pour dénoncer les carences de la culture américaine. Cette réinterprétation se manifeste sur deux plans : l'un esthétique, qui consiste à opposer le jazz, forme d'art originale créée par la minorité noire, aux produits de la culture de masse américaine ; l'autre politique, l'affirmation de la négritude du jazz débouchant naturellement sur une dénonciation virulente du racisme et de la ségrégation en vigueur aux Etats-Unis. (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:170)

For Roger, this "taste for the American counterculture [became] anti-Americanism carried on by other means" (Roger 2005, 443). As one chronicler remarked in 1948: "ne confondons pas le *Reader's Digest* et Duke Ellington" (quoted by Tournès, in Mathé (ed.) 2000:171). An American institution such as *Reader's Digest* was bound to be rejected by the literati, as it constituted the perfect example of the vulgarization of culture, whereas jazz became interpreted, especially by communist circles in France, as "la résistance d'une minorité opprimée face à l'Amérique impérialiste aussi bien à l'intérieur de ses propres frontières qu'au-delà des océans" (ibid:180). Clearly, certain forms of American culture were more oppressive than others. Yet, as Kuisel has argued, "Setting humanistic *civilisation* against Americanization was an implicitly elitist defense" (Kuisel 1993:121). The same can be said for the rejection of mass culture; a culture which, as its name indicates, after all had wide appeal on the masses in France as elsewhere. This early on led Aron to question

why do the intellectuals not admit to themselves that they are less interested in the standard of living of the working class than in the refinements of art and life?

Why do they cling to democratic jargon when in fact they are trying to defend authentically aristocratic values against the invasion of mass-produced human beings and mass-produced commodities? ([1955] 2001:228)

In order to overcome this conundrum, some intellectuals took to evoking “the France of artisans, bistros, and *flânerie* to broaden their appeal and conceal their elitist self-interest” (Kuisel 1993:121). This provided the intellectuals with an alibi in their rejection of American mass culture: While advocating the virtues of both High Culture and the more traditional, national culture, they could repudiate the Americanization of culture as a threat toward French culture and French national identity as a whole.

In this, they found common cause with the political establishment. It may be, as Aron has noted, that the intellectuals often displayed despise for official France ([1955] 2001:229), yet as the years progressed, the bonds between the political elites and the intellectuals seem to have grown stronger. This was most likely due to the political changes taking place at the time both internationally and domestically, and it is especially clear that the two elites increasingly found common ground with respect to their rejection of American power. The year 1956 provided, as was noted above, a renewal of political anti-Americanism as a result of the Suez debacle, yet the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprisings the same year also discredited the communist regimes in the eyes of many French intellectuals, including Sartre, who pronounced “a plague on both houses” (Wall 1983:214). As a result, while rightwing anti-Americanism rose once again, leftwing anti-Americanism became somewhat more subdued, as the attraction of the communist alternative became tarnished by the political realities. In its manifestations, rightwing and leftwing elitist anti-Americanism increasingly merged into one, as the typical anti-American discourses came to acquire an air of mainstream, non-partisan denunciation of the American Other, especially with regard to its cultural impact (Roger 2005). Following de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, the recurrent official displays of vocal or tacit opposition to the American hegemon gave French presidents a particular resonance among the influential cultural elites, seemingly legitimizing a discourse which they had pursued for years. The strong Fifth Republic also gave the French presidents a higher power of patronage over the intellectuals who, while as keen as ever to present themselves as independent of political power, nevertheless enjoyed the privileges extended to them by official France, who often mobilised them for external representation as “cultural ambassadors” (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:201). During the following decades,

their “dissident stance [...] did not prevent them from being national treasures” (ibid:204), and though some of their declarations may at times have been inconvenient for any particular government, there was underpinning all their controversies with official France “a prior commitment to the primacy of the French nation, as incarnated by the state” (ibid:204-205). In many cases, this led to a close cooperation between the intellectuals and the political elites. Mahoney has described how de Gaulle and his minister for culture, the novelist André Malraux, “had a reciprocal need for each other”, with Malraux providing de Gaulle “with the opportunity for genuine intellectual dialogue about his reflection on his ‘certain idea of France’” (1996:52). There is another dimension to the close connection between the intellectuals and the political elites in France: Just as the intellectuals have consistently sought to influence politics, so have leading French politicians been keen to present themselves as men of literature as well as *homo politicus*. Already in 1955, Raymond Aron noted that “The political ambitions of successful French novelists collide with the literary ambitions of French statesmen, who dream of writing novels just as the others dream of becoming Ministers” ([1955] 2001:219). Just as writers and intellectuals such as André Malraux, Maurice Druon, or Luc Ferry have found it natural to move into the ministerial offices of the Fifth Republic, so do French political leaders seem to have a natural inclination toward presenting themselves not just as avid consumers of literature, as when President Mitterrand at one point “declined to see Reagan on the pretext that he was re-reading Lamartine” (Bell 2005:180), but even as producers of literature in their own right. The high literary quality of de Gaulle’s memoirs has frequently been mentioned by his biographers (e.g. by Hoffmann 1974), yet it is even more interesting to note the penchant of several of his successors toward publishing not just political writings, but also historical or literary novels. There is no doubt that the “bookishness” of especially François Mitterrand served to give an added impression to his reign, namely that he was “the President of the Republic of Letters” as well as of the Fifth Republic (Bell 2005:180), thus incarnating both worlds. Even more telling are perhaps the great efforts undertaken by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in order to become elected as a member of the Académie Française following the publication of his romantic novel *Le passage*. Though it caused much furor among literary circles, who felt that the former president had not given proof of the necessary literary qualities for him to become one of the *immortels*, it underlined the strong link between the political and intellectual circles, both within in literary

society as such and within the Académie, which had on other occasions shown a penchant toward electing prominent politicians to its vacant seats.

Not only have the intellectuals and the political elites shared many of the same passions and ambitions; their displays of anti-Americanism seem to have been mutually nourishing. As such, there has been an evident link between political and cultural anti-Americanism, especially in the first decades of the Fifth Republic. The postwar intellectual onslaught on America reached its apogee at the height of the Vietnam War (Roger 2005), which also saw the culmination of the intellectuals' influence on French society. By the mid 1970s, however, "there was a noticeable increase in anti-intellectualism in France, reflected in prolonged bouts of self-questioning among the intellectuals themselves" (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:205, see also Pinto, in Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990). The gradual political rapprochement with the United States combined with the declining role of the intellectuals as the privileged articulators of France's national identity (ibid.) meant that elitist anti-Americanism lost much of its bite in the following decade. Meanwhile, the leftist cultural and intellectual drift, overwhelmingly strong in the decades leading to May 1968, had since then witnessed a sustained period of deceleration (Crozier, in Hoffmann and Kitromilides (eds) 1981:106). Kristin Ross asserts that "to be called anti-American in France in the 1980s was tantamount to being accused of fascist tendencies, Stalinist tendencies, or both at the same time – a kind of post Arendtian red-brown fusion" (in Ross and Ross 2004:150). That clearly is an overstatement, though it is true that during the decade marked in France by the political triumph of socialism, French anti-Americanism, both political and cultural, seemed to be on the decline. This was to a large extent due to an increasing "normalization" of the French political landscape in the 1980s (Collard, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:30-43): The communist party, historically strong by Western standards as well as uniquely faithful to Moscow (Wall 1983), had drawn successfully on the French Revolutionary past. Yet over the decades leading up to the 1980s, it had been steadily losing in support. Paradoxically, its entry into the socialist-led government in 1981, the first time it partook in government since the first years of the Fourth Republic (Chevallier and Conac 1991), accelerated its demise as a political factor of the first order. Governmental responsibility greatly hampered its ability to project itself as a moral and political, and even more so a revolutionary, counterforce to the mainstream political establishment at home at a time when the succession of ailing leaders in Moscow undermined the luster of its closest ally

abroad. As such, the advent of the Mitterrand presidency “demobilized many left-wing intellectuals” at a time when leading intellectual figures such as Sartre, Beauvoir, or Foucault disappeared (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:206). Meanwhile, the French Right, historically strong in France, found itself engaged in rivalry both between the Gaullist party of Jacques Chirac and the more centrist party of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and frequently also within the parties, while a growing ultranationalist and xenophobic Front National gathered the votes of the discontents (Chevallier and Conac 1991). Most importantly, the General’s political heirs turned out to be less Gaullist and more traditionally conservative than their mentor (Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xvii), although the Gaullist heritage still left its mark on the party as well as indeed on the French society as a whole. Until the 1980s, anti-Americanism had been a common feature both of the Communist Left (Bell, in Godin and Chafer 2004:47-60) and of the nationally oriented Gaullist Right, whose principal rallying call had been to recreate France’s *grandeur* in a world increasingly dominated by the rivaling superpowers. In the political climate of the 1980s, virulent anti-Americanism seemed to belong more and more to a different age (Hollander 1995:384), although more subtle critiques of America’s influence on the French society continued unabashed. Simultaneously, a new wave of French philosophers and opinion-makers, hitherto more or less a bastion of intellectual anti-Americanism, began to applaud the nation that had so long been presented as France’s *bête noire* (Lawday 2003:33). Among these “philos-Américains”, as Serge Halimi has called them (Halimi 2000a:10), we find such men as André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Pascal Bruckner (ibid, and Ross, in Ross and Ross 2004:145 and 150) keen to present themselves as defenders of Western, and as such also American, values at the moment when the Cold War was drawing to a close. The following decades would see a growing focus of French intellectuals on their nation’s animosity toward the American other. Jean Baudrillard, described by Paul Hollander as “one of the most extreme examples of a Western anti-Americanism” (2007), or by Lacorne and Judt as “so extreme that it does not lend itself to rational interrogation” (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:2), did in fact deliver a much more nuanced picture of America in his *Amérique* (1988) than in his previous writings (Østergård 1989). Jean-François Revel would deliver a resounding critique of the “anti-American obsession” (Revel 2002), while Philippe Roger would present the most comprehensive account to this day of France’s long tradition of denigrating its “American Enemy” (Roger [2002] 2005). Bernard-Henri Lévy would travel to

America attempting to retrace Tocqueville's footsteps, resulting in his *American Vertigo* (2006), like Baudrillard's *Amérique* a relatively positive, though not uncritical portrait of a nation that had caught the fascination this new generation of intellectuals. The reading of early pro-American thinkers, like Raymond Aron, belatedly came back in fashion (Bruckner 2002:45). Although Aron was far from being apologetic toward the United States and its influence on the West, his resoundingly liberal approach to philosophy and politics had for long rendered him unpalatable to the mainstream intellectual circles, where the fashionable dictum was well into the 1970s that it was better "to be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron" (Østergård 1989:6 and 1992:169). As France was celebrating the bicentennial of its revolution in 1989, Claude Imbert predicted the end of French exceptionalism, "the particularly French passion which leads intellectuals and politicians to want to build society according to theoretical constructs" (1989:48). To Imbert, this exceptionalism was "born from a revolutionary mythology and it is dying at a time when that mythology is fading away" (ibid.). As the twentieth century was drawing to a close, there appears to have been other, more prosaic reasons for the declining position of the intellectuals in France. According to Michael Kelly, it would seem that they had become the victims of the mass culture they so fervently rejected: The growth of the mass media, with its insatiable demand for celebrities, would, while giving them access to voicing their opinions to larger audiences, at the same time contribute to their demise, as they now became "just another group of talking heads" (in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:206).

There is no doubt, however, that as agents of anti-Americanism, the intellectuals have left a deep imprint on the French society. The intellectuals' part in "constituting and transmitting" anti-American discourses has, as Philippe Roger notes, been "eminent but not exclusive. [...] But the intellectuals' greatest success was the wide spread of their discourse. The French public gradually adopted the polemical argumentation and the negative stereotyping produced by the intelligentsia" (2005:449-450). In this, they were largely joined by the political establishment, as keen as the intellectuals to promote the primacy of culture as one of the main attributes of French national identity. During the first three decades of the Fifth Republic, anti-Americanism had been largely the project of the elites. As the political and intellectual elites gradually lost their monopoly of shaping public imagination in the late 1980s and early 1990's, new and more popular voices rose in rejection of America. While building on the same discourses, which the intellectuals had used to "conceal their elitist self-

interest” (Kuisel 1993:121), these voices would originate from the deeper roots of eternal France, fighting to uphold traditional values in an increasingly Americanized world. In the battle between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture, intellectual, political, and popular forces would join hands in defence of the last vestige of perceived French superiority: culture.

6.2.2 The Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture

As was seen in chapter 5, the importance put on culture – and not least the way in which France has typically portrayed itself as the Republic of High Culture as a further affirmation of its *mission civilisatrice* – has had a profound influence on the French national habitus. The end of the Second World War saw the unwelcome confirmation that France’s political primacy was irredeemably a thing of the past. As the political elites were slowly coming to terms with navigating in an international setting, in which France’s hard power was relatively limited, the cultural and intellectual elites were becoming increasingly alarmed by the growing impact of America’s soft power and not least of the power of attraction of America’s mass culture, already a threatening specter in the interwar years, but one which now seemed poised to make an even more substantial foray into the hearts and minds of liberated Europe. Zeldin has described how

reflexion on the American experience, which was so different to that of France, caused many Frenchmen to redefine their own culture, to stress its originality and to defend it more self-consciously in the face of the power which by 1940 was clearly surpassing it in an increasing number of fields. (1977:126)

Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, intellectuals, artists, practitioners, and political circles would unite in an almost uniform rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture. This rejection would essentially centre around three dimensions: First the cultural dimension itself, which often became translated into a rejection of the nature of the cultural outputs originating from the United States. Rejection of these cultural outputs largely followed the same discourses, which had been formulated throughout more than a century in France, depicting America as culturally sterile and devoid of artistic originality. The second dimension was associated with the global spread of America’s culture, which seemed to validate latent and present fears of an increasing Americanization of French culture, thus raising the spectre of a new cultural imperialism. Already present in the interwar years, this dimension would prove one of the most enduring bases for the rejection of American culture

in France following the Second World War, as France's own cultural impact abroad seemed to be fading, at least when compared to that of the United States. Charges of America's cultural imperialism or cultural domination of other societies became a permanent feature of the rejection of American culture in France. This was hardly surprising, as "claims about cultural domination are frequently made [by] nations which have historically been colonisers rather than colonised" (Tomlinson 1991:19). As such, America's ability to export its cultural products and values were a further testimony to its successful universalism in an area, where French cultural elites had long enjoyed primogeniture. Furthermore, it added an economic dimension to the culturally based anti-American discourses, which would become fully operational by the 1990s as the fight against globalization became the rallying call of great parts of the French elites, thus accentuating the considerable overlap between soft power and hard power. The third dimension centers on issues of national identity and typically acquired the form of a linguistic dimension, whereby culture became seen largely in national terms and where the rejection of foreign encroachment on France's cultural turf became essentially viewed through the prism of the mounting threat of linguistic domination. Just as resistance against any erosion of the influence of the French language abroad, and especially in the spheres of influence offered by the system of *la Francophonie*, became an important feature of French foreign policy, so did the rejection of American culture come to acquire clear overtones of the mounting threat of linguistic domination, both at home and abroad. It was first and foremost the encroachment of English on the French language, which was targeted, but as the effects of globalization on culture became a prominent theme among cultural circles in France, the fight for cultural diversity became a thinly veiled attack on what was perceived as a process of global Anglicization, spearheaded by such American cultural powerhouses as Hollywood.

These dimensions were highly interlinked and have remained so until this day. It is no accident that the discourses surrounding French perceptions toward the Republic of Mass Culture typically appear interwoven into a monolithic rejection of cultural America: as we shall see below, some of the most illustrative examples of French resistance toward the Republic of Mass Culture incorporates all three dimensions so forcefully that they appear almost as one. While some of the examples of France's rejection of American culture may approach parody, as with the denunciations of EuroDisney as a "cultural Chernobyl" (Lieber 2005:99, Gordon and Meunier 2002:85, see also below), there is no doubt that a large number

of the French, and especially among the intellectuals, are seriously worried about what they perceive as a process of degeneration of French culture, and one which is largely driven by American style products of mass culture, whether originating from the United States as such or whether copied from the American example. At the same time, it is a fact – rarely mentioned by the defenders of France’s rich tradition of regarding itself as the Republic of High Culture – that the products of mass culture are consumed in great numbers by the French. It would thus be wrong to characterize the majority of the French as opposed to American or American-style products of mass culture, since they appear, as we shall see below, to be avid consumers of these products. Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to the perceived Americanization of French culture among the cultural and political elites, and as they enjoy privileged access to the agenda setting medias, they have succeeded in presenting this opposition as a ‘French’ opposition against the American cultural steamroller.

There are numerous examples of clashes between what one might call the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture. This section will focus on four, which are indicative of both the tone of cultural anti-Americanism in the post-war period and the extent to which cultural anti-Americanism has transcended into political anti-Americanism: First the affair of Coca-Cola in the late 1940s and early 1950s, second the campaign against *le franglais* in the 1960s, third the cinematographic “culture wars” of the early 1990s, and fourth the fight against *la malbouffe* later in the same decade. All four examples show the connection between cultural, economical, social and political anti-Americanism building on the three dimensions of cultural rejection delineated above; in all four instances, political and intellectual forces have joined hands in rejecting the supposedly opprobrious attributes of American power; in all four cases, they have mobilized significant proportions of the French to take a stance in rejecting U.S. power; and in all four instances, this has been presented in terms of a protection of the French national identity in the face of American hegemony. All four examples demonstrate how rejection of ‘cultural Americanization’ has been presented in terms of defence of France’s national identity and that in essence, this has taken the form of a consistent rejection of America’s soft power. The first two examples may appear somewhat dated today, but nevertheless contributed to set the tone for the later two, which have substantially influenced French attitudes vis-à-vis the United States in the later years.

The Coca-Cola affair

An early warning of what was in waiting on the cultural front came with the Coca-Cola affair of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Though the incident is today largely forgotten, it nevertheless provides a good example of not just the type of denigration which a quintessentially American product such as Coca-Cola was subjected to in France, but also of the interplay between political, industrial and cultural forces in their combined attempt at combating the perceived Americanization of the French society. Though Coca-Cola had been introduced to a European public already in the interwar years, it was the Second World War, which “transformed Coca-Cola into a truly international beverage and a global American icon” (Pells 1997:199). At the end of the war, the Coca-Cola Company was able to substantially enlarge its operations throughout Western Europe, yet in several European countries, it met with opposition from not least local producers of rival beverages, who feared that the growing popularity of Coca-Cola would jeopardize their industries (ibid:200). The opposition was, as Richard Pells notes, “fiercest in France” (ibid.), and it was not confined to commercial rivals fearing for their livelihood. As Richard Kuisel notes in his detailed study of the affair¹³⁰, the disturbances encountered by the Atlanta firm elsewhere in Europe “were trivial compared to the controversy that erupted when Coca-Cola arrived after 1945 in France” (1991:100). A massive campaign against the American soft drink was mounted in an unholy alliance between the French Communist Party, lobbyists from the beverage industries, influential medias such as *Le Monde* and more centrist catholic newspapers, officials in government agencies, and even prominent members of the government of the young Fourth Republic. The allegations were not only that Coca-Cola threatened the sale and consumption of local beverages, or even that it threatened the nation’s balance of payments with the United States, but also that it was addictive or even potentially toxic due to the presence of caffeine, phosphoric acid, and not least the mysterious trace ingredient, the secret formula called “7X”, which had to be imported from the United States (Kuisel 1991, Wall 1991). From 1948 to 1953, attempts were made to outright ban “the sale of Coca-Cola for reasons of public health and on economic grounds, that is, to protect domestic [...] interests from the unfair competition of the ‘American trust’” (Kuisel 1991:106-107). Though some of the charges levelled against the Atlanta firm were echoed throughout much of Western Europe, what gave the affair a singularly Gallic twist was the fierceness of the opposition as well as the blatantly anti-American discourse surrounding the rejection of Coca-Cola in France. It was a characteristic

discourse, and one which while building on the anti-American indictment from the interwar years, would set the tone for much of the rejection of American culture in the decades to follow. The communist daily, *L'Humanité* predicted that the invasion of Coca-Cola was “part of the Marshall Plan’s strategy of colonizing France” (ibid:101). Communist propaganda “coined such phrases as *marshallisation* and *cocacolonisation* to expose the United States’ colonizing strategy”, and even “charged that the Coca-Cola distribution system would double as an American espionage network” (ibid., see also Wall 1991:123). Though the fight against Coca-Cola was driven largely by the Communists and their allies, it “exploited [a] deepening anxiety among the French about the United States”, invoking “the alleged submissiveness of the Fourth Republic toward its Atlantic ally, and the threat of American economic and cultural domination” (Kuisel 1991:102).

The choice of Coca-Cola as an object of rejection was hardly accidental: As Richard Kuisel notes, “Perhaps no commercial product is more thoroughly identified with America than Coca-Cola” (ibid:97). Neither was it surprising that the Communist Party should lead the charge against the American soft drink. In 1948, the Coca-Cola company itself described its product as the “Essence of capitalism” (Chuter 1996:214), and no product could better epitomize the Republic of Mass Culture than this soft drink, which one company official once called “the most American thing in America” (Kuisel 1991:97). In a major essay on the affair, *Le Monde* described how Coca-Cola represented the coming cultural invasion from America: “What the French criticize is less Coca-Cola than its orchestration, less the drink itself, than the civilization – or as they like to say, the style of life – of which it is the symbol” (quoted by Kuisel ibid:113). Even if the opposition against Coca-Cola “comportait un élément de pur protectionnisme économique” (Gordon and Meunier 2002:82), the greatest challenge posed by Coca-Cola was not perceived to be toward the livelihoods of French beverage producers, but toward French, and by extension, European culture (ibid.). In a later article, *Le Monde* described Coca-Cola as “the Danzig of European culture” (quoted by Kuisel 1991:113). Richard Kuisel has described “the war over Coca-Cola” as “a symbolic controversy between France and America” (ibid:116), in which “resisting Coca-Cola was a way of expressing latent French uneasiness about American domination” (ibid:108). Irwin Wall concurs, describing Coca-Cola as well as Hollywood imports as

symbols of something much deeper, a penetration of America into the national psyche, [which prompted] an awakening to the new reality of French weakness

and American power, and a resentment against the brutal ways in which the United States often appeared to want to use its power. (1991:126)

Though the Coca-Cola affair subsided in 1953, it left its clear mark on France: Well into the 1990s, the French would drink significantly less Coca-Cola than other Western Europeans (Kuisel 1993:68, Kuisel in Beck, Sznaider and Winter (eds) 2003:109, and Hays 2004:269) and, more importantly for the purposes of this study, it signaled the rise of a new type of anti-American argumentary, in which diatribes against the marshallization and cocacolonization of France would soon become replenished with a rejection of the hollywoodization, disneyfication, and mcdonaldization of European societies (Ritzer 2000). And as with the diatribes against the latter, it was a perfect example of an anti-American discourse, which might have purported to present itself as an advocate of the consumer, but which fundamentally had other interests at heart. As the affair was drawing to an end, the leaders of the Fourth Republic having succumbed to substantial political pressure from Washington to end the charade, the daily *Témoignage Chrétien* concluded that Coca-Cola was neither a poison nor more dangerous than Pernod. Nevertheless, “we must call a spade a spade and label Coca-Cola for what it is – the avant-garde of an offensive aimed at economic colonization against which we feel it’s our duty to struggle” (quoted by Kuisel 1991:112). A few years later, as Charles de Gaulle returned to power, the offensive against cultural and economic colonization would be rejoined by a struggle against political and military colonization, and a decade later these discourses would find a potent unifying rallying call in the campaign against *le franglais*, which under the banner of linguistic self-defense represented a broad campaign to reverse the perceived erosion of France’s national identity, which was uniformly depicted as a result of the Americanization of French society.

The campaign against le franglais

At the same time as anti-Americanism seemed to have received the political approbation from the highest office of the Fifth Republic (see above), René Étiemble, a linguist and prominent sinologist who had lived and worked several years in Chicago, published his *Parlez-vous franglais?* ([1964] 1991). Étiemble’s book was an instant success, and it would set the tone for the linguistic rejection of America for generations to come. Apart from his popularizing the term ‘*franglais*’, commonly attributed to Max Rat (Zevaco and de Saint Robert 1999:61), and soon to enter the French vocabulary as a standard reference to the colonization of French

by the encroaching English language, he became the most prominent source of inspiration for a subsequent campaign to cleanse the French language from the invasion of English and American idioms and loan words. Étiemble's book was a visceral tract against not just the growing spread of the English language among the French, complete with the well known fears of a degeneration of the French language, but also a forceful rejection of the invasion of American ideas, fashions, and cultural products, all of it huddled together in a scathing attack on the "false friends" from across the Atlantic (Étiemble [1964] 1991:416). Written in a rather rambling style, which is not without humor, it nevertheless clearly set out to warn against both the spreading epidemic of *le franglais* and of the growing cultural Americanization. The following passage is illustrative of the tone:

On ne nous l'envoie pas dire : nous devons parler anglais, ou mieux américain, afin de *penser comme* des Yanquis, et de nous laisser évaporer sans rechigner par « la manière américaine de vivre », *the best in the world*. Et si, moi, j'ai horreur de voir des vaches sacrées mâchonner du chewing-gum, et même du chouine gomme, et même de la gomme à mâcher ? Et si, moi, j'ai horreur du Ku Klux Klan et de la « ségrégation » ? Et si on m'a foutu à la porte d'un restaurant, près de Chicago, parce que je m'y trouvais en compagnie d'une belle juive, mais au visage un peu marqué ? Et si j'ai failli me faire foutre à la porte de mon appartement, en plein Chicago, parce que j'avais exigé d'y recevoir *une fois* un de mes camarades français, professeur comme moi, mais Antillais ? Et si vingt autres valeurs de « la manière américaine » de *penser* me révoltent, [...] me jettera-t-[on] au trou, en tant que je refuse de devenir buveur de Coca-Cola ou de Pepsi-Cola [...] ? Et si j'ai horreur des civilisations de l'argent, moi ? Pour servir proprement les desseins du S.H.A.P.E., faut il donc que les Français commencent par avaler, langage compris, la civilisation cocalcoolique ? La vérité, c'est qu'on nous fait jargonner américain afin de nous conduire à l'abattoir les yeux bandés. (ibid:272-273)

The anti-American tone is palpable. The references to the Ku Klux Klan or the policies of segregation are testimonies to the fact that Étiemble has not just embarked on a crusade to save the French language from degeneration; his diatribes against America clearly take the form of a rejection of America's cultural, economic, political, and not least racial practices. The reference to SHAPE, NATO's Supreme Headquarter of the Allied Powers in Europe, then located in France, highlights that the rejection of France's perceived military dependence on its American ally was not just confined to the political circles, though Étiemble gives it a nice linguistic twist: "si l'on a fait l'effort de traduire en sigle français *O.T.A.N.* le sigle anglo-saxon du Pacte atlantique, *N.A.T.O.*, on n'a pas jugé nécessaire, ou poli, de nous gratifier d'un *S.H.A.P.E.* à la française" (ibid:270). At the time when de Gaulle forcefully moved toward

reducing French political and military dependence of the United States, Étiemble judged that France had already paid too high a price for its alliance with the Anglo-Saxons:

Deux guerres en trente ans, où nous fûmes alliés des Anglo-Saxons, précipitent notre asservissement. Pour triompher de l'Allemagne, s'il faut que la France abandonne sur les champs de bataille, outre des millions de cadavres, le cadavre de sa langue, à quoi bon tant de sang, tant de ruines, tant de bêtise ? (ibid:269)

For Étiemble, the French language was the most sacred of France's patrimony, and defense of the French language was thus a moral, cultural, and political imperative: "Détruisez la langue française [et] il ne nous reste plus que le patois d'une chétive colonie de l'impérialisme yanqui" (ibid:386). As noted in chapter 5, the debates surrounding the use of English terms and loan words go back at least to the eighteenth century (see also Hagège 1987:17-23), yet it was the publication of *Parlez-vous franglais?*, which "brought the issue to the attention of a wider public and away from the relatively narrow circle of academicians and literary critics where it had been discussed until then" (Thody 1995:15). As Philippe Roger notes, Étiemble's work largely build on the legacy of anti-American rhetoric, which had been used in the interwar years in such works as *Le Cancer américain*, going so far as to describe the colonizing effects of *le franglais* as "*le cancer yanqui*" (2005:274-275). To Étiemble, the expression "cancer" was to be taken quite literally: "Pour que vive le franglais, sachons-le, il faut que crève la France: ce peu qui nous reste" ([1964] 1991:420), are the concluding remarks of his book. As Claude Hagège, one of the most distinguished French linguists has noted, there was a clear chronological link between the rise of linguistic purism and mounting political "Americanophobia" in the early 1960s: "L'harmonie, sinon la relation osmotique, est éclatante entre la foi gaullienne en une mission civilisatrice de la France et le chauvinisme linguistique qui inspire la conception du français comme bien inaltérable de la nation et précieux héritage culturel" (1987:111). Hagège further notes that in this respect, the fight against *le franglais* builds largely on the sense of national decline, which manifested itself throughout the 1950s: "L'anti-américanisme comme réaction passionnelle d'une nation dépossédée de son ancienne puissance et supplantée par les États-Unis, soit d'une manière occulte, soit d'une manière qu'elle juge ouvertement humiliante [...] se saisit de l'alibi linguistique" (ibid:111). Yet according to Hagège, it was an alibi, which was not funded in any stringent linguistic analysis of the impact of English on the French language. While the period since the end of the Second World War had clearly seen an important rise in the use of English and American idioms and loan words, Hagège demonstrates convincingly that seen

from a linguistic perspective, this had little if any impact on the fundamental structures and mechanisms of the French language (ibid:24-74). Hagège even states that “rien n’indique que la langue française soit aujourd’hui submergée par un raz-de-marée d’anglicismes” (ibid:71), concluding that “Ainsi, la condamnation des emprunts américains, loin d’être fondée sur la réalité d’une menace, n’est que l’expression détournée d’un anti-américanisme nourri par la nostalgie du prestige d’autrefois” (ibid:113). And unable to alter the global redistribution of forces, which had relegated France to second position in the international system, “les nostalgiques de la puissance française s’emparent de ce domaine innocent de représentations du monde, la langue, toute docile et toute prête à servir comme enjeu” (ibid:109).

Though Étiemble’s book today “comes across as stupefyingly brutal” (Roger 2005:333), it had a huge impact and set much of the tone of cultural anti-Americanism not just in the 1960s, but also in the following decades, as can be witnessed by its being reissued in an impressive number of editions and by its style being copied by others, as in Daniel Schneidermann’s denunciation of the “nouvel espéranto américano-mondial” (1995:44). Not only did Étiemble’s book prove an instant success among its readers, it also provoked successive governments to take action against the perceived encroachment of English on the French language. In the preface to the tenth anniversary edition, Étiemble applauded that since the first publication of his book, “le gouvernement a pris plusieurs des mesures que je préconisais pour lutter contre un fléau qui nous livre à l’impérialisme yanqui” ([1964] 1991:21). These measures were followed by the Bas-Lauriol law (loi no 75-1349 du 31 décembre 1975 relative à l’emploi de la langue française), which in December 1975 was unanimously approved in the National Assembly, stipulating that French must be used whenever describing, offering or presenting goods or services for sale, thus restricting the commercial freedom to use foreign loan words (Thody 1995:10-11). The best known attempt at curbing the spread of English words in the French language is probably the Toubon law of 1994 (loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l’emploi de la langue française), which sought to update the Bas-Lauriol law by ensuring that all official communication or any texts with legal force should be in French. Punishments, ranging from fines to imprisonment, were to be levied on those contravening the law (Ager 1997), and the Toubon legislation even “took the precaution of sounding out the Commission first and using the 1992 Constitutional amendment and the GATT negotiations on the cultural exclusion concession [see below] to get the Act through and make sure it could be presented as part of anti-American, pro-

European legislation rather than simply anti-English” (ibid:41). During the debates over the Toubon law, it became clear that the major threat against the French language was perceived as originating from the other side of the Atlantic rather than from across the Channel. Bruno Bourg-Broc, a member of the Gaullist RPR, remarked in the National Assembly that France should “Lutter contre l’hégémonie linguistique, fer de lance d’une hégémonie culturelle et économique” (quoted by Thody 1995:36), and the opposition Communist Party could not agree more, declaring its full support to the Toubon law, which after all had as its aim to defend French culture against “l’impérialisme culturel américain” (ibid:37). Defenders of the law continuously reiterated that French was threatened by the encroaching English, remarking among other that

it was wrong to see the preference of the young for American culture and American expressions as the result of a free choice. They had simply been brainwashed by the media, and consequently needed the protection of the state against an insidious and powerful take-over bid by the worst aspects of transatlantic culture. (ibid:14)

Under the impression of the Toubon law and in the attempt to offer linguistic alternatives to stem the tide of *franglais*, a substantial body of civil servants, each representing all the various ministries, compiled a *dictionnaire des termes officiels de la langue française* (since then jovially referred to as *le Toubon* by the French). Nevertheless, the Toubon law met with two serious obstacles. First, a ruling by the French *Conseil Constitutionnel* stipulated that parts of the law were contrary to the principle of freedom of expression (Décision du Conseil Constitutionnel sur les articles attaqués de la loi Toubon), second – and more importantly – though a 1994 poll revealed that 80 percent of those questioned supported the attempt by Toubon to limit the use of *franglais* by law, the predominant reaction was nevertheless to make fun of it (Thody 1995:3). This is probably largely due to the fact that the *franglais* was and remains the result of the attraction, which American idioms and cultural images have projected on especially younger generations of Frenchmen, who borrow from the English language either because it is agenda setting in a number of domains, not least within business and information techniques, or simply because it is considered *cool*.

The obsession as regards the impact of *franglais* does not today cause the same stir as previously, and the French public has been reluctant to adopt some of the most artificial-sounding French translations of English words, although others seem to have found a permanent and natural place in the French language (Thody 1995, Meunier 2000). There are

still occasional attempts at reinforcing the Toubon law by new measures¹³¹, yet the predominant fear seems no longer to be so much about the contamination of the French language by Anglicisms as the waning global influence of the French language. It is no doubt true that it is “the awareness of how much the French language has declined from its earlier predominance that makes the French so sensitive to the use of English or American terms by native speakers of their language” (Thody 1995:27), but with time, the resistance against the encroachment of English has been carried out under the banners of *la francophonie* or *diversité culturelle* rather than the purely national banner (Meunier 2000). Though a respected linguist such as Claude Hagège has rejected that *le franglais* poses a threat to the French language as such, this does not mean that he and large segments of the French literati do not see the French language as threatened. The threat, however, comes from the spread of English at the detriment of French much more than from any supposed degeneration of the French language. Hagège reminds us that

le rayonnement de la langue française [...] s’est accompagné d’une puissance de l’État s’illustrant par les armes comme par la culture. Cette situation a produit le sentiment d’une primauté, dont la revendication maladroite donne parfois à l’étranger, quand on ne fait pas l’effort d’aller au-delà des apparences, l’impression d’une certaine arrogance française. [...] On peut comprendre que, par rapport à ce rayonnement, celui d’autres cultures, et singulièrement, aujourd’hui, celui de la culture américaine, produise, parmi les élites françaises, le sentiment d’une dépossession. (2006:199-200)

Hagège here seems to echo Grosser’s assessment that “l’ambition mondiale de la France est prioritairement culturelle, la langue devant constituer le support indispensable de la culture” (1989:221), yet he nevertheless agrees that it is vital that France continues its combat, not for the purity of the language, but for its promotion world wide. This is a combat, which, according to Hagège, should be fought under the banner of “diversité culturelle”, and he finds that “La France est à l’avant-garde de ce combat, et ses traditions culturelles l’expliquent largement” (2006:26). These traditions are, apparently, not just the traditions associated with the Republic of High Culture, but as much the socio-economic traditions, which seem to be an integrated part of the French national habitus. As such, the combat for cultural diversity, whether in the cultural or the linguistic sphere, acquires distinctly anti-capitalistic and anti-globalization, if not anti-American, overtones. Hagège notes that there is “une solidarité naturelle [qui] unit l’idéologie libre-échangiste et la langue anglaise” (ibid:61), and he sees

the growing impact of global English as the result of a concerted Anglo-Saxon pressure, which

tire sa force non d'un plébiscite populaire, mais du fait que, non contents d'avoir imposé leurs produits, les producteurs sont, dans une certaine mesure, parvenus à donner aux consommateurs, en particulier les plus crédules, issus des dernières générations, l'illusion que le dynamisme, la liberté, l'ouverture à l'autre, la haute technique, sont associés à l'anglais, d'où le déferlement de termes de cette langue qui sont les supports des talismans dont on s'éprend. (ibid:74)

It would seem that Claude Hagège, who so efficiently demonstrated in the 1980s that *le franglais* presented few risks to the French language, has some two decades later had a change of heart. Apparently, although the *franglais* does not, according to Hagège, threaten the linguistic structure of the French language, the use of English nevertheless remains the vehicle of an ideology, which one must assume is contrary to the French mindset:

Car l'idéologie dont une langue est le support est un ensemble d'informations. Si ces dernières ne sont pas équilibrées par d'autres, issues des pays occupés par ces schémas de pensée importés, et si les pouvoirs politiques desdits pays ne s'efforcent pas de répandre puissamment leurs propres schémas de pensée, alors le sort de la guerre de l'information peut devenir favorable à la langue du pays le plus offensif. C'est ce qui pourrait accroître encore l'hégémonie de l'anglais dans le monde. (ibid:83)

These are not just the words of the detached linguist, analyzing the developments of contemporary English and French. Without resorting to openly anti-American statements, Hagège nevertheless contributes to frame the defense of the French language in terms, which carry an inherent anti-American bias, as when he concludes by linking the erosion of the impact of French with the rise of English as a result of the success of liberal capitalism and calls for concerted political action against this development: "Le français ne peut attendre son salut, comme les autres langues menacées par l'anglais, langue des marchés néo-libéraux, que de cet affrontement entre l'implacable expansion capitaliste et les corrections et régulations qui lui sont opposées" (ibid:232). This is a plea, which seems to have found massive resonance among the French political elites. When former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin remarked that "Le français n'est plus une langue de pouvoir mais il pourrait être une langue de contrepouvoir" (quoted by Asselin and Mastron 2005:215), this was in essence a validation of the fact that in France, language is and remains "une affaire politique" (Hagège 2006:191). In his analysis of the impact of *franglais*, Claude Hagège noted more than two decades ago that

La contestation de ce que l'on aperçoit au-delà de la langue, c'est à dire la culture de masse américaine, ou ce que l'on identifie ainsi, a cette vertu rare de rallier la plupart des opinions, en traversant les clivages idéologiques. Car elle est elle-même une idéologie. (1987:110).

It would seem that large segments of the French, Hagège included, have succumbed to this ideology as part of their national habitus. As we shall see below, it would find an important echo in the 'culture wars' which opposed France and the United States in the 1990s.

The cinematographic 'culture wars' and the promotion of cultural exceptionalism

Whereas the 1980s had seen a relative decline in anti-American rhetoric, both political and (although in lesser measure) cultural, the 1990s would see a renewed opposition to the Republic of Mass Culture. This time, rejection of American culture would be spearheaded as much by practitioners as by the political and intellectual elites, giving it a somewhat less elitist dimension, seemingly validating a concerted French opposition toward the American cultural juggernaut. The foremost arena of opposition was against America's dominant position within the audiovisual spheres, i.e. cinema and television. The triggering event came in 1993 as the negotiations over the Uruguay Round of the GATT were finally nudging toward a conclusion. It was not unusual for trade and tariff negotiations to give rise to Franco-American disagreements, but with the Uruguay Round, these became more acute than usual, as they this time included two new domains, both particularly sensitive to France: agriculture and intellectual services. The former led France and the United States to clash violently and publicly, primarily over the question of subsidies. Though the French agricultural and political circles enjoyed broad domestic support for their stance, agriculture nevertheless accounted for barely 3 percent of the French GDP, and though economic arguments were increasingly coupled with cultural arguments about French agricultural traditions, the issue remained marginal to most of the public (Leblond, in Melandri and Richard (eds) 2003:225-227). This was probably also due largely to the fact that the second issue managed to attract much more media attention, as it was portrayed as concerning nothing less than the future of French culture (Meunier 2000). During the negotiations, the United States had demanded that intellectual services should cover also audiovisual goods such as films and television programs. This predictably gave rise to what later became known in some quarters as the Franco-American "culture wars" (Grantham 2000), in which France vehemently insisted that cultural exports should be treated differently than other goods, as they were expressions of

cultural identity and therefore had the right to be protected if nations so wished (Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004, Gordon and Meunier 2002). In President Mitterrand's words, "aucun pays ne doit être autorisé à contrôler les images du monde entier" (quoted by Gordon and Meunier 2002:87). The United States, by far the world's largest exporter of such products, naturally derided this stance as clear evidence of protectionism, and disagreements over the issue contributed to prolong negotiations on the final accord, which took seven and a half years, almost twice the original schedule. The American wish for including cultural goods had come in response to a French sponsored 1989 EU directive termed "Télévision sans Frontières", which stipulated that when possible, the majority of the scheduled airtime should be devoted to programs originating from Europe. As Gordon and Meunier note, the title of this directive was "cocasse, car d'un point de vue non européen, il s'agit au contraire de télévision *avec* frontières" (ibid. 2002:93). The American reaction to France's – and by extension Europe's – displays of cultural protectionism met with fierce rejection in the cultural milieus in France. Film producers, directors, and actors were soon joined by the political and intellectual elites in a uniform defence of France's cultural identity, which in the media hype surrounding the controversy seemed to have as one of its primary modes of identification the national cinematographic outputs (Grantham 2000).

In reality, it should come as no surprise that film should prove an eminently contentious issue in Franco-American trade relations. The production and distribution of films represents one of the most pervasive features of America's global cultural impact, and Hollywood productions have largely succeeded in dominating European markets since the interwar years (Lieber 2005:103-104). This alone should warrant strong French reactions against American cultural imperialism. But as important was probably the impression that this was once again an example of American encroachment on a domain, where France had previously reigned supreme, and – more importantly – in a field closely connected with French national identity. When the Lumière brothers put on the world's first public film show in the basement of the Grand Café in Paris in December 1895 (Zeldin 1977:388), few could have predicted that cinema would a century later become one of the major sources of quarrel between France and America. American observers such as William Marling may think that "Despite its highbrow pretensions, film is basically entertainment" (2006:19), and thus a commodity like any other, seemingly validating a typical French lamentation: "La stratégie américaine d'encerclement culturel procède du fait que ses protagonistes sont des acteurs de

l'économie et, le plus souvent, uniquement cela. Leur ignorance des civilisations, des cultures, des nations et de leur histoire atteint parfois l'invraisemblable" (Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 1999:61). For many French, nationally produced films represent much more than mere distraction; they represent an image of the nation (Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:170), and as such a cultural manifestation of the inner workings of society. Or rather, that is an opinion frequently voiced by the literati. In a 1954 survey, nine out of ten French respondents answered that their main motive for attending movies was in fact "distraction" (Gaston-Mathé, quoted by Kuisel 2000). Nevertheless, among the agenda setting segments of French cultural society, cinematography is without any doubt considered culture, sometimes high culture, and is frequently referred to as 'le sixième art'. The importance attributed to films by these segments was stressed by *Le Monde's* film critic Jean-Michel Frodon a few years after the culture wars had ended:

Enough futile controversy: France invented the cinema. Because it was its role or, if you prefer, because it needed it to accomplish what it considered to be its role, i.e., to enlighten the peoples of the world and lead them on the paths of freedom and equality, no less. If France had thought that it had accomplished its task in the nineteenth century, it would not have needed to invent cinema. (quoted by Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:169-170)

He continues with a wonderful play on words: "If *les Lumières* (the Enlightenment) had triumphed, *les Lumières* (the brothers, Louis and Auguste) [...] might even have been unnecessary" (ibid:170). Clearly, cinema is no laughing matter in France. In fact, not only had France invented cinema; in the early 1900s, the French controlled the world film market, and even dominated the American market, where the Pathé Frères released 50 to 70 percent of all new films (Marling 2006:19). In 1906, "Pathé produced a film a day [...], dwarfing the combined output of all U.S. competition", and by 1908, "Pathé's domination of world cinema was complete" (ibid.). However the First World War disrupted the powerful French film industry, destroying the ability of French cinema to compete economically with Hollywood, while leaving the American producers and the substantial Anglo-American audience relatively unscathed (Pells 1997:15, Marling 2006:20-21). After the war, as film production costs rose, American film makers easily acquired the upper hand (Marling 2006:21) and in the 1920s, Hollywood produced "extravaganzas with which Europeans could not compete" (Costigliola 1984:176). Thus by 1925, American films made up 70 percent of the total shown in France, while Americans owned three-fourths of all the movie theatres in France (ibid,

Pells 1997:15-16). This led one French critic to lament that “America has colonized us through the cinema”, while a member of the National Assembly remarked that Europeans had become “galley-slaves” to American finance and culture (quoted by Costigliola 1984:177). There is no doubt that a major change had occurred in the cinematographic world in the 1920s: “It was in this decade that cinema became synonymous with Hollywood. The United States dominated every facet of popular filmmaking, and with it the power to “Americanize” the imaginations, if not the behavior, of audiences throughout the world” (Pells 1997:14). The reaction of the French government was to enact measures to “limit the number of imported Hollywood films and encourage domestic production” (Costigliola 1984:177), but the success was limited, as the American studios circumvented such laws by investing in inexpensive local films called “quota quickies” (Pells 1997:17). French hopes that the introduction of sound films would result in the French audiences returning to domestic productions were largely unfulfilled: “If anything, the heightened cost of producing a sound film forced Hollywood to rely even more heavily on the international, and especially the European, market to ensure its profits” (ibid:18), thereby cementing the dominant American position in the cinematographic world. In the years leading to the Second World War, Hollywood came to represent in the minds of French and also many other European intellectuals

everything they dreaded and despised about American mass culture. To these intellectuals, their governments’ inability in the 1920s and 1930s to diminish the popularity of American films was an instance of Europe’s greater failure to preserve its economic and cultural distinctiveness. (ibid:19)

Whereas Hollywood had been shut out of most of the European market during the Second World War, the end of the war saw a craze for American productions, due both to the Americanophilia sweeping the liberated continent and the substantial supply offered as a result of the Marshall Plan, in which film exports were an important part of the distributed aid (Marling 2006:22-23, Hagège 2006:29). The 1946 Blum-Byrnes agreement opened France to Hollywood, but met with fierce opposition in France, where the leader of the Communist Party, Maurice Thorez, accused the government of letting American films “empoisonne[r] littéralement l’âme de nos enfants” (Gordon and Meunier 2002:81, see also Roger 2005:435-437). Following orchestrated street manifestations and other forms of pressure, the agreement was renegotiated in 1948 in order to curb Hollywood imports (Kuisel 2000:123-125, Wall 1991:113-121). Throughout the 1950s, France would come to represent an exception when compared to other Western European nations, whose cinemas would remain dominated by

American productions: In France, domestic filmmakers succeeded in withstanding Hollywood's invasion of the French market, attracting about 50 percent of the audience while the viewers of Hollywood's production dropped to about 30 percent (Kuisel 2000:120). According to Kuisel, this was due less to the reintroduced quota system or a tariff system, whose revenues were largely redirected as subsidies to domestic film production, than to what he terms the "Fernandel factor", namely that the French audiences preferred their own cinema and especially the most popular of their domestic actors (2000). This did not prevent many of the period's French films from having a distinctive American 'look': the hugely popular *Lemmy* films, starring the American-born Eddie Constantine in the role of an American troubleshooter in Paris, was evidence to the fact that even in the golden age of France's postwar cinema, America acted as a powerful source of inspiration, regardless of the fact that France was one of its least lucrative Western European markets. At times, Hollywood did not even fill its quota due to lack of interest among the French audiences (ibid:123). This did not prevent "the French intellectual community, which was in one of its more anti-American moods in the early 1950s" from staging vivid attacks on the

products of American junk culture that accompanied American political and economic domination. A combination of cultural snobbery toward mass culture, an aversion for capitalism, stereotypes of America and Americans, and anxiety about American hegemony and French decline, led many prominent intellectuals as well as influential newspapers and reviews to attack the American cultural menace – especially Hollywood. (ibid:125)

Diatribes build on this argumentative would prove a recurrent theme among the intellectuals and cinematographic critics throughout the following decades, in spite of the fact that French film producers succeeded in retaining roughly half the domestic market "until the early 1980s when the full-scale American conquest occurred" (ibid:133). It was under the impression of Hollywood's increasing stronghold on French audiences that in the early 1980s, Mitterrand's Minister of Culture, Jack Lang

boycottait le festival du film américain de Deauville et se plaignait de l'«invasion» et de la «subversion» d'images fabriquées à l'extérieur et de musiques standardisées [...] qui rabotent les cultures et véhiculent un mode de vie uniformisé que l'on voudrait imposer à la planète entière. (Gordon and Meunier 2002:84)

Though the 1980s were, as has been noted above, characterized by a notable improvement in Franco-American relations, which also extended somewhat to the cultural front (ibid:85),

Lang's complaints are significant both because they so clearly were in prolongation of the by then ingrained French tradition of denigrating American mass culture, and because they show that the highest political offices had no scruples in validating such discourses by adding to them what seemed as the official approbation of the State. Similarly, the French State apparently saw no dichotomy in on the one hand forcefully lobbying the Disney Cooperation in order for its Euro-Disney theme park to be located in France, while on the other hand tacitly encouraging allegations that this Euro-Disney (today renamed Disneyland-Paris) represented a "cultural Chernobyl", in the words of theatre director Ariane Mnouchkine, or a "terrifying giant's step toward world homogenization" as stipulated by philosopher Alain Finkielkraut (Pells 1997:309). A politician remarked that it would "bombard France with uprooted creations that are to culture what fast food is to gastronomy" (quoted by Ritzer 2000:17). Such judgements were repeated albeit in somewhat subdued ways by none other than Jack Lang, minister of the same government which had supplied the Disney Cooperation with thousands of acres of prime real estate at below-market prices, arranged for low interest loans, and seriously upgraded its infrastructures, all in order to close a deal, which they expected would result in the creation of a substantial number of new jobs as well as providing a much needed economic boost as a result of a projected increase in tourist revenues (Pells 1997:308-310). The furore surrounding the opening of Euro-Disney in 1992, where French writers and intellectuals "competed with one another to see whose denunciations were the most hyperbolic" (ibid:309) probably contributed to giving the culture wars over the audiovisual dossier the following year an accrued character of rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture: The intellectual indictment had been prepared over decades, the public had been groomed by the constant warnings against the cultural Americanization of the French society, the intellectual elites had found common cause with the cultural practitioners, and the political elites had shown that they were eager to reap both the rewards offered by the prospects of increased exports of its domestic cultural exports (though without wanting to alienate American investments too much), and not least the support of the powerful cultural agenda setters. Resisting Hollywood apparently provided the ideal opportunity.

After prolonged negotiations and under the close scrutiny of the French media, the 'culture wars' resulted in a compromise, in which France, having secured the lukewarm support of the rest of the European Union, obtained that nations could retain the right to subsidize their cultural goods (a practice which, contrary to standard impressions was anyway

shared on both sides of the Atlantic) and, more significantly, to protect them with quotas. This compromise, frequently referred to as enshrining the right to “cultural exception” or “cultural diversity”¹³², basically meant that cultural products became *de facto* excluded from the accords (Gordon and Meunier 2002:87). This, however, did not signal an end to the culture wars. The Uruguay Round had laid the foundations for the establishment of a proper organization to succeed the somewhat looser GATT negotiating system, the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO would soon become the *bête noire* of the rising anti-globalization movement in France alongside the globalizing power *par excellence*, the United States, and the organization would be “portrayed in France as a Trojan horse that forces on others the low-brow uniformity of the American lifestyle – fast food, bad clothing, and even worse sitcoms” (Meunier 2000:107), in contrast naturally, as Meunier further notes, to “the French cultural model [...] portrayed as a ‘high’ culture of philosophers, fine dining, and intellectual films” (ibid.). In the years to come, the culture wars would see new combatants joining the veterans from the early 1990s in a renewed fight against economic and cultural Americanization. The question of cultural exceptions resurfaced during the OECD’s negotiations over the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), and as was the case during the GATT negotiations in 1993, it was the practitioners of French cinema, who led the opposition against the agreement, which in view of its aim at liberalizing the participating nations’ investment conditions they considered specifically threatening to the still highly protected audiovisual sector (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005:317-318). The protests quickly gathered in momentum, and soon managed to attract a large following of protesters against the increasing globalization. The organizers succeeded in portraying the MAI as the “symbole de la menace néolibérale” (ibid:317), and in 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin declared that France refused to sign the accord (ibid:321, Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 1999:45). This was a great triumph for the nascent French anti-globalization movement, and the aborted WTO meeting in Seattle the following year “gave France further opportunities to reassert what it saw as its basic democratic and sovereign principles – and teach the world a lesson” (Meunier 2000:110). The culture wars had demonstrated that French principles of sovereignty and independence were to remain the guiding principles also within the cultural sphere, and the momentum gained contributed to forge an alliance between the hitherto rather disparate groupings working to combat globalization, liberalism, capitalism, and – of course – the ever threatening Americanization. The successful opposition to the MAI would prove the

triggering factor, which prompted these protesters to coordinate their efforts and establish a common anti-globalization movement – ATTAC (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005:13-14, Gordon and Meunier 2002:131, Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan, in Eschle and Maignuashca (eds) 2005:160). Supported and actively promoted by *Le Monde Diplomatique*, which described globalization as tantamount to a “rape of the popular will” (quoted by Meunier 2000:110), this movement would prove an instant and resounding success, mobilizing tens of thousands of “militants” against the dual forces of global economic liberalism and cultural Americanization (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005:13-14 and 317-337). Before long, the new organization had

drawn support from all parts of civil society: farmers, labor groups, environmentalists, journalists, academics, and film-makers. Even soccer players and coaches [...] demonstrated against the WTO and globalization to protest the advent of capitalism in sports management. Given such breadth of popular sentiment, French politicians [were] forced to follow. The extremist parties [...] seized on the antiglobalization cause as the logical continuation of their traditional combat against free trade. And the mainstream parties [were] unable to withstand the extraordinary appeal of this movement in public opinion. (Meunier 2000:111)

The culture wars are not just highly illustrative of the French rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture, they are also an important reminder that the high politics of international trade relations can be seriously affected by the supposedly low politics of culture. Lieber has noted that in “an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of conflict” (2005:120; see also the discussion in relation to American soft power in chapter 3). The Franco-American culture wars certainly seem to validate this assessment, which also raises the question of the perceived excessiveness of America’s soft power. Quoting former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine’s lamentations that Americans are powerful because they can “inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television”, Joseph S. Nye remarks that this is the essence of soft power (2002:9). It clearly is the essence of soft power, but does this not underline that a preponderant amount of soft power in the hands of one lone superpower can be a double-edged sword? According to Sophie Meunier, “the clash between French and American cultures was probably inevitable given the universalist vocation that both nations claim”, and as such, the reaction against globalization was due to the impression that it “threatens the very foundations of French greatness: France’s unique culture” (2000:107). Yet it was not only the Republic of High

Culture, which felt threatened by the Republic of Mass Culture. The culture wars had given rise to a concerted campaign against first cultural Americanization and later cultural and economical globalization. At the dawn of a new millennium, this campaign would find an echo far away from the cultural circles in Paris, as *la France profonde* joined in opposition against what they perceived to be the greater challenge: the American *malbouffe* and its impact on the French palates as well as the livelihood of French farmers – both clearly eminently cultural issues.

The fight against the malbouffe

Whereas the fight for cultural exception in the early 1990s had been led by the political elites and supported by the intellectuals in an early rejection of cultural globalization, the late 1990s would see a full scale French campaign against globalization originating from both the cultural elites and a rising popular counterforce of grass roots, which felt abandoned by the established political elites. The campaign was largely the result of the prolonged Franco-American trade discords during the 1990s and could as such be interpreted in terms of a continuation of the culture wars, albeit on a new cultural turf. In 1999, in retaliation to an EU decision to uphold its ban on the import of hormone beef, a decision which violated a WTO ruling on the matter, the United States decided to impose an extra 100% tariff on certain European imports, notably Roquefort cheese from France (Gordon and Meunier 2002:133). This prompted a small group of protesters, led by José Bové, a charismatic goat farmer from the rural department of Aveyron, to “dismantle” a McDonald’s under construction in the village of Millau in Southern France (Kincheloe 2002:1-2). What originated as a relatively minor protest, consistent with the French farming lobby’s long tradition of relatively ‘muscle’ demonstrations whenever they have felt their livelihoods threatened, quickly escalated into a large-scale and concerted action against the McDonaldization of food consumption and food production. Charged with vandalism, José Bové and his fellow demonstrators were imprisoned by the authorities, and the image of the Asterix-looking goat farmer, defiantly raising his hand-cuffed hands in the air, made headlines, propelling Bové to instant national fame, where he easily became the year’s “biggest celebrity in France” (Meunier 2000:104). The choice of McDonald’s as an object of protest was not accidental. In anticipation of the American decision to retaliate against the EU-ban, the local farmers had already decided that they would take a stand against McDonald’s, which to them represented

the symbol of industrial agriculture and (mal)nutrition as well as of globalization (Bové and Dufour 2000:14-15). Hardly an original statement, as the same observation had been advanced both by scholars and anti-globalization protesters throughout most of the 1990s (see for example Ritzer 2000). Though Bové has later emphasized that his action against McDonald should be seen as a stance against globalization and not as an expression of anti-Americanism, likening it to the 1773 Boston Tea Party, which sparked the rebellion of the American colonists against the British (Bové and Dufour 2000:206), it nevertheless gave rise to substantial anti-American rhetoric, as it consistently proved impossible to dissociate the image of McDonald's from the image of America and the impact of globalization from the forces of Americanization. At his trial, Bové was supported by "45,000 anti-McDonald's and anti-American demonstrators" (Kincheloe 2002:4). Gordon and Meunier have explained the massive French opposition to globalization by the fact that "les Français sont extrêmement attachés à leur culture et à leur identité, et [...] beaucoup ont le sentiment que celles-ci sont aujourd'hui menacées par une mondialisation qu'ils assimilent à une américanisation" (2002:26-27), adding that "Ce n'est pas un hasard si José Bové, avec son sens de la publicité, a choisi McDonald's comme cible de sa contestation" (ibid:27). Just as was the case with Coca-Cola half a century ago, McDonald's has for many become the quintessential symbol of Americanization. Sardar and Davies have described how,

The hamburger is a particular source of hatred of America. It is the single most concentrated [...] symbol of the entire complex that is America. [...] As a way of life, the hamburger is a seductive novelty with discernible, and deleterious, consequences. Not just because it is an omnipresent con-trick, but also because the consumerism it embodies is seen as a clear cultural threat. It personifies the way in which America is taking over the lives of ordinary people in the rest of the world and shrinking their cultural space – their space to be themselves, to be different, to be other than America. (2002:103-105)

This point of view was clearly shared by Alain Rollat of *Le Monde*, who in an editorial entitled "Vive le roquefort libre!" remarked that "La résistance aux prétentions hégémoniques du hamburger est, avant tout, un impératif culturel" (quoted by Gordon and Meunier 2002:96-97). Clearly, fast-food franchises like McDonald's were seen as symbols of the American way of life, substituting the traditional local businesses and threatening French gastronomic traditions. Sophie Meunier has given a good explanation of why it was the fight against *la malbouffe* staged by Bové, which succeeded in rallying large segments of the French public behind the cause of anti-globalization:

Focusing the cultural arguments on food has proven a particularly fruitful strategy for globalization's adversaries. Food is one of the most universally recognized components of French culture – and remains one of the greatest sources of domestic pride. As *Le Monde* noted, “McDonald's red and yellow ensign is the new version of America's star-spangled banner, whose commercial hegemony threatens agriculture and whose cultural hegemony insidiously ruins alimentary behavior – sacred reflections of French identity.” By painting globalization as a direct attack on French food, its opponents received national approbation for a collective struggle against *la mal-bouffe*, or “lousy food.” Bové and his followers threw into the same bag the issues of American trade imperialism, genetically modified food, and the fatty American nutritional model. Since nothing that French politicians say on behalf of French culinary traditions can backfire, they have now entered a free-for-all battle of wits in which they try to outdo each other with catch phrases and solemn declarations on hamburgers. The winner in this category may be France's agriculture minister, who recently declared that the United States “has the worst food in the world” and publicly announced [...] that he had never eaten at McDonald's and disliked hamburgers. (2000:107-108).

The French insurrection against American culture is clearly not limited to products that would normally be characterized as ‘cultural’ in the strictest sense of the word. Compared with the other examples of France's opposition to the Republic of Mass Culture given above, the McDonald's brouhaha at first seems to resemble the Coca-Cola affair of the 1940s and 1950s more than the fight against the *franglais* or even the related culture wars earlier in the 1990s, which after all raised real questions about an Americanization of the hearts and minds, and not just of the stomachs and bowels. Compared with the onslaughts on commercial products such as Coca-Cola and Big Macs, the campaign to preserve the French language from degeneration and the importance placed on the need to support the national production of films after all seem somewhat validated by the fact that without state sponsoring or interference, France's high culture might indeed be worse off – that is of course if one accepts the premise that purity of the language and the production of (potentially non-commercial) films are important elements of national culture. But economic considerations apart, it is hard to see how Coca-Cola or fast food chains such as McDonald's can seriously threaten French culture. A chosen alternative to Coca-Cola would most likely be (and frequently is) a glass of Orangina or a Perrier, but hardly one of France's fine wines or spirits, which might better pass as examples of France's traditional culture. And given the unavailability of a nearby McDonald's, the customer avid for a quick snack would not seek out a temple of gastronomy as an alternative, but rather a *crêpe* on a street corner, a *croque monsieur* on the counter of the

local café or – much more likely – a hamburger from the French-owned Quick chain, which covers roughly one quarter of the French fast-food market, leaving the rest to McDonald's. Regardless of the fact that José Bové's campaign against McDonald's acquired the public approbation of the French and for a while made him something of a national hero, it remains a fact that "France is McDonald's most profitable market after the United States" (Meunier 2007:82), with McDonald's France serving on average more than one and a half million customers every day¹³³. The McDonald's restaurant located on the Champs-Élysées is the restaurant in France which attracts the most customers, "et la foule qui s'y presse chaque jour est loin d'être uniquement composée d'étrangers" (Gordon and Meunier 2002:98-99). This would seem to indicate that not all French find *la malbouffe* so bad after all.

Part of the success of the fight against *la malbouffe* and, in a wider context, the perceived McDonaldization of societies, is – apart from its association with the threat of Americanization – that the hamburger conjures images of obesity and malnutrition, as was witnessed in the 2004 film *Supersize me*; an American-made production, which played directly into the hands of cultural anti-Americans worldwide. Though the nutritional argument is inherent in the term *malbouffe* itself, there is more to the fight against McDonald's than to protect especially youngsters from developing bad eating habits, a recurrent preoccupation throughout generations, and one which would hardly cease even with the disappearance of all fast-food outlets in the world. More important is probably the resentment spurned by the fact that McDonald's has succeeded spectacularly well on the French market, a clear indicator that it has been able to offer products, which are in high demand, thus cornering a lucrative market. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Franco-American trade exchanges in the fast-food domain are loop-sided when seen from France. Contrary to common belief, McDonald's is actually not the world's largest fast-food company, an honor which goes to the British Compass Group, owners of among other Burger King. Though McDonald's is second, it is closely followed by the French Sodexo firm, which employs 110.000 Americans as opposed to the 35.000 French employed by McDonald's (Marling 2006:59). McDonald's recognizable logo and the hype surrounding the emerging McWorld has nevertheless succeeded in blurring the fact that other multinational firms, including French-owned firms, are as much as McDonald's representatives of the economic globalization of the world, although they clearly have not acquired the same symbolic stature as the American-based company. It is this, which has contributed to popularize the term McDonaldization to denote

the ultimate example of cultural and economic globalization. One of the scholars to have written most extensively on the concept of McDonaldization, George Ritzer, notes that it is the global consequences of McDonaldization much more than the iconic product itself, which should cause alarm:

McDonald's and McDonaldization represent a unique threat to other cultures. First, unlike previous American exports they have an impact on both the way business is organized and on the way people live on a day-to-day basis. Second, they represent a set of principles that can be completely disengaged from their original source [...]. Once these principles have been dis-embedded from their original source and then re-embedded in indigenous structures, identifying them as originating in McDonald's or in the United States will eventually become difficult or impossible. As a result, opposing McDonaldization as some foreign import will become more difficult, as will mounting anti-American sentiment against its various manifestations. (2000:178)

Most French anti-globalists would probably subscribe to this view, rejecting McDonald's practice of altering its menus to suit local tastes or the fact that the practices of McDonald's are copied by domestic firms as further evidence to the fact that McDonaldization is encroaching on local customs (Marling 2006:56). But is this not the essence of globalization? Reading Ritzer, it is difficult to escape the feeling that he is writing about globalization rather than McDonaldization; after all, given the fact that probably no other product is associated more with America than McDonald's, save perhaps Coca-Cola, it is highly inconceivable that the second part of his statement holds true, especially as regards the feeling in France, where there is still very much an impression that McDonald's not only originates in the United States, but is a quintessentially American phenomenon. To the extent that the term McDonaldization gives any meaning at all, it should read as synonymous with Americanization rather than with globalization, though some features of globalization clearly seem imbued, especially when viewed from France, with the undesirable features of Americanization and thus by extension of McDonaldization. The French have a long tradition of rejecting these examples of 'machine civilization', and they massively associate them with America. Irrespective of legitimate worries over nutritional values or the impact of globalization, there is no doubt that in France, the attacks against McDonald's and McDonaldization have come to form part of a wider cultural anti-American narrative. As Sophie Meunier rightly notes,

Thanks to Bové's deliberate attack against McDonald's and politicians' denunciation of "Anglo-Saxon imperialism," the United States has become the

scapegoat for all social groups hurt by globalization. Above all, globalization has been vilified because it threatens the very foundation of French greatness: France's unique culture. (2000:106-107)

The fight against the *malbouffe* was, much more than any of the other examples of cultural anti-Americanism given above, driven or supported by broad segments of the French population, and it continues to form an important part of today's anti-American narrative. Meanwhile, McDonald's France has registered record sales in the first decade of the new millennium¹³⁴ indicating that the campaign has had little effect on the consumer habits of the French. The attacks did however contribute to substantially strengthening the French anti-globalization movement, and as its most emblematic spokesman, José Bové would later travel the world, attending 'altermondialiste' meetings in an attempt at presenting the rejection of the Anglo-Saxon liberal model as a universal priority rather than a French exception.

6.2.3 Conclusion

A common nineteenth century French criticism of America was that it lacked culture (Roger 2005). As noted in chapter 3, the same criticism is advanced today, albeit in almost the opposite meaning: that though America is arguably the world's largest exporter of cultural products, it is the wrong kind of culture that they promote. Their perceived lack of culture is no longer a lack *of* cultural products, but a lack of culture *in the* products that they export. Much of the politically based resistance to American cultural products is naturally dictated by economic fears of lagging too far behind the United States in the trade exchanges between the two countries. But there is much more to it than that. In the minds of many French, Baudelaire was not far off when he described the future to come: the Americanization of society is a fact, visible on virtually every street corner as well as audible in the airwaves. This not only diminishes France's possibilities of exporting their own cultural values (and products) but also, or so it seems to many, threatens to undermine the unique French values at home. As was seen above, some of the main agents of cultural anti-Americanism in France have throughout been the influential *intellectuels*. Since the interwar years, they have promoted the view that America represented a degeneration of culture, an argument, which has gained in momentum as American soft power increased substantially after the Second World War. As France's political influence worldwide seemed in decline, the intellectuals mounted a frontal assault on what they frequently perceived as being a concerted American attempt at achieving

cultural hegemony in the West. The intellectuals' repeated allegations of a looming Americanization of the French cultural mind seem to have had a profound impact on French discourses surrounding the Republic of Mass Culture. The intellectual and political elites have found common cause in their rejection of America's soft power; a rejection, which has increasingly been echoed by other parts of the French society. The fight against cocacolonization, hollywoodization or McDonalldization can largely be seen as synonymous with the opposition to Americanization, which has proved a consistent reference base for the standard narratives of cultural anti-Americanism in France. In later decades, this opposition has been formulated in terms of resistance against globalization, but as it is American products and values, which are targeted as representing the opprobrious features of globalization, the anti-globalist campaigns have easily acquired anti-American overtones. Though most of the protests originate from what one might term the cultural spheres in the broad sense of the word, the perceived threat from the process of globalization is, however, not exclusively of a cultural nature in its strictest sense. According to Meunier, what explains the strong political reactions as well as the enormous popular backlash against globalization is that it seems to consecrate "American individualism and the victory of American-style democracy over French-style republicanism and *dirigisme*. In reacting against globalization, the French are reacting to the surrender of their state traditions to a foreign system of political values" (2000:110). Meunier further notes that with respect to the discourses surrounding the anti-globalization protests, these enjoy broad popular support, as

France feels that nothing short of its national identity is at stake. Rather than being framed as a question of free trade versus protectionism, the trade debate has been recast as "Anglo-Saxon globalization" versus the preservation of France's national and cultural values. (ibid:105)

There is no doubt that many people in several countries have qualms about globalization. Throughout the world, voices are raised against the economic consequences of globalization, which by some are believed to be the cause of widening inequalities, as well as the cultural effects, which are frequently portrayed as leading toward a process of cultural homogenization, which in essence is tantamount to cultural Americanization. But, as Sophie Meunier notes, it is France, which

has taken the international lead here because its political and cultural identity combines all the elements threatened by globalization: a universalist culture, a language with international aspirations, a "superior" cuisine, a sensitive view of national sovereignty, a strong, centralized state, a need for a world role, a sense

of duty toward the poorer nations, and a deeply rooted anti-Americanism. (ibid:116)

The French opposition to the Republic of Mass Culture appears less strident today than half a century ago, when America was vilified, especially by some of the most prominent intellectuals, as an almost unmitigated evil. Except among the few remaining arch-anti-Americans, it is rare to hear the United States or Americanization referred to today as a ‘cancer’, and compared with the tone of the interwar years, the contemporary displays of cultural anti-Americanism may appear almost benign. Such impressions, however, have to be qualified by the realization that anti-Americanism, cultural as well as political, has moved beyond the realm of the elites and has become part of a standard rhetorical culture, which seems to have become almost systematically embedded in the French doxa. The Republic of Mass Culture is still largely scorned by the Republic of High Culture, which in line with its universalist traditions has attempted to project the resistance against cultural Americanization both to a European and a global level.

A common feature of the French rejection of America’s soft power is that it is perceived as threatening not just French, but also European cultural values and habits. This has been a standard argument, which has been put forth since the nineteenth century, where lamentations about the invasion of “American ideas” in Europe where a common refrain among prominent French writers (Zeldin 1977:127, see also Roger 2005). As Markovits has noted (2007), such assessments were made in several European countries, yet the French literati seem to have been particularly vocal in their rejection of the Americanization of Europe. In the interwar years, “All the efforts of the French anti-Americans [...] went into affirming the spiritual and cultural precedence of Europe – and preferably a French or French-oriented Europe – over America” (Roger 2005:444). These efforts were largely carried on after the liberation, and as the European integration process gathered in momentum, new venues seemed open in the combat against the cultural steamroller from across the Atlantic. Just as there has been, as was seen above, a consistent French effort to depict European political unity at least partly in terms of a defense of European political values vis-à-vis the threat of American political and economic hegemony, so has there been a marked tendency toward portraying the resistance against American cultural domination as a common fight for European culture. Furthermore, this is a resistance, which both official France and the France of the cultural elites feel uniquely well placed to lead. Claude Hagège, echoing a sentiment

shared by large proportions of the French elites, remarks that “les expériences les plus authentiques de construction d’une unité européenne ont été [...] d’abord culturelles, bien que s’appuyant aussi sur une primauté politique et économique” (2006:37). Since these impulses are perceived as originating primarily from France, many consider it only natural that she should be at the vanguard of the defense of European culture. As such, many French intellectuals have proclaimed that they were engaged in a quest to defend not just French, but also European culture (Roger 2005), just as French governments have presented themselves as spokesmen for Europe in matters relating to culture, as could be witnessed under the ‘culture wars’, in which France claimed to represent a concerted ‘European’ opposition to trade liberalization in the audiovisual sphere – much to the annoyance of several of its European partners, who felt that the French government had applied undue pressure in order to impose its views in this matter on the more reluctant EU-partners. It is certainly true, as Hagège notes, that “la France possède en Europe une vocation particulière de défense du culturel, même si les adversaires internes du français n’en sont pas convaincus” (2006:37), and in a speech to the Council of Europe, President Mitterrand characteristically described “L’Europe de la Culture” as “un élément de résistance à tous les alibis commerciaux de la culture”, warning that Europe risked being “frappée de pollution sonore et visuelle” (Mitterrand 1986:256-257). Even in the institutional workings of the European Union, France has attempted to resist what it perceives as a growing Anglo-Saxon orientation, both politically and linguistically. Politically and economically, it has long attempted to impose its tradition of dirigisme and protectionism, rejecting the more pro-market postures of countries such as Britain (Meunier 2000). Linguistically, France has attempted to use its former quasi-leadership position within the Union to promote French as “une langue de contrepouvoir”, to use Lionel Jospin’s phrase (see above). As late as in 1986, the former vice-president of the High Committee for the French Language, Gabriel de Broglie, argued that Europe would be stronger if it spoke with one – French – voice (1986). That was, and clearly remains, a mirage. Formerly a bastion of France’s linguistic influence, French has long ago lost ground to English within the EU (Phillipson 2003). As a language spoken by citizens of the Union, French is by far relegated to second position by English and its tied second place is in the process of being overtaken by German¹³⁵. Though there has no doubt over the years been attempts at Europeanizing France’s mission civilisatrice, notably through the policies of francophonie, these attempts have proved only partly successful, and instead, the principle of cultural diversity has been

promoted forcefully. While the issue of cultural diversity was originally presented in France as not least a means toward protecting European culture from American domination, it has increasingly acquired a global dimension. As such, France has spearheaded the efforts to have the protection of cultural diversity acknowledged in a host of different international forums. Significantly, it was France and Canada who sponsored UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which enshrines cultural diversity as a method of protecting local cultures. The convention was passed in 2005 against the lone opposition of the United States and Israel (Wolton 2006:9). In theory, the principle of cultural diversity is a laudable attempt at safeguarding the unique cultures of the world, which also explains why it has received near-unanimous backing – with the notable exceptions mentioned above – among all nations. Yet there are two main observations, which should be made when addressing France's role in promoting cultural diversity. First, that France's advocacy of this issue is of relatively new date. When France was the world's preeminent cultural nation, there was no talk of cultural diversity. France's civilizational role was to export its values, political as well as cultural, for the benefit of mankind. For long, France actively opposed cultural and linguistic diversity on the French territory, as was noted in chapter 5, and cultural diversity is still rarely promoted domestically (Meunier 2007). As such, it is tempting to conclude that the French focus on cultural diversity reflects an implicit admission that the *rayonnement* of French culture is in decline, and that cultural diversity represents a means to protect (and promote) French culture. Second and imminently related to this, it is noteworthy that the French emphasis on cultural diversity seems to specifically target the massive influence of American culture on other societies. The notion of cultural diversity is used by French elites only in two respects: either as a general concept, or in relation to the rejection of cultural domination by a uniform culture, namely that of America, which through the process of globalization is perceived as threatening to invade and supplant local cultures. What is noteworthy is that with respect to cultural diversity, nobody has better disproved the apparent dichotomy between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture than a former French cultural attaché, Frédéric Martel, who has written an impressive treatise on culture in America, which reveals that as opposed to contrary belief (in France), America presents an eminently rich, varied and diversified culture, whereas culture in France by comparison remains uniform and elitist and as such does not propagate any

image of diversity (2006). It would seem that to the French elites, cultural diversity is after all more about protection than promotion.

When speaking about the ‘French rejection of American culture’, there is good reason to question how ‘French’ this rejection is, i.e. to what extent this rejection is shared by a majority of the French. A common perception among most scholars of anti-Americanism is that anti-Americanism in Europe, and especially in France, “has not been, generally speaking, the attitude of majorities but rather of substantial minorities and especially of important elite groups” (Hollander 1995:369). When analyzing the French rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture, this at first seems a valid assessment. There is no doubt that there exists an important segment, whether termed elitist or not, which forcefully advocates that French culture and by extension French national identity is threatened by the Republic of Mass Culture, and who reclaim what André Malraux termed every nation’s right to “cultural self-determination” (quoted by Forbes, in Forbes and Kelly (eds) 1995:259). Yet figures show unambiguously that the French are avid consumers of American cultural products – Hollywood blockbusters, Big Macs and all – and that especially younger generations have a penchant toward embracing for example American idioms. Nevertheless, the assessment that cultural anti-Americanism is largely an elitist phenomenon needs to be somewhat qualified: though the proportion of the French, which consistently shun American culture is rather limited, the rhetoric against American mass culture seems to appeal to a much wider audience than the one confined to the intellectual and political elites. Part of the reason for this can undoubtedly be attributed to the influence of the media, largely sharing the values and habits of the elites, to which they by and large belong as co-shapers of the public social imaginary. Yet this cannot be the sole explanation. As was seen above, the anti-globalization movement at the turn of the millennium undoubtedly attracted much popular support and was largely driven by grass roots rather than by the elites (although these were quick to bandwagon with this popular issue, see Meunier 2000:105); furthermore, the anti-globalization movement was as much about defending cultural values and traditions as it was an anti-liberal or anti-capitalist movement. Clearly, the ‘French’ rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture covers more than the agenda setting elites and less than the French public at large. Just as it would be wrong to take the elitist claims that America is colonizing French society and culture at face value as expressions of the views of France as such, these lamentations cannot be dismissed as just the standard refrain emanating from a non-representative chorus of disgruntled anti-American

intellectuals. There exists a substantial number of French who consume American cultural products while fearing that American culture is nonetheless somewhat of a threat toward the world's cultural diversity. Though the impact of American culture in France is considerable, at least when measured in terms of box office revenues or fast food and beverage sales, there is good reason to assume that the rejection of American cultural values is common to a substantial proportion of the French public. This might in fact disprove the charges of 'cultural colonization of the mind' frequently leveled against American mass culture: though American cultural products are obviously consumed in large quantities by the French, they do not seem to have adopted American cultural values to nearly the same extent. For some, quite the contrary has happened: while few probably subscribe to the most strident vilifications of the American Republic of Mass Culture, many share the unease associated with its seemingly dominating nature. As such, there is no necessary antagonism between deploring the McDonaldization of societies while occasionally enjoying a Big Mac: it is its perceived impact on society rather than the cultural product as such, which is rejected. Even the French appear to agree with Richard Pells that sometimes, "a movie is just a movie and a cheeseburger is just a cheeseburger" (1997:282), but this does not prevent them from harboring a deep-set distrust of the American cultural juggernaut. Though the French public remains an avid consumer of American cultural products, the fight against 'cultural Americanization' or American cultural contamination seems to have become an integral part of France's cultural and thus national identity. Sophie Meunier has described anti-Americanism as a "well-known peculiarity of French cultural identity" (2000:106). One might even say that as the threat posed by the Republic of Mass Culture has progressively become firmly enshrined as a central part of the French doxa, cultural anti-Americanism seems to have become a quasi-permanent component of the French national habitus, perhaps even to a larger extent than political anti-Americanism.

6.3 Conclusion: The Limits of Anti-Americanism

It was argued in chapter 3 that anti-Americanism can be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power. This chapter has attempted to present an analysis of French anti-Americanism in the postwar era as a rejection of both American hard power and soft power; the underlying premise being, as was showed in chapter 5, that there are strong currents in the French national identity, which can be said to constitute a (more or less latent) anti-American

predisposition. The present chapter has focused on both the political actions of French governments, especially under the Fifth Republic, and the efforts displayed by the primary shapers of cultural anti-Americanism in France. There is no doubt that it is to a large extent a rather artificial distinction, at least when regarding France, to divide anti-American narratives and actions into political or cultural anti-Americanism: the two feed on each other and are frequently merged into the same discourses, as was eminently proved by Étiemble's *Parlez-vous franglais?*. Furthermore, it should be noted that while the French rejection of American power appears to constitute the basis for most French anti-Americanism, the distinction between hard power and soft power is largely an academic tool, which can help to identify the structural causes of French anti-Americanism while giving indications as to how the many varied displays of anti-Americanism can be conceptualized within such structures. This said, one should be careful not to assume that various displays can easily be categorized as fitting neatly into corresponding boxes: the politics of anti-Americanism discussed in 6.1 are as much if not more due to a rejection of the attributes of America's soft power, namely its ability to act as a global political and institutional agenda-setter, than to the existence of its hard power as such, although its impressive hard power arsenal contributes enormously to bolster its political soft power. Likewise, the rejection of cultural America is clearly also tainted with a rejection of America's hard power, not least within the economic field. Nevertheless, it appears useful to apply the distinction between the French rejection of America's hard and soft power to show that the two kinds of rejection represent, at least when it comes to France, two sides of the same coin. Katzenstein and Keohane's study on anti-Americanism is highly useful in identifying different types of anti-Americanism, and they identify several types of anti-Americanism, which in various degrees seem to fit the French example, such as elitist or nationalist anti-Americanism. Yet it is the contention of this study that at least regarding France, it is possible to regard anti-Americanism largely in terms of a rejection of American power, whether hard or soft, and that the power dimension largely accounts for the various displays falling into Katzenstein and Keohane's typology.

It has been alleged that the Fifth Republic could be regarded as more or less inherently anti-American (Kuisel 1993). The question is in this respect whether modern France rejects American power. Based on the political history of the Fifth Republic, it is doubtful whether it can be described as rejecting American power as such. In reality, the policies have been much more characterized by attempts at balancing American power. It has

consistently been American hegemony, which has been rejected, rather than American power as such, although such a distinction is probably a matter of nuances. Yet when we turn our attention to the cultural dimension, there are clear elements of rejection – even when the need to balance America’s cultural influence is put forward. A preliminary conclusion must therefore be that there are clear grounds to analyze large parts of the French anti-American narratives in terms of a rejection of American power, and especially America’s soft power. The question remains whether France can be described as inherently anti-American. It has been argued above that France due to its national identity is inherently predisposed to anti-Americanism, not necessarily because of animosity toward America as such, but because the values on which modern France is built are rivaled by those of a buoyant America, eminently better placed to fulfil its universal ambitions than France. French policies and especially French foreign policies have frequently been described as anti-American, especially those pursued under the Fifth Republic. Yet the policies pursued by de Gaulle and his successors have had one clear and permeating goal: to redetermine a role for France consistent with its values and universal aspirations yet conscious of the realities and constraints of the power configuration of the postwar international system (Cerny 1980). In these endeavors, France has felt constricted by the United States and has consequently operated in such a way as to diminish this constriction as much as possible. France’s policies in this respect have thus acquired an aura of anti-Americanism, but opposition to America does not seem to have been the primary target. France has consistently sought to challenge American hegemony *whenever* it was felt to threaten France’s liberty of action. The most important imperative for France has ever since the defeat to Germany in 1870 been to assure its security. The actions of successive American governments since 1918 did not quell French fears of an attack against its territory. If the policies of France seemed blatantly anti-American, it was primarily because the strategic imperatives driving French policy were not understood. During the Cold War, the American commitment to the defense of Europe was not always regarded as sufficient, and means were taken by France to enhance its own security, the attainment of nuclear arms being the most potent evidence. A second imperative, bar the security of France, has been its independence and its ability to project itself unto the world as not just an important player in terms of hard power (which has become increasingly difficult), but also in terms of soft power. There is political anti-Americanism in France, and perhaps there has historically been more political anti-Americanism in France than in most other European nations. Yet France

can hardly be considered an anti-American republic in political terms. The key to understanding French anti-Americanism today is probably that French opposition to American hard power has been not so much linked to its hard power as such, but as much to the radiance of its hard power on its soft power. It is not America's status as preeminent military or even economic power, which is resented; it is the spill-over effect this has on America's soft power, which has been envied. The last resistance of French anti-Americanism is towards American soft power, not just in terms of culture, but the totality of America's soft power arsenal beginning with its political influence and culminating with its ability to win the hearts and minds of the global public. To the extent that France can be termed the anti-American Republic today, it is primarily in relation to culture. Yet given that culture is in France very much *une affaire d'État*, it should be borne in mind that cultural anti-Americanism can also be regarded as imbued with highly political overtones. The anti-Americanism that can be termed culturally-based is a reminder that any eventual foreign policy realignment across the Atlantic will not be sufficient to bridge the differences between France and the United States. Though U.S. foreign policy is undoubtedly a major cause of the recent European disenchantment with America, there remain real differences between the *American model* and what could be termed the *European model*, a concept which might not span the European continent as such, but which is frequently highlighted in France as an alternative, albeit an alternative under pressure. This 'European model' is frequently presented as the result of a more 'mature' society than the American; one where Europeans have put their "trust in the civilizing power of the state, and [...] its capacity to correct 'market failures'" and thus struggle for "more social justice" (Habermas and Derrida, in Levy, Pensky, and Torpey (eds) 2005:11), in short, as a countermodel to the American ditto. Yet it is also a model perceived to be under threat by the forces of globalization. And as Levy, Pensky, and Torpey noted in the aftermath of the transatlantic rift over the course to follow in Iraq:

Culturally speaking the United States seems to function as a substitute for the negative effects of a globalizing world. Globalization is frequently perceived as Americanization. References to the US often seem to serve the role of Europe's new constitutive other. On a deeper, cultural level, the transatlantic tensions are also a function of competing conceptions of universalism. The European insistence on being a particular project based on a collective memory of universalist values clashes with the universal mission of the US (in Levy, Pensky, and Torpey (eds) 2005:xxiv).

This is especially the case in France, which more forcefully than any other European nation opposes a globalization, which is clearly perceived as a threat to the national cultural identity, as exemplified here by Baudrillard:

Our European culture is one that has staked its all on the universal and the danger menacing it is that of perishing by the universal... This includes not only the extension of the concepts of market, monetary exchange, or production goods, but also the imperialism of the idea of culture. We should be wary of this idea, which [...] devours singularity just as rapidly as revolution devours its children. (1988:83)

Robert Kagan has famously asserted that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less” (2003:3); an assessment, which has been derided as “buttressed by a naive, or disingenuous, set of beliefs about how the United States, given its preponderance, has ‘no choice’ but to act in certain ways, as do also the Europeans” (Clark 2005:236, see also Lindberg (ed.) 2005). Though the present study largely concurs with Clark’s criticism, one is left with the impression that the statement, when transposed on the Franco-American relationship, might, after all, contain a grain of truth. Not so much with respect to foreign and security matters, where the French can hardly be accused of having bowed to the Kantian logic of ‘perpetual peace’, but rather when applied to the realm of culture, where it can be difficult to escape the impression that significant parts of the inhabitants in both countries feel that they live on different planets: the civilized homeland of the Republic of High Culture versus the barbarious Republic of Mass Culture. It is an impression frequently propagated by the media, but it is a stereotype nonetheless: What the media often overlook is that French anti-American rhetoric in this domain as in others “is often accompanied by blatantly Americanophile rhetoric” (Lacorne, in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:42). How could it be different in two nations, which are divided by common values? Yet though anti-Americanism in France may seem to have become today first and foremost centered on its cultural dimension, this is still a part of a larger ideational narrative. Marcus Cunliffe describes how:

Displaced industrially and imperially by the United States, Europe as a whole has, according to the French journalist André Visson, fallen victim to the “Athenian complex” – seeing itself, that is, as the older and finer culture ousted by the new “Roman” one. (1991:400)

Cunliffe further notes that when seen in this context as a reaction to the power of the United States, “European anti-Americanism comes to look much less puzzling and pernicious”

(ibid.), an assessment which the present study fully shares. It is certainly an assessment that would seem to befit the French variety of anti-Americanism. This also entails that we should not expect French anti-Americanism to fade away anytime soon; on the contrary, it has, as Lacorne notes, “a bright future” (Lacorne, in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:42). And, irrespective of the fact that the French by and large are rather attracted to American culture, this future will, most likely, primarily be acted out within the domain of culture, which still provides an essential reference point for French national identity.

7 Conclusion

Anti-Americanism is a subject that has attracted a lot of attention over the past decade. At times, it has seemed as if no analysis of American foreign policy at the dawn of the twenty-first century was complete without a chapter devoted to the issue. To many, and perhaps especially to many Europeans, former President Bush embodied all the negative stereotypes commonly associated with America: the evangelical Christian, the inarticulate ignoramus, the Republican unilateralist, the Texan cowboy etc.; all images eminently suited to confirm pre-existing prejudices about the worst America had to offer as seen from the other side of the Atlantic (O'Connor, in O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1-18). Similar images of the French penchant toward denigrating America have been abundant for years, seemingly validating the impression that though anti-Americanism might be a universal phenomenon; it finds particular favor among the French. The typical image of the arrogant French intellectual, complete with shoulder-long hair and a standard set of preconceived ideas about the United States, its inhabitants and its policies is as much a stereotype as that of the Bible-bashing American, cowboy-hat and all. Taken at face value, such stereotypes seem to confirm beliefs held by some that the French and Americans are each other's cultural antipodes. Yet as this study has argued, France and the United States are far from being either political or cultural antipodes; had they been, French anti-Americanism would arguably have been much less worthy of interest. What separates France and America is in fact the opposite: that both nations are imbued with a universal creed, and that this creed has if not common origins, then at least origins which are comparable. France and America are in fact two nations divided by common values.

Anti-Americanism breeds on stereotypes, yet these stereotypes may sometimes overshadow the more fundamental causes, which prompt resentment against the United States. This has partly to do with basic psychology: it is much easier to ridicule what is considered offensive rather than to engage in what might be a painful cognitive process in order to ascertain why particular elements of one's national psyche are especially prone to rejecting another nation. Conversely, a common refrain among those who attempt to 'demonize the demonizers' is to reduce displays of anti-Americanism to notions of petty envy. Many displays of anti-Americanism feature that too, yet the persistence with which

anti-American narratives are rejected on the other side of the Atlantic as largely irrational is problematic, given that the magnitude and pervasiveness of American power, whether hard or soft, entails that every nation is forced to relate to the nation, which has long acted as the defining power of the world: the United States. It has been noted by many observers of anti-Americanism that the phenomenon should be analyzed in terms of prejudice. But such prejudices have some fundamental causes, whether they are accepted as rational or rejected as irrational. The present study set out to analyze the fundamental causes most likely to prompt displays of anti-Americanism, both as a general phenomenon and in its particular French version.

7.1 A Brief Summary

The study has aimed at presenting an alternative interpretation of French anti-Americanism, the overall ambition being to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. In the introduction, it was argued that anti-Americanism is usually depicted as a prejudice or predisposition, which is typically related to issues of culture and identity. It was further argued that in order to present a structural analysis of the phenomenon, both a general and a particularistic approach was necessary. The first part of the study proceeded to present an interpretation of anti-Americanism as a general, indeed universal, phenomenon, whereas the second part of the study set out to explore the constitutive factors most likely to prompt anti-American predispositions in France and to analyze how these predispositions could be said to influence the actions and policies of contemporary France.

Chapter 2 explored the most common definitions and explanations of anti-Americanism and argued that these to a large extent fail to account for the fundamental causes most likely to promote anti-American prejudices. It was argued that as a universal anti-ism, anti-Americanism presents some unique features, which entail that the phenomenon cannot be analyzed as just any other anti-ism. Furthermore, it was argued that the widespread tendency to focus on the irrational elements of anti-Americanism risks diverting our attention from the more explicable causes, which might be at play regarding the global rejection of America. Finally, it was noted that though anti-Americanism presents some unique features depending on both the countries analyzed and the different social segments within these countries, the great variety in the different anti-American attitudes which can be observed, does not, however, mean that the phenomenon is so complex that more fundamental causes for the

rejection of America cannot be identified. It was proposed that the defining characteristic, which sets anti-Americanism apart from other anti-isms, and which contributes to give the phenomenon a certain dimension of explicability, was the dimension of power.

Chapter 3 proceeded to present an alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism as a global phenomenon, arguing that this could best be described in terms of a rejection of American power. First, a number of surveys were presented, which rather conclusively indicated both that there is a global impression of disproportionate American power, and that this impression contributes to foster sentiments, which can well be described in terms of anti-Americanism. Second, building on the notions of hard power and soft power introduced by Joseph S. Nye, it was outlined how in terms of hard power, America could be described as having achieved near-hegemonic power in an international system, which today can best be described as *primopolar*, with the United States occupying the position as its preponderant pole. Daunting as the attributes of America's hard power may be, it was further argued that in certain respects, its attributes of soft power may appear even more impressive, since the United States much more than any other nation has been capable of both fashioning the rules governing global interaction and of promoting its values around the world. There is little doubt that America's political values and cultural norms have had a tremendous impact on other nations, and these values have come to acquire a dimension of universality. Yet at the same time, the practice of American exceptionalism over the years, and especially during the presidency of George W. Bush, has contributed to foster the impression that these values are undermined by an American penchant toward unilateralism; an impression, which seriously mitigates the United States' power of attraction in the eyes of the world.

While the power dimension seems to provide the best explanation for the fundamental causes of anti-Americanism as a universal, indeed almost systemic phenomenon, the cultural and ideational nature of anti-Americanism entails that it manifests itself differently depending on the society in question. Chapter 4 outlined a conceptual and methodological framework, within which a particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in one country could be carried out. The chapter argued that country-specific attributes of anti-Americanism could be related to questions of national identity, and it proposed a number of conceptual tools, which could be used for the particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in one country. Starting from the assumption that national identity evolves around four major vectors, it was argued first that narratives surrounding national identity could be traced

somewhere along these vectors, and second that such narratives were bound to be dialectical in nature, on the one hand promoting a sense of national self-identification and on the other hand providing a contrast to the perceived Other(s). Finally, it was argued that these narratives of national identity affected the behavior of citizens, as they were imbedded in their national habitus, and that this notion of a national habitus, building on a shared national doxa, could be transposed also at the level of the polity, predisposing the nation in question, through the workings of the state or its defining elites, toward certain forms of behavior.

Chapter 5 gave a brief introduction to the most common anti-American narratives in France, and proceeded to demonstrate that these in large parts build on an older aversion, namely the historic enmity against England. It was argued that in several respects, anti-Americanism could be regarded as a successor-phobia to the Anglophobia, which was cultivated by the French for centuries, and which still finds an echo in the rejection of the mythical ‘Anglo-Saxon’, thereby joining opposition against England and America into one common anti-ism. Taking the values inherited from the Revolution of 1789 as laying the foundations for the modern French national identity, its central tenets were identified as republicanism, civilization, and *laïcité*, all values which are imbued with universalistic overtones. It was argued that not only does the French national identity revolve around these tenets, which correspond to three of the four major vectors of national identity identified in chapter 4, namely the political, cultural, and religious vectors, but also that America stands out in all three domains as both a likeminded nation and a challenger to the French aspirations of offering the world a model to follow. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that France and America could in fact be characterized as being ‘divided by common values’.

Chapter 6 turned to the more contemporary subject of anti-Americanism under the Fifth Republic. Starting from the contention that political and cultural anti-Americanism should be regarded as two sides of the same coin, it proceeded to present first a detailed analysis of political anti-Americanism under the Fifth Republic. Here, the numerous difficulties characterizing the Franco-American relationship in the period were evaluated, and it was argued that though these were frequently caused (also) by an official French revulsion against the perceived hegemonic aspirations of the United States, the policies followed by de Gaulle and his successors should not be described in terms of a rejection of American power as such, but rather in terms of a strong wish to balance American power, the imperative motive driving French foreign policy being to present France as a nation of the first order,

capable of influencing world affairs at par with the United States. In order to achieve this position, France undertook to enhance its national independence from American, while it simultaneously sought to maintain and expand its influence on the two continents, where it could best rival the United States as a point of reference: Africa and Europe. Though these actions were not necessarily motivated by anti-Americanism, they have frequently been presented as such, which has contributed to the impression that the Fifth Republic could be characterized as inherently anti-American. And there is little doubt that the French tendency to portray America as having hegemonic aspirations has contributed to engendering a narrative among the French political elites, which has distinctly anti-American overtones, even if, as time has progressed, the displays of political anti-Americanism seem to have abated somewhat. In the second part of the chapter, it was argued that as opposed to the political dimension of French anti-Americanism, its cultural dimension presents evidence of a clear rejection of American (soft) power. As is the case for political anti-Americanism, cultural anti-Americanism is in France the project of the elites, and French intellectuals have for a century succeeded in establishing themselves as the primary agents of resistance against American culture. In the post-war period, the intellectuals have risen in defense of the Republic of High Culture in a battle against the influence and spread of the Republic of Mass Culture; a defense, which was exemplified by four characteristic reactions against America's cultural juggernaut: the Coca-Cola affair, the campaign against *le franglais*, the 'culture wars' of the 1990s, and the fight against *la malbouffe*. These examples give a good impression of both the breadth and the intensity of the cultural rejection of America, and especially the latter two demonstrate that this rejection has with time become incorporated in an anti-globalization rhetoric, which has clear anti-American overtones. Finally, it was argued that though virtually all of the attributes of French anti-Americanism, whether political or cultural, could be related to the French national habitus, the culturally based anti-Americanism might today be more firmly entrenched in the French national psyche than the political ditto.

7.2 Answering to the Research Question

The research question posed in the introduction was: *What elements of the French national identity are particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American sentiments among the French elites, and to what extent can Franco-American relations under the Fifth Republic be regarded as influenced by these elements?* Furthermore, it was stated that the overall ambition

was to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. The structural nature of the analysis has rested on two assumptions: First that as a general phenomenon, anti-Americanism could largely be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power, the contention being that the power dimension offers the best structural explanation of why anti-Americanism has become a universal anti-ism; second that as a particularistic phenomenon, anti-Americanism could best be explained when viewed through the lenses of national identity, the contention being that at the heart of particularistic varieties of anti-Americanism lie national predispositions, which partake in coloring the impressions entertained toward the United States to such an extent that they have become structurally entrenched.

As regards anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon, a number of surveys reproduced in the present study seem to validate the claim that anti-Americanism is indeed either caused or magnified by an impression of excessive American power. The notions of hard and soft power were used to describe how even rather disparate examples of anti-Americanism could also be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power. A thorough reading of the literature on both anti-Americanism and contemporary American power prompts one major observation of importance in this respect: that while there is a notable reluctance among the scholars who study the subject of anti-Americanism to relate it to notions of power, it seems that most scholars studying American power at the dawn of the twenty-first century concur that the overwhelming nature of American power repels other nations and their inhabitants. In the concluding remarks to his *The American Era*, Robert Lieber asserts that “America can do more to win ‘hearts and minds,’ but the beginning of wisdom is to know that [...] anti-Americanism [is] inevitable as long as the United States exists as a great power” (2005:202). The present study draws essentially the same conclusion, as it has attempted to demonstrate that American power remains the most structural cause of anti-Americanism. Yet it should be stressed that fluctuations in anti-American sentiments do not necessarily correspond with fluctuations in American power, since opposition to American power is as much opposition to the manner in which power is wielded as to the magnitude of this power. This study has in that respect argued that the notion of soft power offers a particularly relevant prism through which anti-Americanism can be viewed, as it allows us to escape simplistic caricatures equating anti-Americanism with opposition to the ‘Mr. Big’ of the international system. Although the study uses the notion of soft power in a way, which somewhat departs from the way it was introduced by Joseph Nye, the concept has

shown useful as a corrective to standard definitions of power, which focus essentially on the economic and military dimensions of power, and it has allowed the study to present an alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism as largely a rejection of American power. Given that this assessment runs counter to what is typically advanced by scholars studying anti-Americanism, I find it important to qualify this interpretation in a number of ways: First, though the study has implied that there is a causal relationship between American power and the rejection of America, it should be stressed that this causal relationship is not so easily measured. While the polls reproduced in chapter 3 conclusively show that there is a widespread impression that the United States wields disproportionate power, the same surveys indicate that repulsion can quickly turn to attraction, once America regains its power of attraction, as was the case following the election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States. This leads to the rather banal observation that the perception of how American presidents wield power (or are expected to wield power) has a significant impact on how intimidating American power is perceived to be. In essence this could be described in terms of the ‘promise of soft power’, confirming the impression that America still wields a considerable power of attraction, whenever the White House is considered (at least by its allies) to act multilaterally or to be willing to do so. Second, it should be noted that even when public opinion abroad is relatively sympathetic to the incumbent in the White House, American power may still cause resentment. Though President Clinton was viewed favorably by a majority of the European populations, several European countries, chief among them France, witnessed a massive rejection of America’s cultural and economic power in the late 1990s, when anti-globalization movements protested against the supposed Americanization of other societies and their cultural traditions in ways, which had distinctly anti-American overtones. This essentially validates the impression that anti-Americanism builds, at least in part, on a rejection of American power, yet it also underlines that anti-Americanism is extremely difficult to measure using polls and surveys, given that these more often than not have a tendency to focus on the political dimension of the global perception regarding the United States. Third, it should be stressed that this study has attempted to present an alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power rather than an in-depth analysis of the different power dimensions and how they influence on the perception of the United States throughout the world, the intention having primarily been to provide a necessary linchpin for the more particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in France. It is

nevertheless my hope that I have convincingly illustrated how such an interpretation can be used to account also for the numerous aspects of anti-Americanism, which cannot be related to standard notions of power. I still consider the study of anti-Americanism to be in its infancy, given that there have so far been formulated very few structural analyses of the phenomenon. This study has advanced its interpretation, but there remains a void in the study of the structural causes of anti-Americanism, which the study has only partly been able to fill.

In order to provide a structural analysis of the French variety of anti-Americanism, this study has argued that its constitutive, or structural, causes are best explored through an analysis of the central tenets of the French national identity. Many accounts of French anti-Americanism have a tendency to focus on what separates the two nations, frequently leaving the reader with impressive overviews of the many interstate or intercultural differences seemingly characterizing the relationship; an approach which contributes to give the impression that there is more than an ocean separating France and America. This study has taken a different approach: it has attempted to identify the similarities characterizing the two nations in order to better explain the reservations, which the French entertain against their 'significant Other'. It has proposed that the central tenets of French national identity could be described in terms of republicanism, civilization, and *laïcité*. The study has furthermore argued that these tenets are deeply imbued with universalist aspirations and that the structural cause of French anti-Americanism might be due to the fact that the American example poses a unique challenge to France's value-born universalist ambitions. The literature on national identity constructs and processes of othering concur that there is a need for any nation to measure itself against others, and that the 'chosen enemy' is frequently one, with which there is a significant resemblance (e.g. Volkan 1988). The findings of this study seem to validate that at least as concerns the Franco-American relationship, this is most likely the case, and it has demonstrated that the political and cultural elites have been instrumental in both shaping the French national identity and in promoting the impression of America as a threat to its most fundamental values. This has had important implications for Franco-American relations under the Fifth Republic, both on a political and on a cultural level. The values on which the French national identity is built are echoed by the actions pursued by the political and intellectual elites, and these have frequently had distinctively anti-American overtones. Politically, France has consistently sought to assert its national independence in ways, which have taken the form of a rejection of American tutelage, and France's universalist ambitions led during the Cold

War to attempts to promote France as a ‘third force’ between the two superpowers; a testimony to the willful aspirations of de Gaulle’s France of offering itself to the world as a competing point of reference. Though it has been argued that all three central tenets of the French national identity both unite and divide France from the United States, it seems to be the notion of civilization, which is today the most contentious, given that it finds a clear echo both in the political and especially in the cultural rejection of America. The idea of a great civilizational schism between France and America is as old as the two republics themselves, and it has colored the negative stereotypes regarding the ‘New World’ for centuries. While the political dimension of France’s *mission civilisatrice* has somewhat abated, as de Gaulle’s successors have increasingly come to terms with France’s position as a great, but not preeminent power in the international system, the perception that France and America stand fundamentally opposed on the civilizational lever is still entertained by some within the French cultural elite, validating both the proposition that at the core of French displays of anti-Americanism we find values, on which the French national identity rests, and the assessment that the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism might prove to be more deeply entrenched than the political dimension.

7.3 Implications for Future Research

This study has made two fundamental propositions regarding the study of anti-Americanism: that anti-Americanism can be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power, and that French anti-Americanism can be related to the central tenets of French national identity. As noted above, this study has provided a detailed argumentation for, why these propositions should be accepted, and it is my hope that I have succeeded in arguing convincingly that at the very least, these propositions are plausible and merit further attention. Furthermore, the study has advanced a number of propositions which, while being framed within the study of anti-Americanism, have implications within other areas of study as well.

First of all, by attempting to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon, framed within the overall theoretical approach of constructivism, it has contributed with another piece, however small, to the gigantic puzzle, which is the relationship between national identities and behavior. It has developed a methodology, through which ideational factors can be interpreted in relation to national identity constructs. More specifically, it has identified four vectors of national identity which, it was argued,

appear particularly well adapted to the study of ideational narratives concerning the nation. Building on the well-established tradition of relating notions of the national self with conceptions regarding the Other, it has formulated the proposition that the dialectical interplay between self and Other can be identified as taking place on three levels, namely differentiation, preservation, and denigration. Borrowing from the sociological 'toolbox' of Bourdieu and especially Elias, it has proposed that the concept of national habitus offers some promising perspectives for the study of the relationship between national identity and behavior. As opposed to the notion of habitus, which seems to have become an almost inevitable companion of every sociological reflection published since the 1980s, the term 'national habitus' has received very limited attention so far. Yet it strikes me as a concept eminently well suited to overcome the supposed dichotomy between culture/identity and behavior, and one which should not be confined to the analysis of the sociology of sport (the main area, where it seems so far to have made some serious headway, e.g. Tuck 2003, Maguire & Poulton 1999), but one, which merits attention also within the study of international relations, as it provides a more dynamic interpretation of the ideational forces, which partake in shaping foreign policies.

Second, the study has introduced the notion of successor-phobias. There is in the literature on anti-Americanism a tendency to see the phenomenon either in exclusive terms, as if the United States is the only victim of a national anti-ism, or in relation to such anti-isms as racism or anti-semitism rather than to other national anti-isms. This study has argued that there is a certain explicability to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, not only because it can be interpreted in terms of anti-hegemonism (if the interpretation of anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power is accepted), but also because it is a natural, even inescapable, impulse to construct the national self in opposition to perceived Others. With regard to the French variety of anti-Americanism, this study has argued that the phenomenon could largely be regarded as a successor-phobia to Anglophobia, and it was further noted that America came to be vilified for many of the same reasons that England has long been regarded France's significant Other. For the study of anti-Americanism, this entails that in order to get a proper impression of the phenomenon in a particular country, it might be relevant to look at the previous anti-isms, which have characterized the nation in question, so that it can be assessed whether there are identifiable consistencies regarding the features, which promote otherness towards a particular nation. In short, while anti-Americanism might be a relatively

recent phenomenon when inspected through the lenses of history, nation-specific anti-ism is not.

Third, though this arguably represents one of the more marginal findings of the study, there seems to be today a conceptual vagueness as regards the proper characteristic of the contemporary international system. This study has offered the notion of *primopolarity* to characterize the current international system, and though, as has been argued by for example Nye (2009), the question of polarity is less easily determined today, where for example the rise of China's economic power and the presence of an increasingly integrated Europe entail that America's economic dominance is less pervasive than it was just a decade ago, the fact remains that the United States can still be described as the defining power in all the major dimensions of power, whether hard or soft: military, economic, political, and cultural. The notion of primopolarity seems particularly well suited to characterize the nature of the international system in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as it captures its essence: the days of bipolarity are unequivocally over, the promise of multipolarity still seems a distant mirage, and while the limits of unipolarity have been seriously exposed, the United States remains more capable than any other power of defining the international system. Hyphenated notions merely succeed in blurring the nature of the power distribution in today's international system, as do the many attempts at rejecting that polarity is still relevant, either by their refusal to acknowledge that there is still a global distribution of power in which a select few nations can shape the characteristics of the system, or by devising notions such as nonpolarity. If anything, the reactions and events following the election of President Obama have strengthened the impression that there is – even in the midst of a global financial crisis – only one nation, which has not just the potential, but also the ability to act as *primus inter pares* in the international system: the United States. There is still a long way to go before we enter a “post-American world” (Zakaria 2008).

7.4 Concluding Remarks

Though this study has argued that anti-Americanism could largely be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power, there is no doubt that the United States still retains a tremendous power of attraction abroad, as has been reaffirmed since the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency of the United States. Nonetheless, there is good reason to caution the 44th President as well as his successors to come that though anti-Americanism may be on

the decline for the moment, American power remains viewed with apprehension around the world. Dominique Moïsi has noted that whereas “Kennedy, for all his limitations, made the world dream, George W. Bush’s America has tended to scare the world, even if some of the fear it has generated is excessive and unfair” (2009:121-122). The warm reception greeting the election of Barack Obama, especially in Europe, is a testimony to the fact that even despite a global financial crisis, largely perceived as the result of irresponsible economic policies and practices originating from the United States, an American president can once again, like Kennedy did in his time, inspire hope throughout the world. Global political anti-Americanism will, as a result, most likely see a decline in the coming years, especially among America’s allies. Yet the deeper causes of anti-Americanism are bound to linger on, causing the occasional bouts of resentment or displays of rejection even among America’s traditional friends and allies. Anti-Americanism might flare up or decrease in intensity given situational circumstances, yet it remains a permanent and ineradicable feature of international politics, given the preponderance of American power. The Iraq War caused a noticeable increase in anti-American outbursts reminiscent of the global reactions to the Vietnam War conducted by that other Texan “gun-slinging know-nothing” Lyndon B. Johnson (O’Connor, in O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:3). But anti-Americanism did not die out after the Vietnam War had been brought to its acrimonious end (Heineman, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007b); its proponents just found other sides of America to denigrate while still sporting ‘Vietnam’ as a rallying call against the perceived imperialist tendencies of the United States. The same is most likely to happen in the years to come, partly because many of the impressions associated abroad with American military and political unilateralism have, after all, not been confined to the policies pursued under the Bush administration (Tourreille and Vallet, in David and Grondin (eds) 2006), but especially because the images associated with the War Against Terror (such as the treatment of prisoners or ‘illegal combatants’ in the Abu Graib or Guantánamo prisons) have given rise to substantial anti-American feelings, which are bound to linger on (McCormick 2007:141, Cesarini, in O’Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:162-165). Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has remarked that the Bush years have undermined not just the worldwide credibility of the American presidency, but also tarnished the moral standing of America for years to come (2007), and if this observation holds true, it would be a delusion to expect that the effects of the animosity leveled against George W. Bush’s America can be easily eradicated just because there has been a change in the White House. There is, however,

no doubt that a more inclusive approach toward the conduct of foreign policy can contribute significantly to diminish anti-American sentiments around the world, and there seems to be a growing realization in Washington that American power can indeed repel large segments of the global opinion. During her confirmation hearings in the U.S. Senate, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advanced the notion of “smart power” as a corrective to the way American power was wielded by the Bush Administration (Clinton 2009). Joseph S. Nye, who has staked claim to the concept¹³⁶, has defined it as the “ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy” (2006). The term ‘smart power’ has been derided as belonging to the world of “catchphrase diplomacy” (Beehner 2009), and may as such be considered a new ‘smart slogan’ rather than a new power dimension. Nevertheless, it is a telling slogan. In essence, ‘smart power’ entails wielding power with a higher regard to the sensitivities of those who are subjected to the effects of this power, and though it might just as well be regarded in terms of soft power, which features diplomacy among its attributes, it does promise another way of wielding power than the one characterizing the Bush-years. Regardless of the merits of this new term, the attention given by the Obama Administration to the way American power is perceived abroad can thus be interpreted as a validation, at least in some political circles, of the impression that American power can repel large segments of the global population as well as several foreign governments. This new rhetoric from Washington can of course not serve as validation of the contention made in this study that American power can be considered the structural or even permissive cause of anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, it highlights that there is a widespread impression that the way American power is wielded is bound to influence how America is viewed. This impression received a further boost with the surprise announcement that the Nobel committee had decided to award the 2009 peace prize to President Obama just nine months after his taking office. As Michael Hirsh notes, the decision “shows two things: one, the prize committee wishes to express the world’s delight at being rid of George W. Bush; and two, there is still a yearning out there to have the ‘old America’ back” (2009). As such, the 2009 Nobel peace prize is a telling and highly symbolic illustration of both the repulsion that the unilateral use of American power can engender and the sense of attraction, which the United States still commands, whenever it is perceived as willing to wield its considerable power with a certain regard also to the sensitivities of other nations. In other words, though American power might given its preponderant nature cause

resentment, American power can also attract – whenever the United States takes its leadership role seriously and shows a proper regard for the world, which it alone has the capacity to lead.

This, however, does not mean that by pursuing clever and inclusive policies, whether under the label of ‘smart power’ or any other label, Washington can reduce anti-Americanism among its allies to a wholly negligible level. First, while the policies carried out by American administrations are bound to have a significant impact on the levels of anti-Americanism around the world, they will, regardless of how much consideration they show for other nations and their inhabitants, not be able to fully overcome the impression that the United States wields disproportionate power. It may be that countries such as France have gradually come to accept their role as secondary powers when compared with the United States, yet within their societies, there is a lingering impression that especially America’s soft power remains a potential threat to their identity. The French example is illustrative of the impression that while America’s global preeminence might now be so entrenched that it no longer leads to attempts at pursuing “a global revisionism of a special kind” (cf. chapter 6.1), at least among its allies, the attributes of American soft power continue to cause widespread rejection. Second, while situational factors may from time to time contribute to sour the transatlantic relationship and lead to charges of (political) anti-Americanism, anti-American predispositions have deeper ideational origins, which are not so easily overcome by a change of administration, neither in Paris, nor in Washington DC. In the introduction to his updated reference work of anti-Americanism, Paul Hollander noted in 1995 that since the first publication, “The decline of anti-Americanism in Western Europe is perhaps best exemplified by the case of France” (1995:xxxix)¹³⁷. Borrowing largely from Kuisel’s study (1993), Hollander concluded that the decline of the French left, and notably of the fortunes of the French Communist Party, have “put a major dent into the political and anticapitalist version of anti-Americanism” (1995:xxxix). Clearly, these assessments show that one should be cautious when judging an anti-ism to be on the decline¹³⁸. As was seen in chapter 6, it would not last long before political anti-Americanism was perceived as being once again on the rise in France, as disagreements over the course to follow in Iraq led to the otherwise rather Atlanticist President Chirac being castigated as having “no rivals as global spokesman on anti-Americanism” (the Economist, op. cit.). Similarly, Hollander’s prediction that the “anticapitalist version of anti-Americanism” was in decline was clearly premature. As the fortunes of the Communist Party dwindled to a trickle, others stood ready to continue where

the communists had left, now under a new banner: anti-globalization. To a large extent, anti-globalization carries the mark of anti-capitalism and can in several respects be depicted in terms of anti-Americanism by another name. And there is little doubt that among Western Europeans, the anti-globalization rhetoric finds no greater echo than among the French public. Finally, it should be borne in mind that though national identities are neither fixed nor impervious to impulses from abroad, they change only very slowly. To the extent that the contention made in this study that there is within the French national habitus a predisposition towards anti-Americanism is accepted, it follows that this predisposition will continue to exist for a substantial period of time, even if by some accounts French anti-Americanism might now seem to be on the decline. Antoine Compagnon has described French anti-Americanism as endemic (Ngi 2008), and this assessment both captures the essence of the phenomenon and underlines the fact that regardless of the fluctuations in their bilateral relationship, we have every reason to expect that France and America will, for a long time to come, remain divided by common values.

Notes to chapter 1:

¹ See the introduction to the bibliography provided at the end for an outline of the literature on the subject.

² There are relatively few exceptions to this. Kristin Ross has offered a neo-Marxist analysis of the phenomenon, well-researched but biased, given that it reads throughout as an apologetic argumentative, in which examples of French anti-Americanism become justified by the oppressive nature of the United States (in Ross and Ross (eds) 2004). This kind of representation in the serious literature on the subject is, however, rare.

³ Herder felt it would be more accurate to speak of specific cultures—in the plural—rather than of culture in general. According to Herder, each culture carries within itself its own immanent validity, and hence we have to think of the world as being composed of uniquely different socio-cultural entities, each with its own pattern of development, its own inner dynamic growth. Of particular concern to Herder were culture determinants that help to produce a sense of collective identity, and these he identified chiefly with language, shared symbols and values, customs and norms (Gilbert 2000, Reeves 2004, Walker, in Walker (ed.) 1984:182-216, Calleo, in Kupchan (ed.) 1995:17-19).

⁴ More than any other study, Huntington's work brought culture back into the study of international relations, albeit in a very different form than the ones previously adopted. Viewing culture in terms of civilizations and placing religion at the forefront of cultures, Huntington argues that the international system is characterized as much by cultural differences as it is by anarchy. In this way, while retaining an overall systemic approach to the study of international relations, he effectively challenges the primacy of 'rational' balance of power considerations. One could say that Huntington superimposes a balance of cultures or balance of civilizations to the traditional realist balance of power. Irrespective of the criticisms, which have been leveled against his work (e.g. by Rubinstein and Crocker 1994), Huntington has done us a great favor by providing a culturalist alternative to the standard systemic theories.

Notes to chapter 2:

⁵ The term 'Americanization' should in this sense be understood in the opprobrious way that is frequently used mainly in Europe to denote a process, whereby society or elements of society develop itself in ways that can be said to be reminiscent of the 'American model'. The standard American use of the term is quite different. Here it is used to denote the act of Americanizing, i.e. of naturalizing somebody as an American and thereby as a citizen of the United States.

⁶ America, in this respect, must clearly be the United States. Though 'America' linguistically covers both American continents, anti-Americanism is associated almost exclusively with North America and indeed the United States. As Sardar and Davies point out, the unconscious and indiscriminate usage of the word America as synonymous with the United States "is a testimony to power founded on a wealth of resources, economic strength and its application to an idea of nationhood that is unique" (2002:8). Braudel has termed the United States "*America par excellence*" (1994:458).

⁷ The only possible exception is anti-Zionism, which in its nature is also decidedly anti-Israeli. The parallel, however, should not be overemphasized for three reasons: First, though anti-Zionism is not merely confined to the Middle East or to Muslims around the globe, it is doubtful whether it can be said to have a truly universal dimension, covering every single country in the world. Second, anti-Zionism is not so much a rejection of Jewish or Israeli values or policies as it is the – arguably worse – rejection of Israel's right to exist. Third, while anti-Zionism contains an element of hatred towards the state of Israel, the same can not necessarily be said to be the case for anti-Americanism, though extreme displays of anti-Americanism have that too. It should however be noted that scholars writing on anti-Americanism frequently regard anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as "Twin Brothers", to use Markovits' phrase (2007:150-200). Hollander similarly regards anti-Americanism akin to other "hostile predispositions such as racism, sexism, or antisemitism" (1992:viii). Though there are both similarities and examples of clear overlap, anti-Americanism nevertheless differs too much in its origins to be treated similar to anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism, as will be shown below.

⁸ Most articles on the subject do not contain definitions of anti-Americanism. The same applies to a number of scholarly works as well. Both Russell Berman (2004) and Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross (2004) have for example presented serious studies on anti-Americanism without presenting clear definitions of the phenomenon.

⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye were the authors of one of the most quoted books on international relations in the late 1970s, namely *Power and Interdependence* (1977), and much of their current work can be traced back to the themes they raised in 1977.

¹⁰ Paul Hollander makes a useful distinction between domestic and non-domestic variants of anti-Americanism., arguing that anti-Americanism exists at home as well as abroad (1992 and 1995). Indeed, both his original study (1992) and the revised “Transaction edition” (1995, reprinted in 2003) contain six chapters devoted to the domestic and only three to the global variety (see also Ward, in O’Connor (ed.) 2007b, for an alternative account of anti-Americanism in America). This study is however purely about anti-Americanism abroad, and specifically in France, and the domestic variants of anti-Americanism will receive no further attention here. The definition of anti-Americanism offered here thus only applies to anti-Americanism abroad; whether it could be applied as well to anti-Americanism at home is doubtful.

Notes to chapter 3:

¹¹ See for example polls carried out by The German Marshall Fund, Pew Research Center, Harris Interactive, International Herald Tribune, BBC etc.

¹² The Pew Global Attitudes Project is co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. It provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. One of its aims is to “deeply probe attitudes toward the United States in all countries” (see <http://pewglobal.org/about/>).

¹³ It should be noted that the 2009 Pew survey does not contain any polling regarding the latter.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, to my mind, Nye himself has contributed to give the meaning and exact scope of ‘soft power’ a certain degree of vagueness. Commenting on Leslie Gelb’s *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*, in which Gelb argues that “soft power now seems to mean almost everything” (2009), Nye claims that “Gelb confuses the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources used to produce those outcomes. Military and economic resources can sometimes be used to attract as well as coerce” (Nye 2009). Given that Nye has delineated a number of soft power resources, it would be inconsistent, if the same observation could not be applied to the use of the notion of soft power.

¹⁵ Machiavelli, much less ‘Machiavellian’ than typically assumed, actually agrees. Contrary to common belief, he does not preach power just for power’s sake, but rather analyzes its uses. In *The Prince*, he states that “it would be best both to be feared and loved; but as it may be difficult to obtain both, it is safer to be feared than to be loved, should one have to renounce one of the two” ([1513] 1942:74). He furthermore cautions princes against becoming hated: “A prince, who wants to be feared, must avoid, if he cannot be loved, to be hated” (ibid:75).

¹⁶ Sheehan notes that “the balance of power principle has been central to both the study and practice of international politics for three centuries” (1996:ix). M.S. Anderson has noted that one of the first clear references to a balance of power in terms of international relations “appears to come in 1439 from the Venetian Francesco Barbaro, who claimed that his own state was the main force working for the maintenance of such a balance” (Anderson 1993:151). He further remarks that from the first decades of the seventeenth century, “there was now visible a tendency not merely to describe a balance of power between the states of Europe as a political and military fact but to justify it as inevitable and indeed as desirable, even essential” (1993:153). It has even been argued that balance of power theory can be traced back to the Greek City-states. However, the evidence on which this view is based is slender. It is probably more correct to say as Sheehan that from Thucydides wrote his *History of the Peloponnesian War* onwards, there is evidence of “balance of power *thinking*” (Sheehan 1996:25).

¹⁷ It should however be noted that the Founding Fathers originally showed less reluctance towards terming the newly independent United States an empire. Already in 1783, George Washington spoke of an “emerging empire”, and in a 1809 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson coined the term “Empire of Freedom” to describe his vision of America (Pedersen 2006:30-31). Herein lies naturally the assumption that the United States would develop a different kind of empire to those hitherto known.

¹⁸ Ernest May's epigram derives from Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*, act II, scene V, where Malvolio remarks that while the stars have favored him, there is no need to fear his greatness: "Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them". In the case of the straitlaced Malvolio, it is evidently the latter. It is uncertain whether it was May's intention or not to compare the United States to the puritan character of Malvolio.

¹⁹ The foreign policy related aspects associated with how America acts as an empire (and perhaps even in neo-imperialist ways) will be treated more thoroughly in chapter 2.3.2, which deals with anti-Americanism as the rejection of the attributes of America's soft power, including diplomacy.

²⁰ It should be noted that the figures for countries such as China and Russia are the official budget figures measured in terms of market exchange rates. Older reports from the IISS using other ways to assess the figures rate China as the second biggest spender, though it is still dwarfed by the USA (IISS 2007:406-411).

²¹ In order of decreasing levels of military expenditures, these are Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, South Korea, Australia, Canada, Spain, Turkey, Israel, Netherlands, and Taiwan (IISS 2009:447-452).

²² "To be a Great Power – by definition, a state capable of holding its own against any other nation – demands a flourishing economic base" (Kennedy 1988:697).

²³ President George H.W. Bush in a speech to Congress, March 6th 2001: "Now, we can see a New World coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a New World order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 'world order' in which 'the principles of justice and fair play [...] protect the weak against the strong [...]' A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations." (Retrieved from http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=0391).

²⁴ When Otto von Bismarck was asked in 1864 whether he did not fear British intervention in support for Denmark, which was fighting a losing battle against an Austro-Prussian alliance, he reportedly answered that if Lord Palmerston were to send the British army to Germany, Bismarck would have the police arrest them. The witty remark shows that British military might was not something that was overly feared in Berlin. Without an alliance with either France or Russia (or preferably both), Britain simply would not have the necessary military means to intervene forcefully in a continental war against Prussia and Austria (Taylor 1954:142-156).

²⁵ In the nineteenth century, European power struggles were characterized by five great powers of roughly comparable strength fighting for mastery of the continent's fate: Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia (Taylor 1954:xxiv-xxxvi). Since these five nations more or less embodied the leadership of the international system at the time, one can quite clearly state that it was multipolar precisely because of the comparability of these five great powers. This is yet another reason why Hulsman, Polansky and Prager's claim that the system post 1815 can be characterized as uni-multipolar should be taken lightly.

²⁶ Measured in terms of total GDP in 2007 (OECD 2009:34). It should be noted that in terms of purchasing power parities (PPP), France is overtaken by China, India, and Russia and relegated to eight position (ibid:35).

²⁷ Measured in terms of defense expenditures in 2007 (IISS 2009:447-452).

²⁸ At least measured in terms of continuity. There have been other, more temporary attempts to seek democratic legitimacy in several European nations that have had a larger electoral base than in Britain. As Churchill noted regarding the fifteen hundred deputies of the French States-General assembled in May 1789, they represented "the broadest franchise yet enjoyed by any European country", as they were elected by five million voters (Churchill 1957:223).

²⁹ On the relationship between policies of exclusion and America's world identity, see Renwick 2000:1-21.

³⁰ The words are from Emma Lazarus' poem "The New Colossus" inscribed on the interior of the pedestal. The statue itself was originally named "Liberty Enlightening the World" (French: La liberté éclairant le monde).

³¹ The reference to a land of milk and honey originates from the Bible, Exodus 3:8, in which the Lord promises to bring the Israelites out of Egypt and into a land flowing with milk and honey. This reference is another powerful testimony to the Puritans' legacy in shaping popular imaginary in relation to America as a nation 'blessed by God'.

³² David Calleo has described the impeachment against President Clinton as the “most savage constitutional attack since Nixon’s time” (2000:72).

³³ Zakaria bases this argument on the fact that “Every state sends two senators to Washington regardless of its population – California’s 30 million people have as many votes in the Senate as Arizona’s 3.7 million – which means that senators representing about 16 percent of the country can block any proposed law” (1997:149).

³⁴ These are some of the most common adjectives, which have been used to describe the American foreign policy throughout time, and will for the sake of clarity be employed in this study. Walter Russell Mead has offered an alternative and very compelling description of the four foreign policy traditions in America, which he labels Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian (2001). He asserts that especially the Jacksonian tradition has been overlooked by observers of America’s history of foreign relations (ibid:174-176 and 259-263), and further notes that “when Jacksonian sentiment favors a given course of action, the United States will move too far, too fast, and too unilaterally in pursuit of its goals” (ibid:260); a characteristic, which many, not least on the other side of the Atlantic, would probably see as a befitting description of the way American foreign policy was conducted under the presidency of George W. Bush.

³⁵ The Marshall Plan was presented first in a 1947 speech at Harvard given by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall and lasted from 1948 to 1952. By mid-1951, it had allocated 12 billion USD in various forms of aid to Western Europe (Hogan 1989:103 and 414).

³⁶ Crockatt notes that Fukuyama’s notion of the “end of history” was greeted by academics with “derision or incomprehension” (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:75) and further asserts that “Although in Fukuyama’s scheme the US does not claim direct responsibility for bringing about the end of history, the association of liberal democracy with ‘the West’ and the association of the United States with both is enough to make clear the assumption about American leadership in these transformations” (ibid.).

³⁷ The quotation is often cited from a speech made by Theodore Roosevelt in Chicago in 1903: “There is a homely old adage, which runs: *Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will go far*. If the American nation will speak softly, and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far” (quoted by Morris 2001:215). The impression that Roosevelt’s foreign policy was later associated primarily with ‘big stick diplomacy’ rather than with soft language, does not render the adage less poignant.

³⁸ This title is borrowed from James L. Baughman’s book, 1997.

³⁹ Many contend that the market for films and television programs is an uneven playing field; for instance, foreign movies are less frequently imported into the U.S. for show in major theatre circuits than imports are shown in other Western countries. It is a fact that Americans are not overwhelmingly interested in seeing unknown foreign actors in movies or to watch movies in a foreign language. This would explain the vast number of American films that are actually remakes of European productions. In Europe, this is often considered a sign of arrogance and provincialism on the part of the United States. Furthermore, the United States has a history of using free trade negotiations to open up foreign markets to its cultural products. The implicit argument being that culture is a commodity to be freely traded just like any other. This is rejected in certain other countries, and as will be shown below especially in France, where culture is seen as essential for the moral cohesion of the nation.

⁴⁰ Bollywood is an informal term popularly used for the Mumbai-based Hindi-language film industry in India. Unlike Hollywood, it does not exist as a physical place. A 2002 Businessweek comparison of Bollywood vs. Hollywood shows that in 2001, Bollywood produced 1,013 films, while Hollywood produced 739. Bollywood films sold approximately 3.6 billion tickets worldwide, while Hollywood productions sold 2.6 billion. In terms of revenues however, Hollywood drew 51 billion USD as opposed to a meagre 1.3 billion USD to Bollywood (2002-estimates). (see http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_48/art02_48/a48tab37.gif)

⁴¹ As Benjamin Barber notes, Henry Ford’s commitment to the mass production of cars “has come to be associated with many of the virtues of American lifestyle and not a few of its vices” (Barber 1995:25). See also Ritzer 2000, for an account of how Ray Kroc, the founder of McDonald’s, applied the principles developed by Henry Ford to the preparation and serving of fast-food.

⁴² Lary May for example locates it to between 1911 and 1929; Michael Kammen finds that it did not come properly of age before the late 1950s (May 1983, Kammen 1999).

⁴³ Michael Kammen makes a useful distinction between the terms mass culture and popular culture, which he finds are habitually, but wrongly, used interchangeably (1999:162-176).

⁴⁴ A vehicular language is used as a second language for communication between communities not sharing the same vernacular language. The original Italian meaning of *lingua franca* was Frankish language (composed mostly of Italian with a broad vocabulary drawn from French, Greek, Persian, and Arabic), but was later associated to any language widely used beyond the population of its native speakers. The term has increasingly come to denote the internationally most influential language at any given time.

⁴⁵ ATTAC (Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l'aide aux citoyennes et citoyens or Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) is an activist organization established in France since 1998, and which is now operating in more than forty countries. ATTAC originally advocated the establishment of a tax on foreign exchange transactions, but has since been a strong critic of the functioning of global economics (Birchfeld and Freyberg-Inan, in Eschle and Maiguashca (eds) 2005). While the organization claims not to be opponents of globalization, they are among the most vociferous advocates of opposition to a number of the features associated with globalization, arguing that "the World is not for sale" (see www.attac.org).

⁴⁶ Critics of the American social model hardly need to substantiate their charges. They can point to the ongoing American debate concerning the very same issues that has been shaped by films such as Michael Moore's blockbuster *Sicko* (2007) or books such as Barbara Ehrenreich's *Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-wage USA* (2002).

⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that ATTAC has no affiliated association in the United States. Furthermore, in the list of "countries" in the Americas with affiliated associations, Quebec is mentioned, whereas Canada as such is not. See www.attac.org.

⁴⁸ By infantilism, Barber means "a relationship between infantilism understood in classical developmental psychology as a pathologically arrested stage of emotional development and infantilism understood in cultural psychology as a pathologically regressive stage of consumer market development – the two together comprising what Freud spoke of as 'a pathology of cultural communities'" (2007:34).

Notes to chapter 4:

⁴⁹ Just as is the case with the study of anti-Americanism, national identity is an area of study that spans several academic disciplines, as can be witnessed by the backgrounds of the four scholars to have dominated the field over the last decades: Ernest Gellner (philosophy and social anthropology), Eric Hobsbawm (history), Benedict Anderson (international relations), and Anthony D. Smith (sociology).

⁵⁰ Alternatively described in terms of constructivism or functionalism (see for example Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000).

⁵¹ Hobsbawm defines invented traditions as "A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983:1).

⁵² Many Germans would probably agree with the German historian Walther Schmidt, who begins his analysis of *The Nation in German History* by emphasizing that "Nations are distinguished by ethnic characteristics" (in Teich and Porter (eds) 1993:151). Others may find this emphasis on ethnicity somewhat paradoxical given, as Uffe Østergård convincingly argues, that Germany can, much more than any of the other great European powers, be considered an "invented nation" (Østergård, 1992:293-298). See also Eriksen (1993:113-116) for an anthropological discussion of German identity, which he considers as "characterised by anomalies, fuzzy boundaries and ambiguous criteria for belongingness" (ibid:113). See Miller 2000, for a discussion of the German model of citizenship, built largely on the notion of ethnicity.

⁵³ For an introduction to the different conceptual ways, in which ethnicity can be related to national identity, see Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:449.

⁵⁴ Not all modernists would agree. Liah Greenfeld for example has provided us with an interesting semantic reading of the origins of the idea of the nation (as opposed to the noun itself), arguing that though the "association between the nationality of a community and its uniqueness represents the [...] last transformation in

the meaning of ‘nation’”(1992:8), older meanings have previously been held; an observation, which leads him to declare that the first nation could, if the idea of nation is viewed in terms of the sovereignty of a people, be considered to be England (ibid:8-87).

⁵⁵ I do not want to imply that Smith ignores the religious dimension; rather he treats this dimension as a subcomponent to the other components and especially to the ethnic component (1991:33-37), an approach which, however, I find problematic given the considerable number of nations, where there is no observable correspondence between the two.

⁵⁶ The notions of ‘the Other’, ‘Otherness’, or ‘Othering’ have received much attention over the past decades, both within sociology and numerous other disciplines. Indeed, as Kendall and Wickham remark, “the ‘other’, once revealed, proved to be everywhere” (2001:23). Neumann finds that the Other is “an epistemological as well as an ontological necessity, without which there can be no thinking self” (1996:48).

⁵⁷ This fourth type has, notes Triandafyllidou, recently “emerged as a new type of external Significant Other” (2002:41), and essentially relates to the European Union. As it falls outside of the scope of the present study, it will receive no further attention here. It should also be noted that Triandafyllidou makes a useful distinction between *internal* and *external* Others. Obviously, it is only the latter, which is of interest for the purposes of this study.

⁵⁸ The term can be traced as far back as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. As a philosophical term, *habitus* originates in Aristotle’s notion of *hexis* elaborated in his doctrine of virtue, meaning an acquired yet entrenched state of moral character that orients our feelings and desires in a situation, and therefore our conduct (Aristotle, *Ethics*, Book II, Chapter 4). *Hexis* thus does not denote an innate characteristic or quality. The word is derived from the Greek verb “to have” or “hold as a possession”, and therefore *hexis* is something that is a firmly fixed possession established by habitual and continual effort or action. It is more typically translated in modern texts as state, characteristic, and habit, but disposition is perhaps the least controversial choice. Taking his cue from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas translated the term into Latin as *habitus* (past-participle of the verb *habere*, to have or to hold) in the thirteenth century in his *Summa Theologiae*. Here, it received the added sense of aptitude for growth through activity, or durable disposition suspended half-way between potency and purposeful action (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, part II).

⁵⁹ Some have argued that the use of a concept such as *habitus* in a context of national identity is problematic given that the nation as a group is too large and diverse to be said to have anything resembling a national *habitus*. This is an argument put forward by for example Prieur (in Prieur and Sestoft 2006:45), and it is probably a reflection of the widespread tendency to link Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* rather inextricably to (physically) embodied dispositions (Robbins 2000:28). Yet apart from the fact that the notion of national *habitus* has been used by a number of scholars, who have influenced Bourdieu (such as Elias, who also, as will be seen below, uses *habitus* in a national sense), the concept of *habitus* has already proved so flexible that it arguably has evolved in meaning from any ‘original’ use it might have had (whether you date it from Aristotle, Aquinas, Bourdieu or any other). *Habitus* is, like virtually all other components of Bourdieu’s terminology, an open, abstract concept, whose meaning is determined by its empirical use (Prieur and Sestoft 2006:214). Indeed, Bourdieu himself sees the applicability of theory only in relation to empirical research (Prieur and Sestoft 2006:215). While paraphrasing Kant in writing that “theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind” (1988:774-775), Bourdieu has called for heterodoxy in social science. Given that he sees philosophical and scientific traditions as an “almost inexhaustible toolbox” (Bourdieu 1987:41) from which the scholar can find inspiration and indeed tools to tackle scientific problems, the use of his terminology in other contexts should be permissible.

⁶⁰ Like the notion of *habitus*, the term *doxa* has a long pedigree. It originates from Parmenides, one of the most significant of the pre-Socratic philosophers, and refers in his philosophy to erroneous perceptions of others or of aspects of reality. *Doxa* originates not from reality, but from for example myths, misconceptions or what one might today call socially constructed preconceptions of reality. When Roland Barthes in his work on myths and mythologies refers to collective representations as “des siècles en arrière, maintenues stagnantes dans l’erreur par le pouvoir, la grande presse et les valeurs d’ordre” (Barthes 1957:72-73), it is in fact *doxa* that he describes. *Doxa* can be related to, but is not identical to ‘world outlook’ or *Weltanschauung* in the Hegelian sense, as *doxa* denotes a stronger and broader system of perceptions, or rather a codex of ‘approved’ perceptions to which group members submit. Though the term originates from Parmenides, Bourdieu is inspired primarily by Edmund Husserl’s use of the concept, although he uses the term in a less complex interpretation (John Myles has for example argued that Bourdieu overpolarizes *doxa* and reflexivity; 2004:91-107).

Notes to chapter 5:

⁶¹ It is more difficult to identify a similar value situated along the fourth, ethnic vector. However, much of the French rejection of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ can be seen as evolving at least in part around a narrative built on perceptions of ethnic demarcation, as will be seen especially in 5.2.

⁶² Although France was among the first nations to colonize parts of the New World (first in Acadia and later, after having been expelled by the British in 1755, in Louisiana), the pattern of emigration was very different from the one characterizing especially the British Isles. Here, colonists fled from religious persecution and/or the lack of available cultivable land, which was mostly in the hands of large landowners, a situation which did not characterize France to the same extent. Furthermore, the British colonists were better at establishing democratic institutions in the New World than the French, which in turn attracted new waves of immigrants. As such, both the push and the pull factors worked in favor of the emigrants of British origin. The result was that although France had colonized huge territories in America, they were populated by very few French (Glebe-Møller 1981).

⁶³ When discussing Anglo-French relations, there is, as Bell has noted, “a pervasive problem of nomenclature” between when to speak of the English or the British (1996:5). He adds that “The French usually tend to deal with these problems by ignoring them, referring indiscriminately to England and the English, even when they mean Britain and the British” (ibid.). However, as France has historically perceived Scotland as an ally, the French way of ‘dealing with the problem’ of nomenclature is perhaps not as unfounded as Bell seems to think: For France, England was the hereditary enemy, not Britain. For the French, the English were the antipodes, while the Scots were a kindred people, subjugated by the English. Indeed, Scotland and the Scots have historically been regarded as allies of France rather than as enemies: The series of Franco-Scottish treaties known as the Auld Alliance was intermittently in force between 1295 and 1560, and it was aimed specifically against the mutual “Auld Enemy”, England (Macdougall 2001). In his study, which focuses mostly on Anglo-French relations from 1900 onwards, Bell solves the problem of nomenclature by referring to Britain and the British (1996:5). In this study, focusing less on the political and military aspects of Anglo-French cooperation and more on the historical attributes of Anglophobia in France, Britain will mostly be referred to as England and the British as English when referred to in relation to French perceptions, reflecting that the animosity is directed against a national culture and its representatives rather than against the formal conglomeration of British nations united in a single entity.

⁶⁴ Although the battle of Waterloo marks the end of a long series of wars opposing France and Britain, and indeed also the moment when French aspirations for military domination of Europe were effectively defeated, political rivalry would continue well into the next century. The 1904 Entente Cordiale may have marked the beginning of a liberal alliance in Europe keen to defend itself against armed onslaughts on their democratic societies, yet the Royal Navy’s pre-emptive attack on the French fleet at Mers-el Kébir in 1940, also known as Operation Catapult, briefly reinvigorated armed hostilities between the two nations (Masson 1991:164). In spite of the twentieth century being predominantly a history of alliance between the two countries, political rivalries have lingered on, as can be witnessed not least by Britain’s thorny road towards membership of the European Economic Community, which was twice vetoed by de Gaulle (see chapter 6).

⁶⁵ In her intriguing analysis of the “incredible lovestory between French and English”, Henriette Walter suggests that by paving the way for a French victory in the Hundred Years War, Joan of Arc actually may have done the French language a disservice. Since the Norman invasion in 1066, French had been the language of the English court. By setting about to oust the English king from French soil, Joan of Arc was simultaneously instrumental in seriously limiting the chances of a worldwide expansion of the French language (Walter 2001:12). Regardless, English sovereigns continued to “go to war under a standard emblazoned in French: *Dieu et Mon Droit*” (Rosenblum 1988:87).

⁶⁶ Robert and Isabelle Tombs note that “Symbols of France become not merely allegorically female, but alluringly feminine, compared with frigid Britannia or butch Germania” (2006:450). They further remark that the “importance of women as symbols of civilization explains the virulence of French attacks on British women” (ibid:450). On French stereotypes regarding British women, see also Gibson 1995:314. For a vivid example of French denigration of American women as “frigid, obsessed, and puritan”, see Étiemble [1963] 1991:378.

⁶⁷ Winock recounts that it was originally the French Left, which appropriated itself of the myth of Joan of Arc, but that moderate republicans would later seek to use her as a symbol of consensus and cohesion in a deeply

divided society, until she was finally seized by the nationalist Right and used to denounce first Jews during the Dreyfus Affair and later immigrants, not least today by Jean-Marie le Pen's *Front National* (1990:145-156).

⁶⁸ This is in many respects still the case. Although most French history writing today attempts to provide a more nuanced picture of both his achievements and his shortcomings, Napoleon continues to attract massive interest in France and abroad. On the French political Left, he is frequently vilified, and Bonapartism is an accusation frequently branded against right-wing politicians keen on the promotion of law and order. On the political Right, typically more worried about the Left's tendencies toward Jacobinism, he is, if not a source of inspiration, then a legitimate object of interest. France's former Prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, did not lose in political standing after publishing a highly flattering description of Napoleon's hundred days following his escape from Elba (Villepin 2001). It is noteworthy that one of his most positive biographers, Vincent Cronin, whose account of Napoleon's life (1971) is almost tantamount to a hagiography, is British.

⁶⁹ These words were dictated to General Bertrand by Napoleon as he surrendered to the English captain of the *Bellopheron*, and they were subsequently sent to the British Prince Regent. The reference to Themistocles refers to the commander who had lead the Athenians to victory at the battle of Salamis, but who was nevertheless granted sanctuary by his erstwhile enemy, the King of Persia, when he had been ostracized from Athens (Cronin 1971:506).

⁷⁰ Significant of the importance of the Fashoda incident, Meredith describes how it gave birth to the "Fashoda syndrome", according to which the French have subsequently "been vigilant in guarding against anglophone encroachment in what they considered to be their own backyard – *le pré carré*". He further describes how "In his memoirs, General de Gaulle listed the disasters that had afflicted France in his youth and that led him to devote himself to upholding France's 'grandeur': the first on the list was the Fashoda incident" (2006:493). See also Bell 1996:3-4, for a similar account.

⁷¹ The phrase "a nation of shopkeepers" would seem to derive from Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* from 1776, which Napoleon is known to have read. In Book IV, Chapter 7, Smith states: "To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may, at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of shop-keepers". (Smith [1776] 2007:397)

⁷² In *The Roads to Modernity*, Himmelfarb sets out to reclaim the Enlightenment as a phenomenon largely originating in England, a fact that according to her has been overlooked by the importance given to the *salons* in Paris and the fact that it took the noun Enlightenment more than a century to make its appearance in English (2008:3-22). Indeed, she notes that the "decisive advantage of France over Britain and America may have been the term "enlightenment" itself. [...] "*Siècle des lumières*" was used as early as 1733 by the abbé Dubos, by Rousseau in the *First Discourse* in 1750, by the co-editor of the *Encyclopédie* Jean le Rond d'Alembert the following year in his *Preliminary Discourse* to the *Encyclopédie*, and by others throughout the century." (ibid:11).

⁷³ Or rather the succession of Gaullist or neo-Gaullist parties, as its leaders have had a tendency to rename and refashion the party (or parties) to provide them with a political platform of which they were in maximum control.

⁷⁴ The origins of the quotation are unclear, and the quote is frequently also attributed to both Oscar Wilde (Phillipson 2003:30) and Winston Churchill (Gunn 2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations and the 1951 *Treasury of Humorous Quotations* (Esar & Bentley), however, give the attribution to Shaw, but without offering a source. In *The Canterville Ghost* (1887), Wilde wrote: "We have really everything in common with America nowadays except, of course, language".

⁷⁵ It should be noted that *liberté* is also sometimes translated as 'freedom' and *fraternité* as 'brotherhood'.

⁷⁶ In December 1790, revolutionary leader Maximilien de Robespierre suggested that the words "Le Peuple Français" (The French People) and "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" be stitched onto the uniforms and flags of the National Guard. From 1793 onwards, the following words were painted on a number of Parisian facades: "unité, indivisibilité de la République; liberté, égalité ou la mort", although the final part of the phrase was soon erased as it became too closely associated with the *Terreur*. See for example the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/france_829/institutions-vie-politique_19079/symboles-republique-14-juillet_2615/liberte-egalite-fraternite_5155.html

⁷⁷ The number of different regimes, i.e. constitutions or legal frameworks with constitutional power to have succeeded each other since 1789 is usually estimated to be around twenty, the current Fifth Republic being the

last of these. This number does not include the many major changes that some of the constitutions have been subjected to over the years. See for example Duhamel 1993:15-16 and Chevallier and Conac 1991.

⁷⁸ This is the incident commonly referred to as the ‘official’ start of the Revolution. Olivier Duhamel asserts that the Revolution began in earnest almost a month before, on June 17th 1789, when the estates general decided to transform themselves into the Constituant National Assembly (1993:15). Yet July 1789 saw an escalation of revolutionary activities that not only led to a regime change but indeed resulted in the violent overthrow of the *Ancien Régime*.

⁷⁹ Chevallier notes that no other country, not even Lenin’s or Stalin’s Russia, has conferred on itself such a radical break with the past as the one that separated the modern France born out of the Revolution from the *Ancien Régime* (in Chevallier and Conac 1991:xix).

⁸⁰ The law regarding the use of the revolutionary calendar did not come in effect before October 24th 1793. The calendar was used mostly by the administration and never really caught on in other circles and quickly fell into desuetude. It was abolished under the Napoleonic Empire on 11th *nivôse* year XIV (January 1st 1806). The creation of the calendar itself is often wrongly attributed to the poet Fabre d’Églantine. Though he named the months after the changing seasons in France, the chief architect behind the new calendar was the mathematician Charles Gilbert Romme.

⁸¹ The victory at Yorktown was in military terms as much a French victory as an American victory, enthusiastically greeted in both countries. It is by no means certain that Washington’s Continental Army could have defeated the British forces without the help of France. Washington’s victory came after years of hard-fought war, where victory long looked far from certain. Only after France entered the war following the 1778 alliance between the two nations, did the course of war change significantly. Historians generally agree that the French alliance proved the turning point of the war (e.g. Duroselle 1978:19). In this respect, the United States of America undoubtedly owe part of their very being to the support from France in one of the most crucial periods in the nation’s history. The peace treaty that formally recognized the independence of the United States was signed in Paris in 1783 – a further reminder of the French role in the process that lead to independence. Indeed, French king Louis XVI has been called America’s forgotten founding father (Ross 1976).

⁸² There is no firm agreement as to when the nation-state first appeared in Europe. Scholars of International Relations often date it to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty-year War. Here, the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (the ruler determines the religion of his realm) that had been established at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 was reconfirmed, ending the duopoly of dynastic and papal rule that had characterized a number of states. Henceforth, the ruler decided the ‘official’ religion of his territory, effectively ending the long period of religious strife between the European states. Within the discipline of International Relations, this makes sense, since the states could from then on act as nation-states in international affairs (see for example Nexon, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds.) 2005:276-281). Yet scholars of Sociology and Political Science frequently take the view that the nation-state originated with the ideas of citizenry expounded in the French Revolution (Jenkins and Sofos 1996:12-13). This idea of citizenry is linked to the notion of the nation as the embodiment of the common aspirations of its citizens (see the discussion of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen below).

⁸³ Dated from the advent of Hugues Capet in 987.

⁸⁴ Condorcet, among the leading philosophers of the Enlightenment arguably one of the most favorable toward the American experience (see 3.4.1), was also the only one of them still alive to witness the French Revolution. He had initially high hopes for it, but to him it proved a disappointment. Forced to flee from the Terror, he died in jail in 1794 (Himmelfarb 2008:182).

⁸⁵ Patrick Weil notes that though the revolutionary leaders did originally adopt a universalist conception of nationhood, successive regimes were not always as inclined to relinquish the demand of *jus sanguinis* (2004:30-32 and 37-52).

⁸⁶ Dale Van Kley further notes that “not even the American states’ declarations of rights entirely broke with the notions that the rights in question were peculiarly English rights – even if enunciated against the English – or that they derived their force in part from their status as property inherited from the past.” (In Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6)

⁸⁷ As such, the Declaration’s preamble states that the “simple and incontestable principles” to be enunciated “may always be directed to the maintenance of the constitution and to the welfare of all”, while article 3 states

that “The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation”, and article 6 that “The law is the expression of the general will” (Keith Michael Bakers translation, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:1-2).

⁸⁸ Judith Shklar has described the phrase “general will” as “ineluctably the property of one man, Jean-Jacques Rousseau” (in Wiener 1973:275). Himmelfarb concurs that the concept “has always, and properly so, been identified with Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*” (2008:167), although she recounts that Rousseau himself, seven years prior to the publication of his 1762 work, attributed the phrase to Diderot (ibid.).

⁸⁹ Though Burke is traditionally seen as the philosophical founder of Conservatism, he was also an Enlightenment thinker (Møller 1996, Himmelfarb 2008) long associated with liberalism. His vehement critique of the French Revolution has become his most well-known legacy, to a large extent obscuring the liberal ideas expounded in many of his earlier writings. Himmelfarb has in this respect noted that the French Revolution raised “the specter of the two Burkes, the pro-American and the anti-French Burkes, the first exemplifying the “soft virtues” of the “Speech on Conciliation” – liberty, compromise, religious toleration; the second the “hard virtues” [...] of the *Reflections* – authority, tradition, religious establishment” (2008:84).

⁹⁰ At the time, Burke’s assessments were denounced as reactionary by the most liberal supporters of the French Revolution such as Thomas Paine, who wrote *The Rights of Man* ([1791-1791] 2003) largely as a response to Burke’s *Reflections*. In essence, Burke rejected that the populace was properly qualified to govern a society; to him, the focus on general will rendered the Revolution not just vulnerable to, but would indeed lead to despotism by the excesses of majority rule. His assessment was somewhat vindicated by subsequent events. Burke’s prediction that the chaos engendered by the Revolution would bring about a “popular general” who would become “master of your whole republic” ([1790] 1986:342) seemed fulfilled with Napoleon’s seizure of power shortly after the Revolution’s tenth anniversary.

⁹¹ Not to be confused with his son, the younger Marquis de Mirabeau, who was later to achieve notoriety for his achievements during the French Revolution.

⁹² The myth of the French (and before them the Franks) as the descendants of Hector of Troy can be traced back to one of the few written chronicles from the Merovingian epoch, the *Historia Francorum*, attributed to Fredegar (Frédégaire) and written around 660 AD. According to the myth, Hector’s son Francion escaped a Troy in flames and settled in Gaul, where he founded what would later become the Merovingian dynasty. The chronicles of Francion can be read as parallel to Virgil’s *Aeneid*, and Francion is depicted as a cousin to Aeneas, whose descendants, Romulus and Remulus, according to mythology founded Rome. The chronicles are evidence to an early wish to equal and even surpass Rome, notably by stressing Francion’s royal lineage (as opposed to that of Aeneas, who was a lieutenant of Hector, but not his son). The myth is a.o. described in Ronsard’s epic poem *La Franciade* (1572), where Francion is renamed Francus.

⁹³ This last line stems from the declaration made in 1918 by Georges Clémenceau, leader and defender of France during the First World War, in which he stated that “France, once soldier of God, today soldier of humanity, will always be the soldier of the ideal” (quoted by Chuter 1996:13. See also de Gaulle 1989).

⁹⁴ Since Sully Prudhomme was awarded the first Nobel Prize in Literature in 1901, fourteen laureates have been French. The United States and Britain are tied in second place with ten laureates each.

⁹⁵ At its origins, the role of the Académie, established by Cardinal de Richelieu, was to act more akin to an ‘official’ rival to the growing number of private circles and salons. Bluche describes how the Académie, born out of “hazard and creative intuition”, nevertheless succeeded in acquiring a pre-eminent role as the most important institution for the safeguard and promotion of the French language (Bluche 2003:232-235).

⁹⁶ Hagège nevertheless dates the turning point as regards the spread of French as the preeminent language in the Western world to the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Though this was not clear at the time, a consequence of France loosing most of its territories on the North American continent was both to halt the spread of its language in the New World and to lay the foundations for the subsequent preeminence of English (1987:170-172).

⁹⁷ This codification of the role ascribed to the French language has remarkably ancient antecedents. In 1539, King François I signed the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts, whose articles 110 and 111 prescribed the use of French in all judicial acts and official legislation. At that time, the intention was of course not to protect French from linguistic incursions from across the Channel, English being in the sixteenth century a language spoken by a comparatively small minority in Europe. Rather, the goal was to discontinue the use of Latin in official documents as well as to discourage the use of regional dialects (Hagège 2006:213).

⁹⁸ It was only in July 2008 that the French constitution was revised granting official recognition to regional languages, now deemed to “belong to the patrimony of France” (New article 75-1 of the constitution, see Loi constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008). Yet, though France has signed the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which came into effect in 1998 (Phillipson 2003:92 and 153-154), it has still not ratified it.

⁹⁹ See also La documentation Française 2008, for similar claims.

¹⁰⁰ Milhaud similarly estimates that some 113 million people speak French (Milhaud 2006b). The International Organization of Francophonie reaches a figure that is only marginally higher, around 123 million Francophones, while estimating that in addition, some 72 million people are “partial Francophones” with limited proficiencies (Valentin (ed.) 2007:20).

¹⁰¹ The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs make a similar assessment, although they note that this includes partial Francophones. Without counting partial Francophones, French is relegated to eleventh position. See Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes (2008). *Fiche de synthèse de la Francophonie*. Retrieved on August 12th, 2008, from www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/article-imprim.php3?id_article=11209.

¹⁰² This clearly reflects a Eurocentric vision of the world. There are numerous historical examples of civilizations that have been more advanced than the European civilizations of the time (see for example Kennedy 1988, and Leclerc 2000), yet in the popular European imaginary since at least the Renaissance, such historical facts have been largely neglected.

¹⁰³ There is no formally accepted term that accurately denotes the American version of secularism. The term *religious freedom* is widely used to describe this version, for example by Gunn (2004), but does not in itself indicate secularism in the meaning separation of church and state, but rather religious tolerance. While American secularism is often described in terms of religious freedom, the American society is furthermore characterized by having no formal links between state and church, befitting standard definitions of secularism. Indeed, a vast number of countries have adopted the principle of religious freedom in the meaning freedom of confession while retaining (and frequently subsidizing) an established church.

¹⁰⁴ Depending on the time from which one dates the separation of church and state in France. Though the principle of *laïcité* was first formally recognized as a cornerstone of the republic in 1905, revolutionary France’s break with the established Catholic Church effectively led to the instauration of a secular state, however briefly it lasted.

¹⁰⁵ The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”

¹⁰⁶ The long history of religious strife in France shows that neither king nor the Catholic Church took kindly to the presence of other religious practices in France. The French Wars of Religion, which culminated with the St. Bartholomew Day’s Massacre in 1571, ended with the Edict of Nantes in 1598 that formally conferred certain rights to protestants (or *huguenots*), although Catholicism was reaffirmed as the established religion of France. But the Edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685 by King Louis XIV, who declared Protestantism illegal (see for example Nexon, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2005:272-274). It would not be an exaggeration to state that prior to the Revolution of 1789, France had in effect witnessed more than two hundred years of religious strife, in which the Catholic Church had secured a stronghold on society.

¹⁰⁷ In this respect, *laïcité* can be seen in accordance with the Lockean belief that limits can in certain instances be imposed on religious tolerance. Locke admitted that the state had the right to protect itself from religious communities who threatened the survival of the State, such as he perceived the Catholic Church to do in England in 1688 (Liedman 1989:123).

¹⁰⁸ The 2004 law (loi du 15 mars 2004) banning all ostentatious religious symbols from state schools came into force as a result of a prolonged discussion, which erupted when three Muslim girls were expelled from their school in 1989 because they refused to remove their headscarves. It has raised several critiques both inside and outside of France. See for example Leveau and Hunter, in Hunter (ed.) 2002:12-13. John Bowen even describes how the practice of *laïcité* with regard to the 2004 law was explicitly contrasted with the “Anglo-Saxon” model during the National Assembly debates prior to its adoption (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:235).

¹⁰⁹ The fact that the religious beliefs of only a select few prominent politicians, such as former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (who adheres to the Protestant faith), or former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors (who is a practicing Catholic) are cited as evidence to the source of their inner ideological commitments, is actually a good indication of the relatively limited role of religion in the discussion of politics in France. It shows that while religion is not wholly absent from politics, it is relegated to the secondary role of describing the possible psychology of the various candidates rather than the ideological foundations of their parties as such.

¹¹⁰ Though many opinion makers in other European countries might say the same, they all too often portray their national values as originating at least to some degree from their Christian background. In France, the reference to Christianity is generally left out – another tribute to the fact that the revolutionary origins of the republic are still taken for granted.

¹¹¹ The Abbé Pierre (1912-2007), an abbot who devoted most of his life to helping the poor and homeless, was for many years voted France's most popular person and came third in a 2005 television poll to choose *Le Plus Grand Français* (The Greatest Frenchman).

¹¹² Loi n°2001-504 du 12 juin 2001 tendant à renforcer la prévention et la répression des mouvements sectaires portant atteinte aux droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentales. See <http://www.antisectes.net/law2001-texte-officiel.htm>

¹¹³ The reports can be retrieved from <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/004000552/0000.pdf> and <http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/024000086/0000.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ The quote stems from part I of Paine's *The Age of Reason* (1794). It should be noted that Thomas Paine advocated not as much atheism (for which he was wrongly attacked) as deism (while nevertheless rejecting revelations as anything but a personal experience) or what has later been termed 'secular millennialism'.

¹¹⁵ Turkey is probably the only nation that officially operates as strict a version of secularism as France, notwithstanding the few remaining communist nations, where religion is banned altogether. See for example Zylberberg 1995:49. Indeed, Kemalist Turkey was directly inspired by the French example, going as far as adopting the term *laïcité* itself. See Wievorka 1995:65.

¹¹⁶ Interestingly, Feldman traces the origins of American religious fundamentalism to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, where it rose in reaction to the strong secularism promoted by liberal Protestants inspired precisely by Darwinism (Feldman 2005:12-13). It would seem that while Darwinism gave rise to an inflammation in debates regarding science versus religion in both France and the United States (as in many other Western nations); the outcome was very different in the two countries.

¹¹⁷ As will be seen in 6.2.1, the Dreyfus case also gave birth to the French *intellectuels* who would prove to be an active force of both *laïcité* and anti-Americanism.

¹¹⁸ Previous French natalist policies were motivated much more by geopolitical alarm over France's declining birthrates rather than by religious arguments, especially when they were contrasted to the rising birthrate in France's major continental competitor, Germany (Lockhart 2003:110-111 and 119).

¹¹⁹ Citron describes how Lavissee, "avec toute la distance qui sépare la platitude du génie" (1991:35) builds on Michelet to mould the minds of generations of school children with his very 'personalized' textbook account of French history. See also Chuter 1996:24 and Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:543, for an account of Lavisses's influence.

Notes to chapter 6:

¹²⁰ Not, as Alfred Grosser notes, "that anyone wished to revive the inverse precedent of the eighteenth century where after the War of Independence Congress had refused to settle the debts owed to the king of France" (1980:6).

¹²¹ One of the best-known examples is de Gaulle's rejection to meet Roosevelt in Algiers after the Yalta conference, which has often been presented as a petty gesture toward an American President battling with the last stages of a crippling disease, which would soon after send him to the grave. Yet de Gaulle's rejection had its own, Gaullian logic, which he explained in his War Memoirs: "If Roosevelt wanted to see de Gaulle for good reasons, why had he not permitted him to come to Crimea? And then, how was the American President qualified

to invite the French President to visit him in France? [...] How could I agree to be summoned to a point on the national territory by a foreign chief of state?" (quoted by Grosser 1980:41. See also Vaïsse 1998:28 and Jouve 1967:599-600). This was not a matter of mere protocol – it was a matter of first principles, namely that of the recognition of France as a sovereign partner as well as of the integrity of the French territory.

¹²² After de Gaulle told U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated structures would entail that every American soldier would have to leave France, Rusk allegedly replied "Does that include the dead Americans in military cemeteries as well?" (Schoenbaum 1988:421)

¹²³ It is tempting to regard the preeminent role accorded to the president in the constitution of the Fifth Republic as inspired by the American example, but there is little evidence to substantiate this. The motive driving de Gaulle's wish for a strong executive featured prominently in his 1946 Bayeux speech (de Gaulle 1959:647-652) and was largely the result of a critical reading of the history of the Third Republic with its tradition of governmental instability; a tradition which continued under the Fourth Republic. To the extent that French constitutionalists have looked for inspiration from abroad, the main source of inspiration seems to have come from Britain with its tradition of stable parliamentary majorities, a system which, however, could not be easily transposed on a France characterized by a multiplicity of political parties (Chagnollaud and Quermonne 1996:56-59). The birth of the Third Republic was the result of bitter constitutional haggling between radical republicans, conservative republicans, royalists, and bonapartists, the former two emerging largely victorious (Chevallier and Conac 1991:231-274). But the tensions remained, and accusations of Bonapartism featured prominently in the discussions over the Fifth Republic (Lacouture 1985:590, Wahl 1990:42). Michel Debré, the main drafter of the text of the 1958 constitution, regarded the absence of a "monarque républicain" as a main cause of the deficiencies of the Third Republic (Chevallier and Conac 1991:608), and when article 11 of the constitution of the Fifth Republic was amended in 1962 in order to introduce the direct election by universal suffrage of the head of state, this was a characteristic which became bestowed on President de Gaulle (ibid:687). The 1962 amendment was considered by some as auguring a new era of "présidentialisme à l'américaine", a charge vehemently rejected by de Gaulle, who argued that precisely the fact that the French president, as opposed to the American, was not elected simultaneously with the legislative body, permitted him stay above "la lutte directe des parties" (ibid:688-689). There is no doubt that in practice, however, the "monisme présidentiel" (Lacouture 1985:565) has conferred on the office of the French president an authority, which among Western democracies finds a parallel only in the United States. With the 2000 constitutional amendment, the mandate of the French president was reduced from seven to five years, corresponding with the mandate of the *députés* of the *Assemblée Nationale*. Thereby, the Fifth Republic essentially became a "régime présidentiel intégral" (Boutin and Rouvillois 2000:93), more comparable with that of the United States.

¹²⁴ This is a result not so much of the wording of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which is actually rather vague on the subject, but essentially of the practice demonstrated under the first *cohabitation* from 1986-88. See for example Bell, 2005:119-127.

¹²⁵ It should be noted that Macridis's book appeared just before de Gaulle pronounced his decision to withdraw France from NATO's military structures.

¹²⁶ North Atlantic Council (1994). Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government. Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm>.

¹²⁷ United Nations Security Council (2002). UN Press Release SC/7564: United Nations Security Council Holds Iraq in "Material Breach" of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1441 (2002). Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm>.

¹²⁸ Aron further notes that "If Paris of the Left Bank is the writer's paradise, the United States might be regarded as the writer's hell [...] France exalts her intellectuals, who reject and despise her; America makes no concessions to hers, who nevertheless adore her." ([1955] 2001:229)

¹²⁹ The irony was that the communist regime in Moscow itself had little respect for the intellectuals as a group. When in 1919 Maxim Gorki wrote to Lenin in defence of some members of the *intelligentsia*, who had been arrested and molested by the revolutionary authorities, he argued that intellectuals should be treated with special respect, as they represented the 'brain' of the nation. Lenin brutally rejected his plea in favour of "des petits intellectuels minables, laquais du capital, qui se veulent le cerveau de la nation. En réalité, ce n'est pas un cerveau, c'est de la merde" (quoted by Courtois, in Courtois *et al* 1997:805).

¹³⁰ The depiction of the Coca-Cola affair given here owes much to Richard Kuisel's account (1991, see also Kuisel 1993:52-69 for a slightly shorter version). Most other accounts seem to take their cue from Kuisel's work (see for example Wall 1991, Pells 1997, Gordon and Meunier, 2002), although some, such as David Chuter, seem to find the French reactions at least partly justifiable given France's precarious economic situation following the Liberation (Chuter 1996:243-244).

¹³¹ E.g. the 2005 proposals by Gaullist Senator Philippe Marini: Proposition de loi no. 59 complétant la loi n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française (<http://www.senat.fr/leg/pp104-059.html>).

¹³² French Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann would later describe the relationship between the two as "l'exception culturelle est le moyen juridique, la diversité culturelle notre objectif" (quoted by Gordon and Meunier, 2002:96) With time, the expression "cultural diversity" nevertheless seems to have gained the upper hand, and references to "cultural exception" have become more rare.

¹³³ According to the site of McDonald's France: <http://www.mcdonalds.fr/#/whoweare/chiffres>

¹³⁴ According to the site of McDonald's France: <http://www.mcdonalds.fr/#/whoweare/chiffres>

¹³⁵ A 2006 Eurobarometer survey conclusively shows that not only does English remain the most widely-spoken foreign language throughout Europe (38% of EU citizens state that they have sufficient skills in English to have a conversation, followed by 14% mastering French or German), but also that France's position as the second-most important language in the Union is seriously challenged. The enlargement of the European Union has caused the balance between French and German to shift: More citizens in the new Member States master German (23% compared with 12% in the EU15) while their skills in French and Spanish are scarce (3% and 1% respectively compared with 16% and 7% among the EU15 group). A further cause of worry may be that English is perceived by Europeans to be by far the most useful language to know (68%). French (25%) and German (22%) follow next almost side by side, and Spanish ranks fourth with a 16% share. Yet the gap between the observed usefulness of French and German is narrowing over time: just four years previously, 40% of respondents had rated French as useful. (European Commission 2006:12 and 30).

Notes to chapter 7:

¹³⁶ According to Nye, he developed the term in 2003 "to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy" (2009). Some, however, attribute it to Suzanne Nossel, who appears to have been the first to publish an article calling for "the smart use of power to promote U.S. interests through a stable grid of allies, institutions, and norms" (2004).

¹³⁷ The assessment was not altered in the second printing of the book, which appeared in 2003.

¹³⁸ During a seminar on anti-Americanism held in Copenhagen in March 2007, I had the opportunity to ask Hollander to what extent he thought this assessment was still valid. He laconically answered that many things had changed since his book was first published, and he felt no need to comment further on French anti-Americanism.

Dansk resumé

Antiamerikanisme er et emne, der har tiltrukket sig stigende opmærksomhed gennem det seneste årti. Terrorangrebene den 11. september 2001 var udtryk for et ekstremt had mod USA, og mange amerikanere følte sig efterfølgende kaldet til at spørge ”Hvorfor hader de os så meget?” (Zakaria 2001). Terrorangrebene fik et efterspil, der afslørede, at det kunne være nok så væsentligt også at spørge ”Hvorfor er vi blevet så upopulære, selv blandt vores venner?” (Moïsi 2009). Forberedelserne til invasionen af Irak i foråret 2003 tydeliggjorde, at der var stor uenighed om mål og midler mellem USA og dets europæiske allierede for så vidt angår linjen over for Irak. Særlig ét europæisk land blev fremstillet som repræsentant for europæisk antiamerikanisme: Frankrig. Frankrig blev i amerikanske medier såvel som af ledende amerikanske politikere beskyldt for at agere spydspids for en politisk orkestreret modstand mod USA’s udenrigspolitik, som væsentligst skulle være motiveret af en iboende fransk tendens til antiamerikanisme.

Afhandlingen har som overordnet målsætning at afklare, i hvilket omfang Frankrig kan siges at have en sådan iboende tendens til antiamerikanisme. Hensigten er at præsentere en fremstilling af fransk antiamerikanisme, der på afgørende punkter afviger fra tidligere analyser, idet den søger at præsentere en strukturel analyse af et overvejende kulturelt fænomen. Afhandlingen tager udgangspunkt i det forhold, at antiamerikanisme typisk beskrives som en fordom eller iboende disposition, som ofte sættes i forhold til kulturelle eller identitetsmæssige faktorer, og argumenterer, at kun ved at afdække de grundlæggende identitetsrelaterede faktorer, der bidrager til at fremme antiamerikanske holdninger i et land, kan fænomenet forstås som andet og mere end løsrevne udtryk for frustration og smålig jalousi. Endvidere argumenteres der for, at politisk og kulturel antiamerikanisme ikke, som der ellers er tendens til, bør anskues separat, men som to sider af samme sag, da de bygger på et fælles identitetsmæssigt grundlag, om end de ofte vil give sig udslag på forskellig vis. Der er overvejende konsensus om, at antiamerikanisme i Frankrig især er et elitefænomen, og på den baggrund stiller afhandlingens problemformulering spørgsmålet *Hvilke elementer af den franske nationale identitet bidrager i særlig grad til at fremme antiamerikanske følelser blandt de franske eliter, og i hvilket omfang kan fransk-*

amerikanske forhold under den Femte Republik anskues som værende påvirkede af disse elementer?

Afhandlingens målsætning om at ville præsentere en strukturel analyse af et kulturelt fænomen medfører også, at antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen skal søges forklaret strukturelt. I introduktionskapitlet opstilles de metodologiske forudsætninger for, hvorledes en sådan analyse kan foretages, og det konkluderes, at den konstruktivistiske IP-teori udgør et relevant udgangspunkt for, hvorledes kultur kan anskues strukturelt. Endvidere opstilles hypotesen, at magtdimensionen udgør det mest vedkommende forklaringselement i forhold til studiet af antiamerikanisme som globalt fænomen. På den baggrund definerer afhandlingen antiamerikanisme som *et globalt fænomen og den mest universelle af alle landespecifikke anti-ismer. Antiamerikanisme afspejler en generel disposition mod USA, dets samfund og dets politikker. Det er et komplekst fænomen med mange forskellige attributter, som afspejler antiamerikanerens egne værdier og opfattelser. Disse attributter skyldes eller forstærkes i et vist omfang af opfattelsen af, at USA har en uforholdsmæssig stor magt over andre nationer og deres indbyggere. Således kan antiamerikanisme i udstrakt grad tolkes som en reaktion mod en forestillet trussel om amerikanisering af andre samfund, både på et lokalt og et globalt plan.*

Besvarelsen falder i to hoveddele: en generel, der kort søger at præsentere en nyfortolkning af antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen, og en landespecifik, der mere uddybende søger at analysere den franske variant af fænomenet i forhold til de centrale elementer af den franske nationale identitet, som i særlig grad vurderes at fremme antiamerikanske dispositioner. Kapitel 2 gennemgår de væsentligste standarddefinitioner af antiamerikanisme og argumenterer for, at disse kun delvist kan bidrage til at forklare de grundlæggende årsager, der kan give anledning til antiamerikanske fordomme og dispositioner. Der argumenteres for det første for, at antiamerikanisme er en universel anti-isme, der frembyder nogle unikke karakteristika, som gør, at fænomenet ikke blot kan anskues som andre anti-ismer. For det andet afvises den udbredte tendens til at betragte fænomenet som overvejende irrationelt, idet der argumenteres for, at der kan være en række forklarlige grunde til, at dele af verdenen kan tænkes at afvise den amerikaniseringsproces, som antiamerikanisme også er en reaktion imod. Endelig fremhæves det, at om end antiamerikanisme frembyder mange forskellige og til tider unikke attributter afhængigt af de samfund eller sociale segmenter i samfundene, som analyseres, er dette ikke ensbetydende

med, at mere strukturelle faktorer ikke også kan være på spil, og det argumenteres, at den væsentligste faktor i den forbindelse er magtdimensionen, som er den definerende karakteristik, der adskiller antiamerikanisme fra andre anti-ismer. På den baggrund præsenterer kapitel 3 en alternativ fortolkning af antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen, hvori det argumenteres, at dette bedst kan beskrives som en afstandstagen til amerikansk magt og indflydelse. Først præsenteres en række meningsmålinger og undersøgelser, som dels relativt entydigt viser, at der er en global opfattelse af, at USA har uforholdsmæssig stor magt over andre samfund, dels antyder, at dette forhold bidrager til at fremme opfattelser, som til en vis grad kan beskrives som udtryk for antiamerikanisme. Dernæst introduceres Joseph S. Nyes terminologi om hård versus blød magt (1990), og det fremhæves, at USA's magt i dag kan beskrives som værende af næsten hegemonisk karakter i et internationalt system, der hvad hård magt angår bedst kan betegnes som primopolært, dvs. domineret af ét land, der er i en unik position til at udøve rollen som *primus inter pares*. Om end USA's hårde magt er overvældende sammenlignet med andre landes, fremstår dets bløde magt på mange måder mindst ligeså imponerende, idet USA i højere grad end nogen anden nation har kunnet både påvirke og udforme de globale spilleregler og samtidig eksportere sine værdier til resten af verden, hvormed disse med tiden har antaget nærmest universel karakter. Samtidig fastslås det, at den amerikanske exceptionisme, som udgør en væsentlig del af den amerikanske nationale identitet, i sig indeholder kimen til en unilateralisme, som fra tid til anden, og senest under præsident George W. Bushs embedsperiode, seriøst har bidraget til at mindske USA's tiltrækningskraft i omverdenens øjne.

Afhandlingens anden og væsentligste del retter fokuset mod den landespecifikke analyse af antiamerikanisme i Frankrig. Om end magtdimensionen som skitseret ovenfor synes egnet til at forklare nogle af de mere strukturelle årsager til antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen, er det klart, at antiamerikanisme givet sin kulturelle og identitetsmæssige natur vil manifestere sig forskelligt fra samfund til samfund. Kapitel 4 præsenterer en metodologisk ramme for, hvorledes en landespecifik analyse af antiamerikanisme kan tolkes i relation til nationale identitetsspørgsmål, og foreslår en række konceptuelle værktøj, som med fordel kan anvendes til en sådan analyse. Kapitlet foreslår, at narrativer om national identitet dels kan anskues som udfoldende sig langs fire vektorer, nemlig en politisk, kulturel, religiøs og etnisk; dels typisk vil være dialektiske af natur, således at de både bidrager til at fremme en national selvidentifikation og til at afgrænse denne fra andre, jf. opfattelsen af 'andethed'.

Endelig argumenteres der for, at disse narrativer om national identitet indgår i en fælles national doxa, der påvirker folks adfærd, da den med tiden bliver forankret i deres nationale habitus. Denne forestilling om en national habitus er gældende både på et individuelt og et samfundsmæssigt niveau og giver sig for så vidt angår sidstnævnte især udtryk gennem statens eller dens definerende elitors handlen. I kapitel 5 gives indledningsvist en kort introduktion til de mest gængse antiamerikanske diskurser i Frankrig, hvorefter det påvises, at disse i vidt omfang bygger på en række af de samme fordomme, som Frankrig i århundreder har dyrket i forhold til arvefjenden England. På den baggrund argumenteres der for, at antiamerikanisme i vidt omfang kan beskrives som en efterfølgerfobi til den anglofobi, som har været fremherskende i Frankrig i århundreder, og som stadig finder et ekko i den franske afvisning af det 'angelsaksiske'. Kapitlet argumenterer videre for, at de centrale elementer af den franske nationale identitet skal findes med udgangspunkt i de værdier, som det moderne Frankrig har arvet fra revolutionen i 1789, nemlig republikanisme, civilisation og sekularisme (*laïcité*); tre værdier, som dels kan henføres til tre af de fire vektorer for national identitet, der blev identificeret i kapitel 4, dels har tydelige universalistiske overtoner. Den resterende del af kapitlet argumenterer indgående for, at USA i forhold til samtlige tre værdier kan anskues som både en beslægtet nation, der i udstrakt grad deler disse værdier, om end de på den anden side af Atlanten har fået et anderledes udtryk, og som den nation, der i forhold til disse værdiparametre mest konsekvent fremstår som en rival i forhold til franske aspirationer om at tilbyde sig selv som en model for andre nationer. På baggrund af denne analyse konkluderes det, at Frankrig og USA kan karakteriseres som værende 'adskilt af fælles værdier'. Hvor kapitel 5 således søger at afdække de grundlæggende identitetsmæssige forhold, der kan tænkes at være fremmede for fransk antiamerikanisme gennem de seneste to århundreder, vender kapitel 6 opmærksomheden mod det mere nutidige tema om antiamerikanisme under den franske Femte Republik. Med udgangspunkt i antagelsen om, at politisk og kulturel antiamerikanisme skal anskues som to sider af samme sag, præsenteres en detaljeret analyse af først den politisk motiverede antiamerikanisme under den Femte Republik og dernæst den kulturelt baserede antiamerikanisme i samme periode. De mange politiske uoverensstemmelser, der kendetegner det fransk-amerikanske forhold i perioden, bliver evalueret, og der argumenteres for, at om end disse ofte også kan henføres til en fransk forestilling om og aversion mod USA's hegemoniske aspirationer, er dette ikke tilstrækkeligt til at beskrive dem som værende nødvendigvis drevet af antiamerikanske motiver. De

politikker, som præsident de Gaulle og hans efterfølgere har fulgt, har snarere været karakteriseret ved et stærkt ønske om at balancere amerikansk magt, hvor det drivende *leitmotif* har været at præsentere Frankrig som en stormagt af første rang, der kunne optræde på den internationale scene på (næsten) lige fod med USA. Med henblik på at opnå denne position, som Frankrig efter Anden Verdenskrig havde mistet, har Frankrig under den Femte Republik målrettet arbejdet for dels at øge sin uafhængighed af Washington, dels at fastholde og udbygge sin indflydelse på de to kontinenter, hvor landet bedst kunne præsentere sig som et alternativt referencepunkt til USA: Afrika og Europa. Om end disse politikker ikke nødvendigvis kan siges at have været motiveret af antiamerikanisme, er de ofte blevet udlagt således, hvilket har bidraget til indtrykket af den Femte Republik som værende grundlæggende antiamerikansk af natur (jf. Kuisel 1993). Og der er ingen tvivl om, at den franske tilbøjelighed til at fremhæve – og advare mod – USA's hegemoniske intentioner har bidraget til at fostre en retorik blandt Frankrigs politiske eliter, som har tydelige antiamerikanske overtoner, også selvom retorikken med tiden er blevet mere afdæmpet. Hvor den politiske antiamerikanisme i Frankrig snarere skal ansues som et retorisk følgeresultat af et sæt politikker, der har haft som formål at understrege og underbygge fransk politisk grandeur, argumenteres der i kapitlets anden del for, at den kulturelle antiamerikanisme i Frankrig indeholder et tydeligt element af afvisning af USA, og ikke mindst af den væsentlige del af amerikansk blød magt, som dets kulturelle indflydelse udgør. Som tilfældet er for den politiske antiamerikanisme gælder det også for den kulturelle, at den væsentligst er drevet af de toneangivende eliter, og ikke mindst de franske intellektuelle har med succes etableret sig som de primære aktører i modstanden mod amerikansk kultur. Om end den kulturelt betoned antiamerikanisme havde sin storhedstid i mellemkrigstiden, er det frem for alt i efterkrigstiden, at omverdenen for alvor er blevet præsenteret for de franske intellektuelles opgør med den amerikanske massekultur. Oprøret mod denne massekultur eksemplificeres ved fire hændelser: Coca-Cola affæren i 1950'erne, kampagnen mod *franglais* i 1960'erne, de audiovisuelle 'kulturkrige' i 1990'erne og endelig kampagnen mod *la malbouffe* omkring årtusindeskiftet. Disse eksempler tydeliggør ikke blot omfanget og karakteren af den kulturelt baserede modstand mod USA, men understreger også, at denne med tiden har indskrevet sig i en antiglobaliseringsretorik, som har klare antiamerikanske overtoner. Slutteligt konkluderes det, at om end såvel de politiske som de kulturelle antiamerikanske narrativer kan relateres til

den franske nationale habitus, fremstår den kulturelt baserede antiamerikanisme i dag mere fast forankret i den franske nationale psyke end den politiske ditto.

I konklusionen sættes afhandlingens delkonklusioner i perspektiv, og det vurderes, at det i forhold til målsætningen om at præsentere en strukturel analyse af et kulturelt fænomen er lykkedes at sandsynliggøre, at antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen kan tolkes strukturelt som overvejende bundende i en modstand mod en amerikansk magt, der ofte opfattes som dels havende en uforholdsmæssig stor indflydelse på andre nationers mulighed for selvstændig handlen, dels værende potentielt underminerende for andre nationers identitetsmæssige egenart. Anvendelsen af begrebet blød magt fremhæves i den forbindelse som et nyttigt konceptuelt værktøj, der kan bruges til at illustrere, hvorledes denne modstand relaterer sig nok så meget til en opfattelse af en omsiggribende amerikaniseringsproces af andre samfund som til mere banale forestillinger om USA's magthegemoni. Derved muliggøres det, at man kan undslippe stereotype forestillinger om antiamerikanisme som modstand mod det internationale systems "Mr. Big" (Katzenstein og Keohane 1996); forestillinger, som sandsynligvis har bidraget til, at megen forskning inden for antiamerikanisme længe har nærret et vist forbehold over for at analysere fænomenet i forhold til magtdimensionen. Det understreges dog, at samspillet mellem antiamerikanisme og amerikansk magt, såvel hård som blød, er vanskeligt at måle kvantitativt, da magtopfattelse forbliver en noget diffus størrelse, særligt i forbindelse med spørgsmål om kultur og identitet, og at yderligere forskning indenfor området er nødvendig. Ikke desto mindre når afhandlingen for så vidt angår antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen til samme konklusion som Robert Lieber (2005): At antiamerikanisme er uundgåelig, så længe USA eksisterer som en stormagt. For så vidt angår afhandlingens hovedanalyse af de strukturelle forhold, der betinger fransk antiamerikanisme, noteres det indledningsvis, at der ofte er en tendens til at fokusere på de forhold, der adskiller Frankrig fra USA, hvilket bidrager til det indtryk, at fransk antiamerikanisme skyldes væsensforskellige karaktertræk og verdensanskuelser mellem indbyggerne i de to lande. I modsætning hertil og som svar på problemformuleringen fremhæves det, at en analyse, der tager sit udgangspunkt i de centrale elementer af den franske nationale identitet afslører, at der på det værdimæssige plan er væsentlige paralleller mellem de to nationer. Det er dette forhold der, givet at USA's universalisme har vist sig markant mere succesrig end den franske ditto, udgør den væsentligste årsag til, at USA med tiden har indlejret sig i den franske nationale habitus som nationens 'signifikante Anden'. Der

er tale om et grundlæggende identitetsmæssigt forhold, og heri ligger den strukturelle årsag til den særlige franske variant af antiamerikanisme. Dermed ikke være sagt, at fransk antiamerikanisme er en uforanderlig størrelse, der ikke (også) bliver påvirket af såvel forholdet landene imellem som af den udvikling i landets nationale identitet, der naturligt sker med tiden. Det fremgår af analysen, at den politisk betonedes antiamerikanisme i Frankrig – på trods af sporadiske situationsbestemte uoverensstemmelser, som for eksempel over krigen i Irak i 2003 – synes at være om ikke nødvendigvis på retur, så dog at være blevet nedtonet til et mere afdæmpet leje, i takt med at Frankrig i stigende grad har affundet sig med sin rolle i det internationale system. Noget tilsvarende kan ikke i samme grad siges om den kulturelle antiamerikanisme. Om end retorikken i dag er mindre skinger end den var i efterkrigstiden, for ikke at tale om i mellemkrigstiden, fremstår den kulturelle antiamerikanisme som ganske solidt rodfastet i en fransk (elitær) tradition for at nedgøre amerikanske kulturelle produkter og værdier. Hvor kampen tidligere gjaldt den truende amerikanisering af det franske samfund og den franske kultur, bliver den nu ført under et nyt banner, nemlig kampen mod globalisering. Men modstanderen er reelt den samme: USA og ikke mindst amerikansk kultur.

Bibliography

General works on anti-Americanism

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of works treating the subject of anti-Americanism over the past two decades. The nature and scope of these works is highly heterogeneous, given the breadth and complexity of the topic. There are several ways to assess the literature on the phenomenon. One is to divide it into three broad categories: First, works, whether of a scholarly or more popular nature, which attempt to vilify America by presenting more or less scientific evidence to the opprobrious nature of the United States, considering in essence that much anti-Americanism is of the United States' own making. Sardar and Davies' analysis, *Why do People Hate America?* (2002), can be counted to this category, at least partly, given the very negative picture of America that is painted throughout the book. This does not entail that the book is without its merits; in some respects it offers some very thought-provoking arguments that need to be addressed. However, it requires a critical and vigilant approach on behalf of the scholar using their works to analyze the causes of anti-Americanism. The second category almost falls into the opposite ditch by describing anti-Americanism as a phenomenon bordering on the irrational. This approach can be found even in studies of high scholarly integrity, where the irrational elements of anti-Americanism are well-documented and presented in a convincing form. Many of the works that can be placed in this category are written by American social scientists wishing to come to terms with a phenomenon, whose magnitude they clearly find puzzling – and apparently also slightly offensive. A commentator like Charles Krauthammer may be regarded as an obvious representative of this group, yet his passionate defense of all things American against any criticism from the outside borders on the tiresome eulogy of the United States. Others have treated the subject in a more subtle manner, yet still with the sometimes unacknowledged premise that anti-Americanism is first and foremost a matter of deficiencies on behalf of the beholder. Among these I would place the works of Paul Hollander (1992, 1995, 2004), though some might disagree with me on this. The virulent attacks against anti-Americans delivered by Jean-Francois Revel in his *L'obsession anti-américaine* (2002) also easily falls into the category of what I have termed the attempt to “demonize the demonizers” (see chapter 2). It is furthermore a reminder that this category does not exclusively contain works of American

authors. Josef Joffe, although much more nuanced, is another writer, who finds it difficult to dissociate anti-Americanism as a phenomenon from its more bizarre manifestations (2001, 2006a, 2006b), as do Zeldin (in Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990), otherwise a keen observer of French sentiments (1973, 1977, 1983). Finally, there exists a third category, which places itself more or less between these two extremes. This category is extremely broad, as it covers not just the middle ground between the two, often trying to steer clear of the worst stereotypes and caricatures, but also acknowledges both the sometimes irrational aspects of the phenomenon and the more or less reasonable causes of disenchantment with the United States that are manifested throughout the world. Most of the recent serious studies, such as the very comprehensive works edited by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), Higgott and Malbašić (2008), Judt and Lacorne (2005), and O'Connor (2007a-c), and O'Connor and Griffiths (2007) fall into this category. By far the most comprehensive study of anti-Americanism to this day is without any doubt the one edited mainly by Brendon O'Connor (O'Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007); a study which spans four volumes, totaling some 1,350 pages. This work is also by its breadth and scope alone a good indication that anti-Americanism as a research topic in its own right has come of age since the 1990s, when it started to gain some headway as more than a marginal academic preoccupation.

Another way to assess the broad spectrum of studies relating to the subject of anti-Americanism is to divide them into a number of categories, reflecting neither their bias, nor their level of ambition, but rather their methodological approach: First, studies which focus essentially on the causes of anti-Americanism, eventually in relation to for example the policies and practices of the United States. These studies seek primarily to find the logic in much anti-Americanism as originating from the said policies and practices and the way they are interpreted abroad (e.g. Crockatt 2003). Second, studies which present an anthology of essays on anti-Americanism, the sum of which is meant to illustrate the diversity of the phenomenon while (sometimes) offering a framework of analysis based on these diverse examples (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008, O'Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, and O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007, Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005, Mathé (ed.) 2000). Third, studies which do not have anti-Americanism as their primary focus, but which as part of their analysis of for example aspects of U.S. foreign policy or transatlantic relations incorporate anti-Americanism as a significant element of their analysis (see for

example Fabbrini (ed.) 2006, and David and Grondin (eds) 2006, Lieber 2005). Fourth, the numerous studies devoted to analyzing anti-Americanism in relation to a specific country (for example Roger 2005, Revel 2002, Kuisel 1993, Meunier 2000, Diner 1996, Shiraev and Zubok 2000) or regional entity (Berman 2004, Markovits 2007, McPherson (ed.) 2006), whether as anthologies or not, and which typically, though not always exclusively, attach more attention to the particularistic nature of displays of anti-Americanism in the said countries or regions than to the general characteristics of the phenomenon.

Anti-Americanism treated within the discipline of International Relations

In spite of the growing attention given to the subject of anti-Americanism over the past decade, especially by political scientists and students of international relations, it is noteworthy that anti-Americanism as a research topic has rarely been related to mainstream theories of International Relations. This might at first seem surprising, given that the global, i.e. non-domestic, phenomenon of anti-Americanism is bound to have consequences for the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. There are, however, a number of explanations for this. First, though references to anti-Americanism frequently pop up in articles on foreign affairs, most serious studies of the phenomenon have been carried out by historians, sociologists, or scholars in the tradition of cultural studies rather than by scholars of International Relations. There are notable exceptions to this rule, such as Stanley Hoffmann, an eminent IR theorist as well as one of the most knowledgeable observers of French foreign policy, yet though Hoffmann offers highly valuable insights into some of the mechanisms of French political anti-Americanism (see for example Hoffmann 1974), these are typically presented as part of the nation-specific study of French foreign policy rather than framed within a broader discussion of IR theories. The same largely applies to the works of for example Sophie Meunier (2000 and 2007). Among the rare scholars with a background in International Relations theory to have studied anti-Americanism in a more comprehensive way are Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, who have contributed with a much needed general analysis of the phenomenon (2007). Their analysis, which decomposes the phenomenon into different types of anti-Americanism, provides us with a good conceptual framework for understanding some of the driving forces behind anti-Americanism, yet it does not seem particularly linked to IR theory as such. The same applies to the numerous entries in

the four-volume study chiefly edited by Brendon O'Connor (O'Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, O'Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007).

On anti-Americanism in France

French anti-Americanism has been the subject of a substantial amount of study, reflecting the commonly held impression that among Western nations, France can be associated with some of the most pervasive displays of anti-Americanism. Three of the most important are in my opinion Philippe Roger's *The American Enemy* (2005), David Strauss' *Menace in the West. The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (1978), and Richard F. Kuisel's *Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization* (1993). Especially Roger's work is a formidable genealogy of more than two centuries of anti-Americanism in France, recounted through the use of testimonies of ill will towards America by various philosophers, diplomats, writers and other shapers of public opinion. A better and more elegant description of French displays of anti-Americanism will be hard to find. Strauss' account treats many of the same issues, but has a more limited scope, as it focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on the construction of anti-American narratives in the period from 1917 to 1933. Compared with the two former, Kuisel's study focuses more on the same themes, which are central to the present study: anti-Americanism and its relation to both French national identity and France's attempts to challenge global Americanization. A further contributor on French anti-Americanism should be highlighted in this respect: Sophie Meunier has in numerous articles and contributions to anthologies (2000, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, and in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008) presented what I find to be some of the most perspicacious analyses on the subject available. Uniquely adroit at mingling the political, historical, and cultural factors which promote anti-Americanism in France, I perceive her as one of the foremost contemporary authorities in the field. Worth mentioning are also the succinct accounts given by for example Arianne Chebel d'Appollonia (in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008), Denis Lacorne (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005), and Colin Nettelbeck (in O'Connor (ed.) 2007c). Although it should be noted that I am not altogether convinced by especially Nettelbeck's conclusions, he has provided a highly recommendable account of anti-Americanism in France since 1918, which brilliantly covers most of the political, economic, and cultural manifestations of the phenomenon during the period. The essays in the anthology *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism, A Century of French Perception* (Lacorne, Rupnik,

and Toinet (eds) 1990) also provide some good insights into the many diverse facets of French anti-Americanism, although it comes across today as rather dated in several respects. Numerous other scholars have written extensively about Franco-American relations, and while their primary subject may not have been French anti-Americanism as such, they have contributed massively to the academic writing on the subject and have as such imposed themselves as natural references for anybody interested in the subject. Here Stanley Hoffman (1974) and Alfred Grosser (1980 and 1989) immediately come to mind as unquestionably counting among the leading forces in that respect, and others, such as Michael Harrison (1981) and David Chuter (1996) have equally provided excellent accounts of Franco-American relations, which serve to give good insights into some of the driving forces behind much French anti-Americanism. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the topic of Franco-American relations and passions is far from a new research area and that ground breaking work on the subject has been carried out several decades before it gained wider attention as a research topic, as can be witnessed most notably by the eminent works presented to us by Raymond Aron (1945, 1955, 1969) and especially René Rémond (1958).

References:

- Abalain, Hervé (2000). *Histoire de la langue bretonne*. Paris: Éditions Jean-Paul Gisserot.
- Abdallab, Abdel Mahdi (2003). Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: A Socio-Political Perspective. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4. Retrieved on June 1st 2007 from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a6.html>.
- Abrams, D, and Hogg, M. (eds) (1990). *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Adams, Paul C. (2007). *Atlantic Reverberations. French Representations of an American Presidential Election*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Adda, Jacques, and Smouts, Marie-Claude (1989). *La France face au Sud. Le miroir brisé*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.
- Ager, Dennis (1997). *Language, Community and the State: Linguistic Development in European Nations*. Exeter: Intellect Books.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert (1978). *France coloniale ou parti colonial?* Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

- Aglion, Raoul (1988). *Roosevelt and de Gaulle. Allies in Conflict, A Personal Memoir*. New York: The Free Press.
- Agrikoliansky, Éric, Fillieule, Olivier, and Mayer, Nonna (eds) (2005). *L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Agulhon, Maurice (2000). *De Gaulle. Histoire, symbole, mythe*. Paris: Plon.
- Ajami, Fouad (2003). The Falseness of Anti-Americanism. *Foreign Policy*, no. 118, September-October 2003.
- Allen, David (1992). The United States, the European Community and the GATT. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 1478-2790, Volume 1, Issue 1.
- Ambrosius, Lloyd E. (2002). *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Amnesty International (2008a). *Death Penalty: Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries>
- Amnesty International (2008b). *Death Sentences and Executions in 2007*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/001/2008/en/b43a1e5a-ffeaf11dc-b092-bdb020617d3d/act500012008eng.html>.
- Andersen, Heine, and Kaspersen, Lars Bo (eds) (2000). *Classical and Modern Social Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, M.S. (1993). *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450 – 1919*. London: Longman.
- Andrews, David M. (ed.) (2005). *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress. US-European Relations after Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anholt-GfK Roper (2009). *Nation Brands Index 2009*. Retrieved from <http://www.nation-branding.info/2009/10/10/nation-brands-index-2009-analysis/>
- Ardant, Philippe (1995). La laïcité. *Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques*, no. 75, November 1995.
- Arendt, Hannah (1965). *On Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Aron, Raymond (1945). *L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France*. Paris : Éditions Défense de la France.
- Aron, Raymond ([1955] 2001). *The Opium of the Intellectuals*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Aron, Raymond (1969). *Les disillusions du progrès. Essai sur la dialectique de la modernité*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

- Aron, Raymond ([1974] 2009). *The Imperial Republic. The United States 1945-1973*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Aron, Raymond (1990). *Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflections*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Ash, Timothy Garton (2004). *Free World. Why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity of our time*. London: Allen Lane.
- Ash, Timothy Garton (2008). Præsidentskifte. Obama personificerer 'blød magt'. *Politiken, International kommentar*, June 7th, 2008.
- Asselin, Gilles, and Mastron, Ruth (2005). *Français – Américains. Ces différences qui nous rapprochent*. Paris: Éditions Alban.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. (2002). *American Empire. The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Bagayoko-Penone, Niagalé (2003). *Afrique: les stratégies française et américaine*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Bainville, Jacques (1924). *Histoire de France*. Paris: Arthème Fayard.
- Baker, Wayne (2005). *America's Crisis of Values. Reality and Perception*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Balladur, Édouard (1995). *Deux ans à Matignon*. Paris: Plon.
- Banchoff, Thomas (ed.) (2007). *Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bange, Oliver (2000). *The EEC Crisis of 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Barber, Benjamin R. (2001). *Jihad vs. McWorld*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Barber, Benjamin R. (2007). *Consumed. How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Barnavi, Élie and Friedländer, Saül (eds) (1985). *La politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle*. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France.
- Barth, Fredrik (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Barthes, Roland (1957). *Mythologies*. Paris: Seuil.
- Basler, Roy P. (ed). (1953-1955). *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 7*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Baudrillard, Jean (1988). *America*. London: Verso.
- Baughman, James L. (1997). *The Republic of Mass Culture. Journalism, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in America since 1941*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Bayart, Jean-François (1984). *La politique africaine de François Mitterrand*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.
- Beck, Ulrich, Sznaider, Natan, and Winter, Rainer (eds) (2003). *Global America? The Cultural Consequences of Globalization*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Beehner, Lionel (2009). Catchphrase diplomacy. *USA Today*, September 2, 2009. Retrieved from <http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/09/column-catchphrase-diplomacy-.html>
- Bélit, Marc (2006). *Le Malaise de la Culture. Essai sur la crise du "modèle culturel" français*. Paris: Séguier.
- Bell, David S. (2005). *François Mitterrand. A Political Biography*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bell, P.M.H. (1996). *France and Britain 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement*. New York: Longman.
- Benedict, Michael Les (1996). *Sources in American Constitutional History*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Berger, Peter L. (ed.) (1998). *The Limits of Social Cohesion. Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies. A Report of the Bertelsmann Foundation to the Club of Rome*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bergounioux, Alain (1995). La laïcité, valeur de la République. *Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques*, no. 75, November 1995.
- Berkin, Carol (2002). *A Brilliant Solution. Inventing the American Constitution*. New York: Harcourt, Inc.
- Berman, Russell A. (2004). *Anti-Americanism in Europe. A Cultural Problem*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Bernstein, Serge (1993). *The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Besson, Éric (ed.) (2007). *Les inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy*. Paris: Parti Socialiste.
- Beyer, Peter, and Beaman, Lori (eds) (2007). *Religion, Globalization, and Culture*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.
- Billig, Michael (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Bjøl, Erling (1966). *La France devant l'Europe. La politique européenne de la IVe République*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Bjørn, Claus, Grant, Alexander, and Stringer, Keith J. (eds) (1994). *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past*. Copenhagen: Academic Press.
- Bluche, François (2003). *Richelieu*. Paris: Perrin.
- Boll-Johansen, Hans (1992). *De franske. Fransk identitet, myte og virkelighed*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

- Boniface, Pascal (1997). The NATO Debate in France. *NATO Academic Forum: Conference on NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification*, October 7, 1997. Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from <http://www.nato.int/acad/conf/enlarg97/boniface.htm>
- Boniface, Pascal (1998). *La France est-elle encore une grande puissance?* Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Boniface, Pascal (2003). *La France contre l'empire*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1979). *La Distinction*. Paris: Minuit.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1987). *Choses dites*. Paris: Minuit.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1988). "Vive la crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science" *Theory & Society*, 17/5.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998). *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market*. New York: New York Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre *et al* (1999). *The Weight of the World. Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Boutin, Christophe, and Rouvillois, Frédéric (2000). *Quinquennat ou Septennat?* Paris: Flammarion.
- Bové, José, and Dufour, François (2000). *Le monde n'est pas une marchandise. Des paysans contre la malbouffe. Entretiens avec Gilles Luneau*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.
- Brands, H.W. (1992). *Bound to Empire. The United States and the Philippines*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Braudel, Fernand (1986a). *L'identité de la France. Espace et Histoire*. Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion.
- Braudel, Fernand (1986b). *L'identité de la France. Les Hommes et les Choses I*. Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion.
- Braudel, Fernand (1986c). *L'identité de la France. Les Hommes et les Choses II*. Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion.
- Braudel, Fernand (1994). *A History of Civilizations*. New York: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.
- Breakwell, Glynis M., and Lyons, Evanthia (eds) (1996). *Changing European Identities: Social Psychological Analyses of Social Change*. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann.
- Brecher, Michael (1972). *The Foreign Policy System of Israel. Setting, Images, Process*. London : Oxford University Press.
- Breillat, Dominique (2001). La Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires: le cas français. *Revue juridique Thémis*, Vol. 35, Issue 3.

- Broglie, Gabriel de (1986). *Le français pour qu'il vive*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Brooks, Stephen G., and Wohlforth, William C. (2002). American Primacy in Perspective. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, Issue 4.
- Bruckner, Pascal (2002). *Misère de la prospérité. La religion marchande et ses ennemis*. Paris: Bernard Grasset.
- Brunet, Éric (2007). *Être riche: un tabou français*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Bryman, Alan E. (2004). *The Disneyization of Society*. London: Sage Publications.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997). *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2007). *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*. New York: Basic Books.
- Buchan, David (1993). *Europe: The Strange Superpower*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Burguière, André (ed.) (1993). *Les Formes de la Culture*. Paris: Seuil.
- Burke, Edmund [1790] (1986). *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. London: Penguin Classics.
- Burnham, James (ed.) (1953). *What Europe Thinks of America*. New York: The John Day Company.
- Bush, George and Scowcroft, Brent (1998). *A World Transformed*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Calleo, David P. (2000). The US Post-Imperial Presidency and Transatlantic Relations. *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 3.
- Calvocoressi, Peter (1991). *World Politics Since 1945*. London: Longman.
- Canclini, Néstor García (1995). *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Carroll, Raymonde (1987). *Cultural Misunderstandings. The French-American Experience*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Casanova, José (2006). Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective. *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8, 1&2, Summer & Spring, 2006.
- Céline, Louis-Ferdinand (1932). *Voyage au bout de la nuit*. Paris : Denoël & Steele.
- Cerny, Philip G. (1980). *The politics of grandeur. Ideological aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chagnollaud, Dominique, and Quermonne, Jean-Louis (1996). *La V^e République. I: Le régime politique*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Chapman, Herrick (1999). Modernity and National Identity in Postwar France. *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 1999.

- Chaunu, Pierre, and Mension-Rigau, Eric (1996). *Baptême de Clovis, baptême de la France. De la religion d'État à laïcité d'État*. Paris : Éditions Balland.
- Chay, Jongsuk, ed. (1990). *Culture and International Relations*. New York: Praeger.
- Chesnoff, Richard Z. (2005). *The Arrogance of the French. Why They Can't Stand Us – and Why the Feeling Is Mutual*. New York: Sentinel.
- Chevallier, Jean-Jacques and Conac, Gérard (1991). *Histoire des institutions et des régimes politiques de la France de 1789 à nos jours*. Paris: Editions Dalloz.
- Chomsky, Noam (2001). *9-11*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Churchill, Winston S. (1956). *A History of the English-speaking Peoples. Volume I: The Birth of Britain*. London: Cassell and Company Ltd.
- Churchill, Winston S. (1957). *A History of the English-speaking Peoples. Volume III: The Age of Revolution*. London: Cassell and Company Ltd.
- Chuter, David (1996). *Humanity's Soldier. France and International Security, 1919-2001*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.
- Citron, Suzanne (1991). *Le mythe national. L'histoire de France en question*. Paris: Les Editions ouvrières in association with Etudes et Documentation internationales.
- Clapham, Christopher (1998). Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 2.
- Clark, Ian (2005). *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clemens, Diane Shaver (1970). *Yalta*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2009). *Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton Nominee for Secretary of State before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 13, 2009*. Retrieved from <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/ClintonTestimony090113a.pdf>
- Cochrane, Charles N. (1944). *Christianity and Classical Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Eliot A. (2004). History and the Hyperpower. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83. No. 4.
- Cohen, Roger (2007). Globalist: United States as the anti-France. *New York Times*, January 30, 2007.
- Cohen, Samy (ed.) (1998). *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Cole, Alistair (1994). *François Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership*. London: Routledge.
- Cole, Alistair, Le Galès, Patrick, and Levy, Jonah D. (eds). (2008). *Developments in French Politics 4*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Colombani, Jean-Marie (1998). *Le Résident de la République*. Paris: Éditions Stock.

- Colombani, Jean-Marie (2001). L'Amérique frappée, le monde saisi d'effroi. Editorial: Nous sommes tous américains. *Le Monde*, September 12, 2001.
- Cooper, Duff (1953). *Old Men Forget*. London: Rubert Hart-Davis.
- Costigliola, Frank (1984). *Awkward Dominion. American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Cot, Jean-Pierre (1984). *A l'épreuve du pouvoir*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Courtois, Stéphane, Werth, Nicolas, Panné, Jean-Louis, Paczkowski, Andrzej, Bartosek, Karel, and Margolin, Jean-Louis (1997). *Le livre noir du communisme. Crimes, terreur et répression*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Crockatt, Richard (2003). *America Embattled. September 11, anti-Americanism, and the global order*. London: Routledge.
- Crocker III, H. W. (2006). *Don't Tread on Me*. New York: Crown Forum.
- Cronin, Vincent (1971). *Napoleon*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Cunliffe, Marcus (1991). *In Search of America. Transatlantic Essays, 1951-1990*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Daalder, Ivo H. (2001). *The United States and Europe: From Primacy to Partnership?* The Brookings Institution. Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/daalder/useuropechapter.pdf>
- Daalder, Ivo H. and Lindsay, James M. (2005). *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*. Hoboken: Wiley.
- Daly, Herman E. (1999). Globalization versus Internationalization - Some Implications. *Ecological Economics* 31.
- David, Charles-Philippe & Grondin, David (eds) (2006). *Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Davie, Grace (1994). *Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Davie, Grace (2002). *Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.
- Davie, Grace (2006). Is Europe an Exceptional Case? *The Hedgehog Review*, Spring & Summer 2006.
- Death Penalty Information Center (2008). *International Polls and Studies*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2165>
- DeFleur, Melvin L., and DeFleur, Margaret H. (2003). *Learning to Hate Americans: How U.S. Media Shape Negative Attitudes among Teenagers in Twelve Countries*. Spokane, WA: Marquette Books.

- Degn, Inge (ed.) (2003). *Frankofoni. Sprog, historie, litteratur og kultur*. Language and Cultural Contact series no. 33. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag.
- Demetz, Jean-Michel (2004). France-Angleterre. Histoire de couple. *L'Express*, no. 2753, April 5-11, 2004.
- Denning, Michael (1996). *The Cultural Front. The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Verso.
- DePorte, A. W. (1968). *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy 1944-1946*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Der Derian, James (1987). *On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Desch, Michael C. (1998). Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998.
- Dieckhoff, Alain, and Gutiérrez, Natividad (eds) (2001). *Modern Roots. Studies of national identity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Dinan, Desmond (2004). *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Diner, Dan (1996). *America in the Eyes of the Germans. An Essay on Anti-Americanism*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Dovring, Karin (1997). *English as Lingua Franca. Double Talk in Global Persuasion*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Dreyfus, François-Georges (1982). *De Gaulle et le gaullisme. Essai d'interprétation*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Druon, Maurice (2007). Non, la culture française n'est pas morte! *Le Figaro*, December 4, 2007.
- Duffield, John S. (1999). Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism. *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4, Autumn 1999.
- Duhamel, Georges (1930), *Scènes de la vie future*. Paris: Mercure de France.
- Duhamel, Olivier (1993). *Le pouvoir politique en France: La V^e République, vertus et limites*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Dunning, Eric, and Mennell, Stephen (1998). Elias on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust: On the Balance between 'Civilizing' and 'Decivilizing' Trends in the Social Development of Western Europe. *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 49, No. 3, September 1998.
- Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1965). *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*. Paris: Denoël.
- Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1978). *France and the United States from the Beginnings to the Present*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1982). *Tout empire périra. Une vision théorique des relations internationales*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

The Economist (1995) End of an affair? *The Economist*, August 12, 1995.

The Economist (2005). Jacques Chirac, socialist. *The Economist*, March 19, 2005.

Edinger, Lewis J., and Nacos, Brigitte L. (1998). From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Can a Stable Democracy Continue? *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 113, No. 2.

Ehrenreich, Barbara (2002). *Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-wage USA*. London: Granta Books.

Eley, G. and Suny, R. G. (eds) (1996). *Becoming National*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Elias, Norbert (1978-82). *The civilizing process*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elias, Norbert (1991). *The Society of Individuals*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Elias, Norbert (1996). *The Germans. Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Elias, Norbert (2000) [1939]. *The civilizing process*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Elias, Norbert, and Scotson, John L. (1994). *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems*. London: SAGE Publications.

Ellis, Joseph J. (2000). *Founding Brothers. The Revolutionary Generation*. New York: Vintage Books.

Emig, Rainer (ed.) (2000). *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993). *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

Eschle, Catherine, and Maignashca, Bice (eds) (2005). *Critical Theories, International Relations and 'the Anti-Globalisation Movement'. The Politics of Global Resistance*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Étiemble, René [1964] (1991). *Parlez-vous franglais?* Paris: Gallimard.

European Commission (2006). *Europeans and their Languages*, Eurobarometer survey published in February 2006. Retrieved on August 11th, 2008, from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_243_en.pdf

The European Institute (2006). French-U.S. Relations: Sarkozy Has a Fresh Take. *European Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006*. Retrieved from http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2006_fall_winter/2006_fall_winter_15.php4

Fabbrini, Sergio (ed.) (2006). *The United States Contested. American unilateralism and European discontent*. London: Routledge.

Falk, Richard (1999). *Predatory Globalization. A Critique*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Farrell, Robert Barry (ed.) (1966). *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Farrell, Theo (2002). Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2002.
- Featherstone, Mike (ed.) (1990). *Global Culture. Nationalism, globalization and modernity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Featherstone, Mike (1995). *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity*. London: Sage.
- Feldman, Noah (2005). *Divided by God: America's Church-State Problem and What We Should Do About It*. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux.
- Fender, Stephen (ed.) (1996). *American and European National Identities. Faces in the Mirror*. Keele: Keele University Press.
- Ferguson, Niall (2005). *Colossus. The Price of America's Empire*. New York: The Penguin Press.
- Ferguson, Yale H., and Mansbach, Richard W. (1999). Global Politics at the Turn of the Millenium: Changing Bases of "Us" and "Them". *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1999.
- Fermi, Laura (1971). *Illustrious Immigrants. The Intellectual Migration from Europe 1930-41*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ferro, Maurice (1973). *De Gaulle et l'Amérique, une amitié tumultueuse*. Paris: Plon.
- Finkelkraut, Alain, and Lévy, Benny (2006). *Le Livre et les livres. Entretiens sur la laïcité*. Lagrasse: Éditions Verdier.
- Flaubert, Gustave ([1881]1966). *Dictionnaire des idées reçues. Édition diplomatique des trois manuscrits de Rouen*. Naples: Liguori
- Foot, Rosemary, MacFarlane, S. Neil & Mastanduno, Michael (2003). *US Hegemony and International Organizations. The United States and Multilateral Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Forbes, Jill, and Kelly, Michael (eds) (1995). *French Cultural Studies. An Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Formery, Simon-Louis (2000). *La Constitution commentée article par article*. Paris: Hachette.
- Fouskas, Vassilis K. & Gökay, Bülent (2005). *The New American Imperialism. Bush's War on Terror and Blood for Oil*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
- Franchi, Anne-Marie (1995). Laïcité: la parole à la défense... *Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques*, no. 75, November 1995.
- Frémy, Dominique (1987). *Quid des présidents de la République... et des candidats*. Paris: Robert Laffont.

- Friedman, Thomas L. (1999). A Manifesto for the Fast World. *New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1999.
- Friedman, Thomas L. (2005). *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Allen Lane.
- Friend, Julius W. (1989). *Seven Years in France. François Mitterrand and the Unintended Revolution, 1981-1988*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Fritz, Ben, and Nehan, Brendan (2004). John Kerry's French Connection. Spinsanity, March 24, 2004. Retrieved on February 19, 2008 from <http://www.spinsanity.org/columns/20040325.html>
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989). The End of History? *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2006). *America at the Crossroads. Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Furet, François (1982). *L'Atelier de l'histoire*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Furet, François (1988). *La Révolution française. De Turgot à Napoléon (1770-1814)*. Paris: Histoire de France Hachette.
- Furet, François, and Ozouf, Mona (eds) (1988). *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Furet, François, and Ozouf, Mona (eds) (1993). *Le siècle de l'avènement républicain*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. Série Bibliothèque des Histoires.
- Furet, François, Julliard, Jacques, and Rosanvallon, Pierre (1988). *La République du centre. La fin de l'exception française*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Furniss, Edgar S. Jr. (1960). *France – Troubled Ally. De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis (2004). *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gallet, Dominique (1995). *Pour une ambition francophone. Le désir et l'indifférence*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Gamble, Richard M. (2003). *The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation*. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. & Young, Marilyn B. (eds) (2005). *The New American Empire*. New York: The New Press.
- Garreau, Joseph E. (2002). *The Languages of Europe: A Cultural Introduction*. University of Massachusetts Lowell, Department of Cultural Studies. Retrieved on 4 June, 2009 from <http://faculty.uml.edu/jgarreau/50.315/Europ1.htm>

- Garrison, Jim (2004). *America as Empire. Global Leader or Rogue Power?* San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc.
- Gaulle, Charles de (1954). *Mémoires de guerre. L'appel 1940-1942*. Paris: Librairie Plon.
- Gaulle, Charles de (1956). *Mémoires de guerre. L'unité 1942-1944*. Paris: Librairie Plon.
- Gaulle, Charles de (1959). *Mémoires de guerre. Le salut 1944-1946*. Paris: Librairie Plon.
- Gaulle, Charles de (1989). *Vers l'armée de métier*. Paris: Presses Pocket.
- Geertz, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. London: Fontana.
- Gelb, Leslie H. (2009). *Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Gellner, Ernest (1964). *Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Gettel, R. C., and Dunning, W. A. (eds) (2004). *Nationalism. A Political Reader*. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications.
- Giauque, Jeffrey Glen (2002). *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity. The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Gibson, Robert (1995). *Best of Enemies. Anglo-French Relations Since the Norman Conquest*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson.
- Gilbert, Paul (2000). *Peoples, Cultures and Nations in Political Philosophy*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Gildea, Robert (1987). *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800-1914*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gilder, Alfred, and Salon, Albert (2004). *Alerte Francophone. Plaidoyer et plan d'action pour les generations futures*. Paris: Arnaud Franel Éditions.
- Girardet, Raoul (1983). *Le Nationalisme français. Anthologie 1871-1914*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Gladwyn, Lord (1969). *De Gaulle's Europe or Why the General Says No*. London: Secker & Warburg.
- Glebe-Møller, Lis (1981). Hovedtræk af fransk-amerikanernes historie – en overset minoritetsgruppe i USA. *RIDS, No. 87, August 1981*.
- Godin, Emmanuel, and Chafer, Tony (eds) (2004). *The French Exception*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gordon, Philip H., and Meunier, Sophie (2002). *Le Nouveau Défi français. La France face à la mondialisation*. Paris: Odile Jacob.

- Gordon, Philip H., and Shapiro Jeremy (2004). *Allies at War. America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gordon, Raymond G., Jr. (ed.), 2005. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Fifteenth edition*. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Online version: <http://www.ethnologue.com/>.
- Goudsblom, Johan, and Mennell, Stephen (eds) (1998). *The Norbert Elias Reader. A Biographical Selection*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Gouvernement français (1994). Livre blanc sur la défense 1994. Paris: Union générale d'Éditions.
- Gouvernement français (2008). Défense et Sécurité nationale. Le Livre blanc. Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française.
- Gozard, Gilles (1976). *De Gaulle face à l'Europe*. Paris: Plon.
- Grantham, Bill (2000). 'Some Big Bourgeois Brothel'. *Contexts for France's culture wars with Hollywood*. Luton: University of Luton Press.
- Grazia, Victoria de (2005). *Irresistible Empire. America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Green, John C., Guth, James L., Smidt, Corwin E. and Kellstedt, Lyman A. (1996). *Religion and the Culture Wars. Dispatches from the Front*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Greene, Jack P. (1993). *The Intellectual Construction of America. Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to 1800*. London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Greenfeld, Liah (1992). *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grosser, Alfred (1978). *Les Occidentaux. Les pays d'Europe et les États-Unis depuis la guerre*. Paris: Fayard.
- Grosser, Alfred (1980). *The Western Alliance. European-American Relations Since 1945*. New York: Continuum.
- Grosser, Alfred (1989). *Affaires extérieures. La politique de la France 1944-1989*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Gubbins, Paul, and Holt, Mike (eds) (2002). Beyond Boundaries. Language and Identity in Contemporary Europe. *Multilingual Matters*, 122.
- Guillou, Michel (1984). *Pour un dialogue Nord-Sud*. Paris: Albatros.
- Guillou, Michel (2005). *Francophonie-Puissance. L'équilibre multipolaire*. Paris: Éditions Ellipses.
- Gundelach, Peter (2001). National identitet i en globaliseringstid. *Dansk sociologi*, 1/01.
- Gunn, T. Jeremy (2003). *Les Mythes Fondateurs des États-Unis et de la France; "Religious Freedom" et "Laïcité"*. Keynote address delivered at l'Université Laval, Québec, Canada, on

September 26th, 2003. Retrieved on September 26, 2007, from: www.miviludes.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/GUNN.pdf.

Gunn, T. Jeremy (2004). *Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France*. Retrieved on September 25, 2007, from: <http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2004/5GUN-FIN2.pdf>.

Guyatt, Nicholas (2003). *Another American Century? The United States and the World since 9/11*. New York: Zed Books.

Haass, Richard N. (2008). The Age of Nonpolarity. What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, Issue 3, May/June 2008.

Haberski, Raymond J. Jr. (2001). *Is's Only a Movie! Films and Critics in American Culture*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Hagège, Claude (1987). *Le français et les siècles*. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob.

Hagège, Claude (2006). *Combat pour le français. Au nom de la diversité des langues et des cultures*. Paris: Odile Jacob.

Halimi, Serge (1998). Liberal Dogma Shipwrecked. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Supplement to *The Guardian Weekly*, October 1998.

Halimi, Serge (2000a). Les 'Philo-Américains' saisis par la rage. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2000.

Halimi, Serge (2000b). Un mot de trop. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2000.

Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John ([1788] 2006). *The Federalist*. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics.

Hamilton-Williams, David (1994). *The Fall of Napoleon. The Final Betrayal*. London: Arms and Armour Press.

Hanahoe, Tom (2003). *America Rules. US Foreign Policy, Globalization and Corporate USA*. Dublin: Brandon.

Hansen, Mogens Herman (2005). *Kilder til demokratiets historie 1750-2000*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag.

Harbulot, Christian, and Pichot-Duclos, Jean (1999). *La France doit dire non*. Paris: Plon.

Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000). *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harrison, Michael M. (1981). *The Reluctant Ally. France and Atlantic Security*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hauge, Hans and Horstbøll, Henrik (1988). *Kulturbegrebets kulturhistorie*. Århus: Århus universitetsforlag.

Hays, Constance L. (2004). *The Real Thing. Truth and Power at the Coca-Cola Company*. New York: Random House.

- Hayward, Jack (2007). *Fragmented France. Two Centuries of Disputed Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Held, David (ed.) (2000). *A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Hermann, Charles F., Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Rosenau, James N. (eds) (1987). *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Herslund, Michael (2002). *Sider af Europas historie. Introduktion til Europæiske Studier*. Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur.
- Herslund, Michael *et al* (forthcoming). *Fra Leviathan til Lissabon. Magt og rettigheder i Europa*.
- Hervieu-Léger, Danièle (2001). France's Obsession with the Sectarian Threat. *Nova Religio*, Vol. 4, No. 2.
- Hervieu-Léger, Danièle (2003). Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa. *Transit* 26, 2003.
- Hess, John L. (1968). *The Case for de Gaulle: An American Viewpoint*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Higgott, Richard, and Malbašić, Ivona (eds) (2008). *The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism*. London: Routledge.
- Hill, Christopher (ed.) (1996). *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude (2008). *The Roads to Modernity. The British, French and American Enlightenments*. London: Vintage Books.
- Hippler, Jochen (1994). *Pax Americana? Hegemony or Decline*. London: Pluto Press.
- Hirsh, Michael (2003). *At War With Ourselves. Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hirsh, Michael (2009). Thanks for Not Being Bush. *Newsweek*, October 9, 2009. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/id/216994/output.
- Hirst, Paul, and Thompson, Grahame (2002). The Future of Globalization. *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, No. 3.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1994). *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*. London: Michael Joseph.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J., and Ranger, Terence (eds) (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1974). *Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s*. New York: The Viking Press.

- Hoffmann, Stanley (2004). France, the United States & Iraq. *The Nation*, February 16, 2004.
- Hoffmann, Stanley, and Kitromilides, Paschalis (eds) (1981). *Culture and Society in Contemporary Europe*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Hogan, Michael (1989). *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan, Michael (ed.) (1999). *The Ambiguous Legacy. U.S. Foreign Relations in the "American Century"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan, Michael J., and Paterson, Thomas G. (eds) (2004). *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hollander, Paul (1992). *Anti-Americanism. Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hollander, Paul (1995). *Anti-Americanism – Irrational & Rational*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Hollander, Paul, ed. (2004). *Understanding Anti-Americanism. Its Origins and Impact at Home and Abroad*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
- Hollander, Paul (2007). *Anti-Americanism since the End of the Cold War and the Rise of Global Terrorism*. Keynote address at a seminar organized by the Danish Institute for International Studies, March 7, 2007. Quotations from his address are based on the author's notes.
- Holm, Ulla (1993). *Det franske Europa*. Århus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
- Holsti, Ole R. (1962). The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VI, No. 3.
- Holsti, Ole R. (2004). *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.
- Hopf, Ted (1998). The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998.
- Horne, Alistair (2004). *Friend or Foe. An Anglo-Saxon History of France*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Howes, David (ed.) (1996). *Cross-cultural Consumption: Global Markets, Local Realities*. London: Routledge.
- Hudson, Valerie M. (ed.) (1997). *Culture and Foreign Policy*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Huliaras, Asteris C. (1998). The 'anglosaxon conspiracy': French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4.
- Hulsman, John C., Polansky, David and Prager, Rachel (2003). *The Rebirth of Realism and the Lessons of History: The British Example (1)*. Retrieved April 28th 2007 from <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue3/Vol2Issue3Hulsmanetal.html>

- Human Rights Watch (1995). *A World Leader in Executing Juveniles*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Us.htm>
- Human Rights Watch (2001). *Beyond Reason. The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental Retardation*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/>
- Human Rights Watch (2003). *World Report 2003. United States*. Retrieved on May 13th 2008 from <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/us.html>
- Hunter, James Davison (1991). *Culture Wars. The Struggle to Define America*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Hunter, Shireen T. (ed.) (2002). *Islam, Europe's Second Religion. The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape*. Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. London: Praeger.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Touchstone.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1999). The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, Issue 2.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (2004). *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
- Huntington, Samuel P., and Weiner, Myron (eds) (1987). *Understanding Political Development: An Analytic Study*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Hurrell, Andrew (2002). "There are No Rules" (George W. Bush): International Order After September 11. *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 2.
- Hutchinson, John, and Smith, Anthony D. (eds) (1994). *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ignatieff, M., (1998). Identity Parades. *Prospect*, April 1998.
- IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) (2007). *The Military Balance 2007*. London: Routledge.
- IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) (2009). *The Military Balance 2009*. London: Routledge.
- Ikenberry, G. John (1998-1999). Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order. *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1998-1999.
- Imbert, Claude (1989). The End of French Exceptionalism. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, Issue 4, Fall 1989.
- Ingham, Hilary, and Ingham, Mike (eds) (2002). *EU Expansion to the East. Prospects and Problems*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Inkeles, Alex (1997). *National Character. A Psycho-Social Perspective*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Internet World Stats (2009). *Internet World Users by Language, Top 10 Languages*. Retrieved on August 13th, 2009 from <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm>
- Jakelić, Slavica (2006). Secularization, European Identity, and “The End of the West”. *The Hedgehog Review*, Vol. 8, Spring & Summer 2006.
- Jakobsen, Janet, and Pellegrini, Ann (2000). World Secularisms at the Millennium. *Social Text* 64, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 2000.
- James, Peter (ed.) (1998). *Modern Germany: Politics, Society and Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Jenkins, Brian, and Sofos, Spyros (eds) (1996). *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Jerlang, Espen, and Jerlang, Jesper (1996). *Socialisering og habitus*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard-Rosinante.
- Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard, and Stein, Janice (eds) (1985). *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Joffe, Josef (2001). Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big? *The National Interest*, Issue 64, Summer 2001.
- Joffe, Josef (2006a). Dissecting Anti-isms. *The American Interest*, Summer 2006.
- Joffe, Josef (2006b). *Überpower. The Imperial Temptation of America*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Johnson, Chalmers (2004). *The Sorrows of Empire. Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. London: Verso.
- Johnson, Paul (1996). *Modern Times. A History of the World from the 1920s to the 1990s*. London: Phoenix.
- Johnson, Douglas, Crouzet, François, and Bédarida, François (1980). *Britain and France. Ten Centuries*. Folkestone: Dawson & Franco-British Council, British Section.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995.
- Jönsson, Christer. (1984). *Superpower. Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy*. London: Frances Pinter Ltd.
- Jouve, Edmond (1967). *Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l’Europe (1940-1966), volume I*. Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence.
- Judis, John B. (1992). *Grand Illusion. Critics and Champions of the American Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Judis, John B. (2000). *The Paradox of American Democracy. Elites, Special Interests, and the Betrayal of Public Trust*. New York: Pantheon Books.

- Judis, John B. (2004). *The Folly of Empire. What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Judt, Tony, and Lacorne, Denis (eds) (2005). *With Us or Against Us. Studies in Global Anti-Americanism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Julliard, Jacques (1985). *La faute à Rousseau. Essai sur les conséquences historiques de l'idée de souveraineté populaire*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Julliard, Jacques (1999). *La faute aux élites*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Julliard, Jacques (2008). *L'Argent, Dieu et le Diable. Face au monde moderne avec Péguy, Bernanos, Claudel*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Julliard, Jacques, and Winock, Michel (eds) (1996). *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français*. Paris: Seuil.
- Kagan, Robert (2003). *Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. London: Atlantic Books.
- Kagan, Robert (2004). *The Crisis of Legitimacy: America and the World*. The Centre for Independent Studies, 21st Annual John Bonython Lecture, November 2004.
- Kammen, Michael (1999). *American Culture American Tastes. Social Change and the 20th Century*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Karlsson, Ingmar (1997). *Europa og folkene. En europæisk nation eller nationernes Europa?* Copenhagen: Fremad.
- Kastoryano, Riva (ed.) (2005). *Les codes de la difference. Race – Origine – Religion. France – Allemagne – États-Unis*. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996). *Cultural Norms and National Security*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Keohane, Robert O. (2006). Anti-Americanisms. *Policy Review No 139, October & November 2006*.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Keohane, Robert O. (eds) (2007). *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kaufmann, Karen (2002). Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification. *Political Behavior, Vol. 24, No. 3. September 2002*.
- Kauppi, Niilo (2003). Bourdieu's Political Sociology and the Politics of European Integration. *Theory and Society, Vol. 32, No. 5/6, Special Issue on the Sociology of Symbolic Power: A Special Issue in Memory of Pierre Bourdieu, December 2003*.
- Kedward, Rod (2005). *La Vie en Bleu. France and the French since 1900*. London: Allen Lane.

- Keeler, John T. S. and Schain, Martin A. (eds) (1996). *Chirac's Challenge. Liberalization, Europeanization, and Malaise in France*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Keiger, J.F.V. (2001). *France and the World since 1870*. London: Arnold.
- Kellermann, Henry J. (1978). *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Germany 1945-1954*. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State/U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Kendall, Gavin, and Wickham, Gary (2001). *Understanding Culture. Cultural Studies, Order, Ordering*. London: Sage Publications.
- Kennedy, Paul (1988). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Fontana Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, December 1988.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown, Cop.
- Kessler, Marie-Christine (1999). *La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus*. Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Keylor, William R. (1992). *The Twentieth-Century World. An International History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kimball, Warren F. (ed.) (1992). *America Unbound. World War II and the Making of a Superpower*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kincheloe, Joe L. (2002). *The Sign of the Burger. McDonald's and the Culture of Power*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kissinger, Henry (1979). *À la Maison Blanche, 1968-1973, volume 2*. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard.
- Kissinger, Henry (1994). *Diplomacy*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Kohut, Andrew (2007). *America's Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Testimony of Andrew Kohut, President of the Pew Research Center, to the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2007.
- Kom, Ambroise (2000). Knowledge and legitimation. *Mots Pluriels*, No. 14, June 2000.
- Krastev, Ivan (2004). The Anti-American Century? *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 2.
- Krauthammer, Charles (1990-91). The Unipolar Moment. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, Issue 1.
- Krauthammer, Charles (2002-03). The Unipolar Moment Revisited. *The National Interest*, Issue 70.
- Krauthammer, Charles (2003). To Hell With Sympathy. *Time*, Vol. 162, Issue 20.

- Krieken, Robert van (1998). *Norbert Elias*. New York: Routledge.
- Kuisel, Richard F. (1991). Coca-Cola and the Cold War: The French Face Americanization, 1948-1953, *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1991).
- Kuisel, Richard F. (1993). *Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kuisel, Richard F. (2000). The Fernandel Factor: The Rivalry between the French and American Cinema in the 1950s. *Yale French Studies*, No. 98: *The French Fifties*.
- Kupchan, Charles A. (ed.) (1995). *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- La documentation Française (2008). *Les francophones dans le monde*. Retrieved on August 15th, 2008, from www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/francophonie/francophones-monde.
- Laborde, Cécile (2002). On Republican Toleration. *Constellations*, Vol. 9, No. 2.
- Lacorne, Denis, Rupnik, Jacques, and Toinet, Marie-France (eds) (1990). *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism. A Century of French Perception*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lacouture, Jean (1985). *De Gaulle. 2: Le politique, 1944-1959*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Landau, Saul (2003). *The Pre-Emptive Empire. A Guide to Bush's Kingdom*. London: Pluto Press.
- Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Friedrich, eds. (1996). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Latouche, Serge (1996). *The Westernization of the World: The Significance, Scope and Limits of the Drive towards Global Uniformity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Laval University, Québec (2008). *Qu'est-ce que la Francophonie?* Retrieved on August 15th, 2008, from <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/francophonie/francophonie.htm>
- Lawday, David (2003). Now French intellectuals love America. *New Statesman*, 22 September 2003.
- Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie, and Smolar, Aleksander (eds) (2003). *Entre Kant et Kosovo. Études offertes à Pierre Hassner*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- LeBlanc, Benjamin-Hugo (2001). No Bad Sects in France. *Religion in the News*, Vol. 4, No. 3. Retrieved from <http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol4No3/French%20sects.htm>.
- Leclerc, Gérard (2000). *La mondialisation culturelle. Les civilisations à l'épreuve*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Lefebvre, Georges, Guyot, Raymond, and Sagnac, Philippe (1930). *La Révolution française*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan.
- Léger, Jean-Marc (1987). *La Francophonie: grand dessein, grande ambiguïté*. Montréal: Nathan.

- Lerner, Max [1957] (1987). *America as a Civilization. Life and Thought in the United States Today*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Lévy, Bernard-Henri (2006). *American Vertigo*. Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle.
- Levy, Daniel, Pensky, Max, and Torpey, John (eds) (2005). *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War*. London: Verso.
- Lichbach, M., and Zuckerman, A. (eds) (1997). *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lieber, Robert J. (2005). *The American Era. Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Liedman, Sven-Eric (1989). *Från Platon till Gorbatsjov. De Politiska Idéernas Historia*. Trondhjem: Månpocket.
- Lieven, Anatol (2005). *America Right or Wrong. An Anatomy of American Nationalism*. London: Harper Perennial.
- Lindberg, Tod (ed.) (2005). *Beyond Paradise and Power. Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*. New York: Routledge.
- Lindqvist, Herman (2005). *Napoleon*. Copenhagen: Jyllands-Postens Forlag.
- Lipiansky, Edmond Marc (1991). *L'identité française. Représentations, myths, ideologies*. La Garenne-Colombes: Editions de l'Espace Européen.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1996). *American Exceptionalism*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (2000). Still the Exceptional Nation? *Wilson Quarterly*. Vol. 24, Issue 1, Winter2000.
- Little, R., and Smith, S. (eds) (1988). *Belief Systems and International Relations*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Lloyd, Selwyn (1980). *Suez 1956. A Personal Account*. London: Coronet Books.
- Lockhart, Charles (2003). *The Roots of American Exceptionalism. History, Institutions and Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lofts, Norah and Weiner, Margery (1968). *Eternal France. A History of France 1789-1944*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
- Lonsi Koko, Gaspard-Hubert (2007). *Mitterrand l'Africain?* Paris: Les Éditions de l'Égrégore.
- Loughlin, Sean (2003). House cafeterias change names for 'french' fries and 'french' toast. Move reflects anger over France's stand over Iraq. CNN.com/Inside Politics. Posted March 12, 2003. Retrieved on February 19, 2008 from <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/11/sprj.irq.fries/>
- Lull, James (2000). *Media, Communication, Culture: A Global Approach*. Oxford: Polity Press.

- McCormick, John (2007). *The European Superpower*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McCullough, David (2001). *John Adams*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- MacDonald, Sharon (ed.) (1997). *Inside European Identities. Ethnography in Western Europe*. Oxford: Berg Publishers.
- Macdougall, Norman (2001). *An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295-1560*. East Linton: Tuckwell Press.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò [1513] (1942). *Fyrsten*. Copenhagen, Forlaget Vega.
- Maclean, Mairi (ed.) (1998). *The Mitterrand Years. Legacy and Evaluation*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- McMillan, James F. (1992). *Twentieth Century France. Politics and Society 1898-1991*. London: Edward Arnold.
- McPherson, Alan (ed.) (2006). *Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean*. New York: Berghahn Books-
- Macridis, Roy C. (1966). *De Gaulle: Implacable Ally*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Maguire, J., and Poulton, E. (1999). European Identity Politics in EURO 96: Invented Traditions and National Habitus Codes. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Vol. 34.
- Mahoney, Daniel J. (1996). *De Gaulle. Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Diplomacy*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Marchesin, Philippe (ed.) (1995). Mitterrand et l'Afrique. *Politique Africain*, Vol. 58, June 1995.
- Markovits, Andrei S. (2007). *Uncouth Nation. Why Europe Dislikes America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Marling, William H. (2006). *How "American" Is Globalization?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Martel, Frédéric (2006). *De la Culture en Amérique*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Massey, Doreen (1994). *Space, Place and Gender*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Masson, Philippe (1991). *La Marine française et la guerre 1939-1945*. Paris: Tallandier.
- Mathé, Sylvie (ed.) (2000). *L'antiaméricanisme. Groupe de Recherche et d'Etudes Nord-Américaines (G.R.E.N.A.) Actes du colloque des 26 et 27 mars 1999*. Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence.
- Maupassant, Guy de (1888). *Le Rosier de Madame Husson*. Paris: Librairie moderne.
- May, Ernest R. (1961). *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

- May, Lary (1983). *Screening Out the Past: The Birth of Mass Culture and the Motion Picture Industry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, George Herbert (1934). *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Mead, Walter Russell (2001). *Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. A Century Foundation Book.
- Mead, Walter Russell (2007). *God and Gold. Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Melandri, Pierre, and Ricard, Serge (eds) (2003). *Les relations franco-américaines au XXe siècle. Colloque de l'observatoire de la politique étrangère américaine 24 et 25 Mai 2002*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Melville, Herman (1967). *White-Jacket*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Ménil, Lois Pattison de (1977). *Who Speaks for Europe? The Vision of Charles de Gaulle*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Menon, Anand (1996). "France and the IGC of 1996". *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 3, no. 2.
- Meredith, Martin (2006). *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. London: Simon and Schuster.
- Meunier, Sophie (2000). The French Exception. *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2000.
- Meunier, Sophie (2007). The French Twist. *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2007, Issue 160.
- Milhaud, Olivier (2006a). "Le harem linguistique de la France", *EspacesTemps.net*. Mensuelles, 01.06.2006.
- Milhaud, Olivier (2006b). "Post-Francophonie?" *EspacesTemps.net*. Actuel, 07.08.2006.
- Miller, David (2000). *Citizenship and National Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Miller, John J. and Molesky, Mark (2004). *Our Oldest Enemy – A History of America's Disastrous Relationship with France*. New York: Doubleday.
- Miller, Michael B. (1987). *Au Bon Marché 1869-1920: Le consommateur apprivoisé*. Paris: Armand Collin.
- Miquel, Pierre (1976). *Histoire de la France*. Paris: Fayard.
- Mitterrand, François (1986). *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Introduction à vingt-cinq discours (1981-1985)*. Paris: Fayard.
- Moïsi, Dominique (2009). *The Geopolitics of Emotion. How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are Reshaping the World*. New York: Doubleday.
- Møller, Per Stig (1996). *Den naturlige orden*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. ([1948] 1973). *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Morris, Edmund (2001). *Theodore Rex*. New York: Random House.
- Muravchik, Joshua (1992). *Exporting Democracy. Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington D.C.: The AEI Press.
- Myles, John F. (2004). From Doxa to Experience, Issues in Bourdieu's Adoption of Husserlian Phenomenology. *Theory, Culture & Society*. Vol. 21, (2).
- Naím, Moisés (2002). Anti-Americanisms. *Foreign Policy*, January-February 2002.
- National Security Strategy (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington DC: The White House, September 2002.
- Neier, Aryeh (2004). America's New Nationalism. *Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences*, Volume 71, Number 4, Winter 2004.
- Neumann, Anika, Thouaille, Charles-Henri, Wagner, Ines, Lenaers, Jeroen, Henning, Karla, Capitaine, Maxime, and Lübben, Timm (2006). *French Exceptionalism, A conceptual enquiry into Recent French History*. Paris: Exception Independent Press.
- Neumann, Iver B. (1995). *Collective Identity Formation: Self and Other in International Relations*. Badia Fiesolana, Firenze: EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/36.
- Neumann, Iver B. (1996). Self and Other in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2., June 1996.
- Newhouse, John (1970). *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons*. New York: The Viking Press.
- Ngi, Céline (2008). « Elle résiste moins bien à la mondialisation ». Entretien avec Donald Morrison et Antoine Compagnon in Fluctuat.net. Retrieved on December 6th 2008 from <http://www.fluctuat.net/6564-Entretien-avec-D-Morrison-et-A-Compagnon>
- Niebuhr, Reinhold (1949). *Faith and History*. New York: Scribner's Sons.
- Nieguth, T. (1999). Beyond dichotomy: Concepts of the nation and the distribution of membership. *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 5, No. 2.
- New York Times (1867). Minor topics. *June 11th*, 1867. Retrieved on March 22, 2009 from http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D07E3D9103AEF34BC4952-DFB066838C679FDE
- Nossel, Suzanne (2004). Smart Power. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, Issue 2, March/April 2004.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1990). *Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2002-3). Limits of American Power. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 117, No. 4.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2003). The Velvet Hegemon. *Foreign Policy*, May-June 2003.

- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004a). *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004b). The Decline of America's Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83 Issue 3.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004c). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, Number 2.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2006). In Mideast, the goal is 'smart power'. The Boston Globe, August 19, 2006. Retrieved from www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/19/in_mideast_the_goal_is_smart_power/
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2009). Get Smart. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, Issue 4, July/August 2009.
- O'Brien, Patrick Karl and Clesse, Armand (eds) (2002). *Two Hegemonies. Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- O'Connor, Brendon (ed.) (2007a). *Anti-Americanism. History, Causes, and Themes. Volume 1: Causes and Sources*. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing.
- O'Connor, Brendon (ed.) (2007b). *Anti-Americanism. History, Causes, and Themes. Volume 2: Historical Perspectives*. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing.
- O'Connor, Brendon (ed.) (2007c). *Anti-Americanism. History, Causes, and Themes. Volume 3: Comparative Perspectives*. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing.
- O'Connor, Brendon, and Griffiths, Martin (eds) (2007). *Anti-Americanism. History, Causes, and Themes. Volume 4: In the 21st Century*. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E., Rice, Susan E., and Steinberg, James B. (2002). The New National Security Strategy and Preemption. *The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief No. 113, December 2002*.
- O'Sullivan, John (1839). The Great Nation of Futurity. *The United States Democratic Review*, Vol. 6 Issue 23. New York: J. & H.G. Langley.
- OECD (2009). *OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics*. Retrieved from <http://puck.sourceoecd.org/pdf/factbook2009/302009011e-02-01-01.pdf>.
- Onuf, Nicholas (1989). *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Østergård, Uffe (1989). *De franske intellektuelle og USA. Fra Malraux og Sartre til Furet og Baudrillard*. Aarhus Universitet: Romansk Institut, Prépublications 118.
- Østergård, Uffe (1992). *Europas ansigter. Nationale stater og politiske kulturer i en ny, gammel verden*. Copenhagen: Rosinante.
- Pagden, Anthony (ed.) (2002). *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Paine, Thomas [1776-1794] (2003). *Common Sense and Other Writings*. New York: The Modern Library.

- Palmer, Robert R. (1959). *Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800. Vol. I, The Challenge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Paxman, Jeremy (1999). *The English. A Portrait of a People*. London: Penguin Books.
- Paxton, Robert O., and Wahl, Nicholas (1994). *De Gaulle and the United States. A Centennial Reappraisal*. Oxford: Berg.
- Péan, Pierre (1990). *L'Homme de l'Ombre*. Paris: Fayard.
- Pedersen, Carl (2006). *Den forkerte krig. USA og den nye verdensorden*. Copenhagen: Aschehoug.
- Pells, Richard (1997). *Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Pells, Richard (2007). *Transatlantic Misunderstandings. American Anti-Europeanism, European Anti-Americanism*. Speech at the Danish Institute for Military Studies, May 31, 2007. Quotations from this speech are based on the author's notes.
- Perry, Sheila, and Cross, Máire (eds) (1997). *Voices of France. Social, Political and Cultural Identity*. London: Pinter.
- Petras, James and Morley, Morris (1995). *Empire or Republic?* New York: Routledge.
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002). *Among Wealthy Nations... U.S. Stands Alone in its Embrace of Religion*. A Pew Research Center Project. Retrieved May 14th 2007 from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/167.pdf>
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2005). *U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative. American Character Gets Mixed Reviews*. Washington: A Pew Research Center Project. Retrieved May 14th 2007 from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/247.pdf>
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006). *America's Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas*. Washington: A Pew Research Center Project. Retrieved May 14th 2007 from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252>
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007). *Global Unease with Major World Powers*. Washington: A Pew Research Center Project. Retrieved July 12th 2007 from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>
- Pew Global Attitudes Project (2009). *Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the World*. Washington: A Pew Research Center Project. Retrieved August 12th 2009 from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/264.pdf>
- Peyrefitte, Alain (1994). *C'était de Gaulle. Volume 1 : « La France redevient la France »*. Paris: Éditions de Fallois/Fayard.
- Peyrefitte, Alain (1997). *C'était de Gaulle. Volume 2 : « La France reprend sa place dans le monde »*. Paris: Éditions de Fallois/Fayard.
- Peyrefitte, Alain (1998). *La société de confiance*. Paris: Odile Jacob.

- Phillipson, Robert (2003). *English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Pickering, Michael (2001). *Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Pitts, Jennifer (2005). *A Turn to Empire. The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pond, Elizabeth (2004). *The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq*. Fiesole: EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004/26.
- Poissonnier, A. and Sournia, G. (2006). *Atlas mondial de la francophonie*. Paris: Editions Autrement.
- Prittie, Terence (1972). *Konrad Adenauer, 1876-1967*. London: Tom Stacey.
- Prizel, Y. (1998). *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Prunier, Gérard (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994. History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Puddington, Arch, and Melia, Thomas O. (2008). *Today's American: How Free?* Excerpt from the Overview Essay in Freedom House's *Today's American: How Free?* Retrieved on May 15th 2008 from http://www.freedomhouse.org/printer_friendly.cfm?page=384&key=44&parent=5&report=61
- Pye, Lucian (1991). Political Culture Revisited. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1991.
- Rahman, Sabeel (2002). Another New World Order? *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 23 (4).
- Rauhut, Friedhelm (1953). Die Herkunft der Worte und Begriffe Kultur, Zivilisation, Bildung. *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift III*, April 1953.
- Reeves, Julie (2004). *Culture and International Relations. Narratives, natives and tourists*. London: Routledge.
- Regenbogen, Lucian (1998). *Napoléon a dit. Aphorismes, Citations et Opinions*. Paris: Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres.
- Rémond, René (1958). *Les Etats-Unis devant l'opinion française 1815-1852. Thèse pour le doctorat ès lettres présentée à la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences humaines de l'Université de Paris*. Paris: Académie de Paris.
- Rémond, René (1995). La laïcité et ses contraires. *Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques*, no. 75, November 1995.
- Renan, Ernest (1882). *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 Mars 1882*. Paris: Calmann Lévy.

- Renouvin, Pierre (1954). *Histoire des relations internationales. Tome cinquième: Le XIX^e siècle, I. De 1815 à 1871. L'Europe des nationalités et l'éveil de nouveaux mondes*. Paris: Librairie Hachette.
- Renwick, Neil (2000). *America's World Identity. The Politics of Exclusion*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Revel, Jean-Francois (2002). *L'obsession anti-américaine. Son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses conséquences*. Paris: Plon.
- Ritzer, George (2000). *The McDonalizing of Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Ritzer, George, and Liska, Allan (1997). "McDisneyization" and "Post-tourism". In Rojek, Chris and Urry, John (eds). *Touring Cultures: Transformations of travel and theory*. London: Routledge.
- Robbins, Derek (2000). *Bourdieu and Culture*. London: Sage Publications.
- Roger, Philippe (2005). *The American Enemy. A Story of French Anti-Americanism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rosenau, James, Thompson, Kenneth, and Boyd, Gavin (eds.) (1976). *World Politics: An Introduction*. New York: Free Press.
- Rosenblum, Mort (1988). *Mission to Civilize – The French Way*. New York: Anchor Press Doubleday.
- Ross, Andrew, and Ross, Kristin (eds) (2004). *Anti-Americanism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Ross, George, Hoffmann, Stanley, and Malzacher, Sylvia (1987). *The Mitterrand Experiment. Continuity and Change in Modern France*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ross, Maurice (1976). *Louis XVI, America's forgotten founding father, with a survey of the Franco-American alliance of the Revolutionary period*. New York: Vantage Press.
- Rubin, Barry, and Rubin, Judith Colp (2004). *Hating America. A History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rubin, James P. (2003). Stumbling Into War. *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003. Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82504-p50/james-p-rubin/stumbling-into-war.html>
- Rubinstein, Richard E., and Crocker, Jarle (1994). Challenging Huntington. *Foreign Policy*. Fall 1994, Issue 96.
- Rundell, John, and Mennell, Stephen (eds) (1998). *Classical Readings in Culture and Civilization*. London: Routledge.
- Said, Edward W. ([1978] 1995). *Orientalism*. London: Penguin.
- Said, Edward W. (1993). *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Chatto & Windus

- Salhi, Kamal (ed.) (2002). *French in and out of France. Language Policies, Intercultural Antagonisms and Dialogue*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Sardar, Ziauddin, and Davies, Merryl Wyn (2002). *Why do People Hate America?* New York: Disinformation.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas (2006). *Testimony*. Petersfield: Harriman House Publishing.
- Sarkozy, Nicolas (2007). Speech by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, before the Congress of the United States of America, Washington, November 7, 2007. Retrieved on January 24th, 2009, from <http://ambafrance-us.org/IMG/html/standpoint/archives-standpoint/stand230.html>.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1972). *Plaidoyer pour les intellectuels*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul ([1946] 1998). *La responsabilité de l'écrivain*. Lagrasse: Éditions Verdier.
- Schama, Simon (2003). The Unloved American. Two Centuries of Alienating Europe. *The New Yorker*, March 10, 2003.
- Schiff, Stacy (2005). *A Great Improvisation. Franklin, France, and the Birth of America*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1966). *Kennedys tusind dage i det hvide hus, bind 2*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Skrifola.
- Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1967). Origins of the Cold War. *Foreign Affairs*, 46.
- Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1986). *The Cycles of American History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Schoenbaum, Thomas J. (1988). *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Schom, Alan (1997). *Napoleon Bonaparte*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Schneidermann, Daniel (1995). *Nos mythologies*. Paris: Plon.
- Sellar, W.C., and Yeatman, R.J. (1930). *1066 and All That*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.
- Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1972). *Mod en ny civilisation*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
- Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques (1967). *Le défi américain*. Paris: Éditions Denoël.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh (1977). *Nations and States*. London: Methuen.
- Shafer, Byron E. (1999). American Exceptionalism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1999, Vol. 2.
- Shalom, Stephen S. (1993). *Imperial Alibis. Rationalizing U.S. Intervention After the Cold War*. Boston: South End Press.
- Sheehan, Michael (1996). *The Balance of Power. History and Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Shirayev, Eric, and Zubok, Vladislav (2000). *Anti-Americanism in Russia. From Stalin to Putin*. New York: Palgrave.

- Shlapentokh, Vladimir, Woods, Joshua, and Shiraev, Eric (2005). *America. Sovereign Defender or Cowboy Nation?* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Skillen, James W. (2005). *With or Against the World? America's Role among the Nations*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Smith, Adam (2007 [1776]). *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Petersfield: Harriman House.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Smith, Anthony D. (2003). *Nationalisme. Teori, ideology, historie*. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
- Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H.W., and Sapin, Burton (eds) (1962). *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. New York: Free Press.
- Snyder, Jack (2004). One World, Rival Theories. *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004.
- Stark, Rodney, and Bainbridge, William Sims (1985). *The Future of Religion. Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006). *Making Globalization Work*. London: Allen Lane.
- Strauss, David (1978). *Menace in the West. The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Stråth, Bo (ed.) (2000). *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.
- Swartz, David (1997). *Culture and Power. The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Tanter, Raymond (1990). *Who's at the Helm?* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Tanter Raymond, and Ullman, Richard H. (eds) (1972). *Theory and Policy in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Taylor, A.J.P. (1954). *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor, Charles (2004). *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Teich, Mikuláš, and Porter, Roy (1993). *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Teyssier, Arnaud (1995). *La V^e République 1958-1995: De de Gaulle à Chirac*. Paris: Pygmalion/Gérard Watelet.
- Therborn, Göran (1995). *European Modernity and Beyond*. London: Sage.

- Thies, Cameron G. (2002). Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 2.
- Thody, Philip (1995). *Le Franglais. Forbidden English, Forbidden American. Law, Politics and Language in Contemporary France. A Study in Loan Words and National Identity*. London: Athlone.
- Thomas, Scott (2005). *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thompson, John B. (1995). *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Timmerman, Kenneth R. (2004). *The French Betrayal of America*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- Tinard, Yves (2001). *L'exception française*. Paris: Maxima.
- Tishkov, V (1997). *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de [1835-1840] (2003). *Democracy in America*. London: Penguin Classics.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de [1856] (1928). *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*. Paris: Calman-Lévy, Éditeurs.
- Todd, Emmanuel (2003). *After the Empire. The Breakdown of the American Order*. New York: Colombia University Press.
- Todd, Olivier (2005). *Malraux. A Life*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Todorov, Tzvetan (1989). *Nous et les autres. La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Tombs, Robert and Isabelle (2006). *That Sweet Enemy. The French and the British from the Sun King to the Present*. London: William Heinemann, The Random House Group Limited.
- Tomlinson, John (1991). *Cultural Imperialism*. London: Pinter.
- Tomlinson, John (1999). *Globalization and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Trachtenberg, Marc (2004). *The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance*. Fiesole: EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004/27.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna (1998). National Identity and the Other. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Volume 21 Number 4.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna (2002). *Negotiating Nationhood in a Changing Europe – Views from the Press*. Lewinston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press/Studies in Social and Political Theory, Volume 28.

- Tuck, Jason (2003). The Men in White: Reflections on Rugby Union, the Media and Englishness. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, Vol. 38, No. 177.
- Tulard, Jean (1991). *Napoleon eller myten om en frelserskikkelse*. Copenhagen: Forum.
- Turner, Frederick Jackson [1894] (1966). *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*. Washington DC: Ann Arbor University Microfilms, Inc.
- Turner, John C. (1975). Social Comparison and Social Identity: Some Prospects for Intergroup Behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 5, No. 1.
- Tuveson, Ernest Lee (1968). *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Vaisse, Justin (2008). A Gaullist By Any Other Name. *Survival*, Vol. 50, Number 3.
- Vaïsse, Maurice (1998). *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle 1958-1969*. Paris: Fayard.
- Valentin, Christian (ed.) (2007). *La Francophonie dans le monde 2006-2007*. Paris: Nathan.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre (1981). *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. New York: Elsevier Press.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre (1995). Does race matter? *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 1, No. 3.
- Van Kley, Dale (ed.) (1994). *The French Idea of Freedom. The Old Regime and the Declaration of Rights of 1789*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Védrine, Hubert (2000). *Les cartes de la France à l'heure de la mondialisation. Dialogue avec Dominique Moïsi*. Paris: Fayard.
- Vercors (1993). *Moi Aristide Briand. Essai d'autoportrait*. Paris: Éditions Complexe.
- Verschave, François-Xavier (1998). *La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République*. Paris: Stock.
- Verschave, François-Xavier (2000a). *France-Afrique: Le crime continue*. Lyon: Éditions Tahin Party.
- Verschave, François-Xavier (2000b). *Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique?* Paris: Éditions des Arènes.
- Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. (1990). *The World in Their Minds. Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Vidal, Gore (2002). *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be so Hated*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books.
- Villepin, Dominique de (2001). *Les Cent-Jours ou l'esprit de sacrifice*. Paris: Perrin.
- Viotti, Paul and Kauppi, Mark (1990). *International Relations Theory. Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

- Visby, Børge (1992). *Arveffjender. Tyskland og Frankrig efter Anden Verdenskrig*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- Volkan, Vamik D. (1985). The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach. *Political Psychology, Volume 6*.
- Volkan, Vamik D. (1988). *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*. Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Voltaire, François Marie A. de (1762). *Idées Republicaines par un member d'un corps*. Sine loco.
- Wagnleitner, Reinhold (1994). *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wahl, Nicholas (1990). *Aux Origines de la Nouvelle Constitution*. In: *Naissance de la Cinquième République. Analyse de la constitution par la Revue française de science politique en 1959*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Wailly, Henri de (2004). *Cette France qu'ils aiment haïr*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Wakeman, Rosemary (ed.) (2003). *Themes in Modern European History Since 1945*. London: Routledge.
- Walker, R.J.B. (ed.) (1984). *Culture, Ideology, and World Order*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wall, Irwin (1983). *French Communism in the Era of Stalin. The Quest for Unity and Integration, 1945-1962*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Wall, Irwin (1991). *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Walt, Stephen (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Walt, Stephen (1998). International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy, Issue 110, Spring 1998*.
- Walt, Stephen M. (2005). Taming American Power. *Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, Number 5*.
- Walter, Henriette (2001). *Honni soit qui mal y pense. L'incroyable histoire d'amour entre le français et l'anglais*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1959). *Man, the State and War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: Addison-Wesley.
- Waltz, Kenneth (1991). America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective. *PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, (4)*.
- Wauthier, Claude (1995). *Quatre Présidents et l'Afrique. De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand. Quarante ans de politique africaine*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Weber, Eugen (1979). *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1970-1914*. London: Chatto & Windus.

- Weber, Max ([1904-05] 1992). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London: Routledge.
- Weil, Patrick (2004). *Qu'est-ce qu'un Français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution*. Paris: Gallimard, Collection Folio Histoire.
- Wendt, Alexander (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992.
- Wendt, Alexander (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2, June 1994.
- Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, Donald W. (1996). *The American Century. The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- White, Dorothy Shipley (1979). *Black Africa and de Gaulle. From the French Empire to Independence*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Wiener, Philip P. (1973). *Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Volume 2*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Williams, Raymond (1983). *Keywords. A vocabulary of culture and society*. London: Fontana Paperbacks, Flamingo edition.
- Wilson, John F. and Drakeman, Donald L. (eds) (2003). *Church and State in American History. Key Documents, Decision, and Commentary from the Past Three Centuries*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wilson, Kevin and van der Dussen, Jan (eds) (1993). *The History of the Idea of Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Winock, Michel (1990). *Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Wiznitzer, Louis (1991). *Le grand gachis. Faillite de la politique étrangère de François Mitterrand*. Paris: First.
- Wolton, Dominique (2006). *Demain la francophonie*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Woodward, Bob (2004). *Plan of Attack*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- Yankelovich, Daniel (2005). Poll Positions. What Americans Really Think About U.S. Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 84, Number 5.
- Zakaria, Fareed (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1997. Reprinted in Foreign Affairs, Editors' Choice (2002). *America and the World. Debating the New Shape of International Politics*. New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book.
- Zakaria, Fareed (2001). Why Do They Hate Us? *Newsweek*, October 15, 2001.

- Zakaria, Fareed (2004). Americans Eat Cheese, Too. *Newsweek*, October 11, 2004.
- Zakaria, Fareed (2008). *The Post-American World*. London: Allen Lane.
- Zeldin, Theodore (1973). *A History of French Passions 1848-1945. Volume One: Ambition, Love and Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Zeldin, Theodore (1977). *A History of French Passions 1848-1945. Volume Two: Intellect, Taste and Anxiety*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Zeldin, Theodore (1983). *Les Français*. Paris: Fayard.
- Zevaco, Claudine, and de Saint Robert, Philippe, (1999). *Guide du français pour tous*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Zola, Émile ([1883] 1970). *Au Bonheur des Dames*. In *Les Rougon-Macquart. Histoire naturelle et sociale d'une famille sous le second Empire*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Zola, Émile ([1896-1901] 1969). *L'affaire Dreyfus. La vérité en marche*. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion.
- Zølner, Mette (2001). *Making Sense of Globalisation: French Narratives and Anti-Americanism*. Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France, *L'exception Française*, University of Portsmouth, 6-8 September 2001.
- Zukin, Sharon (1995). *The Cultures of Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Zunz, Olivier (1998). *Why the American Century?* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Zylberberg, Jacques (1995). Laïcité, connais pas: Allemagne, Canada, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni. *Pouvoirs. Revue Française d'Etudes Constitutionnelles et Politiques*, no. 75, November 1995.