# The Constitution of Meaning - A Meaningful Constitution?
## Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion in the debate on the future of Europe
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in the debate on the future of Europe

## PhD thesis by Sine Nørholm Just

## Copenhagen Working Papers in LSP

# THE CONSTITUTION OF MEANING
# - A MEANINGFUL CONSTITUTION?

# Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion in the debate on the future of Europe

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### PhD thesis

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*We shall not cease from exploration*
*And the end of all our exploring*
*Will be to arrive where we started*
*And know the place for the first time.*
- T. S. Eliot

As the explorative journey that is undertaken in and through the following pages approaches its final destination and the intellectual effort (hopefully) reaches full circle, it is appropriate to extend greetings and words of thanks to the host of fellow travellers, who have contributed to the development and completion of this project.

Lita Lundquist, my supervisor, has provided useful guidelines throughout the process, and she continuously ensured I was progressing according to plan. Mette Zølner and Lisa Storm Villadsen, my co-supervisors, have supplied detailed social scientific and rhetorical bearings. I am grateful for all the advice that my three guides have given me at crucial points of the journey.

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I spent the fall term of 2002 at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, Italy, and my stay there was personally and intellectually formative. Ideas and concepts, to which I was first introduced in Florence, saturate the following pages, and I am indebted to professors and researchers at the EUI for their willingness to share insights and discuss ideas.

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A special word of thanks goes to my friends and family for their patience and encouragement. The high expectations and unwavering trust of my parents are central motivating factors to me. Dad, I'm sorry there aren't any bullet points in the text – hope you like the figures, though.

Finally, I dedicate this work to Jawad, without whom all my explorations would be meaningless.

# 1.

# Introduction

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of June 2004 the political leaders of the 25 member states of the European Union (EU) agreed on a *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*. However, the agreement was reached in the shadow of a spectacular failure and was not presented as the triumph of European concord one might have expected. The process of creating a new foundational text for the EU should have been sealed when the leaders met in December of 2003, but on that occasion the assembled politicians could neither agree on the proposal that was on the table, nor could they reach a compromise or partial solution. All the heads of state and government could decide at the meeting in December 2003 was to spend the first quarter of 2004 probing how the pieces could be mended and to recommence the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the institutional arrangement for deciding on treaty changes, as soon as possible. As it turned out, the unsuccessful summit did not terminate the European constitutional process as such. Nevertheless, it halted nearly four years of perpetual, if sometimes almost imperceptible, movement towards refounding the EU by means of a single constitutional text.

Before the December summit a proposal for a fully-fledged constitution had been prepared by the so-called European Convention, a temporary institution consisting of national and European parliamentarians and representatives of the executives. During its working period from March 2002 to July 2003 the Convention took on more and more features of a constitutional assembly, and its final proposal establishes the EU as an independent polity[1] with a unique blend of intergovernmental and federal features. Before the 13<sup>th</sup> of December 2003 leading national and European politicians routinely called for an agreement that would alter the Convention's proposal as little as possible. After the Brussels summit political leaders by and large abandoned the lofty declarations of adherence in principle and settled down for the muddle of finding a passable compromise. The changes in the political leaders' communicative interaction with each other and with the various national and European publics that followed from the redirection of the constitutional process deserve to be studied in their own right.

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[1] The term polity is used here and in the following to denote the political field – the political institutions and the society they represent. The courses of action adopted and pursued within the polity are termed policies, and the task of creating these specific courses of action is policy-making, whereas politics refers to creating and maintaining the polity.

However, the present investigation deals with the European constitutional process before the fall; *it is one of the aims of this study to explain how the EU got to the point in which agreement on the constitutional treaty had come to be expected.* Through an examination of the early phases of what has become known as the debate on the future of Europe[2] I shall seek to explain how the process that began as any other round of treaty revisions was moved in the constitutional direction. Thus, one aim of the study is to understand how it became commonly accepted that the creation of a constitution was the goal of the reform process, but at the same time I shall suggest reasons why the actual decision on the constitutional text proved so difficult to reach. *I shall seek to explain why the constitutive momentum did not culminate in a univocal constitutional moment.*

One feature that marks the present round of reforms off from earlier treaty revisions is the very fact that the current reforms have been discussed in public. In contradistinction to earlier efforts the current reforms have been accompanied by a broad public debate. Moreover, European and national political leaders have actively sought to open up the reform process in which only members of the highest political echelon were formerly allowed to participate. The debate on the future of Europe is by and large a political initiative, an invitation to the peoples of Europe to participate in the discussion of what the EU should do and how it should be organised. Naturally, the discussion of such issues as how our societies should be organised and what role the EU should play in that organisation precedes the current round of treaty revisions. Nevertheless, the initiation of the debate on the future of Europe as this debate is now understood and conducted can be dated quite precisely.

On the 12th of May 2000 Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, delivered a speech entitled "From Confederacy to Federation – thoughts on the finality of European integration." In this speech Fischer synthesised and articulated a number of ideas that had been circulating and fermenting in European political and academic circles for quite some time, thus "blowing the lid off Europe's superstate agenda," as the British Conservatives phrased it. Expressed in more neutral terms, Fischer put the issues of the EU's end-goals and the possibility of expressing these in a written constitution on both the official political and broader public agendas of Europe. Thereby, he effectively framed the debate on the future of Europe, as it would henceforth develop.

The present project takes Fischer's speech as its starting point and follows the political and the public dimensions of the debate as it unfolded from May 2000 until December 2001, when

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[2] While some debators do recognise that the EU and Europe are not equivalent, many use the terms interchangeably.

the discussion was institutionalised through the creation of the aforementioned European Convention. Hence, it is the aim of the project to account for the temporal developments of the debate from its inception until its institutionalisation.

An equally important spatial dimension accompanies the temporal focus of the present study. Before the Convention was set down the public discussions of European reforms did not have a commonly accepted centre, but were instead conducted in a great number of disparate settings in which different expectations and priorities prevailed, wherefore 'the debate' actually consisted of a number of different discussions.[3] The specific contextual articulations may contribute to the same chorus, but each contribution is a unique variation of the general theme. Thus, an examination of the debate on the future of Europe must not only be attentive to the debate's temporal aspects, but also to how the debate was perceived and conducted in its various concrete contexts of articulation. The spaces to be studied in the following consist of a mix of national and European contexts. More specifically, the study includes British, Danish, French, German, and Spanish utterances – speeches by national political leaders and coverage by national newspapers – as well as intrinsically European ones – a statement by the Commission President and two Council declarations. National boundaries between the member states of the EU mark the most obvious lines of division between arenas of debate, but the national debates are not isolated from each other. The focus of this study is not the insular meaning formation of each national public sphere but the interrelations between the different contexts. In the broadest terms possible, then, *the aim of this project is to explain how the debate on the future of Europe is perceived and conducted in its distinct yet related spatio-temporal settings*.

The debate on the future of Europe is generated by and structured around a basic argument concerning the legitimating powers of public discussion. The argument runs as follows: the legitimacy of the European Union will be enhanced if the citizens come to identify themselves more with the European project and such identification may result from active participation in that project. Apart from the direct influence citizens obtain through voting, their participation in the European as well as any other democratic polity takes the principal form of public debate. The conclusion of the argument, therefore, is that an augmentation of European public debate will in itself enhance the legitimacy of the EU. And a further benefit, the argument continues, is that opening up the reform process to public participation facilitates the creation of a foundational treaty

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[3] Even when the Convention was established the discussions continued to develop in the fora and public spaces in which they had begun – the only difference being that there now was one common and consistent point of reference.

that is better attuned to the demands and expectations of the citizens and to which citizens will feel greater attachment. The combined claim, then, is that the process of European discussion is legitimating in itself and that it will produce a more legitimate EU. *The analysis of the debate on the future of Europe is meant to provide empirical grounding for a reasoned evaluation of the validity of this claim.*

In order to realise this purpose the three concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion with their corresponding processes of legitimation, identification, and public opinion formation are crucial. The project has an *empirical aim* of explaining how the three processes interrelate and become meaningful in the debate. Here, existing theoretical understandings of the processes will inform the analyses of particular utterances that take up central positions within the meaning formation of the debate as such. Furthermore, the project has a *theoretical ambition* that consists of investigating which general understanding of the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion corresponds best with the empirical reality of the debate. As Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner assert: "The creation of a European polity […] lays bare the limits of an approach to political philosophy that focuses on addressing general issues of relevance for all polities at all times and points to the need for politico-philosophically exploring a polity in its specificity, that is, its being in space and time" (Friese & Wagner, 2002, pp. 342-343). It is the ambition of the present project to relate current theoretical discussions of what constitutional order is proper for the EU with the analytical findings of the study of the European constitutive debate. *The final aim is to suggest a spatio-temporally sensitive theoretical foundation for the EU.*

The general purpose of this project, then, is to explain the debate on the future of Europe as it unfolds in a specific period of time and in a number of concrete contexts. The overall intent is to identify differences and commonalities in the opinion formation as it occurs in its various contexts. The temporal aspect of the investigation implies a focus on collective developments; it is here that the common movement towards a constitutional text will be explored. The spatial aspect highlights the differences between various settings, and it is through examination of these differences that I hope to explain the failure to create a common European constitutional moment.

Within the general purpose of explaining the meaning formation of the debate a special emphasis is placed upon the conceptually established relationship between legitimacy, identity and public opinion. Theoretical understandings of the mutually constitutive dynamics between the three processes of legitimation, identification and public opinion formation inform the

investigation of the debate. The guiding question, then, is *how the interdependent processes of legitimation, identification and public opinion formation constitute and are constituted in and through specific spatio-temporal instantiations of the complex and diversified network of communication that is the debate on the future of Europe*. The analytical findings, in turn, will be used to nuance and strengthen the theoretical understanding of and constitutional recommendations for the EU.

## 1.1. Theoretical perspective and analytical approach

The present study focuses on the European debate as a constitutive process, and seeks to understand the dynamics of this process in order to explain the meaning that it creates. But the idea of the constitution as a product understood empirically as the new treaty and theoretically as whether a constitutional treaty is indeed desirable and feasible for a polity such as the EU is never far away. Hence, the term constitution in its various senses – as the process by which a specific utterance or an entire community becomes meaningful and as the textual product on which communities are based – is of central importance to the investigation. In fact it is so central that I shall propose the term constitutionism as a general label for the perspective that informs my research. The details and implications of the constitutionist perspective will be unfolded in the following; at present it suffices to say that the perspective finds its main sources of inspiration in rhetorical theories of meaning formation. Here, José Luis Ramírez' reinterpretation of Aristotle is of particular importance, but generally speaking the constitutionist position begins from the basic rhetorical insight that no articulation of meaning can be detached from its temporal and spatial circumstances. Meaning – whether understood as the rhetor's utterance or the audience's reception – is always conditioned by the space and time of its creation.

Furthermore, the constitutionist perspective has much in common with Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, and Habermas is an influential figure throughout this project. Habermas offers extensive discussions of the concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion as well as the relationship between them, and he has applied the theoretical understanding of the concepts and their import on the constitution of society to the context of the EU. At every turn of this project it is pertinent to compare and contrast my position with that of Habermas, and there is a debt to be acknowledged even where Habermas' views are not explicitly foregrounded. By incorporating the Habermasian perspective as well as other legal and social scientific scholars' conceptualisations of the European polity the project takes a decisive interdisciplinary turn. The

process of European integration is closely interconnected with legal and social scientific investigations of it, wherefore insights from these scholarly fields inform the rhetorical study, but it will also be argued that investigations in the rhetorical mode offer unique insights that may improve the understanding of European phenomena.

As mentioned above, issues of space and time are central to my investigation of the debate on the future of Europe; the rhetorical understanding of the particularity of meaning by which the constitutionist position is guided means emphasis is placed on the here and now of each particular utterance. The creation of meaning depends as much on the contexts in which texts[4] are produced as on the situations in which they are received, but the present study neither investigates the meanings as intended by the rhetors themselves nor as perceived by the audiences. Instead, the study is purely textual, and although it deals with intertextual relations it has no recourse to an extra-textual universe. The meanings and the opportunities for identification and further action – communicative or otherwise – are studied as they appear in the texts. The sheer textuality of my investigation of the debate on the future of Europe poses an important dilemma. As there is no way of knowing how the audiences actually responded, nor whether that response was intended by the rhetor, how can I ensure that the phenomenon I am studying is not in fact my own formation of meaning? When conducting textual criticism there is always a sense in which the critic is in risk of studying her own reception of the text and not much else.

In the case of the present study two precautions have been taken to avoid the danger of simply reproducing my personal understanding of the studied texts. First, the study is primarily a formal one; it deals with argumentative strategies, tropes, figures, and other formal features as they actually appear in the texts. However, in making the appeal to formality it should immediately be noted that a text's formal and substantial features cannot and should not be separated from each other, and that these interconnected features in turn reach beyond the limits of the individual utterance.[5] The rhetor's formal choices as well as his or her more substantial decisions on which issues to address, what arguments to pursue, and which positions to ignore bear the mark of the situation in which the utterance was created. As such the text is a trace of its original context, and

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[4] I use 'text' and 'utterance' interchangeably as general terms for a single communicative entity or what Mikhael Bakhtin calls a "unit of speech communication," that is, a statement – whether of one word or a thousand pages – that elicits response thereby causing a "change of speaking subjects" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 71).

[5] In the words of Michael Leff "…the two [form or style and content or argument] blend together within the unfolding development of a discourse, a development that simultaneously holds the discourse together and holds it out as a way of influencing the world in which it appears. Form, then, plays a decisive role in rhetorical discourse, but only as it promotes the function of the discourse, as it acts to produce an effect [on] auditors and to do some work in the social world" (Leff, 1992, p. 226).

the textual analysis may reveal much about both the formal and substantial expectations by which the rhetor was constrained at the moment of production. The second precaution is that I do not study a single text in its exclusivity, but instead look at a debate, a series of interrelated interventions that comment on and respond to each other. I have selected six political speeches, two official EU declarations, and newspaper coverage of these eight utterances as the material to be analysed; the selected texts offer insight into decisive moments of the debate as these were conceived in the different contexts. The study of various utterances and their intertextual relations allows insight into the dynamic processes of the debate and thus facilitates a textual criticism that explains the discussants' meaning formation on its own terms.

These precautions do away with the charge of solipsism on the part of the critic, but do not rule out the possibility that both speakers and audiences could take other views than those offered and fail to act as recommended. Moreover, the investigation is subject to a lingering charge of elitism that is, however, a result of the chosen data, not of the approach as such. I study the debate on Europe as conducted in a communicative network in which politicians, academics and journalists are situated as the primary participants, not the sense which citizens make of this debate in their personal communications. Thus, the study may not deal with physical actions or private thoughts, but it investigates the ways in which it is possible to speak about Europe in public. The analysis of the selected data explains how the debate was presented to the citizens, thereby pointing out the ways in which citizens' participation in the discussion on Europe and in the European project as such are restricted and facilitated.

By coming to understand how recommended positions and actions are constituted in the debate, it becomes possible to hold the speakers to their words and, alternatively, to suggest ways of speaking that would allow other positions and actions to become meaningful. Whereas the principal aim of this study is not a normative one in the sense of recommending concrete ways in which the existing public debate on Europe may be improved, I shall as part of the theoretical discussion suggest how the citizens' interests are best served.

**1.2. Partitio**

The investigation of how meaning is constituted in the debate on the future of Europe is informed by the three above-mentioned concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion as well as by a number of analytical tools that all aim at explaining textual-intertextual meaning formation in its spatio-temporality. The study proceeds as follows: first the debate on the future of Europe will be presented and information about the workings of the EU that is pertinent to the present situation will be given. Then I shall provide an overview of existing research that deals with public debate in the context of the EU. This overview will result in a first presentation of my constitutionist and rhetorical position, thereby making a basic distinction between the present study and other investigations of the field.

The next main section is the theoretical one; in this chapter the rhetorical perspective will first be unfolded and then the concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion will be presented. The concepts will first be discussed in the context of the EU; various theoretical notions of the proper European institutionalisation of the concepts will be presented in order to facilitate the eventual analytical evaluation of their adequacy. Secondly, the concepts will be linked to the rhetorical perspective, whereby they become procedural and thus may inform the analyses. In order to reach an evaluation of the theories it is necessary to explore how processes of legitimation, identification, and public opinion formation are constituted and interrelated in the debate. When the concrete processes have been explained it can be ascertained which general model is best suited for the European polity.

The theoretical section is followed by the analytical endeavour. The analysis is divided into two main rounds and is preceded by a thorough introduction of the material to be analysed. Although the ambition of this study is to make pronouncements on the meaning formation of the debate in general, the study remains strictly textual, securely grounded in but also limited by the actual utterances that have been singled out for analysis. When I reach the analytical parts of the study, I shall have much more to say about the selected texts and the procedures of selection. However, before embarking on the various explanatory tasks that will prepare the way for the analyses, I wish to state clearly that the empirical material consists of six political speeches, two Council declarations and newspaper coverage of these eight texts stemming from five national contexts. The material is organised spatio-temporally so that the two declarations mark major transitions or turning points in the debate and each speech both represents a specific context – typically a unique combination of national and transnational features – and a moment in the flow of

discussions between the two turning points. The newspaper coverage displays purely national characteristics, but also convergence between the different settings. Thus, the selected set of texts is well suited for studying the intricate spatio-temporal relationships that constitute the debate on the future of Europe as a meaningful communicative process. Having made this preliminary introduction of the texts that will eventually be analysed I now turn to the task of introducing the European reform process and the existing studies of European debate.

# 2.

# European debate and the study thereof

In this chapter I shall first present information about the EU and its developments that provides the background for the study of the debate on the future of Europe. Second, I shall present already existing research on European debate in order to situate my investigation in the context of these studies. The aim is both to show the connections between my approach and that of other scholars with interests similar to mine, and to establish an important difference between the basic orientation of the present study and the starting point of most of the related investigations.

## 2.1. How the EU functions and is reformed

Discussions of visions for the future and their possible realisation in institutional arrangements have been important driving forces in the development of the European project from the establishment of the Coal and Steel Union to the present attempt to endow the European Union with a constitutional treaty. And in a broader sense debates on the future of Europe have always been integral to the conceptualisation of the continent. The questions around which European history has evolved since the concept of Europe was invented concern what Europe is and how this European identity should be realised in cultural, economic and political terms (Pagden, 2002, p. 33). Throughout its history Europe has witnessed grand intellectual unifying efforts as well as brute attempts to unite the continent by arms. It was not until the nation-states were consolidated in the 18th and 19th centuries that European division and the sovereignty of the nation-state came to be seen as the general norm.[1] However, the lack of stable borderlines does not mean a harmonious European unity existed. It is a general historical condition that "the discourse of Europe is ambivalent in that it is not always about unity and inclusion, but is also about exclusion and the construction of difference based on norms of exclusion" (Delanty, 1995, p. 1).

The European project of integration that was begun in the aftermath of the Second World War and is today embedded in the treaties and institutions of the European Union was from its inception guided by the norm of national sovereignty.  And – hearkening to the original

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[1] The understanding of the Europe of nations was, however, prefigured in the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, and it was in turn contested by the fascist and communist ideologies of the 20th century.

formulation of the Treaty of Rome's Preamble – the process of integration is still directed towards "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." In the fifty years of institutionalised European integration discussions of the European community's identity and further developments have focused on the relationship between the European and the national levels of governance and authority (Ruttley, 2002, p. 228).

Important as it is for understanding the background of the current discussions, this project does not deal with the debate on the future of Europe in the general and long-term sense sketched out above. Instead, I focus on the process of European reform that was begun around the year 2000 and still has not found its conclusion.[2] The specific aim of this process is the creation of a new foundational treaty for the EU, but embedded within the process are broader issues of European identity, the general purpose of European integration, and the citizens' support for and participation in the European project.

Understanding the debate on the future of Europe in the restricted sense not only requires an awareness of the broader issues involved, it is also premised upon some foreknowledge of the EU's current institutional structure and of the stipulated process for revision of the EU's foundational treaties. In the following I shall provide a brief overview of previous treaty revisions, and I will then introduce the EU institutions and the formal procedures of European reform.

European treaty revisions are usually linked to institutional reform; they aim at changing the mode of decision-making within the different European institutions or altering the relationship between these institutions, between the member states, or between the member states and the EU institutions. Such shifts in the institutional balance and the procedures for decision-making were the main results of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (McCormick, 2002, p. 79 and p. 82). But the reforms may also focus on endowing the European institutions with new authority. This was the case with the creation of the biggest single market in the world through the Single European Act from 1986, and with the Maastricht Treaty's establishment of the European Union in 1992 (McCormick, 2002, p. 75 and p. 78). In both these cases the Community – and the Union in the latter case – were granted powers to make decisions and take actions that had previously rested exclusively with the individual member states. Or, to use the jargon employed within the EU institutions, European co-operation passed from the intergovernmental to the supranational mode,

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[2] It should be noted that the most recent round of enlargement, which was concluded on the 1st of May 2004 when ten new members entered the Union, has been a very important parallel to the process of treaty revision. I only deal with enlargement as it was presented by the participants in the debate on the future of Europe and do not discuss the enlargement process in its own right.

meaning that a transfer of sovereignty had occurred and that the individual member states were no longer able to veto decisions in the affected policy areas (McCormick, 2002, pp. 5-6).

The more recent treaty revisions have been sparked by the belief – widely held in both academic and political circles – that the EU institutions, which were conceived for the Community with its six original member, are not optimal for the Union of 15 and will be paralysed by further enlargement. The trouble is that the existing methods for decision-making become increasingly complex and opaque as the Union enlarges and that reaching agreement becomes correspondingly more difficult (Wallace, 1993).

The EU institutions have been modified over the years, and new bodies have been added, but the basic structure has not changed since the community's inception. At present the EU's institutional framework consists of five primary entities[3]: first, there is the Council of Ministers which is in fact a number of technical councils divided according to policy areas. Here the member states' ministers (say, finance or fisheries, environment or education) meet to make the final decisions on policies proposed in their respective areas of competence. Second, the European Council consists of the member states' heads of government, the foreign ministers, and the president and vice-president of the Commission. The European Council is an intergovernmental institution in which the leaders of the member states meet as masters of the treaties and discuss general issues of the EU's current agenda and further developments. Third, the Commission, consisting of nationally appointed, but supranationally charged Commissioners, is the guardian of the treaties and promoter of common European interests. Fourth, the European Parliament (EP) is the EU's directly elected legislative assembly, but the European electorate is divided into national entities and the EP has limited functions and powers. EU laws and policies are passed by these four institutions in combination, the European Council only stepping in when the normal decision-making process, which involves the three other institutions, has become deadlocked. The fifth and final general institution is the Court of Justice, whose role is to clarify the decisions reached by the other institutions through rulings in specific cases.

The EU institutions are perched against each other in a precarious power-balance, and this rather complex decision-making procedure has become even more difficult to understand and to operate with the introduction of the so-called pillar system that divides European policy-making

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[3] There are a number of more specialised institutions such as the European Central Bank or the Court of Auditors. Furthermore, there are various agencies divided into policy areas (e.g. the European Environmental Agency) and a number of committees of which the most important is the Committee of Permanent Representatives that acts as a link between the Brussels-based institutions and the member states. Most member states also have national institutions – in some cases ministries – devoted to the scrutiny of and participation in European affairs.

into three groups with different modes of operation.[4] Further complications arise from the fact that each new treaty has not replaced the already existing foundational texts. Instead the treaties have been placed alongside each other so that eight compilations of primary rules are now in function. These eight treaties lay out a number of specific modes of decision-making, wherefore the EU's secondary rules or day-to-day decisions may take different forms ranging from law-like regulations to opinions with no binding force. The total of primary and secondary laws and policies as well as the rulings of the European Court of Justice is known as the *acquis communitaire*, and it is generally agreed that it now surmounts 80,000 pages. Understanding the exact procedures and the specific variations is not central to the present project, and knowledge of the totality of the *acquis* is of even less relevance.[5] What is important, however, is to note that as masters of the treaties the national heads of state and government meeting in the European Council have the sole authority to make treaty revisions.

Treaty revisions are prepared by so-called Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that are convened at the behest of the European Council supported by the Commission and the EP. The final agreement on a new treaty must be reached at a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States held in connection with a European Council summit, but intense preparations led by the country currently holding the rotating Council presidency[6] precede the decisive meeting. In advance of the summit the presidency attempts to create a draft treaty to which all member states can agree, but the final details of the new treaty are traditionally settled in an ordeal of give and take as each of the national leaders defends his or her country's interests. These last-minute bargains may have decisive effects on the resulting treaty, as they concern highly contested issues that are of great importance to some or all of the member states. More than once the leaders have been forced to postpone decisions on the most divisive issues in order to reach a

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[4] Or put more precisely, the first pillar works through the community method – the combination of intergovernmental and supranational elements that is peculiar to European decision-making – whereas the second (common foreign and security policy) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars are purely intergovernmental.

[5] But see the EU's official internet portal (www.europa.eu.int) and McCormick (2002), the sources on which the preceding account primarily relies, for more detailed explanations. As for the *acquis*, it is doubtful whether anyone would even attempt to gain insight into the full extent of it.

[6] The member states take turns at holding the Council presidency. Each presidency lasts six months during which period the presiding country is largely responsible for setting the EU's agenda and is responsible for preparing and chairing the Council of Ministers' meetings as well as the European Council summits. The presiding country mediates between the member states and between the member states and the EU institutions, and it represents the EU in matters of foreign policy.

decision at all. The creation of such 'leftovers' – infamously begun at Amsterdam[7] – and the necessity to deal with them as part of the preparations for the most recent round of enlargement partially explain the relatively frequent treaty revisions of later years. The development towards more and more frequent revisions seemingly culminated with the agreement on the Nice Treaty, which was only reached on the provision that a new reform process was immediately begun.[8]

## 2.2. Existing studies of European public debate

With the account of the formal provisions for and the dominant practices of treaty revisions the necessary background information on the EU and its workings has been provided. I now turn to the presentation of a background of a different type, namely, the already existing academic studies of debate in and about the EU.

Research of this type usually focuses on the issue of public opinion formation, or more specifically, on public opinion, the public sphere, and public opinion formation. A slightly different angle is, however, provided by Philip Schlesinger, who emphasises the importance of the EU's cultural and media policies and focuses on the relationship between the contents of these policies and citizens' feelings of allegiance and belonging (see Schlesinger, 1987 and 1991). Moreover, Christoph Meyer has, in a study of the EU's communication deficit (Meyer, 1999), investigated the role of the European institutions in creating this deficit and their chance of ameliorating it, a concern that is also at the core of Schlesinger's discussion of EU policy and practice. Both Schlesinger and Meyer have much in common with scholars, who focus on the public opinion formation; most significantly, they share an interest in the relationship between collective identity and public communication. Yet there is an important difference between Schlesinger and Meyer's approaches and most other studies of public opinion formation. Other studies focus on public communication in a broad sense and understand mass mediated public opinion formation as existing beyond the grasp of policy makers, be they national or European. Schlesinger and Meyer, in the studies cited here, emphasise the possibility of changing existing communication patterns

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[7] At Amsterdam the leaders failed to reach decisions on three issues: the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of each member state's vote in the Council, and the areas in which the Council was to take decision by qualified majority voting rather than by consensus. There is general agreement on the presentation of these issues in the literature, but see for instance Yataganas (2001) for a thorough review of each of them and an account of the attempt to deal with them that led to the creation of the Treaty of Nice. Of particular interest is the fact that all three issues remain troublesome – perhaps have become even more problematic – even after an entire IGC has been devoted to their resolution.
[8] The "Declaration on the future of the Union," the statement initiating a new round of revisions that was appended to the Treaty, is central to the debate on the future of Europe, and it forms part of the textual material that will be analysed in the following.

through policy.[9] In the following I focus on studies of public communication in the general sense as these are closer related to the investigation I will be conducting than are the studies of the EU's media and communication policies.

Studies of public opinion are dominated by quantitative analyses of data collected in the Eurobarometer[10] and other extensive surveys. The quantitative studies of public opinion seek correlations between peoples' views and background variables such as nationality, age, gender, and education, but they do not study the processes by which the different groups come to hold their opinions. Illuminating as they may be (for a particularly interesting example see Niedermayer and Sinnott (eds.), 1995), quantitative studies of public opinion have research agendas that are very different from the purpose of the present project. Quantitative studies see public opinion as an already existing entity that is to be discovered; I see public opinion as the always momentary result of continuous processes of public opinion formation and seek to explain how these processes work. Hence, I shall not consider the studies of public opinion further, but instead turn my attention to research that shares my emphasis on the dynamic processes of public opinion formation.

The questions of whether a European public sphere exists, has ever existed or is likely to come into existence have received a great deal of attention recently. The reason for the upsurge of interest in this matter is that a European public sphere is deemed to be necessary for the enhancement of the EU's democratic legitimacy. The issue of the existence of a European public sphere is studied in a variety of different ways. One starting point is the theoretical and/or normative enumeration and explanation of conditions that are necessary for a public sphere to arise. Following Jürgen Habermas' path-breaking study of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1989) such conditions may be established generally or they may be studied in their European specificity. Studies of the conditions that enable a specifically European public sphere take two different directions. The investigations are either historical as exemplified by Hartmut Kaelble's (2002) review of the features that have enabled European-wide public debate at different moments in time. Or they turn to investigating how the specific values and tasks of the EU could be expressed in public communication, as in Damian Chalmers' and Carlos Closa's studies of the potentials of European deliberative governance (Chalmers, 2003) and European citizenship (Closa, 2001).

Empirical investigations of the European public sphere's possible existence are

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[9] It should be noted that Schlesinger has also done research that fuses the study of EU policy with broader investigations of the European public sphere (Schlesinger, 1999; Schlesinger & Kevin, 2000).
[10] The Eurobarometer is the EU's official opinion poll; for further information, see its website: www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.

complicated somewhat by the unsettled issue of what features constitute that public sphere, but a number of researchers have found ways around these complications. Empirical investigations are usually facilitated through a simplification of the matters at hand; the empirically inclined researcher looks for actual evidence of European-wide public discussions or of public discussions of European matters rather than for indications that the general conditions of the public sphere are fulfilled. The Europeanisation of public communication, for which the empirical studies seek evidence, may be understood in a strong and a weaker sense. In the strong sense, a transnational and independent European public sphere is created. In the weak sense, existing national public spheres focus increasingly on European issues and do so in a manner consistent with the discussion of the same matters conducted in other national fora (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, pp. 2-3).

Recognising that the strong form of Europeanisation is highly demanding and quite unlikely to arise, given that most means of public communication remain nationally bound, empirical studies usually focus on the Europeanisation of national public spheres and are often comparative. They investigate the media landscapes of various European countries and assess their differences and similarities using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, one may count how often European issues are mentioned in the media and compare these numbers with the coverage of national, regional, and local issues. Such quantitative studies tend to result in a negative evaluation of the European public sphere, since European issues are consistently shown to hold low salience (Gerhards, 2000, Porta (ed.), 2003). Interestingly, qualitative studies usually reach the opposite conclusion, since investigations of how European issues are reported in national media show that the same meaning structures are used in different national contexts (Eder & Kantner, 2000, Trenz, 2000, Risse & Maier (eds.), 2003).

The combined results of the quantitative and qualitative empirical investigations of the European public sphere are that European issues generally receive less attention than national and local subjects, but when the national media do report on European matters they all do so in more or less the same manner. The conclusion is that we are witnessing the emergence of not one, but a plurality of European public spheres. There is no overarching and coherent European communicative network, but the general national spheres converge when European issues are given attention, and the emergence of issue-specific and specialised public spheres that cut across national publics is a developing trend to be noted. The conclusions of empirical studies are sometimes united with the theoretically established prerequisites for the existence of a European public sphere leading to the creation of empirically sensitive general requirements. Three such requirements stand out: a

high degree of salience of European issues, similar meaning structures across national public spheres, and mutual awareness that the issues being discussed in one sphere are also on the agenda elsewhere (Risse & Van de Steeg, 2003, p. 16).

Studies of emergent European public spheres go deeper into the actual debate than do the purely quantitative surveys of public opinion. Yet even the most qualitatively oriented studies of the meaning structures used in national representations of EU issues emphasise general tendencies at the expense of detailed analyses of individual utterances. Such close textual analysis is only found in research that focuses on the processes of opinion formation about European matters. This type of research typically deals with discussions of a specific issue, concentrates on the debate in one or a few countries, and analyses a limited number of texts. One important group of studies aims at locating expressions of national identity in the texts under study, sometimes focusing on one nationality, sometimes including a comparative aspect (research of this type abounds; representative examples include Anderson & Weymouth, 1999, Marcussen et al., 1999, Risse et al., 1999, Wodak et al., 1999, and Le, 2002). Another group of studies concentrates the investigation at the supranational level and seeks to identify a particularly European mode of opinion formation (this approach is less common, but perhaps gaining influence; see Abèlé, 2000, Hellström, 2002, and Herrmann, Risse & Brewer (eds.), 2004 for examples of this type of work). There are, however, significant overlaps between these two groups of research, as it appears that Europe has become an important element in the construction of distinct national identities and that national variation remains intrinsic to the articulation of European opinions. Processes of national and European opinion and identity formation are deeply interwoven and studies of these processes must take account of their mutual interdependence (Risse, 2001).

### 2.2.1. Demarcation from (social) constructionism and (critical) discourse analysis

The investigation of the debate on the future of Europe that I shall conduct in the following seeks to balance the European and the national perspectives and has much in common with the in-depth investigations of European public opinion formation mentioned above. Like the authors of these studies I seek detailed explanations of how public opinions are created in particular circumstances and through specific utterances. Furthermore, we share a basic interest in the relationship between public opinion formation and the creation of collective identities. However, all of the mentioned studies explicitly position themselves as constructionist and/or discourse analytical, two interrelated approaches to which my own perspective is closely connected, but from which I also wish to

distinguish myself. The relationship between my analytical endeavour and the aims of the constructionist and discourse analytical investigations of European meaning formation can best be illustrated through a consideration of Gilbert Weiss' study of "speculative talk on Europe" (Weiss, 2002).

Weiss' article is probably the published piece of research that my project resembles the most both in terms of the studied material and the objectives of the study. Weiss investigates French and German political speeches as a means of casting light on the questions of the identity and legitimacy of Europe. He explores the speeches along a space-time and an idea-organisation axis concluding that French speakers primarily establish Europe in temporal and ideational terms whereas Germans conceive it as a spatial and organisational entity. Weiss seeks to locate the dominant strategies of meaning formation of the texts under study and to explain how these strategies are employed in the conception of a European political society. These are also central concerns of the investigation I undertake, and in this sense my study can be viewed as an extension of Weiss' that includes a larger number of national contexts as well as more texts of various genres. However, I do not only aim at extending the existing study, but also to deepen its conclusions.

I believe that the choice of a rhetorical rather than a discourse analytical approach allows me to reach a more thorough and detailed explanation of the processes of meaning formation than Weiss provides. While Weiss' goal is to locate discursive patterns and establish separate German and French types of discourse, my main interest is not to set up general categories. Instead I aim at explaining each utterance both as an articulation of meaning in its own right and as a contribution to the European debate. Where Weiss mainly seeks to compartmentalise the speeches he studies, my predominant aim is to provide insight into the complex interrelationships between them. Where Weiss seeks differences and order, I look for interdependence and nuances.

These diverging objectives are not caused by a simple difference in analytical emphasis, but rather are consequences of the overall assumptions that condition our respective approaches: where Weiss understands meaning formation as a construction, I prefer to perceive it as a constitutive process. In the following, I shall first discuss the limitations of social constructionism and discourse analysis, and then I shall introduce the constitutionist alternative that I advocate. A more detailed explanation of the constitutionist approach and its analytical consequences will be offered as I turn to the presentation of the theoretical framework and rhetorical perspective that sustains and guides my investigations.

Both (social) constructionism[11] and discourse analysis are broad terms with a variety of different interpretations and uses. Generally speaking, social constructionism presents an alternative to the positivist theory of knowledge with its ideal of scientific objectivity (Gergen, 2001, p. 7). The common starting point for constructionists of all hues is the notion that our understanding of the world cannot be separated from the contexts and processes in and through which we perceive it. Or, to paraphrase the title of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's groundbreaking work, reality is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Constructionists take for granted that the human understanding of the world is never given and focus attention on the process of its construction, but it remains a matter of dispute what consequences this common starting point and emphasis should have for research. Discourse analysis offers one prominent answer to the latter question, holding that common understandings and general opinions of a group or society are the results of discursive interactions within that society and may be studied and explained as such (see e.g. van Dijk (ed.), 1997). Thus, one can be a constructionist without being a discourse analyst, but the reverse is highly unlikely.[12]

The social constructionists' common focus on how the human conception of reality is formed has led critics of the approach to charge it with idealism and relativism (Parker, 1998, pp. 1-2). As regards the first charge, indeed some (extravagantly radical) members of the constructionist field may deny the independent existence of reality, although it is not at all clear what such denial entails.[13] However, it is much more common for constructionists to distinguish between social and physical reality. The existence of physical reality (bodily illnesses for instance) is not questioned, but the human perception of it is (the feeling 'ill' and the processes by which a certain disease, its

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[11] The term constructivism is also found in the literature, but constructionism is often preferred in order to indicate a difference from the constructivist approaches to cognitive processes as forwarded by the likes of Vygotski and Piaget (Burr, 1995, p. 2). However, the two positions remain closely related and share the fundamental presupposition that social relations influence the individual's understanding and knowledge of the world in which he or she lives (Gergen, 2001, pp. 123-124).

[12] The field of discourse analysis is, however, so broad and the use of the term so varied that it is not impossible that there is someone out there claiming to do discourse analysis from an objectivist position. Nevertheless, I would argue that any non-constructionist use of the discourse analytical label would be hard pressed to justify itself. Moreover, I am not aware of any scholarship that defends such usage, at least not when by 'discourse analysis' one means the study of phenomena existing above the level of the individual text.

[13] The most radical constructionist positions are often associated with postmodernist thinkers such as Jean Baudrillard. To my mind, however, the Baudrillardian claim that everything is a simulacrum is as staunch a truth claim as is the opposite assertion that everything is real (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 139). That is, taken to its extreme the constructionist position becomes the evil twin of positivism, not a viable alternative to it.

cause, and cure are discovered).[14] Furthermore, some phenomena belong exclusively to the realm of social reality (the broad categories of cultural practices and political institutions spring to mind), and although they do have physical manifestations (museums and parliaments, say) they can be studied as social constructs without remainder. In this sense, social phenomena gain their very reality precisely because they are constructed, and even when there is a 'material base' to the processes of social construction, the study of these processes is valid and worthwhile in its own right. The charge of idealism, then, can be overcome by pointing out that social construction is a very real and very central element of the human world.

The charge of relativism, as I see it, is potentially more damaging to the constructionist position. Constructionists contend, and rightly so, that such phenomena as social norms and political practices are conditioned by the circumstances in which they arise, take on various shapes in different contexts, and can be altered within the specific contexts in which they arise. However, the sensitivity to the dynamic and contextual character of (social) knowledge may lead to either a naive cherishing of all norms and practices as being right and good in their proper contexts or a constant suspicion that no society is ever good enough.

Multiculturalism, a popular approach to intercultural encounters in the face of the plurality of norms and values, provides an apt example of the first constructionist option and its limitations.[15] Zygmunt Bauman presents the problem pointedly:

> …the invocation of 'multiculturalism' when made by the learned classes […] means: *Sorry, we cannot bail you out of the mess you are in*. Yes, there is confusion about values, about the meaning of 'being human', about the right ways of living together; but it is up to you to sort it out in your own fashion and bear the consequences in the event that you are not happy with the results. Yes, there is a cacophony of voices and no tune is likely to be sung in unison, but do not worry: no tune is necessarily better than the next, and if it were there wouldn't at any rate be a way of knowing it (Bauman, 2001, p. 124).

Thus, the constructionist position may lead to a relativistic disengagement based on the claim that no one is able to understand norms and practices that originate in contexts other than their own. The idea is that even though a certain practice may look utterly despicable from my place of perception, it may be perfectly acceptable in someone else's context, and I am in no position to know. This sort of relativism not only disallows engagement and learning between differently situated individuals,

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[14] To illustrate this point further it may be noted that the great majority of constructionists would concede that the earth has a certain shape independently of the form we attribute to it, but they do not think it possible to determine that shape independently of the processes of determination. Opining that the resulting beliefs all too often obliterate the processes by which they come about, constructionist researchers seek to draw attention to and explain these processes as such.

[15] For a more thorough presentation and critique of multiculturalism see Just (forthcoming).

but also has the slightly ironic twist of making each position anything but relative to its occupants. If I am not able to come to an understanding of any other positions than my own, how am I to learn that some of my current practices and beliefs may be less than perfect, and how am I going to be able to change them? If learning from others is not possible how can one learn at all?

The second possible constructionist take on relativism seeks to avoid the weaknesses of the first by focusing on the shortcomings of existing situations and emphasising how things could be different. Many modes of discourse analysis and particularly the influential approach known as critical discourse analysis (CDA) exemplify this suspicious constructionism. CDA takes its starting point from the insight that "…discourse is socially *constitutive* as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people" (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). In studying the relationship between discursive action and social structures (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 9), CDA tends to focus on the dark side of discourse. The purpose is to highlight discursive features that usually pass unnoticed but contribute significantly to the creation of social reality.

A specific emphasis is placed on the power relations embedded in predominant and commonly accepted discourses: discriminations that generally shared presuppositions uphold, discursive patterns and standard expressions that favour certain groups or obliterate possible alternative positions (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, pp. 4-6). Thus, CDA operates on the suspicion that something is always rotten; for instance, New Labour's talk of reforming the welfare system and enhancing social inclusion by creating more job opportunities is revealed to be nothing but a new form of exclusion and oppression (Fairclough, 2000). The aim of CDA, most unambiguously in Norman Fairclough's version of it, is to explain the relationship between discursive and social practices in order to allow people to change their discursive practices in directions that will emancipate them socially (Fairclough, 1992, esp. chap. 7).

CDA seeks to avoid the constructionist trap of relativism by focusing on the relationship between discourse and society and emphasising how discourses may hide or even excuse social injustices. Thereby, CDA becomes able to pass critical judgement on current situations and to create possibilities for change, but it is my contention that CDA obtains its critical privileges at the expense of its fundamental insight about the social constitutiveness of discourse. In order to perform its critique CDA must operate with a notion of what is 'really' going on behind the discourse and grant itself a privileged position; the notion is that 'these people may think they are perfectly happy, but we know better, and their discourse reveals their subjugation.' But if the

contention that social reality is discursively constituted is to be taken seriously, one should also be willing to take the full consequences of that claim. There is nothing behind the discursive constitution of the social, there is no recourse to a truer understanding of the situation with which the predominant discursive constructions can be compared, and there is no way of generating change except with the available discursive means. In its attempt to avoid the charges of relativity and to endow its normative position with critical bite, CDA tends to disregard the theoretical foundation in the constitutive nature of discourse that in my opinion is its greatest asset.

I believe that the relativist weaknesses of the constructionist stance can be avoided without hampering the basic insight that human understanding is a contextually bound social and communicative process from which there is no escape. We are beings of space and time; always facing each other and the world in the concrete here and now, but while the context limits our actions it is also what enables us to act. Without limitations there would be no possibilities; human action is facilitated by the prior existence of structures and frameworks, norms and expectations that give us guidance on what to do and how to do it. On the one hand, it is only by means of our preceding understanding that we can make sense of the specific situations in which action must be taken, but rendering a situation meaningful is, on the other hand, a truly creative act from which new opportunities may spring. Social realities are continually constituted by the sense people make of them, and the processes of meaning formation are in turn constituted by structures and expectations that exist prior to the specific interaction. Social constitution contains its own dynamic whereby change becomes possible as a consequence of existing understandings. Our situatedness is what allows us to move beyond existing horizons.

The reflection on the interdependence of limits and possibilities for the creation of social reality provides the starting point for an alternative to constructionism that I propose to label constitutionism (Just & Noergaard, 2004). This term has a decidedly Habermasian flavour; acknowledging his debt to Kant, Jürgen Habermas defines constitutionism as the primordial entwinement of knowledge, thought, and reality. Says Habermas: "[the human race is] a species that reproduces itself under cultural conditions, that is *that constitutes itself* in a self-formative process" (Habermas, 1972, p. 195). The shift from constructionism to Habermasian constitutionism is also a move from the language of discourse analysis to that of discourse ethics with its emphasis on

communicative action and intersubjective understanding.[16] The constitutionist position is based on the claim that the world and our being in it only become meaningful through processes of communicative interaction. Furthermore, constitutionism focuses on the continual production and reproduction of meaning based on guidelines and norms that exist prior to any given interaction, but are only articulated in concrete communications.

Continual meaning formation is the process that constitutes our social reality; such meaning formation is, of course, connected to phenomena that are not purely communicative, but these phenomena only become meaningful through communicative interaction. The focus of attention for research that adheres to the constitutionist approach is the question of how meaning is constituted in and through communication. Emphasis is placed on specific utterances and their relationship with other utterances, on the constitution of common understandings in communicative networks, rather than on the relationship between discursive and extradiscursive phenomena. By focusing on communicative norms and expectations and the creative use of these to form new meanings in specific situations the constitutionist researcher seeks to explain how the contexts in which we interact and the meanings we create are stabilised yet remain changeable.

The constitutionist perspective, as I intend to employ it and shall present it in the following chapter, concentrates on the things it explains best, namely, how meaning is constituted communicatively. I believe that the theoretical position of constitutionism is best substantiated and operationalised in and through the rhetorical approach to meaning formation. The constitutionist framework as expressed in rhetorical criticism demarcates the present project from constructionist discourse analyses. While the theoretical implications are deep, the practical consequences of this demarcation are of nuance and explanatory emphasis rather than of kind. My investigation remains closely associated with the constructionist and discourse analytical research on European public debate and greatly indebted to its findings.

Having presented the backdrop of my study both in terms of general information about the EU and in terms of existing research on European debate, I turn to the task of detailing the theoretical framework within which I will conduct the investigation of the debate on the future of Europe. Through the presentation of the rhetorical perspective I shall seek to substantiate the claims abut the advantages of constitutionism, and having dealt with this basic issue I shall turn to a

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[16] See for instance Habermas (1997a) for a good introduction of discourse ethics and Habermas (1984 and 1987) for a full presentation of the theory of communicative action. In the following I will have much more to say about Habermas' view of the interrelationship between communication and the constitution of society, but it should already now be noted that Habermas sees an intimate connection between legal constitutional frameworks and social constitutive processes (Habermas, 1996, p. 299).

consideration of legitimacy, identity and public opinion, the more specific theoretical concepts by which this study is informed.

# 3.

# Theoretical framework

This chapter begins with an introduction of the rhetorical perspective. Then, I shall consider the relationship between the rhetorical and other disciplinary approaches. Finally, the chapter contains a presentation of the social scientific concepts of legitimacy, identity and public opinion. These three concepts will be examined both with regard to their particular relevance for the empirical study of the EU and their theoretical relationship with the field of rhetoric. A consideration of the concrete procedures for selecting and investigating the empirical data will precede the actual analyses, but will not figure in the more general theoretical discussions that are the focus at present.

In its entirety my approach to the study of the debate on the future of Europe may be unfolded as shown in figure 1. The present chapter discusses the rhetorical perspective and the incorporation of the social scientific concepts into that perspective, whereas the introduction of the specific analytical tools will await their implementation.



*Figure 1: The approach unfolded*

## 3.1. The rhetorical perspective

The study that I shall undertake has a significant interdisciplinary inclination, but its basic orientation is rhetorical. The overriding purpose of the investigation of the debate on the future of Europe is to explain how meaning is created in the interrelationships between various utterances and their contexts of articulation. In so far as social scientific concepts are brought into the analysis, they are auxiliary to the rhetorical task of explaining the communicative formation of meaning. The rhetorical perspective not only directs the attention of the investigation, but also expresses the constitutionist understanding of social reality that I advocate. An exploration of the rhetorical theory of how meaning is constituted therefore precedes the presentation of the social scientific concepts. In the following, I shall take my starting point from the classical division of rhetoric into a practical and a theoretical dimension, and I shall then argue that an inherently rhetorical mode of analysis should be added to the two classical dimensions. The goal of the ensuing discussion is to establish a general perspective from which rhetorical acts may be studied as being constitutive of meaning.

### 3.1.1. Rhetoric is meaningful – meaning is rhetorical

Rhetoric, some argue, is the practical art of persuasion, and should be distinguished from the hermeneutic endeavour of interpreting meaning (Gaonkar, 1997). This argument appears to find support in the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1355b). Aristotle recognises that rhetoric cannot be defined by its subject matter (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1355b and 1359b), but he also asserts that the rhetorical activity is productive of a specific kind of knowledge and thereby creates boundaries that are perhaps not very clearly defined but still limit the range of rhetoric. Rhetoric is not defined by the specific topics with which rhetors deal, but by the things that the speakers do to and with these topics, by the nature of the rhetorical endeavour. To Aristotle, rhetoric is an ability that has to do with *doxae* – the probabilities that are the means and ends of arguments conducted in circumstances of contingency (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1357a). The rhetor argues the plausibility of his or her claims to knowledge and advocates the desirability of his or her preferred courses of action; the aim is to win the argument here and now, but the truth and rightness of a claim is only established until further notice. Rhetoric is, on the one hand, the specific acts of persuasion, on the other hand, a set of normative guidelines concerning the rhetorical practice.

In the Aristotelian conception, the rhetorician is either a practitioner or a teacher, and this understanding prevailed in the classical Latin understanding of rhetoric as either *rhetorica utens*

or *rhetorica docens* (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27). Given the definition of rhetoric as a practical art confined to the domain of *doxa*, how is the introduction of the third category of rhetorical criticism justified? And how may the end of such rhetorical criticism come to be seen as the explanation of meaning?

The basic argument for the suspension of the distinction between the interpretive[1] or hermeneutic and the practical rhetorical task is one of reciprocity (Black, 1978, p. 10). The practitioner's rhetorical act of formulating and uttering a statement intended to fulfil some function in a given social setting calls for the equally rhetorical investigation of how that statement is made and what purposes it serves. This argument is based on the close connection between theory and practice that has been rhetoric's hallmark since antiquity, but the emphasis has shifted from effectiveness to understanding (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27).[2] The preoccupation with understanding leads the critic to investigate how utterances become meaningful for speakers and audiences. However, this investigation is still guided by the basic rhetorical question: "…why is the author doing this and what is the intended effect on readers?" (Booth, 2001, p. 187).[3]

The interpretive turn in rhetorical studies is premised upon a specific understanding of meaning according to which the rhetorical practitioner's formulation of the utterance cannot be separated from his or her own interpretation of the world. In their pioneering article on the relationship between hermeneutics and rhetoric Michael Hyde and Craig Smith argue that "meaning is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making-known that meaning" (Hyde & Smith, 1998, p. 66, emphasis removed). Only in their articulation do understandings and opinions become truly meaningful. Such an understanding of the rhetorical endeavour as an expository process leads to the conclusion that "hermeneutics and rhetoric form a symbiotic relationship with each other. The relationship defines the process of interpretive understanding and meaning formation that lies at the heart of our temporal existence" (Hyde, 2001, p. 336). Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer, the exponent of modern philosophical hermeneutics par excellence, puts it, "the rhetorical and the hermeneutical aspects of human

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[1] I understand interpretive as a technical term designating the practice of studying and explaining the meaning formation of texts (for an introduction to this usage see for instance Gross & Keith, 1997, p. 11).

[2] Gaonkar is himself sceptical of the interpretive turn, but that does not make his presentation of it any less illuminating.

[3] Such a definition of the rhetorical critical task, of course, begs the question of how we gain access to the speaker's intentions. As will be seen shortly I advocate the study of rhetorical action in its pure textuality as a way of side-stepping this difficult issue. The leading analytical question, then, becomes not what the author meant to say, but what meanings are articulated in the text.

linguisticality interpenetrate each other at every point" (Gadamer, 1985, p. 280).[4] The individual's understanding of the world and his or her expression of it are intimately connected, and the creation of meaning can thus be understood as an inherently rhetorical process.

By pointing out that the rhetorical practice is always already interpretive, Hyde and Smith establish the link between rhetoric and meaning. What has happened is that the rhetorical intention of persuading a particular audience of some specific point has been equated with the more general aims of discovering and communicating how one understands a given issue. This equation is performed through a reconsideration of what it means to be rhetorical. The redefinition not only marks a turn to interpretation in rhetorical studies, but also a move away from the instrumental understanding of rhetoric that is often implied in the singular focus on how the rhetor's persuasive endeavour becomes most effective. In this movement the scope of the rhetorical is broadened considerably; the term is no longer used as a label for a certain category of utterances, but is instead regarded as a constitutive element of all communication. Rhetoric, as Kenneth Burke famously puts it, "…is rooted in an essential function of language itself […]; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols" (Burke, 1969, p. 43, emphasis removed).

The language-functional understanding of rhetoric provides the basis for viewing rhetoric as meaningful, but in order for the connection between rhetoric and interpretation to be fully established, the rhetoricity of meaning must also be recognised; a definition of meaning as a communicative and dynamic process must be substantiated. Although it cannot be denied that words have some degree of stable intentional and conventional meaning, there is an equally undeniable actional or communicative dimension of meaning formation. Words only become fully meaningful when used in utterances whose meanings, in turn, are never simply the sum of the employed units. Meaning is use, as Wittgenstein would have it (Wittgenstein, 2001, § 43), and only emerges in the act of usage. When the dynamic, communicative dimension of meaning is highlighted, it becomes possible to see meaning formation as being subject to the urgency and contingency that is characteristic of the rhetorical endeavour (Farrell & Frentz, 1979). Meaningful expressions are only created through adaptation of the articulations to the specific situations in which they are made. Hence, the articulation of meaning becomes a rhetorical act, the result of the meeting between a certain speaker and a particular audience, expressed in a specific way and

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[4] This understanding is echoed in the Danish rhetorical scholar Jørgen Fafner's dictum that rhetoric and hermeneutics are connected like Siamese twins (Fafner, 1997, p. 15).

influenced by various factors of the given situation and the broader societal context. The speaker's interpretive skills are prerequisite to his or her rhetorical act, and the audience's rhetorical capabilities are in turn inherent to the interpretation of the utterance; meaning is constituted in this dual rhetorical-hermeneutical process.

The interdependency of speaking and interpreting forms the basis of the constitutionist approach to meaning formation. In the constitutionist view social knowledge arises in situations that are always already constrained by prior knowledge and expectations as well as other contextual factors. While the constraints limit the range of possibilities available to the actors, these very limits are also what facilitates choice and as such makes action possible. When given a constitutionist foundation rhetoric is inherently interpretive, and the aim of rhetorical criticism is to understand the communicative constitution of meaning on its own terms.

### 3.1.2. Bringing Aristotle back in

Having established the interdependencies of rhetoric and meaning and rhetoric and hermeneutics we are drawing nearer to the question of how the rhetorical analysis should be conducted. However, one issue remains open: does the interpretive turn in rhetoric imply that we should give up the classical foundations of the discipline? Is the possibility of rhetorical interpretation bought at the price of the classical concepts? Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (1997) argues that the classical concepts with their explicit practical and pedagogical aims are too thin for analytical purposes. However, I believe that the classical roots of rhetoric should be preserved, not only as part of the discipline's foundational myth, but as central and useful elements of present-day rhetorical studies. The classical rhetorical scholars both offer theoretical underpinnings for the discipline on which the analytical practice may be based, and they present a number of concepts that may easily and with great advantage be adapted for analytical purposes.

Certainly, the interpretive use of the classical theories of rhetoric involves some adaptation, but the exercise of reconsidering the practical art of rhetoric from the constitutionist position is well worth the while, as I hope to illustrate with the following reinterpretation of Aristotle's rhetoric. The reading to follow is greatly indebted to the Spanish-Swedish rhetorical scholar José Luis Ramírez, who has developed a humanistic theory of action in which the understanding of rhetorical utterances as creative acts that are constitutive of meaning forms the cornerstone. To me, Ramírez' theoretical endeavour is especially appealing because it does not depart from Aristotle's conceptions, but instead arrives at the constitutionist perspective through a

careful repositioning of rhetoric within the framework of Aristotle's general theory of knowledge formation.

Ramírez' basic contention is that the articulation of meaning is a rhetorical *praxis*, that meaning is created in and through its specific formulation under particular circumstances. This claim is grounded in a re-examination of Aristotle's understanding of knowledge. In the Aristotelian knowledge scheme there are two basic kinds of knowledge: *episteme* is the theoretical and certain type of knowledge that is the object of the natural sciences, and *doxa* is the practical kind produced in the multiple settings of social life. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle thinks rhetoric is productive of the second type of knowledge. Ramírez makes no attempt to counter this view and concentrates his investigation at the level of socially contingent knowledge formation. This level of knowledge is again divided into a productive (*poíesis*) and a practical (*praxis*) way of knowing and acting. The purpose (*telos*) of the former mode of knowing is the realisation of something by means of something else; the fulfilment of production lies outside the scope of the individual action, and it has technical ability (*tekhne*) as its form of knowledge.[5] The latter type is conducted for its own sake, and its knowledge form is practical wisdom (*phronesis*)[6] (Ramírez, 1995, p. 8). Whereas *poíesis* is instrumental, the performance of *praxis* implies the simultaneous realisation of the act and its *telos*, or put differently the act is the purpose. Figure 2 presents an overview of the relationships between the ways of knowing and forms of knowledge.

| ACTIVITY | KNOWLEDGE FORM | |
|---|---|---|
| Theory | Episteme | |
| Poíesis | Tekhne | D o x a |
| Praxis | Phronesis | |

*Figure 2: Ways of knowing and types of knowledge*
(adapted from Ramírez, 1995, p. 8)

Aristotle classified rhetorical knowledge and knowledge of rhetoric as *tekhne* (Conley, 1990, p. 14), but Ramírez argues that rhetoric also has a dimension of *phronesis* and thereby of

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[5] The typical example here is the construction of a material object. When one builds a piece of wooden furniture, for instance, the individual acts of sawing, hammering, etc. are all directed at producing the furniture, but the purpose is only realised in the finished product that exists independently of the process by which it was created.

[6] *Praxis* is not as easy to exemplify as *poíesis*, but think of the declarative performatives of Austin's famous speech act theory ('I name this ship'), and more specifically think of the illocutionary force of an utterance as opposed to its perlocutionary consequences (Austin, 1962). The comparison with speech act theory foreshadows the important point that rhetorical acts, according to Ramírez, are simultaneously productive and practical.

*praxis*. In so doing Ramírez reforms Aristotle's notion of rhetoric, but he does so from within the broader Aristotelian categorisation of the different forms of knowledge. The connection between rhetoric and *praxis* is established by way of a pragmatic understanding of language according to which *phronesis* is articulated in *logos*, defined broadly as both thoughts and words. The *telos* of speech is the creation of meaning and as such it is realised in and through the utterance, but the rhetorical act also retains the instrumental aspect of expressing its meaning through this or that choice of words. As Ramírez puts it, "*logos* is the creative force, the activity which, in order to intervene in the world, must be objectified and reified. *Praxis* is expressed in *poíesis*" (Ramírez, 1995, p. 204, my translation). Meaning is not identical with the words that express it, yet it can never arise independently of the words.[7]

Having established a link between *praxis* and *poíesis*, Ramírez can redefine rhetoric as knowledge of "…how the words and the world become meaningful" (Ramírez, 1995, p. 255, my translation). In its concrete articulation the rhetorical act unites an ethical dimension with the aesthetic endeavour of expressing something by means of something else, and only in this unison does meaning arise.[8] Or, to put the matter in the simplest possible terms, the specific meaning of an utterance is constituted in and through its unique combination of content and form. When constructing the particular utterance the speaker chooses from a variety of different styles and arguments, and Ramírez sees these *topoi* – the places from where arguments and expressions are obtained – as providing an inventory of possible significances. Meaning, however, is only created as the merger of form and content in the particular moment of articulation.[9] Thereby, the choice of *topos* is connected with *kairos*, the opportune moment, and the *phronetic* rhetorical act, the communicative interaction that fulfils its own *telos*, may be finally defined as the choice of the right

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[7] The affinity between this position and the starting point of Judith Butler's study of *Excitable Speech* is striking. Writes Butler: "We do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do things to language, but language is also the thing that we do. Language is a name for our doing: both 'what' we do (the name for the action that we characteristically perform) and that which we effect, the act and its consequences" (Butler, 1997, p. 8). While I agree perfectly with the understanding of language Butler advocates here, my analytical focus is different from hers. Butler aims at understanding the doing and its effects, whereas I wish to explain the act and its prerequisites. However, even these diverging purposes are joined in the common understanding that the explanatory aims are best met in the investigation of how acts are performed.

[8] This conception has much in common with the view expressed in Thomas Farrell's work on the relationship between rhetorical theory and social knowledge (Farrell, 1976 and 1993). Farrell's position is of special interest to the present study because it is based on a rereading of both Aristotle's classical rhetorical theory and Jürgen Habermas' present-day philosophical-sociological conception of society.

[9] To Ramírez, significance is the sense of an expression which can be established independently of the particular context in which the expression is employed; meaning, on the contrary, only arises through the dynamic fusion of text and context (Ramírez, 1995, p. 222). Others have defined meaning as the stable element and viewed significance as the alterable dimension (see Hyde, 2001, p. 333), but I prefer Ramírez' distinction and shall adhere to it in the following.

expression at the right time (Ramírez, 1995, p. 266).[10] Thus, a mutually constitutive dynamic of the meaning and its articulation is established: the right utterance is that which enacts its *telos*, but the *telos* only becomes known in and through the utterance. There is no way of knowing which meaning is right in advance of its articulation, and no way of evaluating the rightness of the meaning independently of the articulation.

Ramírez' humanistic theory of action provides the main inspiration for the rhetorical perspective that informs this study. The theory, I believe, explains well why the art of persuasion should be regarded as an interpretive study of the creation of meaning, and it justifies the explanatory potential contained in this view. The reconsideration of Aristotle's knowledge scheme and the redefinition of rhetoric as *praxis* expressed in *poíesis* enhance and refine the constitutionist position. The communicative creation of meaning may now be understood as both a reproductive and a creative process, the use of pre-existing norms and expectations to create new understandings and opinions. Moreover, meaning is conditioned by the situation in which it is articulated; it arises in the contextually bound meeting between speaker and audience and is thus a thoroughly social phenomenon. The ensuing understanding of the rhetorical act makes processes of meaning formation available for rhetorical study, and at the same time it points to the character of such rhetorical investigations and their results. Commonly acknowledged meanings are the goal of both the practical rhetorical act and the analytical rhetorical endeavour. The analyst cannot claim any privileged position from which certain knowledge can be announced; instead the rhetorical critic is committed to and bound by the acts of meaning formation that he or she seeks to explain. The meaning formation of the analyst is hermeneutically aligned with that of the practitioner.

In adhering to Ramírez' action-theoretical explanation of the link between rhetorical utterances and the creation of meaning, I am also provided with conceptual tools for the analysis of rhetorical meaning formation. The introduction of *telos*, *topos*, *kairos*, and the interrelations between them as central to the constitution of meaning offers clues as to how the meaning formation of rhetorical utterances may be discovered and explained. The three concepts will be central to the analysis of the debate on the future of Europe, and they will be discussed further before being employed (see chapter 6). However, the time has not yet come to unfold the specific analytical practices, as I still need to attend to the question of how the rhetorical perspective relates

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[10] The mutually constitutive relationship between concrete utterances and general norms that follows from this view is consistent with the position expressed in Carolyn R. Miller's influential work on "genre as social action" (Miller, 1984) and her later elaboration on "the cultural basis of genre" (Miller, 1994). Although I shall not pursue the generic perspective in the present study, it is evident that the issue of how a certain utterance is shaped in order to express a specific meaning is inextricably linked to the expectations of the genre to which that utterance belongs.

to other disciplines that are of relevance to the study of the European debate. In the following I shall first establish the general interdisciplinary potential of the rhetorical perspective. Then I will discuss social scientific and rhetorical conceptualisations of legitimacy, identity and public opinion, the three notions that in this study serve as focal points within the overarching rhetorical-constitutionist approach to the formation of meaning.

## 3.2. The interdisciplinary nature of the project

The EU is a thoroughly researched phenomenon; there are subfields within the disciplines of history, law, and political science dealing exclusively with the matter, and sociological and anthropological investigations of life in the Union are also becoming more and more frequent. That the EU should be of great interest to legal, political, and social scholars[11] is hardly surprising: the creation of a European polity endowed with a legal framework and a social base constitutes a unique opportunity for empirical testing of theoretically conceived hypotheses about society formation. Through theorisation and empirical testing the legal and social sciences have built up a comprehensive EU-lore which has in turn informed the practices of politicians and policy-makers and thus has not left its subject-matter untouched. The European political project is a remarkably reflexive one in the sense that academic investigations and evaluations of the EU have continuously influenced its developments and vice versa.[12] Political and academic debates about the EU's current situation and about possible solutions to perceived problems have often overlapped, and no student of European political discussions can ignore the corresponding scholarly disputes completely.

The close link between political and academic discussions provides a first reason why legal and social scientific concepts are indispensable for the rhetorical study of the creation of meaning in the debate on the future of Europe. These concepts and their development form part of the meaning formation; they shape and inform the political debate while also providing second order explanations of what the debate is about. The study of the academic debate on the EU might well form an independent rhetorical project. However, the focus of the present study is the political level of debate, and the question therefore is how legal and political scientific concepts may inform

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[11] There are of course many differences between students of legal systems, political institutions, and societal developments, but they all share an interest in the structures and functions of society. For the sake of convenience I shall use the term 'social sciences' as a collective label for the various political and social scientific disciplines. The expression 'the legal and social sciences' hence refers broadly to all the disciplinary approaches with which my own rhetorical perspective enters into interdisciplinary contact.
[12] In the following I focus attention on the academic influence on political developments, but the reversed flow of information and impact is, of course, equally important.

rhetorical investigation. How can the rhetorical perspective and the social scientific concepts merge?

The question of the possibility of interdisciplinarity hinges upon the different disciplines' understanding of the kind of knowledge they produce. The legal and social sciences have typically adhered to an objective and universal ideal of knowledge; scholars in these fields strive for the kind of knowledge Aristotle termed *episteme* and therefore deny that their investigations have a rhetorical dimension. However, to Aristotle the study of society was the prime practical discipline – thoroughly steeped in *praxis* and productive of *phronesis* – and this understanding of the social sciences has regained influence in recent years (Flyvbjerg, 1991, pp.70-71). Hence, the social sciences and the rhetorical discipline, as I have repositioned it in the preceding section, belong to the same sphere of knowledge, whereby interdisciplinary dialogue becomes possible.

Some present-day scholars have taken the argument about the practical dimension of knowledge formation further, claiming that all knowledge is intrinsically social, that there is no *episteme* without *praxis*. Steve Fuller, who is the founder of social epistemology, a research program aimed at the normative assessment of current scientific practices of knowledge production (Fuller, 2002, p. ix), promotes this claim forcefully. While Fuller's discussion of the status of knowledge production in the natural sciences is not pertinent to the present consideration of the possibility of merging rhetorical and social scientific perspectives, his positioning of rhetoric as a central element in the social epistemological program is central to this line of reasoning. In Fuller's scheme rhetoric plays the role of facilitating interdisciplinarity. Through an investigation of the rhetorical strategies that various disciplines use in their construction of knowledge and a critique of the disciplinary boundaries that are thus constructed, rhetoric emerges as the mediator between disciplines. The aim of Fuller's investigation is to develop a "rhetoric of interpenetrability" that displays interdisciplinary unity and conflict and may "…recast disciplinary boundaries as artificial barriers to the transaction of knowledge claims" (Fuller & Collier, 2004, p. 3).

Fuller is neither the only nor the first scholar to recognise rhetoric's interdisciplinary powers. In medieval and renaissance times – when all scholarship was interdisciplinary – rhetoric was often seen as "the master-study organizing and strengthening all the others" (Booth, 2001, p. 184). Furthermore, rhetoric has been seen as a generally applicable method "…that all disciplines rely on for their roadwork" (Booth, 2001, p. 188). To these two interdisciplinary functions Fuller

adds a third: that of the mediator. Rhetoric, says Fuller, provides the means by which the connection between previously separated fields of study may be established. [13]

When the social epistemological argument is followed through, it may be argued that rhetoric itself holds the key to the merger between it and other academic disciplines. In the following, I shall proceed from this assumption and attempt to create interpenetration between the legal and social scientific concepts and the rhetorical perspective, the purpose being to establish a genuinely interdisciplinary analytical approach to the debate on the future of Europe. First, I shall present the basic concepts upon which the social scientific assumptions about the debate are based and the various general understandings of and recommendations for the EU that emerge from these assumptions. Second, I shall explore the relationship between the social scientific concepts and rhetorical theory.

## 3.3. Legitimacy, identity, public opinion – and the European Union

As mentioned above, many of the assumptions and controversies that characterise the debate on the future of Europe have parallel academic and political versions, and there is a high degree of exchange between the academic and political arenas of debate. In the following, I shall present the academic version of the debate; the subsequent empirical investigations will focus on the political enactment of the same issues. Thus, the theoretical concepts presented here will be drawn into the analysis of the empirical data in order to explain the processes of meaning formation, but the data also provides insights into how the theoretical notions are enacted in practice.

The social scientific study of the EU is characterised by a rather stark entrenchment between different general theories – for instance realism and (neo-)functionalism – claiming to provide internally coherent and comprehensive explanations of European integration. Adherents to the various theories tend to deny or ignore the merits of each other's positions, wherefore the most constructive and fruitful discussions are carried out within the individual schools of thought rather than between them. Here, I focus attention on discussions between academics, who all adhere to a deliberative understanding of democracy in general and European integration in particular. Within this approach political processes are conceived as deliberations, and the EU's legal, political, and social formations are studied from a primarily participatory perspective, concentrating on contributions that go into decision-making.

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[13] Taken as a whole Fuller's view of rhetoric may be too instrumental to sit comfortably with the rhetorical perspective I have developed above (see Keith, 1995), but this discrepancy does not impinge upon the relevance of his thoughts on rhetoric's interdisciplinary potential.

I have singled out the deliberative approach because I consider it to be the most topical to the discussions that are currently undertaken at the political level. Of the various available explanatory schemes the theory of deliberative democracy is arguably the most finely attuned to the problems and challenges that define the present moment of European integration (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000).[14] A further reason for emphasising the deliberative model is that it is the social scientific approach that is most immediately compatible with my own research agenda and overall perspective. This is not to say that other social scientific approaches are generally invalid or unimportant, but simply a note of the fact that they have different concerns than those pertinent to the rhetorical study of meaning making. Accordingly, the presentation of the legal and social scientific conceptualisations will focus primarily on the discussions carried out between scholars, who may have little else in common, but at least agree on conducting the discussion within the general setting of the theory of deliberative democracy.[15]

The legal and political scientific literatures that discuss the EU as a democratic polity and assess the future developments of that polity in terms of its deliberative potential share one basic assumption: legitimacy, identity, and public opinion are interdependent concepts of the utmost importance. This shared assumption leads to a wide variety of different conclusions about the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion and its impact on European developments, and these conclusions spur at least as many predictions and recommendations, but the starting point of the argument is always the same.

The various theoretical verdicts also begin with a common empirical observation, namely, that the Europeanisation of politics – the transfer to the EU of tasks that were previously decided and performed at the national level – has not been accompanied by an equal increase in citizen support for the European project. The EU in its present state is not generating the kind of acceptance and allegiance from its citizens that one would expect of a political project with the dimensions and ambitions of the Union. Citizens, it is agreed, do not feel any strong attachment to the European polity, and they participate very little in the political discussions that inform the

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[14] As my repeated mention of the connection between academic and political levels of debate should indicate this is a recursive process. As the deliberative model of explanation gains supporters the political processes may in fact become more deliberative whereby the explanatory power of the theory is in turn enhanced.

[15] For a general introduction and discussion of deliberative democracy see Elster (ed.) (1998). The collection of essays in Eriksen & Fossum (eds.) (2000) provides an overview of the employment of the deliberative democratic perspective in studies of the EU.

Union's policy choices. This situation is known as the EU's democratic deficit,[16] and the different reflections on the interdependence between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion aim at offering theoretical grounds for ameliorating the problematic condition of deficiency.

In the following, I shall seek to unravel the different explanations of the relationship between the three concepts and the hypotheses about European polity- and policy-making that they lead to. In so doing, I shall begin with a presentation of the concept of legitimacy, and as I move on to identity and then to public opinion I shall both introduce these notions individually and seek to show how the three concepts are interrelated. Following the general presentations, I shall discuss the different consequences that the variously conceived conceptual interdependencies have for the understanding of the EU.[17]

### 3.3.1. Legitimacy

A political regime's legitimacy is, broadly speaking, measured by that regime's reasonableness and justifiability, by the degree to which the regime is commended to and accepted by its subjects (Banchoff & Smith, 1999, p. 4). In a slightly more specific sense of the word, the legitimate is that which is right according to law. However, legitimacy in this stricter sense may be seen as a subcategory of the general concept since it is usually required that laws be endorsed by their subjects;[18] legitimate laws, accordingly, have undergone successful legitimation. Although legitimacy can be ascribed to both specific acts and to entire systems, students of legitimacy usually focus on the societal level, and furthermore their studies often concentrate on the procedures and institutions that govern society. The study of legitimacy, then, may be characterised as the study of whether the modes of governance that are operative in a given society are lawful, reasonable, and accepted (Beetham, 1991, p. 19).

Democratic legitimacy may be divided into three constitutive elements: juridical, political, and social legitimacy (see figure 3). Juridical legitimacy, or formal legality, designates the

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[16] Many discussions of the democratic deficit and how to overcome it have appeared over the past decade; see inter alia García (ed.) (1993), Banchoff & Smith (eds.) (1999), and Eriksen & Fossum (eds.) (2000). All the contributors to these edited volumes assume that the Union does indeed have a democratic deficit, yet the argument that the EU in its current form "…redresses rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output" (Moravcsik, 2002, p. 603) is not entirely obsolete.

[17] In this section I only present the aspects of each concept that are necessary for understanding the relations between them and their importance to theories of the European polity. In the following section I shall discuss the concepts further as I investigate the interception between social scientific and rhetorical understandings of them.

[18] In principle there is no necessary connection between legitimacy and democracy, but in modern, Western societies democratic government has come to be seen as the only legitimate type of government (Verhoeven. 2002, p. 10).

general rules according to which political authority is acquired and established (Beetham & Lord, 1998, p. 3); it is *government* of the people.

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            ┌─────────────────────┐
            │     Democratic      │
            │     legitimacy      │
            └─────────────────────┘
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| Juridical legitimacy (*Government* of the people) | Political legitimacy | Social legitimacy (Government of the *people*) |

| Output (Government *for* the people) | Input (Government *by* the people) |

*Figure 3: Constitutive elements of democratic legitimacy*

Political legitimacy may be subdivided into input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy designates modes of participation, ways of ensuring that members of society are represented by the political system; output legitimacy deals with the results that the political system delivers to its members, the solutions offered to social problems (Scharpf, 1999, pp. 7 –13). Input legitimacy is legitimation of political power through the citizens' direct participation in collective decisions or their representatives' employment of transparent modes of decision-making (Lenaerts & Desomer, 2002, p. 1225). Output legitimacy may be further divided into the distinct but related concerns for effectivity – achieving goals and solving problems – and efficiency – doing so at the least possible cost (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 12). Put simply, input legitimacy is government *by* the people, whereas output legitimacy designates government *for* the people.

It should be noted that although the issue of the EU's output legitimacy is in no way trivial – there is great and understandable concern about the EU's capability of action – I shall bracket this issue in the following discussion. This is done because output legitimacy is not related to identity and public opinion in the same way as legality and especially input and social legitimacy are. In fact, concerns for output legitimacy may obstruct or be obstructed by the employment of identification and public opinion formation as means of legitimation since participatory processes

are seldom very efficient. Having observed this crack in the coherence of the conceptual framework I seek to establish, I shall leave it out of the following account.

The third and last dimension of legitimacy, social legitimacy, "…refers to a broad, empirically determined societal acceptance of or loyalty to the system" (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 11). Social legitimacy is government of the *people*; it is generated by the communicative processes by which individuals come to an intersubjective understanding of their place in the world (Habermas, 1988, p. 14).

Various theories of what constitutes good governance[19] have prioritised one type of legitimacy over the others, but a governmental system is in fact only legitimated if it takes into account all modes of legitimation and is able to establish productive relationships between them. Emphasising the participatory modes of legitimation, Amaryllis Verhoeven presents the relationship thus:

> A system enjoys legitimacy when it achieves an identification between rulers and ruled, in the sense that politics can be seen as constitutive of the identity of the society. To that end, it is not sufficient for political systems to solicit loyalty by enhancing social welfare and integration. Legitimacy also requires an active citizenry, for it is in political participation that a society constitutes itself as a political identity. Political systems must, therefore, also foster inclusion and the participation of civil society in political affairs. […] Legitimacy becomes 'constructive' in that it hinges on effective identity-building (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 11).

### 3.3.2. Identity

It is in legitimacy's social dimension that the most immediate connection between identity and legitimacy exists, but identity also has obvious affiliations with input legitimacy. The concept of identity can be divided into two main categories: individual identity that corresponds well with input legitimacy's notion of the citizens' personal participation in the democratic processes, and collective identity corresponding with the diffuse allegiance with the group that constitutes social legitimacy. The main difference between the individual and collective identities is their respective changeability:

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[19] Governance being "…a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with each other and cooperating in the implementation of these decisions" (Schmitter, 2001, p. 7).

For the individual, or at any rate for most individuals, identity is usually 'situational', if not always optional. That is to say, individuals identify themselves and are identified by others in different ways according to the situations in which they find themselves [...]. Collective identities, however, tend to be pervasive and persistent. They are less subject to rapid changes and tend to be more intense and durable, even when quite large numbers of individuals no longer feel their power (Smith, 1997, p. 322).

The recognition of the difference between individual and collective identity should not, however, lead to denial of the intrinsic relationship between individual and collective identities that – all useful divisions apart – is one of the main defining features of both concepts (Sampson, 1989, pp. 3-4). People become who they are through participation in social settings and although a given societal grouping exists independently of its actual members at any given moment, the group is ultimately dependent on the members' dynamic enactment of its constituent traits.[20]

A regime's social legitimacy depends upon the relationship between individual and collective identities, and is hence related to the modes of participation that also provide input legitimacy. The degree of social legitimacy is determined by the society members' actual identification with the collective identity offered to them by the system, that is, by the society's legal framework and the politicians, who derive their authority from this framework. In the case of the EU there is a common understanding rooted in thorough empirical studies of both quantitative and qualitative nature that no strong collective identity exists for the European polity as such, and that most individuals primarily identify with the national community to which they belong.[21] However, the interpretation of this common insight varies according to the individual scholar's theoretical understanding of how identities – individual and collective – come into being. There are

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[20] It should be noted that there are many different kinds of collective identities, or social groupings to which the individual may belong. Such collectivities are determined by nationality, religion, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, or race, to name but the large categories that are presently perceived as being most salient (Appiah, 1994, pp. 149-150). I focus on the collective identities that encompass society as such and are formally expressed in political systems. Such collectivities are usually equalled with national identities as explained and criticised by Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991; 1st edition published in 1983) to mention but a few famous examples of the extensive literature on nationalism (the aforementioned study by Wodak et al. (1999) also belongs to this group).
[21] The quantitative studies are typically based on the data provided by the Eurobarometer (see for instance Niedermayer & Sinnott (eds.), 1995), but there are also quantitative studies of publicly mediated identities (i.e. Triandafyllidou, 2002). The qualitative studies employ a broad range of types of data, methods of collection and modes of analysis; for instance qualitative interviews (Nanz, 2001), participant observation (Bellier & Wilson (eds.), 2000), and readings of literary texts (Passerini, 1999).

two opposite theoretical positions on this matter, the essentialist and the constructivist,[22] and the disagreement arises over how to conceive the relationship between the political identity expressed by the system and the cultural identity of the society represented by the system (Cederman, 2000).

The discussants have one further presupposition in common: all view political identities as being reflexively created and voluntarily selected. The political identity of a society is the society's conscious definition of itself (Neumann, 1995, pp. 2-3), the official version of which is inscribed in the basic law or constitution that sets down political institutions and procedures of collective decision and action at the level of society. The matter of theoretical dispute is whether there is a necessary link between cultural and political communities.

If one believes, as do the essentialists, that a political identity reflects already existent cultural raw material, then the lack of a European identity means that the EU has no legitimacy as an independent political body. As there is no European cultural identity the EU has no people or *demos*[23] to represent and to derive its legitimacy from. If, however, one takes the constructivist stance, one does not see any inherent hindrance in the current absence of a European people, since such a collective identity may be formed through active efforts by policy makers and other concerned members of the community to be. Although constructivists do not deny that there is some relationship between political and cultural identities, they believe that the two levels of identification can be separated because they have different functions. And furthermore they believe that the direction of influence goes both ways so that political identity formation may give rise to cultural identities and vice versa (Cederman, 2000, pp. 5-6). The full argument between these opposing views will be presented once the third concept, public opinion, has been introduced.

### 3.3.3. Public opinion

The concept of public opinion is directly related to both legitimacy and identity; the two concepts are internal to the dynamic process out of which public opinions emerge. The process of public opinion formation has at least five constitutive dimensions: publicity, publicness, the public sphere, the public, and public opinion. The first dimension, publicity, is the principle or norm according to which participation in public affairs and sharing in public goods is a human right. Second,

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[22] Constructivist is Lars-Erik Cedermann's choice of word; the general position he describes is closely related to the views I have earlier presented as constructionism. In the presentation of the various understandings of identity formation I shall use Cedermann's term in order to indicate a distinction between the constructivist views on identification, which I join in confronting the essentialist position, and the overall constructionist approach from which I have previously differentiated my constitutionist perspective.

[23] A *demos* may be defined as "…a group of people the vast majority of which feels sufficiently attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic discourse and binding decision-making (Cederman, 2000, p. 7).

publicness refers to the state of being public; it designates the nature of an activity or space (as in public service broadcasting or public school). Third, the public sphere denotes a(n) (imagined) space of social life that mediates between state and civil society, a framework for public discourse that may serve the functions of social integration and/or opinion brokering. Fourth, the public is a social category that may act collectively; in contrast to the crowd, the public represents a reasoned and reasonable collective body. The fifth and final dimension, public opinion, binds the four other elements together and adds the dynamic feature of opining, thereby establishing the procedural nature of public opinion formation as a whole (Splichal, 1999, pp. 6-7). In the following I shall leave the dimensions of publicity and publicness aside; I focus on the public, the public sphere, public opinion and the relations between them as these three elements are most directly connected to identity and legitimacy and thus of primary concern to the present study. The presentation I shall give here establishes an ideal conception of public opinion formation; it does not consider whether the ideal is actually realisable or whether it would in fact be as ideal in practice as it is in theory. These issues are discussed in the coming sections as first the controversy over the possible emergence of a European public sphere is presented and, secondly, the connection between rhetoric and public opinion formation is established.

The social collectivity of the public comes together and finds a shared identity in the process of discussing matters of common concern. Participants in public dialogue may come to recognise each other as members of the same society, thereby creating a reflexive sense of belonging from which the society's political system can derive its social legitimacy. The ongoing public discussion of political matters may bind the members of a society together as a social group, and it may facilitate acceptance of the governmental institutions' rightful and proper representation of that social group (Splichal, 1999, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, the individuals' public exchanges of viewpoints lend input legitimacy to the political system. Participation in the political debate may provide people with a sense of influencing political decisions directly, thereby allowing the system to claim to represent each person as an individual (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 13). The ideal is that the process of public debate allows participants to reach common understandings and agreements on specific policy issues, whereby qualitatively substantiated public opinions emerge. These public opinions can be regarded as expressions of a common interest – as specific articulations of the public's collective will (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 23). Public opinion in the sense of collective views on particular matters and common public identity in the broader sense both emerge through

the dialogic process of public opinion formation, wherefore this process serves two general functions: social integration and political legitimation (Glynn et al., 1999, p. 221).

These general functions of public opinion formation are interrelated, but although the distinction between them is somewhat artificial it is beneficial for analytical purposes. Political legitimation in the form of input legitimacy is generated through the individuals' participation in political discussions of specific matters resulting in public opinions on these matters. But the political institutions are also endowed with social legitimacy through the general establishment of a public, of the sense of belonging to a group with collective interests and common goals that is attained by way of the societal conversation as such. The existence of a public sphere is a prerequisite for legitimation in both these senses; the public sphere provides the arena for public opinion formation, thereby enabling both specific agreements and general common attitudes to arise (Splichal, 1999, p. pp. 22-23). The public sphere is a platform for participation, but it is also a source of information about government activities; it mediates between the political institutions and the individual members of society. The general sense of belonging to a society is embedded in this mediation – to belong means being a part of the ongoing public conversation about common concerns.

The social legitimacy of a political system relies on the perceived correspondence between governmental institutions and the social entity established in the public conversation (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 7-8). A framework must exist that not only informs the individuals of government activities, but also keeps the flows of communication open in both directions, thereby allowing the individual to become an active participant in the public debate if and when he or she should so desire. The public sphere mediates between the government and the individual in specific issues thereby providing each governmental action with input legitimacy. And the public sphere facilitates a societal conversation that is generative of the members' more general sense of belonging to that society. The public sphere is the framework within which the functions of public opinion formation are realised; here opinion formation, collective identification and political legitimation emerge as inextricably intertwined and continuously renewed communicative processes.

### *3.3.4. The relationship between the three concepts in the context of the EU*

The following is a presentation of the competing theoretical conceptualisations of the relationship between legitimacy, identity and public opinion in the context of the EU. The worth of the diverging theoretical views will not be discussed here; such evaluation will instead be the final outcome of the analytical endeavour. Thus, I shall establish the positions here, and will only return to them at the end of the analysis at which point their respective explanatory potential and normative power will be discussed.

The theories to be presented here are conceptualisations of the adequate European constitution – theories of the product of the debate on the future of Europe. The theories that will inform the analysis directly are conceptualisations of the process of the debate, explanations of the constitution of Europe as an activity. The procedural understanding of the relationship between legitimation, identification, and public opinion formation will be explicated in the section immediately following the ensuing presentation of theoretical views of the European product. Because the theories to be presented here deal with recommendations for the European product, that is, with the EU's ground- and framework, they focus primarily on the issue of formal legality. Whereas the preceding introductions of the concepts relied mostly on social scientific work, the theoretical positions to be explored now ensue mainly from the domain of legal scholarship.

The academic debate on the present state and future developments of the EU finds its crux in the question of whether or not the EU's difficulties with procuring citizen support can be solved by endowing the Union with a constitution. This constitutional issue is connected to the discussion of the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion because a constitution is the explicit expression of a system's formal legality. That is, a polity's constitution provides the legal basis for the dynamic processes of legitimation through identification and public opinion formation in that polity. In the constitutional debate Dieter Grimm and Jürgen Habermas represent the extreme positions of the essentialistic argument against the creation of a European constitution, and the constructivist promotion of such a development. The main point of disagreement is whether or not the writing up of the constitutional text requires the prior existence of a people. Is the constitution but a formal expression of an already existing community, or can the act of creating the constitutional text be constitutive of the people as such?

*Dieter Grimm*

Grimm takes his starting point from the *de facto* absence of a European people with a common collective identity and argues that this absence cannot be overcome *de jure* because there exists no transnational public discourse or European public sphere (Grimm, 1997, pp. 254-255). Furthermore, Grimm asserts that

> prospects for Europeanization of the communication system are absolutely non-existent. A Europeanized communication system ought not to be confused with increased reporting on European topics in national media. These are directed at a national public and remain attached to national viewpoints and communication habits. They can accordingly not create any European public nor establish any European discourse (Grimm, 1997, p. 252).

To Grimm the lack of a common language is the main obstacle to the establishment of supranational public debate (Grimm, 1997, p. 253). Through this claim he reveals a romantic understanding of language as the bearer of "…a common worldview that somehow provides the glue for the divergent social views and interests to be found in a modern polity" (Nanz, 2001, p. 34).

Grimm does take a deliberative stance on democracy, but maintains that a community must exist before any legitimating public deliberation can take place. Although he explicitly argues against the necessity of a homogeneous ethnic community as the democratic base of society, he insists that collective identity must precede political institutions. And he maintains that the necessary collectivity only exists and can only arise within the linguistically defined boundaries of the nation state (Grimm, 1997, p. 254). The conclusion of Grimm's argument is that "the European public power is not one that derives from the people, but one mediated through states" (Grimm, 1997, p. 251). In this view, the establishment of a European constitution would only aggravate the EU's democratic deficit since "the legitimation it would mediate would be a fictitious one" (Grimm, 1997, p. 257).

*Jürgen Habermas*

In a direct response to Grimm's position, Habermas asserts that while he agrees with the diagnosis his political conclusion is different (Habermas, 1997b, p. 259). Habermas argues in favour of a European constitution because he believes the creation of such a document would facilitate the citizen's identification with the European polity that is currently lacking. Moreover, he argues that the European constitution should be federal in nature. This solution is deemed to be desirable, but also necessary. The claim to the necessity of European integration stems from the observation that the nation-state has outlived its role and that societal integration and control today must be

conducted in a postnational constellation. Habermas believes this argument to be thoroughly grounded in empirical evidence concerning the effects of globalisation (Habermas, 2001a, p. 61).

In Habermas' own words:

> The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community must not be taken as a historical-cultural *a priori* that makes democratic will-formation possible, but rather as the flowing contents of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens' communication. This is precisely how national identities were formed in modern Europe. Therefore it is to be expected that the political institutions to be created by a European constitution would have an inducing effect. […] Given the political will, there is no a priori reason why it cannot subsequently create the politically necessary communicative context as soon as it is constitutionally prepared to do so (Habermas, 1997b, p. 264).

In this conception the European public sphere needs not supersede the existing communicative context of the national media. "A real advance," says Habermas, "would be for the national media to cover the substance of relevant controversies in the other countries, so that all the national public opinions converged in the same range of contributions to the same set of issues, regardless of their origin" (Habermas, 2001b, p. 9). Furthermore, he argues that even if a common language were a necessary precondition, this would not be an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of a European public sphere, as the goal of making English "the second first language" is attainable (Habermas, 1997b, p. 264).

The argument in favour of creating a European constitutional text is premised upon the assumption that collective identities may arise through conscious political acts. A sharp distinction is made between political and cultural identities, but the political salience of culture is not rejected altogether.[24] Habermas acknowledges that each distinct community has a political culture, but insists that this political culture is not founded on social practices; rather, it is expressed in the legal framework and universal principles of a constitutional text (Habermas, 1998, p. 118). Hence, the constitution not only establishes a polity's legal framework but is also generative of the social and political legitimacy of that polity.

This understanding of the truly constitutive powers of the legal text is labelled constitutional patriotism, and it combines the separation of the notions of cultural and political identity with adherence to a strictly procedural theory of deliberative democracy (Nanz, 2001, p. 36). Hereby, such identity forming features as ethnicity, language, religion and traditions are

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[24] For an interpretation that privileges the role of culture in politics while remaining grounded in the Habermasian framework of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics see Seyla Benhabib's work on "the claims of culture" (Benhabib, 2002).

separated from a general political culture which every member of a society, regardless of his or her personal background, will be able to accept and support (Habermas, 2001a, p. 74). The non-discriminatory and all-inclusive solidarity of the shared political identity is based on the interpretation of such legally constituted principles as popular sovereignty and human rights (Habermas, 1998, p. 118). And, according to Habermas, constitutional patriotism is the answer to the current signs of disintegration within societies and the existing tensions between different cultural groups:

> A previous background consensus, constructed on the basis of cultural homogeneity and understood as a necessary catalysing condition for democracy, becomes superfluous to the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinion- and will-formation make a reasonable political understanding possible, even among strangers. Thanks to its procedural properties, the democratic process has its own mechanisms for securing legitimacy; it can, when necessary, fill the gaps that open in social integration, and can respond to the changed cultural composition of a population by generating a common political culture (Habermas, 2001a, pp. 73-74).

*Grimm vs. Habermas*

Habermas agrees with Grimm that a European-wide collective political identity and equally European processes of public opinion formation are necessary for the legitimation of a European federal polity, and he also concurs that these elements are not yet in existence. However, his insistence on the total separation of cultural and political identities and his belief in the legal text's capability of generating political allegiance lead him to conclude that the lacking elements may be contrived. The creation of a European constitution would facilitate European-wide debate – that is, the emergence of a European public sphere – through which citizens would come to share a common political culture and lend substantial legitimacy to the community's formally established legal base. Grimm, on the contrary, accepts the constructed character of political identity, but argues that such construction is dependent upon the pre-political existence of a community of cultural dimensions. Thereby, Grimm is representative of the so-called no *demos* thesis that has raised considerable support at both academic and political levels of debate. The argument of the no *demos* thesis runs as follows:

…trust and solidarity, the two fundamental socio-cultural resources of democratic politics, are generated from a belief in 'our' essential sameness, […] which is based on pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture and ethnicity. […] European integration would therefore presuppose a European people (*Staatsvolk*) as a cultural and cognitive frame of reference. Given the historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity of its member states, there is no question for the protagonists of this argument that the European Union is very far from having achieved the 'thick' collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national democracies. And in its absence, institutional reform will not greatly accelerate the formation of a European people. By this view, public deliberation can take place only within a pre-established *demos* (Nanz, 2001, p. 23).

In my opinion, Habermas argues his theoretical case more convincingly than does Grimm. Grimm's is a blunt insistence upon the non-existence of the European *demos*, whereas Habermas' is a careful consideration of how political communities – national, European, and otherwise – may develop. Nevertheless, Habermas' position with its radically reformatory potential is not without weaknesses. Especially problematic is its neglect of the fact that – tendencies towards and effects of globalisation notwithstanding – nationally grounded communities of both cultural and political dimensions continue to be centrally important as both the main locus of citizens' affiliation and as actors in their own right. Conversely, it is precisely in the affinity with the immediate empirical reality that Grimm's position shows its strength. Grimm describes the presently dominant social identity formation adequately, but cannot explain it; Habermas provides a good explanation of how collective identities are created, but his theory is not very well adapted to current reality. In the following, I shall discuss a number of intermediate positions that seek to establish empirically justifiable theoretical propositions of how the EU's legitimacy may be enhanced.

*Joseph H. H. Weiler*

Joseph H. H. Weiler seeks to account for the unique nature of the EU by recognising that the *demos* has both a cultural and a political dimension. Weiler believes that both dimensions are necessary for the legitimation of a polity, but insists that they may be kept apart from each other and thereby establishes a theory of multiple *demoi*: the national and the supranational.

> The national is Eros: reaching back to the pre-modern, appealing to the heart with a grasp on our emotions, and evocative of the romantic vision of creative social organization as well as responding to our existential yearning for a meaning located in time and space. […] The supranational is civilization: confidently modernist, appealing to the rational within us and to Enlightenment neo-classical humanism, taming that Eros (Weiler, 1999, p. 347).

According to Weiler, the virtue of the supranational European *demos* is the recognition of the lack of unity between its members embodied in the assertion that the European polity is one of peoples rather than of one people. "In the fundamental statement of its political aspiration, indeed of its very telos, articulated in the first line of the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the gathering nations of Europe 'Determined to lay the foundations for an ever closer Union of the peoples of Europe'" (Weiler, 2001, p. 4).

The voluntary acceptance of and submission to a community not of 'my people' but of others – a principle termed constitutional tolerance – is in Weiler's conception the very foundation of the European political construct (Weiler, 2002, p. 568). The principle of constitutional tolerance dictates that Europe should not aspire to become a federation of one people, but should continue to base itself in a treaty that "…subject[s] the European peoples to a constitutional discipline even though the European polity is composed of distinct peoples" (Weiler, 1999, p. 12). In the European polity the authority of the common constitution is accepted voluntarily, and the sovereignty and authority of the EU is renewed with each act of acceptance, that is, each time the Member States submit themselves to EU decisions (Weiler, 2001, p. 13).

Weiler separates the cultural and political dimensions of collective identity as sharply as does Habermas. But where Habermas urges the creation of a purely political European polity and proposes constitutional patriotism as the founding principle, Weiler suggests that the European community should continue to base itself on the individual cultural entities' – the nation-states' – voluntary submission to supranational rule, the principle of constitutional tolerance. Weiler believes that the value and purpose, the *telos*, of the European system is found precisely in this voluntary submission of different peoples to the same rule.

*Deirdre Curtin*

A host of legal and political scientific scholars have taken the same path as Weiler and sought to conceptualise the EU as a multilevel polity, a political entity uniting multiple social communities within a constitutional framework and establishing a differentiated system of governance adapted to the various levels of operation. The multilevel parlance may be applied in diagnosing the EU's current situation, as does Deirdre Curtin in her location of multiple deficits. According to Curtin, the EU is not only democratically deficient in the sense of not having matched the shift in decision-making towards the European level with a shift in methods for citizen participation and governor accountability. Granted, the lack of a real political arena, of a public sphere of deliberation on

matters of public interest, and of a European *demos* are serious problems in themselves (Curtin, 1997, pp. 43-45), but they are not the EU's only cause for trouble. Curtin accounts for several other deficits, namely, a deficient separation of powers leading to undue empowerment of the executive, and a rule of law deficit meaning that bureaucrats, not politicians, have control of EU policy (Curtin, 1997, pp. 45-46). On the basis of her characterisation of the EU's present state, she asks: "given this terrible 'here' […], where can we possibly *go* with this 'here' as our starting point? Is there a 'there' which can be labelled, for example, 'postnational democracy'?" (Curtin, 1997, p. 48). Curtin answers the second of these questions in the affirmative, and the postnational conception of democracy is the remedy she offers for the EU's deficiency diseases.

The introduction of postnational democracy takes us back to the division between cultural and political identities and Curtin displays close affinity with the Habermasian position. In her own words, "the 'post' in 'postnational' is meant to express the idea that democracy is possible beyond the nation-state: what is being left behind in terms of political identity is the link with nationalism in the sense of cultural integration" (Curtin, 1997, p. 51). To Curtin, the division between cultural and political identities is not so much a theoretical assumption as it is a normative principle, a goal to be achieved in order to cope with the deficiencies for which there is no national cure. Curtin accounts for her position thus:

> I believe that the effort of reimagining political community other than premised on an ethno-culturally homogenous *Volk* is an imperative task. The alternative is not as the Euro sceptic would have us believe that of a perfectly fine status quo where an adequate system of accountability can be assured at the national level. No, the alternative is much more grim and bleak […]; it is the route of increasingly authoritarian and non participative decision-making, increasingly far removed from the by now entirely alienated citizen (Curtin, 1997, p. 50).

*Ingolf Pernice*

Taking his cue from the emergence of a necessarily postnational reality Ingolf Pernice advocates multilevel constitutionalism as a proper description of the European constitutional order and a desirable arrangement for the kind of polity that the EU is. Pernice bases his argument on the assumption that the social contract embedded in the constitution does not necessarily lead to the formation of a unitary state (Pernice, 1999, p. 709). A further premise is that people in fact "…have adopted multiple identities – local, regional, national, European – which correspond to the various levels of political community they are citizens of" (Pernice, 2002, p. 512). On the basis of these assumptions Pernice defines multilevel constitutionalism as "…the ongoing process of establishing

new structures of government complementary to and building upon – while also changing – existing forms of self-organisation of the people or society" (Pernice, 2002, p. 512).

The purpose of the constitution is to ensure that each public decision is taken and carried out at the appropriate level and that all levels function properly without interfering unduly with each other. In this sense, Pernice contends, the European polity already has a constitution, namely the EU's primary laws and the national constitutions, bound together in a functional, not a hierarchical relationship (Pernice, 2002, p. 514 and 520). Since the EU already has a constitution, Pernice concludes, it is actually not in need of one. What is needed is instead assurance that each of the multiple constitutional levels functions correctly, and in this respect improvements are possible. Specifically, "intermediary rooms" between private individuals and public authorities as well as between national and European levels of governance must be created and strengthened (Pernice, 2002, p. 522).

Pernice side-steps the issue of the non-existence and possible creation of a European *demos* by presupposing that identification is a concentrically ordered process. Yet he cannot ignore the issue of how to connect the European level of identification and the corresponding governmental structures, and he, therefore, advocates the enhancement of participatory modes of government at the European level. From the perspective of multilevel constitutionalism the people's participation is necessary for the continuous enactment of the European project:

> …the progressive 'constitution' of the European Union is matter, not of States but of the people, who through this process not only create common institutions for their common goals, but also define themselves as the citizens of the Union and provide themselves a common, European political and legal status… (Pernice, 2002, p. 519).

*Summing up the theoretical conceptions of the EU's adequate constitution*

Common to the positions presented above is that no matter whether they advocate a purely intergovernmental or some form of postnational – multilevel or federal – solution to the EU's equally commonly perceived deficiencies they all understand citizen participation in public deliberation as a necessary part of the solution. The different constitutional models are all advocated on the basis of their champions' belief that they will provide the best framework for the strengthening of deliberative democracy in Europe. Among the proponents of postnational models there is furthermore agreement that some sort of differentiation between different modes of identification is not only necessitated by the particular relationship between the EU and its member states, but is actually a prerequisite for the release of the full potential of deliberative democracy. Grimm argues that a shared cultural identity is a necessary precedent of political dialogue wherefore

such dialogue can only be conducted at the national level and the democratic legitimation of the EU is purely indirect. However, the other scholars agree that the severance of culture and politics facilitates supranational deliberation of a particularly virtuous kind.

The deliberative supranationalism,[25] which is argued in one form or another by all parties except Grimm, "…does not hinge on the assumption of macro-subjects, like the 'people' of a particular community, but on anonymously interlinked discourses or flows of communication" (Curtin, 1997, p. 54). In the deliberative perspective political participation is ongoing, dialogic, and individualised; it is this last feature which makes the perspective particularly attractive as a means of legitimation in the EU and also makes the EU a particularly attractive arena for its realisation. Deliberative supranationalism provides the theoretical justification for promoting a polity that is not culturally unified, and the EU offers the opportunity of turning the theoretical norm into practice.

Pernice is the least deliberatively minded of the four scholars in the postnational group; he focuses on the possibility of establishing correspondence between different levels of governance and the various identities of the people (Pernice, 2002, p. 512). Weiler has it that the EU provides a constitutional framework for 'our' voluntary subjection to the 'other' (Weiler, 2002, p. 568). Habermas goes a step further in arguing that a common European constitution could provide the basis for the "inclusion of the other" within the political community (Habermas, 1992a, pp. 17-18). Both Weiler and Habermas conceive of the EU as an inherently modern project that has the potential of enlightening through organisation. Curtin comprehends the situation differently and – recounting a position originally forwarded by Ian Ward (Ward, 1995)[26] – suggests that the EU by facilitating "multiperspective interconnectedness" and "multilevel networks of interaction" shows itself to be "the first postmodern polity" (Curtin, 1997, pp. 50-51).

Whatever the degree of radicality and the precise formulation of these claims, they all share the common feature of anchoring the EU's claim to legitimacy in its capacity of being a "contested polity." That is, the EU is legitimated through institutions and procedures that allow different actors to participate in policy-discussions at the European level while maintaining previously established identities of national and subnational character (Banchoff & Smith, 1999, p. 2).

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[25] The term was coined by Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, but their original definition of it has been highly contested (Joerges, 2002, pp. 133-134). In a general sense, deliberative supranationalism indicates that interaction at the European level can aim at consensual solutions based on common interests and is not just a bargaining process through which a compromise between diverging national interests is obtained (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000, p. 22).

[26] Ward is in turn inspired by Jacques Derrida, who has suggested that Europe as such can only be understood as 'other' than itself, as a non-entity perpetually moving somewhere else (Derrida, 1992).

As has surely emerged from the preceding presentation, my personal leaning is towards the postnational conceptualisation of the relationship between legitimacy, identity and public opinion formation. I presume that people in fact have multiple identities and that the legitimacy of different polities – from the local to the European level – may be recognised simultaneously. Also, I take for granted that peoples' participation in public debate is both a direct source of input legitimacy and conducive of collective political identities and hence of social legitimacy. However, I remain doubtful as to how severely political and cultural identities may in fact be separated, and I wonder whether some form of prior recognition of commonality is not a prerequisite of political participation after all.

Two central questions, the answering of which may help clear away that doubt, emerge: can public deliberation arise without the participants' antecedent acknowledgement of each other and common understanding of communicative practices? And if public discussions may be generated on the basis of a thin, legally constituted sense of commonality, can these discussions, once begun, avoid generating collective identities in a thick sense, thereby drawing in and altering already existing cultural identities? These questions have an empirical bend and seeking answers to them will be one of the main purposes of the analysis of the political debate on the future of Europe. Through the analysis I shall also seek to clarify which of the different theoretical recommendations for the constitution of the European polity is most attuned to and suitable for the political process of constituting Europe. The question to be pondered is which theory or combination of theories offers the best explanation of the process and recommends the most desirable product.

While the ultimate analytical ambition is to examine which constitutional proposition for the EU is most adequate, the analysis is also reliant on the general theoretical understanding of the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and opinion formation that was established before I embarked upon the presentation of the various constitutive theories. The analysis will aim at providing a detailed explanation of how the conceptual relationships are articulated at the communicative level of public political discussion, and it will seek to uncover the possibilities and limitations for political choice and action that emerge in the course of the debate. Before embarking upon this analytical task further theoretical consideration is, however, necessary. It must be investigated how the empirical relationship between the three core concepts can actually be studied, and to this end I shall seek to combine the social scientific concepts with the rhetorical perspective on meaning formation as this has already been established. I shall now undertake the task of

creating rhetorical and social scientific interpenetration, thereby seeking to establish a truly interdisciplinary platform for the empirical analyses.

### 3.4. Public opinion formation, identification, legitimation – and rhetoric

The central contention of this section is that public opinion formation, identification, and legitimation are all rhetorical processes and may be studied as such. This claim is perhaps most readily acceptable in the case of public opinion formation. Therefore, I shall consider the connection between the rhetorical and the social scientific understanding of argumentative exchanges in public fora before moving on to the relationships between rhetoric and identification and rhetoric and legitimation.

### *3.4.1. Public opinion formation*

The social scientific study of public opinion formation is primarily concerned with exploring the general social and systemic conditions that enable and constrain the free exchange of viewpoints concerning matters of public interest. This type of research focuses on the concept of the public sphere as the arena in which the exchanges occur, and in spite of the harsh criticisms levelled at his early work and the many revisions his theory has undergone, Jürgen Habermas remains the seminal writer on the subject.

Habermas first developed his theory of the public sphere in his *Habilitationsschrift*, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, from 1962, which was belatedly translated into English in 1989. Bearing the subtitle *An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* this work is primarily an investigation of the institutional frames and procedural norms that were constitutive of the public sphere in the period of early modernity. However, Habermas extends his analysis into the 20th century, and his unveiled lament of the transformation he charts makes it difficult not to conclude that Habermas ascribes general value to the bourgeois norms of opinion formation. Or, as Michael Warner explains in his account of Habermas' theory, the ideals of bourgeois society hold an emancipatory potential to which modern culture should be held accountable (Warner, 2002, p. 46). One may deduce four such ideals or norms from the account given in *Structural Transformation*. First, in public deliberation all discussants are treated as if they were social equals. Second, the deliberation should only concern the common good, leaving out private interests and issues. Third, the public sphere should form a single, comprehensive whole. And fourth, a sharp division between civil society and the state should be maintained (Fraser, 1992, pp. 117-118).

In *Structural Transformation* Habermas concludes that the rise of the Welfare State and the appearance of the mass media have made it impossible to uphold the bourgeois norms. The argument concerning the mass media is that they transform public discussion into a commodity – mass media audiences are spectators not participants. As regards the welfare-model, it causes the borders between the public and the private to blur because the state now takes up many tasks that were previously left to the individual. The expansion of the domain of public intervention cannot be accompanied by an equal expansion of public discussion because the mass media impair the citizens' participation in public opinion formation. The combination of the heightened degree of state intervention into the individual's life and the commodification of public opinion leads to a transformation of citizens into clients and consumers (Habermas, 1989, pp. 164, 170-171, and 232-233). This conclusion has been put into question by recent research, especially in the field of media studies. And, attentive to the results of this research, Habermas has recognised that the "…diagnosis of a unilinear development from a politically active public to one withdrawn into a bad privacy, from a 'culture debating to a culture-consuming public,' is too simplistic" (Habermas, 1992b, p. 438).

The critique of Habermas' early understanding of the public sphere also moves beyond the diagnostic level in order to question the norms upon which the diagnosis depends. Nancy Fraser (1992) is among the most thorough critics of the bourgeois norms of public opinion formation; she calls each of the four assumptions into question, showing that they are contingent upon the historical conditions in which they emerged and partial in their distribution of rights and opportunities.[27] Again, Habermas has been sensitive to his critics and now accepts that any empirically existing public sphere is partial and exclusive in one way or another. Accordingly, the existence of various competing public spheres and the impossibility of creating a form of discussion that is equally accessible to everyone are recognised (Habermas, 1992b, p. 429 and 438). However, Habermas maintains that universal norms for communicative exchanges can be established, and on this basis he continues to hold a normative view of the public sphere from the perspective of which comparison of actually existing processes of opinion formation with universal, normative standards is possible.

Habermas presents the compiled results of the search for universal norms that has been a central theme throughout his academic career in the two-volume work *The Theory of*

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[27] Many other criticisms have been directed at the early Habermasian conception of the public sphere. See Calhoun (ed.) (1992) for a useful overview of various reconstructive readings of *Structural Transformation* and Robbins (ed.) (1993) for a partially overlapping but somewhat more radical critique of the concept of the public sphere.

*Communicative Action* (Habermas, 1984 and 1987). Here, the starting point is that all societal formations can be divided into two distinctive parts: a system governed by instrumental rationality and a lifeworld in which the rationality and corresponding mode of action is communicative. Communicative action is defined as the form of rational action in which intersubjective understanding is the goal. Habermas believes this goal to be integral to communication: "reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech" (Habermas, 1984, p. 287). Universal communicative norms or validity criteria, claims Habermas, can be established on the basis of this *telos* and are embedded in the so-called ideal speech-situation. The ideal speech-situation consists of four norms to which all participants must adhere and for which they must account if so charged: comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and social adequacy (Habermas, 1970). Habermas' conclusive move is the establishment of a discourse ethics grounded in the claim that, if conducted properly, the interaction that is governed by communicative rationality will lead to agreement based upon "the unforced force of the better argument."

The end-result of his own and other scholars' revisions of the original understanding of the concept, is that Habermas today views the public sphere as a dynamic communicative network:

> The public sphere is a social phenomenon just as elementary as action, actor, association, or collectivity, but it eludes the conventional sociological concepts of 'social order.' The public sphere cannot be conceived as an institution and certainly not as an organization. It is not even a framework of norms with differentiated competences and roles, membership regulations, and so on. Just as little does it represent a system; although it permits one to draw internal boundaries, outwardly it is characterized by open, permeable, and shifting horizons. The public sphere can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way as to coalesce into bundles of topically specified *public* opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so, too, the public sphere is reproduced through communicative action, for which mastery of a natural language suffices; it is tailored to the *general comprehensibility* of everyday communicative practice (Habermas, 1996, p. 360).

This definition takes the public sphere's dependency on concrete communicative processes into account. It describes public opinion formation as a dynamic communicative act, and thereby it is directly linked to collective identity formation, as Habermas understands this process. "Collective identity […] can today only be grounded in the consciousness of universal and equal chances to participate in the kind of communication processes by which identity formation becomes a continuous learning process" (Habermas, 1974, p. 99).

Habermas' theory of the public sphere has been greatly nuanced and improved since it was first launched, but one major weakness remains unamended. In spite of its understanding of the dynamic and continuous nature of the communicative processes that constitute present-day society Habermas' theory contains no suggestions as to how the diverse and fragmented opinions of individuals come to merge into an expression of common understanding and collective will. The concrete communicative interactions without which any general conditions of public opinion formation are in reality null and void are not considered, and therefore it is not possible to account for the interaction between them.

The rhetorical understanding of public opinion formation takes the individual utterance as its starting point. The rhetorical scholar studies how the specific interrelations of text and context give rise to concrete meanings, and thus offers detailed insights into the interactions of which the communicative network of the public sphere consists. However, the process by which the many unique meanings expressed in individual utterances gather into common public opinion remains as elusive to the rhetorician as it does to the social scientist.[28] The recognition of this common explanatory failure has led rhetorical scholars to suggest that a proper conception of the process of public opinion formation can only be found in a combination of rhetorical and social scientific insights. It is thus proposed that the relationship between individual utterances and public opinion should be seen as being recursive and mutually constitutive (Hauser, 1999, p. 33).

The interdependence of the particular and the general may be explained as follows: the speaker's prior understanding of what constitutes a viable position on the given subject in the existing situation and of how this position can be expressed shapes each particular expression of opinion. In speaking his or her mind the speaker thus reproduces already existing expectations concerning the form and content of the particular expression of a viewpoint – each utterance is an instantiation of public opinion in both a subject specific and a broader communicative sense. But in creating its unique meaning the utterance may also contribute to the alteration of existing norms concerning what may be said and how one may say it. The speaker always has a choice: "[he or she] can accept the sanctioned, widely used bundle of rules, claims, procedures and evidence to wage a dispute. Or, the arguer can inveigh any or all of these 'customs' in order to bring forth a new variety of understanding" (Goodnight, 1982, p. 217). In the persisting gap between collective views and

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[28] Meaning and opinion are obviously related terms; I understand meaning as synthesising the understanding and attitude expressed in concrete utterances, whereas (public) opinion implies a generality and collectivity that is detached from any specific utterance, but remains intricately related to the individuals' formation of meaning and the concrete articulations thereof.

their individual expressions lies the possibility of opining differently (Farrell, 1993, p. 228).

The conclusion to these considerations of the recursive relationship between the specific and the general is that creation of public opinion is an ongoing dialogic process. Each utterance is conditioned by preceding utterances and in being uttered forms part of the context out of which subsequent utterances arise. Or, as the Russian literary critic Mikhail M. Bakhtin so aptly puts it, "any concrete utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication of a particular sphere" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91). General conditions for public opinion formation and commonly perceived public opinions arise in and through the interrelations of the particular utterances that constitute the ongoing societal conversation.

The perception of the recursiveness of specific articulations and general conditions leads to a reconciliation of the rhetorical and the social scientific approaches to public opinion formation. In accordance with the combined rhetorical-social scientific conception public opinion formation should indeed be studied in its only concrete manifestations, namely specific communicative encounters, but the investigation should take account of the social norms, political institutions, and media structures that provide the broader context for each instance of communicative interaction. And most significantly the analysis should aim at explaining the relationship between the utterances, thereby reaching a deeper understanding of the formal and substantial commonalities and differences that are operative in the communicative network under study. Explaining the relations between different utterances and between the texts and their contexts will be an important aim of the analysis of the debate on the future of Europe.

### 3.4.2. Identification

The most forceful argument for the connection between rhetoric and identity has been put forward by Kenneth Burke, who proposes that identification should replace persuasion as rhetoric's basic function. Says Burke: "you persuade a man [sic] only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, *identifying* your ways with his" (Burke, 1969, p. 55). Rhetorical identification, Burke points out, aims at overcoming divisions between the speaker and the audience he or she wishes to persuade; "rhetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall" (Burke 1969, p. 23). In order to achieve his or her goal the speaker has several general strategies available. First, appeal to partisanship: the speaker and the audience are united in their common difference from a third party (Burke, 1969, p. 22). Second, identification of the speaker's cause with a kind of conduct already considered admirable by the audience, that is, "the

translation of one's wishes into terms of an audience's opinions" (Burke, 1969, p. 55 and 57). Third, there are purely formal devices of identification – argumentative patterns and procedures, tropes and figures that invite audience participation regardless of the specific subject matter. Such forms, Burke contends, have a universal appeal that, if successfully transferred to the matter at hand, may overpower audience resistances to a speaker's proposition (Burke, 1969, p. 58). Burke's concept of rhetorical identification places its emphasis on how the speaker can identify with the audience's already existing values and beliefs, but also points to the speaker's ability to change the audience's identity.

Maurice Charland has elaborated upon the idea that rhetoric is not only about adapting a statement to the audiences' existing identities. Rhetoric, Charland proposes, may not only alter the views of the audience, but can in fact constitute it as a group with a common identity. In his view "…the very existence of social subjects is already a rhetorical effect" (Charland, 1994, p. 211) and the type of rhetoric that creates this effect – that "calls its audience into being" – is labelled "constitutive" (Charland, 1994, p. 213). Constitutive rhetoric not only aims at creating a position for the speaker with which the audience already identifies, but holds up an identity for the audience to don.

Such identification of the audience in the rhetorical utterance is, however, not necessarily restricted to the constitutive rhetoric in which a new collectivity is explicitly being created. Edwin Black has suggested that establishment of the "second persona" is basic to all rhetorical utterances and that it is in this move rather than in references to the speaker's own character that the intention and value of the utterance is revealed (Black, 1970). Black proposes the second persona as the pivotal concept of his analysis in order to avoid falling subject to the intentional fallacy; instead of focusing on the relationship between the text and its author Black turns to the study of the audience conjectured in the text. However, Black proposes this move as a roundabout way of passing moral and intellectual judgement on the author, thereby implying that the author's identity has by no means become irrelevant or external to the text (Black, 1970, p. 110). There are two central concepts for analysing authorial identity in the text: ethos and first persona. These two concepts are somewhat overlapping, but distinguishable along the following lines:

> "…ethos refers to a set of characteristics that, if attributed to a writer [or speaker] on the basis of textual evidence, will enhance the writer's credibility. Persona, on the other hand, […] provides a way of describing the roles authors create for themselves in written [or spoken] discourse given their representation of audience, subject matter, and other elements of context" (Cherry, 1998, p. 402).

The claim is that a persona is somehow more fictitious than the ethos. However, I concentrate my analysis entirely at the textual level, and only see the difference as being one of specificity. Whereas ethos refers to a predetermined set of characteristics (i.e. the Aristotelian qualities of wisdom, virtue, and goodwill), persona designates the multitude of traits that an author may attempt to present him- or herself as having.

Following Burke it is recognised that the unity between the first and the second persona is often created through reference to a common 'other' or third persona, and the textual establishment of the third persona, therefore, indicates the rules and norms that underlie communicative interaction. Philip Wander has proposed that the third persona, marked by absences and explicit negations, is an expression of the possibilities and restrictions that condition the utterance. By studying the constitution of the third persona – ignored positions, unaddressed or excluded groups – the critic may reach understanding of the rules for producing discourse that are operative in the context in which the utterance is made (Wander, 1999, p. 376).

The presence of first, second, and third personae in rhetorical utterances draws our attention to the interrelations between these different identificatory categories. The agency established in the utterance – that is, the capability for action, which the utterance ascribes to the personae – is a combination of 'I', 'you', 'we' and 'they' positions. Or, as Michael Leff puts the point:

> In the interpretative frame, agency refers not just to the use of character appeals but also to the way rhetors place themselves within a network of communicative relationships. At minimum, the explication of agency requires attention to: (1) the rhetor's construction of self, (2) the rhetor's construction of audience (what Edwin Black calls the 'second persona'), and (3) the enactment within the text of the relationship between rhetor and audience (Leff, 2003, p. 9).

I suggest that the speaker's establishment of the third persona and the enactment of the relationship between it and the other two personae should be added to this list of issues that require attention. The study of textually established agencies and the relations between them enables the critic to account for both instrumental and generative aspects of rhetorical performance (Leff, 2003, pp. 6-7).

Furthermore, the combination of Charland's constitutive rhetoric and Wander's concept of the third persona points to the recursiveness of rhetorical identification; the utterance both draws upon established identities and creates new possibilities of identification. The identity formation of individual rhetorical utterances is related to already existent collectivities with or against which the speaker and the audience are identified in the same manner that individual and

public opinions relate to each other. The speaker is neither in a position to adapt freely to the perceived identity of the audience, nor capable of creating the audience entirely at his or her own will, but is instead constrained by personal and social identities that prefigure any concrete utterance. However, possibilities for change arise in the speaker's ability to use the identities that exist beforehand creatively and to reconfigure the relationships between them.

The three identificatory strategies that Burke enumerates are means by which speakers may establish new collective actors and create the agency needed for altering the social and political context in which they speak. Analysis of the rhetorical strategies, which are employed in constituting the textual positions of the first, second, and third personae, begins from the assumption of the recursive relationship between individual utterances and social settings. The aim of the analysis is both to explain how the social identities existing prior to the utterance constrain communicative interaction, and to investigate the concrete and perhaps altered possibilities for collective action that arise in and through the utterance. Analysis of this kind will complement the study of textual and contextual relationships in the investigation of the European debate.

### 3.4.3. Legitimation

The preceding presentations of the rhetorically informed understandings of public opinion formation and identification point to the connection between rhetoric and input and social legitimacy; legitimation in the participatory and the social senses are rhetorical processes (Lucaites, 1981, p. 800) and can be studied as such.[29] Also, it should be clear that both juridical and output legitimacy are often employed rhetorically – the two forms of legitimacy provide reasons in support of the speaker's position in arguments like 'the law says so' or 'the pursued policy has led to a 5% cut in public spending.' But can these two forms of legitimation themselves be understood as rhetorical processes? As before, I shall leave the question of output legitimacy aside; the performance of political acts, in my view, has an obvious rhetorical dimension (the implementation

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[29] For an interesting suggestion as to how this criticism should be conducted see Robert Francesconi's attempt to incorporate Habermas' theory of legitimation into the rhetorical critical practice (Francesconi, 1986). Francesconi recommends evaluating the legitimising functions of political communication according to four criteria: "(1) Justifications of legitimacy should maintain consistency with the norms generated from the collective identity. (2) Such justifications should be criticizable and be capable of being argued rationally. (3) Justifications of legitimacy should in the general (or public) interest be considered rational. (4) Justifications of legitimacy should partake of procedures and presuppositions which have the power to produce consensus" (Francesconi, 1986, p. 20). I find these criteria to be illuminating, but they are subject to the same criticism as the norms of the bourgeois public sphere, and therefore I shall not employ them directly in my analysis. Instead of taking recourse to pre-established and possibly irrelevant or even distorting normative principles, I shall seek to explain and evaluate the meaning formation of the debate on the future of Europe on its own terms.

of a decision demands further persuasion), but investigation of this feature is not relevant to the present study. Exploring the possible rhetoricity of juridical legitimacy is, however, of great importance. Since the status of the constitutional text is pivotal to the legal and social scientific evaluations and recommendations for the EU, the full connection between the rhetorical perspective and the legal and social scientific understanding cannot be made before the relationship between rhetoric and legality has been explored. Also, this exploration is a justification of the claim that the rhetorical study of the debate on the future of Europe may, indeed, offer insight into which theoretical recommendation for the constitution of Europe is to be preferred.

The traditional view of law is that it is a collection of autonomous rules and principles; in this view law is separated from politics and popular discourse, and rhetoric is granted no constitutive role in its creation (Hasian, 1994, p. 44). Recently, however, the opinion has emerged that there is no legal recourse outside of culture and that the foundational legal text is thus not an embodiment of universal principles, but a creative expression of contextually bounded norms and values. James Boyd White puts the point thus:

> It [the law] is always communal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a social context, and in the sense that it is always constitutive of the community by which it works. The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it commends (White, 1985, p. 35).

The claim that the legal text has a genuinely community forming capacity is also an argument for the rhetorical nature of formal legality. Or put otherwise, the constitutional text cannot be separated from the political and social processes for which it provides the formal and procedural framework. Quite to the contrary law and community stand in a mutually constitutive relationship[30] that is parallel to the relationships between personal and public opinions and between individual and collective identities discussed above.

The rhetorically informed understanding of the reciprocal relationship between legal texts and social formations at once lends support to and seems to contradict the various postnational arguments about the development of a European polity. On the one hand, the rhetorical perspective argues the dynamic and thoroughly constituted character of all communities, but on the other hand it casts doubt on the feasibility of separating cultural and political identities, it questions whether it makes sense to distinguish 'thin' political affiliations from 'thick' cultural ties.[31] If meaning and

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[30] J. Peter Burgess (2002) gives a particularly illuminating account of this relationship, expounding how the law must represent the community but can never become identical with it.
[31] As stated earlier these questions must be empirically studied, but I am now providing rhetorical reasons for the doubts that were previously raised intuitively.

identity is somehow interrelated as White suggests (White, 1984, p. 3) and as Ramírez' theory of action implicitly supports, then there is no way of upholding a cultural identity apart from the political discussions in which one participates.

The creation of societal identity and the establishment as well as the legitimation of corresponding political structures cannot be separated from the specific contexts in which these processes occur. However, the understanding of the dynamic interdependencies also leads to a realisation that "…the 'we' is not unitary but constituted and that no actor is ever entitled to speak for all of us" (White, 1985, p. 239). Thus, the rhetorical position actually endorses the view that a societal formation and its political institutions are never symbiotic, and that no political system is ever a natural expression of a community. Rather, social collectivities, political structures, and legal frameworks are mutually formative, and the constitutive power lies exactly in the tension between the social, political, and legal dimensions. Understanding the dynamic relationship between the social, political, and legal dimensions that in combination constitute democratic legitimacy is a third objective of the study. This objective will not be reached by means of specific analytical tools. Instead, the issue of legitimacy will be considered in and through the analyses of opinion formation and identification, and the concern with this issue will find its culmination in the evaluation of the various theoretical conception of the European constitutional entity.

The consideration of possible points of interpenetration between the social scientific concepts and the rhetorical perspective leads to a focus on the dynamic relations between the individual articulation and the general manifestation of each concept and on the interdependencies between legitimacy, identity and public opinion. The rhetorical emphasis on the communicative creation of meaning in a sense puts opinion formation at the centre of attention. It would, however, be more correct to say that legitimacy, identity and public opinion are all regarded as results of interactions in the communicative network of the public sphere; all are constituted in and through meaningful rhetorical acts. The following study will attempt to explain how this constitution of meaning is achieved in the debate on the future of Europe. The recursive relationship between the individual utterance and the general concepts will be studied in order to show how already existent understandings condition the debate and how the debate in turn alters the concepts. Having established the theoretical perspective and the conceptual framework I can now turn to the specific preparations for the analytical task. Accordingly, the next chapter will present the employed procedures for collecting the empirical data and introduce the two analytical rounds in which this material is studied.

# 4.

# Procedures for selecting and
# organising the empirical material

A final preparatory step is necessary before the analytical endeavour can be undertaken: the empirical material and the rationales for its selection must be presented. Such presentation is the purpose of the ensuing chapter, which will end with an introduction of the actual analyses.

## 4.1. Trajectories and turning points

The debate on the future of Europe is an ongoing and multifaceted process developing in many different settings – local, national, and European. In order to capture these important spatio-temporal features of the debate I have chosen to focus the analysis upon texts originating at different times and in various places. As will be explained later, the analysis of texts that originate in purely national as well as mixed contexts provides the spatial dispersion of the study. An adequate temporal distribution is not achieved by a random selection of texts that were put forward at different times; it must be ensured that the specific studied moments represent distinct stages in the debate. I employ the concepts of trajectory and turning point as means of ordering the debate into significantly different temporal stages and have chosen texts that form part of different stages as well as texts that mark the boundaries between such stages.

The notions of trajectory and turning point originate in sociological studies of individual life courses. Trajectories designate sequences of events that seem to run along an already set course, whereas turning points mark changes in the life history. As Andrew Abbott remarks: "the smooth befores and afters are trajectories, linked by a relatively abrupt 'turning point.' They are stable regimes separated by unusual transitions" (Abbott, 2001, p. 247). The conceptual pair of trajectory and turning point has proven its worth in the study of many other phenomena than the life course, for instance political scientific studies of voting patterns and applied economics studies of business cycles (Abbott, 2001, p. 244). The concepts have also been applied to studies of meaning making (Mützel, 2002), and it is this usage that has inspired me to employ the notions in the study of the European debate. I thus understand the debate as an unfolding process consisting of various

sequences that are internally coherent and marked off from each other by formal and substantial changes that occur at identifiable moments in time.

Sociological studies are often inductive and quantitative, designed to find the exact locations of turning points and describe the changes they generate (Abbott, 2001, p. 245). I use the notion more loosely as a tool for structuring the analysis, and I presuppose rather than induce the turning points. The main purpose of my analysis is to explain how meaning is made in the debate, not to establish an exact account of the course of events. Therefore, I believe the usage of the concepts as a means of structuration that precedes the analysis rather than as an analytical outcome to be justified. I assume that the conditions of the debate change at moments of institutionalised European decision-making and poise European Council declarations concerning the European reform process as turning points of the debate. Accordingly, the discussions that go on between Council meetings constitute the trajectories.

The debate on the future of Europe can be understood as a constant element in the process of European integration. But, as explained earlier, I have chosen to use the term to designate a course of events that was begun in May 2000 and will end when the EU's new constitutional treaty has been ratified in all member states. Moreover, I have chosen to focus on the first stages of this debate, ending the careful textual analysis in December 2001 when the European Convention was established. I understand the debate as it unfolded from May 2000 to December 2001 as consisting of two trajectories and two turning points. I locate the turning points in the two Council meetings that were held in Nice in December 2000 and in Laeken in December 2001. At the first of these meetings the debate on the future of the EU was officially recognised and decisions concerning the issues to be discussed and the procedures of discussion were laid down in the "Declaration on the Future of the Union" that was appended to the Treaty of Nice. At the second meeting the debate was institutionalised through the creation of the Convention, and the Laeken Declaration set down the mandate and composition of this body. The two declarations that resulted from the Nice and the Laeken summits form the textual marks of the turning points and are analysed as such.

The two trajectories have time-spans from May 2000 to December 2000 and from December 2000 to December 2001. Each of these trajectories consists of an enormous number of utterances, and for practical purposes I have chosen to focus on what I consider to be three decisive moments in each of the two trajectories. A moment, as I understand it, is a specific articulation that is part of a trajectory; the moment contributes to the dynamic of the trajectory without altering its

course. The moment is like the turning point in that it moves the process of the debate along, and it differs from the turning point in that it does not in itself change the process.

| Trajectory 1 | | | Turning point 1 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fischer (Berlin, 12/05/00) *Moment 1* | Aznar (Paris, 26/09/00) *Moment 2* | Blair (Warsaw, 06/10/00) *Moment 3* | Nice Declaration (07-09/12/00) |

| Trajectory 2 | | | Turning point 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jospin (Paris, 28/05/01) *Moment 4* | Prodi (Paris, 29/05/01) *Moment 5* | Lykketoft (Copenhagen, 23/08/01) *Moment 6* | Laeken Declaration (14-15/12/01) |

*Figure 4: Turning points, trajectories and moments of the debate*

The moments I have selected are occasioned by the interventions of political leaders into the debate.[1] The first moment of the first trajectory arises with the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on the 12th of May 2000.[2] The second moment consists of a speech by José María Aznar who was then Spanish President of Government; this speech was delivered at the French Institute of Foreign Relations in Paris on the 26th of September 2000. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair provides the third moment with his speech at the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw on the 6th of October 2000. In the second trajectory the first chosen moment is occasioned by a speech held at the Maison de Radio France in Paris on the 28th of May 2001 by Lionel Jospin, who was then Prime Minister of France. The second moment arises on the following day, the 29th of May 2001, with Commission President Romano Prodi's speech at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris. The third moment is a speech delivered by Denmark's Foreign Minister at the time, Mogens Lykketoft, on the 23rd of August 2001 at the

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[1] Policy speeches and statements of visions by leading politicians are central in spurring the European debate on. During the studied period there were many other significant interventions than the six I have singled out, and as will be seen in the analysis these other speeches cannot be completely disregarded as they form part of the debate's communicative network. However, as I argue below, there are good reasons for focusing on the six chosen utterances.

[2] There are strong indications that this speech marked a turning point in its own right, but since I do not include any preceding material I cannot confirm this claim, and instead I study the speech as part of the trajectory it may have occasioned.

Danish Council for Foreign Relations in Copenhagen.[3] Figure 4 provides an overview of the temporal stages that are studied and the eight texts' placement within them.

## 4.2. Textual-intertextual analysis

The six moments have been selected because of their dispersal over time and their setting in different contexts, but they have also been chosen for the similarities between them that make comparisons possible. Each speech is held by an incumbent national or – in the case of Romano Prodi – European politician and is explicitly presented as a contribution to the debate on the future Europe. Also, each intervention has been lifted out of its original speech situation and included on the EU's 'futurum'-website,[4] a nodal point in the communicative network making up the European debate. Three of the speeches are delivered in the speakers' own national contexts whereas the three others were delivered abroad, and all six speeches share the characteristic of addressing multiple audiences of both national and European scope.[5] Thus, a certain degree of transversal of the various national contexts and intermingling of viewpoints and arguments can be assumed. Moreover, the fact that three of the speeches are held in academic settings, two in political arenas of symbolic or consultative rather than practical status, and one in journalistic surroundings points to a close interconnection between academia, political circles and the media.[6] The six moments, then, are chosen in order to study regularities within the two trajectories, but they are also meant as keys to studying the interrelationship between the many national and European contexts within and between which the debate is conducted.

The two declarations that mark the turning points and the six speeches that constitute important moments in the trajectories provide a platform for exploring the spatio-temporal developments of meaning making in the European debate. However, an exclusive focus on a total of eight texts would neither provide sufficient insight into the dynamics of meaning formation nor pay adequate attention to the relationship between texts and their contexts. In order to overcome this

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[3] The six speeches and two declarations are all available on the internet (see bibliography for details), but they are also reproduced in full in the appendices of this study (see appendix 1-8).

[4] www.europa.eu.int/futurum.

[5] I do not think that the fact that three of the speeches were delivered in Paris is of great significance, neither as a suggestion of the debate's geographical centre, nor as a weakening of the representability of the chosen texts. The speakers have different backgrounds and therefore relate to the Paris setting differently; Paris constitutes a unique context for each of them. Of course, the spatial and temporal proximity links Jospin's and Prodi's speeches to each other, but this does not mean that their specific speaking conditions were the same.

[6] I have already pointed out that the interconnection between political and academic circles is typical of European debate. I suspect that the media in some ways open the closed political-academic circles to the public, in some ways participate in creating a realm of European discussion that is set off from other areas of political debate, but this is a point that must be substantiated analytically.

deficiency I propose to conduct a textual-intertextual analysis of the kind suggested by the rhetorical scholar Leah Ceccarelli. In a study, the purpose of which is similar to mine although it deals with a different type of meaning formation, Ceccarelli proposes that the close analysis of a text should be supplemented with evidence of the actual responses with which the text was met. Ceccarelli's contention is that it is possible to explain how texts work by exploring the connection between rhetorical strategies and their effects on historical audiences – that is, the relationship between texts and their intertextually established contexts (Ceccarelli, 2001, p. 6).

In my version of the textual-intertextual analysis there are eight texts, namely the two declarations and the six speeches, and the intertextual responses to these texts consist of articles and comments published in newspapers stemming from the five national contexts that are also represented by the speakers.[7] I have chosen to focus on the responses made in newspapers in order to include the broader level of public opinion formation in each of the national contexts. Newspapers are often hailed as being of vital importance to the nation-builders of yore (Anderson, 1991, p. 46), and although the printed press has been experiencing some decline as a result of competition from the electronic media it still plays a central role as national arena for public opinion formation. Moreover, the production of news is today so standardised that most media follow more or less the same agenda; the coverage of one mainstream medium may in many respects be considered representative of the media's coverage as such. In the case of media coverage of political discussions the newspaper is arguably the most comprehensive medium: the papers' traditional affiliation with specific political groups ensures that they take an interest in political issues and allows for some divergence between them. Although most newspapers have today cut their direct connections with political parties and as a matter of course adhere to the same news criteria as all other media, the papers remain the most politically involved of the news media. Many still overtly recognise political leanings, at least on their leader pages, and most devote more attention to political developments and discussions than the other media do.

There is also a purely instrumental reason for choosing the newspapers as the source of intertextual responses to the eight texts: the existence of searchable electronic archives makes the newspapers' coverage of the two declarations and six speeches readily available and allows the

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[7] In order to create total complementarity between texts and contexts, I should also have included responses from European news services. Such services exist – most notable is the *European Voice* that has an actual paper version, but internet services such as *Agence Europe*, *EUObserver*, and *Euractive* should also be mentioned. These services provide an inherently European level of mediation, but are mostly read by people working in or in close contact with the EU's institutions and do not reach a broader public. Although the slight dispersion of the European news services justifies their exclusion somewhat, the main reason for my omission of them is, unfortunately, one of lack of access. Articles from these sources that dated back to May 2000 simply were not available.

generation of compatible sets of data. I have employed two such archives or databases, namely InfoMedia in the case of the Danish context and LexisNexis for the other four.[8] From the totality of available sources 17 newspapers were selected: three from each of the French, German, and Spanish contexts and four from Denmark and England[9] (see table 1).

| Country | **Denmark** | **England** | **France** | **Germany** | **Spain** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| News-papers | *Berlingske Tidende* (*BT*), *Information* (*Inf*), *Jyllands-Posten* (*JP*), *Politiken* (*Pol*) | *Financial Times* (*FT*), *The Guardian* (*Guar*), *The Independent* (*Ind*), *The Times* (*Tim*) | *Le Figaro* (*LF*), *Le Monde* (*LM*), *Libération* (*Lib*) | *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (*SZ*), *taz, die tageszeitung* (*taz*) | *Cinco Días* (*CD*), *El País* (*EP*), *Expansión* (*Exp*) |
| Context[10] | *BT*, *JP*, and *Pol* are Denmark's three major national morning papers. *Inf* is a smaller, intellectual paper included for its full coverage of EU-matters. | *Guar*, *Ind*, and *Tim* are major national dailies. The economic newspaper *FT* is included for its European scope. The absence of tabloids is especially problematic in the English case as the tabloids hold a large share of the market and are very outspoken on European issues. | The French press is particularly politicised; *Lib* is socialist in inclination, *LM* reveres an ideal of balanced, in-depth coverage, but remains attached to left-of-centre goals, and *LF* has Gaullist sympathies | The German press is extremely regionalised. *FAZ*, *SZ*, and *taz* are among the few nationally read newspapers, but having national readerships does not rule out regional attachments as *FAZ* and *SZ* immediately reveal in their titles. | The Spanish press is also regionalised, but three national papers exist, *EP* being the largest. Unfortunately, the other two (*ABC* and *El Mundo*) were not available in the LexisNexis database. *CD* and *Exp* are economic newspapers of the *FT* type. |

*Table 1: Presentation of the 17 newspapers included in the study*

All the chosen newspapers belong to the so-called serious press; there are no tabloids among them and thus 'popular' opinion formation in the somewhat derogatory sense of the word is not represented. The lack of tabloid newspapers is, at least in some national contexts, a major setback for my study's claim of representing mainstream opinion formation. However, I have prioritised cross-national compatibility over national representability, and since I did not have

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[8] Both are electronic databases available to subscribers; I have accessed them through the library of the Copenhagen Business School: http://www.cbs.dk/library.

[9] Although the chosen newspapers are published in all of the UK they all have their base in London and do not necessarily represent Scotch, Welsh or other regional views. In order to avoid the risk of being accused of ignoring regional differences I term the newspapers and the viewpoints they represent English rather than British. However, the newspapers themselves do not seem to make this distinction, and I shall be referring to British views when the coverage does so, but not in my own characterisation of the coverage. A similar argument about the partiality of the represented nationality could be made in the case of the Spanish newspapers. These newspapers do not represent Spanish regional identities such as the Basque or the Catalan, but a term for Spain and the Spanish national identity in the restricted sense that could parallel England and English in the British case does not exist (at least not in the English language). Therefore, all I can do is notice that the Spanish national context presented here is a majority position from which significant regional minorities actively delineate themselves.

[10] The information about the national contexts is obtained from the European Journalism Centre's website (www.ejc.nl), Kuhn (1995), and Seymour-Ure (1996).

access to newspapers of the more popular type from all countries I have chosen to disregard them altogether. The exclusion of popular media of both the printed and the electronic kind can also be justified on the basis of the serious newspapers' special status as both strictly national media and as the media with the most thorough coverage of political issues – European and otherwise.[11]

The papers are in a sense both the least and the most likely arenas for supranational opinion formation to emerge and therefore constitute a particularly interesting field of study. The papers offer one among several possible representations of the national publics – surely their image is a biased one, but just as surely it is influential. My study will not discuss internal differences of the various national contexts; the purpose of the investigation is to compare and contrast the different national versions of the debate. Hence, I will only consider features that are typical of the national representations and enactments of the European debate. The direction towards the interrelations of the contexts is caused by my interest in European opinion formation, but it is also an attempt to cope with the vastness of each national context. Rather than claiming in-depth knowledge of each of the five national contexts, I explicitly and exclusively focus on the contextual information that appears in the selected intertextual material. I explain the characteristics of the national contexts as these emerge from the transnational comparison rather than as a result of studies of each context in isolation. My study is textual and comparative and finds its limitation, but also its main justification in these two traits. At the national level, then, differences will be smoothed over in order to establish a general impression and understanding of emerging commonalities and remaining differences of the European debate as it is articulated in the national contexts.[12]

Having selected the 17 newspapers whose coverage of the two declarations and six speeches is to provide the intertextual dimension of the textual-intertextual analysis, I set specific temporal boundaries around the surveys for intertextual references. In order to facilitate searches that are both precise and exhaustive, the surveyed periods for each studied moment and turning point were limited to ten days (see table 2). When the period is limited to ten days one can set rather

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[11] Nevertheless, the socio-demographic leanings of my data should be recognised. The opinion formation processes that the newspapers reflect and participate in primarily include the intellectual and political elites who beforehand can be estimated to be the most likely to care about European issues and most likely to engage in European debate. This puts restrictions on what I can claim to be studying; I may point out the emergence of common European modes of discussing EU matters, but cannot ascertain the depth of such Europeanisation. However, the data does allow me to draw general conclusions on the limits of the convergence, the point being that if those most likely to discuss the EU in European terms do not do so, then there is little likelihood that such discussions are emerging elsewhere.

[12] This disregard for admittedly salient features in the name of cross-national compatibility also extends to the issue of party politics. I shall not seek to explain the speakers' proposals in terms of party affiliations, but only as they relate to and seek to establish specific national and common European positions.

precise search terms: the speaker's name and "speech" in the case of the six moments and the name of the city in which the Council meeting was held and "declaration" for the two turning points. The results include all the relevant articles published within the ten days, and the sets of data are not unmanageably large. See appendix 9 for a list of all the articles of the eight ten-day samples; each sample will be presented in detail in the course of the textual-intertextual analysis.

| Turning point/moment | Survey period |
|---|---|
| Fischer's speech, 12th of May 2000 | 10/05/00 – 19/05/00 |
| Aznar's speech, 26th of September 2000 | 24/09/00 – 03/10/00 |
| Blair's speech, 6th of October 2000 | 04/10/00 –13/10/00 |
| The Nice Declaration, 7th-9th of December 2000 | 05/12/00 – 14/12/00 |
| Jospin's speech, 28th of May 2001 | 26/05/01 – 04/06/01 |
| Prodi's speech, 29th of May 2001 | 27/05/01 – 05/06/01 |
| Lykketoft's speech, 23rd of August 2001 | 21/08/01 – 30/08/01 |
| The Laeken Declaration, 14th-15th of December 2001 | 12/12/01 – 21/12/01 |

*Table 2: The turning points/moments and their corresponding survey periods*

## 4.3. Scope and representability of the study

When studying something as large and as complex as the meaning formation in the communicative network constituting the debate on the future of Europe one cannot possibly cover everything, and it is necessary to focus the investigation on specific arenas and concrete events. That is what I have done with my choice of the two declarations, the six speeches and the coverage of these eight events by newspapers published in five national contexts. The eight events and five contexts are not representative of the debate as such, but the in-depth study of them can yield insights into the specific dynamics of meaning making that are important in their own right. Moreover, the choice of the five national contexts means that most of the major groupings that have typically dominated the cross-national EU-dialogue are represented in the study.[13]

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[13] I here present categories that are established on the basis of features that pertain to each nation-state regardless of the political orientation of the incumbent government. Of course, there are also cross-national alliances based on party affiliations, but at the governmental level these are not always dominating. For example, it is common knowledge to commentators on European affairs that Blair's New Labour views and Aznar's Conservative position were often in agreement. And the commentators also agree that when Lionel Jospin was still the French Prime Minister the social democratic German chancellor Gerhard Schröder nevertheless worked better with the Gaullist French president Jacques Chirac than with the socialist PM.

It is often said that the process of European integration was begun in order to prevent France and Germany from ever going to war against each other again. Bearing this in mind it is hardly surprising that both of these countries have traditionally been positive towards European integration and that many conceptions of the integration process view co-operation between France and Germany as the 'motor' of integration. France and Germany represent the original and the integrationist EU-members, and like the UK they are also large member-states. England (and the British government, but not necessarily other British nations like the Scots or the Welsh) has since its entry into the EC in 1973 taken a more tentative position, and Denmark, which entered the community at the same time as Britain, has often held similar sceptical views. Denmark, moreover, is a small country and a northern one, whereas Spain is a medium-sized, southern country. Spain, with its entry in 1986, also represents the group of recent members with a shorter democratic history[14] than the original and medium-term members.

The five chosen national contexts represent large, medium and small member states as well as founding, medium-term and recently entered members. Furthermore, both the North-South and the integrationist-sceptic divides are represented. However, it should also be admitted that the choice of these five contexts is conditioned by my ability to understand the languages of these contexts, and by my realisation that five would probably be the maximum number of national contexts that I would be able to handle. The necessary delineation of the specific elements of the vast material that I have chosen to study has, then, to some extent been predetermined by these constraints. Nevertheless, I feel confident that the chosen texts and contexts can provide insights into important features of the multitudinous processes of meaning making. If a discussion of European matters that transcends national discourse – a European public sphere – is emergent or is to emerge, it will surely be as an admixture of elements that are already existent at the national levels. By studying the five chosen contexts, one should be able to locate synergies between nationally bound discussions, out of which a genuinely European debate could form, if such synergies exist at all. Hence, I submit that the chosen set of data is adequate for a comparative study of various national articulations of the debate on the future of Europe that aims at locating indications of the emergence of a genuinely supranational mode of discussion while remaining sensitive to persistent national differences.

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[14] The countries that entered in the 1990s – Austria, Sweden, and Finland – do not share this feature, but the Eastern European countries included in the present round of enlargement do.

**4.4. Presentation of the analyses**

In my usage, the conceptual pair of trajectory and turning point and the textual-intertextual mode of analysis primarily serve as means of organisation, as guidelines for selecting and ordering the empirical material. The investigation of the selected material will consist of two analytical rounds. In the first round of analysis (chapter 5) the six speeches, two declarations, and the newspapers' coverage of them will be presented. Here, I shall focus on the speaker- and audience-positions, the personae, and the agency options created in the eight main texts. Furthermore, I shall seek to establish the relationships between the texts and the responses to them, and I shall describe the dynamic of the debate as it unfolds chronologically. The purpose of the first round of analysis is to create an overview of the sequence of events and the communicative network of which the debate consists and to provide a first characterisation of the positions available to the participants in the debate.

The former aim entails a focus on public opinion formation, and here convergences and persisting disparities will be established. To that end, I shall be especially attentive to the centripetal and centrifugal forces of the debate. The search for unifying and diversifying features is inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin's understanding that these two opposite dynamics co-exist in any communicative process (Farmer, 1998, p. xviii). Analysis of these forces not only illuminates the different existing versions of the debate, but also points to conservative and reformatory elements of the discussions. In order to reach the second aim of the first round of analysis – establishment of the positions and proposals forwarded by the participants in the debate – I shall prioritise the issue of collective identity formation. In the first round of analysis I shall explore how first, second, and third personae are constituted in the utterances, and seek to establish how the identification of the various personae enables and delimits further participation in the debate. At this stage legitimation will be studied primarily in the speaker's direct appeal to legitimacy and in the two declarations' establishment of official positions that are perceived as being legitimate. That is, I shall be introducing the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion as political actors addressing the broader public explicitly conceive it.

The second round of analysis (chapter 6) concentrates on the spatio-temporal relations that are established within the individual utterances and on the substantial and formal features that link the various utterances to each other. Whereas the first round of debate is conducted chronologically and relies heavily on the notions of the trajectory and the turning point as well as on the textual-intertextual mode of analysis, the second round is conceptually guided and studies the

utterances according to generic categories. During this investigation the concepts of *topos*, *kairos*, and chronotope will take over the guiding role, which the trajectory-turning point and textual-intertextual distinctions played in the first analytical round. The final analytical moment in which generic and dynamic features will be brought together will be steered by the concept of *telos*. These four analytical concepts – of which three were briefly mentioned in the establishment of the rhetorical perspective – will be introduced further when they are taken into use.

The purpose of the second round of investigation is to explain how meaning is created within and between the utterances. General assessments of the five national versions of the debate on the future of Europe will be made, and it will be discussed whether and how a debate that transcends national contexts and takes on genuinely European proportions may be emerging. The analysis will culminate in an empirically informed reconsideration of the relationships between legitimacy, identity and opinion formation in the context of the EU, and on that basis the evaluation of the theories of European constitution will be conducted.

Since both rounds of analysis deal with the same set of texts there will be some overlap between them. Yet the two rounds have different explanatory purposes, wherefore the recurrence will hopefully not become circular. To sum up the analytical procedure and the purposes of the two analytical rounds it could be said that the first deals primarily with the what of the debate and that the second focuses on the how. First, I shall be looking at what meanings are articulated in the different contexts and what developments occurred in the debate as a whole, establishing the main features of the various contexts and the general developments of the debate as such. Second, I shall seek to explain how the meanings were constituted and explore the various modes of national and European meaning formation.

Common to both rounds of analysis is the general concern with explaining the meaning formation of the debate in terms of the interdependency between the general and the particular, the established and the emerging. Moreover, the rhetorical-social scientific understanding of public opinion formation, identification, legitimation and the relationships between these three processes constantly guides the analytical endeavour. A final unifying feature is that the entire study is conducted from within the constitutionist rhetorical perspective. The study is aimed at explaining how meaning is formed in concrete situations and processes and all analytical insights and conclusions remain hermeneutically bound to the utterances under study.

# 5.

# First round of analysis

The first round of analysis proceeds chronologically. I shall treat each of the six moments in the two trajectories by first presenting the speech in question and then turning to the newspapers' coverage of it. When analysing the reactions to the speeches, I shall divide the coverage according to national contexts. When studying the reactions to the two Council declarations that mark the turning points of the debate I shall treat the press coverage as a whole. This choice of analytical strategy in a sense reflects Jürgen Habermas' suggestion that a common European public sphere emerges during Council meetings (Habermas, 2001, p. 9), but it also aims at discerning how convergent the coverage actually is. By treating the press coverage of the moments and the turning points in these two different ways I seek to emphasise both differences between the national contexts and European similarities.

A note should be made on the quotation practice employed in the analytical sections. When quoting from or referring to the speeches and declarations I indicate the corresponding line-numbers of the texts as they appear in the appendices. When referring to newspaper articles I indicate the paper in which the article appeared and the date of appearance; further information enabling the reader to relocate the article in question can be found in appendix 9. In order to promote the readability of the text, I have relegated references to lists of articles to footnotes, and only include such references in the text when dealing with direct quotes. Also for the sake of readability, I have chosen to render all quotations in English, and readers wishing to consult the original texts are referred to the appendices. Although I have had recourse to English versions of all the speeches (except Aznar's which to the best of my knowledge only exists in Spanish), the analyses of both speeches and articles are primarily based on the original texts, and I am myself responsible for the correctness of all translations. The declarations exist in all the EU's official languages, and I have chosen to work exclusively with the English versions of these.[1]

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[1] I recognise that the question of translation is not an unproblematic one, but I have chosen to bracket the language issue as far as possible in order to study differences and similarities of formal and substantial features within and between national contexts. If such bracketing is not performed, it seems that one has to resort to *a priori* acceptance of Grimm's assertion about the lack of a European level of public debate, and in that case this study would have ended before it was begun.

## 5.1. Trajectory one: deepening and widening

The first of the two trajectories begins with Fischer's speech from the 12th of May 2000 and ends with the turning point of the Nice Summit. Fischer's speech and the utterances by Aznar and Blair mark the three moments of the trajectory. As mentioned, I shall first present the constitution of personae and agency of each speech and then account for the reactions to the speeches as these appeared in the press coverage of the five national contexts.

### 5.1.1. "Erosion or integration" – Fischer in Berlin

*Presentation of the speech*

On the 12th of May 2000 the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer addressed an immediate audience of students, diplomats, and journalists[2] at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Under the heading "From Confederacy to Federation – thoughts on the finality of European integration"[3] he presented his visions for Europe.

According to Fischer the EU is currently facing two main challenges: the processes of widening the Union by accepting new member states and deepening the political integration of the EU. Fischer sees these processes as being necessarily connected; he claims that enlargement, in itself an undeniable process, makes deeper integration necessary. The pending enlargement is one of the main reasons why the finality for Europe, in Fischer's opinion, must be the development of a European Federation that is based on a constitutional text.

*Constitution of personae*

In the Humboldt-speech Joschka Fischer carefully points out that he is not speaking on behalf of the German government. He asks the audience to allow him to step out of the role of foreign minister for the duration of the speech (ll. 20-23) and announces his speaking position to be that of a convinced European and German parliamentarian (ll. 31-32). The reason for this positioning, Fischer says, is that he wants to contribute to the fundamental and conceptual public discussion on the future of Europe and the finality[4] of the European project, and the official role may restrict such public reflection (ll. 20-32). In a second round of explicit positioning Fischer adds one more reason for speaking as a private person: he does not want to cause the anger or fear of anybody. Here,

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[2] According to *Financial Times'* report from the event (*FT* 13/05/00).

[3] "Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration."

[4] It should be noted that the conventional English understanding of finality as something completed and irrevocable is at odds with the French and German usage of the term, which refers to the aim or purpose of something (Walker, 2002, p. 1).

Fischer appeals to "all the Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel" and asks them not to "produce the big headlines" (ll. 196-198).

By removing the weight of officialdom from his words, Fischer creates a speaking position that gives him maximum freedom to speak his mind without causing an outrage. Yet in assuming that his speech will be heard and taken seriously by other audiences than the immediate one, Fischer seems to take for granted that his position is authoritative, whereby he creates a tension between the pledged speaking position and the presupposed agency. Even if Fischer is speaking as a private person he assumes that he has the power to set the European agenda, an act that arguably must be performed from an official position in order to succeed.

The reference to the Eurosceptics is the speech's first attempt to anticipate negative reactions. Another anticipatory move is performed during the discussion of the federation Fischer sees as the ultimate aim of the European integration process (ll. 281-283). Through the two anticipations, Fischer positions the Eurosceptics in general and the British in particular in relation to the speech. He recognises that people who are resistant towards the EU may overhear the speech, but does not invite these people to consider whether his arguments might hold any persuasive force for them. Instead of engaging in dialogue with these parties, Fischer divides them off from the primary audience of the speech. By asking sceptics to keep quiet and telling them not to become annoyed at his choice of words or fear his theses (ll. 200-201), Fischer positions the Eurosceptic persona as a passive one, a third persona without agency in the debate that the speech seeks to initiate.

The second persona that Fischer creates is decidedly pro-European, but Fischer also projects a sense of national identity that may appeal to hesitant and unresolved listeners. "Europe is not a new continent," says Fischer, "but full of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. The nation-states are realities that cannot be thought away, and the more globalisation and Europeanisation create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the people will hold on to the nation-states that mediate security" (ll. 221-226). The European citizens with their national identities and the nation-states that represent these identities, then, are presented as active personae, participants in the realisation of Fischer's goals.

The audience, to whom the arguments about the necessity of political integration and the national involvement in this process are addressed, is first and foremost German. In the course of the historic narrative, Fischer repeatedly presents that which is generally true for Europe as being *a fortiori* true for Germany. This goes for the fatal price a backward move or

a standstill in integration would demand (ll. 48-52), the historical lessons about the value of integration (ll. 80-82), the consequences of European division and its termination (ll. 92-97), the damaging effect it would have if all the European states were not bound by an overarching order (ll. 114-117), and for the national interests inherent in enlargement (l. 160). Thus, Fischer consistently identifies the Germans with proposals for deeper European integration, thereby positioning them as the most European of Europeans. The identity Fischer envisions for his German audience corresponds exactly to the dual identity with which he has endowed himself: European and German.

Fischer excludes one group, the Eurosceptics, and especially the British Eurosceptics, from his address and identifies another, the Germans, completely with his own position. In the speech Fischer mentions a third national group, the French, whom he projects as being closely allied with the Germans in the creation of Europe. The French and the German personae are not the only national agents that are positioned as active participants in the realisation of Fischer's vision for the future of Europe. However, France, Germany, and other non-specified integrationist member states hold especially important agencies as they may unite in a "centre of gravity" and constitute "the avant-garde" or "locomotive" for the completion of political integration (ll. 364-365).

Fischer's positioning of himself and his main audiences is an attempt to overcome the division between national and European identity that Eurosceptics pose as their prime cause for resistance to the European project. However, Fischer does not directly aim to dissuade the sceptics of their present beliefs. Instead, he constitutes identities for his primary audience – defined in national terms as the French and the Germans – that impair scepticism as such. Fischer does not create one exclusive audience position, but he does attempt to set the stage for future debate in such a way that it requires participants to identify with a positive and constructive stance towards the EU. In this setting, limiting the EU's powers is not an option (ll. 12-15, ll. 48-52 and ll. 297-298), and the main issue for further discussion is how the European finality can best be conceptualised and obtained. Only speakers willing to accept these preconditions are endowed with agency in Fischer's framing of the debate.

### 5.1.2. Fischer and the final federation – the press coverage of Fischer's speech

*Germany: surveying the reactions to the speech*

The German sample consists of a total of 26 pieces, three of which are commentaries; figure 5 provides an overview of the articles and the sequence in which they were published. The coverage takes its starting point in recent criticisms of Fischer: he has been accused of having lost his energy and power of initiative, and the speech is seen as an answer to these charges.[5] On a more general note, Fischer is said to be responding to the citizens' waning support for the European project.[6] The articles published right after the delivery of the speech have taken up Fischer´s account of the double challenges of enlarging the EU and reforming its institutional structure, and they present the speech as an attempt to tackle these two challenges.[7]



*Figure 5: The German coverage of Fischer's speech*

Later articles attend to different reactions to the speech. The groups whose voices are heard include: the German opposition, the French government and other French political actors, the British press and British politicians of both government and opposition, a number of smaller member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.[8] In the cacophony of

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[5] *SZ* 12/05/00, *taz* 13/05/00D.
[6] *SZ* 13/05/00A.
[7] *taz* 13/05/00A+C, *SZ* 13/05/00A.
[8] *taz* 15/05/00B, *SZ* 15/05/00B, *SZ* 16/05/00, *taz* 17/05/00, *SZ* 17/05/00B, *SZ* 18/05/00A,C,D+E, *FAZ* 18/05/00, *SZ* 19/05/00A, *FAZ* 19/05/00. The reactions, with the exception of the British, are by and large presented as being positive. Some nuances are provided in the coverage of the German opposition's and the members of the European Parliament's reactions; here elements of the speech are criticised, but the initiative and the general direction of Fischer's proposals are complimented. Only one article, entitled "Europe needs no visions" (*taz* 15/05/00B), leaves the impression that the speech was mostly met with scepticism.

voices a warm French tone of approval rings through clearly. And this tone is picked up in a number of articles that ponder whether Fischer's speech will impact the Franco-German relationship positively.[9]

The possibility of implementing Fischer's ideas is discussed in several articles. The views expressed range from the hope that Fischer's initiative will spark more discussion to the claim that Fischer's ideas will form part of a common Franco-German proposal for the institutional reforms that are to prepare the EU for enlargement.[10] Between these extremes lie the lament that Fischer did not include specific proposals for the current IGC, the irritation that he did not present his ideas officially, and the call to transform the thoughts into action.[11]

### *France: let the debate begin*

The French ten-day sample contains 28 articles in all (see figure 6); 6 of the texts are commentaries and there is one leader. In the French coverage Fischer's speech is sometimes perceived in the context of preparing for enlargement.[12] Also, it is presented in the context of the upcoming French EU-presidency and the IGC to be held during that presidency.[13] But most importantly, the speech is seen as an attempt to launch a broad and fundamental debate on European finality.[14] Fischer's speech is said to break with a reportedly dominant "minimalist" or "realist" approach to integration in which only goals that are immediately realisable can be discussed. Repeatedly, it is stated that Fischer's speech provides an opportunity, which should not be ignored.[15]

Having set the context for reception of Fischer's message, the French coverage attends to a number of reactions to the speech,[16] and a substantial part of the sample is made up of first-hand responses in the form of evaluative articles. All of the evaluative pieces view Fischer's statement positively: they all applaud the initiative, most agree with the overall goal of the speech, and some take up the detailed discussion of what will be the best means of achieving the commonly perceived end. The tone is struck by a *Le Monde* leader (15/05/00A) entitled "Danke schön, M.

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[9] *SZ* 17/05/00A, *SZ* 18/05/00B+C, *SZ* 19/05/00B.

[10] *SZ* 17/05/00A, *SZ* 18/05/00A.

[11] *FAZ* 18/05/00, *taz* 16/05/00, *SZ* 17/05/00B.

[12] *LF* 13/05/00, *Lib* 13/05/00, *Lib* 16/05/00. The claim that the enlargement process must be accompanied with deeper political integration is widely accepted.

[13] *Lib* 13/05/00, *LM* 13/05/00B, *LM* 15/05/00D, *Lib* 19/05/00C+D. The question is whether Fischer's proposals come at a convenient time or not.

[14] *LM* 11/05/00, *LF* 12/05/00, *Lib* 15/05/00, *LM* 15/05/00B+D, *Lib* 16/05/00, *Lib* 19/05/00.

[15] *LM* 13/05/00, *Lib* 15/05/00, *LM* 15/05/00B+D, *Lib* 19/05/00D, *LF* 19/05/00A.

[16] Among the mentioned reactions are those of the French, German, and British politicians of both government and opposition parties (*LM* 13/05/00A+B, *LF* 13/05/00, *Lib* 13/05/00, *LM* 15/05/00D-F, *Lib* 15/05/00, *LF* 18/05/00A, *Lib* 19/05/00C+D, *LF* 19/05/00A).

Fischer," and it reaches its climax in *Le Figaro*'s editor's call for the French government to present its own vision, "because that which Berlin has started, France should conclude" (19/05/00B).

*Figure 6: The French coverage of Fischer's speech*



*England: who's afraid of Joschka Fischer?*

The English sample has two commentaries and one letter out of a total of 19 articles (see figure 7).

*Figure 7: The English coverage of Fischer's speech*



The one article that precedes Fischer's speech sets the intervention in the context of a recent survey that shows the German support for the European project to be declining.[17] The focus of the first four articles that follow Fischer's speech is his attempt to strengthen the Franco-German axis.[18] These articles all mention Fischer's assurance that the ideas presented in the speech and the use of the

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[17] *Tim* 11/05/00.
[18] *Tim* 13/05/00, *Ind* 13/05/00, *Guar* 13/05/00, *FT* 13/05/00.

term federation are not meant as a provocation and should not be feared. Yet all articles convey a general understanding of the speech as having a negative impact on the British government's relations to Germany and on the British position in the EU as such. This understanding is either presented as the central meaning of the speech,[19] or it emerges in British reactions to it.[20] The reactions of the British Labour government and the Conservative opposition are given equal attention, and both reactions seem to follow consistent patterns. The Conservatives are presented as being furious at Fischer's proposals, but satisfied that he has "…blown the lid off Europe's superstate agenda" (*Ind* 14/05/00). The government emphasises that Fischer's is a minority position and a personal view, but also claims that the existence of positions such as his underlines the importance of continued British involvement in Europe.

Following the first days' focus on the content of the speech and the immediate responses by the British government and opposition, the coverage is broadened to include other reactions and to consider the wider context of the speech. The reported reactions include those of French and German politicians and of the European Commission.[21] Furthermore, direct responses in the form of commentaries now appear, and these commentaries display a willingness to take up Fischer's invitation and discuss his proposals constructively that is not present anywhere else in the English coverage.[22]

The vast majority of the English coverage of Fischer's speech is centred upon the theme of whether or not the speech presents a threat to Britain's position in Europe.[23] Seemingly unable or unwilling to discuss the substance of Fischer's proposals, the newspaper coverage of the speech and the reactions to it focuses on tactical aspects especially as they pertain to the upcoming summit at Nice – what alliances are being forged? What negotiating positions are available? The

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[19] "Britain was given notice yesterday that it faced being isolated from a new 'fast-track' European federation" (*Tim* 13/05/00). "Germany is pulling away from Britain and moving closer to France again as it seeks to build up a federalist Europe" (*Ind* 13/05/00).

[20] *Ind* 13/05/00, *Tim* 13/05/00, *Guar* 13/05/00, *Ind* 14/05/00.

[21] *FT* 16/05/00, *Guar* 16/05/00, *FT* 18/05/00, *Guar* 18/05/00, *Tim* 19/05/00A+B, *Guar* 19/05/00.

[22] The lone letter of the sample (*Tim* 17/05/00) is authored by Andrew Duff, a British Liberal Democrat member of the European Parliament and fervent federalist, and one commentary (*FT* 19/05/00A) is by Dominique Moisi, deputy director of the French Institute for International Relations. The identities of these commentators account for their willingness to participate in the debate as Fischer proposes it should be conducted. The other commentary (*FT* 18/05/00) is written by two *Financial Times* reporters and, unsurprisingly, it also proves willing to discuss Fischer's propositions positively.

[23] The theme of the connection between institutional reform and enlargement is mentioned in passing (*Guar* 13/05/00) or presented as one of Fischer's reasons why France and Germany need to collaborate closely (*FT* 13/05/00). In the British context it is, however, also possible to use the pending enlargement as an argument against conducting fundamental discussions at the moment (*Tim* 19/05/00).

broader prospects of a debate on the finality of Europe is welcomed by a few enthusiasts, but generally it is "…met with a frosty silence from Britain" (*Guar* 18/05/00).

*Denmark: interferences in the euro-debate*

There are nine articles in the Danish sample (see figure 8), eight news stories and one commentary. In the Danish coverage Fischer's speech is frequently seen in the context of the upcoming Danish referendum on accession to the EMU and the single European currency.[24] Fischer's speech coincides with an intervention into the Danish euro-debate by Commission President Romano Prodi, and both statements are taken to reveal that accession to the common currency is a thoroughly political process.



Figure 8: The Danish coverage of Fischer's speech

The contextualisation of the speech in terms of the Danish euro-debate includes Danish politicians' reactions to it. The Eurosceptics and advocates of a 'no' in the referendum are reported to be happy with the honesty of the proposals whereas proponents of a 'yes' seek to downplay Fischer's message and the role it will have.[25] There is some disagreement over the importance and potential impact of the speech at the European level.[26] However, it is characteristic of all the Danish coverage that it only discusses Fischer's speech actively when the utterance is reinterpreted as a contribution to the national discussion of Denmark's affiliation with the EU in

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[24] *Pol* 13/05/00A+B, *JP* 14/05/00, *Pol* 14/05/00A, *Pol* 18/05/00. The referendum was held on the 28th of September 2000 and resulted in a rejection of the euro by a majority of the voters (53.2 % voted against, 46.8% in favour).

[25] *Pol* 13/05/00A+B. The Eurosceptics, of course, disagree with everything Fischer says and only applaud his honesty. In a similar vein, one article reports that while the Danish supporters of further European integration emphasise the substantial differences between their own and Fischer's views, they welcome the broader debate to which the speech contributes (*Pol* 14/05/00A).

[26] *Pol* 14/05/00A, *Inf* 16/05/00.

general and the euro in particular. The broader European debate that Fischer's speech is said to inspire is typically reported rather than enacted.[27]

*Spain: the placid bystander*

The Spanish ten-day sample consists of only six articles (see figure 9), one of which is a commentary. In the Spanish coverage of Fischer's speech, the discussion of European political integration is typically related to the thematic of how to ensure the EU's economic strength.[28] Fischer's emphasis on the connection between enlarging the EU and strengthening its political dimension is not mentioned at all.

*Figure 9: The Spanish coverage of Fischer's speech*

The most frequently emphasised issue is the question of the Franco-German relationship. Several articles state that Fischer's speech should be seen as an attempt to revive the connection, and the French reception of the German invitation is also a recurrent theme.[29] In all articles it is agreed that the Franco-German ties are no longer as close as they once were, but there are different interpretations of the effect Fischer's speech will have on the relationship.

The reactions of other countries than France are only mentioned one time. Here it is stated that "…although it [the speech] is hair-raising to some Eurosceptics in London and Copenhagen, or even Madrid, it contributes decisively to reactivating the debate on the construction

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[27] The exception to this rule is the sample's lone commentary (*Pol* 14/05/00B). Here *Politiken*'s editor in chief discusses Fischer's proposals from the perspective that a European Federation is a legitimate and laudable project precisely because it would not be based on one common European people.
[28] *Exp* 13/05/00, *Exp* 17/05/00B.
[29] *EP* 14/05/00, *Exp* 17/05/00A+B, *Exp* 19/05/00.

of Europe that was languishing" (*EP* 16/05/00).[30] Fischer's attempt at igniting a debate on the future of Europe is recorded by the Spanish newspapers but the issue is not explored at any length.

### 5.1.3. Personae offered in and responses given to Fischer's speech

Joschka Fischer seeks to create a situation in which his own first persona is endowed with a high degree of freedom to address an audience of likeminded citizens. The first and second personae are largely identified with each other – they are individuals with national identities that neither hamper their pro-European sentiments nor their participation in the ongoing project of European integration. Fischer frames his speech as the visions of a private person thereby both seeking to put himself on equal terms with the European citizens at large, calling for broad public debate, and to take the edge off the more radical of his propositions. However, Fischer seeks to set the terms of debate so as to exclude Eurosceptics from the discussion, and the actual scope of the dialogue he invites may also be limited by the fact that only incumbent politicians inhabit the formal positions necessary to carry out Fischer's suggestions. Although Fischer allegedly speaks as a private person the authority with which he makes his claims and the matter of course with which he assumes that they will make an impact, reveal that he himself is not willing to abandon the position of the statesman.

A few articles in the German coverage attend to the personal reasons Fischer may have for delivering the speech and thereby do see the utterance as a statement by Fischer, the private person. However, the majority of the German coverage and the entirety of the coverage in the four other national settings see the speech as an official statement by the German government, Fischer´s claims to the contrary not withstanding. Thus, the responses ignore Fischer's postulated first persona, but this does not go against Fischer's articulated meaning, since his words would probably not have the impact he envisions if they were actually stated by a 'nobody.' However, the perceived incumbency of the speaker means that the ostensible address to 'everybody' only elicits reactions from the highest political circles. The broad public debate is not enacted, but the dialogue between Europe's leading politicians has begun.

There are significant similarities between the coverage of each national press that indicate a common understanding and general acceptance of Fischer's speech as a call for debate on the future of Europe. However, Fischer's more specific creations of personae are reacted to

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[30] The ability of the speech to inspire further debate is also a theme in an article that judges French reactions to be ambiguous (*Exp* 19/05/00), and it is mentioned in one further article (*Exp* 17/05/00A).

differently in the various settings. The German and the French coverage by and large accept the role of the second persona that Fischer offers to these nations, and the presented reactions generally take on the agency ascribed to this persona. The English newspapers focus on the role of the third persona Fischer ascribes to them, but are not content with keeping quiet. Rather, they bring out the big headlines and warning signs, thus, speaking squarely against Fischer's request. The Danish and the Spanish reports do not relate directly to any of the positions offered in Fischer's speech. The Spanish coverage stays loyal to the terms of engagement set out by Fischer and reports on the reactions of those that are in the offered positions without identifying with these. The Danish reporting recontextualises the debate in terms of the pending national referendum on the euro, thereby endowing the speech with a meaning and assuming an agency that is decidedly outside the proposals and positions forwarded by Fischer. Figure 10 illustrates the relationships between the personae offered in Fischer's speech and the reactions of the national press coverage.



*Figure 10: The personae offered in and responses given to Fischer's speech*

### 5.1.4. "I am ready to share new and greater responsibilities" – Aznar in Paris

*Presentation of the speech*

On the 26th of September 2000 José María Aznar, the Spanish president of government at the time,[31] spoke at the French Institute of International Relations on the topic of the future of Europe. Aznar was in Paris at the invitation of the Institute; during the visit he also held unofficial meetings with Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin and was interviewed by *Le Figaro*.[32]

In the speech Aznar sets his visions for Europe within the context of simultaneous geographical enlargement and political deepening of the Union. The purpose of the speech is to present solutions to the "deepening-widening dilemma" (l. 50). Throughout the speech Aznar presents himself as a pragmatic integrationist. His goal, he says, is to create a political entity that is as capable of action and as responsive to the citizens' demands as possible – an efficient, flexible, and dynamic European Union.

*Constitution of personae*

At the opening of the speech Aznar announces that he will be setting out the Spanish orientation in the ongoing debate on the future of Europe (l. 13). He introduces himself to the audience by stating that he is "…a clear participant in a profound integration process and […] ready to share new and greater responsibilities" (ll. 6-7). Aznar speaks in the name of "his government" (l. 19), "being Spanish" (l. 37 and 134), and his proposals are said to comply with "Spanish interests" (ll. 19-20). The speech presents "the principles that form the Spanish position" (l. 49), setting forth that which "Spain aspires to" (l. 68) and which "Spain desires" (l. 96). In sum, Aznar speaks as the Spanish head of state, and in doing so he identifies his own position with an official Spanish persona; it is the relationship between this official national persona and the European Union that is developed in the speech.

Aznar initially takes a positive and active stance towards Europe, and he presents Spain and all other member states as being subjected to the common European interest saying that the EU is constituted on the basis of a "deeply rooted will of belonging" (l. 38). In elaborating on the tension between the national and European levels of governance

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[31] Before the parliamentary elections of the 14th of March 2004 Aznar had announced that he would step down from office. However, he had surely not planned that his conservative Partido Popular would have to concede the incumbency to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and his socialist party.

[32] According to the coverage by *El País* and *Le Figaro* (*EP* 26/09/00, *EP* 28/09/00, *LF* 27/09/00). Aznar spoke in French, albeit "with a strong Spanish accent" (*EP* 27/09/00); however, I have only been able to locate the speech in a Spanish translation, wherefore the following analysis is based on the Spanish text.

Aznar also seems to opt for the European side of the scale. He maintains that the formation of a "Europe a la Carte" is an undesirable development and concludes: "We have to guarantee the common stem and avoid the birth of various Europes" (ll. 78-79).

Aznar presents his own persona as being decidedly pro-European and also offers a pro-European stance to his audience. Yet he recognises that European integration has its limits: "The European states are very jealous of their national and international identities, and the modification in the competencies of the Union should continue to be submitted to the agreement of all" (ll. 114-116). Although Aznar repeatedly calls for their resolution, the tensions between diverse national interests and the common European position run through the entirety of the speech. The question of how European commonality may arise remains unanswered, meaning that both the first and second personae that Aznar creates are ridden with tension. Aznar may speak of European unity as the goal, but the nation is positioned as the main actor, who either demonstrates European sentiment or performs on the European stage (ll. 247-256).

The speech is directed to the immediate audience at the French Institute of International Relations, to which reference is made at both the beginning and the end of the intervention (ll. 3-4 and l. 255). Also, the speech directs itself to other heads of state; Aznar makes explicit reference to a recent intervention by French President Jacques Chirac (ll. 4-5 and ll. 90-93), and his discussion of the terminology of federation and constitution implicitly refers to Fischer's proposals (l. 106). Towards the end of the speech it becomes quite clear that Aznar sees his primary audience as the political elite rather than a larger public. He states: "With this [the proposals set forth] I am sure that we can generate the respect and adhesion of our citizens, and it is up to us, the European politicians, not to disappoint this new favourable predisposition" (ll. 245-246).

There is very little address outside the narrow circle of academics and politicians. Although Aznar identifies himself with Spain, the speech does not contain any explicit appeal to the Spanish – they are neither asked to identify with Aznar personally or with the vision of Spain in Europe he sets out.[33] Furthermore, Aznar identifies Spain with Europe, and presents his speech as an intervention in an ongoing European debate, but he does not specify what it means to be European, nor does he align himself clearly within the

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[33] Aznar is speaking on behalf of the Spanish not to them. The lack of invitation to active identification also means that the speech offers no concrete points of contestation.

debate. References to "the European idea" (l. 40), "the common European interest" (l. 141) and the like do not add up to any clear sense of Europeanness.

Aznar's self-avowed pragmatism means the position on specific matters may be perfectly clear, but it provides no overall sense of direction to guide the proposals for the future. The pragmatism makes it possible for Aznar to manoeuvre freely, but it also means that no stable audience persona is established in the context of the broader public debate on the future of Europe. There is, however, a quite clear sense of who is excluded from European co-operation and from participating in the debate. The first excluded group, who all EU-members define themselves against and actively oppose, is defined explicitly as "…the enemies of democracy and freedom called nationalist exclusivity, ethnic tyranny and terrorism" (ll. 237-238). The second silenced group is cut off from the debate through the strong emphasis on the co-ordination of national and European interests. Neither total rejection nor total embracement of Europe is an option, and uncompromising scepticism as well as fervent federalism is relegated to the third persona. In Aznar's conception of the debate all tenable proposals must aim at balancing the national and the European.

### 5.1.5. Aznar and silence – the press coverage of Aznar's speech

The ten-day surveys of Danish, English, French, German and Spanish newspapers only yielded six articles (see figure 11), one is the above-mentioned *Le Figaro* interview and the rest are news stories or notes, one of which appeared in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the rest in *El País*. The Danish and English press did not contribute to the sample at all. The six articles do not deal exclusively with the speech, but mention it along with the other items on the agenda of Aznar's visit to Paris. Also, the theme of Europe's future takes second place to the issue of the fight against terrorism.[34]

The *FAZ* article is a mere note announcing Aznar's visit to Paris. *Le Figaro's* interview presents some information on Aznar's attitude towards the EU's future developments. Here it is noted that "in dealing with the European debate […] José María Aznar sees himself as being pragmatic before all else" (*LF* 27/09/00), and Aznar's main opinions and objectives are presented. One of the Spanish articles (*EP* 27/09/00B) also deals with these issues, citing both the main points of *Le Figaro's* interview and of Aznar's speech. This is the only article that pays any attention to other politicians' reactions to Aznar's views. It is reported that "…the president of the

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[34] Thus, we are reminded that this issue was on the public agenda long before the 11th of September 2001.

French Republic, Jacques Chirac, expressed to the journalists that his points of view and those of Aznar on 'almost the totality' of the European agenda 'are very close'" (*EP* 27/09/00B). The three other Spanish articles focus almost exclusively on the theme of terrorism, barely mention that the upcoming summit at Nice is also on the agenda, and do not present the broader debate on the future of Europe at all.



*Figure 11: The press coverage of Aznar's speech*

### 5.1.6. *Personae offered in and responses given to Aznar's speech*

Aznar positions his first persona as an authoritative statesman who speaks on behalf of the Spanish people and is able to act freely in the European context. The second persona that he creates is that of like-minded leading politicians, and the speech does not hold any invitation to broader public debate on the presented views specifically or the future of Europe generally. Although the speech does set forth the official Spanish position in Europe and on matters of future European reform, it does not call for discussion of these views.

Aznar invites both the general public and the circle of politicians to take note of the Spanish position, but whereas the public is placed in the entirely passive role of the spectator, the politicians are Aznar's equal partners in the realisation of the European project. Although Aznar does not explicitly request dialogue it is clear that the second personae of the European politicians – and to some extent of the academics in the immediate audience – are influential partners in Aznar's pragmatic project.

Aznar asks everyone to identify with a middle position in which neither purely national nor purely European stances are feasible, and he asks his fellow politicians to participate in the process of negotiating solutions that are acceptable to all. However, he does not seek to enhance

the debate on the general questions of what the EU is and what it should be, and he does not invite the public to participate in such discussions. In Aznar's conception of the EU and the debate on its future only politicians are endowed with agency. Thus, it is quite fitting and in line with the meaning constituted in the speech that it should be met with silence in the mediated public sphere. Aznar's utterance is a presentation of his views not an invitation to discuss them. The relationship between the personae that Aznar offers and the (lacking) response to them is illustrated in figure 12.



*Figure 12: The personae offered in and responses given to Aznar's speech*

### 5.1.7. *"A superpower but not a superstate" – Blair in Warsaw*

*Presentation of the speech*

On the 6th of October 2000 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair presented his vision of the future of Europe before an immediate audience of Polish and other Eastern European politicians assembled at the Polish stock exchange in Warsaw.[35] Blair sets his proposals firmly within the context of simultaneous deepening and widening. He discusses Britain's role in Europe and also considers the general nature of the EU. Blair's message can be summed up as follows: enlargement should happen as soon as possible and include as many countries as possible, Britain's place is at the centre of Europe, and the European Union should be a strong but not a federal entity.

*Constitution of personae*

There is no doubt Blair is speaking in his official capacity of British Prime Minister, but he does not set forth an elaborate presentation of his own persona. Instead, Blair's position shines through in his constitution of audience personae and his presentation of Europe's future. In the introductory paragraphs Blair addresses the immediate audience, especially the Poles, and seeks to build a strong relationship between Poland and Britain. Concluding the introductory positioning of the Poles as a free, proud, idealistic people with close links to Britain, Blair says: "Few countries have contributed more to the fall of fascism and Soviet dictatorship in Europe. Now we want you in the European Union" (l. 45-46). This invitation to and promise of entry is repeated twice during the speech and with each repetition it is extended to a broader circle of candidate countries (ll. 77-78 and ll. 417-419). Blair consistently creates a persona for the candidate countries that allows them to participate actively in the European integration process and allies them closely with Britain.[36]

Affirming the alliance between the UK and the applicant countries, Blair says: "Britain will always be a staunch ally of all those European democracies applying to join the European Union. A staunch ally, wielding its influence at the centre of Europe" (ll. 80-82). Here Blair speaks for Britain and presupposes its central position in the European context. However, this presupposition is not left unchallenged and the quoted passage marks the beginning of a discussion of the British relationship with Europe, a discussion that is directed as much to the British people as it is conducted for them. The purpose of this discussion is to shift the British position within the EU

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[35] Several articles make a note of the speech situation; good examples are *FT* 06/10/00A and *Guar* 07/10/00A.
[36] The friendly, welcoming gesture is also extended to Serbia who has just rid itself of Slobodan Milosevic, the authoritarian leader who now stands trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Says Blair: "…we must stand ready […] to hold out the hand of partnership to a democratic Serbia, and welcome her into the European family of nations" (ll. 16-18).

from a hesitant and reactionary role to that of a confident and active player. Both Blair's own persona and the second persona of the British audience are circumscribed by this redefined British-European relationship. "Britain's future," Blair concludes, "is and will be as a leading partner in Europe" (ll. 158-159).

As for the European future Blair envisions for himself and the members of his audience it is set squarely between the opposite models of the free trade area and the federation: the EU should become a superpower but not a superstate (l. 248 and l. 410). Blair claims his reform proposals are shaped to the needs and desires of the European citizens. The European citizenry as Blair defines this persona has common interests, but consists of independent national *demoi* (ll. 233-241). Blair assumes the role of spokesperson for the citizens in setting out their demands for "prosperity, security, and strength" (l. 214), and he speaks to the citizens of Europe when arguing that his proposal for reforms is fitted to their priorities (ll. 272-276).

Blair speaks to the European citizens in general and to the peoples of the candidate countries and of Britain in particular. He is asking them to share with him a vision of a well-functioning European Union that attends to their needs but does not interfere unduly. In so doing, he constitutes the EU as "…a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational" (ll. 245-246), and he emphasises that the issue of institutional change should be submitted to that of the peoples' demands (ll. 193-196). Blair does not include the possibility of discussing whether or not the EU should widen geographically and deepen politically – that these developments should occur is simply taken for granted (ll. 192-193). Furthermore, he excludes the possibility of reducing British participation in the European project. Thereby, he seeks to discontinue discussion of these issues.

Blair's claim to knowledge of the citizens' demands does not invite debate either, but the questions of how the EU's efficiency and legitimacy are ensured are left open. Thus, Blair invites his immediate and extended audiences to join him in taking a positive and constructive attitude towards Europe and to partake in the consideration of how the Union can most appropriately realise its superpower potential while remaining celebratory of unique national traits. He seeks to position both his first and second personae so that they may identify with these discussions and are endowed with the agency needed to partake in them.

### *5.1.8. England and the rest – the press coverage of Blair's speech*

*Germany, Spain, Denmark, and France: contextualising the speech*

The ten-day sample of the German newspapers' coverage of the speech contains five articles (see figure 13) all of which are regular news pieces. The German coverage places Blair's speech within the context of the IGC to be concluded in December 2000 and the preparatory Council meeting taking place on the 13th and 14th of October in Biarritz.[37] The speech is also set in the context of the long-term discussion of European integration.[38] One article presents an overview of this broader debate, taking Fischer's appearance at the Humboldt University as its starting point:

> For a long time the second commandment was in force in European politics: 'You shall not make any images of me.' There was hardly any discussion on the question of where the integration of the continent should lead, that is, on the finality of the Union. This changed on the 12th of May 2000. On this day foreign minister Joschka Fischer held his 'Berlin speech' and set the European debate in motion (*SZ* 12/10/00).

The interventions following Fischer's are then presented,[39] and Blair's speech is positioned as the most recent contribution to the developing debate.



*Figure 13: The German, Spanish, Danish, and French coverage of Blair's speech*

In the surveyed period six Spanish articles refer to Blair's speech (see figure 13); two of these texts are of an evaluative nature. The Spanish coverage discusses the speech in the context

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[37] *FAZ* 10/10/00 and 13/10/00.
[38] *FAZ* 10/10/00 and 12/10/00, *SZ* 12/10/00.
[39] The viewpoints of French President Jacques Chirac, Günther Verheugen, Commissioner for enlargement, and Commission President Prodi are mentioned.

of the Danish rejection of the euro and the happenings in Belgrade.[40] But more significantly, the speech is related to the reform process of the current IGC and the ongoing debate on European finality.[41] Regarding the IGC, the most troublesome issues are presented, and in a commentary by Felipe Gonzalez, the socialist politician and former head of government, the prospects for success are reviewed.[42] In the context of the long-term debate Blair's speech is related to preceding statements of Fischer, Chirac, Aznar,[43] and Prodi. In a leading article it is claimed that: "Blair's proposals […] are primarily of interest because they come from a British responsible [politician] who has not been ashamed of talking about the desire for a 'European superpower'" (*EP*, 09/10/00).

There are a total of nine articles in the Danish sample (see figure 13), and two of these are leaders. The Danish coverage primarily relates Blair's intervention to the IGC and the broader debate. Only one article does not mention this theme choosing instead to relate the speech to the events in Belgrade.[44] Other articles bring in issues such as the Warsaw-setting and the consequences of the Danish referendum alongside the theme of European debate.[45] In the dominant contextualisation of the short- and long-term debate Blair's proposals are compared to those of Fischer, Chirac, and Prodi, and the prospects for reaching agreement at Nice are pondered.[46] A prevalent concern is whether or not the British position is in the Danish interest.[47]

Although there is disagreement as to whether Blair's position is beneficial or damaging to Denmark, the coverage conveys a common understanding of the proposal as being an adequate intervention into the European debate. As one leading article concludes: "In Warsaw Tony Blair passed the test that determines whether a top-politician is a true European: he did not oppose width and depth in the European co-operation. He rightly saw reforms and enlargement as two sides of the same issue. […] Even if Tony Blair does not have all the answers, at least he posed the right questions" (*Pol* 07/10/00).

The French sample consists of two commentaries and eight news pieces adding up to a total of ten articles (see figure 13). In the French coverage one article focuses on the relationship between Blair's speech and the recently conducted Danish referendum.[48] Blair's positioning of

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[40] *EP* 07/10/00A+B.
[41] *Exp* 07/10/00, *EP* 09/10/00, *Exp* 11/10/00, *EP* 13/10/00.
[42] *EP* 13/10/00.
[43] The appearance of Aznar's speech in the context of the coverage of Blair's intervention indicates that the former utterance has not, after all, been inconsequential.
[44] *Pol* 06/10/00.
[45] *Inf* 07/10/00A+C, *Inf* 05/10/00.
[46] *Inf* 05/10/00, *Inf* 07/10/00C, *Pol* 07/10/00A, *Inf* 12/10/00.
[47] *Inf* 05/10/00, *Inf* 07/10/00A+B.
[48] *LM* 10/10/00.

himself as the champion of enlargement, and the speech's aptness to its immediate audience is mentioned a number of times.[49] The speech is also related to the upcoming IGC.[50] But the context of the broad European debate pervades the majority of the articles.[51] In the context of European debate, Blair's proposals are compared to the ideas put forward by Fischer, Chirac, Aznar and Prodi, and there is general satisfaction that the discussion of fundamental issues will lead to a continuation of the reform process beyond the current IGC.[52] Moreover, it is lamented that France has not been more active in the ensuing debate.[53]

*England: now say it at home, Mr. Blair*

The ten-day survey of the English newspapers' coverage of Blair's Warsaw-address resulted in a total of 39 articles (see figure 14); seven of these are commentaries and there are five leaders as well as five letters.



*Figure 14: The English coverage of Blair's speech*

The English coverage includes all the contextualisations mentioned above and also has several unique features. The coverage can be divided into four groups: three of these are established

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[49] *Lib* 07/10/00, *LM* 07/10/00, *LF* 07/10/00, *LM* 09/10/00.

[50] *LF* 09/10/00, *LM* 13/10/00.

[51] *Lib* 04/10/00, *Lib* 05/10/00, *Lib* 07/10/00, *LF* 07/10/00, *LM* 09/10/00, *LF* 09/10/00, *Lib* 11/10/00, *LM* 13/10/00.

[52] There is but one exception to the general approval of fundamental discussions and further reform: "If the Union's latent institutional crisis bursts forth at Nice, it is not certain that a majority of the member states will be inclined to engage rapidly in a new round of negotiations. The European construction will then enter into a period of stagnation, road to regression, because the fifteen have made the mistake of responding to the recurrent question: where does one find the point of equilibrium between an association of nation-states conserving the essence of their free will and a community structure of federal vocation?" (*LM* 13/10/00).

[53] *Lib* 05/10/00 and 11/10/00.

according to temporal developments, and the fourth group, consisting of leaders, commentaries, and letters, runs parallel to the three others (see table 3).

| | Times | Independent | Guardian | Financial Times | Total articles in group |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Early stage** | 5 | 4 | 0 | 3 | **12** |
| **Middle stage** | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | **4** |
| **Late stage** | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | **5** |
| **Evaluative articles** | 1 | 4 | 4 | 8 | **17** |
| Total articles in paper | 11 | 9 | 7 | 12 | |

*Table 3: The four groups of the English coverage*

The first group of articles focuses primarily on Blair's speech as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and also includes the factors of the pending enlargement, the Danish referendum, and the events in Serbia. The gist of this first group may be summed up as follows:

> When the Prime Minister originally decided to offer a speech on the future of the European Union […] it was to be a response to the debate opened by Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, and then by Jacques Chirac earlier this year. The referendum in Denmark and the revolution in Serbia have transformed the context in which Tony Blair delivered his address (*Tim* 07/10/00A).

In the second group, covering the survey period's intermediate phase, the coverage attends to different reactions to the speech. The recorded reactions come primarily from the British Conservatives, "…who said that it [the speech] would undermine Britain as a nation state" (*FT* 07/10/00A). However, the guarded reaction of the pro-European Liberal Democrats is also noted. And the positive reception of the speech on the continent, especially in the Commission, is present in several accounts.[54]

The articles of the final temporally established group primarily place the speech in the context of the Biarritz Council and the short-term debate on the reforms that are to be settled at Nice. Here, the main issue is the negotiating position Blair has created in the speech, and the possible outcomes of the meetings are considered. Yet there is also a general understanding that the meeting at Biarritz "…will frame the terms of debate for the future of the European Union" (*Tim* 13/10/00A), and thus the immediate negotiations are tied in with the broader debate.

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[54] *Guar* 07/10/00A, *FT* 07/10/00A, *Tim* 08/10/00.

The fourth group of texts, the comments published throughout the surveyed period, contains many of the same themes as the other three groups, but distinguishes itself by taking an explicit stance on the issues that are pondered. Here the content and the timing of the speech are discussed and evaluated. The content of Blair's proposal is the primary topic of the letters, and evaluations of specific elements[55] as well as of the speech's general direction[56] are offered. The commentaries tend to focus more on the process and strategic aspects of the debate than on the particular content of Blair's intervention. Some commentators deny the need for further discussion of general ideas,[57] but most welcome the debate as such and find that Blair's intervention is particularly fortuitous.[58] Also, the commentators repeatedly emphasise the need for a national British debate, inviting Blair to restate his European position in a British setting.[59]

### 5.1.9. Personae offered in and responses given to Blair's speech

Tony Blair seeks to create a close correspondence between his own persona and the second persona of the European citizenry as such as well as the more specific personae of Britain and the candidate countries. Blair offers to represent the citizens at the political level, but also invites them to participate in the public discussion on the future of Europe. In Blair's conception this is a discussion that is to be carried out in the intermediate space between the Eurosceptic and the federalist views and from which both of these extremes are excluded.

Blair does not seem to be speaking primarily to the political leaders of the EU member states; he does not address them explicitly, but instead refers to politicians from the candidate countries and to the nationally anchored publics of these candidate countries and of the UK. Yet the German, French, Danish and Spanish press coverage primarily contextualises Blair's speech as a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between the European leaders. This coverage both compares Blair's position to those of the leaders that have spoken before him and conveys the reactions of the leaders to Blair's proposals. Two factors may explain this common feature of these four national

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[55] "The proposal to create a second chamber of the European Parliament consisting of national MPs threatens to impede the decision-making process of the EU as never before" (*Ind* 09/10/00A).

[56] "Blair's vision is likely to deliver less, not more, accountability" (*Guard* 11/10/00).

[57] "The answer to Europe's current difficulties is not rhetoric about tomorrow but addressing the problems of today" (*FT* 06/10/00B). "Europe needs a pause for reflection, not an interminable round of constitutional debate" (*FT* 13/10/00B).

[58] "Tony Blair's speech in Warsaw today […] could not be better timed" (*Ind* 06/10/00). "He has not come up with all the answers, but he made a good start, with all the right questions" (*FT* 09/10/00). "At Warsaw last Friday Tony Blair entered the real debate on the future of the EU. Not before time" (*FT* 11/10/00A).

[59] "Who knows, Mr. Blair may make his next big European speech in Britain itself" (*Ind* 06/10/00A). "What is now necessary is an advance into the nether reaches of British public opinion…" (*Guar* 07/10/00B). "Mr. Blair should now debate these political issues here in Britain" (*FT* 11/10/00A).

reports: firstly, the debate on the future of Europe has now become generally recognised as an ongoing and important process, and the coverage with its description of the debate helps consolidate this fact. Secondly, Blair does not address the national publics of Germany, France, Denmark, and Spain in the same direct way that he addresses the publics of Britain and the candidate countries, wherefore there may be less incentive to engage the speech in active dialogue in the four former national contexts.



*Figure 15: The personae offered in and responses given to Blair's speech*

In England, however, Blair's invitation to debate is taken up, and his opinions are discussed. Nevertheless, the general English sentiment is that Blair has not succeeded on the national scene. His performance, the English coverage contends, has secured him an influential position in Europe, but it is doubtful whether it will have much effect on the British public opinion. On this latter issue the outcome hinges upon Blair's ability to follow up the speech with equally forceful national interventions, and, the argument continues, these forthcoming interventions must be more carefully adapted to the national setting with its peculiar demands and expectations. Thus, it is clear that Blair's attempt to reposition the British persona in relation to Europe has not effected any decisive change in the attitude of the English press. Moreover, the agency Blair asks his countrymen to allow him to exert on their behalf at the European level of action does not pass uncontested. However, the coverage concedes that Tony Blair has made a good start. If the PM

makes further efforts to occasion a national debate, the English newspapers suggest, that debate may foster the outcome he desires. The relationship between the personae Blair seeks to create and the responses forwarded in the press coverage is illustrated in figure 15.

## 5.2. Turning point one: consolidation of the debate

A Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the concluding session of the intergovernmental conference that prepares treaty revisions, was held in conjunction with the European Council of Nice on the 7$^{th}$ to the 10$^{th}$ of December 2000. Here the assembled leaders agreed to reform the Union's institutional structure and procedures of decision-making. Thereby, they amended the existing foundational treaties and created the Treaty of Nice. The Conference also adopted a number of declarations – statements of intent, acclamation, and/or explanation – to be appended to the Treaty. "The Declaration on the future of the Union" is the 23$^{rd}$ and second to last of these declarations. With this text the debate on the future of Europe is consolidated and officially recognised as a process that is to lead to another revision of the EU's foundational treaties. Hence, the Nice Declaration marks the first turning point of the debate on the future of Europe.

### 5.2.1. "A deeper and wider debate" – the Declaration on the future of the Union

"The Declaration on the future of the Union" presents itself as a transitory text. It states that the ratification of the Nice Treaty will complete the necessary preparations for enlargement (ll. 5-7), and goes on to proclaim that "having […] opened the way for enlargement, the Conference calls for a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the European Union" (ll. 8-9). The declaration then sets out the timetable and agenda for this discussion. In 2001 "wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties" (ll. 10-11) shall take place, culminating in a "…declaration containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process" (ll. 15-16) to be signed at the European Council at Laeken in December 2001.

There are four main issues for discussion: delimitation of powers between the EU and the member states, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, simplification of the Treaties, and the role of national parliaments (ll. 18-24). These matters are addressed in recognition of "…the need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, to bring it closer to the citizens of the Member States" (ll. 25-27). The discussions, it is stated, are meant as preparations for a new IGC to be convened in 2004 (ll. 28-30). Finally, the

declaration ensures that this new IGC and the preparations for it will not hinder the enlargement process in any way and that the candidate countries will be involved in the process (ll. 31-34).

Given the official and declaratory nature of the text, it does not address anyone in particular nor speak from any particular position; the voice of "The Declaration on the future of the Union" is the voice of the EU talking to itself. This omnipresent voice functions in the manner of a declaratory performative (Austin, 1962, p. 7) to create what it names. In the Nice Declaration the EU is foreseeing its own future: a future in which the Union's democratic legitimacy and the people's identification with the EU are improved. Furthermore, the declaration specifies that this future state is to be achieved through wide-ranging discussions of the four designated issues.

### 5.2.2. A game of poker at the marketplace – the press coverage of the Nice Declaration

As mentioned earlier, I deal with the coverage of the turning points *en bloc* rather than country by country. The ten-day sample of the 17 newspapers contains 194 articles in all (see figure 16); of these 25 are commentaries, ten are leaders, there are four letters, and the remaining 155 are news stories. It should be noted that a considerable number of the articles deal with the meeting at Nice as such and only mention the declaration and the debate on the future of Europe in passing. Although I include all the articles in the following analysis, I focus attention on the relationship between the Nice Declaration and the European debate.



*Figure 16: The press coverage of the Nice Declaration*

The coverage is dominated by three broad and recurrent themes around which I have structured the analysis (see table 4). The purpose of the analysis is to present the press' conceptualisation of the Nice summit as a turning point in the debate on the future of Europe. How does the press coverage conceive of the relationship between the summit at Nice and the debate? And which conditions for further discussion – contexts, processes, and issues – emerge from the conceptualisation?

|  | Institutional reforms | National and European interests | Continuation of the debate | Other issues |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total** | **63%** | **44%** | **38%** | **26%** |
| Denmark | 59% | 44% | 41% | 25% |
| England | 55% | 41% | 41% | 15% |
| France | 67% | 52% | 38% | 33% |
| Germany | 60% | 33% | 23% | 37% |
| Spain | 76% | 48% | 48% | 18% |

*Table 4: Recurrent themes of the Nice coverage* [60]

*Institutional reforms in preparation of enlargement*

The negotiations and the subsequent Treaty of Nice are most frequently placed within the framework of the enlargement process. The general idea is that the EU must change its institutional framework in order to be functional after the entrance of the candidate countries and that it is the task of the European heads of state and government convened at Nice to reach agreement on the necessary changes. Creating the new treaty is generally understood as the main goal of the summit and the criterion by which its success or failure should be judged.

The coverage of the institutional reforms can be divided into three temporal stages. Attention to the three stages is evenly distributed in the Danish, French and German coverage, but in England and Spain there are about twice as many articles covering the last stage than the two preceding ones, wherefore the total coverage appears skewed (see table 5). Before the negotiations at Nice begin, the coverage concentrates on explaining the different reforms and their significance

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[60] The table shows how many percent of the coverage dealt with the theme in question. Please note that more than one theme may be present within the same article (the total is more than a 100%). The category "Other issues" includes coverage of decisions that are not part of the institutional reform – for example the declaration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. "Other issues" also refers to coverage of demonstrations at Nice and to reports that connect the summit to other themes – for example a scandal regarding party subsidies that Jacques Chirac was involved in at the time.

for the enlargement process. While the negotiations take place the focus is on the process itself, the proposals put forward, the positions of the actors, and the rejections and concessions. Finally, the articles that are published after agreement is reached seek to explain and evaluate the results, bringing in the reactions of both the negotiating politicians and third parties such as members of the European Parliament and national oppositions.

|  | Before summit | During summit | After summit |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total in stage** | **33** | **30** | **56** |
| Denmark | 6 | 5 | 8 |
| England | 11 | 10 | 22 |
| France | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Germany | 6 | 5 | 7 |
| Spain | 6 | 5 | 14 |

*Table 5: The temporal stages of the coverage of institutional reforms*

The coverage traces a movement from enthusiastic proclamation of ambitious goals through the give and take of the negotiations to fatigued acceptance of the results, and it is well aware of this developmental path. A *Le Monde* article summarises the movement thus:

> Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin had repeated it ad nauseam: no agreement is better than a discount agreement… They have not had this commitment as is demonstrated by the very limited results that the heads of state and government of the Fifteen have reached Monday morning the 11th of December, after four days of laborious negotiations and the longest summit in the history of European construction (12/12/00E).

This sentiment is echoed in *taz*: "The Treaty of Nice does not redeem any of the high demands that the politicians have placed on it for months" (12/12/00B). *Expansión* presents the developments in a more pragmatic light: "…this skirmish [for the distribution of national powers], although it can be considered critically for its limited ambition, incorporated decisions of great interest in relation to some essential technical prerequisites for the functioning of the European project" (13/12/00). *The Independent* takes this pragmatic line even further: "…agreement at Europe's longest summit was achieved only by scrapping grandiose ambitions and satisfying basic national interests" (12/12/00D). And the understanding common to all is represented by *Jyllands-Posten*'s laconic verdict: "the Treaty of Nice does not fulfil the ambitious goals that the heads of state and government had set for themselves, but it is sufficient to keep the EU's plans for enlargement on track" (12/12/00A).

*National and European interests*

The orientation of the articles that take up the issue of representation of national and European interests undergoes a development that is parallel to the dynamic of the coverage on institutional reforms (see figure 17).



*Figure 17: Primary orientations of the coverage*

The tension between national priorities and general European concerns is a main issue in the first days of the sample-period, and this is reflected in the coverage, which at this stage contains articles of all three orientations. The emerging common understanding of the coverage that preludes the Nice summit is that the relationship between different national and European interests is the steering dynamic of the ensuing negotiations. *Le Monde* exemplifies this understanding of the situation:

> These negotiations have revealed a double cleavage. The first opposes the countries that estimate that the moment has come to pass on to a new phase in the political integration, and those that are not ready; the second opposes the small and the big countries – but also France and Germany – over the balance to be respected between the states in the future Union (07/12/00).

As the negotiations get under way the coverage pays more and more attention to the exclusively national positions. The negotiations are presented as a hard-nosed bargaining process in which the participants will not concede any point without being gratified on some other issue. *Jyllands-Posten* recounts the impressions of non-European journalists attending the summit: "to them the negotiations of the heads of state and government are reminiscent of the carpet dealers in an Arabic bazaar" (11/12/00B). And novelist Christopher Hope writing for *The Guardian* describes the scene thus:

> Some have likened the Nice summit to a long, late-night poker game. It isn't really. Poker is sedentary. […] What you really see are teams of athletes fit and smiling, and ready to knock the hell out of the opposing teams. Summitry is a bruising contact sport played by consenting adults. It is ice hockey for politicians (11/12/00A).

This mode of coverage complies with the communicative strategies of the politicians as an *Information* editorial presents them:

> While the process, in appropriate tumult, produces compromises, solutions, and common repressions, the heads of state and government are simultaneously preoccupied with sending their versions of the summit home to the national publics where their [personal] political futures are decided (09/12/00).

The nationally oriented line of reportage culminates in the naming of the winners and losers of Nice: "Histories of the European Union will remember the Nice summit as a landmark moment when big governments won the big arguments – and left the integrationists reeling and humiliated at their loss of power" (*Guar* 12/12/00B).

The culmination is followed by a shift in the orientation of the coverage, and national jubilance is tempered by the re-emergence of the European perspective. For example, *Le Monde* laments that the agreement "…testifies to the continued erosion of the European spirit and the rise of national egoism" (12/12/00A). And *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* notes bitterly: "when successes solely are summed up from a national perspective, as it has become fashion, then the conclusions of Nice, this one sees clearly abroad, are not all that bad for Germany. (Such a result is not necessarily congruent with the tableau of Germany's long-term interests)" (14/12/00).

The reports' shifting emphases on national and European interests are in agreement with the dynamic of the summit. In the early stages both national and European expectations are voiced, but as the heads of state and government get down to business the European perspective is all but eclipsed by national interests. And after agreement has been reached the European interest is brought back in to evaluate the results. The question lurking behind these developments – whether national and European interests are indeed reconcilable – is not addressed directly, yet it is of paramount importance not only to the outcome at Nice, but also to the continuation of the debate on the future of Europe.

*Continuation of the European debate*

In the articles preceding the inauguration of the summit several references are made to the debate on the future that was begun by Fischer. Here, the debate is presented as "…the only positive event of the last year" (*Inf* 08/12/00). Also, it is suggested that the upsurge in profound debate does not come as a surprise, given the present insecurity and hesitancy about the nature and purpose of the EU.[61] But most significantly, the continuation of the debate is introduced as an objective of the German government. "At the Humboldt University of Berlin foreign minister Fischer let the public know that the real European future does not begin until after the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice" (*FAZ* 07/12/00A). Thus, the official recognition of the debate is introduced as a stake in the bargain. Germany is said to be willing to give up other demands in return for the inclusion of the "Declaration on the future of the Union" in the Nice Treaty.[62]

As it becomes clear that the declaration will be included in the final agreement the coverage by and large abandons the strategic considerations of the proposal as part of the bargain. The agenda and timeline for the coming debate are instead presented in detail and broader reflections on the need for and possible outcomes of the debate appear.[63] In dealing with the four points on the agenda of the coming debate most of the coverage is strictly referential, and although the presentation of the debate's timetable involves some speculation on the institutional forms the discussions could take[64] this coverage is also mainly descriptive. However, the evaluation of whether or not a continuation of the debate and a new treaty revision is desirable at all is one of the most pervasive themes. On this subject three different evaluations are offered[65]: scepticism towards the necessity and possible benefits of continuing the discussion, recognition of the need for debate accompanied by pessimism about the ability to make real improvements, and enthusiastic approval of the initiative.

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[61] *EP* 05/12/00.

[62] *LM* 05/12/00, *Guar* 06/12/00, *Exp* 08/12/00.

[63] There are exceptions to this tendency as a few articles of broader scope were published before the decision on inclusion of the declaration was reached, but there is a clear concentration of such articles in the second half of the sampled period. The German coverage, however, breaks with the general pattern: here articles that do not focus narrowly on the proposal as a part of the German bargaining position at Nice, are distributed evenly throughout the coverage.

[64] In the coverage there is general agreement that the current procedure of the IGC must change. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was created by a convention of representatives of national and European institutions who met in public and involved civil society in its discussions. This convention method is presented as one possible alternative to the existing procedures for treaty revision (*FA Z* 06/12/00A and 07/12/00A, *F T* 08/12/00A, *Ind* 11/12/00B, *Inf* 12/12/00A, *LM* 12/12/00B).

[65] The coverage also includes other angles than the directly evaluative – for instance the issues of the meaning and importance of the earlier contributions to the debate are considered (*EP* 05/12/00, *FAZ* 07/12/00A, *LM* 08/12/00B, *CD* 11/12/00, *Ind* 12/12/00B, *L M* 12/12/00B).

In several articles the first position is represented by Göran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister who is to take over the EU's presidency and thus somewhat ironically will be in charge of initiating the process that he is sceptical of. Persson thinks that the aim of the integration process should be a union of nation states.[66] Thereby, he questions the need for further reform and suggests that "…it is also important and an at least equally good European vision to really protect the EU we have decided to realise" (*Inf* 08/12/00B). The second position is based on the assumptions that the Treaty of Nice does not solve all of the EU's existing problems, that further reform is needed, and that the debate should therefore be continued.[67] However, from this point of view "the ambivalent outcome of the European Council is not necessarily a good omen for the debate on the future of Europe" (*LM* 12/12/00D).

The third position shares the starting point of the second, but does not judge the prospective outcome of the debate negatively. Rather, the chance for a wider public debate is welcomed and the potential positive consequences of such public involvement are cherished.[68] Here, the main argument is that the EU can strengthen its legitimacy by involving the people in the discussion of what the Union should be and how it should act. And the concern is that the citizens' reluctance towards the European project will continue to grow if a broad and dynamic dialogue is not sparked. The position is stated clearly in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*: "we must find forms of European-wide debate that also bring in the people" (09/12/00). And *Jyllands-Posten* reports the politicians' endorsement of this position: "EU's leaders hope that the next reforms of the co-operation will build upon a very broad popular foundation. They wish to inspire a comprehensive public debate on the road to an EU that is more effective and easier to understand" (11/12/00A). As is seen, the coverage both represents scepticism about the continued reforms and concern that the debate may be futile, yet the emerging common understanding is that the post-Nice debate and reform process is a worthwhile effort with a real chance of yielding positive results.

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[66] *FT* 07/12/00B.
[67] *FAZ* 06/12/00, *LM* 08/12/00B, *EP* 11/12/00D, *FT* 11/12/00.
[68] *SZ* 09/12/00B, *BT* 11/12/00B, *FT* 11/12/00C, *Ind* 12/12/00B, *SZ* 12/12/00B, *FAZ* 12/12/00C, *EP* 13/12/00A.

### *5.2.3. Consequences of the first turning point*

The coverage of the creation of the Nice Declaration displays a tension between the modes of discussion that prevail at times of institutionalised decision-making as opposed to periods of non-binding dialogue. When the immediate goal is not to take consequential decisions the politicians and the reporters covering their actions have a tendency to view the debate in terms of deliberation – that is open-ended discussions oriented at reaching common understanding. During such non-binding discussions there exists a common will to reach consensus and even if both European and national interests are considered, these are understood to be reconcilable. When the moment of decision-making arrives, however, the discussions become much more concrete, politicians and reporters now focus on exclusively national positions and priorities and the mode of interaction turns from deliberation to bargaining. Thus, the coverage reveals a tension between the politicians' abstract agreement on general European goals and their specific disagreements on concrete intergovernmental decisions. Also, there seems to be a cleavage between the politicians' common attempt to reach agreement and their differentiated communications to the national constituencies. These differences between the discussions as they are carried out at consequential as opposed to non-binding moments may hamper the agreement on any radical change and may lock the debate in already established patterns.

In spite of these limiting conditions the leaders did reach agreement at Nice: not only did they create a new treaty, they also established new terms for continuing the debate. The most obvious consequence of the Nice Declaration is the official recognition that the stipulated discussions should result in yet another treaty change. The agreement that it is not only necessary to reform the treaty, but also the very procedure by which reforms are made is, however, more far reaching. The formal recognition of the debate as a round a treaty reforms changes the topics and goals of the discussion: the necessity of the continued reform process is now taken for granted, and the timeframe as well as general procedures of the ensuing discussions are established. The establishment of public debate as the best way to achieve reforms changes the basic way of conceiving the reform process and grants the debate a position of unprecedented centrality. The debate is now valued as both a constituent aspect of the legal reform of the EU's foundational texts and as a constitutive process that in itself provides the Union with input and social legitimacy. Thus, the form of deliberation in periods of non-binding dialogue may not change radically immediately after the first turning point of the debate, but the status of the deliberations and the expectations to them are heightened considerably. Public debate now becomes an end in itself, and

it is perceived as the central means of ensuring that the next round of changes will yield actual and substantial improvements.

## 5.3. Trajectory two: objectives and instruments

The agreement on the "Declaration on the Future of the Union" marks a turning point in the debate and calls the second trajectory into being. This trajectory of official, yet non-binding exploration of the various possible reforms – the available objectives and alternative instruments – lasted for one year and was ended with the Laeken Declaration, a course of events that was predetermined by the Nice Declaration. The three chosen moments of the second trajectory are occasioned by Jospin's, Prodi's, and Lykketoft's speeches.

### 5.3.1. "I am not a tepid European" – Jospin in Paris

*Presentation of the speech*

On the 28th of May 2001 Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister at the time, presented his visions of Europe in a speech held at the Centre for Foreign Journalists at the Maison de la Radio in Paris. The audience at the Maison de la Radio was a mix of young socialists and French and foreign journalists who had been notified in advance that there would be no chance to ask questions after the speech.[69] The speech is entitled "The future of the enlarged Europe,"[70] but the pending enlargement forms the background rather than the actual subject matter of the speech. Jospin proclaims that the debate should not deal primarily with the question of institutions and their reform. Rather, the concrete proposals should be based in a consideration of the kind of political project the EU is and should be.

*Constitution of personae*

The speech is both begun and ended with statements that constitute Jospin's personal identity through a combination of European and national features. In the introduction Jospin states: "I am French. I feel European" (l. 16). And in the concluding remarks he reaffirms the European sentiment: "Because I am not a tepid European, I do not want a bland Europe" (l. 334). The identity, which Jospin seeks to build for his persona, presupposes the existence of an *art de vivre* that is common to all European national identities. To Jospin Europe is a civilisation,

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[69] As reported by *Le Monde* (29/05/01F).
[70] "L'avenir de l'Europe élargie."

justified by its diverse cultures that are united by the sharing of territory, history, economy and human values (ll. 30-35). Thus, Jospin's first persona with its dual national and European sentiments is equivalent to the collective identity of all members of the European society that is posed as the main second persona of the speech.

The positioning of the audience is begun by recognising that in spite of the EU's many successes people and even some policy-makers are feeling disenchanted with and uncertain of the European project. A list of legitimate questions about the EU's future is presented: will enlargement cause the EU to fall apart? Does globalisation affect the European identity? Do reforms mean a reduction of the role of the nation states? How can citizens become more involved in Europe? (ll. 8-11). Jospin sees the public debate initiated by the heads of state and government at Nice as a response to these questions. He offers his speech as a contribution by an incumbent politician to the debate now getting under way in France (ll. 12-15). The underlying premise of this passage is that people's anxieties can be resolved through debate on the worrisome issues, and the speech offers a starting point for such resolution. In the attempt to perform the reconciliatory task, Jospin chooses to focus on the content of Europe, on the things that all the European nations have in common, and the tasks that everyone agrees the EU should perform.

The conciliation of the national and the European that is the main premise for both the first and the second personae is furthered by opposing the European nations to a common 'other,' namely unregulated, free-reeling globalisation and more specifically unilateral cultural, economic and political dominance (ll. 117-118, ll. 128-130). By references to recognised achievements and common others and through inclusive appeals to participation in further developments Jospin seeks total identification between his own and the audience's positions. The common identity he envisions is one in which national and European dimensions are not opposed, and in which both can be seen to benefit from the same initiatives. Jospin proposes the term "federation of nation states"[71] as the conceptualisation of the EU that conforms to the personae he has created for himself and his audience.

Jospin seeks to construct an inclusive position to which 'everyone' can adhere. He sets his speech in the context of the French public debate on the issues raised at the Nice summit, and he extends an invitation to the citizens to participate in the debate. However, Jospin does not offer any explicit opportunities for discussion since there is little trace of alternative positions and counter-

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[71] According to Jospin, this term, as coined by Jacques Delors, reflects the unique mixture of national realities and federal ideals at which he aims: "There are nations, strong, vibrant, attached to their identity that found the wealth of our continent. And then there is the will to unite, to build a unity that will make each one stronger" (ll. 232-233).

arguments within the speech. On the basis of Jospin's intervention the average citizen may accept or reject the offered vision of a reconciled European and national identity grounded in shared values and principles, but the speech offers little clue as to how the discussion could be continued. If citizens are to discuss Jospin's position critically they must have recourse to alternatives independently of the speech.

At one point Jospin does mention an alternative position, a recent proposal by the German social democrats for the constitution of a European federation along the lines of the German federal model (ll. 210-212). This reference and a foregoing reminder that the final decision on the treaty reforms will be taken by the heads of state and government in unanimity (ll. 205-207), indicate that Jospin is speaking as much to the decision-makers at the European level as to his national public. As a contribution to the discussion between high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats the speech may be better suited to elicit responses, since other policy-makers have prior knowledge of alternative suggestions and, thus, are able to provide the lacking objections. Also, the speech is concluded by proposing that a convention composed of different political actors be set down (ll. 328-332), and this proposition provides a concrete suggestion as to how the debate should be continued at the political level.

These considerations do not narrow the inclusiveness of Jospin's speech, but point out that the speech serves different functions for different audiences. The general French public is offered a presentation of their Prime Minister's vision of Europe; a position that can be accepted or rejected but hardly debated substantially. The audience of European decision-makers is provided with further alternatives to include in the already wide catalogue of reform proposals and with a constructive suggestion on the procedure for continuing the debate.

### 5.3.2. "A qualitative leap is necessary" – Prodi in Paris

Since Romano Prodi's speech was delivered on the day following Jospin's intervention and since there is a considerable overlap in the coverage of the two speeches, I have chosen to present the reactions to the two speeches jointly. Therefore, I shall introduce Prodi's speech before turning to the press coverage.[72]

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[72] The coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches was gathered using the same procedure as in the case of the four other speeches. After the two ten-day samples had been collected they were joined in one eleven-day sample; within this sample distinctions can still be made between those articles that treat one or the other of the speeches exclusively and those that deal with both utterances.

*Presentation of the speech*

Romano Prodi is Italian and had a national political career – he was Prime Minister from May 1996 to May 1998 – before he took over the presidency of the Commission in September 1999.[73] Prodi has announced that he will return to national politics when his term as Commission president ends on the 1st of November 2004.[74] As president of the European Commission Romano Prodi makes regular interventions into ongoing debates on issues that pertain to the EU, and the debate on the future of Europe is certainly no exception. The speech to be discussed here was held on the 29th of May 2001 in Paris, more specifically in the grand amphitheatre of the Institute of Political Studies, or Sciences-Po as this elite institution is commonly called.[75] As is his custom when addressing primarily French audiences, Prodi delivered the speech in French,[76] and the speech is entitled "For a strong Europe, endowed with a grand project and the means of action."[77] As indicated in the title, the speech is decidedly pro-European and deals with the nature of the EU's objectives and instruments.

*Constitution of personae*

At the very beginning of the speech Prodi identifies and positions the immediate audience: "You are young. You have grown up after the fall of the Berlin wall. You are not prisoners of the schemata of the cold war: an enlarged Europe is your natural horizon. The discussion of the future of the European Union is above all your debate" (ll. 6-9). Prodi invites the immediate audience to identify with the Europe that will emerge after enlargement, and to participate in the debate that is constitutive of this emergent Europe. However, the speech is not only directed to the students in the amphitheatre, but is to be seen as a contribution to the on-going political debate on the future of Europe. Through references to Jospin's speech of the previous day (ll. 78-79, l. 309, and l. 495) and to a proposal by the German Chancellor Schröder (l. 502) it is indicated that Prodi's speech should

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[73] http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/president/cv_en.htm

[74] This announcement was first made in February 2004 and recorded in several media. See the website of "United in the Olive Tree" (www.ulivo.it), Prodi's political alliance, for his own account. Prodi's successor, former Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso, was appointed by the heads of state and government at their European Council meeting on the 18th of June 2004 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/barroso/index_en.htm).

[75] As reported by *Le Figaro* (30/05/01). Other speeches by Prodi that would have been suitable for study include his intervention at the European Parliament on the 3rd of October 2000 and a speech held at the University College of Cork, Ireland, on the 22nd of June 2001. The Sciences-Po-speech was chosen for its close temporal and spatial proximity to another of the studied speeches, as I felt it would be important to study how the press coverage reacted to such closeness.

[76] According to a personal communication with the Commission press corp. I was also informed that Prodi usually speaks to international audiences in English and that he uses Italian when addressing Italian audiences and when speaking to the European institutions.

[77] "Pour une Europe forte, dotée d'un grand projet et de moyens d'action."

be regarded as an intervention of similar calibre. As a major statement of opinion by a member of the highest European political echelon, the speech is not only directed to the general public, but also seeks to contribute to the dialogue of the decision-makers. Thus, while the speech is explicitly addressed to the physically present audience at Sciences-Po, it is also an intervention into the arena of public debate on the future of Europe in the broad sense, and it has a more specific appeal to the political decision-makers.

Apart from the introductory remarks on the immediate audience, the speech contains very little direct positioning of the audience. Instead, Prodi offers his own persona as a role model for his audiences. The speaker's position is presented as a comprehensive one whose breadth is achieved by circumventing false contradictions. The first contradiction is that between those who want more and those who want less Europe. Prodi feels that this polarisation stifles the debate and seeks to side-step it by advocating complementarity; local, national and European levels of collective action, says Prodi, are all necessary for those who wish to operate effectively in a globalised world (ll. 376-386). However, the recognition that the European and the national positions may be harmonised does not lead Prodi to suggest they are interchangeable. Thus, Prodi rejects the purely federal approach, but his rejection of renationalisation is just as firm (ll. 284-286). In fact, he contends that "all in-depth interrogations, every attempt to assign objectives to the Union that live up to the challenge of globalisation, lead to a single diagnosis: the Union needs more coherence and, in many key areas, more integration. A qualitative leap is necessary" (ll. 265-270).

The second contradiction that Prodi seeks to overcome consists of the discussants' tendency to focus on either the EU's substance or its institutions. Prodi thinks these two areas are interdependent and thus should not be viewed as separate issues. However, he recognises that the reconciliation of objectives and frameworks is no easy task and attempts to unite the two elements under an overarching demand for change. It is in this spirit of synthesis that Prodi invites further contributions to the debate (ll. 510-511), and hereby the active participant in the discussion is positioned as necessarily recognising the need for change.

In Prodi's conception, agency hinges upon willingness to combine views that are often seen as being irreconcilable; the second persona is constituted as participating with the first persona in a rational process through which the best possible means of operation can be determined once the

objectives have become clear.[78] These two personae need not agree on the specific proposals, but they have a common understanding of what issues should be debated and of how the discussion should be conducted. However, it seems that Prodi acknowledges the existence of a position that does not share these features and feels obliged to address this position as a second rather than a third persona. In introducing the issue of the EU's democratic legitimacy Prodi says: "in reality, I am always astonished by the tenacious idea that the European institutions suffer from a deficit of legitimation. […] But such is the perception" (ll. 443-453). Prodi concedes to the public demand for treatment of the issue, thereby displaying that he is willing if not to change his own position, then at least to address concerns that are not his own. He demonstrates willingness to engage in dialogue with people, who do not fit his ideal conception of the second persona.

In its tone and general line of inquiry Prodi's speech belongs to the level of debate at which the proposals of the different political leaders are compared in order to locate possibilities for reaching consensus or striking deals. Yet the inclusion of the non-ideal second persona indicates readiness to address issues of broad public concern even when these issues do not match Prodi's own priorities, and thereby the possibility of a dialogue between the first persona and a broader public is maintained.

### 5.3.3. Initiatives and responses – the press coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
*France: at long last Jospin speaks*

The 11-day sample of the French coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches consists of a total of 30 articles (see figure 18); two are commentaries and there is one leader, but many of the 27 regular news stories also have a decidedly evaluative tone. The overwhelming majority of the articles focus on Jospin's speech, and Prodi's intervention is almost exclusively considered in relation to Jospin's utterance. The most frequently recurring theme of the coverage is that Jospin's speech was expected.[79] The main point of the articles, which concentrate on this matter, is that the speech is a response to a demand that has been mounting in the French public and among European policy-makers for a long time, a demand for Jospin to break his silence on Europe. Jospin has been "ridiculed for an attitude deemed timorous, criticised by his political friends for having let the field open to Jacques Chirac, and by all for having *de facto* substantiated the impression of an inversion

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[78] The first and second personae are thus conceptualised and united by their common difference from the third personae that inhabit one or the other extreme position. These third personae are the most important of the speech, but Prodi also refers to the 'other' of unregulated forces of globalisation and capitalism (ll. 139-146, ll. 201-205) against which Jospin sought to unite his first and second personae.

[79] *LM* 26/05/01B, *Lib* 28/05/01, *LF* 28/05/01, *LM* 29/05/01F+J, *LF* 29/05/01, *LM* 30/05/01B.

of the tradition according to which, concerning Europe, France has explained its ideas to Germany who would execute them…" (*LM* 26/05/01B).



*Figure 18: The French coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches*

Jospin's long awaited contribution is also placed in the context of the ongoing debate, beginning with Fischer's Humboldt-speech and ending with Prodi's intervention on the following day.[80] When referring to the debate coverage presents the developments of the debate so far, and the positions of the different political leaders are ordered along a federal-intergovernmental continuum. Jospin is then positioned within the debate, and more specifically his proposals are compared to those of Prodi. The general opinion is that Jospin should be placed at the middle of the continuum and that his views are less integrationist than Prodi's. In the words of *Libération*'s reporter: "…the president of the Commission has used the opportunity of his speech at Sciences-Po to make heard a more 'communitary' music than the hymn to the 'reality of the nation states' song by Jospin on Monday" (*Lib* 30/05/01).

A few articles draw lines from the present into the future in order to indicate how the debate will be continued.[81] And others place the speech in the broad historical context of general conceptions of Europe.[82] The traditional positions are presented as follows: "In the 1970's it was said that the French wanted a strong Europe with weak institutions, the British wanted weak institutions for a weak Europe, and the Germans strong institutions in service of a Europe in which the finality was ignored" (*LM* 02/06/01). Jospin is thought to be continuing the traditional French

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[80] *LM* 26/05/01B, *Lib* 28/05/01, *LF* 28/05/01, *LM* 29/05/01D+F, *Lib* 30/05/01, *LF* 30/05/00.
[81] *LM* 26/05/01B, 29/05/01F, and 02/06/01.
[82] *LM* 02/06/01, *LF* 05/06/01.

line – in fact the speech is accused of being too French[83] – and it is doubted whether his proposals can overcome the paradox inherent in the French approach.[84]

Jospin's speech is also perceived in more strategic terms as an attempt to claim a favourable position in the French presidential election campaign.[85] In this campaign Jospin faces several EU-sceptical candidates, and the intervention is seen as a "…purely French electoral speech, intended to muffle the European debate until 2002" (*LM* 30/05/01A). That the speech should serve the function of taking the EU-debate off the French electoral agenda is rather ironic, since it is perceived as opening up this discussion in the context of the British electoral campaign.[86] In this regard, it is reported that Jospin's speech will not help Tony Blair, and that Jospin had been asked not to present views that would be too inconvenient for Blair and his Labour government. Also, it is stated that, the speech having been delivered, Blair attempts to turn the situation to his advantage by arguing that Jospin's visions prove Britain has nothing to fear from Europe.[87]

There is one last recurring theme of the French coverage, namely the reactions that Jospin's intervention brought about both nationally and in the capitals across Europe. The national reactions are reported to be mostly negative, with only the members of Jospin's own party voicing genuine enthusiasm and support.[88] The speech is said to have attracted much attention outside of France and to have been received more positively in Madrid, Warsaw, and Stockholm than in Berlin.[89] The German reactions are explored at more length than those of other countries; in Germany Jospin's initiative receives praise, but there is also a certain disappointment, and it is in the context of the German reactions that the speech is accused of being too narrowly French.[90] Although reactions are mixed, the overall judgement passed by the French press is that Jospin with his speech has shown European tenacity and thereby warded off the accusations made against

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[83] *LM* 29/05/01J and 30/05/01B+E.

[84] "How to demand new integrated policies and refuse the profound reform of the institutions that would allow them to manage them well?" (*LM* 02/06/01).

[85] *LM* 29/05/01I and 30/05/01A+E. The election was not due in another year, but already the campaign was gaining momentum. The first electoral round was held on the 21st of April 2002. To everyone's great surprise, Jospin did not make it past the first round, and in the duel of the second round held on May 5th the incumbent Jacques Chirac instead faced right wing populist Jean-Marie Le Pen. The result was that Chirac stayed in office and could appoint a government of his own political hue to replace the socialist-green coalition government of which Jospin was head until the disaster of the presidential elections caused him to step down.

[86] British general elections were to be held on the 7th of June 2001.

[87] *LM* 26/05/01A, 28/05/01, and 04/06/01.

[88] *LM* 30/05/01A+B.

[89] *Lib* 30/05/01.

[90] *LM* 30/05/01A+E.

him.[91] The general sentiment is summed up in a *Le Monde* leader: "One can discuss the conclusions, but the step can only be approved" (29/05/01J).

*Denmark: a Franco-German conversation*

The Danish sample consists of 12 articles (see figure 19). There are two commentaries and one leader in the sample, and most articles focus on Jospin or on the two speeches in conjunction – only one piece deals exclusively with Prodi. As was the case in the French coverage, Jospin's proposals take the lead not only in the articles of which they are the sole focus, but also in the instances where Prodi is also mentioned. The Danish coverage also resembles the French in presenting Jospin's speech as an eagerly anticipated event.[92]



Figure 19: The Danish coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches

The main theme of the Danish coverage, however, is the relationship between France and Germany. Although the accusations that Jospin is a lukewarm European and the context of the upcoming presidential elections are mentioned,[93] Jospin's speech is mainly viewed as a response to German initiatives. The coverage explains that France has lost the right of initiative on EU matters to Germany and presents the speech as a rejection of the German vision of a European federation. The German reactions to Jospin's speech are also covered in depth.[94]

When Prodi's speech is included in the reports it is recognised that there are other participants in the debate than France and Germany, but the Franco-German conversation remains

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[91] *LM* 29/05/01F+J, *LF* 29/05/01.
[92] *Inf* 26/05/01, *Pol* 29/05/01, *JP* 29/05/01, *Inf* 29/05/01.
[93] *Pol* 29/05/01.
[94] *Inf* 26/05/01, *Pol* 29/05/01, *Inf* 29/05/01, *JP* 29/05/01, *Inf* 30/05/01A, *JP* 30/05/01.

the main point of reference. Prodi is said to ask more than Jospin offers, and he is therefore aligned with the German side of the discussion. In return Jospin's position is backed by the Danish government, and the full range of possible viewpoints is unfolded through the inclusion of the British stance.[95] At this juncture, the debate on the future of Europe is introduced as an ongoing process.[96] The developments of the debate from its inception and onwards to its planned conclusion in 2004 are traced, and a fault-line between those who want constitutional debate and those who do not is introduced. On this issue France and Germany are said to agree, and their active attitude is opposed to the passive Danish position:

> The European constitutional debate rages after the latest manifestations by the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, but a telling silence has spread over the Danish EU-debate. Not even when the president of the Commission, Romano Prodi, launched the idea of a common EU-tax was there any particular reverberation in Denmark (*Inf* 05/06/01).

This Danish passivity is lamented, and the call for active participation is subtly extended beyond the line of leading politicians: "A long European conversation has begun. It will be interesting to see how many others than the heads of government will participate in it in the months and years to come" (*Pol* 03/06/01).

*Germany: a noble contest of European ideas*

There are 33 articles in the German 11-day sample (see figure 20), including two commentaries and four leaders. The German coverage follows the pattern of attending mostly to Jospin's speech and it presents Prodi's intervention as a response to Jospin, although it is recognised that this is not how Prodi intended it.[97] Jospin's speech is seen as a positioning in the burgeoning French presidential electoral campaign, but more frequently it is conceived as a response to German initiatives.[98] As an answer to Germany, Jospin's speech is reported to be a rejection of federalist ambitions, and in this context other member states are said to join forces with the French, not necessarily because of agreement with Jospin's proposals, but because of common opposition to the German plans.

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[95] *BT* 30/05/01, *Pol* 02/06/01.
[96] *Pol* 02/06/01 and 03/06/01, *Inf* 05/06/01.
[97] *taz*, 30/05/01, *SZ* 30/05/01B, *FAZ* 30/05/01A.
[98] *FAZ* 28/05/01, *taz* 29/05/01A, D+E, *SZ* 29/05/01A.

Figure 20: The German coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches

The most dominant contextualisation, however, is that of the European debate as such. Germany and France may lead this debate, and the relationship between the two may form a central axis, but the coverage claims that the discussion is not restricted to these two countries.[99] In the context of the general debate, special attention is paid to Joschka Fischer's initiatory and agenda-setting function, and there are summaries of the views posited so far (Fischer, Chirac, Blair, Schröder). *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* expresses the general sentiment of this line of coverage:

> Happy Europe: since foreign minister Fischer sketched out a picture of the future Europe in his Humboldt-speech in May of last year, a noble contest on the best form of the grand conception of the European Union has been going on. […] One may regret that the discourse on the future architecture of Europe is limited to the political elite and hardly reaches the people. But it could be that it will contribute to the creation of a European consciousness without which the unification of Europe cannot be successful in the end (31/05/01B).

The understanding of the speech as an intervention into national French, Franco-German, and European debates is reflected in the reported reactions to it. The reactions of the immediate audience and of the French socialist party are said to be positive, but Jospin's political partners are not enthusiastic and the speech is criticised by his opponents.[100] The German government reacts positively to the speech, welcoming it as an important contribution to the debate, but the German opposition and German MEPs express their disappointment.[101] As mentioned, Prodi's speech is treated as a reaction to Jospin's, and Prodi is reported to be supportive of Jospin's

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[99] *SZ* 29/05/01A+B and 20/05/01B, *FAZ* 30/05/01A and 31/05/01B.
[100] *taz* 29/05/01D, *FAZ* 30/05/01D.
[101] *taz* 29/05/01C-E, *FAZ* 29/05/01B,C+E, 30/05/01E, and 31/05/01A.

views.[102] Furthermore, Polish reactions to Jospin's proposals are said to be positive, and the Spanish government also expresses its support.[103] Finally, the British government's response to both Jospin and Prodi is recorded. Tony Blair, the coverage notes, is not happy with the nourishment the speeches have given to the European theme in the British electoral campaign, but he says Britain should participate actively in the European debate in order to win the arguments on the Union's future shape.[104]

*England: foreign interventions into the electoral campaign*

The sample of the English newspapers yielded 34 articles covering Jospin's, Prodi's or both speeches (see figure 21). Almost two thirds of the coverage deals exclusively with Jospin's speech, one third include both, and the few remaining pieces only mention Prodi. There are six commentaries, two leaders, and one letter in the sample. The most prominent contextualisation of the English newspapers is that of the British electoral campaign.[105] In this context both speeches are conceived as being inconvenient for Tony Blair and his Labour party, who try to keep the European theme out of the campaign, and advantageous for the Tories, who are placing all their hopes in the electorate's fear of the advent of a European superstate.



*Figure 21: The English coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches*

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
[102] *taz* 30/05/01, *SZ* 30/05/01B, *FAZ* 30/05/01A.
[103] *FAZ* 30/05/01B+F.
[104] *FAZ* 30/05/01C.
[105] *FT* 26/05/00, *Tim* 27/05/01, *Ind* 28/05/01A+B, *Guar* 28/05/01, *Tim* 29/05/01C+D, *Ind* 29/05/01A+B, *Guar* 29/05/01B, *FT* 29/05/01A+B, *Tim* 30/05/01, *Guar* 30/05/01C, *FT* 30/05/01B, *Tim* 01/06/01, *Guar* 01/06/01.

Although the upcoming British elections impact heavily on the coverage, the broader context of the ongoing European debate is also presented. Jospin's and Prodi's speeches are placed alongside the foregoing interventions of other political leaders so that "…the interested public can now ponder plans for the future ranging – for want of a more precise word – from the 'federal' to the 'intergovernmental'" (*FT* 30/05/01A). In this context the main purpose of the English coverage is to place the different interventions on the continuum and to display cleavages and alliances.[106]

There is general consensus on placing Prodi's speech at the more integrationist end of the scale. Moreover, Jospin's speech is commonly understood as a rejection of the German federal visions of Europe. However, the articles display disagreement as to how this rejection places Jospin in relation to the British position. Some see a close connection between Jospin's and Blair's visions, others emphasise the differences between the British and the Continental views, and some choose to position Jospin as mediator between British and German views.

Interestingly, the whole range of options is expressed in articles of the issue of *The Times* that was published on the 29th of May. A home news article entitled "The real rift in Europe is not the Channel" states: "Europe is divided on its future, but not in the way that the Conservatives claim. […] much more important than any cross-Channel differences are those between France and Germany" (29/05/01C). A feature article claims that "…far less divides France and Germany than divides both from the British position" (29/05/01A). And the journalist covering the events from Paris asserts: "…the French Prime Minister, yesterday laid down marks for a more Gallic-style union that fell between Germany's blueprint for federation and Tony Blair's vision of a European 'superpower but not a superstate'" (29/05/01B).

In spite of the differences concerning the exact positioning of the players, the English coverage generally agrees that the ensuing debate represents a positive development. A *Financial Times*-leader puts the case clearly: "all these ideas […] must be debated long and hard between now and 2004 – the deadline for the next EU reform" (29/05/01C).

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[106] *Ind* 28/05/01A+B, *FT* 28/05/01, *Tim* 29/05/01A-C, *Ind* 29/05/01C, *Guar* 29/05/01A+B, *FT* 29/05/01B-D, *Ind* 30/05/01, *Guar* 30/05/01A+B, *FT* 30/05/01A+B, *FT* 01/06/01A, *Tim* 03/06/01.

*Spain: presentation of various issues from different angles*

The Spanish coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches during the sampled period consists of 24 articles (see figure 22); of these two are commentaries and three are leaders. Although more than half of the Spanish articles only mention Jospin, there are proportionately more pieces that refer to Prodi's speech in the Spanish coverage than in any of the other national reports. However, this distribution of attention is not an expression of any general tendency, but rather an indication of how dispersed the Spanish coverage is. The Spanish articles bring up a number of different themes, but there is no general direction of the reporting. Thus, it is mentioned that Jospin's speech was long awaited, the two speeches' interference with the British electoral campaign is noted, and the clash between French and German viewpoints is also a recurring theme.[107]



*Figure 22: The Spanish coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches*

In the context of the Franco-German exchange Prodi is positioned alongside France.[108] Moreover, Spain is reported to be closer to the French than to the German position,[109] but the Spanish government is also criticised for being unclear or even inarticulate, and calls are made for an upsurge and reorientation of the debate in Spain.[110] An *El País* leader discusses the situation and states that recent Spanish actions have left an "…image of an executive that has not been able to create a strategy that makes it possible to make the Spanish interest compatible with the common European interest. While Jospin, Blair, Schröder or Prodi speak of their visions for the Europe of the future, a general Spanish focus still has not been articulated" (31/05/01). This lack of focus not

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[107] *Exp* 29/05/01A, *CD* 29/05/01, *EP* 29/05/01A-D+F, 30/05/01C, and 03/06/01A,B+D.
[108] *CD* 30/05/01B, *EP* 03/06/01A.
[109] *EP* 29/05/01D, *CD* 29/05/01, *EP* 31/05/01 and 01/06/01B.
[110] *EP* 29/05/01C, 31/05/01, and 04/06/01.

only defines the Spanish executive's attitude, but – as the preceding presentation has shown – may be extended to the Spanish press coverage of the debate as well.

### 5.3.4. Personae offered in and responses given to Jospin's and Prodi's speeches

Both Jospin and Prodi seek to create positions of collective action in the form of continued debate on the future of Europe that are characterised by the reconciliation of national and European positions. Moreover, both speakers explicitly invite continuation of the debate. Jospin primarily sees the active discussion as a matter for the politicians and positions the public as spectator. Prodi primarily addresses the people and invites them to debate his views with him. On this basis it is perhaps surprising that Jospin's speech receives the most public attention and that it is his terms of discussion that pervade the coverage. However, a consideration of the specific situations in which Jospin and Prodi speak may help explain the newspapers' reception of the speeches.



*Figure 23: The personae offered in and responses given to Jospin's speech*

Jospin's speech is perceived as an answer to a demand that had been building in both the French public and in the European political context, and as such the statement would probably draw attention no matter what personae and fields of communicative interaction it were to offer. Jospin chooses to speak at the Maison de la Radio to an audience partially composed of French and foreign journalists thereby clearly demonstrating that the actual audience of his speech is the French and European public (see figure 23). Prodi speaks in a less salient situation; the fact that he once

again presents his views to one or another specific audience might have passed altogether unnoticed had it not been for the close proximity between his and Jospin's utterances. Although the German press is probably right in arguing that Prodi had not intended his statement at the Sciences-Po to be conceived in the context of Jospin's speech, it is quite understandable that the newspapers should make this contextualisation. In itself Prodi's speech is too abstract in the positions it forwards and too conventional in the choice of speaking situation for the newspapers to pay it any sustained attention and for other actors to discuss it independently (see figure 24).

*Figure 24: The personae offered in and responses given to Prodi's speech*

### 5.3.5. *"The EU is our effective, progressive platform" – Lykketoft in Copenhagen*

*Presentation of the speech*

On the 23rd of August 2001 Mogens Lykketoft, who was then the Danish foreign minister, presented his visions for the future of Europe to the Council for International Affairs at the Danish parliament. The speech was entitled "Europe in the world,"[111] and its advent had been announced in June when the government published a white paper on Denmark's relationship with Europe.[112] The relationship between Denmark and the EU is at the base of all the opinions set forth in the speech. The vision advocated is one in which common European decisions and actions should be taken in many different areas. Yet Lykketoft places a fundamental restriction on the EU's development: however profound and extensive the co-operation may become, it should retain its intergovernmental dimension.

*Constitution of personae*

In the opening paragraphs of the speech Lykketoft performs a simultaneous identification of himself and his audience, not only establishing the speaking and the listening positions, but also creating common ground between them. He begins this task by presenting the EU as a necessary framework for Danish efforts to create positive developments on a global scale (ll. 5-6), but public support for the common project is not taken for granted (ll. 25-29). Rather, Lykketoft takes up the issue of people's hesitancy towards the EU and seeks to redefine it: "The doubt about the EU is probably not an expression of a division of the nations into two populational groups in total disagreement. It is rather an expression of oppositional sentiments in the minds of most of us: We both have strong feelings tied to the nation and a sense of the utility of European co-operation" (ll. 32-36). This definition of doubt as an inherent trait of both speaker and audience is followed by a narrative in which historical developments mean that an initial scepticism towards the EU is replaced by firm conviction that it is the most productive forum for positive change.

Lykketoft's position is abstractly identified as being proactive and the speech is addressed to an equally abstract second persona with the same basic traits as the speaker. It is from this vantage-point of basic commonality that Lykketoft substantiates and advocates his proposals, but before taking up this task he performs a move of demarcation, identifying and shutting out a third persona and confirming the identity of the first and second personae in the process:

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[111] "Europa i verden."
[112] Says the reporter covering Lykketoft's speech for *Information* (24/08/01B).

> There is talk of building bridges in Danish European policy. Bridges cannot be built to those who deny the realities of the European co-operation and whose political lives depend upon nourishing prejudices and fear of the future, the foreign, and the foreigners. But bridges can and must be built between the national characteristics we want to maintain, and the European co-operation we cannot do without. My speech today is an attempt at such bridge building (ll. 47-53).

Viewing the rest of the speech from the perspective of the bridge metaphor, it seems that a double connection is being sought. In presenting his vision of Europe Lykketoft both attempts to bind his and the audience's nationally anchored personae to each other and to the EU. Lykketoft presents a substantial vision of Europe's future that he judges to be wholly realistic, capable of dealing with the existing challenges, and in accordance with the positions of the European partners (ll. 61-63).

The third persona that is internal to the Danish context, but differentiated from the people whom Lykketoft invites to participate in dialogue and co-operation, is not the only position from which the speaker differentiates himself and his audience. An external third persona that is similar to the third personae of unregulated capitalism and globalisation presented by Jospin and Prodi is also established. However, Lykketoft does not only present the common 'other' of the EU members in terms of a struggle against abstract forces, he also presents the US as the specific third persona in opposition to which a common European identity should be created and endorsed (ll. 227-248).[113]

Lykketoft creates a common speaker-audience identity that is clearly national, but takes a constructive attitude towards the EU seeing it as the means to achieve already accepted goals. From this perspective the main question becomes how to organise the EU in such a way that it will be capable of effective action without encroaching on the member states' national sovereignty. The question of this organisation is the issue on which Lykketoft welcomes further discussion, and he thereby endorses and promotes the agenda of the Nice Declaration. In his consideration of how the debate should be continued, Lykketoft declares his support for the idea of creating a convention (ll. 538-540). However, Lykketoft warns of entering into complicated debates about a constitution for the EU, a catalogue of competences and other technical matters; such discussions, he says, will only strengthen myths about secret plans of a stronger Union (ll. 616-620).

By following the agenda that was established at Nice, by referring to Jospin's position (ll. 374-375) and to proposals put forward by Tony Blair and the Czech president Vaclav Havel (ll.

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[113] Jospin (ll. 166-1667 and ll. 181-182) and Prodi (ll. 139-142 and ll. 261-263) also refer to the US as part of the problem, but do not position it directly as a third persona.

659-660) Lykketoft relates to the European debate that is being conducted at the highest political level. However, the speech is not primarily an intervention into this context, but instead addresses a distinctly Danish second persona. Rather than creating a European persona for himself and his audience, Lykketoft establishes a Danish perspective from which the EU can be viewed positively and encountered constructively.

The speech recognises the importance of presenting one's views on the European scene in order to influence the reform process (ll. 532-533), but the invitation to public participation in the debate does not transcend the national boundaries. Public discussion, in Lykketoft's account, takes place nationally, and the politicians represent the views of their electorates at the European level; as Lykketoft sees it, the two domains do not overlap. In the last instance the goal of the speech is to create a national public opinion, a consensus on Denmark's relationship with the EU, on the basis of which the Danish government can seek to influence developments in Europe.

### 5.3.6. A singularly Danish response – the press coverage of Lykketoft's speech

The ten-day survey of English, French, German, and Spanish newspapers did not yield any results at all,[114] but the Danish sample contains 16 articles (see figure 25).



*Figure 25: The Danish coverage of Lykketoft's speech*

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
[114] As will be seen from the examination of the Danish coverage, the Danish Prime Minister at the time, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, delivered a speech on the future of Europe at the Czech foreign ministry on the same day as Lykketoft gave his speech. However, a search for English, French, German, and Spanish coverage of Nyrup's speech did not bring forth any results either.

The coverage presents the speech in two different contexts: it is both seen as a response to demands put forth in the national Danish setting and as an intervention into the European debate. In the national context the speech is viewed as a long awaited effort to heighten the quality of the EU-debate by setting out the government's position.[115] In this respect the content of the speech is compared with a statement that the Prime Minister delivered to the Czech Foreign Ministry on the same day as Lykketoft made his intervention. The two speeches are judged to be very similar, thereby presenting a coherent impression of the government's position.[116] The coverage briefly focuses on the content of Lykketoft's – and the Prime Minister's – speech(es), and then moves on to cover the reactions of various actors on the Danish political scene.[117] The individual articles focus on one or another political party's or a number of parties' reactions, but all the texts contribute to the same general picture. An article from *Jyllands-Posten* provides an overview:

> The government's first initiative in the grand project of building bridges to those parties who voted no to the EU's common currency last year, is received well by SF [the Socialist People's Party]. It is received with mixed emotions by the Christian People's Party [now the Christian Democrats] and hits rock-bottom with the Danish People's Party [a right wing, populist party] and the United List [a left wing coalition of former communists and other radical socialist groups]. […] Among the EU-supporters in parliament there is only cautious criticism. […] Outside parliament, in the two EU-opposition movements, the reaction is that the government is about to found a united Europe (24/08/01A).

In the European context it is noted that the Danish government's proposal replies to the speeches of other leading politicians, but does not set the agenda in Europe.[118] *Information*'s reporter comments that "it is not altogether easy to contribute something new when one has chosen the spot as speaker number 15 in line after Fischer, Jospin, Amato, Blair, Lipponen…" (25/08/01C). Lykketoft's intervention is compared with the proposals of the other leaders, and here the articles show some disagreement. One *Politiken* article sees the speech as an attempt at alignment with the UK, whereas the rest of the coverage emphasises the close connection with Jospin's position.[119] However, the coverage agrees that the speech should be placed at the intergovernmental end of the scale. Also, there is general agreement that the speech is not primarily addressed to the European scene, but to "…the half of the population – or as Lykketoft perhaps more precisely put it, the half of all of us – that might vote no to an EU-referendum" (*Pol* 28/08/01B). And the final verdict on the

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[115] *JP* 23/08/01, *Inf* 24/08/01A, *JP* 24/08/01B, *Pol* 28/08/01B.
[116] *Pol* 24/08/01B, *Inf* 24/08/01A+B, *JP* 24/08/01B.
[117] *Pol* 24/08/01A, *Inf* 24/08/01A+B, *JP* 24/08/01A, *Inf* 25/08/01B, *JP* 25/08/01B.

speech is that given the various national and European constraints[120] it is a success – at least in the national context. Or, as an *Information* leader puts it: "Hurray! Now there finally is some movement in the debate on European policy" (25/08/01A).

### 5.3.7. Personae offered in and reactions given to Lykketoft's speech

The first and second personae that Lykketoft offers are primarily national; from the Danish vantage-point they reflect constructively on the European developments and discuss how the EU might be improved. Although the purely sceptic position is excluded from the dialogue Lykketoft invites and although he creates a specific 'other' against which the members of the EU might unite, his appeal is first and foremost national.



*Figure 26: The personae offered in and responses given to Lykketoft's speech*

When taking account of the personae Lykketoft creates and the opportunity for debate he offers, it is by no means surprising that his intervention should only elicit a Danish response. Lykketoft's speech is directed to a national audience, and this direction combines with the fact that

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[118] *Inf* 24/08/01B, *Pol* 25/08/01.
[119] *Pol* 25/08/01, *Inf* 25/08/01A+C, *Pol* 28/08/01B.
[120] In addition to joining the debate late, the Danish exceptions are mentioned as impediments to an offensive Danish line in the European debate (*Pol* 28/08/01B).

media from other nation-states are not likely to pay much attention to utterances emanating from a small, notoriously foot-dragging EU-member like Denmark to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Danish views do not receive much attention abroad because they are of primarily national Danish relevance, and Danish statements are exclusively oriented to the national context because they do not receive any attention abroad. Thus, the Danish press' evaluation of Lykketoft's speech is an interesting reversal of the English press' judgement of Blair's intervention: successful at home, but a failure abroad. The relations discussed here are illustrated in figure 26.

## 5.4. Turning point two: institutionalisation of the debate

On the 14th and 15th of December 2001 the heads of state and government of the EU's 15 member states convened at the castle of Laeken just outside Brussels to hold the European Council meeting marking the end of Belgium's half-year of presidency over the Union. As the first annex to the presidency conclusions, the official record of the meeting, the Council adopted the "Declaration on the future of the EU" that sets out the agenda and procedure for the next years' debate and the eventual assembly of the new IGC. As mentioned above, the adoption of the Laeken Declaration was prefigured in the "Declaration on the future of the Union" that was appended to the Nice Treaty. In the earlier declaration it was established that the purpose of the Laeken Declaration would be to lay down the form in which the debate begun at Nice would be continued. In fulfilling this purpose the Laeken Declaration marks the second turning point of the debate on the future of Europe. The Laeken Declaration opts for the creation of a convention, a possibility that was mentioned and recommended in both Jospin's and Lykketoft's speeches, and, hence, the debate is institutionalised.

### 5.4.1. "A defining moment" - the Laeken Declaration

The Laeken Declaration consists of three main parts: the first part, entitled "Europe at a Crossroads," presents the achievements of the EU and the internal and external challenges the Union is currently facing. The second, "Challenges and Reforms in a Renewed Union," goes on to pose a long list of questions about the possible changes that might improve the EU's ability to meet the challenges. And the third section, "Convening a Convention on the Future of Europe," sets up a forum for debate that is to seek answers to the questions raised in the declaration.

       The first part of the declaration establishes the understanding of the EU that constitutes the text's speaking position. The declaration begins with a historical account of the EU's

achievements culminating in the firm assessment that "the European Union is a success story" (l. 14). However, the declaration goes on to place the EU at "…a defining moment in its existence" (l. 18), thereby indicating that past accomplishments do not vouch for equal success in the performance of future tasks. The pending enlargement is presented as a first reason why reforms are necessary: "at long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first took the lead" (ll. 21-23). Two further reasons are put forth in the form of an external and an internal challenge that the Union must meet. Externally, "…Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power […] seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development" (ll. 47-52). Internally, the EU is faced with the challenge of moving closer to its citizens and corresponding better with their expectations. "Citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach developing a Europe which points the way ahead for the world. […] There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to undergo renewal and reform" (ll. 69-72). By positioning the EU between its past feats and its current challenges, the declaration makes the claim that the Union must be reformed if it is to remain a success story in the future.

Since the declaration is an official text its first persona is the EU as such, but instead of assuming an anonymous and authoritative character the declaration carefully identifies the community of which and for which it speaks. Like the Nice Declaration the Laeken Declaration is a piece of auto-communication conducted at the EU's highest political level. Yet the text is also aware of the citizens as a potential audience group, and it carefully positions them in relation to the EU persona:

> Citizens undoubtedly support the Union's broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action. They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also feel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in matters by their nature better left to Member States' and Regions' elected representatives. This is even perceived by some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny (ll. 26-32).

The Laeken Declaration identifies the citizens as having a basically positive inclination towards the EU, but the text asserts that the citizens have a number of expectations, which the Union currently

does not fulfil, and that they are dissatisfied with certain elements of the present institutional and procedural structure.

On the basis of the initial identification of the Union and its citizens three basic challenges are posed: "how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world" (ll. 75-78). The declaration does not itself seek answers to these challenges, but poses several series of questions in each area, thereby explicating the various elements of which each challenge consists and pointing the search for solutions in certain directions. The answers to the questions are to be sought by the Convention that is set up in the third part of the declaration.

The Laeken Declaration, thus, performs three tasks corresponding to its three main sections. It identifies the sentiments of the citizens towards the EU as being characterised by general support but also of unfulfilled expectations. On the basis of the tension between these sentiments the main issues of the debate on the future of Europe are located. And the debate is institutionalised through the establishment of the Convention.

### 5.4.2. Once again, the debate is launched – the press coverage of the Laeken Declaration
The ten-day survey of the 17 newspapers for coverage of the Laeken Declaration yielded 125 articles (see figure 27).



*Figure 27: The press coverage of the Laeken Declaration*

Included in this set of data are 13 commentaries, nine leaders, one letter, and 102 news stories. There are four dominant themes of the coverage: the declaration, the Convention, the possibility of a European constitution, and the bargaining process of the summit (see table 6). In the following, each of the four themes will be presented individually.

| | Declaration | Convention | Constitution | Bargaining | Other issues |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total** | **51%** | **70%** | **34%** | **20%** | **38%** |
| Denmark | 48% | 67% | 19% | 22% | 30% |
| England | 46% | 62% | 40% | 32% | 49% |
| France | 50% | 83% | 25% | 17% | 42% |
| Germany | 38% | 72% | 31% | 13% | 28% |
| Spain | 71% | 65% | 53% | 18% | 41% |

*Table 6: Recurrent themes of the Laeken coverage*[121]

*Creation of consensus on the declaration*

In combination the articles dealing with the Laeken Declaration present a rather detailed account of how agreement on the text was reached. A reflection group set up by Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian Prime Minister, and consisting of various political notabilities drafted the declaration.[122] In anticipation of the Laeken summit Verhofstadt toured the member states' capitals with the reflection group's draft declaration, taking note of the leaders' comments and amending the text accordingly. The first draft was reportedly criticised in Copenhagen, London, Paris, and Madrid, whereas Berlin is said to be supportive of the text.[123] *Jyllands-Posten* notes that the draft declaration gave rise to a paradoxical divide: "the countries that are most eager for integration are busy scolding the EU, while the sceptical countries like Great Britain and Denmark are defending the Union" (12/12/01B). Amidst the reports on the necessity to water down the declaration, the coverage contains several calls for an ambitious statement. It is suggested that the declaration should "…inject fresh impulse into the 'deeper and wider debate about the future of the European Union' launched a year ago in Nice" (*FT* 14/12/01A). And a sense of urgency emerges from the claim that

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[121] The table shows how many percent of the coverage dealt with the theme in question. Please note that more than one theme may be present within the same article (the total is more than a 100%). The category "Other issues" mainly consists of coverage of the other items that were dealt with at the Laeken summit, such as the creation of an EU rapid reaction force, the common European satellite project, Galileo, or the development of a European patent. Also, there was mention of the upcoming introduction of the euro and the possibility of a British referendum on the common European currency.
[122] *CD* 17/12/01 and 20/12/01.
[123] *JP* 12/12/01B, *FT* 12/12/01and 13/12/01A+C, *Inf* 14/12/01, *Tim* 14/12/01, *CD* 14/12/01A+B.

the initiatives to be put forth in the declaration offer "…the last chance […] of strengthening the Union before enlargement" (*SZ* 13/12/01).

The declaration is to be finalised at Laeken, and as the leaders begin their discussions the coverage comments on the negotiating process and its possible outcome. As noted by *Le Monde*:

> The heads of state and government can choose to debate the text prepared by the Belgian presidency profoundly, or consider that it only has a relative importance in so far as it will pass through the mill of the Convention, then of the Intergovernmental Conference. All will depend on the manner in which Guy Verhofstadt has taken account of the remarks made by his partners (14/12/01).

It soon emerges that the declaration has been toned down considerably, and agreement is promptly reached.[124] However, it is noted that the smooth acceptance of the final version of the declaration does not mean everyone interprets the text in the same way.[125] And the agreed text retains some points that are uncomfortable to the leaders of the more sceptical member states.[126] A *Süddeutsche Zeitung* article suggests that political pressure was the reason why the declaration was signed in spite of the remaining differences: "After the disaster summit last December in Nice the Union's ridiculousness would have been exposed once and for all, if Laeken had also been a failure" (17/12/01A).

Another factor, which contributes to the relatively easy acceptance of the declaration, is that it is now generally accepted that further debate on the future of Europe is needed. Although some national leaders, as noted above, continue to hold reservations about how far-going the reforms should be, there has emerged a common understanding of the need for both reforming the EU and changing the reform process itself. The politicians' attitude is mirrored in the coverage: the necessity of reform is presupposed and the resolution to continue the debate receives almost full support.

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[124] *FT* 14/12/01B, *JP* 15/12/01B, *BT* 15/12/01, *EP* 15/12/01 and 16/12/01B+D, *Ind* 16/12/01, *taz* 17/12/01B, *Tim* 18/12/01.
[125] *JP* 16/12/01B.
[126] *BT* 15/12/01, *EP* 15/12/01, *FAZ* 15/12/01B, *EP* 16/12/01C, *Guar* 17/12/01A+B, *FT* 17/12/01A+C, *EP* 20/12/01.

*Setting up the Convention*

The Laeken Declaration sets up the Convention on the Future of Europe,[127] designating its composition and mandate, and hence the question of what the Convention will look like is closely related to the creation of the declaration. In fact, it is generally agreed that setting up the Convention is the most important task of the declaration, and it is reported to be the one issue that gave cause to real controversy during the negotiation of the final text.[128] Another general feature is the consistent presentation of the happenings at Nice as the reason why everyone now agrees that the method for reforming the EU's foundational treaties must be changed.[129] The Convention is said to represent a procedural novelty meant to create a genuinely consensual basis for reforms rather than leaving the reform process at the mercy of the heads of state and government who are likely to put their own national interests before those of the Union. Moreover, it is reported that the purpose of the Convention is not only to ensure a better result, but also to strengthen people's involvement in the reform; both the process and its result are to enhance the public support of the European project. As *The Guardian* puts it, the leaders' "…most important mission [at Laeken] may be launching a great debate on the future of the EU – ensuring it brings some changes in its wake" (13/12/01).

The coverage of the entire summit is marked by a tension between hope of renewal and suspicion of a lapse into the problematic patterns of former meetings. However, the tension is especially evident in the articles dealing with the different issues that had to be settled in order to establish the Convention. Initial disagreements concern the agenda and mandate of the Convention, an issue that is closely linked to the different opinions on the general tone of the declaration. Here, the intergovernmentalists are portrayed as preferring a restricted agenda for a forum that is to deliver inspirational input to the following IGC. The federalists, on the contrary, are said to strive for a Convention with a broad room for discussion and to hope that its eventual recommendations will become impossible to ignore.[130] In spite of the opposite opinions on the agenda and mandate of the Convention, disputes about the composition of the Convention and especially about who should

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[127] Only two articles pay any serious attention to the question of what a convention is and which historical antecedents the present initiative has (*FAZ* 14/12/01B, *SZ* 14/12/01A). The rest of the coverage either inserts a short explanatory note, usually stating that The Convention is the EU's new, broad forum for debate, or simply leaves the term unexplained.

[128] *JP* 12/12/01B, *Ind* 12/12/01, *FT* 12/12/01, *Guar* 13/12/01, *FT* 13/12/01C, *taz* 13/12/01A+B, *JP* 14/12/01A, *Guar* 14/12/01, *CD* 14/12/01B, *Lib* 14/12/01, *FAZ* 14/12/01B, *JP* 15/12/01B, *LM* 15/12/01A.

[129] *taz* 12/12/01A, *Pol* 13/12/01, *Guar* 13/12/01, *FT* 13/12/01, *Inf* 14/12/01, *Lib* 14/12/01, *LM* 14/12/01, *SZ* 14/12/01A, *FAZ* 14/12/01B and 15/12/01B, *BT* 16/12/01B and 17/12/01, *FT* 17/12/01A.

[130] *LM* 12/12/01, *SZ* 13/12/01 and 14/12/01A, *FAZ* 14/12/01A, *JP* 16/12/01B.

chair it proved to be more intense, and most attention is paid to these compositional issues.

In the "souk-like atmosphere" that *Financial Times* (14/12/01B) felt had descended on Laeken a decision on who should head the Convention finally had to be made. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* accounts for the decisive events:

> As the Belgian host Guy Verhofstadt declared his intention to put forth a proposal, Chirac quickly broke in and appealed, immediately supported by Schröder, for his favourite Giscard. The Portuguese Antonio Guterres attempted once again to bring Delors into consideration. Then the conversation was […] deadlocked for a long while as there was no consensus over Giscard. […] Finally, Prime Minister Verhofstadt conjured up a solution 'à la belge': Giscard would be Chairman but 'surrounded' as he later put it by two deputies: the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and his own predecessor Jean-Luc Dehaene (17/12/01A).

There were no vetoes to this compromise and all other issues regarding the composition and proceedings of the Convention had already been settled. Thus, agreement was reached; the Convention was created and could begin its work in March 2002.

*Infamous last words*

The preceding account of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's appointment as head of the Convention shows that the Laeken summit was not entirely purged of the bargaining that had so hampered the Nice summit. After the issue of setting up the Convention had been resolved the situation got even worse as the leaders turned to discussing the location of a number of European agencies. This discussion ended in a farce-like exchange of words over the placement of the European Food Authority, and the squabble grew so ugly that Guy Verhofstadt decided to end the meeting without locating the agencies, thereby leaving the issue to be settled at a future summit. Much to the delight of the reporters covering the Laeken Council the final exchange was subsequently leaked to the press and a number of articles indulge in extensive reports of the heated exchange.[131]

The events of the summit's concluding session lead to some scepticism about what was really achieved at Laeken.[132] And the irony of the events is not lost on the reporters,[133] as the introductory remarks of an article from *The Times* illustrate:

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[131] *Tim* 16/12/01 and 17/12/01, *Guar* 17/12/01A+B, *FT* 17/12/01D+E, *Pol* 17/12/01B, *JP* 17/12/01, *taz* 17/12/01D, *SZ* 17/12/01B+E, *Tim* 18/12/01, *BT* 18/12/01, *CD* 20/12/01.
[132] *JP* 17/12/01, *Pol* 17/12/01B, *Tim* 17/12/01, *Guard* 17/12/01A, *SZ* 17/12/01E, *Tim* 18/12/01, *CD* 20/12/01.
[133] In the Danish coverage attention is paid to a further ironic twist, namely, that the agreement on the declaration that is to bring more openness to the EU was reached in secrecy (*Inf* 15/12/01, *JP* 15/12/01A, *BT* 15/12/01).

It speaks volumes for all that is wrong with the direction of the European Union that its leaders could engage in a bitter row as to where a European food safety agency might be located while cheerfully endorsing a major constitutional review with only the minimum dissent. It is as if those who founded the United States had spent hours arguing where some tea might be dumped in Boston Harbour and had ignored details of the Declaration of Independence (18/12/01).

However, the lasting impression is a hesitant optimism as this quote from a *Guardian* article aptly conveys: "Laeken will be remembered for its exquisite catering and unseemly haggling that left a familiar unpleasant aftertaste. And for creating a tempting menu of ways of providing a better deal – and not a backroom one – for millions of ordinary Europeans" (17/12/01C).

*Taking the debate further – the prospect of a European constitution*
The ambivalent evaluation of the summit forms the backdrop of the attempts to foresee future developments. The coverage of reactions to the declaration leaves a generally positive impression.[134] Turning to the issue of what the likely outcome of the Convention might be, it is noted that the Laeken Declaration is an expression of the changed terms of debate. "Half a year ago almost no one spoke of the goal of a constitution" (*FAZ* 14/12/01E), but with the declaration it is recognised as a possibility.

With the acceptance of the Laeken Declaration the agenda of the debate seems to have changed radically, but *Cinco Días* thinks otherwise: "…[one] should not ignore that the answer to most of the imaginative challenges put forward at Laeken already appear in the speech of the German foreign minister at the Humboldt University…" (17/12/01). Although other articles also see some of the happenings at Laeken as mere reruns of earlier turns in the debate,[135] all agree that Laeken constitutes at least one major novelty: the institutionalisation of the debate in the Convention. It is also agreed that the value of the Convention lies in the prospect of a deep and wide public debate. This sentiment is aptly summed up in a *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* commentary's conclusion that: "the Convention is a risky institutional experiment but it brings the great chance of attributing the constitutional foundation of the EU to a 'grand débat Européen'" (14/12/01A). However, as another commentary in the same issue of *FAZ* points out, it remains

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[134] *BT* 16/12/01C, *EP* 16/12/01A,B+D, *FAZ* 16/12/01B, *taz* 17/12/01D, *SZ* 17/12/01A+C, *BT* 17/12/01, *FT* 17/12/01A-C, *Ind* 18/12/01A, *FAZ* 17/12/01B, *EP* 18/12/01, *FAZ* 19/12/01, *CD* 20/12/01. Only in the English newspapers is there any serious questioning of whether the reform process that is institutionalised by the declaration will be beneficial (*Tim* 16/12/01A-C). The sentiment expressed in these articles is that "Europe is moving on. And not necessarily in the direction Britain would want" (*Tim* 16/12/01C).
[135] *FT* 12/12/01, *Exp* 13/12/01, *LF* 13/12/01, *taz* 13/12/01A, *FAZ* 15/12/01C and 16/12/01B, *taz* 17/12/01A, *SZ* 17/12/01C, *Tim* 18/12/01, *CD* 29/12/01.

doubtful whether the Convention will be able to spark any serious public debate: "How many citizens can muster the interest, time, and leisure to follow the happenings of the Convention?" (14/12/01B).

### 5.4.3. Consequences of the second turning point

Before institutionalising the debate by setting up the Convention the Laeken Declaration in a sense surveys the discussions that have been carried out so far, whereby the understandings and positions that the declaration mentions become part of the unproblematic background on which the debate will continue. Thus, the Laeken Declaration synthesises and endorses the personae positions and agency options that were presented and responded to at the six moments I have studied. The declaration creates a first persona of responsible politicians who are determined to ensure that the EU will remain successful in the future and that it will realise its full potential. The politicians will do this for the benefit of the second persona of the citizens who are positioned as being basically positively inclined towards the Union, but concerned about its recent developments and future challenges.

The course of action suggested in the declaration is reform of the treaties based on public debate. This debate, in turn, should be conducted in positive terms – the goal is to improve the Union not to disassemble it. The issues to be discussed and the available proposal are all located between the extremes of the purely intergovernmental and the strictly federal, between the nation and Europe. Neither extreme is feasible, but it is equally impossible to abandon the dichotomy altogether. The Laeken Declaration not only stipulates what the debate should be about and how it should be conducted in terms of the formulation of concrete proposals, by establishing the Convention the declaration also sets down the procedure of the debate and defines its main actors. Thus, it becomes clear that politicians and members of the political circles are the primary participants, whereas the public at large is more of a spectator than a participant. The understanding of a public debate that emerges, then, is one in which political actors discuss their viewpoints with each other in public, not one in which ordinary citizens participate actively.

The press coverage of the Laeken Declaration by and large reflects the understanding of the debate that is laid down in the declaratory text. There is a wide acceptance of the terms of debate that the text establishes, wherefore these are reinforced as the basic assumptions that will constitute further discussions. The coverage mostly represents these ground-rules of the discussions, but there are some attempts at evaluating them and estimating their chances of generating the

desired outcome. These preliminary judgements are lukewarm. On the one hand, it is suggested that the debate on the future of Europe, which is now institutionalised, is a definite improvement of the modes of reform that have been employed so far. On the other hand, it is indicated that the institutionalisation of the public debate as it is now conducted may not in itself be a sufficient means of improving and securing the EU's legitimacy.

The coverage that focuses on the Laeken summit rather than the content of the declaration and the process of the debate displays many of the same tendencies that defined the coverage of the Nice summit. The split between high-minded common European visions and fierce haggling over specific issues in which everyone seeks to protect and promote their national interests emerges clearly. Thus, the process of debating the future of Europe is set apart from the actual decision-making and it remains doubtful whether the preparatory discussions will impact and facilitate the actual reforms once the moment of binding decision-making arises. There is no sign of the emergence of stronger mechanisms of connection between the general non-binding discussions and the institutionalised turning points. The lack of mediation between the debate as it is conducted in fora that are accessible to the public and the decisions as they are made at the closed summits does not bode well for the prospect of basing eventual decisions directly on the debate. Thus, there are no strong indications that the debate will be an independent and significant source of input and social legitimacy for the EU.

## 5.5. From institutionalisation to ratification – further developments of the debate[136]

On the 28th of February 2002 the Convention on the Future of Europe, or the European Convention as it was soon officially dubbed, held its inaugural session. On this occasion the chairman,[137] Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, presented the Convention's agenda and working methods to the convened participants.[138] Giscard d'Estaing also discussed the nature of the Convention's end-result. He

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[136] This section is a strictly referential account of the events succeeding the Laeken summit. While my conclusions are based exclusively on the analyses of the first two stages of the debate on the future of Europe, I felt subsequent developments could not be entirely ignored. Therefore, I provide the following overview of major events that took place between December 2001 and September 2004. The articles quoted in the following are listed in appendix 9 along with the rest of the studied newspaper coverage; however, they were not collected in the same systematic manner as the coverage of the speeches and the declarations. A number of other contributions to the debate are also referred to in the following; the complete references to these can be found in the bibliography.
[137] In the course of the Convention's working period the title of president was employed more and more frequently (Norman, 2003, p. 43). This shift possibly reflects the lack of a distinction between a chairman and a president in the French language, but it may also be a sign of growing recognition and acceptance of Giscard d'Estaing's authority. Since the term chairman was preferred in the early stages of the debate on which I focus, I have chosen to maintain this term in my presentation of later events in order to avoid any confusion as to which post I am speaking of.
[138] This introductory speech as well as all the other oral and written statements that were presented to the Convention can be found on the Convention's website (http://european-convention.eu.int).

recognised that the Laeken Declaration allows the Convention to either submit one or several final recommendations, but stated:

> …there is no doubt that, in the eyes of the public, our recommendation would carry considerable weight and authority if we could manage to achieve broad consensus on a single proposal which we could all present. If we were to reach consensus on this point, we would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe. In order to avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to call it: a 'constitutional treaty for Europe' (d'Estaing, 28/02/02).

Thus, the chairman from the very outset of the Convention sought to make consensus the commonly assumed goal, and he also attempted to create the common presupposition that the eventual proposal should be constitutional in nature. Giscard d'Estaing then went on to talk about how the desired results could be achieved, stating that: "This Convention cannot succeed if it is only a place for expressing divergent opinions. […] the members of the Convention will have to turn towards each other and gradually foster a 'Convention spirit.'" "So," he urged the members of the Convention, "let us dream of Europe!" "And," he concluded, "persuade others to share that dream!"

During the course of the Convention's work there were lively discussions of both the substantial issues on the agenda and of the various procedural matters, not least Giscard's somewhat autocratic style. As the work drew towards its conclusion the members of the Convention still disagreed on a number of central issues, but the vast majority now shared the belief that the process should culminate in the presentation of one and only one proposal. Therefore, they proved willing to compromise and to accept elements that did not correspond exactly with their own views and interests. Moreover, the proposal's constitutional character had become part of the common understanding of the members of the Convention, and on the 18$^{th}$ of July 2003 the chairman could hand over the *Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* to the Italian Presidency of the European Council. The Convention succeeded in taking on a dynamic of its own, and its final proposal went well beyond the explicitly stated suggestions of the Laeken Declaration. The declaration only posed the question "…whether this simplification and reorganisation [of the treaties] might not in the long run lead to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union" (ll. 162-163); the Convention ended up proposing a fully fledged constitution.

On the 4$^{th}$ of October 2003 the Italian Presidency of the European Council convened the Intergovernmental Conference that, taking the Convention's proposal as its starting point, was

to endow the EU with a new foundational treaty.[139] The IGC set to work amidst calls for a swift agreement on a Treaty that would be as close to the Convention's proposal as possible. However, it soon became clear that all of the heads of state and government had particular concerns and specific objections to the Convention's draft, and the Italian presidency received more than a hundred proposals for changes, which the various actors wanted incorporated into the final text.[140] By the time the IGC reached its scheduled culmination at the European Council meeting in Brussels on the 12th and 13th of December 2003 the leaders had come a long way towards a final agreement. Consensus had been created on the general structure of the new Treaty, it would indeed be constitutional, and most of the main issues had been resolved to everyone's satisfaction. However, a couple of major stumbling-blocks remained – disagreements so severe they caused Silvio Berlusconi to state that it would take a miracle to reach agreement.[141]

The leaders of the old and new Member States, the ten incoming members were allowed full participation in the negotiations, opened the discussions with echoes of the prelude to the Nice summit: rather no agreement than a bad agreement.[142] But contrary to what was the case at Nice, the politicians now stuck to their warnings at the moment of truth. When it became apparent that no common position on the thorny issue of the individual countries' voting weights in the European Council could be found, the leaders decided to end the discussions rather than to negotiate a complicated compromise solution. The Council simply concluded that: "…it was not possible for the Intergovernmental Conference to reach overall agreement on a draft constitutional treaty at this stage. The Irish Presidency is requested on the basis of consultations to make an assessment of the prospect for progress and to report to the European Council in March" (IGC, 12/12/03).[143]

In accordance with the Council conclusions of the December summit the Irish government, which took over Council presidency in January 2004, took on the task of sorting out the various positions and creating new compromises. In March the presidency was able to announce that enough progress had been made for the official talks to be continued; the resumed IGC now aimed at a final agreement at the June European Council marking the end of the Irish presidency

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[139] Thus, the opening of the IGC was pushed forward; in the schedule originally laid down in the Nice Declaration it was set for 2004.
[140] As reported by *Politiken* (28/10/03).
[141] Quoted in *Le Monde* (13/12/03).
[142] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (12/12/03A) quotes Joschka Fischer for taking this stance. According to *El País* (11/12/03) this was also the Polish and the Spanish Prime Ministers positions, and even Berlusconi who reportedly wanted agreement more than anyone said he would not accept it at any price (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12/12/03B).

(IGC, 24/03/04). And on the 18th of June the European heads of state and government experienced a moment of sweet relief, as they were able to announce their agreement on the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*. The agreement was reached on the basis of specific changes in the highly contentious institutional matters as well as compromises concerning the decision-making procedures in a number of specific policy areas (IGC, 18/06/04). These details apart, the agreed text was identical with the proposal that was also on the table in December, and thus the main thrust and central ideas of the Convention's proposal were officially accepted.

Following the leaders' agreement the constitutional treaty is to be officially signed; a solemn ceremony, which is scheduled to take place in Rome on the 29th of October 2004.[144] The process then turns from creation of the new treaty to ratification of it. The treaty must be ratified in each of the 25 member states before it can come into effect; in some states ratification is left to the national parliaments while others will hold national referenda on the issue. Ratification can be quite a lengthy process, and it is not expected that the treaty will be ratified in all countries any earlier than 2006 – if it is indeed ratified in all of the member states as is by no means certain.

## 5.6. Concluding the first round of analysis: from personal thoughts to official action

It is now time to sum up the insights that have been established by studying the speeches and declarations in their textual-intertextual relationship with the press coverage and in chronological sequence. What is at stake here is beginning to provide the why of the who, when, where, and what of the debate.

Taking a bird's-eye view of the developments from May 2000 until the present (September 2004) the debate on the future of Europe appears to contain five phases. From May 2000 to December of that year the discussions were initiated, and with the "Declaration on the Future of the Union," which was appended to the Treaty of Nice, the debate was officially recognised as another round of treaty reforms. The second phase consisted of intensified non-binding discussions and consolidation of the available positions both in terms of the broad public debate and the more specific discussions among political leaders. This phase culminated in the institutionalisation of the debate through the Laeken Declaration's establishment of the Convention. The third stage, institutionalised discussion, comprises the Convention's working period from March 2002 to July 2003. The decisive phase was begun with the inauguration of the IGC on the 4th

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[143]Although it failed to agree on the constitutional treaty and thereby to conclude the task that was set up in Nice and institutionalised at Laeken, the Council meeting did reach agreement on a number of other issues. Among the achieved decisions was the allocation of agencies over which the leaders had such a hefty row at the Laeken summit.

of October 2003. This fourth phase was temporarily suspended after the failed summit of December 2003, but was continued in March 2004 and concluded on the 18th of June when the heads of state and government reached final agreement on the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*. The fifth phase of ratification only begins officially after the constitutional treaty has been signed, but was in practice begun as soon as agreement on the text was reached. This last phase can be concluded in two ways: all the 25 member states may accede to the constitutional treaty and the process of debating the future of Europe will then reach an at least temporary conclusion. A momentary silence may then prevail before discussions of the implementation of the constitution and its consequences are initiated, at which point it is possible that the circle of debating the future of Europe and proposing institutional reforms begins anew. Alternatively, one or more countries may reject the constitution, whereby the debate is forced into a sixth and as of yet wholly indeterminate and unpredictable phase. The sixth phase could include repetition of the ratificatory procedure in the country/ies where ratification failed, revision of the rejected text, or perhaps abandonment of the constitutional project.



*Figure 28: Past developments and possible future turns of the debate*

        The dynamic of the debate leads from a situation in which the idea of a constitution for the EU is presented as a private vision for a far-off future to the present reality in which such a constitution has been created and is in the process of being ratified. The present investigation focuses attention on the two first phases of the debate and a few preliminary conclusions concerning

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[144] As announced by the Dutch presidency in a press-statement (Dutch presidency, 09/09/04).

these phases are due before I leave the chronological perspective and turn to the study of various conceptual aspects of the debate.

### 5.6.1. Abstract commonalities, concrete differences

The first conclusion of the first round of analysis is that an inherently European level of debate does exist, but that it is a rather restricted one. During meetings in the European Council national politicians negotiate directly and produce purely European statements. However, the decision-making capability of the European summits remains rather restricted, not because of any lack of formal opportunity, but because the leaders' ability to reach substantial agreements are limited. The inability of the leaders to produce common decisions and statements of great consequence may be explained by considering the discrepancies between discussions as they are conducted outside of the European-level forum and as they are conducted within it. What emerges is a distinction between abstract commonalities that are allowed to permeate the different national contexts in which non-binding opinion formation is conducted, and the concrete differences which become visible when leaders meet in institutionalised settings of common will formation and decision-making.[145]

The speaking positions and agencies that are constituted at different instances of the debate stand in a paradoxical relation to each other. When participating in non-binding and general discussions leading politicians are able to articulate their viewpoints in such a way that nationally dispersed audiences are presented with similar abstract notions of what the EU is and how it should be developed. In institutionalised settings designed to act out the common expectations, however, the politicians are restrained by prevailing notions of conflicting national interests that must be served. Therefore, the potential for common action that is built up through general processes of public opinion formation is not released when the moment of decision-making arrives. When speaking in national contexts the politicians attempt to persuade their audiences to adopt a European perspective. Yet the prevalence of nationally differentiated positions is generally accepted, and when appearing in European settings the politicians are obliged to represent these diversified positions and thereby prevented from enacting the common European position they advocate elsewhere.

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[145] In drawing this conclusion I am greatly indebted to Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum's work on strong and general publics in the EU (Eriksen & Fossum, 2002; Eriksen, 2004).

### 5.6.2. Centripetal and centrifugal forces

The second conclusion of the analysis that has been conducted so far is that the unifying forces of the debate are primarily temporal, whereas the differentiation of the debate is spatially structured. When the temporal dimension of the debate is highlighted a powerful centripetal force may be observed to run through the discussions, a force that pulls the collective meaning formation in a constitutional direction. Although hesitation and opposition is voiced at every stage, the expectation that the reform process will result in a constitutional text becomes stronger and stronger as the debate unfolds.

The operative force is the power of self-invocation that lies in the very concept of constitution. A constitutional text is a text that brings what it names into being, and this quality rubs off on the constitutional debate; when one discusses the possibility of constituting a political body, the discussion is partly constitutional itself. Whereas nothing arises out of silence, the mere engagement of the constitutional issue suggests the legitimacy of some form of European political community. Hence, even the starkest opposition to the creation of one coherent text for a unified polity implies the constitution of a European community of an alternative kind. Once the constitutional issue is voiced and validated a centripetal dynamic is set in motion: it moves the discussion on to establishment of the various constitutional possibilities that exist at the European level and implicates the eventual adoption of one of these.

There is no necessity that the European constitutional text should be anything like the texts that establish the unified polities of the nation-states, but since the nation-states designate the horizon of previous constitutional experiences, the European constitutional process evolves through constant comparison with these nationally informed experiences. This, then, is a related, but slightly different centripetal force: no matter whether a particular utterance is for or against the idea of a European constitution, the meaning is articulated in terms that have been developed and defined in the context of the nation-state.

However, the linkage between the European discussion and the nationally developed concepts also points to the centrifugal forces of the debate. When the spatial aspect of the debate is brought into focus, differences between the debate as it is understood and conducted in the distinct national settings emerge. Hence, the constitutional experiences of the nation-states may focus the debate on common concepts, but since the experiences of each nation-state are unique they are also responsible for the continued disparity of the debate. The various nation-states interpret the constitutional issues in different ways; distinct ideas about how the national constituencies are best

preserved and how their interests are best promoted have developed in each of the national contexts. These differences mean that the European constitutional debate varies from one national context to the other; more often than not the same concepts are interpreted differently in the various settings, and the different national debates also display a variety of specific concerns. These spatially established differences in priorities and understandings are the main centrifugal forces of the common European debate.

### 5.6.3. Recursiveness and progress in the debate on the future of Europe

The textual-intertextual analysis of the six moments and two turning points of the debate on the future of Europe shows that the infinity of particular situations in which the debate is articulated are, for all their disparity, the starting points for a broader and more stable process of meaning formation. The national contexts are the main loci of this common meaning formation and between them there are considerable differences, but they are also bound together by an abstract centripetal force of perpetual temporal development.

In presenting their visions for the future of Europe the political leaders recognise common issues and they present their views using the same conceptual frameworks. Hereby, a diffuse agreement, a sense of partaking in a coherent process of European scope, emerges. At the specific instances that mark the turning points of the debate the unifying forces are intensified, whereby the possibility of common European decision-making arises. At these instances, however, the political leaders' views are articulated in specific terms revealing differences that often remain unnoticed when general visions of Europe are being invoked.

Thus, the main finding of the first round of analysis is a significant discrepancy between an abstractly perceived common mode of discussion and the variety of more specific concerns and expectations that make up actual speaker and audience positions. The tensions between a common sense of the abstract temporal developments of the debate and the diverse specific spaces of its articulation result in a dynamic that may best be conceptualised as a spiral. The debate progresses recursively, so to speak. It moves forward without leaving the already established contexts completely and intertextual references to previous interventions in the debate are one of its primary means of perpetuation.

The distinction between the possibilities for positioning and acting in the institutionalised European settings of decision-making as opposed to the predominantly national contexts of public opinion formation is another major constitutive feature of the debate. The

national settings remain differentiated and subject to divergent specific expectations concerning what issues should be treated and how to treat them, yet these settings allow for the emergence of an abstract European collective identity. The European institutions offer the possibility of enacting the will of this European persona, but when the debate is crystallised around specific decisions national differences become visible and shatter the image of unity. In combination the constitutive tensions of the centrifugal (spatial) – centripetal (temporal) pair and the national opinion formation – European decision-making divide account for four general traits of the debate as illustrated in table 7.

|  | National opinion formation | European decision-making |
|---|---|---|
| Centripetal force | Abstract commonality concerning form and content of the European project and the debate about | Institutional frame for collective decision brings national leaders into direct contact and dialogue |
| Centrifugal force | Specific differences concerning national interests and their preservation | Intergovernmental procedures for decision-making encourages bargaining rather than deliberation |

*Table 7: Constitutive features of the debate on the future of Europe*

In order to explain the findings of the first round of analysis further and to elaborate upon these preliminary conclusions the second round of analysis will deal with three sets of questions: 1) how do the political leaders establish the various persona positions that they make available in their speeches? That is, what rhetorical strategies are used in the constitution of the positions that the speeches offer? And how do they – the strategies and the personae – enable and restrict participation in the debate? What viewpoints are conceivable and how may they be argued? 2) How do the Nice and Laeken Declarations create possibilities for change? And how does the creation of these texts become possible? In what ways do the declarations function as turning points? How do they both bind past and future together and redirect developments? 3) How does each nationally linked group of newspapers conceive of the relationship between the national and the European? And how does this conception play into the national understandings of the European debate?

After having studied each of these three dimensions a fourth and conclusive move will seek to tie them together. Thereby, I shall attempt to answer the general question of what potentiality for common meaning formation there exists across the board of the particular fora in which the debate is carried out. It is this final analytical insight that I hold to have implications for

the proper conceptualisation of the European polity, and an evaluation of the constitutional theories that were presented earlier rounds off the second round of analysis to which I now turn.

# 6.

# Second round of analysis

With the completion of the first round of analysis I have established the general temporal developments of the debate and reached a preliminary understanding of the national and European positions that are available to and created by participants in the discussions. I now turn to a deeper inquiry into the time-space relations that are internal to the various interventions. This second round of analysis will be divided into four parts. First, I shall study the *topoi* – the rhetorical strategies – used in the six speeches in order to cast light on the places from which the speakers retrieve their arguments and to explain the spaces created in and through the utterances. I shall then turn to the declarations and study them as expressions of *kairos*, of the right moment in which action becomes possible. Third, I will bring the spatial and temporal aspects together in the study of how the press coverage of each national context forms patterns of time-space relationships, so-called chronotopes.[1] Finally, I shall bring the studies of speeches, declarations and newspaper reports together in the attempt to explain the general purposes and goals of the debate, its *teloi*.

## 6.1. Constitutive dichotomies – the *topoi* of the speeches

The purpose of the following investigation is to explain how the speakers present their proposals and what room for meaningful interaction they create. The issues of how the speakers identify themselves with the audiences' existing beliefs and how they seek unity with the audiences through the invocation of common others are not abandoned. However, the focus is now on the third of the identificatory strategies that, according to Kenneth Burke, are available to the rhetor. That is, I move from the investigation of agency and personae to the study of the formal devices by which textual positions are established, and these formal devices of identification are examined through an analysis of the speakers' use of *topoi*.

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[1] I use the three concepts as guiding tools for analysing the various utterances according to genre. I believe that each concept highlights the most important feature of the genre with which it is associated. However, I recognise that the concepts are not genre specific in any strict sense, but do in fact apply to all of the genres. The purpose of the linkage between concepts and genres is solely to focus the analysis, and since the overriding perspective is conceptual rather than generic I have on occasion drawn in other types of texts than the one primarily associated with each conceptual heading.

The Greek term *topos* literally means place, and the spatial metaphor is part of the reason why the term is attractive to the present project with its special emphasis on spatio-temporally bound processes of meaning formation. As will be explored in the following, the spatiality of the *topoi* can be interpreted in various ways. A *topos* can be understood as a place where one goes to find arguments, and it is the place from where one views the world. With the introduction of the concept of *topos* attention is directed to the internal spaces of the utterances; by what means is meaning created? But *topos* also points to the inherent relationship between the meaning created in the text and the broader background from which the speaker draws the various *topoi* he or she uses in articulating the message. What resources are available to the speaker and what possibilities for future communicative interaction are created? Explaining the interrelationship between the meaning that is articulated in and through the utterance and the constraints that make such articulation possible is a central rhetorical concern, and in this respect the study of how formal devices are used to create new meanings holds a particularly strong explanatory potential.

In classical rhetoric the *topoi* – or topics as lists of *topoi* are often termed – were tools of invention and of argumentative analysis (Bloomer, 2001, p. 779). Aristotle designated two general strategies for creating arguments: either the argument can be based on specific viewpoints or *eide*, opinions about the subject matter at hand that are commonly accepted and may serve as the premise of the argument. Or one can create the concrete argument from a general mould, taking recourse to abstract patterns or argumentative forms that function independently of the specific subject and presenting the issue at hand in terms of one of these forms.[2] Common to both categories is that they are ways "…for a speaker to move from generally accepted ideas or norms to some particular end" (Bloomer, 2001, p. 779). Whereas both Aristotle's and Cicero's *Topicae* – regardless of Cicero's claim to the contrary, the two books are quite different from each other – deal exclusively with rational means of argumentation, later commonplace books broaden the scope. The commonplace book was a tool for storing examples of various argumentative and stylistic forms and for arranging them in a proper manner so as to have ready recourse to fixed formulas and fancy formulations to suit any occasion. Hereby, the *topoi* became connected not only to the first of the five canons of rhetoric, *inventio*, but also to *dispositio* and *elocutio* (Moss, 2001, p. 121).

Modern interpreters of the concept are in variance as to how much it should be expanded. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca apply a quite narrow definition, understanding *topoi* – or

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[2] There are indications that Aristotle reserved the term *topos* for the general positions, but the issue remains unsettled, and now it is most common to regard both substantive premises and abstract argumentative patterns as *topoi* (Eide, 1997, pp. 21-22).

*loci* as they say, preferring the Latin name – as "…premises of a general nature that can serve as the bases for values and hierarchies (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 84).[3] Contrary to this view, Kenneth Burke, in his examination of the concept, includes both commonly held substantial attitudes and purely formal invitations to assent, and under the latter heading he places tropes and figures as well as schemes of argumentation (Burke, 1969, pp. 56-59). In the following I apply the notion of *topoi* in the extensive sense suggested by Burke, whereby the concept becomes a broad category including all the different persuasive appeals, devices, and strategies employed in an utterance.

The concept of *topos* has not only been broadened; the understanding of its epistemological functions and ontological status has also developed over time. In the heuristic sense that was dominant in the classical conception and in the practice of writing commonplace books, the *topoi* clearly refer to places in which argumentative and stylistic forms already exist and where one can go to look for them. But the use of *topoi* may also be understood as a particular way of reasoning, as suggested by Giambattista Vico who forwarded the topical method as an alternative to Cartesian criticism (Vico, 1990 [1708]). The introduction of this topical mode of thinking implies that the *topoi* are not only forms in which already perceived ideas may be clad, but are inherent to the process of perception as such. When this line of reasoning is followed through, there emerges a hermeneutical understanding of the *topos* as the perspective from which the speaker understands the world and articulates his or her understanding (Nothstine, 1988). Such a conception of *topos* as the speaker's ontological place in the world implies that the rhetorical utterance is an articulation of the understanding, which this place facilitates. Or as William Nothstine puts it: "…rhetoric always involves the attempts of finite humans to come to terms with their condition and their finitude through language-use, to orient themselves to the world of tensions and discontinuities in which they always already find themselves" (Nothstine, 1988, p. 158).

I argue that *topoi* should not be understood as being either internal or external to the speaker; instead their double nature ought to be recognised. *Topoi* are communicative forms that at once constrain the speaker to a certain perspective and enable him or her to create new spaces of understanding. The selection of one out of the different available means of expression is a genuinely creative choice that facilitates the articulation of unique opinions and understandings. This view of

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[3] Whereas Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the *loci* rather narrowly they do have a broad definition of argumentation in which rhetorical figures are included. *The New Rhetoric*'s inclusive definition of argumentative schemes corresponds to my equally inclusive definition of *topoi*, and I draw heavily upon Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's comprehensive catalogue in the explication of the speakers' rhetorical strategies.

*topoi* is in accordance with José Luis Ramírez' conceptualisation; he uses the term topics to designate the sets of conventional forms – some universal, some specific to cultural or professional contexts – that are available to the speaker. A topic in Ramírez' sense is not the particular *topoi* that are pronounced, but that which enables the speaker to create meaningful utterances in the first place (Ramírez, 1995, p. 266). *Topoi* are central to the speaker's formation of meaning, to his or her constitution of the world, and the speaker's topics, his or her horizon of understanding, are present in the *topoi* used in a concrete articulation.

The textual study of *topoi* aims at understanding how a meaningful place is created in the merger of *inventio* and *elocutio*, that is, in and through the utterance.[4] It is this textual creation of meaning that I shall now seek to explain. The present part of the analysis focuses on the six speeches comparing and contrasting their employment of *topoi* in order to discover the speakers' topics. The study of the *topoi* employed by the six political leaders shows how they create the positions and possibilities that they ask their audiences to endorse. Thereby, the study may lead to a deeper understanding of the meaning formation of the European debate as such. The purpose of the analysis is both to gain further insight into the formal dimension of each speaker's creation of meaning and to begin the assessment of the meaning formation that the speeches have in common. How are the visions and proposals presented and what possibilities of engagement do these presentations offer? How do the speakers conceive of the debate that they are contributing to? And what consequences do these conceptions have for the possibility of continuing the discussion?

Naturally, each speech contains a wide range of different *topoi*. Some stylistic and argumentative features are only used once or a few times in one, some or all of the speeches. Other features are decisive to the creation of meaning in the individual speech, but are not found in any of the other utterances, or do not play an important role if they do occur. And some *topoi* are recurrent in and decisive to all of the speeches; it is around these that the following investigation evolves.

Preliminary readings of the six speeches reveal that the most important and pervasive of the recurrent *topoi* are variations of a binary motive of opposition or strain. I have labelled

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[4] In the critical discourse analysis of Ruth Wodak and her co-authors *topoi* are also employed as analytical units. However, Wodak et al. view *topoi* as pertaining to a mezzo level between the particular articulation and the general strategies that make up discourses, and they analyse each of the three levels separately (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 34). While I can understand the procedural advantages of making such an analytical distinction, I do not believe the three levels exist separately in actual meaning formation. Rather, meaning formation is a result of the interaction between general norms and expectations and specific articulations, and I think this interaction is best explained by focusing exclusively on the *topoi*. In my opinion *topoi* point both to the speaker's creative choices and to the constraints imposed by the subject and the context of the utterance, wherefore they are the analytical tools that hold the most potential for explaining meaning formation as it occurs in and through the utterance.

this group of *topoi* constitutive dichotomies, a general rhetorical strategy that I define as the establishment of antagonistic duality and subsequent suggestion of how that duality may be reconciled or overcome. The various specific instances of the general strategy have much in common with *The New Rhetoric*'s "Procedures for Avoiding Incompatibility" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, § 47), but include the preceding acknowledgement or establishment of the incompatibilities that are subsequently removed or transformed. The constitutive dichotomies are means of simplifying, organising, and explaining complex phenomena. Furthermore, they are used to establish relationships – be they of agreement or opposition – between the various elements of an utterance, and it is this relational aspect that enables them to facilitate the creation of new meanings. I have divided the constitutive dichotomies of the six speeches into three subcategories according to their main purposes: some aim at justifying the need for reform, others set out the procedures of the debate, and the last group is used to advocate the speakers' actual proposals.

The division of the constitutive dichotomies into these three groups has some affinity with the classical rhetorical categorisation of central controversial issues. This categorical system, known as *stasis*, was primarily developed for the juridical genre. It was "…designed to assist rhetors in identifying the central issues in given controversies, and in finding the appropriate argumentative topics useful in addressing these issues" (Hohmann, 2001, p. 741). The *stasis* system consists of four basic questions with corresponding argumentative strategies: first, it may be discussed whether an act was done and whether the defendant did it; this is the *conjectural stasis*. Second, the nature of the act in question could be disputed; strategies for such disputes are found under the *definitive stasis*. The third grouping, the *qualitative stasis*, suggests ways of contesting the evaluation of the act. Finally, there is the *translative stasis* in which it is argued that the case is being tried before the wrong court (Conley, 1990, pp. 32-33). The static categories of this theory can be transformed into a dynamic view of the process of argumentation; from this perspective the speaker takes the case through all of the argumentative stages rather than choosing one of them. In this dynamic conception the *translative stasis* is replaced by the advocative phase so that the resolution of the three other basic questions – is it the case? What is it? What value does it have? – is followed by the consideration of what should be done about it (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960, pp. 52-53).

The three general categories I have established are all present in all the speeches and should thus be understood as phases through which the argumentation runs rather than as isolated argumentative strategies. The third category is identical with the advocative phase whereas the two

others combine elements from the conjectural, definitive, and translative stages. The question of why reforms are needed is both a matter of justifying that this is actually the case and an issue of defining the reforms. And the issue of how the reforms should be debated resembles the *translative stasis* because it is a meta-reflection on matters of procedure, but the detailed definition of the debate takes the discussion beyond what would usually be included in this category. The *qualitative stasis* is implicitly present throughout the discussions in the guises of assessments of the present value of the European institutions, judgements of the appropriateness of the revision procedure, and appraisals of the proposed reforms.

The three categories are meant to provide general understandings of the debate while remaining in close contact with the six speeches under investigation. Thereby, I wish to suggest that concrete argumentation may not fall neatly into the pre-set categories of the theories of argumentation and that one must always be attentive to the unique features of each rhetorical utterance, but this, of course, does not mean that classificatory schemes are without value. The relations between specific utterances and general patterns allow the speaker to create unique meanings, and by studying these relationships the critic may explain the speaker's formation of meaning. The division of the constitutive dichotomies into three general groups is the result of my attempt to locate general patterns within the set of utterances under study. The division creates a starting point for exploring the relationship between general strategies and specific meanings, and thereby it presents a means of explaining how each speaker creates his meaning and of assessing the degree of commonality between the speakers' meaning formation. The constitutive dichotomies of each of the three groups take various different forms. It is the purpose of the analysis to establish and explain these forms and to consider how auxiliary *topoi* partake in the concrete creation of meaning (see appendix 10 for a schematic overview of the strategies that will be presented and explained in the following).

### 6.1.1. Why are reforms needed?

The speeches contain three predominant justifications for reform: enlargement, globalisation, and the disconnection between the EU and its citizens.

*The argument from enlargement*

The first three speeches – Fischer's, Aznar's, and Blair's – present the necessity of change in terms of enlargement. The speeches establish enlargement as an irrefutable historical demand through narratives that display the problems of division and the advantages of working together and through definitions of the candidate countries as natural members of the European unity. Enlargement is also presented as a process that will ensure stability and prosperity on the entire continent. The justification of enlargement is based on space in the geographical sense, on the *topos* of (re)uniting Europe, of making Europe whole. Furthermore, the understanding of geographical expansion as a positive development is connected to the historical narrative; the EU's expansion is presented as a natural consequence of its development in time. Through the spatio-temporally grounded argumentative strategies the necessity of enlargement is established as a common starting point. The ensuing shared understanding of enlargement is that it may be a challenge, but it is also an opportunity (Aznar, l. 18, Blair, ll. 49-50) and there is no alternative to it (Fischer, ll. 117-119).

Having established the necessity of enlargement, the speakers are immediately faced with the problem that the enlargement process is undertaken at a time when the EU is also trying to expand its areas of activity and responsibility. This problem is articulated in spatial terms as the dilemma or double challenge of simultaneous deepening and widening (Aznar, l. 50, Fischer, l. 314). Or, as Blair says, setting the terms for the EU's imminent collective actions and pointing to their inherent difficulty: "there will be more of us in the future, trying to do more" (Blair, ll. 190-191). The different goals of enlarging the EU and endowing it with more responsibilities are seemingly incompatible, and the speakers must tackle this incompatibility in order to move the argument along. The tension between including more members and extending the political co-operation is unfolded in Fischer's speech:

> The institutions of the EU were made for six member states. They function with difficulty with 15. […] The danger is that an enlargement up to 27-30 members will overload the ability to absorb of the EU with its old institutions and mechanisms, and that it can come to severe crises. Yet this danger does not speak against the fastest possible enlargement, but even more for a decisive and appropriate institutional reform, whereby the capability to act is maintained even under the conditions of enlargement. Erosion or integration is thus the consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU (Fischer, ll. 169-178).

In this passage Fischer overcomes the opposition between deepening and widening and instead establishes further integration in the shape of institutional reform as a prerequisite for successful enlargement. The dilemma of the coincidental realisation of two seemingly contradictory, but equally advantageous processes is, thus, replaced by an antithesis in which only one option is desirable.

Fischer reaches his conclusion by recognising that the EU's current mode of spatio-temporal development – increasing the number of members while maintaining the original institutional structure – has reached its limits. Thereby, the need for institutional reform is established, and through the antithesis of erosion or integration the tension between deepening and widening is resolved, making the two processes interdependent, rather than contradictory. Fischer pushes this point further than Aznar and Blair, who both display some hesitancy as to how far institutional integration should go.[5] Yet all three speakers present the tension between deepening and widening as the reason why the EU is in need of fundamental reform. The common argument is that institutional and procedural reform is the only means of overcoming the incompatibility between the two equally desirable goals and thereby realising both at once.

### *The argument from globalisation*

Whereas the first group of speeches labour to establish enlargement as a necessary event, the inevitability of enlargement is taken for granted in Jospin's, Prodi's, and Lykketoft's interventions. In their speeches globalisation has become the basic exigence; it is now the unwieldy global developments and Europe's need to assert itself on the world scene that figure as the basic reasons why reforms are needed. This is also a geographical argument, but now the issues of setting Europe off from the rest of the world and ensuring its effectiveness in the global context are at the centre of the reasoning.

The argument is unfolded in several stages: first, the inevitability of globalisation and its critical importance is established. Lykketoft and Prodi perform these moves through analogy, thereby taking recourse to one of the most common strategies for ascribing new traits to existing phenomena. When used argumentatively, the purpose of analogy is to show the resemblance of structures: A is to B as C is to D. The relationship between C and D, the *phoros*, must be well known and generally recognised, and the purpose of the analogy is to transfer characteristics of this relationship to A and B, the *theme*, which have not previously been considered as being connected

in this way (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 372-373). Lykketoft makes the analogy thus: "The only thing that is completely certain is that there is no secret path back to the closed nation-states of decades past. Our globally mutual interdependence is just as impossible to turn away from, as it is for the egg to get back in the shell once it has been cracked into the hot pan" (Lykketoft, ll. 73-76). The analogy between the reality of globalisation and the egg frying on the pan may seem a bit far-fetched and it also has somewhat unfortunate connotations, but it does convey the message of irreversibility effectively.[6] Prodi chooses a historical *phoros*, stating that "there are times when history leaves people with a decisive choice. I am convinced that, for the Europeans, such a moment has arrived. Globalisation engenders an upheaval similar to that which the discovery of America caused five centuries ago: the world becomes smaller; the exchange of ideas and goods multiplies" (Prodi, ll. 15-19). Here, it is not only the diffuse sense of being an important and unalterable event that is transferred; Prodi also specifies what elements of the discovery of America he wishes to pass over to the present situation. Furthermore, he indicates that the analogously established historical significance of the present circumstances necessitates decisive action thereby preparing the way for the second part of the argumentative chain.

Jospin presupposes the magnitude of the processes of globalisation; he skips the first part of the argument and states the underlying dilemma directly: "How to open it [Europe] to globalisation without diluting its identity?" (Jospin, ll. 9-10). The second stage in the argument, then, is the presentation of globalisation's contradictory nature, its potential benefits and inherent risks. Presenting globalisation as both an advantageous and a dangerous process opens the way for the third move of the argumentation, the establishment of the need for active involvement that is anticipated in Prodi's analogous formation of the historical moment. Lykketoft argues for the active stance by setting up two alternatives of which only one is desirable: "we are facing a new and exciting reality. A reality that one can choose to participate in and influence the content of. Or to be without influence on, but unable to liberate oneself from anyhow" (ll. 44-46). The impossibility of disconnection from the reality of which Lykketoft speaks forms the basis of his argument; here the impossibility is presupposed, but it is unfolded and supported through the analogy. In a similar line of argument, Prodi explains what is needed to gain influence: "In isolation our nation-states no longer have the critical mass for acting profitably. The people who will influence the course of

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[5] These considerations overlap with the theme of what reforms should be conducted, and they will be explored further under that heading.

[6] Note that Lykketoft accompanies the analogy with a metaphor of direction – the non-existence of a road back to the nation-states. This group of metaphors will be considered further in the following.

events will be those who have become aware of this change of scale. The others must resign themselves to being subjected" (Prodi, ll. 20-22).

In the fourth and final move of the elaborate argumentative chain that establishes globalisation as the root cause for the EU's need for reform it is asserted that the member states' need to act collectively in order to assert active agency in the global reality is as of yet unfulfilled. Jospin takes the consequence of the choice between passivity in isolation or common European action. He demands "…a strong Europe that fully assumes its responsibility in the redefinition of the global order and which acquires the means of conveying its message of peace, solidarity, and pluralism" (Jospin, ll. 120-121). Jospin and Prodi argue the EU's need for reform on the basis of the discrepancy between its potential to develop into a value-based world power (Jospin, ll. 150-151, Prodi, l. 40). Whereas the French Prime Minister and the Commission President advocate the constitution of a European collective actor, the Danish foreign minister takes the less integrationist view that the EU is the member states' best "platform" for global action (ll. 247-248). In either case the constituting mechanism is the same, namely that of closing the gap between the capability of the Union's existing institutions and instruments and the tasks which the EU is expected to perform in the global reality. As Romano Prodi concludes: "The danger that threatens us is that of consensus on the apparent status quo at a time when the world changes, at a time when the Union changes" (Prodi, ll. 500-501).

The argument presented by Jospin, Prodi, and Lykketoft is based on the relationship between the EU and the rest of the world and develops through variations of the general argumentative strategy that consists in aligning the premises and the conclusions through an implicit warrant of reciprocal relations (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1397a). The general argument runs as follows: if the EU is to act on the global stage, it must be given the means to do so. More specifically, the speakers seek to establish the political reforms they propose as the proper means for achieving the desired ends in the present circumstances. This position is grounded in the common assumption that symmetry is a prerequisite for successful action (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 221). The three speakers base their claims on the same presupposed symmetries: first, they establish the EU as the only available political entity large enough to assert itself in a globalised world; thereby globalisation comes to be seen as an external force against which the members of the EU are united. Here, the implicit warrant stipulates that there must be a symmetrical relationship between the size of the scene in which an act is performed and the size of the actor performing the act. Second, the speakers use an argument about the necessary correspondence

between means and ends in order to conclude that the EU is in need of reform. The speakers assert that the EU is not at present able to perform its tasks on the world stage, and it is argued that this failure is due to a lack of the adequate means of action, wherefore the EU's institutional and procedural framework must be reformed.

*The argument from disconnection between the EU and the citizens*

The last reason why the EU is in need of reform is present in all six speeches: the disharmony between the way the EU is currently run and peoples' expectations of it. While all the speeches recognise this disharmony as a major impulse towards reform – the reform process presenting the cure to the present problems – there are varying conceptualisations of it. Prodi sets up the argument in its basic form:

> Almost 90% of the European citizens assign ambitious priorities to the Union: maintaining peace and security as well as fighting unemployment, organised crime, and social exclusion. These same citizens, however, hardly concern themselves with the way the Union functions. This is the sign it is time to make Europe differently (Prodi, ll.47-52).

In a similar vein Aznar takes a pragmatic stance towards the peoples' dissatisfaction: using the argument from symmetry he simply states that the EU must answer the citizens' expectations in order to conserve their adhesion and suggests that his proposals create the necessary correspondence (Aznar, ll. 152-154 and l. 244). Unlike Prodi, Aznar does not explicitly recognise that a disconnection between the people and the Union has become a reality; instead he speaks of the conservation of adhesion and of the European politicians' responsibility of not letting down the favourable disposition that the reforms will ensure (Aznar, l. 245). Since Aznar does not conceptualise a situation of crisis his call for reform is not very forceful, and accordingly he advocates minor adjustments, not fundamental change.

At the outset of his speech, Fischer recognises that the process of integration is being called into question; the EU's achievements and remaining challenges stand in contrast to the growing scepticism. Fischer presents this mismatch as one of the main reasons why he is happy to have been given the opportunity to present his visions for Europe (Fischer, ll. 15-20). However, he does not really discuss the sceptical position. In the course of the speech several attempts to anticipate negative reactions are made, but only in order to ask the opponents to abstain from making shrill replies and to feel at ease with the ideas of the speech (Fischer, ll. 196-201 and ll. 281-283). Although Fischer recognises the problem of the disenchanted populations this issue is not his main concern; instead his call for fundamental reform is primarily premised upon the need to

ensure the enlarged Union's capability of action. Fischer, therefore, advances his position without much attention to what the people think.[7]

Jospin sets up the same contradiction between the EU's success and the growing disenchantment and incertitude, but contrary to Fischer he shows some understanding for the rising insecurity, acknowledging that "…it is true that the future of Europe raises legitimate questions" (Jospin, l. 8). Jospin poses three such legitimate questions, all ridden with productive tensions. The first question sets up the relationship between Europe and the world that has already been presented, and the other two present different angles on the relationship between Europe and the nation, a constitutive dichotomy that will be presented under the heading of what reforms should be made. Jospin's strategy for dealing with the disconnection between the individual citizen and the European project consists in alleviating other, more specific tensions, the implicit argument being that if the questions citizens pose are answered satisfactorily, the general incertitude will also be dissolved.

Like Jospin, Blair and Lykketoft connect the citizens' concerns about the EU with the relationship between Europe and the nation-state, that is, with the issue of what reforms to make rather than with why reforms are needed. However, both speakers also set up the peoples' priorities as a reason to begin the discussion of reforms in the first place. In this context, Blair presents an argument about the inevitability of Europe – an argument similar to that put forward by Prodi and Lykketoft in the context of globalisation:

> …as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would be something truly bizarre and self-denying about standing apart from the key strategic alliance on our doorstep. None of this means criticisms of Europe are all invalid. […] But to conduct the case for reform in a way that leaves Britain marginalised and isolated […] is just plain foolish. […] being at the centre of influence in Europe is an indispensable part of influence, strength and power in the world. We can choose not to be there; but no-one should doubt the consequences of that choice… (Blair, ll. 128-138).

Here, Blair both argues for British participation in the reform process and seeks to set the terms for how the debate should be conducted, an issue to which I shall return. The argument is not so much about why reforms are needed, as it is about why Britain should participate actively in the reform process. Blair attempts to redefine valid criticisms of Europe as reasons to become involved in the process, rather than for standing apart from it. By advancing the claim that there are no alternatives to the EU, he seeks to create a dynamic of commitment, urging the citizens to seek solutions to their current dissatisfaction by engaging the system, not by withdrawing from it.

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[7] The actual proposals for reform are, as will be explained when I turn to the examination of the third subcategory, not inattentive to people's sentiments, but these are not Fischer's main motivation for seeking reform.

Lykketoft begins his treatment of the issue by setting up the contrast between the EU's potential and the people's current support (Lykketoft, ll. 25-31). He then attempts to create a productive dynamic, equal to that set up by Blair, by presenting the strained relationship with Europe as being internal to each citizen, thereby avoiding the risk of locking the debate in polarised conflict between opposed groups. Says Lykketoft:

> The doubt about the EU is probably not an expression of a division of the nations into two populational groups in total disagreement. It is rather an expression of oppositional sentiments in the minds of most of us: We both have strong feelings tied to the nation and a sense of the utility of European co-operation (ll. 32-36).

This reasoning allows Lykketoft to conclude that: "bridges cannot be built to those who deny the realities of the European co-operation […]. But bridges can and must be built between the national characteristics we want to maintain, and the European co-operation we cannot do without" (ll. 51-52). The argumentative strategies employed by Lykketoft in this passage include a shift in perspective and an establishment of correspondence in spite of controversy. The changed perspective, moving from external conflict between groups to a tension that is internal to each person regardless of his or her group affiliations, facilitates reconciliation. Since all involved individuals are now perceived as recognising both sides of the issue a common understanding of the need to find a compromise emerges.[8]


*Why reforms are needed*

The EU's need for reform and thereby the basic justification of the debate as such is established by positioning the EU in an intermediate position. This intermediacy is conceived spatially, as the occupation of a space between the individual nation-states and the entire world. It is also understood temporally; the EU is put in the middle of a developmental process that must be continued. Furthermore, a combined spatio-temporal transitory stance is created in which the EU is seen as being on the way to realising its finality. This combined argument has two dimensions: the EU is on its way to achieving its final geographical form through enlargement and it will achieve its ultimate institutional form through reformation. The basic argument, then, is that the reforms represent the means of moving the EU along towards its finality, and in addition it is proposed that the reforms may overcome the tensions of the EU's development. That is, through reform the strained relationship between the EU and its citizens can be alleviated, the incompatibilities between the

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[8] The question of what that compromise should look like belongs to the third group of dichotomies and will be discussed below.

Union's goals and its current capability of action can be overcome, and the risk that enlargement will put further strains on the relationship between means and ends can be avoided. The general purpose of the constitutive dichotomies that are used in speaking of the need for reform is to cast the reform process as a necessity for finishing the ongoing European project and for making the EU physically complete.

### 6.1.2. How should reforms be debated?

The issue of how the debate should be conducted is not as central to the speeches as are the two other main categories, but in dealing explicitly with the procedures and forms of the discussion it is of great concern to my investigation, and I have therefore included it here. In discussing this issue the speakers reflect directly upon the process in which they partake and seek to set the terms for further debate. Two main relationships constitute the speakers' understanding of the debate: the relationship between short- and long-term debate, and the relationship between the discussion of the EU's purpose and its institutional makeup. These two relationships indicate what should be discussed and how the discussion should be conducted. A few other issues, namely who should participate in the debate and where it should be conducted, are also present, but these are addressed more implicitly than the other two dimensions. I shall explore the speakers' treatment of these questions before turning to the investigation of the two more central issues.

*The who and where of the debate*

Blair's verdict on the foolishness of standing outside of the reform process, Fischer's attempts to silence certain reactions to his speech, and Lykketoft's statement about who he will not build bridges to all seek to exclude radically sceptical positions from the conversation. The three other speeches do not contain such direct markers of exclusion, but it is evident that all the interventions take a constructive tone that does not include considering secession of member states or rolling back the integration process.

The speakers also touch upon the related issue of where the debate should be conducted. Here, two main distinctions are brought to bear namely the differentiation between national and European-wide fora for discussion and the division between popular and elite debates. The speakers ascribe varying degrees of importance to this issue: Aznar barely mentions it, but implies that the discussion is elitist and enjoins politicians and experts at the European level (Aznar, ll. 2-5 and ll. 244-245). The other speakers in one way or another express concern about the broader

public involvement in the discussion. Prodi casts the discussion on Europe's future as the young people's debate, and he understands the debate as aiming at granting the citizens a political role not only locally and nationally but also at the European level (Prodi, ll. 8-9 and ll. 373-375). Thus, Prodi appears to assume that a European-wide public debate with a genuine European focus can arise. Fischer also speaks into a European context, but he addresses a number of different audiences attempting to adapt his speech to some of the many national publics that he sees as the basic elements of the proposed European institutional unity (Fischer, ll. 241-249).

Jospin continues this line of differentiating between distinct national publics and presents his intervention as the opening of the French debate on the future of the enlarged Union. Moreover, Jospin speaks of an elite European level of discussion represented by the heads of state and government, but also by other politicians who meet in permanent or temporary European institutions. He sees it as the politicians' responsibility to invite the citizens to participate in discussions of the European issues at the level of the various national publics (Jospin, ll. 12-15). Blair and Lykketoft share the belief that a European-wide public does not exist and that people are primarily directed to their nations and the national political institutions (Blair, ll. 232-237, Lykketoft, ll. 633-635), but only Lykketoft takes the consequence of speaking directly to his national public. Although Blair seems to speak to both a united European political elite and to dispersed national publics, he does not explicitly make the distinction nor discuss how publics – national or otherwise – can become involved in the debate on Europe, much less the European debate.

The constitutive dichotomies that establish the who and where of the debate, thus, involve a dividing move in which sceptical positions are simply left out of the context of the debate. Also, the debate is divided spatially; it is seen to unfold in various national contexts where public debate may occur as well as at a general European level that primarily is a dialogue between political leaders. Prodi is the only speaker who attempts to overcome the dichotomy between the national public debates and the elitist European discussions, and he does so by assuming a European public rather than arguing its existence. The five other speakers simply accept the division of the debate as inevitable and base their various recommendations for the reform of the European polity on this fact.[9]

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[9] As will be seen in the discussion of the third group of dichotomies various proposals for reform may spring from the common recognition that a general European public does not presently exist.

*Short- and long-term change*

Whereas the distinction between the discussion on goals and institutions, to which I shall turn shortly, is present in five of the speeches, most clearly in the three that belong to the second trajectory, the distinction between short- and long-term change only arises in the first two speeches. Fischer and Aznar divide their speeches into two sections, one dealing with the reforms to be decided at the Nice summit, and one going beyond the IGC that is to be concluded at Nice. Neither speaker argues for the need to continue the discussion in the longer term, but simply claims that the current reform process should be succeeded by further changes. The distinction between short- and long-term change, then, is not construed as a dichotomy at all. Rather, the two modes of discussion are presented as overlapping each other seamlessly, with long-term issues reaching their fruition as the short-term changes are decided and realised. The need for continuation of the debate that is already taken for granted in Fischer's and Aznar's speeches was officially recognised in the Nice Declaration. However, it seems that the debate had moved beyond the issues to be decided at Nice even before the summit had been held. At least Blair – delivering his message two months before the Nice summit – does not mention the upcoming negotiations at all, but instead focuses all his attention on the long-term discussion.[10]

Although the distinction between short- and long-term change is only directly articulated in Fischer's and Aznar's speeches, the understanding of European reform and the concurrent debate as a continuous process is common to all the speeches. This common understanding shows itself most clearly in the use of metaphors of construction and direction to describe ongoing and future events. These two groups of metaphoric expressions recur frequently in all six speeches and constitute the European project as an unfinished process, which must be continued, but can also be changed along the way.[11] The speakers all refer to the construction of Europe, the Europe that is being built, the directions the project can take, the available courses of action, etc., etc., and thereby they establish a sense of Europe's temporal and spatial emergence.

The metaphors of construction and direction are so basic to the human understanding and expression of the world – they are "metaphors we live by" as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) say – that they typically are not seen as bringing together different spheres, but rather as expressing

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[10] In more direct ways Jospin and Lykketoft foreshadow the decision to be reached in Laeken by declaring their support for the establishment of a convention (Jospin, ll. 329-331, Lykketoft, ll. 535-537). The speeches' various hints at the future developments of the debate reinforce the feeling that the debate as a process progresses steadily, just as the EU moves gradually towards its final goal.

[11] Thereby, the metaphorical conception of the debate corresponds to and provides further support for the reasoning about the need for reform.

meaning directly. These metaphors have become dormant (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 405), but still serve their original functions of making abstract social and political processes concrete and of lending impetus to these processes. They provide spatial and temporal frames for the subjects of which they speak. At the same time the metaphors are themselves so general and flexible that the speakers can endow them with very different specific meanings and thus shape them to match their own purposes. While the six utterances use the same types of metaphors, the envisioned European constructions and the recommended developmental directions are quite varied as will become clear from the study of the speakers' actual proposals for reform.

*The EU's purpose and its institutional makeup*
The second relationship that is constitutive of the terms of debate is closely associated with the two groups of metaphors presented above, and arises through the tension between the metaphors' procedural and substantial elements. The issue is whether the EU should primarily be understood as a content or a form, and thus whether the debate should focus on what the EU should be and do, or how it should do it. Or, as Prodi expresses the situation, there are two approaches in the debate: "some privilege the foundations, others give priority to institutions" (Prodi, ll. 488-489).

Fischer is the only speaker who does not mention the issue of whether form or content should be prioritised in the debate; this is because he makes no distinction between the EU's substantial end and its institutional reformation. In Fischer's speech the two elements merge through the understanding of integration as an institutional phenomenon that is revealed in his use of the antithesis of erosion or integration.

The speakers who do take up the distinction between the two approaches all put the discussion of the EU's basic features and goals, the substantial aspects, before the consideration of the institutional and procedural dimensions. Jospin uses wordplay to express this choice, stating that "Europe is first and foremost a political project, a 'content' before being a 'container'" (Jospin, ll. 18-19) wherefore Europe's political sense should be established before the institutional architecture and procedural formulae can be decided (Jospin, ll. 213-215).

Using directional metaphors Blair expresses a similar position: "the trouble with the debate about Europe's political future is that if we do not take care, we plunge into the thicket of institutional change without first asking the basic question of what direction Europe should take" (Blair, ll. 165-168).[12] Blair continues this line of reasoning and connects it with the basic exigence

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[12] In this passage the inscrutability of procedural discussions is also presented metaphorically – 'the thicket of institutional change' is not a place that is easily traversed.

of closing the gap between Europe and the citizens. He states: "the problems Europe's citizens have with Europe arise when Europe's priorities aren't theirs. No amount of institutional change most of which passes them by completely will change that. Reforming Europe to give it direction and momentum around the people's priorities will" (Blair, ll. 269-273). And he concludes using reversed repetition, a stylistic feature known as antimetabole,[13] to sharpen the point: "The citizens of Europe must feel that they own Europe, not that Europe owns them" (Blair, ll. 273-274). To Blair, only substantial discussions on the purposes and actions of the EU can ensure such popular ownership. This claim is supported through a double argument of asymmetry: problems arise when the EU's and its citizens' priorities do not correspond and when institutional change and peoples' comprehension do not correspond.

Lykketoft's attitude is quite similar to Blair's and it is based on the same argument from the lack of correspondence:

> Technically complicated debates about an EU-constitution or a catalogue of competences or the creation of a new second chamber in a decisional structure that is complicated already are not necessarily shortcuts to creating greater popular support for the project. On the contrary, they risk strengthening the mistrust and aversion and nourish myths about secret plans of a closer Union – unless we can explain the purpose of the changes in crystal-clear terms as a strengthening of the citizens' influence on Europe (Lykketoft, ll. 616-621).

Aznar expresses a parallel concern about the technicality of the central terms of the debate, and his is an argument based entirely on the undesirability of using ambiguous terms.[14] Aznar uses the incompatibility of various rivalling definitions to argue that pragmatic agreement on actual contents is preferable to conceptual discussions:

> …the two words, federalism and constitution, have a marked tendency towards polysemy, perhaps towards ambiguity. Both signify, for some, more transfer of sovereignty, more integration; and, for others, the opposite, that is, more decentralisation and reservation of competences to the states, regions, etc. before a centralism seated in Brussels. In both cases they generate both passionate adhesions and radical rejections. This is why I doubt their efficacy for the future of the European Union. It is preferable to reach understanding about the content instead of managing venerable words that cannot be verified in practice (Aznar, ll. 106-111).

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[13] In the binomial form Blair uses here the antimetabole resembles the chiasmus, the figure of presenting the two parts as an antithetical cross (Albeck, 1968, p. 169 and 186).

[14] The varied meanings of a word is a *topos* discussed by Aristotle; while Aristotle firmly supports defining each of a term's varied meanings clearly, he does not seem to think that the existence of multiple senses of single words is inherently problematic (Aristotle, *Topica*, book I, 107b).

The apparent general agreement on the necessity of keeping the debate focused on the substantial and goal-oriented side of the European construction rests somewhat uneasily with the various speakers' own proposals for institutional and procedural changes. However, none of the speakers actually thinks that the formal level of discussion should be abandoned altogether. Rather, the common argument is that the EU's ends should guide its means and that this symmetry should also exist in the discussion. Prodi sums up the common position well by stating that the exercise in fact consists in synthesising the two approaches, deciding on common goals and then creating the means of achieving them (Prodi, ll. 490-510). "It is in this direction," he concludes, "that we should pursue the discussion until 2004" (Prodi, ll. 510-511).

*How reforms should be debated*

The designation of how the reforms should be debated is based on complementary pairs more than actual constitutive dichotomies. The short-term debate is to be supplemented by and continued in the long-term, and discussions of the EU's form are to be aligned with preceding deliberations on the purpose and content of the European project. The creation of Europe is seen to run its due course, and continued debate is understood as a central, constitutive element of that process. Through debate the blueprint is established and the route is laid out – to remain within the speakers' preferred metaphorical framework of construction and direction.

However, there is a recognised tension between those who wish to discuss the EU's developments in constructive terms, and those who wish to focus attention at the antagonistic level of support for or opposition to the EU. Here, the speakers do not attempt to resolve the tension, but simply opt in favour of the constructive mode of argumentation, thereby seeking to disallow the other option and setting the debate's agenda at a level above the basic settlement of the EU's right of existence. Furthermore, it is widely recognised that discussions of the EU's contents and procedures are not necessarily in harmony with each other, but here potential incompatibilities are avoided by setting up the EU's purposes and ends as the guideline to which its procedures and means have to be adapted. That is, the issue of content takes precedence over the discussion of form, the exception to this rule being Fischer's speech in which the two discussions are conceived as being at one.

By presenting the debate as a process in which potential conflicts are resolved through the (chrono)logical arrangement of the involved issues tensions are smoothed, and the discussion is seen as progressing harmoniously and concurrently with the process of European integration as

such. However, the presentation of the debate as a unified process is inconsistent with the recognition that public discussion is actually conducted in many different contexts in which participants have varied priorities and concerns. There may be a coherent dialogue between European top politicians, but the politicians also have to refer to national audiences and take heed of the predominant expectations and demands of their national contexts. All speakers except Aznar recognise this situation and explicitly present the debate as taking place in diverse rooms with varied priorities and different participants. In actual conduct the debate remains dispersed over a great many specific contexts with divergent expectations and agendas, wherefore the process of debate in practice has far less chance of progressing smoothly than the temporal conceptualisations of it would indicate. However, none of the speakers addresses the inconsistency between the temporal coherence they invoke and the spatial differentiation they heed.

### 6.1.3. What reforms should be made?

The question of what reforms should be made is organised along two lines: the spectrum connecting the concepts of federalism and intergovernmentalism and that mediating between national and European sentiments. I shall begin with an examination of the national-European dichotomy since it forms the basis of the proposals that are expressed in conceptual terms. Although the speakers lean towards one or the other end of the scale in various degrees, the question to all of them is not how one end can be eradicated, but how a balance between the two poles can be struck.

*The national and the European*

Aznar and Prodi have the least developed accounts of the substantial relationship between Europe and the nation states. Prodi simply asserts: "there exists in effect a 'European model,' nuanced, diversified, but which really belongs to us. It is the result of an original historical equilibrium between prosperity and well-being on one side and the search for a solidary and open society on the other" (Prodi, ll. 92-95). In his definition of the European model the president of the Commission employs another spectrum, that between liberal and social concerns, and he pronounces the equilibrium between these two objectives to be the hallmark of European unity and distinctness. Prodi focuses solely on establishing commonality between the members of the EU; he sets up the Union as the single collective actor that represents all the members equally – and equally well – and ignores the possibility that members may experience contradictions between the national and the European priorities.

The possible contradictions are taken up by the Spanish President of Government who warns against taking a solely national position. "Being Spanish," Aznar says, "I tell you that Europe is no springboard for strictly national projects, nor an insurance of stability for the weakest members, but a deeply rooted will of belonging" (Aznar, ll. 37-38). The metaphor of the springboard is somewhat more original than the typical metaphors of direction, but its membership of that group is nevertheless evident; the expression 'deeply rooted will' is an instance of another fundamental group of metaphors, namely the expressions of organic relation. Such metaphors – the metaphor of the root is the most commonly used, but references to trunks and branches as well as to human body parts are also typical of this group – are used to create natural relations between objects and concepts. The root metaphor is a special instance since it also belongs to the class of foundational metaphors, a group in which we also find metaphors of construction such as the fundament or the cornerstone. The present instance of the root metaphor creates both a natural and fundamental relationship between the EU and its member states, but even if it is "deeply rooted," in Aznar's conception belonging to Europe is still a willed act on the part of the members.

Aznar also constitutes the specific Spanish relationship in terms of a deep belonging, but in this case he uses the strategy of shifting perspective: "In reality, we did not enter Europe, because from here we had never left" (Aznar, ll. 252-253). Moving beyond the concrete act of becoming an EU member, Aznar claims that Spain is an innately European country. And in conclusion he declares his loyalty to both the nation and Europe, using a metaphor of organic and foundational relation in order to emphasise the correspondence between the two dimensions: "an active Spain in the heart of the European unity" (Aznar, ll. 255-256). Again, it is noteworthy that Aznar presents the nation-state as the active entity even as European unity is declared.

Aznar's and Prodi's conceptualisations are alike in presenting the national entities as being part of a common European whole and constituting the relationship between the Union and the member states as a harmonious one. However, in Aznar's perspective the individual members remain the central actors of the united Europe, leaving little sense of an independently acting Union. To Prodi, on the contrary, the establishment of such a united European actor is the main aim of the intervention.

Lykketoft and Blair are the two speakers who lean the most towards purely national definitions of collective identity. Both speakers see emotional attachment as a national matter and define Europe in primarily utilitarian terms (Blair, ll. 238-244, Lykketoft, ll. 35-36). However, Blair re-narrates the last fifty years of British history in order to be able to position Britain as a leading

partner at the centre of Europe (Blair, ll. 81-82 and ll. 158-159), and Lykketoft insists that there is no way back to the closed nation-states (Lykketoft, ll. 73-74). Moreover, both speakers recognise the existence of some sort of European community of values. Blair does so implicitly through the assertion that the EU "…underpinned peace and democracy in the reconstruction of post-war Western Europe…" (Blair, ll. 51-52), and through the use of the emotionally charged metaphor of belonging to "the European family of nations" (Blair, l. 17).

Lykketoft is more direct in his assertion of what unites the EU members: "… [the] EU has many common opinions, attitudes and values with which we will increasingly seek to influence the international community and which are in opposition to the opinions of the new American government" (Lykketoft, ll. 227-230). By setting up a common 'other,' Lykketoft is able to constitute Europe as a unity. This strategy is recurrent in several speeches: Aznar establishes a blurred image of the European alter ego in speaking of "…the enemies of democracy and freedom called nationalist exclusivity, ethnic tyranny and terrorism" (Aznar, ll. 237-238). Jospin and Prodi are more specific in their presentations of Europe as an alternative to the US (Jospin, ll. 82-83, 166-167, 181-181, and 195-196, Prodi, ll. 99-100, 139-142, and 261-262), but they do not establish the United States' 'other'-role as forcefully as does Lykketoft.[15]

Lykketoft's active establishment of European commonality does not lessen his commitment to the national identity, and in a concluding vision of the EU in 2010 he states firmly: "we have not become less Danish because we co-operate better" (Lykketoft, l. 692).[16] As was seen earlier, Lykketoft understands the tensions between the national and the European levels of identification as being internal to all individuals, and his concluding denial of the notion that one identity should exclude the other continues this line of reasoning. Lykketoft sees identities – individual and collective – as consisting of complex relationships between elements that may not be totally harmonious, but do not exclude each other.

A similar acceptance of the coexistence of national and European features is present in Jospin's assertion that: "like so many other convinced Europeans, I want Europe, but I remain attached to my nation. Making Europe without undoing France – or any of the other European nations: this is my political choice" (Jospin, ll. 216-218). However, Jospin places emphasis on the

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[15] Blair also seems to recognise the opposition between the US and the EU, but instead of exploiting it to enhance European commonality, he places Britain in an intermediate position: "…our strength with the United States is not just a British asset, it is potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US" (Blair, ll. 124-127). Events such as the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 and the war in Iraq mean that the presentation of the EU as an alternative to the US has become an immensely more delicate and consequential operation than it was at the moments of utterance of the six speeches.

[16] It is typical of Lykketoft's intervention that he speaks of better not more co-operation.

European dimension, and in contradistinction to Lykketoft who sees the national and the European as distinct domains, Jospin "does not separate France from Europe" (Jospin, l. 216). In this vein he also states: "I am French. I feel European"[17] (Jospin, l. 16). The conception of the duality as a unity is basic to Jospin whose understanding of the national-European relationship should thus be grouped with the positions forwarded by Prodi and Aznar.

However, the position is unfolded in more detail in Jospin's speech than in Prodi's and Aznar's interventions. Jospin begins with the presentation of a European model that is very similar to Prodi's, stating that Europe "…is a work of the mind, a model of society, a world view" (Jospin, ll. 20-21). Also, "…Europe is much more than a market. It is carrier of a social model, fruit of history, and it unfolds through the ever more intense bonds that today unite the European peoples. There exists a European 'art de vivre'…" (Jospin, ll. 26-28). Europe is a civilisation (Jospin, l. 33), a community of values (Jospin, l. 36), and a community of destiny (Jospin, l. 53). Yet Jospin's deeper investigation of the European unity leads to the conclusion that "the justification of Europe is its difference" (Jospin, ll. 32-33). Europe "…carries in itself an exceptional diversity of cultures" (Jospin, l. 131), and its vocation is to bring this cultural diversity alive (Jospin, l. 122). Although he claims the unity of Europe and the nation-states, Jospin's consideration of what the European unity means, leads to the assertion that it is constituted through diversity. The strategy of declaring 'unity in diversity' consists in facing the apparent incompatibility boldly and insisting that it is in fact beneficial. The clash between endeavours of unification and of differentiation is avoided through the claim that overarching unifying structures can bring together disparate entities without hampering the unique features of each (Hellström, 2002).[18] In accordance with the argument of unity in diversity every reflection on the future of Europe must pay special attention to the role of the different nations that come together in the European entity (Jospin, ll. 214-215).

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[17] Note the emotional charge of this expression that is so far from Lykketoft's and Blair's preferred utilitarian mode of presenting their European attachment.
[18] This argumentative strategy is so fundamental to the EU that the Convention decided to propose it – in a slightly altered version: "United in diversity" – as the motto of the Union (article IV-1 of the *Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*).

*The intergovernmental and the federal*

Although Fischer does not conceptualise the national and the European as separate entities in the same manner as do the other speakers, he does believe that the nations hold a special place within the European unity. Speaking as a "convinced European and German parliamentarian" (Fischer, ll. 31-32) he advocates the establishment of a European federation, but immediately anticipates the objections such a proposal will provoke and concedes that the nation-states are realities that cannot be thought away (Fischer, ll. 223-224). The nation-Europe relationship is presented as follows: "…Europe will not emerge in an empty political room, and for that reason a further fact in our European reality is the different national political cultures and their democratic publics, also separated by language borders" (Fischer, ll. 242-245). Fischer does not distinguish between this relationship and its institutional parallel, and he goes directly to the presentation of the institutional framework that in his opinion will match the double-sided national-European reality. He suggests that "a European parliament must […] always be doubly representative: a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of citizens. This will only be possible when this European parliament actually brings the different national political elites and also the different national publics together" (Fischer, ll. 245-249).

In Fischer's articulation of the dichotomies the substantial and institutional issues merge. This is possible because his institutional conceptualisation lacks an intergovernmental side; in Fischer's scheme both differing national and common European interests are represented in and served by European-level institutions. By proposing a fully-fledged federation Fischer seeks to accommodate the tension between national and European dimensions within a coherent supranational structure. And in an argument similar to that put forward by Lykketoft, although with much more radical implications, Fischer maintains that institutional integration will not lead to the loss of national identity: "also in the European finality, […] we will still be British and German, French and Polish" (Fischer, ll. 284-285).

Fischer's is the only one of the six speeches in which the federal ideal is adopted fully; the other five preserve the institutional duality between intergovernmental and federal features as well as the tension between substantial national and European issues. Blair argues for the mixture of the features in the following way:

There are two opposite models so far. One is Europe as a free trade area […]. The other is the classic federalist model […] The difficulty with the first is that it nowhere near answers what our citizens expect from Europe, besides being wholly unrealistic politically. In a Europe with a single market and single currency, there will inevitably be a need for closer economic co-ordination. In negotiations over trade and global finance, Europe is stronger if it speaks with one voice. […] So a limited vision of Europe does not remotely answer the modern demands people place on Europe. The difficulty, however, with the view of Europe as a superstate, subsuming nations into a politics dominated by supranational institutions, is that it too fails the test of the people. […] The EU will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational. Such a Europe can, in its political and economic strength, be a superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate (Blair, ll. 197-248).

The argumentative strategy that is explicitly employed here is also the backbone of many of the other considerations of alternatives that the speakers undertake. The strategy consists of two moves: first one sets up two extreme positions, and then a middle version is advocated. This strategy, then, might be termed the Goldilocks argument or, using Aristotelian vocabulary, the argument of the mean (Aristotle, *Ethics*, 1106a-b). Blair, in this particular articulation of the argument, uses wordplay (superpower/superstate) to enhance his conclusion and highlight the blend of features that makes his European porridge particularly appealing.

The idea of the unique combination of institutional features recurs in Prodi's speech, in which it is stated that:

The genius of the founders consisted precisely in proposing an original institutional construction that is neither federal nor intergovernmental. It is because the European Economic Community has overcome the dilemma between a 'superstate' and 'juxtaposed states' that it has entered into history. It is by assembling instead of provoking confrontation that it [the Community method] is a solution for the future (Prodi, ll. 352-357).

Prodi does not present his solution to the dilemma as elegantly as Blair does, but instead he bolsters the argument by reference to the authority of the Union's founders. And, elegant or not, Prodi's claim is in a sense more forceful than Blair's; Prodi does not simply advocate a middle ground but in envisioning the EU as "an original institutional construction" seeks to overcome the dilemma altogether.

Aznar's solution to the problem represents a return to the balancing strategy. He supports the institutional mixture that "…combines the strengthening of the institutions that represent the Union's general interest […] and a better co-operation between the national governments and parliaments…" (Aznar, ll. 145-147). Here, the desirability of such a combination

is simply assumed, and the argument is thereby implicitly based on Aznar's harmonious construction of the national-European relationship.

Jospin points directly to "…the constitutive tension of the European Union. There are nations, strong, vibrant, attached to their identities that found the wealth of our continent. And then there is the will to unite, to build together a unity that will make each one stronger" (Jospin, ll. 231-233). The institutional framework that productively unites the opposed forces is, according to Jospin, the federation of nation states; a combination of concepts that itself requires a redefinition of the term federation in order to hold together. In this context federation does not mean "…a European executive that only derives its legitimacy from the European parliament" (Jospin, ll. 221-222), but a "…progressive and controlled process of sharing or transferring competences to the level of the Union…" (Jospin, ll. 225-226). The expression federation of nation states, in Jospin's view, captures the EU's uniqueness: "…Europe is an original political construction, in an indissociable fashion mixing a singular solid of two different elements: the federalist ideal and the reality of the European nation-states" (Jospin, ll. 228-230). In a formulation that is almost identical with Prodi's statement on the original institutional construction, Jospin seeks to position Europe's political structure beyond the continuous reshuffling of national and European interests. Jospin expresses his argument about the desirable mixture of the two unviable extremes through a rather complex metaphor of chemical processes, but the purpose of creating a new unity is unmistakable.

Lykketoft emphasises that "the EU is the member states' effective instrument for solving common problems – not some entity that is taking new, large steps to becoming a federal state. […] The EU will remain a completely special and historically new and unique phenomenon" (Lykketoft, ll. 365-371). Thus, Lykketoft also conceives of the EU as more than a precarious balance between federal and intergovernmental elements, although his special European entity is decidedly less unified than is Jospin's and Prodi's. In his discussion of what name should be given to the unique co-operation, Lykketoft refers to Jospin's preferred concept and states that "in Danish we will call it a 'binding community of nation states,' but probably mean more or less the same thing" (Lykketoft, ll. 375-376). However, Lykketoft's redefinition of the federation of nation states arguably moves the concept closer to the intergovernmental pole than what appears to be Jospin's intention. The imprecision with which Lykketoft refers to the federation of nation states is part of his strategy and allows him to endow the concept with a much less integrationist meaning than what emerged from Jospin's usage of it. Lykketoft advocates a primarily instrumental understanding of the EU that seems premised on the assumption that European statehood is the greater evil of the two

possible extremes. Therefore, the uniqueness he ascribes to Europe mainly consists of its political organisation not being that of a state.

*The reforms that should be made*

The speakers' proposals for reforms are all centred around the dichotomy of the national and the European, and the tension takes two forms: identification of and with the national and the European dimensions and the political organisation of them. Here, all speakers perceive a purely European identity and polity as a nonentity, and all present the nation-states as constitutive parts of Europe. However, Europe and the EU are also viewed as unavoidable features of the individual nation-states' reality, wherefore tensions between the European and the national levels have to be resolved through compromise rather than by opting for one of the two sides (see figure 29). The speakers handle the extremes in various ways, and they use distinct strategies to advocate their preferred solutions. Some seek to move the resulting entity off the scale by claiming that the mix of national and European features creates something new and unique. Others simply seek to strike a balance between the national and the European, but the aim of overcoming the tensions between the two extremes is common to all.



Figure 29: *The national/intergovernmental-European/federal scale and the speakers' position*[19]

### 6.1.4. Meaning formation through constitutive dichotomies

One of the main aims of all of the speeches is to position the debate on the future of Europe spatio-temporally. Taking their cue from existing conditions of space and time the speakers create a here and now that facilitates common European debate while remaining sensitive to national differences, and they also seek to constitute a political entity that displays both national and European sensibilities. The formal features that I have analysed under the general heading of constitutive dichotomies are modes of meaning formation that are both operative at the common European and

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[19] The positioning of the speakers is an analytical abstraction; in practice most of the speakers are able to move up and down the scale according to their special purposes. The positioning of Blair and Prodi above the other four speakers is only intended to show the overlap between their positions and those of other speakers.

particular national levels. Thus, the constitutive dichotomies enable the speakers to create new opportunities for political discussion and action on the basis of the nationally constrained positions from which they speak.

The speakers explain why there is a need for reform and thereby also justify the existence of the debate; they attempt to set up the procedures for discussion and to delimit the issues to be discussed. In all of these efforts the constitutive dichotomies are essential tools. One of the central features shared by all of the speakers is the attempt to position both the process of debating and the resulting European political entity in a middle position. As a regional entity the EU is the geographical link between the nation-state and the world order, but – it is claimed – reforms are needed if it is to fulfil that function effectively. Also, the EU is in the middle of an enlargement process, and again reforms are needed if that process is to be concluded effectively. The need for reform, then, is basically argued on the premise that the EU has come halfway and further changes are needed to bring the project to its conclusion and to realise its full potential. The debate is positioned between the poles of substantial and procedural discussion, the idea being that both the EU's ends and means must be considered and that the eventual reform must establish harmony between the two dimensions. Finally, the proposals for reform aim at balancing the national and European dimensions, wherefore they are situated between the extremes of intergovernmental and federal institutions and mechanisms.

The speakers advocate different solutions to the balancing exercise, and each utterance is a unique creation of meaning, but they all navigate the same conceptual space and use the same rhetorical strategies to establish their specific positions in the landscape. By placing himself within the debate on the future of Europe each speaker also sets his vision of the EU off from those presented by other participants in the debate. In so doing the speakers are constrained by existing expectations – some specifically national, others of general purport – as to the form and content of their utterances. One major strategy of identification is to adapt the utterance to the audience's prior relationship with the European project and with other social entities. Notably, it is argued that the EU does not do damage to the nation-states, which are conceived as the audience's primary point of reference, and the European unity is reinforced through reference to 'others' that are common to all the nations of Europe. Furthermore, the speakers seek to live up to expectations as to what issues should be dealt with and how these should be discussed. In this regard there is a high degree of intertextuality between the six speeches as well as other contributions that belong to the specific sub-genre of political leaders' presentations of their positions in the debate.

The speakers use the audiences' prior feelings about the EU and the existing conventions concerning the form and content of their utterances creatively, thereby suggesting new meanings and changed relationships. For example, Lykketoft establishes a new relationship between sceptical and pro-European positions by suggesting that both of these are internal to all of us. Fischer endows the notion of federation with a new meaning, when claiming that political integration into a European federation does not erase national identity, Jospin also redefines the concept by combining it with the notion of nation-states. The argumentative and figurative *topoi* are the means by which the speakers seek to create new and alter old common meanings and positions. The various ways of negotiating incompatibilities and dissolving dilemmas all suggest the establishment of the EU as a new type of community – a third place.

To all the speakers the EU is a unique social and political entity, neither state nor international association, neither nation nor collection of strangers. The ultimate aim of all the speeches is to substantiate this third place, to endow it with a meaning that goes beyond the enumeration of what it is not. In this regard the available and preferred *topoi* show their limitations: the rhetorical strategies prove well suited to opening up the new, intermediary space, but the room remains rather empty, mostly populated in the negative sense of all that it is not. The communicative constitution of the EU as a polity in its own right remains heavily dependent on the creation of conceptual relationships between the European polity and other political and social groupings that seem to be better defined and more stable.

Yet the vagueness of the meaning formation concerning the European entity may also be regarded as a strength. The loose construction implies that the EU is in a transient state and thereby facilitates acceptance of proposed changes. Furthermore, the somewhat ambiguous images that emerge from the utterances allow for general agreements to arise even if differences of specific opinions remain. All the speakers use the strategy of keeping references to other positions so abstract as to allow surface resemblances to pass uncontested, whereby a productive if unsubstantiated sense of commonality emerges.

Conducting the meaning formation at an abstract level facilitates the creation of consensus on the overall goals and the general directions of the European project and on the agenda and procedures of the debate about its future. On this basis it becomes possible to continue the discussion of specific points of disagreement, and the interlocutors may eventually move towards more substantial common understandings. The notion of the gradual build-up of consensus is supported by the speakers' common conception of the temporal developments of both the debate

and the European project; the movement is one of continuous progress rather than abrupt leaps and radical change. Thus, the debate and the reforms are conceived as perpetuators of a smooth transition that gradually moves the EU towards the fulfilment of its ends.

Finally, the constitutive dichotomies' loose mediation between and blending of well-known, opposed positions allow the speakers to address specific national concerns and to participate in the project of creating common European meaning simultaneously. The speakers' usage of constitutive dichotomies to establish meanings that are common enough to facilitate a continued European dialogue and different enough to be adapted to the diverse expectations of nationally situated publics is a central feature of the debate on the future of Europe. This characteristic mode of meaning formation, the workings of which have been explained through the analysis of the speeches' *topoi*, allows a general process of European debate to arise on the basis of diversified national positions. Moreover, the extensive use of constitutive dichotomies means divergences may persist in spite of the existence of the common process. National and European processes of meaning formation are interrelated, but neither subsumes the other; rather, they are mutually constitutive and recursive, they are established and altered in (re)productive tension with each other.

## 6.2. Deciding the future – the *kairoi* of the declarations

Having studied the *topoi* that the speakers employ in their attempts to create positions for themselves and their audiences that combine national and European elements meaningfully, I now turn to the investigation of the Nice and Laeken Declarations. The two declarations express the outcome of institutionalised moments of European decision-making and as such they mark the turning points of the debate. Furthermore, the declarations are the result of European processes of common opinion and will formation. These processes take place in a transnational forum in which politicians with decision-making powers interact directly, but the institutionalised processes of deciding are purely intergovernmental meaning that decisions are threatened by vetoes, and the final result tends to be a bargained compromise rather than a deliberated consensus. Being the result of these European negotiations the declarations point out the possibilities and limitations of creating common European meaning.

At the moments of European decision-making the speeches' abstractly postulated common meanings are tested as it becomes apparent what it is actually possible for the political leaders to agree upon and to decide collectively. The declarations are the results of decisive moments in which the leaders' positions and proposals are concretised and take on binding force.

The declarations are conditioned by opinions and expectations that exist prior to their moment of creation, and they in turn set possibilities and limitations for continued debate and future agreements. In the following I shall study how the turning points of the debate become possible and how they facilitate further discussion. This means a shift from the focus on *topoi* as employed by the individual speakers, to an analysis of the *kairoi* in which the EU speaks as a collective actor.

A *kairos* is not just a moment in time, but a 'right' moment. In the classical Greek conception *kairos* is associated with the rhetorical utterance in both the sense that the rhetor must speak at the appropriate moment and in the sense of speaking the words that befit the moment (Sutton, 2001, p. 413). *Kairos* arises when the time has come for something, and it is a quality of properly adapted things (Andersen, 1997, p. 22). The utterance can thus be seen as a response to the various conditions of the speech situation, but the concept of *kairos* also has a creative dimension; there is a sense in which the right moment is only established when the utterance is made (Sipiora, 2002, pp. 4-5).

As a result of Lloyd F. Bitzer's (1992) conceptualisation of the rhetorical situation and Richard E. Vatz' (1973) direct contradiction of Bitzer's claims, the responsive and the creative perspectives on the relationship between utterance and situation are today usually understood as being in stark opposition to each other. The concept of *kairos*, however, encompasses both the understanding of the situation as preceding and conditioning the utterance and the view that the moment only becomes meaningful in and through the utterance. The tension between these two understandings is not resolved in *kairos*, on the contrary the tension is understood as being productive – it is in the relationship between "slavish propriety" and "solipsistic novelty" that meaning is made (Miller, 2002, p. xiii).

The concept of *kairos* encompasses another tension, namely that between unity and plurality. This tension is not unrelated to the first one, but rather helps explicate the relationship between the situation-as-given and the situation-as-created. Even in the most compelling situations the speaker has a choice of how to respond; he or she must consider how situational aspects and textual features will function together and choose the rhetorical strategies that seem best suited to creating a coherent and meaningful communicative unit of text and context. The choice is both an ethical and an aesthetic one: given the circumstances, the speaker has to decide which course of action to advocate, and he or she must decide how the recommendations are expressed most appropriately (Kinneavy, 2002, pp. 61-62 and 64-65). *Kairos* emerges as a combination of these

two dimensions; it only becomes apparent what the appropriate answer to a situation is, when this answer is formulated in the right way (Sipiora, 2002, p. 5).

The understanding of the utterance as both a response to and an articulation of *kairos* is central to Ramírez. He writes:

> In *kairos* the accidental, on the one hand, and the intentional and freely chosen, on the other, come together dialectically. *Kairos* thus has two faces: the circumstance or occurrence is the objectively given side, the ground for that which is to arise; the insight, ability to act, and practical wisdom is the subjective side, that which sows and causes the harvest […]. *Kairos* is a merger of both these faces (Ramírez, 1995, p. 175, my translation).

Moreover, Ramírez recognises the connection between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of *kairos*; it is the combination of these two elements in the *kairotic* moment of the utterance that constitutes the meaningful rhetorical act (Ramírez, 1995, p. 222). The question of how given circumstances and choices of content and style merge in the utterances and create possibilities for further discussion is pivotal to the following analyses of the Nice and Laeken Declarations.

The decisions upon the Nice Treaty's "Declaration on the future of the Union" and the Laeken Declaration provide turning points of the debate on the EU's future. Being turning points, the declarations display the dual nature of *kairos* vividly; they both conform to a given moment and reform it – are conditioned and conditioning. The declarations are expressions of a moment in which decision is appropriate and through their articulation in and of that decisive moment they shape consecutive developments. The declarations are doubly situated, so to speak, and it is this duality that I seek to explore in the following. The investigation contains two dimensions: how does it become the right time for the declarations? And what sort of right time do the declarations create? But the two sides cannot really be separated as past and future conditions merge in the declarations' unique presents; therefore, I shall seek to attend to both dimensions in conjunction. While focusing on the texts, the investigation also brings in the press coverage of the summits at which they were created, and the six speeches are mentioned as instantiations of the debate leading up to and connecting the two turning points.

### *6.2.1. The Nice Declaration*

Judging from the three speeches that preceded the Nice summit the need to continue the reform process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nice was commonly recognised well before the content of the Treaty had been agreed upon. And as it became clear that the only possible result at Nice would be a complex compromise with the prime function of safeguarding national interests, a change of the revision procedures also seemed to be necessary. Only altering the mode of reform could support the claim that making another effort would be worthwhile. Before the Nice summit there may not have been consensus on granting the debate official status, but as the negotiations continued without resolution, the call for a deeper and wider debate offered an ever more appealing way out of the bind between lofty European ambitions and stark national positions.

With the benefit of hindsight the situation was summed up neatly in a commentary published in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on the opening day of the Laeken summit: "A year ago, as the strongly delayed reform of the European Union failed at Nice, the 15 heads of state and government took their escape in the future. 'Fear not,' they called out to the Europeans, 'for we will begin a post-Nice process'" (14/12/01A). Thus, the recognition that the Nice Treaty did not live up to the leaders' ambitions and the citizens' expectations provided the background for the Nice Declaration, and the process initiated in the declaration aimed at correcting the procedural deficiencies of earlier treaty revisions.

At Nice the emerging consensus on continuing the reform process and organising it differently was codified. The "Declaration on the Future of the Union" sets out the general procedural plan and agenda for the new round of reforms. The declaration establishes the overall time frame, agenda, and purpose of the ensuing debate, proclaiming that the reform process is to culminate in the convening of an IGC in 2004. The leaders were neither willing nor able to give up their control of the final decision on the revisions – changing that part of the procedure would demand a treaty revision in itself. Since existing rules stipulate that a new treaty can only be formally recognised by an IGC, the reference to such a conference is in fact the mark of officiality, the guarantee that the process will result in actual reforms.

The Nice Declaration opens the new round of discussions and presents the novel idea that eventual decisions should be preceded by a deeper and wider debate, but it leaves open the questions of how the debate about the reforms should be created and conducted. The task of setting up "…appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process" (Nice, ll. 17-18) is relegated to the Council meeting to be held at Laeken in December 2001.

### 6.2.2. The Laeken Declaration

The writing of the Laeken Declaration was stipulated directly in the Nice Declaration, wherefore agreement on the Laeken text would be a sign that the process initiated at Nice was running its due course. The advent of the Laeken summit meant that the time had come to make good the promises of Nice. In the time-span between the Nice and Laeken summits the debate took on an interim nature: in this period discussions followed the agenda of the debate that was set in the Nice Declaration, but were also directed towards the pending institutionalisation of the debate, which the Laeken Declaration was to execute. This duality is most apparent in Jospin's and Lykketoft's speeches; here there are both references to the decisions taken at Nice and forecasts of the agreements to be reached at Laeken. In the first respect Jospin says: "…the heads of state and government, united last year in Nice, have decided to engage in a profound reflection on the future of the enlarged Union. […] It is in this framework that I inscribe my remarks today" (Jospin, ll. 12-14). Lykketoft focuses on the four points that the Nice Declaration puts on the agenda, structuring his discussion of institutional reforms around them (Lykketoft, ll. 521-523). In anticipation of the decisions to be made at Laeken, both Jospin and Lykketoft declare their support for letting a convention prepare proposals for reform before beginning the IGC (Jospin, ll. 328-332, Lykketoft, ll. 534-540). Lykketoft sees a convention as a possibility for creating broader popular discussion, and Jospin refers to the success of the Convention that prepared the Charter for Fundamental Rights as justification for using the method again.

Jospin's and Lykketoft's unreserved endorsements of setting up a convention indicate that consensus on creating such an institution had been established prior to the Laeken summit. In accordance with this consensus, the Council did not consider whether a convention should be set up, but turned directly to the issue of which composition and mandate the Convention on the Future of Europe should be granted. In the three interim speeches there are no indications as to the Convention's composition, but it is clear that the agenda for discussion is conceived more broadly than stipulated by the Nice Declaration. Lykketoft is the only speaker who refers directly to the agenda decided at Nice, and all three speakers agree that a debate on the goals and purposes of the EU should precede the discussion of institutional and procedural reforms.

The willingness to initiate a broad and fundamental debate proved to be a commonly held sentiment, as the press coverage of the Laeken summit clearly indicates. While it was readily agreed that the Convention should be given a broad mandate, the coverage of the Laeken summit reports prevailing disagreement as to how fundamental the reforms should be and what status the

final results of the Convention should be given. Should the EU be totally restructured or should its current modes of operation simply be adjusted? Should the Convention have any binding force or should it be a merely consultative organ? Also, there was disagreement on the Convention's composition up until the last minute.

It is the general understanding of the press coverage that agreement on the Laeken Declaration was partially conditioned by the leaders' perception that yet another failure to reach a common decision would demand a fatally high price in the form of loss of public credibility and support. Such considerations may have led the politicians to accept the composition and leadership of the Convention even if they did not consider it to be optimal, but the strategy of leaving some issues unresolved was also employed in order to ensure agreement. Thus, the Laeken Declaration states that the Convention's final document "…may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved" (ll. 207-208). While the declaration presents the Convention's recommendations as a starting point for the following IGC, the press coverage points out that if the Convention reaches a strong consensus, its recommendations will become impossible to ignore. The declaration's weak formulation satisfies those leaders who do not wish to grant the Convention any formal powers, but leaves open the possibility that the Convention may take on its own dynamic, thereby asserting itself and ensuring that its proposals will not be negligible.

The open-endedness that allowed for agreement on the Laeken Declaration also reflects upon the agenda-setting function of the text. Through its many open questions and loose formulations about the most controversial issues, such as the possibility of creating a European constitution, the declaration strikes the general tone of the debate, but does not set any prior limitations on the possible outcome. Vague as it may be in pointing the debate onwards, the declaration does establish a firm base and general framework for the coming debate. In doing so, the text draws upon and sums up the experiences made and insights achieved in the debate so far. Thus, the first section of the Laeken Declaration reasserts the constitutive tensions between the EU's past achievements and future challenges, between the citizen's expectations and the EU's current priorities, between the EU's potential for playing a leading role in a globalised world and its present capabilities. The debate arises out of these highly charged relationships and is directed to alleviating stress and realising potential.

### 6.2.3. Openness and closure in institutionalised kairotic moments

The reflection and creation of *kairos* in the declarations is reminiscent of the use of constitutive dichotomies as means of constituting the space for further discussion in the speeches. Both declarations reflect that the debate in certain respects has reached its fruition, but the decisions taken deal with redirection, not closure, and the moments created in the texts are beginnings more than they are ends. Both declarations seek to create new possibilities for discussion in replacement of the phase that they conclude. The speeches and the declarations in a sense are related to each other as action and reaction: the speeches initiate discussions that it is the institutionalised role of the declarations to conclude. However, the declarations take recourse to intermediary decisions and abstract formulations in order to fulfil situational demands for decision-making without closing the discussion. The declarations, then, contribute to substantiating and populating the spaces of discussion that were opened by the speeches; they aim at facilitating the debate by establishing its agenda and procedures, not at closing it.

The declarations represent institutionalised decisive moments, but the texts also create the possibility for further interventions in the debate. In their orientation towards the future the declarations set out guidelines for the continuation of the discussion, but they do so in the vague manner that is also the speakers' strategy of choice. In this respect, the Nice Declaration seems clearer than the Laeken Declaration, but the former also recognises that many issues remain unresolved and explicitly piles the burden of resolution upon the latter. The Laeken Declaration takes on this task and is quite clear in its institutionalisation of the debate, but in its presentation of the issues to be discussed and the terms of discussion it employs the whole range of constitutive dichotomies and thereby avoids foreclosing any part of the discussion.

Both declarations move the reform process onwards and create new openings without limiting the possible final results of the debate. The openness is, however, not just a reflection of the intent to invite a broad discussion, but also reflects the lack of substantial agreement among the decision-makers. The declarations are reflections of the degree of agreement that existed among the political leaders of Europe at the time of their creation. They demonstrate that the politicians can agree to continue the discussion, but that they have not reached any substantial consensus on the eventual outcome. Moreover, the open invitations extended by the declarations indicate that the broader debate, whether it is conducted in its general public or its institutionalised form, cannot have but an advisory function. The initiatives set up by the declarations do not themselves have the

power of closing the discussions; that privilege rests solely with the IGC and is thus bound up with the procedures of reform whose inadequacy the new initiatives are meant to soothe.

## 6.3. What future for which Union? – The chronotopes of the press coverage

The analysis of the *kairoi* of the declarations focuses exclusively on the European level of meaning formation, and the study of the *topoi* of the speeches also paid most attention to the modes of meaning formation that the speakers have in common. I shall now turn to the analysis of the debate in its various national guises as these emerge from the newspapers' coverage of the speeches and the declarations. The aim of the present section is to establish national chronotopes[20] – the specific time-space relations that constitute the European debate within and between the national contexts (Nielsen, 2002, p. 68).

The term chronotope was originally used by Mikhail Bakhtin as an expression of "…the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84). I shall apply the term somewhat more broadly than did Bakhtin: the chronotopic relationships I explore are not literary but belong to the realm of mediated public debate. Moreover, I use the chronotope as an expression of general tendencies in the mediation of the debate in question. This use is partially in line with Bakhtin's connection of chronotopes with genres, but at the same time shifts the focus from a specific genre to the complex of utterances that constitute a debate. The questions that I seek to answer through the concept of the chronotope do not deal with concrete time-space relationships in individual utterances, but with the general possibilities and limitations that shape the utterances and in turn are shaped by them.

The general tendencies I now seek to highlight and investigate are at the centre of many discourse analytical studies. Discourse analysts have given the tendencies various names, for instance "discursive regularities" (Foucault, 1972), "discursive strings" (Langer, 2000, pp. 133-134), or some other term pointing to the commonalities and patterns that construct the field of discourse from within. I prefer the concept of the chronotope because of the greater sensibility to the debate's flexibility and changeability that this concept holds. A debate can be seen as a

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[20] The continued dominance of national publics, upheld and reinforced by the exclusive national status of the media, by language barriers, and by the less tangible factors of political culture, makes it safe to assume that on the level of broad public debate the chronotopes are nationally divided. However, it is evident that a European chronotope already exists at the level of the European summits and their declarations. Furthermore, the political leaders' utterances permeate national borders both in the choice of specific speech situations, in the use of common *topoi*, and in intertextual references.

relatively stable entity, but it is made up of individual utterances – specific positions in time and space – and is therefore constantly articulated anew and altered in the articulation.[21]

The debate on the future of Europe constitutes a movement from a certain present position to a different future state. Contributions to the debate thus articulate positions of becoming, wherefore it is to be expected that the different conceptualisations of the debate are variations of the general theme of the chronotope of the threshold (Boutaiba, 2003, p. 33 and 61). Bakhtin understands the chronotope of the threshold in its actual physicality (standing in the doorway), but also points to its broader meaning of crisis and break (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 248). I have chosen to use the general concept of the chronotope and the special variation of the chronotope of the threshold in the broader, metaphorical sense. Instead of studying the actual locations in time and place of individual utterances, I focus on the possibilities and limitations that emerge in the various contexts in which the European debate is conducted. That is, I study the general conceptualisations of the debate that are constituted in and through the newspapers' coverage, and I seek to answer the question of how the possibility for change – the chronotope of the threshold – is enacted and appraised in each of the national contexts. Having established each national chronotope, I shall investigate whether any possibilities and limitations for debate cut across the national contexts and thereby point to the emergence of a general European chronotope.[22]

### 6.3.1. France: finally there is a European debate

The French coverage focuses on the advent of the debate as such and conceptualises this debate at the European level. Thus, it is a recurring theme of the coverage that now at long last a discussion of European issues is being conducted at the corresponding European level. Fischer's speech is taken as the starting point: it sets the general agenda and tone of the debate, and the coverage repeatedly refers back to this intervention to create the context for the reception of later utterances. The debate is consistently viewed as a positive phenomenon; one may, as is stated in reference to several of the politicians' utterances, oppose the specific proposals, but the initiative is to be

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[21] Please recall that I regard the present study as being closely related to many of the projects conducted under the heading of discourse analysis, but that I consider the rhetorical perspective as an independent alternative to the various discourse analytical endeavours (see section 2.2.1.).

[22] Whereas the first round of analysis sought to present the developments of the debate at both national and European levels, I now seek to conceptualise each national coverage as a consistent attitude in space and time. This conceptualisation is somewhat artificial, as the national chronotopes are deeply involved in the general developments. However, I think it is possible to establish overall national perspectives from which the developments are conceived and into which they are incorporated. The establishment of the national chronotopes is based on the press coverage that was presented in the first round of analysis; for documentation of the general assessments made in the following I refer to these presentations.

applauded. The general purpose of the debate, defined as the creation of a new constitutional order for Europe, is also endorsed fully. The focus of discussion is whether that order is to be federal or intergovernmental, and more specifically it is considered how substantial policies and institutional structures are to be adapted to each other. In the French newspapers' conceptualisation of the debate these two constitutive dichotomies are of the utmost importance.

Throughout the coverage the various speakers' proposals are compared and multiple reactions to each speech are recorded. But even if the scope of debate is principally European, the special positions of France and Germany and the importance of the relationship between these two countries are continuously highlighted. When Fischer makes his intervention, calls are heard for French responses, and by the time of Blair's speech concern about France's lack of participation is a recurrent theme of the coverage.[23]

The coverage of Jospin's intervention focuses on the pressure that had been building on him personally to present his views, but also mentions that his speech alleviates a more general pressure on France to position itself in Europe. Jospin's speech is thus perceived as a response to a demand emanating from both the French national public and the European policy-makers. This perception reveals a general tendency of the coverage, namely that of viewing the debate as genuinely European, but assuming that any truly European initiative is led by France, possibly in tandem with Germany. Although the schisms of this position are not totally ignored, it is presupposed that any European debate is also a French debate. This is true both in the procedural sense that France should take a leading role in generating and perpetuating the discussions and in the substantial sense that whatever reforms are finally passed should bear a significant French mark.

The French chronotope positions France at the centre of Europe now and in the future.[24] It is seen as being up to the French politicians to maintain this leading role through interventions into the ongoing European discussion. The terms of debate are constructive, and adequate interventions propose answers to the questions of what Europe should do and how it should do it. Although the general public may participate in these discussions, the European debate is primarily viewed as being a matter for politicians, and it is this level of debate that the coverage sees as being most important. The coverage positions the national public as demanding evidence that the French politicians are assuming their leading role, rather than seeking dialogue with the

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[23] Curiously, the fact that President Chirac had presented his views in a speech to the German Bundestag on the 27th of June 2000 is either only mentioned in passing or altogether ignored.

[24] These findings fit well with other authors' conclusions on the French tendency to conceive of Europe as France writ large and as the heir of the French *mission civilisatrice*; see inter alia Risse (2002), Weiss (2002), and Wæver (2003).

politicians about the nation's position in Europe.

### 6.3.2. Denmark: will there ever be an EU-debate?

Whereas the French coverage does not distinguish sharply between national and European scenes, contending that successful participation in the European debate is a prerequisite for national acceptance and denying the relevance of national exclusivity, the Danish newspapers insert clear lines of demarcation between national and European contexts. The European debate is mainly presented as something going on 'out there,' as something Denmark (unfortunately) does not participate in actively. The national debate, on the contrary, is seen as a confrontation between sceptics and pro-Europeans at the base of which one may still find the question of whether or not Denmark should be a part of the EU at all. The difference between the national and supranational levels of debate is neatly contained in the terms designating the debate; the national EU-debate is about Denmark's relationship with the EU institutions, whereas the European debate is a broader and looser discussion about the future of the continent as such.[25]

The interventions of Fischer, Blair, Jospin, and Prodi[26] and the reactions they spark are primarily reported upon from the outsider's position – they are registered but not discussed actively – and the European debate is set apart from the context of national Danish discussions. Nevertheless, utterances put forth in the European context may interfere with Danish developments as is reported in the case of Fischer's speech. This speech is primarily conceived in the context of the national debate leading up to the referendum on participation in the EMU. The understanding of Fischer's speech as initiating a new, important debate is absent from the Danish coverage. The reverse relationship, how Danish developments interfere with the European debate, is also noted; this is the case with the coverage of Blair's speech, in which the impact of the Danish referendum result on Blair's position is pondered. The coverage of Blair's speech is also aware of the connection between the national and European levels of debate in the sense that it is discussed whether the views advocated are in Denmark's interest or not. By the time of Blair's speech the Danish coverage recognises the existence of a European debate, the connection between the European and the Danish levels of debate is realised, and the lack of Danish participation in the

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[25] The distinction between the EU as a political entity and Europe as a larger, geographical unit is not found in the French debate; just as the French do not separate the national from the European levels of discussion, so the terms EU-debate and European debate are used interchangeably.

[26] Aznar's speech is not covered by the Danish newspapers.

general debate is lamented. Yet the focus of attention remains the national debate and its sorry state.

Lykketoft's long-awaited intervention is primarily conceived and evaluated in the national context. It is seen as an attempt to reach out to the various national positions on the European issues and to create common ground. Also, the speech is seen as an attempt to enhance the national EU-debate. In this context the speech is evaluated as being successful, and the fact that it has not remedied the Danish passivity on the European scene does not affect the positive judgements. Lykketoft's speech is perceived as creating some of the momentum and enthusiasm that is necessary for involving the national public and moving the EU-debate along.

The Danish coverage creates a two-tiered chronotope consisting of a broader European level at which Danish passivity is understandable if not desirable, and a national level at which efforts to engage the broad public in dialogue are called for. Thus, the Danish debate does not focus so much on the future of Europe in general as on the Danish attitude towards the EU, and membership/non-membership remains a major issue.[27] Denmark's position within the EU and influence on the European-level debate is understood to be dependent on the attitude emerging from the national debate. The guiding question is not what kind of Europe should be created, but what kind of EU the Danish people can agree that it wants to participate in and whether such a Union is a realistic option. Thus, the relationship between the Danish public and the EU is perceived as being indirect; the Danes' sentiments exclusively reach the European level through the national government's mediation.

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[27] These results correspond well with the conclusions reported in Hansen & Wæver (eds.) (2002). The Danish public's passivity on European matters is partly explainable through a consideration of the many Danish referenda on EU issues. The referenda give the people a chance to influence the Danish relationship with the EU directly, but have the side effect that the people rarely become involved if there is not a vote to be cast. Moreover, the continued existence of influential EU-sceptical forces conditions the debate towards consideration of Denmark's relationship with Europe and away from unobstructed participation in European affairs. The four Danish exceptions undoubtedly enhance this tendency. It should be noted that on one issue – enlargement – Denmark has been very active on the European scene. Several features may account for this attitude; the fact that Denmark held the EU-presidency at crucial moments in the enlargement process is probably among the most important, and the close relationship between Denmark and Baltic states is another frequently mentioned factor.

### 6.3.3. Spain: what debate?

The Spanish coverage of the debate on the future of Europe has a marked tendency towards description of happenings rather than engagement with the events. The newspapers seem only slowly to realise the importance of the debate; none of the three first speeches receive much attention, and notably Aznar's speech is not covered at any length.[28] In the coverage of Fischer's speech it is mentioned that the utterance contributes to reviving the European debate, but this is only one of a number of themes. During the coverage of Blair's speech a sense of the context of the European debate emerges more clearly. Here, Aznar's speech is brought in showing that although the intervention did not receive much independent coverage it has not passed totally unnoticed. The reference to Aznar's and other national leaders' speeches in connection with Blair's speech shows that there is some awareness that a European debate has begun.

The coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches also presents the debate on Europe's future as an important context for understanding the speeches, but it remains one of several issues to which the interventions are related. In the coverage of these two speeches criticism of the Spanish politicians for not having formed a coherent European policy emerges. However, the Spanish coverage itself continues to point in various directions and to present the European debate as one of several contexts in which the speakers' interventions should be understood. Thereby, the coverage reflects and reinforces the dispersed Spanish engagement with the debate.

The Spanish chronotope is one of detached observation of the European developments as they unfold. Significantly, there is no national context to take account of and the implied national attitude is benevolently indifferent.[29] The non-articulated Spanish public opinion that the coverage

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[28] It may be hypothesised that if Aznar had intervened in the debate later or if he had chosen a more spectacular location for his intervention, it might have received more attention, but significantly Aznar did neither. Thereby, the Spanish government's choices regarding participation in the debate and the national coverage of the debate seem to reinforce each other in conveying the impression of a somewhat detached and indifferent Spain. This position, of course, is quite contrary to the message Aznar seeks to convey through his speech. The tension between Aznar's words and the general impression of Spain's position gives rise to the suspicion that pragmatism and fatalism need not be contradictory attitudes.

[29] The public's passivity may seem to be at odds with Aznar's call for an active Spain, but the active agent of his speech is actually the Spanish executive who is endowed with the ability to act for the people without having to consult it first. There is a similarity between the Danish and the Spanish chronotopes in that they both see the national governments as representing their peoples on the European scene. However, the Danish government has to receive a mandate from its constituency before acting; the public is involved in shaping the leaders' attitude and actions. By contrast, the Spanish president of government endows his people with a purely receptive persona that is reproduced and reinforced by the Spanish newspapers' coverage of European affairs. In Spain, the public is informed of what the leading politicians think and do; the people may appraise the politicians' attitudes and actions *post facto* but does not constrain these in any significant way.

implicitly conveys is that whatever happens in Europe is probably okay, but there is no need to get too excited about it.[30]

The Spanish position within Europe is created through comparisons with France, Germany and the UK. Here, Spain is seen as being closer to France and Germany than to Britain, and closer to France than to Germany.[31] However, in later contributions concerns are voiced that no combination of the Spanish and the common European interests has been found, indicating that the Spanish government's position on Europe is not sufficiently well defined to allow for forceful interventions in Europe.

There are signs that the features of the Spanish chronotope are changing towards the end of the period covered. Thus, it is reported that national initiatives and discussion fora are to be set up in conjunction with and run parallel to the Convention, and during the EU-presidency, which Spain was to hold in the first half of 2002, the country is required to take initiatives on the European scene. Thus, a more active stance may be emerging at both the national and the European level.[32]

At the end of the time period on which I focus, however, the Spanish chronotope does not present the opportunity of instigating change, but instead encourages reporting on events as they occur and on changes as they are made. The Spanish coverage, for the most part, is detached from the European developments it records, and although Spanish concerns are mentioned from time to time, these concerns do not arise from or give rise to any national deliberations about the EU. The European debate is observed and described, and individual commentators participate in it, but the coverage shows no signs of any general public opinion formation on either the Spanish-European relationship or the European developments as such.

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[30] My findings match those of Antonio Menéndez-Alarcón closely; he reports that the Spanish people's general acceptance of the European project has not led to a strong desire for further integration nor to any major reconfiguration of the Spanish national identity (Menéndez-Alarcón, 2000).

[31] These relationships have, of course, been altered considerably by recent developments in international relations. When Spain joined the UK as the ally of the United States in the war against terrorism, generally, and the campaign in Iraq, particularly, this also influenced its position within the European community and in the debate about its future. The new Spanish government's decision to change the foreign policy – most notably to withdraw all troops from Iraq – may alter this position once again.

[32] In fact both the Spanish government and the Spanish people have become more actively involved in European affairs. However, events that are external to the debate on the future of Europe have taken these activities in directions that are quite different than what one may foresee from the Spanish press coverage of the first phases of the European debate.

### *6.3.4. England: a dangerous debate*

The main constitutive feature of the English chronotope is the national division between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics. Holders of the Euro-friendly position wish Britain to participate in the European debate and influence developments. Sceptics, on the contrary, fear the creation of a European superstate, see this federal construct as the underlying motive for all proposals for change, and suggest that if the UK cannot block European developments it should detach itself from them. There is a certain development during the course of the coverage: whereas Fischer's speech is generally perceived as having a negative impact on both Britain's relationship with Europe and on the national EU-debate, the invitations of discussion are generally welcomed by the time Jospin and Prodi make their interventions. However, the notions that interventions by other European leaders are uncomfortable to the pro-European British Labour government and play into the hand of the Eurosceptic Conservatives and that several issues of the debate present a threat to the British interests remain dominant throughout the coverage.

The English coverage's evaluation of Blair's speech is a reversal of the Danish verdict on Lykketoft: Blair is deemed to have performed successfully on the European scene, but to be evading the hard task of engaging the national public. Thus, there is a conflict between the British government's quest for active participation in Europe and the underdeveloped national debate. There is a fear that Britain will be marginalised if it does not participate in the European debate, but at the same time there is a prevailing suspicion that the debate will lead to changes that cannot be accepted by the British public.[33] The coverage places the British government in a dilemma: if it does not enter the European debate developments are likely to go against Britain's wishes, but if it does participate in the debate it is likely to face domestic accusations of betraying national interests and selling out on sovereignty.[34]

The obvious solution to this dilemma would be to raise national backing for the government's position in the European debate or to base the government's position on the public's opinion on European matters if such an opinion could be stated strongly. However, either solution is

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[33] I find it difficult to maintain the English/British distinction in this section. As mentioned earlier, the newspapers I have studied are all English, but they do not themselves distinguish the English and the broader British publics. Rather, they speak of these as if they were a unified whole. While this tendency to subsume all the British nations under the English position may say much of the internal political landscape in Britain I shall not pursue the issue further here. I will continue to speak of the English newspapers and the English coverage, but in so far as the presented positions are said to be British that is also the term I shall use.

[34] These results are in agreement with those presented by Anderson and Weymouth (1999) who emphasise the press' role in creating and upholding the precarious position. My findings on the increasing acceptance of the European debate and Britain's participation in it indicate that the general attitude may be on the move, but the generalisability of these findings is seriously hampered by the character of the newspapers that have been studied.

dependent on the existence of a constructive public debate that undertakes substantial discussions of European matters rather than simply rejecting or endorsing developments. In its later stages the coverage seems to be gravitating towards such a change in the mode of national opinion formation, but it has not emerged fully at the end of the studied period.

In the English chronotope the national and the European contexts remain separated. Although concern and reluctance continue to be voiced, the European debate receives more and more acceptance throughout the coverage. The lasting impression is that constructive British participation at the European level is necessary. Throughout the coverage the relationships between British, French, German and other significant actors are pondered with a view to how Britain can avoid isolation and place itself most favourably. However, the constructive attitude and active positioning of Britain in Europe does not pervade the national context. Here, debate on the EU remains a shouting match between those crying superstate and those advocating the view that European integration is beneficial and does not endanger the sovereignty of the member states. This situation leads to a differentiated perception of the government's stance on EU-matters – offensive in Europe, defensive at home. Such a stance reinforces the impression that EU-decisions are being passed behind the people's back, thereby making it even more difficult to change the terms of national debate in a more productive direction. So far the position has held together in spite of its internal tensions, but it is doubtful whether British politicians can keep participating actively on the European scene if the national public remains suspicious and fearful of every European move.

### 6.3.5. Germany: a genuinely European debate

The German coverage consistently displays full endorsement of and enthusiasm for the European debate. With Fischer's intervention a constitutional debate that breaks with unhealthy taboos is said to be launched, and the coverage of the unfolding discussion voices the hope that a European consensus on the (re-)constitution of the EU will emerge as a result of the process. It is regretted that the debate continues to be rather elitist, but the possibility that discussions will lead to the emergence of a European consciousness is not ruled out.

The German coverage takes support of the reform process for granted and concentrates on the content of the various interventions and the different reactions to them. Hence, the German coverage pays more attention to a wider range of reactions to the utterances and does so more thoroughly than any of the other national reports. There is a strong concern with investigating what differences remain between the involved national and European political actors and with

pointing to the possible emergence of agreements. Although the coverage includes the reactions of representatives of the European institutions – parliament and Commission – and of various national governments, German actors are given the most in-depth attention. Throughout the coverage both German government and opposition viewpoints are presented; while differences on specific issues are spelled out, all the German positions presented share the characteristic of welcoming whichever contribution to the debate is now being discussed and offering constructive propositions for the continuation of the debate. In presenting the various non-German interventions and reactions the coverage recurrently concerns itself with how the others relate to Germany. Whereas reactions to Fischer's speech are said to be mostly positive, both Blair's and Jospin's interventions are seen as rejections of German proposals. The persevering differences between the various national positions, it is agreed, suggest that an eventual common European vision will have to be a compromise between the different national perspectives and that such a compromise has yet to be struck.

The German chronotope has no strictly national level; in fact it seems bent on dissolving its own nationality.[35] No national criticisms of the government's federal ambitions for Europe are voiced, and it is never questioned whether Germany should be involved with Europe in the first place. However, it is recognised that a German position exists at the supranational level of debate, and other countries' objections to the German model are taken into account. There is an implicit acceptance that neither the process nor the final result of the European debate can be exclusively German. The point of European integration, as perceived in the German chronotope, is exactly the demise of such exclusively national positions. Even if the German chronotope contains the lure of thinking that the German understanding of Europe is the truly European one, the prevailing notion is that Germany cannot, after-all, create Europe alone. The basic constitutive element of the German chronotope is the hope for a genuinely European dialogue to emerge and for Europe to be re-constituted through this dialogue. The participants in such dialogue would ideally be all Europe's citizens, but it is recognised that active involvement may in reality be restricted to political elites.

With the decision to create the Convention the potential for establishing a supranational chronotope of common European debate grows. This decision may, therefore, be seen as a decisive step towards the realisation of the German ambitions, but the question remains what

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[35] The ultimate goal of the reform process, and thereby of the discussion, is conceived as the containment of Germany within a European legal structure. The self-conscious German effacement ("we do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany," as Thomas Mann said) and the recourse to legalism (constitutional patriotism, *Verfassungspatriotismus*, is a decidedly German notion) have also been noted in other studies; see inter alia Risse (2002), Weiss (2002), and Wæver (2003).

pre-existing transnational commonalities the members of the Convention had to build on. Having explored the separate chronotopes that constitute the differing national takes on the European debate I shall now investigate whether the coverage as a whole displays similarities that may form the basis of a common European conceptualisation of the debate.

### 6.3.6. *Unity in diversity – an emergent European chronotope?*

Most of the national chronotopes recognise two levels of debate, a distinct national level and a common European one. The national debates are constructed with varying degrees of exclusivity: in the English and Danish cases foreign interventions are typically seen as disturbing intrusions, the French and German chronotopes seek a merger of national and European debate, and in Spain the connection between the national and the European communicative space is rarely made at all. The national and the European discussions are related differently and the national arenas also take on various shapes, but the common European domain shares decisive features in each of the national mediations of it.

The common European features of the press coverage are in some respects closely connected to the consensus reached among the leading politicians. As politicians agree on the agenda and procedure of the European debate, newspapers faithfully report this agreement. In the coverage of the speeches there is also a common understanding of what should be discussed and how the discussion should be conducted. It is repeatedly stressed that although a given speaker's viewpoints remain controversial, he has asked the right questions. In some national arenas agreeing to the European agenda is troublesome, but nevertheless agreement is reached whereby the common debate is at least made possible.

The presentation of a common agenda is followed by converging understandings of the issues to be discussed, and the coverage also displays a high degree of agreement on the main positions in the debate. The fault lines and alliances between the discussants are drawn up consistently, thereby continuing the constitution of a genuinely European debate. However, this agreement on where and how to disagree actually also contains an indication of the limits of the common European stance since the available positions are all nationally bound. The national anchorage of any actor's perspective on Europe recurs in even the most pro-European utterances as when Jospin says he is French and feels European, or when Fischer positions himself as a staunch European and a German parliamentarian. The press coverage reproduces and enhances the national ties, and consistently presents them as the main cause for the debating parties' diverging opinions.

The continued national grounding of the discussants' positions is taken to its extreme in the newspapers' common conception of the summit negotiations as processes of bargaining rather than of deliberation. The leaders are presented as going to the summits with fixed stances, with a set of priorities of which the lower may be altered or given up in return for concessions on the higher. As there exists no conception of how decisions may be reached other than through bargaining the European debate does not seem to hold much potential for genuinely common opinion and will formation. Views and propositions may be exchanged, but when the moment of decision arrives, the politicians striking the deals as well as the journalists reporting on the events revert to the pattern of give-and-take between previously cemented national positions. The genuine transcendence of national views may be advocated in non-binding situations, but European decision-making remains a question of balancing primarily national interests.

There does appear to be a common conception of European debate, but this conception consistently gives priority to national positions. The possibility for change, the chance of actually forming a common European attitude, is blocked because agency continues to be nationally bound. There may be a European debate, but there is no conception of a common outcome other than that which emerges from compromises between the national agents; the common features of European debate are procedural rather than substantial. The procedural norms on which agreements exist are such that the various agents may interact and debate the different positions reasonably. However, there is no common conception of how remaining substantial differences are to be overcome. Participants are expected to listen and perhaps to adapt, but not to change their own prior positions, and there exist no shared means of creating a common European agency.

### 6.3.7. Becoming European, nationally speaking

By pointing to the limitations of the European chronotope I do not mean to suggest that total substantial agreement should be the normative goal of the debate on the future of Europe. However, the participants must accept the possibility of learning and changing if the debate is to be truly constitutive. Without such recognition the common chronotope provides nationally bound actors with chances for presenting their views and being acknowledged on a European scene, but only limited possibilities for reaching common decisions and taking collective actions arise. For the time being the spatio-temporality that is characteristic of debate at the European level remains the most abstractly defined of the chronotopes I have studied; if offers the least specific opportunities for

communicative interaction and for collective identification. The spatio-temporal conditions of becoming by which the future of Europe is constituted in the debate as it is conducted at the level of the EU-institutions can most adequately be described as an *open field*. At the European level of debate there is a wide range of opportunities for interaction and it is not specified how these opportunities are to be realised; in this sense the field is a more adequate metaphor for this specific spatio-temporality than the Bakhtinian notion of the threshold.

In a similar manner the conditions of becoming that are characteristic of the five national chronotopes may also be represented more precisely by means of other metaphors than the threshold. Thus, the Spanish spatio-temporality is like a *weather vane*, turning undecidedly with the flow of events. That is, in a certain sense the Spanish room for discussion is constantly subject to changes imposed by others, but in another and possibly deeper respect it stoutly remains the same. The Danish and the English conditions of becoming resemble those of the *boxing ring*; a rather strictly defined space in which each new intervention constitutes yet another round of battle between ritually aligned adversaries of equal weight. Finally, the French and the German chronotopes may be likened to *windows of opportunity*; here moments in space and time that do provide substantial opportunities for collective movement towards a common future are constituted. However, the French and German chronotopes remain unclear as to what actions should be taken and how they should be performed, wherefore the narrow and swift passage across a threshold does not convey it properly, and the less specific possibilities that are invoked by the window of opportunity are more adequate.

The metaphorical presentations of the chronotopes point to the dominant conceptions of the debate on the future of Europe in each of the national contexts, and they highlight the similarities between the Danish and the English as well as the French and the German chronotopes. These general metaphorical characterisation of the chronotopes may be supplemented with an establishment of the modes of meaning formation that are predominant within each chronotope; that is, with a categorisation of the chronotopes according to how the EU is typically constituted within them. To create an overview of these forms, one may study whether the EU's emergence is primarily conceived in spatial or in temporal terms, and one may establish how much stress is put on either of the diverging issues of the form and the content of the Union.[36] Making this

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[36] This categorisation of the predominant themes of each of the six chronotopes is deeply indebted to Gilbert Weiss' study of French and German conceptualisations of Europe (Weiss, 2002). I have embarked from Weiss' conclusions and merely added the remaining four categories. Like Weiss, I must emphasise that the following are generalisations and that all four strategies for conceiving the EU are found in all contexts, only not to equal degrees.

categorisation demands drawing more upon the speakers' constitution of Europe than on the press coverage since the speakers' conceptualisations of the time-space and content-form relationships are more explicit and elaborate than are those of the newspapers. The establishment of the categories leads to a different grouping of the six chronotopes than did the metaphorical characterisation of their respective conceptions of the debate (see table 8).

|  | Time (abstract) | Space (concrete) |
|---|---|---|
| Content (concrete) | France<br><br>Spain | England & Denmark |
| Form (abstract) | Europe | Germany |

*Table 8: Dominant ways of constituting the EU*

The two distinctions of space-time and content-form are both instantiations of the more general concrete-abstract partition, space and content being the more specific terms and time and form belonging to a more abstract level of conceptualisation. When arranging the chronotopes according to these categories it becomes apparent that although the French and the German understandings of the possibilities of change are quite similar, these meanings are constituted in different ways. The German understanding of the future of Europe and the debate about it tends to focus on the concrete issue of European spatial unification and the abstract issue of institutional (re)form. The French conceptualisation rests upon the abstract idea of a common future and the concrete notion of the contents of European co-operation. Contrary to the French and German chronotopes the common meaning of the Danish and English chronotopes is also created in similar ways; in both national contexts the concrete features of space and content are privileged over time and form. Since the Spanish chronotope seems to change its direction for every new event, it is extremely hard to locate in a fixed matrix, but when one focuses on the indications of Aznar's speech it seems fair to place Spain in the same category as France, but tending strongly towards a middle position. Finally, the European chronotope – the conceptualisation of the EU at the supranational level – is purely abstract with an emphasis on the realisation of the true European vision that is relegated to the future and is to be realised by institutional means.

**6.4. Had we but world enough, and time – the *teloi* of the debate**

The analysis of the chronotopes of the debate contains the first general pronouncements on the debate as such; it establishes regularities and conventions that are unique to each national setting and explores similarities and differences across the board. The analysis of the *teloi* of the debate, to which I now turn, seeks to explain the general tendencies by combining the insights of the three preceding analytical sections and by bringing in the theoretical reflections on the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion formation in the European setting.

*Telos* is normally understood as the end of an action in an instrumental sense or as the final goal in a utopian sense (Ono & Sloop, 1992, p. 53). In Ramírez' conception of *praxis*, however, *telos* is the realisation of *phronesis* in the very performance of the act. In the humanistic theory of action the teleological or purposive moment does not lie outside of the act. The *telos* of an act is not a consequence of what is done, but is contained in the performance of the action, and the explanation and evaluation of the act must focus on how it is carried out (Ramírez, 1995, p. 120). When the act is a rhetorical one, the *telos* is realised in the speaker's adequate (*phronetic*) combination of substantial (proposals and recommendations), formal (*topoi*), and situational (*kairoi*) elements. In an abstract sense, the rhetorical *telos* is the creation of meaning as such, but the *telos* always takes the specific form of being the meaningful expression of something. Each utterance has a concrete *telos* that is enacted in the very articulation of it.

Understanding *telos* as the enactment of the particular meaning of an utterance may seem to imply an isolated view of the utterance. Indeed, each and every individual expression does carry its own *telos*, but no *telos* can be separated from the situation in which the utterance is made or from the broader context that delimits and enables its articulation. As constitutive elements of the utterance, *kairoi* and *topoi* point to the existence of intertextual *teloi* – purposes realised by a group of related texts collectively. The debate on the future of Europe is such a collection of texts, united in the collective action of reforming the institutional and procedural underpinnings of the EU and endowing it with a new foundational treaty.

Reform, however, is not a *telos* in itself; instead, it is a way of enhancing the legitimacy of the EU. The changes suggested by the various participants in the reform process all aim at making the EU more legitimate in one way or another. The argument is that if the advocated changes are made, then the EU will become more effective, more accountable, more transparent, more democratic, more acceptable – more legitimate. The purpose of the debate, then, can be stated as the agreement on reforms that will augment the EU's legitimacy when enacted, but the debate is

in itself a legitimatory process. Legitimacy can be understood as a function of common opinions and collective identities created through public debate, and the enactment of this constitutive relationship is the *telos* of the debate as such. Throughout the preceding analyses of the selected moments and turning points of the debate I have been exploring various dimensions of the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion. I now turn to the task of bringing the pieces together in the explanation of how the *telos* of the debate is enacted.

### 6.4.1. Legitimating the EU in and through public discussion

The Nice and Laeken Declarations contain the explicit statements of the *telos* of the debate – the aim is to make reforms that increase legitimacy and to do so legitimately. Moreover, the declarations officially create the agendas and procedures of the debate; they designate what will be considered relevant and proper contributions as well as how, where, and by whom such contributions can be made. Being declaratory performatives the declarations primarily perform the task of establishing the legal basis for the ensuing debate. This establishment is in turn reliant on the need for debate that was justified in the preceding interventions, and these earlier developments are referred to in both declarations. The Nice Declaration keeps such reference to a minimum, merely stating that the Nice Treaty has opened the way for enlargement and that it is now time to begin a deeper and wider debate. The Laeken Declaration is more elaborate; it reproduces many of the constitutive dichotomies of the foregoing utterances, notably the tensions between the EU's past accomplishments and its future challenges and between the citizens' demands and the EU's capacities. Although the declarations do contain some references to the EU's current level of legitimacy and the possibility of enhancing it, their primary *telos* is to justify the debate – not the Union – and to inaugurate it by identifying the central participants and the adequate modes of discussion. The underlying argument is that if the debate is conducted properly, it will enable agreement on reforms that will in turn boost the EU's legitimacy, but this argument can only be enacted in the actual debate, not in the declarations that instate it.

The speeches also seek to legitimate the process of the debate and to identify its proper arenas and procedures, but these functions are secondary to the primary *telos* of creating a harmonious relationship between the audiences' identities and the EU. The speeches mean to legitimate the EU directly by raising public support for the European project and to promote the speakers' particular version of that project. In order to realise their purpose the speakers use two interwoven strategies; they create a position of collective identity from which their image of the

reformed EU may be endorsed, and they establish an image of the EU that is desirable to all those who accept the offered identity. That is, the speakers use strategies of legitimation through identification and of identification through legitimation. They seek to move existing collective identities towards endorsement of the EU, and to adapt the EU to the perceived preferences and expectations of these collectivities.

In performing this dual *telos* some speakers touch directly upon the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion formation. Blair and Lykketoft do so most explicitly in their common endorsement of the no *demos* thesis. They argue that the EU should remain intergovernmentally organised because the lack of a European people and of European-level public discussions entails that the EU can only be legitimated indirectly through the national governments' mediation between the European level and the national publics. Fischer also recognises the dispersed state of the European debate and the exclusiveness of national publics, but he feels the situation can be remedied and suggests setting up European institutions that both represent the citizens as individuals and as members of nationally defined collectivities. Fischer, in agreement with Habermas' retort to the no *demos* thesis, alleges that common political institutions may found a unity of culturally dispersed peoples.

The three remaining speakers do not pose an explicit argument about the relationship between the three concepts, but even so their utterances are in themselves enactments of the relationship. Jospin and Prodi both constitute multilevel identities in which individuals are presented as holding national and European affiliations, they advocate institutional changes that are adapted to this duality, and, implicitly, their conception of the debate also contains the diverging national and the common European levels. The identity Aznar offers to his audience also holds both national and European features, but his lacking sense of public participation in the discussions leads to a singular staging of the debate at the political level as a dialogue between national leaders with common European inclinations. Aznar thinks a European attitude can be expressed in intergovernmental institutions and that such expression will ensure the support of the people. The Spanish leader is the only one of the six speakers who does not include public participation as a legitimating factor in its own right. Nevertheless, he remains faithful to the aim of raising support for the EU, but claims that such enhanced support can spring solely from the citizens' recognition that the leaders' actions are beneficial. Aznar conceives of results as being more important than participation and, hence, privileges the output dimension of legitimacy.

Central to the speeches' common *telos* of creating public endorsement of the European project as they present it, is the constitution of positive relationships between national identities and the European polity. The speakers all seek to accomplish this task by creating an intermediate space – a position that is neither solely national, nor eradicates nationality. Furthermore, they all use the same strategies of identification in which the tensions between national and European affiliations are presented as productive dynamics, not inhibitory bonds. In seeking to resolve the apparent incompatibilities between the national and the European levels the speakers rely heavily on constitutive dichotomies. Although the speakers employ the same range of strategies to realise the same general goals, the positions that they advocate as the common ground on which the reformed EU should be erected are quite distinct from each other and the proposals for reform vary accordingly. These differences are in concordance with the variations in the speakers' constraints. The specific contexts in which the utterances are made, the speakers' diverging perceptions of the audiences' expectations, and their own disparate evaluations of what would be a positive development all contribute to marking each utterance off as a unique expression of meaning. However, each speech aims at establishing a collective identity position that balances national and European concerns, and to suggest institutional and procedural changes reflecting this balance. The speeches do not enact the EU reforms as such, but seek to raise public opinion in favour of the positions they suggest, thereby generating support for their preferred vision of the future Europe.

The press coverage of the two declarations and the six speeches represents the link between the political level of debate and the broader spheres of public opinion formation. The media constitute the main point of contact between the politicians and the citizens, and they are necessary for involving the people in the reform process. However, the media are not noiseless channels of communication. The institutionalised methods of production, self-perceived functions, and rules of access constitute the media not only as facilitators of dialogue, but also as actors who participate in deciding what the dialogue should be about, how it should be conducted, and who should participate in it. The main *telos* of the newspaper coverage may be one of public opinion formation through mediation, but in performing this act the newspapers cannot avoid serving functions of identification and legitimation as well. First, the newspapers, through their choices of which events to report, identify the matters that qualify for public discussion. Second, they identify the available stances of the debate by choosing which reactions to the events should be recorded. Third, the selections of what issues and arguments to pursue and what quotes to print influence how

the debate is conducted. And by making these choices, the newspapers constitute and legitimate a certain version of the debate, silencing other versions or at least rendering their access to the public space extremely difficult.

The analysis of the chronotopes showed that there are important differences between the national media's conceptions of what the debate is about, how it should be conducted, and who should participate in it. However, there is also an emergent European-wide acceptance of the need for reforms and of the debate as the proper means of reformation. And more specifically, the newspapers do present more or less the same image of the European debate as it is conducted at the political level. What is significantly different from country to country is how the transnational political dialogue is connected to the broader realms of public discussion. Some chronotopes see the public debate as being European even when conducted within national boundaries, whereas others presume that the national arenas not only delimit the spaces of public discussion but also set out peoples' horizon of solidarity and engagement.

The newspapers seek to promote public opinion formation, but they also accommodate their coverage to the expectations and demands of their readerships. Therefore, the identity positions and entailing visions of what constitutes a legitimate European Union, which the newspapers offer to their readers, vary from country to country. However, all the newspapers do confirm the national-European and the intergovenmental-federal spectra as the two dimensions along which collective identity and political legitimacy should be sought. As studies of the so-called agenda setting function of the media have amply shown (Hjarvard, 1995, p. 48), the news does not determine what public opinion should be, but contributes greatly to the settlement of what issues should be addressed and how one should address them. In this regard, the coverage perceives and reproduces a European-wide general scheme of discussion, but the general commonalities are enacted differently in each of the national contexts.

The three types of contributions to the debate included in this study lay their main emphasis on one or another of the three related *teloi* – legitimation, identification, and public opinion formation. However, they all contribute to the overall *telos* of creating a constitutive relationship between these elements, of presenting the EU as a legitimate polity with which citizens may identify and in which they can participate. All the contributions also have a common conception of how the constitutive relationship should be conceived in the case of the EU; it should be a point of mediation between differentiated national interests and common European concerns. It is to the evaluation of this overall constitution of meaning that I now turn. The evaluation is

conducted on the terms of the debate; the various interventions are seen as contributions to a collective action of establishing middle ground, and it is the possibilities for engagement and identification offered – not the audiences' actual reactions – that are scrutinised. The question to be answered here is what potential for further communicative interaction the debate creates. The question of whether this potential is realised can only be answered through investigations that attend to the audiences' reception of the offered positions. The answering of that question, therefore, goes beyond the purely textual scope of this study and is left open for investigations conducted in the mode of reception analysis.

### 6.4.2. Evaluation of the constitution of meaning

The general characteristic of the terms of articulation that delimit and enable every specific intervention into the debate is that they are both too open and too closed. Statements about Europe's future are locked between conceptions of nation-states co-operating intergovernmentally, on the one hand, and of a federally organised Europe, on the other, wherefore the creation of the EU as a genuinely different third place is effectively disallowed. In this sense there is an uncreative foreclosure of the discussion: if the EU is to be more than an international co-operation it must take on federal features, and if the nation-states are to be protected the institutional structure of the EU must remain intergovernmental. However, the ground between the two predetermined points of reference is so vast and so undetermined that it is difficult to say anything about what the EU actually is. Thus, the two contradictory tendencies of closure and openness actually feed on each other. It is easier to begin a statement on the EU by describing what it is not – it is neither a state nor an international organisation – and in choosing this easy solution it becomes increasingly difficult to say what the EU is – something different altogether. The sense in which the EU can be described positively is a very broad one. It can be presented as a promoter of values and principles shared by all the member states (the French solution), as a preserver of each member's particular identity (the Danish and British versions), as a common legal framework (the German option), or as a political scene (the Spanish model).[37]

Identifications of and with the EU are restricted by the alternatives that constitute the debate, but it seems that without these alternatives neither the debate nor the European project as such could have begun. Without the two well-established extremes of national unity and

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[37] The national conceptions of the EU do, of course, contain elements of all four predominant descriptions. What I spell out here are the general tendencies. The degree to which interventions in the various national debates are aware of and able to employ each others' preferred conceptions indicates how developed the common European debate actually is.

international co-operation and their derivative models for European integration, the notion of the European project as constituting a third kind of polity could not have emerged at all. The constitutive dichotomies provide the creative force by which new meaningful conceptualisations of the EU may emerge, but they also set limitations on how this new political entity may be thought. Seeing the constitution of Europe as a matter of balancing already existing models and positions allows the EU to emerge as an independent polity. In the long run, however, it may present serious limitations to the development of that polity – just as it already restricts the range of proposals that can be forwarded in the discussion of the future developments. In time the dichotomies may prove to be unduly restrictive in their constitution of the EU in relations of opposition. Such binary relations are adequate tools for initiating a process of reconsideration, but could restrain the possibility of establishing and detailing alternatives once the process has begun – as again may be illustrated by the limited range of proposals that emerge within the broadly defined agenda of the debate.

Here, once again, the restraining tension of simultaneous openness and closure is at play. The constitutive dichotomies present the participants with very few alternative enactments of the broad theme of European constitution, and thus give them few means of moving beyond the rough description of the initial scene. The rhetorical strategy of the constitutive dichotomies is a very general one, but it does not provide the interlocutors with means of moving beyond it. The seemingly open texture of the guiding conceptualisations explains the limited range of possible meaning formation; had the debate been more closely defined – in terms of a larger number of more specific rhetorical strategies – more possibilities of different articulations might have emerged.

The dilemma of simultaneous closure and openness is also apparent in the differences between the contexts in which the debate is carried out. The politicians' messages – declarations as well as speeches – are both too broadly and too narrowly contextualised. As addresses to the European people they offer rather weak possibilities of identification since they do not endow the supposedly common European position with much substance. And as specific contributions to the ongoing discussions between the leaders of Europe, with their high presupposition of common knowledge and narrow intertextuality, they offer little chance of public participation. The solution to this dilemma that most of the speakers choose is to address nationally defined audiences – whether they be of the speakers' own nationality or pertaining to other current or coming member states – and seek to inscribe these audiences into the European project. As a consequence of the national addresses the understanding of the EU as something common yet different is reinforced.

The EU is offered to the national audiences as a project they should support and participate in both because it has the same values and goals as they do, and because it is not identical with the existing statal formations.

The ambivalent condition of being simultaneously 'our' and 'other' that the citizens are offered as the defining feature of their relationship with the EU is both a blessing and a curse. The European structure, as it is forwarded in the debate, offers the potential of overcoming the perceived problems of the states' incapacity for dealing with global challenges and of the states' inability or unwillingness to include individuals whose identities deviate from the national norm. As it is presented in the debate, the EU offers better protection and more benefits than the states, and it promises to set the individual free of snaring national ties. However, the citizens are also disallowed deep identification with the European project, and their active participation in the debate about it is severely hampered. As long as the European collective identity is not substantiated in its own right, it offers no actual alternative to the national affiliations. And as long as the debate at the European level is conducted in either too broad or too narrow contexts, the discussion that citizens may readily participate in is limited to the question of how their nation-state should relate to the EU's institutions.

The politicians who participate in European decision-making share an institutionalised space of debate and negotiation, and each nationally elected politician has a room for interaction with the electorate. As is to be expected in a representative democracy, the citizens are not directly present in the European political institutions, nor do they – and this is more surprising and problematic for a polity as developed as the EU aspires to be – have a corresponding common public sphere of interaction. European will formation is strictly elitist and public opinion formation about European matters remains diversified.

Elitism needs not be detrimental to democratic legitimacy if a strong public sphere monitors the elite's opinions and actions, and such a public sphere does not have to be unitary. Even the most coherent of national public spheres is a network of different media and various specific arenas, the question is how tightly interwoven the network is and how conscious the various nodal points are of being related. It is a basic insight of the theory of deliberative democracy that if the political elite is to derive its legitimacy from a public sphere, the alleged participants in that sphere must at least be aware of being part of it. The members of a public need not communicate directly or be informed by the same media, but they must be conscious of each other and of the relationships between their respective positions.

In the case of the EU this demand for awareness is only partially fulfilled: each national public sphere recognises its connection with the European level, but not necessarily with the other national spheres. Information and opinions are usually exchanged within the national arenas or between the national and the European levels. Direct exchanges between national arenas are less frequent and usually confined to intergovernmental negotiations. When views emanating from other national contexts are made available to a national public they are usually presented as positions with which one may compare the viewpoints forwarded in one's own national context, not as invitations to dialogic engagement let alone identification. The network of the European public sphere is not very well developed; it evolves around the EU-institutions and is mainly enacted in the already established national fora for public debate.

The different national spheres are not closely connected and at the supranational level the communicative network is only slightly interwoven. Transnational spheres of dialogue on specialised topics – political standing, professional training, spare-time activities, etc. – have not (yet) become so strong that they receive much attention within or are able to attract attention from the national dialogues. There are opportunities for European-wide opinion formation, but only in narrowly defined political and specialised settings do the communicative networks that constitute these opportunities become more than loosely coupled, and generally speaking the citizens remain detached from all the contexts and situations in which European meaning making unfolds. As long as the national discussions do not convey a stronger sense of belonging to the same European debate European-wide decisions can hardly claim to be publicly controlled let alone grounded.

Even though the political leaders have access to institutionalised European settings of dialogue, their communicative interaction is also constrained by the general terms of discussion. At the political level the problem is that when abstract pronouncements on the national-European and intergovernmental-federal relationships are substantiated general agreements are replaced by specific differences. When the discussions turn detailed it is revealed that the politicians actually mean very different things by their common references to general concepts. Here, the distinction between the EU's overall purpose and its institutional instruments is also at work; the leaders readily agree on the common goals, but disagree on how to achieve them. When the interlocutors seek to conclude the reform process and turn from general invocations to detailed negotiations, particular differences that remain hidden within the general statements emerge and actual closure becomes impossible.

The difficulty of reaching consensus on the reforms that everyone agrees are necessary suggests a difference between deciding a new treaty and realising the purpose of the debate. The *telos* of the debate is not realised in the agreement that eventually results from the bargaining process to which the leaders have to resort in the face of their continued substantial divergences. Rather, the purpose of the debate is realised in its continuation; only through perpetual discussions of what the EU is and what it should be does a common conception of Europe come into being. The process of European becoming will be continued for as long as discussions on the future of Europe are carried on, and gradually a common understanding of the EU that is both denser and more inclusive may emerge. The process is one of perpetual creation, and there is no definite constitutive moment, no instance in which the EU comes to be and the debate can be brought to an end. As evidenced by the events surrounding the agreement on the two declarations, whenever the discussion reaches its institutionally stipulated turning points, its moments of decision, the common creation of meaning has to be abandoned and instrumental means of bargaining that leave everyone partially satisfied must be taken into use.[38] Only in an imagined space of infinite communicative interaction does the image of a finally constituted Europe make sense, and in order to uphold that vision the European process of constitution through self-reflection must be continued.

### 6.4.3. What is becoming? – The European debate theoretically speaking

This project in its entirety has been guided by the basic assumption that meanings cannot be understood independently of the time and space in which they are articulated, and that, conversely, meanings may alter our understanding of the time and space in which they are articulated. The presupposition of the mutually constitutive relationship between texts and their contexts has, on the one hand, led to the discovery of an abstract European temporality in which the continuation of debate leads to the recursive constitution of the EU as an independent polity. On the other hand, a number of national contexts that divide the debate into spatially distinct sections have been identified. It is now time to apply the analytical findings to the various theoretical conceptions of the European constitutional order with the purpose of determining which theory is most appropriate for the European polity. It is time to answer Wagner and Friese's (2002) call for a theorisation of the EU that is sensitive to the European polity's specific being in space and time.

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[38] The failure to agree on the new Treaty at the meeting of December 2003 can be explained by the leaders' unwillingness, in that instance, to bargain.

Even if transnational spaces for debate and modes of discussion are emerging, the *telos* of the debate on the future of Europe continues to be enacted, and to be enacted differently, within the various contexts of the debate. Difference is a main constitutive element not only of the debate but also of the European polity as such. Any politico-legal conception of the EU that aspires to rise above a status of marginal relevance must take into account and account for the multiple multiplicity of the Union. The EU must be conceived as a multilevel, multifunctional, multirepresentational polity. Even so, the conception must not lose its sense of coherence and commonality – no mean feat for a single model, which is exactly why I shall suggest that the available theories only approach adequacy in combination. In the following I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various theoretical positions in relation to the analytical findings. And I outline the conceptual combination that I believe holds the greatest potential for explaining the EU in its present state and the strongest normative force for directing the European political project towards its future.

The European debate certainly represents and recreates the reality of a multilevel polity; the debate occurs in a variety of different contexts, has many layers, and passes through a number of filters. The multiplicity of the debate cannot be described simply in terms of concentric circles moving from the specific locale in which a particular utterance is delivered to the general European context of the debate as such. Although there is a certain tendency towards such a movement, the intertextuality of utterances, the interrelations between different contexts and the appearance of speakers in situational contexts that are not 'their own' complicate the image of neatly ordered circles of increasing generality and thinness. The interdependence of the contributions to the debate across the various specific settings, to which each contribution is necessarily tied, constitutes the discussion as a rich and complexly interwoven process. The European debate can be likened to an unfinished patchwork made up of differently patterned and shaped pieces and with considerable holes where pieces do not fit or have not yet been meshed.

The process of debating the future of Europe displays affinities with the generally accepted theoretical understanding that the EU is a multilevel polity. The understanding of Europe emerging from the communicative interaction that is the thread and needle of the European patchwork also corresponds to various elements of the different theoretical explanations. In the debate, however, features that are not theoretically harmonious are present simultaneously, wherefore no single theory is consistent with and explanatory of the Europe that is constituted in the debate. Most obviously, neither the no *demos* thesis nor the theory of constitutional patriotism

adequately capture the European development, although both theoretical standpoints have their advocates among the participants in the debate. A common European polity cannot emerge on a purely legal basis, nor does cultural diversity make it impossible. In this sense Joseph Weiler's assessment of the European *telos* as the continued and conscious subjection to the will of the 'other' comes closest to the Europe of the debate. At present the EU and the debate about its future does not overcome the differences between 'us' and 'them,' but makes it possible for us to recognise each other and to collaborate in pursuing common goals.

The European *telos* of achieving and upholding unity in diversity places the EU and the debate about it in a precarious position between theories of modernity and explanatory models informed by postmodernism. The EU is an enlightenment project in the Habermasian sense of relying on and promoting communicative rationality, of being a reasonable community, but it is also, as Deirdre Curtin points out, an inherently postmodern project whose potential is only realised if it remains other than itself. The Habermasian ideal of creating community on a purely legal basis has proven its limitations, but if the European collective identity is substantiated it loses its liberating potential. The EU must be kept in a state of productive tension in which its constitutive dichotomies are neither dialectically resolved nor deconstructed. Only as a constantly contested alternative to existing realities does the European postnational constellation emerge.

If the EU's constitutive strains were resolved the common European project that would then emerge could probably in the long run raise public support to much higher levels than is currently feasible. Embarking from a written constitution of a purely federal nature the EU could begin a process of nation building in the traditional sense, and it might end up beating the nation-states in their own popularity contest. But the EU is not meant to be popular; it is meant to be right. As a project continuously in its making it can play a crucial civilising role through the constant reminder that 'we' are 'the other.' This is how the EU should be constituted, but also what limits its constitution.

It may be recognised as a democratic weakness that there is no unitary discussion, no single European public sphere, and the desire to endow the citizens with a stronger European agency, a better ability to participate in European debates, is certainly a laudable one. Nevertheless, the benefits of the EU would be lost if potentials for common discussion and enhanced agency were to be realised at the expense of the Union's present diversity. If the EU were constituted – in legal and communicative terms – as a coherent and uncontested polity it would forfeit its unique liberating potential; removing the EU's current limitations would also alter its possibilities.

The continued division between the fora of discussion, the perpetual variations in the issues discussed, and the different meanings given to the terms of discussion do inhibit the Union's development in a certain sense, but it would be much more problematic if the EU were not discussed at all. Ultimately, the EU finds its legitimation in its contestation, understood both as the challenge the EU poses to our ingrown understandings of political formations and collective identities and as the citizens' and politicians' questioning of the alternatives Europe has to offer. The constitution of Europe is a thoroughly reflexive process; it is grounded in its constant commentary upon itself, and it is in this dynamic and strained process, not in any state of blissful being, that the uniquely European *telos* is realised. The specific round of debate that has been the subject of this study may find its end in the ratification of the EU's constitutional treaty. The constitution of Europe, however, is only achieved through continued communicative interaction in and among the EU's many distinct publics with their prevailing differences and emerging similarities.

# 7.

# Conclusion

A text is the result of a complex process; it arises out of a dialogue with the myriad of other texts that precedes it, and on its pages a dialogue is conducted between the writer and his or her anticipated audience. A text is a physical product, but a peculiarly dynamic and interactive one that loses its purpose and meaning if it is not read and commented upon. If the discussion a text invites is discontinued, that text suffers the destiny of yesterday's newspaper – fit for nothing but wrapping fish. Some texts have an ability to maintain relevance across space and time, to fascinate generation after generation of readers and to remain central to discussions about the subjects with which they deal. Other texts are fleeting, meant to be read once and immediately replaced by other interventions. Two patterns of textual dialogue emerge from these extreme cases: one of circularity or recursiveness, the other of linearity or perpetual progression.

The recursive dialogue, on the one hand, is structured around issues with lasting relevance whose main problems and possible solutions are embedded in central texts around which other texts evolve, on which they comment, and to which they repeatedly return for inspiration. The progressive dialogue, on the other hand, moves from one utterance to the other without looking back, stringing each statement together to form a dynamic process the aim of which is less important than the movement as such. The recursive dialogue is characterised by spatiality; it is conducted in a well-known context and directed towards the examination of issues whose resolution may be the professed goal of each utterance, but whose lasting relevance actually ensures the continuation of the dialogue. The progressive dialogue is primarily temporal; it develops through time by means of a gradual solution of problems that simultaneously spurs new issues to be dealt with; each statement is both an answer to earlier utterances and an invitation to further responses.

The debate on the future of Europe displays both recursive and progressive features. In its connection to specific contexts – primarily nationally defined, but with emerging cross-cutting and transnational variants – the debate is recursive. In its movement from the emergence and recognition of the debate as a special version and independent round of the European reform process to the institutionalisation of the debate and the eventual agreement on a constitutional treaty the debate is progressive. The most striking feature of the debate, however, is the interdependence

between the two modes of dialogue: temporal progression can only be articulated in a recursive setting, and the spatial dialogue is only continued and maintained if it is provided with temporal impetus. In the following I shall explore this spatio-temporal interdependence further, thereby summing up the results of the preceding investigation and pointing out its contribution to the understanding of both the political process and the theoretical conceptualisation of debating the future of Europe.

## 7.1. The constitutive process of European debate

The constitutional debate exists in and as a combination of national and European fora. At the European level politicians meet in face-to-face discussions of the reforms and aim at the eventual agreement on a refoundation of the institutional and procedural framework of the EU. Genuine European debate only exists in an area of restricted participation, in the strong, but narrow public sphere of political incumbents. The newspapers mediate between the narrow European level of political will formation and decision-making and the broader publics of their nationally defined readerships. In the process of mediation, the European issues are adapted to the various expectations and concerns that are dominant in the different national contexts. Although the press coverage as a whole displays general agreement on the main issues and positions of the debate there are also significant differences between each of the national versions of the debate. The weaker and broader publics of opinion formation vary from each national setting so that there are differences as to what issues receive public attention and how public opinions about these issues are formed.

The English and Danish contexts are significantly shaped by the presence of strong Eurosceptic actors, and the debate in these countries concentrates on the relationship between the nation and the EU understood as an institutional co-operation which one may choose to join or opt out of. In Germany and France the EU is conceived as a project in which participation is both desirable and inevitable – Europe is understood as a community of destiny and the question is how this community should be institutionally organised. Thus, the German and the French debates go beyond the more restricted discussions of the countries' particular relationship with the EU to discuss the organisation of the EU as such. The debate in the Spanish context is somewhat ambiguous; although the Spanish press presents the common European concerns as well as the positions of other nations there is neither an active discussion of the European issues nor a contested enactment of the Spanish relationship with Europe.

One of the common features of the debate in all its contexts is the development of a concern for constitutional issues that gradually evolves into an expectation that the debate should result in the settlement of these issues and that such settlement should take the shape of a constitutional text. While the national contexts provide the spatial settings in which the broader public debate is enacted, whereby centrifugal dispersion of the debate is maintained, the temporal dimension of progressive dialogue generates centripetal forces of European scope. Meeting in their narrow political fora the heads of state and government are able to initiate the debate and thus to set the centripetal forces in motion. Although the relevance of the debate is generally accepted, a common debate does not arise across the various national publics. In all its versions the debate is directed towards the same abstractly defined goals, but it remains too differentiated and fragmented to enable the emergence of a common European public opinion about how these goals should be realised. Thus, the common will to discuss European matters does not lead to a common European discussion, and at the time of decision no substantial public opinion has arisen. Since the constitutive processes of public discussion remain nationally dispersed, no common European constitutional moment arises. Even though the leaders eventually reached a compromise to which they could all agree, one of the main lessons of the process should be that the idea of constituting the EU once and for all is not consistent with the purpose of the European political project. The EU may, as Jospin says, be a content before it is a container, but it is also a process before it is a product.[1]

## 7.2. The rhetorical study of European debate

The rhetorical study of the debate on the future of Europe shows that any conception of the relationship between legitimacy, identity and public opinion that does not highlight their dynamic interdependence provides an inadequate account of European developments. Furthermore, if one supposes that the legitimation of Europe through a public constitutional debate is a once-off process the conduction of which will yield a stable and constantly legitimate product, then one is grossly mistaken. The EU remains, and should remain, united in diversity, but this tension is only productive as long as it is enacted. If the discussion on the relationship between the EU's different constitutive elements were to ebb out, the difference would either be replaced by unreflected

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[1] This distinction is not just a matter of splitting hairs: a process is dynamic whereas a container is static. The EU emerges, realises its content in both the senses of discovering and fulfilling, in and through the continuous constitutive discussion of what it is and what it should be. The establishment and reform of the EU as a product, the institutional container, is the instrumental aim of this generative debate.

agreements or harden into uncompromising oppositions. Neither of these opposite alternatives would allow the fulfilment of the EU's unique potential as a collective actor with the legitimacy of a state, but without the identity of a nation.

As regards the theorisation of the legitimacy-identity-public opinion relationship in the European context, the rhetorical perspective lends support to the notion that the EU is indeed a unique and independent polity, but also highlights the EU's being on the threshold, its perpetual state of becoming. The most important theoretical lesson to be drawn from the present study is that the EU should not be conceptualised as a static entity; rather, both the Union itself and theories about it find their strength in being dynamic and in being able to explain and further the dynamics. The recommendations for a European constitution that can be derived from this theoretical understanding stipulate that the constitutional text should also be seen as a dynamic entity. The constitution should provide a framework for sustained and continuous communicative interaction between a plurality of actors in multiple contexts. The European polity should be seen as arising in and out of the continuous debate; only if the constitutional text continues to be discussed – if it becomes the centre of a recursive dialogue – can it be said to constitute the EU.

The constitutional text should be seen as marking a new beginning – a turning point – not a termination of the discussion. What is distinctive about the ensuing phase in the discussion is that the constitution may provide a common European centre of attention. While discussions continue to be carried out in the primarily national contexts, they now have a common textual reference that could cause the discussions to enter a path of gradual conversion. As Habermas argues, the constitution could provide the basis for the establishment of a European public, but only if it succeeds in becoming a common point of reference for the various communicative contexts in which the opinions of the European public will continue to be articulated. If the constitution obtains such pivotal status there would be a common text as well as a common temporality to provide centripetal impetus in each of the national debates. That would not mean the end of the centrifugal forces that distinguish the contexts from each other; however, it would mean a stronger recognition of common concerns as well as points of disagreement and possibly a better understanding of the various positions.

Viewed from the theoretical position that I advocate the constitutional text will not, nor should it, espouse a uniform European debate, nor will it lead to the substantiation of a collective European identity. Instead, it is predicted and advocated that the mutual awareness across contexts will rise and that a better understanding of similarities will also lead to a stronger

acceptance of differences. By recognising their shared norms and common concerns Europeans of all nationalities may become able to engage each other in communicative interaction, and they may do so with genuine respect for each others' unique identities rather than with a desire to become substantially the same. The national contexts would remain the nodal points of European discussions, but their boundaries would become increasingly fluid and their interiors would be criss-crossed by the articulation of so many diverse interests that the identification and expression of one consistent national position would become decreasingly relevant. Thus, the full potential of Europe's diverse cultural richness as well as its common political values would be released.

On a more general theoretical note, I believe this study has shown the worth of the constitutionist perspective as an alternative to constructionism. While it is valid to speak of constructions when explaining the instrumental use of language to create speaker and audience positions, choosing the label constructionism as the defining term for one's approach as such may lead to a singular focus on strategic issues. Constitutionism, on the contrary, can be accused of having a singular focus on generative aspects. However, the constitutionist recognises that constitutive features are enacted by means of constructive strategies. Thus, both instrumental and generative elements and the relations between them are included in the constitutionist study. When investigating collective processes of meaning formation such as the debate on the future of Europe constitutionism is a more adequate starting point than constructionism. The constitutionist perspective allows the critic to take the full analytical consequence and release the total explanatory potential of such ideas as the recursiveness of social norms and creative acts and the mutual interdependence of general expectations and individual actions.

The interrelationship between the individual and the general, between possibilities and limitations, is an important starting point for constructionists and constitutionists alike, but the constructionists tend to lose the point amidst discussions of structural power or strategic resistance. Constructionists conceive the actor as being either too constrained or too free and fail to see the dynamic relationships between limits and possibilities that enable action as such. Constitutionists know that both elements are equally important and focus the investigation on how particular meanings are articulated in the field of tensions between them.

**7.3. Outlook**

Just as the European debate is both a recursive and a progressive dialogue so the present investigation of it aspires to contribute to discussions carried out in both dialogic modes. I hope to have contributed to the recursive theoretical discussion of the role of rhetoric as an academic discipline. Thus, I have sought to establish the benefits of uniting rhetoric and the legal and social sciences in interdisciplinary endeavours, and more particularly I have aspired to demonstrate the relevance of combining rhetorical studies in the interpretive mode with legal and social scientific theories of society formation. Rising again to a general level, I have argued that studies of meaning formation have a greater explanatory potential if their overall perspective is conceived as constitutionist rather than constructionist; I hope my analytical findings have substantiated this claim. My theoretical suggestions regarding the constitutionist-constructionist distinction and the interdisciplinary relationship between rhetoric and other academic fields are neither exhaustive nor conclusive, and I am looking forward to continuing the dialogue on these recursively relevant matters.

As regards the subject matter of the project, the EU and the public debate about its future development, I hope to have contributed to the progressive dialogue that is carried on in both academic, political, and broader public circles. The study of meaning formation in the particular situations of the six speeches and two declarations, in the five national contexts, and at the general European level aims at explaining how the EU is being conceived and debated at present. The study explores the various defining spatio-temporal features of the debate showing that the main constraint – simultaneously enabling and restricting – of European meaning formation lies in the concrete spatial variations of the debate combined with the abstract temporal commonality. Thus, there is a vague idea of a common European goal, but the common vision is only embodied nationally, and the concrete national manifestations are diverse. However, one cannot substantiate the European collective idea and identity at the supranational level for both practical reasons – the lack of a European public sphere – and because of normative concerns. If the European peoples were to become genuinely united, the EU would lose its normative appeal as the only political entity that is able to promote unity and diversity simultaneously.

The investigation of the debate on the future of Europe has pointed out the unique potential of the EU and has hopefully laid the ground for continuing the debate in such a mode that the potential may be released. I am looking forward to participating both in the political and the

academic debates about the future of Europe as these debates progress beyond the current discussions of the character of the European constitutional text, but remain as constitutive as ever.

# Dansk resumé

M anglen på en fælles europæisk offentlighed er et af de karakteristika, der oftest nævnes som begrænsende omstændighed for den europæiske integration. Uden et fælles offentligt rum, hvor synspunkter kan udveksles og en offentlig mening samt en bredere fornemmelse af fællesskab – af kollektiv europæisk identitet – kan opstå, kan den Europæiske Union (EU) ikke styrke sin demokratiske legitimitet, og unionen må derfor fortsætte med at legitimere sig gennem de nationale demokratier, lyder argumentet. I de senere år har den europæiske udvikling imidlertid i stigende grad bevæget sig fra mellemstatsligt til overstatsligt samarbejde, og i den anledning er en række initiativer, der dels søger at sikre det formelle, legale grundlag for et sådant overstatsligt samarbejde, dels søger at involvere medlemslandenes befolkninger mere aktivt og direkte, blevet iværksat. Disse initiativer kan samles under betegnelsen "debatten om Europas fremtid", der i denne afhandling står for totaliteten af nationale og overnationale meningsdannelsesprocesser rettet mod reformeringen af EU's eksisterende traktatmæssige grundlag. Den igangværende reformproces kan siges for alvor at have taget form og retning i løbet af 2000 og at have nået et foreløbigt klimaks med stats- og regeringsledernes vedtagelse af en europæisk forfatningstraktat i juni 2004. Processen vil finde sin endelige afslutning, når traktaten enten er blevet ratificeret i alle medlemslandene, hvad enten denne godkendelse sker glat eller traktaten forkastes i et eller flere lande og må igennem yderligere bearbejdning, eller den er blevet forkastet, fordi det har vist sig umuligt at opnå alle medlemslandenes tilslutning til den.

Denne afhandling fokuserer på debatten om Europas fremtids tidligste stadier fra debatten blev lanceret og officielt anerkendt som en ny reformrunde i 2000 til den i december 2001 blev institutionaliseret med beslutningen om at nedsætte det såkaldte europæiske konvent. Afhandlingen analyserer udvalgte tekster, der dels dækker den udvalgte periode, dels repræsenterer forskellige nationale og overnationale dimensioner af debatten. Det overnationale aspekt udtrykkes primært i to erklæringer udstedt af det europæiske råd, det vil sige alle EU's medlemslandes stats- og regeringschefer i enhed; en tale holdt af præsidenten for den europæiske kommission, Romano Prodi, udgør en yderligere overnational dimension. Fem nationale kontekster – Danmark, England, Frankrig, Spanien og Tyskland – inddrages, og disse kontekster studeres dels gennem taler afholdt af ledende politikere, dels gennem den nationale pressedækning af de i alt seks taler og de to erklæringer. Undersøgelsen foregår således at taler og erklæringer opfattes som initiativer på hvilke

pressedækningen responderer, og det overordnede formål er at udfinde blivende nationale særpræg og fremkommende europæiske ligheder.

Projektets grundlæggende perspektiv er retorisk: meningsdannelse af en hver slags – det være sig politisk mening som den, der studeres, og akademisk mening som den, der søges produceret – opfattes som en retorisk proces. Det vil sige at meningsdannelse er en kommunikativ handling, der både muliggøres og begrænses af den kontekst hvori den indgår. Mening opstår i et gensidigt konstituerende samspil mellem den overordnede helhed og den konkrete artikulation, mellem de forventninger kommunikationen er underlagt og den kreativitet kommunikatøren lægger for dagen. Meningsdannelsen i det udvalgte tekstlige materiale – erklæringer, taler, avisartikler - analyseres ud fra denne grundlæggende opfattelse, og der benyttes konkrete retoriske analyseredskaber. Afhandlingen har dog også et vigtigt tværfagligt element: samfundsvidenskabelige teoridannelser om legitimitet, identitet og offentlig mening informerer både forståelsen af den europæiske integrationsproces som sådan og analysen af den aktuelle europæiske debat. Spørgsmålet er dels hvordan legitimitet, identitet og offentlig mening benyttes i debatten, altså hvordan allerede fastsatte betydninger af begreberne inddrages i den tekstuelle meningsdannelse, dels hvordan legitimering, identifikation og offentlig meningsdannelse skabes i debatten. Endelig vurderes det hvilke(n) teoretisk forståelse af de tre begreber og deres indbyrdes relationer i den europæiske kontekst, der bedst reflekterer og forklarer den sociale virkelighed debatten konstituerer.

De analytiske hovedpointer er, at debatten om Europas fremtid er kendetegnet ved en samlende tidslig kraft og en spredende rumlig dimension. Debatten er karakteriseret ved en rekursiv fremdrift, således at meningsdannelsen gennem periodevis gentagelse af visse temaer og retoriske strategier bevæger sig i retning af den endelige vedtagelse af den nye grundtraktat. Disse gentagne temaer og deres formulering er fælles for både de overnationale ytringer og for tekster, der udgår fra de fem nationale kontekster, og jeg betegner dem 'konstitutive dikotomier'. En konstitutiv dikotomi er et modsætningsforhold, i den europæiske debats tilfælde kan dette som oftest føres tilbage til en kontrast mellem nationalt tilhørsforhold og europæisk integration, hvis spænding søger overført til og udløst i skabelsen af det reformerede EU.

Udover disse fælles temaer, der både inkluderer begrundelser for nødvendigheden af reform og debat, fastsættelse af hvad og hvordan der skal reformeres og debatteres, og egentlige forslag til reform, er der unikke forhold ved hver ytrings konkrete udsigelsessituation, og der er specifikke karakteristika ved hver af de nationale kontekster – både hvad angår det der debatteres

og måden der debatteres på. Således er man i den engelske og den danske kontekst konstant optaget af at italesætte EU og debatten om Europas fremtid som et konkret rum med et bestemt indhold, mens man i Frankrig og Spanien ser det europæiske projekt og reformprocessen som en abstrakt tidslig proces med et bestemt indhold. I Tyskland er man primært optaget af unionens institutionelle form og ligeledes af debattens formelle rammer, og man indskriver disse i konkrete geografiske og fysiske rum. Rent overnationale artikulationer er typisk både abstrakte i deres opfattelse af EU som en tidslig proces og i deres fokus på unionens og debattens form.

Den endelige vurdering af den europæiske meningsdannelse, der konstitueres i og med debatten om Europas fremtid, peger på at EU er en konstant tilblivende størrelse. Den Europæiske offentlige debat i alle dens forskellige fremtoninger er en genuint konstituerende proces, men den er ikke karakteriseret ved et konstitutionelt øjeblik, hvor det europæiske folk kan siges at være gået sammen om at etablere det europæiske politiske system en gang for alle. EU finder sin legitimitet og den europæiske kollektive identitet fremkommer i den kontinuerlige og vidt forgrenede offentlige meningsdannelsesproces. Debattens målsætning, der i øvrigt også er EU's nye motto, er enighed i forskellighed, en konstitutiv dikotomi, der kun bevarer sin skabende kraft gennem konstant artikulation.

Afhandlingen bidrager til den empiriske forståelse af en fremkommende europæisk offentlighed, der realiseres i løse koblinger mellem situationelt bundne artikulationer. Afhandlingen viser at genuin europæisk meningsdannelse endnu kun er en svag afskygning af de meninger, der artikuleres på nationalt niveau. Jeg konkluderer at en mere ensartet europæisk meningsdannelse ikke er en nødvendig forudsætning for borgernes fremtidige identifikation med og legitimering af EU, men at de forskellige kommunikative rum må bindes sammen i et tættere netværk, hvor man indenfor hver kontekst er opmærksom på de omgivende meningsdannelsesprocesser, og der i højere grad sker en udveksling af informationer og holdninger mellem de forskellige kontekster.

Teoretisk bidrager afhandlingen til dannelsen af en tværfaglig platform fra hvilken meningsdannelse som sådan kan undersøges og forklares. Projektet viser at det retoriske perspektiv på meningsdannelse og samfundsvidenskabelige begrebsdannelser med fordel kan kombineres; i det konkrete tilfælde danner den retorisk-samfundsvidenskabelige syntese grundlag for udforskningen af europæiske meningsdannelsesprocesser. Mere overordnet argumenteres der i og med afhandlingen for en konstitutionel tilgang til den sociale virkelighed; det er i sammenhængen mellem del og helhed, artikulation og kontekst, det værende og det kommende, at mening bliver til.

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**Internet resources**

The European Convention
http://european-convention.eu.int

The EU's "futurum" website
http://europa.eu.int/futurum

The European Journalism Centre
http://www.ejc.nl/


**Newspaper databases**

LexisNexis Professional
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/

Infomedia
http://www.infomedia.dk/infomedia/MainPage.aspx?pageid=/infomedia/forside.ascx

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Fast auf den Tag vor 50 Jahren stellte Robert Schuman seine Vision einer "Europäischen Föderation" zur Bewahrung des Friedens vor. Hiermit begann eine völlig neue Ära in der europäischen Geschichte. Die europäische Integration war die Antwort auf Jahrhunderte eines prekären Gleichgewichts der Mächte auf diesem Kontinent, das immer wieder in verheerende Hegemonialkriege umschlug, die in den beiden Weltkriegen zwischen 1914 und 1945 kulminierten. Der Kern des Europagedankens nach 1945 war und ist deshalb die Absage an das Prinzip der balance of power, des europäischen Gleichgewichtssystems und des Hegemonialstrebens einzelner Staaten, wie es nach dem Westfälischen Frieden von 1648 entstanden war, durch eine enge Verflechtung ihrer vitalen Interessen und die Übertragung
10 nationalstaatlicher Souveränitätsrechte an supranationale europäische Institutionen.
Ein halbes Jahrhundert später ist Europa, der europäische Einigungsprozess für alle beteiligten Staaten und Völker die wohl wichtigste politische Herausforderung, da sein Erfolg oder Scheitern oder auch nur die Stagnation dieses Einigungsprozesses für die Zukunft von uns allen, vor allem aber für die Zukunft der jungen Generation von überragender Bedeutung sein wird. Und eben dieser europäische Einigungsprozess ist gegenwärtig bei vielen Menschen ins Gerede gekommen, gilt als eine bürokratische Veranstaltung einer seelen- und gesichtslosen Eurokratie in Brüssel und bestenfalls als langweilig, schlimmstenfalls aber als gefährlich.
Ich möchte mich gerade deshalb für die Gelegenheit bedanken, heute dazu öffentlich einige grundsätzlichere und konzeptionelle Überlegungen über die zukünftige Gestalt Europas
20 entwickeln zu können. Gestatten Sie mir deshalb auch, für die Dauer dieser Rede, die beim öffentlichen Nachdenken bisweilen beengende Rolle des deutschen Außenministers und Mitglieds der Bundesregierung hinter mir zu lassen, auch wenn ich weiß, dass dies nicht wirklich geht. Aber ich möchte heute eben nicht über die operativen Herausforderungen der Europapolitik in den nächsten Monaten zu Ihnen sprechen, nicht also über die laufende Regierungskonferenz, die Osterweiterung der EU und alle anderen wichtigen Fragen, die wir heute und morgen zu lösen haben, sondern vielmehr über die möglichen strategischen Perspektiven der europäischen Integration weit über das nächste Jahrzehnt und über die Regierungskonferenz hinaus.
Es geht also, wohlgemerkt, nicht um die Position der Bundesregierung, sondern um einen
30 Beitrag zu einer öffentlich längst begonnen Diskussion um die "Finalität", um die "Vollendung" der europäischen Integration, und dies will ich eben als überzeugter Europäer und deutscher Parlamentarier tun. Um so mehr freue ich mich deshalb, dass beim letzten informellen Außenministertreffen der EU auf den Azoren, dank der Initiative der portugiesischen Präsidentschaft, exakt zu diesem Thema der Finalität der europäischen Integration eine lange, ausführliche und überaus produktive Diskussion stattgefunden hat, die sicher Konsequenzen zeitigen wird.
Man kann es gegenwärtig fast mit den Händen greifen, dass zehn Jahre nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und mitten im Beginn des Zeitalters der Globalisierung die europäischen Probleme und Herausforderungen sich zu einem Knoten geschürzt haben, der innerhalb der
40 bestehenden Vorgaben nur noch sehr schwer aufzulösen sein wird: Die Einführung der gemeinsamen Währung, die beginnende Osterweiterung der EU, die Krise der letzten EU-Kommission, die geringe Akzeptanz von europäischem Parlament und europäischen Wahlen, die Kriege auf dem Balkan und die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Außenpolitik definieren nicht nur das Erreichte, sondern bestimmen auch die zu bewältigenden Herausforderungen.
Quo vadis Europa? fragt uns daher ein weiteres Mal die Geschichte unseres Kontinents. Und die Antwort der Europäer kann aus vielerlei Gründen, wenn sie es gut mit sich und ihren Kindern meinen, nur lauten: Vorwärts bis zur Vollendung der europäischen Integration. Für einen Rückschritt oder auch nur einen Stillstand und ein Verharren beim Erreichten würde
50 Europa, würden alle an der EU beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten und auch alle diejenigen, die Mitglied werden wollen, würden vor allem also unsere Menschen, einen fatal hohen Preis zu entrichten haben. Und dies gilt ganz besonders für Deutschland und die Deutschen.
Was vor uns liegt, wird alles andere als einfach werden und unsere ganze Kraft erfordern, denn

wir werden in der nächsten Dekade die Ost- und Südosterweiterung der EU zu wesentlichen Teilen zuwege bringen müssen, die letztlich zu einer faktischen Verdoppelung der Mitgliederzahl führen wird. Und gleichzeitig, um diese historische Herausforderung bewältigen und die neuen Mitgliedstaaten integrieren zu können, ohne dabei die Handlungsfähigkeit der EU substantiell infrage zu stellen, müssen wir den letzten Baustein in das Gebäude der europäischen Integration einfügen, nämlich die politische Integration.

60 Die Notwendigkeit, diese beiden Prozesse parallel zu organisieren, ist die wohl größte Herausforderung, vor der die Union seit ihrer Gründung jemals gestanden hat. Aber keine Generation kann sich ihre historischen Herausforderungen aussuchen, und so ist es auch diesmal. Nichts Geringeres als das Ende des Kalten Krieges und der erzwungenen Teilung Europas stellt die EU und damit auch uns vor diese Aufgabe, und deshalb bedarf es auch heute einer ähnlich visionären Kraft und pragmatischen Durchsetzungsfähigkeit, wie sie Jean Monnet und Robert Schuman nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bewiesen haben. Und wie damals, nach dem Ende dieses letzten großen europäischen Krieges, der wie fast immer auch ein deutsch-französischer Krieg gewesen war, wird es bei diesem letzten Bauabschnitt der Europäischen Union, nämlich ihrer Osterweiterung und der Vollendung der politischen

70 Integration, ganz entscheidend auf Frankreich und Deutschland ankommen.
Meine Damen und Herren,
zwei historische Entscheidungen haben das Schicksal Europas zur Mitte des letzten Jahrhunderts grundsätzlich zum Besseren gewendet: Erstens, die Entscheidung der USA, in Europa zu bleiben. Und zweitens, das Setzen von Frankreich und Deutschland auf das Prinzip der Integration, beginnend mit der wirtschaftlichen Verflechtung.
Mit der Idee der europäischen Integration und mit ihrer Umsetzung entstand nicht nur eine völlig neue Ordnung in Europa, genauer: in Westeuropa, sondern die europäische Geschichte kehrte sich in ihrem Verlauf fundamental um. Vergleichen Sie einmal die europäische Geschichte der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit dessen zweiten fünf Jahrzehnten, und

80 Sie werden sofort verstehen, was ich meine. Gerade die deutsche Perspektive ist dabei besonders lehrreich, denn sie macht klar, was unser Land der Idee der europäischen Integration und ihrer Umsetzung tatsächlich zu verdanken hat!
Dieses fast revolutionär zu nennende neue Prinzip des europäischen Staatensystems ging von Frankreich und seinen großen Staatsmännern Robert Schuman und Jean Monnet aus. Seine schrittweise Verwirklichung von der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl bis zur Schaffung des Binnenmarkts und der gemeinsamen Währung beruhte in allen Stadien seiner Entwicklung zentral auf der deutsch-französischen Interessenallianz. Diese war allerdings niemals exklusiv, sondern für andere europäische Staaten immer offen, und so sollte es bis zum Erreichen der Finalität auch bleiben.

90 Die europäische Integration hat sich als phänomenal erfolgreich erwiesen. Das Ganze hatte nur einen entscheidenden Mangel, der durch die Geschichte erzwungen war. Es war nicht das ganze Europa, sondern ausschließlich dessen freier Teil im Westen. Die Teilung Europas ging fünf Jahrzehnte mitten durch Deutschland und Berlin hindurch, und östlich von Mauer und Stacheldraht wartete ein unverzichtbarer Teil Europas, ohne den die europäische Integrationsidee niemals vollendet werden konnte, auf seine Chance zur Teilnahme am europäischen Einigungsprozess. Diese kam dann mit dem Ende der europäischen und deutschen Teilung 1989/90.
Robert Schuman hat dies bereits 1963 mit äußerster Klarheit gesehen: "Wir müssen das geeinte Europa nicht nur im Interesse der freien Völker errichten, sondern auch, um die Völker

100 Osteuropas in diese Gemeinschaft aufnehmen zu können, wenn sie, von den Zwängen, unter denen sie leiden, befreit, um ihren Beitritt und unsere moralische Unterstützung nachsuchen werden. Wir schulden ihnen das Vorbild des einigen, brüderlichen Europa. Jeder Schritt, den wir auf diesem Wege zurücklegen, wird für sie eine neue Chance darstellen. Sie brauchen unsere Hilfe bei der Umstellung, die sie zu bewerkstelligen haben. Unsere Pflicht ist es, bereit zu sein."
Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Sowjetimperiums musste sich die EU nach Osten öffnen,

sonst hätte sich die Idee der europäischen Integration selbst ausgehöhlt und letztlich zerstört. Warum? Ein Blick nach dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien zeigt uns die Konsequenzen, auch wenn sie nicht immer und überall zu ähnlich extremen Entwicklungen geführt hätten. Eine auf
110 Westeuropa beschränkte EU hätte es dauerhaft mit einem gespaltenen Staatensystem in Europa zu tun gehabt: in Westeuropa die Integration, in Osteuropa das alte Gleichgewichtssystem mit seiner anhaltend nationalen Orientierung, Koalitionszwängen, klassischer Interessenpolitik und der permanenten Gefahr nationalistischer Ideologien und Konfrontationen. Ein gespaltenes europäisches Staatensystem ohne überwölbende Ordnung würde Europa dauerhaft zu einem Kontinent der Unsicherheit machen, und auf mittlere Sicht würden sich diese traditionellen Konfliktlinien von Osteuropa auch wieder in die EU hinein übertragen. Gerade Deutschland wäre dabei der große Verlierer. Auch die geopolitischen Realitäten ließen nach 1989 keine ernsthafte Alternative zur Osterweiterung der europäischen Institutionen zu, und dies gilt erst recht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung.
120 Die EU hat als Antwort auf diesen wahrhaft historischen Einschnitt konsequent einen tiefgreifenden Umgestaltungsprozess eingeleitet:
- In Maastricht wurde von den drei wesentlichen Souveränitäten des modernen Nationalstaats – Währung, innere und äußere Sicherheit – erstmals ein Kernbereich ausschließlich in die Verantwortung einer europäischen Institution übertragen. Die Einführung des Euro bedeutete nicht nur die Krönung der wirtschaftlichen Integration, sie war zugleich ein zutiefst politischer Akt, denn die Währung ist nicht nur eine ökonomische Größe, sondern sie symbolisiert auch die Macht des Souveräns, der sie garantiert. Aus der Vergemeinschaftung von Wirtschaft und Währung gegenüber den noch fehlenden politischen und demokratischen Strukturen ist ein Spannungsfeld entstanden, das in der EU zu inneren Krisen führen kann, wenn wir nicht die
130 Defizite im Bereich der politischen Integration produktiv aufheben und so den Prozess der Integration vollenden.
- Der Europäische Rat in Tampere markierte den Einstieg in ein neues weitreichendes Integrationsprojekt, den Aufbau eines gemeinsamen Raums des Rechts und der inneren Sicherheit. Damit rückt das Europa der Bürger in greifbare Nähe. Die Bedeutung dieses neuen Integrationsprojekts geht aber noch darüber hinaus: Gemeinsames Recht kann eine große integrative Kraft entfalten.
- Die europäischen Staaten haben, gerade unter dem Eindruck des Kosovokrieges, weitere Schritte zur Stärkung ihrer gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Handlungsfähigkeit ergriffen und sich in Köln und Helsinki auf ein neues Ziel verständigt: die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen
140 Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Die Union hat damit – nach dem Euro – den nächsten Schritt getan. Denn wie sollte man auf Dauer begründen, dass Staaten, die sich durch die Währungsunion unauflösbar und in ihrer ökonomisch-politischen Existenz miteinander verbinden, sich nicht auch gemeinsam äußeren Bedrohungen stellen und ihre Sicherheit gemeinsam gewährleisten?
- Ebenfalls in Helsinki wurde ein konkreter Plan für die Erweiterung der EU vereinbart. Nach diesen Beschlüssen dürften die äußeren Grenzen der künftigen EU mehr oder weniger vorgezeichnet sein. Es ist absehbar, dass die Europäische Union am Ende des Erweiterungsprozesses 27, 30 oder noch mehr Mitglieder zählen wird, beinahe so viel wie die KSZE bei ihrer Gründung.
150 Wir stehen damit in Europa gegenwärtig vor der enorm schwierigen Aufgabe, zwei Großprojekte parallel zu organisieren:
1. Die schnellstmögliche Erweiterung. Diese wirft schwierige Anpassungsprobleme für Beitrittsländer wie für die EU selbst auf. Sie löst zudem bei unseren Bürgern Sorgen und Ängste aus: Geraten ihre Arbeitsplätze in Gefahr? Wird durch die Erweiterung Europa noch undurchsichtiger und unverstehbarer für die Bürger? So ernsthaft wir uns mit solchen Fragen auseinandersetzen müssen, wir dürfen darüber nie die historische Dimension der Osterweiterung aus den Augen verlieren. Denn diese ist eine einmalige Chance, unseren über Jahrhunderte kriegsgeschüttelten Kontinent in Frieden, Sicherheit, Demokratie und Wohlstand zu vereinen.

160 Die Erweiterung liegt gerade für Deutschland im obersten nationalen Interesse. Die in Deutschlands Dimension und Mittellage objektiv angelegten Risiken und Versuchungen werden durch die Erweiterung bei gleichzeitiger Vertiefung der EU dauerhaft überwunden werden können. Hinzu kommt: die Erweiterung – siehe die Süderweiterung der EU – ist ein gesamteuropäisches Wachstumsprogramm. Gerade die deutsche Wirtschaft wird von der Erweiterung einen hohen Gewinn für Unternehmen und Beschäftigung davontragen. Deutschland muss daher weiter Anwalt einer zügigen Osterweiterung bleiben. Zugleich muss die Erweiterung sorgfältig und nach Maßgabe des Beschlusses von Helsinki vollzogen werden. 2. Die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas. Die Institutionen der EU wurden für 6 Mitgliedstaaten geschaffen. Sie funktionieren mit Mühe noch zu 15. So wichtig der erste Reformschritt mit

170 seiner verstärkten Mehrheitsentscheidung bei der vor uns liegenden Regierungskonferenz auch für den Beginn der Erweiterung ist, so wird er langfristig für die Erweiterung insgesamt allein nicht ausreichen. Die Gefahr besteht dann, dass eine Erweiterung auf 27 – 30 Mitglieder die Absorptionsfähigkeit der EU mit ihren alten Institutionen und Mechanismen überfordern wird, und dass es zu schweren Krisen kommen kann. Aber diese Gefahr spricht, wohlgemerkt, nicht gegen die schnellstmögliche Erweiterung, sondern vielmehr für eine entschlossene und angemessene Reform der Institutionen, damit die Handlungsfähigkeit auch unter den Bedingungen der Erweiterung erhalten bleibt. Erosion oder Integration lautet deshalb die Konsequenz aus der unabweisbaren Erweiterung der EU.
Meine Damen und Herren,

180 die Bewältigung dieser zwei Aufgaben steht im Zentrum der aktuellen Regierungskonferenz. Die EU hat sich verpflichtet, bis zum 1.1. 2003 aufnahmefähig zu sein. Nach dem Abschluss der Agenda 2000 geht es nun darum, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen für die nächste Erweiterungsrunde herzustellen. Die Lösung der drei Kernfragen – Zusammensetzung der Kommission, Stimmgewichtung im Rat und ganz besonders der Ausweitung von Mehrheitsentscheidungen – ist unverzichtbar für eine reibungslose Fortsetzung des Erweiterungsprozesses. Ihr kommt deshalb jetzt als nächster zu lösender praktischer Schritt unbedingte Priorität zu.
So zentral die Regierungskonferenz für die Zukunft der EU als nächster Schritt auch immer ist, so müssen wir angesichts der Lage Europas gleichwohl schon heute damit beginnen, uns über

190 den Prozess der Erweiterung hinaus Gedanken zu machen, wie eine künftige "große" EU einmal funktionieren kann, wie sie deshalb aussehen und funktionieren müsste. Und das will ich jetzt tun.
Gestatten Sie mir deshalb, meine Damen und Herren, dass ich jetzt "den Außenminister" definitiv weit hinter mir lasse, um einige Überlegungen sowohl über das Wesen der sogenannten "Finalität Europas" anzustellen als auch darüber, auf welchem Weg wir uns diesem Ziel annähern und es schließlich erreichen können. Und auch allen Euroskeptikern diesseits und jenseits des Kanals sei empfohlen, jetzt nicht gleich wieder die dicksten Schlagzeilen zu produzieren, denn erstens handelt es sich um eine persönliche Zukunftsvision von der Lösung der europäischen Probleme. Und zweitens reden wir hier über einen

200 langfristigen Zeitraum, weit jenseits der laufenden Regierungskonferenz. Niemand muss sich also vor diesen Thesen fürchten.
Die Erweiterung wird eine grundlegende Reform der europäischen Institutionen unverzichtbar machen. Wie stellt man sich eigentlich einen Europäischen Rat mit dreißig Staats- und Regierungschefs vor? Dreißig Präsidentschaften? Wie lange werden Ratssitzungen dann eigentlich dauern? Tage oder gar Wochen? Wie soll man in dem heutigen Institutionengefüge der EU zu Dreißig Interessen ausgleichen, Beschlüsse fassen und dann noch handeln? Wie will man verhindern, dass die EU damit endgültig intransparent, die Kompromisse immer unfasslicher und merkwürdiger werden, und die Akzeptanz der EU bei den Unionsbürgern schließlich weit unter den Gefrierpunkt sinken wird?

210 Fragen über Fragen, auf die es allerdings eine ganz einfache Antwort gibt: den Übergang vom Staatenverbund der Union hin zur vollen Parlamentarisierung in einer Europäischen Föderation, die Robert Schuman bereits vor 50 Jahren gefordert hat. Und d.h. nichts

geringeres als ein europäisches Parlament und eine ebensolche Regierung, die tatsächlich die gesetzgebende und die exekutive Gewalt innerhalb der Föderation ausüben. Diese Föderation wird sich auf einen Verfassungsvertrag zu gründen haben.

Mir ist wohl bewusst, welche Prozedur- und Substanzprobleme es bis zur Erreichung dieses Ziels zu überwinden gilt. Es ist aber für mich völlig klar, dass Europa seine ihm gemäße Rolle im wirtschaftlichen und politischen globalen Wettbewerb nur dann wird spielen können, wenn wir mutig vorangehen. Mit den Ängsten und Rezepten des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts können
220 die Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht gelöst werden.

Freilich erhebt sich gegen diese einfache Lösung sofort der Vorwurf der nicht vorhandenen Machbarkeit. Europa a sei kein neuer Kontinent, sondern voll mit unterschiedlichen Völkern, Kulturen, Sprachen und Geschichten. Die Nationalstaaten seien nicht wegzudenkende Realitäten, und je mehr die Globalisierung und Europäisierung bürgerferne Superstrukturen und anonyme Akteure schaffen, umso mehr werden die Menschen an ihren Sicherheit und Geborgenheit vermittelnden Nationalstaaten festhalten.

Nun, alle diese Einwände teile ich, denn sie sind richtig. Deshalb wäre es ein nicht wieder gut zu machender Konstruktionsfehler, wenn man die Vollendung der politischen Integration gegen die vorhandenen nationalen Institutionen und Traditionen und nicht unter deren Einbeziehung
230 versuchen würde. Ein solches Unternehmen müsste unter den historisch-kulturellen Bedingungen Europas scheitern. Nur wenn die europäische Integration die Nationalstaaten in eine solche Föderation mitnimmt, wenn deren Institutionen nicht entwertet oder gar verschwinden werden, wird ein solches Projekt trotz aller gewaltigen Schwierigkeiten machbar sein. Anders gesagt: die bisherige Vorstellung eines europäischen Bundesstaates, der als neuer Souverän die alten Nationalstaaten und ihre Demokratien ablöst, erweist sich als ein synthetisches Konstrukt jenseits der gewachsenen europäischen Realitäten. Die Vollendung der europäischen Integration lässt sich erfolgreich nur denken, wenn dies auf der Grundlage einer Souveränitätsteilung von Europa und Nationalstaat geschieht. Genau dieses Faktum aber steckt hinter dem Begriff der "Subsidiarität", der gegenwärtig allenthalben diskutiert und von
240 kaum jemandem verstanden wird.

Was hat man sich nun unter dem Begriff der "Souveränitätsteilung" vorzustellen? Wie gesagt, Europa wird nicht in einem leeren politischen Raum entstehen, und ein weiteres Faktum unserer europäischen Realität sind deshalb die unterschiedlichen politischen Nationalkulturen und deren demokratische Öffentlichkeiten, getrennt zudem noch durch die allfälligen Sprachgrenzen. Ein europäisches Parlament muss deswegen immer ein Doppeltes repräsentieren: ein Europa der Nationalstaaten und ein Europa der Bürger. Dies wird sich nur machen lassen, wenn dieses europäische Parlament die unterschiedlichen nationalen politischen Eliten und dann auch die unterschiedlichen nationalen Öffentlichkeiten tatsächlich zusammenführt.
250 Dies lässt sich meines Erachtens erreichen, wenn dieses europäische Parlament über zwei Kammern verfügt, wobei eine Kammer durch gewählte Abgeordnete besetzt wird, die zugleich Mitglieder der Nationalparlamente sind. So wird es keinen Gegensatz zwischen nationalen Parlamenten und europäischem Parlament, zwischen Nationalstaat und Europa geben. Bei der zweiten Kammer wird man sich zwischen einem Senatsmodell mit direktgewählten Senatoren der Mitgliedsstaaten oder einer Staatenkammer analog unseres Bundesrates zu entscheiden haben. In den USA wählen alle Staaten zwei Senatoren, in unserem Bundesrat hingegen gibt es eine unterschiedliche Stimmenzahl.

Ebenso stellen sich für die europäische Exekutive, die europäische Regierung, zwei Optionen. Entweder entscheidet man sich für die Fortentwicklung des Europäischen Rats zu einer
260 europäischen Regierung, d.h. die europäische Regierung wird aus den nationalen Regierungen heraus gebildet, oder man geht, ausgehend von der heutigen Kommissionsstruktur, zur Direktwahl eines Präsidenten mit weitgehenden exekutiven Befugnissen über. Man kann sich hier aber auch verschiedene Zwischenformen dazu denken.

Nun wird es den Einwand geben, dass Europa ja bereits heute viel zu kompliziert und für die Unionsbürger viel zu undurchschaubar geworden sei, und nun wolle man es noch komplizierter

machen. Aber genau das Gegenteil wird hier intendiert. Die Souveränitätsteilung von Föderation und Nationalstaaten setzt einen Verfassungsvertrag voraus, der festlegt, was europäisch und was weiterhin national geregelt werden soll. Die Vielzahl von Regelungen auf EU-Ebene sind mit das Ergebnis der induktiven Vergemeinschaftung nach der Methode

270 Monnet und Ausdruck zwischenstaatlicher Kompromisse im heutigen Staatenverbund EU. Die klare Zuständigkeitsregelung zwischen Föderation und Nationalstaaten in einem europäischen Verfassungsvertrag sollte die Kernsouveränitäten und nur das unbedingt notwendig europäisch zu Regelnde der Föderation übertragen, der Rest aber bliebe nationalstaatliche Regelungskompetenz. Dies wäre eine schlanke und zugleich handlungsfähige Europäische Föderation, voll souverän und doch auf selbstbewussten Nationalstaaten als Glieder dieser Föderation beruhend. Zudem wäre dies auch eine Föderation, die von den Bürgern durchschaut und verstanden würde, weil sie ihr Demokratiedefizit überwunden hätte.
Dies alles wird aber nicht die Abschaffung des Nationalstaates bedeuten. Denn auch für das finale Föderationssubjekt wird der Nationalstaat mit seinen kulturellen und demokratischen

280 Traditionen unersetzlich sein, um eine von den Menschen in vollem Umfang akzeptierte Bürger- und Staatenunion zu legitimieren. Dies sage ich gerade mit Blick auf unsere Freunde in Großbritannien, denn ich weiß, dass der Begriff "Föderation" für viele Briten ein Reizwort ist. Aber mir fällt bis heute kein anderer Begriff ein. Es soll hier niemand gereizt werden.
Auch in der europäischen Finalität werden wir also noch Briten und Deutsche, Franzosen und Polen sein. Die Nationalstaaten werden fortexistieren und auf europäischer Ebene eine wesentlich stärkere Rolle behalten als dies die Bundesländer in Deutschland tun. Und das Prinzip der Subsidiarität wird in einer solchen Föderation künftig Verfassungsrang haben.
Diese drei Reformen: die Lösung des Demokratieproblems sowie das Erfordernis einer grundlegenden Neuordnung der Kompetenzen sowohl horizontal, d.h. zwischen den

290 europäischen Institutionen, als auch vertikal, also zwischen Europa, Nationalstaat und Regionen, wird nur durch eine konstitutionelle Neugründung Europas gelingen können, also durch die Realisierung des Projekts einer europäischen Verfassung, deren Kern die Verankerung der Grund-, Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, einer gleichgewichtigen Gewaltenteilung zwischen den europäischen Institutionen und einer präzisen Abgrenzung zwischen der europäischen und der nationalstaatlichen Ebene sein muss. Die Hauptachse einer solchen europäischen Verfassung wird dabei das Verhältnis zwischen Föderation und Nationalstaat bilden. Damit ich nicht missverstanden werde: Dies hat mit Renationalisierung überhaupt nichts zu tun, im Gegenteil.
Meine Damen und Herren,

300 die Frage, die sich nun immer drängender stellt, ist folgende: wird sich diese Vision einer Föderation nach der bisherigen Methode der Integration realisieren lassen oder muss diese Methode selbst, das zentrale Element des bisherigen Einigungsprozesses, in Frage gestellt werden?
Bis in der Vergangenheit dominierte im wesentlichen die "Methode Monnet" mit ihrem Vergemeinschaftungsansatz in europäischen Institutionen und Politiken den europäischen Einigungsprozess. Diese schrittweise Integration ohne Blaupause für den Endzustand war in den 50er Jahren für die wirtschaftliche Integration einer kleinen Ländergruppe konzipiert worden. So erfolgreich dieser Ansatz dort war, für die politische Integration und die Demokratisierung Europas hat er sich als nur bedingt geeignet erwiesen. Dort, wo ein

310 Voranschreiten aller EU-Mitglieder nicht möglich war, gingen deshalb Teilgruppen in wechselnden Formationen voraus, wie in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion oder bei Schengen.
Liegt also in einer solchen Differenzierung, einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit in Teilbereichen, die Antwort auf die doppelte Herausforderung von Erweiterung und Vertiefung? Gerade in einer erweiterten und zwangsläufig auch heterogeneren Union wird eine weitere Differenzierung unverzichtbar werden. Sie zu erleichtern, ist deshalb auch ein zentrales Ziel der Regierungskonferenz.
Allerdings wird eine immer stärkere Differenzierung auch neue Probleme aufwerfen: einen

Verlust von europäischer Identität, an innerer Kohärenz sowie die Gefahr einer inneren Erosion
320 der EU, wenn nämlich neben die Klammer der Integration immer größere Bereiche intergouvernementaler Zusammenarbeit treten sollten. Schon heute ist eine wohl innerhalb ihrer eigenen Logik nicht mehr zu lösende Krise der "Methode Monnet" nicht mehr zu übersehen.

Jacques Delors sowie Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d´Estaing haben deshalb in jüngster Zeit versucht, auf dieses Dilemma neue Antworten zu finden. Nach den Vorstellungen von Delors soll eine "Föderation der Nationalstaaten", bestehend aus den 6 Gründungsländern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, einen "Vertrag im Vertrag" schließen, mit dem Ziel einer tiefgreifenden Reform der europäischen Institutionen. In eine ähnliche Richtung gehen die Überlegungen von Schmidt und Giscard, die allerdings anstatt der 6 Gründungsmitglieder von
330 den Euro-11 Staaten als Zentrum ausgehen. Bereits 1994 hatten Karl Lamers und Wolfgang Schäuble die Schaffung eines "Kerneuropa" vorgeschlagen, das allerdings einen entscheidenden Geburtsfehler hatte, nämlich die Vorstellung eines exklusiven "Kerns", der noch dazu das Gründungsland Italien ausschloss, anstatt eines für alle offenen Integrationsmagneten.

Wenn angesichts der unabweisbaren Herausforderung der Osterweiterung die Alternative für die EU tatsächlich Erosion oder Integration heißt und wenn das Verharren in einem Staatenverbund Stillstand mit all seinen negativen Folgen bedeuten würde, dann wird, getrieben durch den Druck der Verhältnisse und der von ihnen ausgelösten Krisen, die EU innerhalb der nächsten Dekade irgendwann vor der Alternative stehen: Springt eine Mehrheit
340 der Mitgliedstaaten in die volle Integration und einigt sich auf einen europäischen Verfassungsvertrag zur Gründung einer Europäischen Föderation? Oder, wenn dies nicht geschieht, wird eine kleinere Gruppe von Mitgliedstaaten als Avantgarde diesen Weg vorausgehen, d.h. ein Gravitationszentrum aus einigen Staaten bilden, die aus tiefer europäischer Überzeugung heraus bereit und in der Lage sind, mit der politischen Integration voranzuschreiten? Die Fragen würden dann nur noch heißen: Wann wird der richtige Zeitpunkt sein? Wer wird teilnehmen? Und wird sich dieses Gravitationszentrum innerhalb oder außerhalb der Verträge herausbilden? Eines jedenfalls ist dabei sicher: ohne engste deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit wird auch künftig kein europäisches Projekt gelingen.

Angesichts dieser Lage könnte man sich also weit über das nächste Jahrzehnt hinaus die
350 weitere Entwicklung Europas in zwei oder drei Stufen vorstellen:

Zunächst dem Ausbau verstärkter Zusammenarbeit zwischen denjenigen Staaten, die enger als andere kooperieren wollen, wie dies bereits auch in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und bei Schengen der Fall ist. Auf vielen Gebieten können wir hiermit vorankommen: bei der Weiterentwicklung der Euro-11 zu einer wirtschaftspolitischen Union, beim Umweltschutz, der Verbrechensbekämpfung, der Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik und natürlich auch in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Sehr wichtig dabei ist, dass verstärkte Zusammenarbeit nicht als eine Abkehr von der Integration verstanden werden darf.

Ein möglicher Zwischenschritt hin zur Vollendung der politischen Union könnte dann später die Bildung eines Gravitationszentrums sein. Eine solche Staatengruppe würde einen neuen
360 europäischen Grundvertrag schließen, den Nukleus einer Verfassung der Föderation. Und auf der Basis dieses Grundvertrages würde sie sich eigene Institutionen geben, eine Regierung, die innerhalb der EU in möglichst vielen Fragen für die Mitglieder der Gruppe mit einer Stimme sprechen sollte, ein starkes Parlament, einen direkt gewählten Präsidenten. Ein solches Gravitationszentrum müsste die Avantgarde, die Lokomotive für die Vollendung der politischen Integration sein und bereits alle Elemente der späteren Föderation umfassen.

Mir sind nun die institutionellen Probleme im Hinblick auf die jetzige EU durchaus bewusst, die ein solches Gravitationszentrum mit sich bringen würde. Deshalb würde es entscheidend darauf ankommen, sicherzustellen, dass das in der EU Erreichte nicht gefährdet, diese nicht gespalten und das die EU zusammenhaltende Band weder politisch noch rechtlich beschädigt
370 werden darf. Es müssten Mechanismen entwickelt werden, die eine Mitarbeit des Gravitationszentrums in der größeren EU ohne Reibungsverluste erlauben.

Die Frage, welche Staaten sich an einem solchen Projekt beteiligen, die EU-Gründungs-, die Euro11-Mitglieder oder noch eine andere Gruppe, lässt sich heute unmöglich beantworten. Bei jeder Überlegung über die Option Gravitationszentrum muss eines klar sein: diese Avantgarde darf niemals exklusiv, sondern muss für alle Mitgliedstaaten und Beitrittskandidaten der EU offen sein, wenn diese zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt teilnehmen wollen. Für alle diejenigen, die teilnehmen wollen, aber dazu die Bedingungen nicht haben, muss es Heranführungsmöglichkeiten geben. Transparenz und eine Mitwirkungsoption für alle EU-Mitglieder und –kandidaten wären wesentliche Faktoren für die Akzeptanz und
380 Realisierbarkeit des Projekts. Und dies muss gerade auch gegenüber den Beitrittsländern gelten. Denn es wäre historisch absurd und zutiefst töricht, wenn Europa just zu dem Zeitpunkt, wo es endlich wieder vereint wird, erneut gespalten würde.
Ein solcher Gravitationskern muss also ein aktives Erweiterungsinteresse haben und er muss Attraktivität für die anderen Mitglieder ausstrahlen. Folgt man dem Grundsatz von Hans Dietrich Genscher, dass kein Mitgliedstaat gezwungen werden kann, weiter zu gehen, als er es kann oder wünscht, aber dass derjenige, der nicht weitergehen möchte, auch nicht die Möglichkeit hat, die anderen daran zu hindern, dann wird sich die Gravitation innerhalb der Verträge herausbilden, ansonsten außerhalb.
Der letzte Schritt wäre dann die Vollendung der Integration in einer Europäischen Föderation.
390 Damit wir uns nicht missverstehen: von der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit führt kein Automatismus dorthin, egal ob als Gravitationszentrum oder gleich als Mehrheit der Unionsmitglieder. Die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit wird zunächst vor allem nichts anderes als eine verstärkte Intergouvermentalisierung angesichts des Drucks der Fakten und der Schwäche der Methode Monnet bedeuten. Der Schritt von der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit hin zu einem Verfassungsvertrag – und genau dies wird die Voraussetzung der vollen Integration sein – bedarf dagegen eines bewussten politischen Neugründungsaktes Europas.
Dies, meine Damen und Herren, ist meine persönliche Zukunftsvision: Von der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit hin zu einem europäischen Verfassungsvertrag und die Vollendung von Robert Schumans großer Idee einer Europäischen Föderation. Dies könnte der Weg sein!

Señor Director, señoras y señores

Pensar en serio en el futuro de la Unión Europea y ofrecer criterios y propuestas nítidas constituye un doble ejercicio muy estimulante. Doy las gracias al Instituto Francés de Relaciones Internacionales por la oportunidad de hacerlo hoy ante ustedes. La última de las voces que se han escuchado al respecto ha sido la del actual Presidente del Consejo Europeo, Jacques Chirac, Presidente de la República Francesa.

Con gusto les adelanto que tienen en mí a un decidido amigo de que las instituciones de la Unión progresen en su integración de un modo más rápido y decidido que en sus cuarenta años de existencia. También estoy persuadido de que nuestro porvenir compartido ha de mirar más que nunca por las reformas económicas tendentes a la liberalización de mercados y a la privatización del sector público; reformas que supongan más competitividad y, por lo tanto, mayores

10 oportunidades de prosperidad en un mundo global.

Me considero partidario claro de un profundo proceso de integración y estoy dispuesto a compartir nuevas y mayores responsabilidades.

Creo que es oportuno presentar la orientación de España en este debate, y no es mera coincidencia que yo lo haga en el país que ahora mismo ostenta la Presidencia de la Unión y que tanto ha tenido que ver en su nacimiento y desarrollo.

La ampliación ha sido, sin duda, lo que ha desencadenado estas inquietudes sobre nuestro futuro. La ampliación rejuvenece el anhelo de unidad europea, pone a prueba la solidaridad entre los pueblos de una misma civilización y el deseo de compartir nuestra prosperidad con ellos. Sin ampliación, Europa estará desprovista de la necesaria dimensión continental para actuar en la época de la globalización. Para mí, la ampliación es más una oportunidad que un problema.

En consecuencia, mi Gobierno pretende que la ampliación se haga realidad lo antes posible. No podría desear otra cosa

20 para España, que ha conocido una larga transición económica y una feliz transición política. Esta ampliación, no hay duda, exige esfuerzos a los Estados miembros y a los candidatos. Nosotros estamos dispuestos. Era justo que la negociación se abriese cuanto antes; pero también lo es que no se cierre precipitadamente. Lo importante es que sea un proceso bien ordenado.

En este sentido, el quid de esta quinta ampliación no está en marcar fechas y plazos rápidamente desmentidos por el curso de los hechos. Es preferible que todos los participantes respeten las reglas de toda ampliación: los candidatos, porque tengan a punto su transformación de sus economías en economías de mercado y sus Estados, en Estados de Derecho; y nosotros, preparando las instituciones comunes para acoger a un gran número de candidatos. Es el único modo que conozco de no poner en peligro la legitimación social en toda Europa de nuestra Unión.

Dicho esto, no obstante, creo que el 2003 puede ser el año que dé paso a los vecinos más avanzados, y con esa

30 perspectiva creo que debemos todos, Estados miembros actuales y candidatos, hacer los esfuerzos necesarios para estar en condiciones de dar ese primer paso hacia la reunificación del continente.

Por ello, resulta imprescindible aclarar cómo ha de funcionar la Unión en sus condiciones actuales cuando se duplique el número de sus miembros.

Pero, al tiempo que la extensión geográfica, la profundización de nuestra unidad, poniendo en común nuestra moneda hoy, o de nuestra defensa mañana, exigen que seamos conscientes de la responsabilidad y del compromiso que esto implica.

Como español, les digo que la idea europea no es un trampolín para proyectos estrictamente nacionales, ni un seguro de estabilidad para los miembros más débiles, sino una voluntad inveterada de pertenencia.

Europa es, para mí, una comunidad atravesada por múltiples trayectorias históricas e intereses confrontados. El gobierno

40 y la administración de la idea europea representan un proceso simultáneo que consiste en apostar por el futuro, consolidando el acervo laboriosamente conseguido.

En concreto, debemos evitar la tentación de recurrir a modelos políticos que no cuentan con la aceptación espontánea y pacífica de los ciudadanos de nuestros respectivos países. Es preciso, igualmente, que evitemos el colapso en el funcionamiento diario de las instituciones comunes. Yo pienso que es posible articular una respuesta en dos fases ante la nueva situación: una, inmediata, en el marco de la Conferencia Intergubernamental, y otra, a más largo plazo, que en mi opinión debería culminarse en la segunda mitad de esta década.

Por lo que respecta al corto plazo, quiero insistir sobre el hecho de que estoy dispuesto a contribuir activamente al éxito de Niza y, aunque no quiero entrar en el detalle de las negociaciones de la Conferencia Intergubernamental, no puedo, sin embargo, dejar de recordar los principios que conforman la posición española. En ese contexto, me detendré algo más en

50 la cuestión en la que algunos cifran todas sus esperanzas para resolver el dilema profundización-ampliación, y a la que conciben como nexo o enlace entre las reformas a corto y a largo plazo: las cooperaciones reforzadas.

El objetivo de la Conferencia Intergubernamental de Niza es dotar de una mayor eficacia y de una mayor representatividad a las instituciones de la Unión ampliada. Para ello es necesario ahora y lo será más en el futuro contar con una Comisión fuerte con capacidad de iniciativa que le permita continuar desempeñando sin trabas su misión equilibradora y de guardiana de los Tratados y que continúe siendo el pulmón de la Unión. Creo que se equivocan quienes plantean propuestas en orden al debilitamiento de la Comisión.

Estoy convencido de que la reorganización de la Comisión será fácil y rápida si se acepta el principio de que la renuncia a un Comisario sea compensada con una adecuada ponderación de votos en el Consejo. En todo caso, en mi opinión, está

fuera de toda lógica política una Comisión en la que no estén presentes los grandes Estados de la Unión.

60 El Consejo debe ser capaz de actuar de forma eficaz, y ello es especialmente importante porque, a mi juicio, la fuerza de la Unión reposa, sobre todo, en su capacidad de tomar decisiones acertadas que faciliten la vida cotidiana de sus ciudadanos, y que amplíe sus horizontes culturales, sus oportunidades materiales, etcétera.

La mayoría cualificada facilita la adopción de esas decisiones y debe, por tanto, ser ampliada. Ahora bien, cualquier extensión de la mayoría cualificada exige previamente que las decisiones sean representativas. Ello supone que se reequilibre el peso respectivo de cada Estado miembro en el Consejo. Si la Unión continúa ignorando por más tiempo el peso real de cada Estado, no sólo renuncia a ser una instancia de gobierno verdaderamente democrática, sino que el proceso de adopción de decisiones será difícilmente viable. Es preciso adecuar los equilibrios institucionales a la realidad. En ese contexto, España aspira a que le sea reconocido un peso acorde con su importancia demográfica y que se restablezcan los equilibrios que se han ido deteriorando con sucesivas ampliaciones.

70 A pesar de todo, la mayoría cualificada no permitirá, sin duda, siempre acordar entre veintisiete Estados el ritmo y la profundidad de la Unión. Para superar estas divergencias y permitir que la Unión avance, incluso cuando no todos sus miembros lo deseen o no estén en condiciones de hacerlo en la misma medida, en Amsterdam se pactaron normas que rigen actualmente las cooperaciones reforzadas. En una Unión cada vez más vasta y plural conviene contar con instrumentos que se atengan a la diferente situación social y económica de algunos Estados y la diferente magnitud del esfuerzo necesario para alcanzar objetivos comunes.

El problema se plantea en la llamada "Europa a la carta", en la que cada Estado elige aquellos ámbitos en los que quiere participar y aquellos objetivos que desea compartir. Es aquí donde aparecen los peligros de disgregación y de erosión del acervo de la Unión. Por ello, hemos hecho sonar la señal de alarma. Tenemos que garantizar el tronco común y evitar el nacimiento de varias Europas.

80 Yo propongo que las cooperaciones reforzadas se apliquen a los ámbitos en los que la construcción europea está menos desarrollada y en los que, de momento, las posiciones de los Estados miembros no permiten avanzar al unísono. Me estoy refiriendo a la cooperación en asuntos de Justicia e Interior y a algunos sectores de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común, ámbitos en los que ya hemos hecho distintas propuestas en el seno de la Conferencia Intergubernamental.

Ahora bien, también tenemos la obligación de velar por que ni el Mercado Interior ni las políticas comunes queden afectadas negativamente. Eso no convendría a la unidad europea. Me congratulo de que esta preocupación fuera hecha suya por el Consejo Europeo de Feira, que recordó que las cooperaciones reforzadas debían, en todo caso, respetar las necesidades de coherencia y de solidaridad en una Unión ampliada.

Considero igualmente positivo el criterio que se observa en los últimos documentos de la Presidencia francesa sobre esta cuestión en el marco de la CIG. En efecto, se insiste en la necesidad de entender las cooperaciones reforzadas como un

90 factor de integración y no de segregación. Es, sin duda, esta filosofía la que inspira la idea expresada por el Presidente Chirac, quien concibe la cooperación reforzada como un instrumento mediante el cual un grupo de países pioneros avanzan en la construcción de una Europa más unida, señalando el camino a otros y animándoles así a emprenderlo a su lado.

Por utilizar términos de la biología, se podría decir que los Estados miembros que lancen una cooperación reforzada serían precursores cuya combinación y esfuerzo común desembocaría en una realidad más elaborada y más amplia. En ese sentido, España desea ser uno de los precursores de esa nueva vía.

Pero no podemos convertir a la Unión Europea en un rompecabezas. Es fácil imaginar que, si proliferan y multiplican distintos núcleos, los integrantes en cada ocasión también varíen. Es evidente que no puede forzarse a nadie a participar, pero tampoco se debe practicar una especie de sutil exclusión. Debe ser el valor añadido obtenido por la participación el

100 que incite a los diferentes Estados miembros a integrarse. Este riesgo de fragmentación es el que ha llevado a algunas voces a desarrollar, en el marco de una reflexión a más largo plazo, la idea de un centro de gravedad que agrupe a aquellos Estados miembros con una visión compartida de principio federalista, encarnada en una Constitución que definiría las reglas jurídicas fundamentales de esa Federación.

Esto me lleva a reflexionar sobre la configuración de la Unión Europea a largo plazo. Creo que esta reflexión debe iniciarse después de Niza, pero sin fijarnos calendarios estrictos y sin aprioris nominalistas.

A ese respecto, las dos palabras, federalismo y Constitución, tienen una marcada tendencia a la polisemia, quizás al equívoco. Ambas significan, para unos, una mayor transferencia de soberanía, una mayor integración; y, para otros, lo contrario, es decir, mayor descentralización y reserva de competencias para los Estados, las regiones, etcétera, ante un centralismo con sede en Bruselas. En ambos casos generan tanto adhesiones apasionadas como rechazos radicales. Es

110 por ello por lo que dudo de su eficacia para definir el futuro de la Unión Europea. Es preferible entendernos sobre los contenidos más que manejar venerables palabras sin verificación práctica.

Es loable delimitar las competencias de los distintos niveles de gobierno y administración, asignando a cada uno las que pueden desarrollar más apropiadamente. Yo entro en ese debate con una mentalidad abierta, pero creo que hay dos límites que cualquier discurso federal no puede ignorar alegremente: los Estados europeos son muy celosos de su identidad nacional e internacional, y las modificaciones en la esfera de competencias de la Unión deben seguir supeditadas al acuerdo de todos.

Otro tanto ocurre en lo que se refiere a la utilización del término "Constitución". No hay que quedarse en el aspecto formal, sino más bien fijarse en su aspecto material. Nada impide que un texto que sea formalmente un Tratado tenga un contenido constitucional. Yo creo que ésa es una buena vía por recorrer, donde todavía queda mucho trecho por mejorar

120 y donde las ideas de simplificación y de consolidación de los Tratados actuales pueden encontrar su acomodo.

En cuanto al contenido de ese pacto constitucional, quisiera destacar dos aspectos: el primero de ellos, la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales. Yo soy partidario de que forme parte de ese Tratado, para lo cual sería preciso alcanzar un consenso suficiente sobre un texto que recoja los derechos personales derivados de la dignidad individual de cada ser humano, y de dar mayor amplitud a los valores en los que se asienta la integración europea.

En segundo lugar, está la cuestión de la definición de los ámbitos en los que queremos trabajar juntos. Esto es lo que pretenden los que son favorables al establecimiento de un catálogo que delimite las respectivas competencias de la Unión Europea, de sus Estados miembros, de sus regiones, etcétera. Esta opción, basada en el principio de la subsidiariedad, aspira a que la Unión sólo se ocupe de un número reducido de cuestiones y deje las demás a otras esferas de poder más próximas a los ciudadanos.

130 La preocupación por la subsidiariedad es genuinamente europea, pero no puede servir de pretexto a un nacionalismo renovado, con el efecto no querido de una repatriación de competencias de la Unión hacia los Estados miembros y que éstos últimos, o sus regiones, las ejerzan sin control en cuanto al pleno respeto a las reglas y a los principios jurídicos de la Unión.

Como español, creo que, más que en la división geométrica de competencias, hay que profundizar en la noción del ejercicio compartido de las competencias. No debe fomentarse la creación de compartimentos estancos, sino favorecer la puesta en común de esfuerzos a diferentes niveles en pro de un objetivo común. Queremos una subsidiariedad que fomente empeños comunes, no que desagregue.

Será conveniente que la Unión resista a tendencias uniformizadoras. Saber organizar la diferencia: ésta es la clave para construir una Europa de alcance continental.

140 Por su parte, los Estados miembros deben estar dispuestos a acomodar sus intereses nacionales, ellos mismos resultado de conjuntar intereses inferiores, al interés común de la Unión. Es cierto que este proceso de acomodo recíproco supone renuncias por parte de los Estados miembros; pero esto no debe interpretarse como una pérdida o una cesión sin más, sino como la asunción en común de lo que antes se ejercía unilateralmente e incluso, y por qué no reconocerlo, que se tienen perdidos o recluidos algunos poderes en la historia europea reciente.

Esta acomodación recíproca de intereses deberá hacerse en el marco de un entramado institucional que combine el fortalecimiento de las instituciones que representan el interés general de la Unión, como la Comisión, el Tribunal de Justicia y el Parlamento Europeo, y una mejor cooperación con los Gobiernos y Parlamentos nacionales, con el fin de garantizar un equilibrio entre las diferentes instancias en las que se manifiesta la legitimidad democrática en las naciones europeas.

150 Ahora bien, el debate sobre la nueva arquitectura institucional de la Unión no debe perder de vista que su principal objetivo es dar una respuesta eficaz a los problemas de los ciudadanos europeos.

Para responder a las expectativas de sus ciudadanos y conservar así su adhesión, la Unión Europea debe contribuir a lograr una Europa reforzada al servicio de quienes la viven, una Europa competitiva y dinámica que preserve su cohesión social y una Europa abierta al mundo.

Para lograr una Europa reforzada al servicio de sus ciudadanos, yo propongo que se haga realidad un Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia en el que los europeos vean garantizados sus derechos en un marco jurídico común y en el que puedan circular libremente. Éste es el objetivo del Consejo extraordinario en la finlandesa ciudad de Tampere.

De estas libertades cotidianas y civiles no debemos excluir a los nacionales que sean ciudadanos de otros Estados distintos y se encuentren legalmente en el territorio de la Unión. Debemos abordar, quizá ya en las próximas citas en

160 Biarritz o en Niza, una política común de inmigración, asilo y refugio que pueda contribuir no sólo a resolver situaciones humanitarias o de necesidad económica, sino también a hacer frente a los evidentes problemas demográficos que la población europea va a experimentar en el nuevo siglo.

Naturalmente, debemos prever que este nuevo espacio común para los ciudadanos europeos facilitará la actividad de quienes cometen delitos. Por eso, la cooperación policial y judicial es otro corolario de la Unión que está forjándose durante estos últimos años y que debemos potenciar para luchar, en particular, contra el terrorismo, el narcotráfico y otras formas de crimen organizado.

Siempre con el mismo deseo de dar una respuesta a las inquietudes de nuestros países, con la intención de acelerar la unidad europea en los primeros años del siglo XXI, hemos ofrecido desde marzo de este año una estrategia de reformas económicas y liberalizaciones a escala europea y en el horizonte del año 2010; un programa que estimule la participación

170 de nuestros ciudadanos y favorezca su espíritu de iniciativa en la próxima década

En síntesis, la oferta aprobada en Lisboa desea acertar en tres vertientes decisivas para el nivel de vida y de empleo de nuestro continente, en dura competencia con otras pujantes regiones económicas del planeta. Francamente, debo reconocerles que no sé si hemos entrado en una "Nueva Economía", con reglas de comportamiento diferentes de la clásica. Dejemos que el tiempo responda a esta cuestión. El tiempo nos permitirá hacer la distinción entre cuánto hay de

realmente nuevo en la presente fase de expansión o cuánto resulte simplemente de la aplicación de principios de buena política económica.

Sabemos que en Europa el desarrollo de las nuevas tecnologías no se ha visto frenado por la falta de excelencia técnica o científica, pues de ésta hay sobradas pruebas, sino por la regulación excesiva, el dirigismo y la fragmentación de los mercados nacionales. Eso es lo que hemos querido combatir en Lisboa mediante un ambicioso programa de liberalización

180 a medio plazo de nuestros mercados, que ahora debemos llevar a la práctica.

En segundo lugar, la cuestión de la modernización y la sostenibilidad del modelo social europeo es inaplazable. Las cotas de bienestar y cohesión alcanzadas desde el pacto social fundado tras la Segunda Guerra forman parte de nuestra herencia. Esto es cierto, es indiscutible; pero la deuda moral hacia las nuevas generaciones nos empuja a movernos y no dilapidar esta herencia. El "statu quo" no es suficiente. En tanto que responsables de administrar esta herencia, nada peor que consentir un miedo paralizante ante cualquier cambio que modifique parcialmente el modelo hasta ahora vigente. No tendría sentido repetir mecánicamente el proceso de convergencia de Maastricht, ni plantear una mera armonización de regímenes. Por el contrario, sí creo que existe un valor añadido fundamental en el trabajo en común.

Finalmente, llegamos al tercer componente del proceso: la apertura económica. Sería un error pensar que, gracias el euro, podemos prescindir del resto del mundo. La realidad ya se encarga de demostrarlo día a día. Cerrarnos y aislarnos

190 sería un error y un absurdo desde el punto de vista económico y desde el punto de vista político.

Una Europa dinámica, competitiva y segura de sí misma tiene todo que ganar en un orden comercial multilateral sólido y abierto. Seattle debe enseñarnos algunas lecciones: hay que reflexionar sobre lo que no hemos sabido hacer o quizá sobre lo que no hemos sido capaces de explicar bien. Pero no debe, en ningún caso, servir de excusa para quienes pretenden debilitar el orden multilateral, que constituye, en definitiva, la clave de la prosperidad económica internacional, muy en particular en los países menos desarrollados.

Por lo tanto, yo soy partidario de fortalecer plenamente la cohesión de la zona euro. El euro debe hacer más visible en el mundo la dimensión y vitalidad de la economía europea. Europa debe aprovechar este mayor peso en el mundo para asumir un papel de liderazgo en la economía internacional y los países del euro deben aparecer como un frente unido en los foros económicos internacionales.

200 La actual crisis del petróleo nos da la oportunidad de mostrar esa unidad. Hasta ahora, cada Gobierno ha tomado sus decisiones en función de sus prioridades y esto es comprensible ya que nadie sabe mejor que cada país el orden de sus preferencias nacionales; pero hay que reconocer que el conjunto de los países europeos no ha estado a la altura de las circunstancias.

Estamos ante una situación que afecta a nuestro ritmo de crecimiento económico y a un cierto vacío de iniciativa europea ante un problema del que están pendientes todos los países del mundo. En este compás de espera, hemos conocido la proposición de Estados Unidos de sacar al mercado sus reservas estratégicas y yo creo que en Europa debemos pensar seriamente en la posibilidad de tomar una medida semejante.

En adelante, lo más inteligente y realista es pensar que tendremos que hacer frente a imprevistos en el camino de la Unión, imprevistos que no figuraban en el llamémosle "programa oficial". Lo decisivo es tener la voluntad de resolver en

210 común las dificultades y hacerlo al máximo nivel, mejor entre los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno y la Presidencia de la Comisión sin delegar nuestras responsabilidades. Es el método para garantizar la rapidez de respuesta y nos asegura que será ejecutada por todas las instancias de gobierno a escala europea.

Lo menos acertado frente a la actual circunstancia, dominada por el riesgo de un fuerte impacto petrolífero en la economía mundial, sería desentenderse de la necesidad evidente de proseguir la vía de la coordinación económica entre los miembros de la Unión. El entendimiento en el seno de la Unión es la ayuda más adecuada que podemos aportar a nuestro plan de unidad monetaria. El euro representa la más decisiva apuesta por la unidad que Europa ha anunciado a la comunidad internacional. Los demás pilares de integración necesitan de una Europa en muy buena forma, competitiva a nivel mundial y generadora de prosperidad entre sus respectivas opiniones públicas.

Señoras y señores,

220 En mi opinión, no valen las fórmulas del pasado. Más costes y más rigideces no nos van a permitir conseguir el crecimiento del empleo. La Europa del empleo requiere una economía más flexible y competitiva, basada, en mi opinión, en el equilibrio presupuestario, la liberalización económica y la reforma laboral.

Ahora mismo, en un momento de dificultad, el pensar y deliberar sólo en términos institucionales supone conformarse seguramente, permítanme la expresión, con una cierta "política de salón". Aspiraciones e ideales tan valiosas como la unión política y la corresponsabilidad en la defensa del continente; escenarios fabulosos como una multitud de ciudadanos atravesando libremente los distintos países del mosaico europeo, hoy tienen su mejor compañero de viaje en trabajar constantemente a favor del euro. Créanme cuando les digo que siento una sana ilusión materialista al defender el valor de la moneda común. Seamos "activamente proeuro" en esta situación que exige nuestra atención, pero que todavía está bien lejos de degenerar en una crisis o en un "shock" petrolífero. La economía europea depende de un factor intangible: la

230 voluntad y del sentido del compromiso que deseemos poner en el proyecto monetario.

Es muy ilustrativo recordar que, viviendo en Shangai antes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Jean Monnet tuviese conocimiento de que el primer emperador de la dinastía Qin había unificado China al uniformar pesos y medidas. Ustedes

lo saben igual que yo.

Por nuestra parte, el fortalecimiento de la voz de Europa en el mundo exige también una Europa más activa en la proyección y defensa de sus valores en las relaciones internacionales. Debemos reforzar la política exterior y de seguridad común para convertirla en herramienta coherente y eficaz, para permitirnos defender mejor en el mundo abierto del futuro nuestros valores e intereses frente a los enemigos de la democracia y de la libertad, que se llaman la exclusión nacionalista, la tiranía étnica y el terrorismo.

En esa lucha, Europa debe contar con las organizaciones y aliados que de un lado y otro del Atlántico comparten esos

240 intereses y esos valores. De esa manera, aportaremos nuestra contribución a lograr un mundo en paz y más próspero. En efecto, la lucha contra la pobreza no es eficaz si no va acompañada de la extensión de las libertades, del respeto a los derechos humanos y del apoyo a Gobiernos responsables democráticamente ante sus ciudadanos. Quiero decirles que he efectuado una propuesta a la Conferencia Intergubernamental para una cooperación reforzada a este respecto.

Con ello, estoy seguro de que podemos generar la estima y la adhesión de nuestros ciudadanos, y nos corresponde a nosotros, los políticos europeos, no defraudar esta nueva predisposición favorable.

Señor Director, señoras y señores,

La España del año 2000 es una nación antigua, sin complejos y dispuesta a merecer su lugar en un mundo globalizado. Es extremadamente creativa porque la democracia genera la pluralidad y la apertura de un modo natural. Mi país es, naturalmente, abierto y plural. La Constitución de 1978 significó la liberación de un potencial desusado que guardábamos

250 en nuestro interior; pero qué lejos estaríamos de esta imagen de España sin el acicate de la integración europea durante estos últimos años, que nos atrae siempre como el primer día del ingreso en la Comunidad.

España se incorporó con entusiasmo a este proceso que fundara, entre otros, Francia. En realidad, no entrábamos en Europa porque de aquí nunca habíamos salido. España es de los pocos países en el continente que ha deseado y demostrado durante siglos que era europeo al entrar en contacto con otras civilizaciones.

Con estas palabras hoy, ante un auditorio de una competencia probada, he pretendido ser fiel a ambas dimensiones: una España activa en el corazón de la unidad europea.

Muchas gracias.

A few weeks ago, you celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the
extraordinary revolution that gave birth to a movement called Solidarity.
Poland grew to be the icebreaker for the end of communism in all of
Europe and for the end of the Cold War.

As we speak, another revolution is taking place. What the people of
Poland begun, the people of Serbia will finish - opening up for the first
time in history the prospect of a European continent united in freedom and
democracy.

Milosevic has done enough damage, for one man, in one country.

10 Three wars. Tens of thousands dead. Millions displaced. Acts of barbarism
not seen in Europe since the Second World War. Their effect felt
throughout Europe.

We, and you, part of the NATO Alliance that stood up for our values
against him in Kosovo last year, know what he is capable of. The sooner he
is gone, the better for Serbia, the better for the whole of Europe.

Then we must stand ready, when the will of the people is finally
done, to hold out the hand of partnership to a democratic Serbia, and
welcome her into the European family of nations.

Poland led the wave of revolution in Europe. Since then, Poland has

20 been critical to the great transition from communism to democracy,
together with your dynamic Central European partners. I am delighted that
the Czech and Slovak Prime Ministers, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister
are also with us today.

Britain and Poland have marched shoulder-to-shoulder at decisive
moments in Europes history. Last month in a moving ceremony, we unveiled
in London a statue of General Sikorski, a fitting monument to a great
patriot.

Britain went to war in 1939 because Hitler invaded Poland. Robbed
of their own homeland, the Polish people gave themselves selflessly in the

30 liberation of Western Europe, only to see the iron curtain come down on
Poland.

Winston Churchill said of the pilots who so valiantly and against

such odds defended the last bastion of resistance in Europe against

Hitlers air armadas that never had so many owed so much to so few.

And of those few, the Polish pilots are remembered and revered for

their courage, their skill, their idealism. They laid down their lives not

in defence of their own country, but in defence of an ideal, in defence of

a free Europe.

As the Allied forces struggled to roll back

40 fascism, Polish servicemen marched, fought and died for that same ideal,

shoulder-to-shoulder with their British comrades; in the Battle of the

Atlantic; at Tobruk and Monte Cassino; in Normandy; the unsung heroes of

the Special Operations Executive and the most spectacular intelligence

coup of the Second World War, Enigma.

Few countries have contributed more to the fall of fascism and

Soviet dictatorship in Europe. Now we want you in the European Union.

ENLARGEMENT

The European Union is on the brink of one of the most important

decisions in its history. Enlargement to the East may be the EUs greatest

50 challenge, but I also believe it is its greatest opportunity.

Nobody who considers how the European Union has underpinned peace

and democracy in the reconstruction of post-war Western Europe can doubt

the benefits that enlargement will bring post-Cold War Europe and the

Balkans.

Nobody who considers the role that open markets have played in

generating wealth and prosperity in the European Union can doubt the

benefits of creating a market of half a billion consumers.

People can always find good reasons for delay. People concerned

about what these momentous changes will mean for the EU, and for them.

60 Farmers worried about the implications for the CAP. Popular but misplaced

fears that freedom of movement means massive shifts of population.

But let me be frank. Without enlargement, Western Europe will

always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass

migration on its borders. Without enlargement, the political consensus

behind economic and political reform in the weaker transition countries
may splinter.

Should that happen, we would all lose. That is why supporting
enlargement in principle but delaying in practice is no longer good
enough.

70 So I am determined there should be a breakthrough on enlargement
under the Swedish Presidency. I will be urging Europes political leaders
to commit themselves to a specific framework leading to an early end of
the negotiations and accession. I want to see new member states
participating in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 and having a
seat at the table at the next IGC.

My message to you is this: there are no guaranteed places. Reform
is the only entry ticket. But we want Poland, and as many others as are
ready, in the EU as soon as possible.

BRITAIN IN EUROPE

80 Britain will always be a staunch ally of all those European
democracies applying to join the European Union. A staunch ally, wielding
its influence at the centre of Europe.

It was not always like that. The blunt truth is that British policy
towards the rest of Europe over half a century has been marked by gross
misjudgements, mistaking what we wanted to be the case with what was the
case; hesitation, alienation, incomprehension, with the occasional burst
of enlightened brilliance which only served to underline the frustration
of our partners with what was the norm. The origins of this are not
complex but simple. Post-war Britain saw the issue entirely naturally as

90 how France and Germany were kept from going back to war with each other.
Britain's initial role was that of a benign, avuncular friend encouraging
the two old enemies to work together. Then with gathering speed, and
commensurate British alarm, Europe started not just to work together but
to begin the institutional cooperation that is today the European Union.
At each stage, Britain thought it won't possibly happen and held back. And
at each stage it did happen and we were faced with the choice: catching up

or staying out.

This was complicated by the fact that for all the other key

players, there were compelling reasons for being in: reasons of history,

100 reasons of proximity, reasons of democracy. For Britain, the victor in

WWII, the main ally of the United States, a proud and independent-minded

island race (though with much European blood flowing in our veins) the

reasons were there, but somehow always less than absolutely compelling.

And for the rest of Europe, the reasons for Britain being in seemed

less compelling too. Reading over the summer Jean Lacouture's biography of

de Gaulle, I could see clearly why our French friends hesitated over

Britain. There is a perception in Britain that it was because de Gaulle

was anti-British. Nothing could be more misguided. He was an admirer of

Britain and grateful for our support in WWII. But he had painstakingly

110 given France back her dignity and self-esteem. He mistrusted American

intentions and saw Britain as both a Trojan Horse for the United States

and a brake on the necessary strengthening of Europe. So, even though,

ironically, he was closer to Britain in his conception of what Europe

should be than to virtually anyone else, he blocked Britain. There is

something very poignant about the accounts of his meetings in 1963 with

Macmillan, a sometimes underestimated British Prime Minister, who saw only

a little late the danger for Britain in isolation from Europe.

All this is history, but its effects live on. Now, the

circumstances of today mean it is time to overcome the legacy of Britains

120 past. Two things have changed. From Europe's perspective, Britain as a key

partner in Europe is now a definite plus not a minus. Britain has a

powerful economy, an obvious role in defence and foreign policy and there

is genuine respect for Britain's political institutions and stability.

Also, in a world moving closer together, with new powers emerging, our

strength with the United States is not just a British asset, it is

potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and

the US.

And for Britain, as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would

be something truly bizarre and self-denying about standing apart from the
130 key strategic alliance on our doorstep. None of this means criticisms of
Europe are all invalid. They aren't, as I shall say later. But to conduct
the case for reform in a way that leaves Britain marginalised and isolated
(and that, despite the efforts of John Major, was the reality we inherited
three years ago), is just plain foolish.

For Britain, as for those countries queuing up to join the European
Union, being at the centre of influence in Europe is an indispensable part
of influence, strength and power in the world. We can choose not to be
there; but no-one should doubt the consequences of that choice and it is
wildly unrealistic to pretend those consequences are not serious. In
140 particular, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind, that our strength
with the US is enhanced by our strength with the rest of Europe and vice
versa.

I have said the political case for Britain being part of the single
currency is strong. I don't say political or constitutional issues aren't
important. They are. But to my mind, they aren't an insuperable barrier.
What does have to be overcome is the economic issue. It is an economic
union. Joining prematurely simply on political grounds, without the
economic conditions being right, would be a mistake. Hence our position:
in principle in favour; in practice, the economic tests must be met. We
150 cannot and will not take risks with Britain's economic strength. The
principle is real, the tests are real.

A word about Denmark. The Danish referendum was an important vote
for the Danish people, but the rest of us should draw the correct
conclusions. It will have no impact on the political support for
enlargement as some fear. Nor will it affect the British Governments
position on the Euro. Each country must make up its own mind on the Euro,
in its own way.

But my point is this: Britain's future is and will be as a leading
partner in Europe. Today I turn to the issue of Europe's political future.
160 A LARGER, STRONGER, DEMOCRATIC EUROPE

What sort of European Union will Poland join?

The Polish historian Joachim Lelewel famously asked Polska tak, ale jaka? Poland, yes, but what sort of Poland? Today I want to ask: Europe, yes, but what sort of Europe?

The trouble with the debate about Europes political future is that if we do not take care, we plunge into the thicket of institutional change, without first asking the basic question of what direction Europe should take.

To those who say the need for change in Europes institutions is
170 driven by the impression Europe is slowing down, I must say I find that bizarre. Monetary union is currently the most ambitious economic enterprise in the world. We have just begun to fashion a common defence policy. And we are now set to reunify Europe and expand it with up to 13 new members and in the longer term more. We are hardly short of challenges.

Neither do I see any profit in pitting the European institutions against intergovernmental co-operation. We need a strong Commission able to act independently, with its power of initiative: first because that protects smaller states; and also because it allows Europe to overcome
180 purely sectional interests. All governments from time to time, Britain included, find the Commissions power inconvenient but, for example, the single market could never be completed without it. The European Parliament is a vital part of the checks and balances of the EU. The Commission and the Council have different but complementary roles.

The need for institutional change does not derive either from a fear that Europe is immobile or that it is time to upset the delicate balance between Commission and governments; it derives from a more fundamental question.

The most important challenge for Europe is to wake up to the new
190 reality: Europe is widening and deepening simultaneously. There will be more of us in the future, trying to do more.

The issue is: not

whether we do this, but how we reform this new Europe so that it both
delivers real benefits to the people of Europe, addressing the priorities
they want addressed; and does so in a way that has their consent and
support.

There are two opposite models so far proposed. One is Europe as a
free trade area, like NAFTA in North America. This is the model beloved by
British Conservatives.

200 The other is the classic federalist model, in which Europe elects
its Commission President and the European Parliament becomes the true
legislative European body and Europes principal democratic check.
The difficulty with the first is that it nowhere near answers what
our citizens expect from Europe, besides being wholly unrealistic
politically. In a Europe with a single market and single currency, there
will inevitably be a need for closer economic co-ordination. In
negotiations over world trade and global finance, Europe is stronger if it
speaks with one voice.

In areas like the environment and organised crime, in policing our
210 borders, Europe needs to work together. In foreign and security policy,
though nations will guard jealously their own national interests, there
are times when it will be of clear benefit to all that Europe acts and
speaks together. What people want from Europe is more than just free
trade. They want: prosperity, security and strength.

In a world with the power of the USA; with new alliances to be made
with the neighbours of Europe like Russia; developing nations with vast
populations like India and China; Japan, not just an economic power but a
country that will rightly increase its political might too; with the world
increasingly forming powerful regional blocs ASEAN, Mercosur; Europes
220 citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power
in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about
peace. It is about projecting collective power. That is one very clear
reason, quite apart from the economic reasons, why the central European
nations want to join.

So a limited vision of Europe does not remotely answer the modern
demands people place on Europe.

The difficulty, however, with the view of Europe as a superstate,
subsuming nations into a politics dominated by supranational institutions,
is that it too fails the test of the people.

230 There are issues of democratic accountability in Europe the
so-called democratic deficit. But we can spend hours on end, trying to
devise a perfect form of European democracy and get nowhere. The truth is,
the primary sources of democratic accountability in Europe are the
directly elected and representative institutions of the nations of Europe
national parliaments and governments.

That is not to say Europe will not in future generations develop
its own strong demos or polity, but it hasnt yet.

And let no-one be in any doubt: nations like Poland, who struggled
so hard to achieve statehood, whose citizens shed their blood in that

240 cause, are not going to give it up lightly. We should celebrate our
diverse cultures and identities, our distinctive attributes as nations.

Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who
choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests and the
common good, achieving more together than we can achieve alone. The EU
will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the
supranational.

Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a
superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate.

We should not therefore begin with an abstract discussion of

250 institutional change. We begin with the practical question, what should
Europe do? What do the people of Europe want and expect it to do? Then we
focus Europe and its institutions around the answer.

How we complete the single market.

How we drive through
necessary economic reform.

How we phase out the wasteful and

inefficient aspects of the CAP.

How we restore full employment.

How we get a more coherent foreign policy.

260 How we develop the

military capability we require without which common defence policy is a

chimera.

How we fight organised crime, immigration racketeering, the

drugs trade.

How we protect an environment that knows no borders.

And of course, how we stop Europe focussing on things that it

doesnt need to do, the interfering part of Europe that antagonises even

Europes most ardent supporters.

The problem Europes citizens have with Europe arises when Europes

270 priorities arent theirs. No amount of institutional change most of which

passes them by completely will change that.

Reforming Europe to give it direction and momentum around the

peoples priorities will. The citizens of Europe must feel that they own

Europe, not that Europe owns them.

So let me turn to the changes I believe are part of delivering that

direction.

PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL REFORM

First, we owe it to our citizens to let them know clearly what

policies and laws are being enacted in their name. The European Council,

280 bringing together all the Heads of Government, is the final court of

appeal from other Councils of Ministers unable to reconcile national

differences.

That is a vital role. But the European Council should above all be

the body which sets the agenda of the Union. Indeed, formally in the

Treaty of Rome, that is the task given to it. We now have European Council

meetings every three months. And in truth they do, for example, in areas

like the Luxembourg summit on jobs, the Lisbon summit on economic reform,

the Peortschach summit on defence, develop the future political direction

of Europe. I would like to propose that we do this in a far more organised

290 and structured way.

Just as governments go before their electorates and set out their

agenda for the coming years, so must the European Council do the same. We

need to do it in all the crucial fields of European action: economic,

foreign policy, defence, and the fight against cross-border crime. I am

proposing today an annual agenda for Europe, set by the European Council.

The President of the Commission is a member of the European

Council, and would play his full part in drawing up the agenda. He would

then bring a proposal for Heads of Government to debate, modify and

endorse. It would be a clear legislative, as well as political, programme

300 setting the workload of individual Councils. The Commission's independence

as guardians of the treaty would be unchanged. And the Commission would

still bring forward additional proposals where its role as guardian of

those treaties so required. But we would have clear political direction, a

programme and a timetable by which all the institutions would be guided.

We should be open too to reforming the way individual Councils

work, perhaps through team presidencies that give the leadership of the

Council greater continuity and weight; greater use of elected chairs of

Councils and their working groups; and ensuring that the Secretary-General

of the Council, Javier Solana, can play his full role in the development

310 of foreign and defence policy. For example, when Europe is more than 25

members, can we seriously believe that a country will hold the Presidency

only every 12 or 13 years? But two or three countries together, with a mix

of large and small states, might make greater sense. In future we may also

need a better way of overseeing and monitoring the Unions programme than

the three monthly European Councils.

Second, there is an important debate about a Constitution for

Europe. In practice I suspect that, given the sheer diversity and

complexity of the EU, its constitution, like the British constitution,

will continue to be found in a number of different treaties, laws and

320 precedents. It is perhaps easier for the British than for others to

recognise that a constitutional debate must not necessarily end with a single, legally binding document called a Constitution for an entity as dynamic as the EU.

What I think is both desirable and realistic is to draw up a statement of the principles according to which we should decide what is best done at the European level and what should be done at the national level, a kind of charter of competences. This would allow countries too, to define clearly what is then done at a regional level. This Statement of Principles would be a political, not a legal document. It could therefore
330 be much simpler and more accessible to Europes citizens.

I also believe that the time has now come to involve representatives of national parliaments more on such matters, by creating a second chamber of the European Parliament.

A second chamber's most important function would be to review the EU's work, in the light of this agreed Statement of Principles. It would not get involved in the day-to-day negotiation of legislation - that is properly the role of the existing European Parliament. Rather, its task would be to help implement the agreed statement of principles; so that we do what we need to do at a European level but also so that we devolve
340 power downwards. Whereas a formal Constitution would logically require judicial review by a European constitutional court, this would be political review by a body of democratically elected politicians. It would be dynamic rather than static, allowing for change in the application of these principles without elaborate legal revisions every time.

Such a second chamber could also, I believe, help provide democratic oversight at a European level of the common foreign and security policy.

Efficient decision making, even with these changes, will be harder in an enlarged European Union. In the long run, I do not believe that a
350 Commission of up to 30 members will be workable. The present intergovernmental conference must and will address the size of the Commission. More radical reform is not possible this time round in view of

the worries of some states. I simply give my view that, in the end, we shall have to revisit this issue and streamline considerably. Reweighting votes in the Council has also become a democratic imperative which this current intergovernmental conference must resolve.

Efficient decision making in an enlarged Union will also mean more enhanced cooperation. I have no problem with greater flexibility or groups of member states going forward together. But that must not lead to a hard

360 core; a Europe in which some Member States create their own set of shared policies and institutions from which others are in practice excluded. Such groups must at every stage be open to others who wish to join.

I agree with Guy Verhofstadt that enhanced cooperation is an instrument to strengthen the Union from within, not an instrument of exclusion. That is why enhanced cooperation must not be used to undermine the single market or other common policies. The safeguards must be stringent ones. The present treaties provide them. Any changes must be equally stringent in avoiding a multi-tier Europe; the creation of different sets of rules; damage to the rights of those not able to

370 participate; or erosion of the powers of the Commission as guardians of the treaties. The European Parliament should play a part in ensuring that these conditions are met, both at the time an enhanced co-operation is decided upon and during the course of its implementation.

Within a coherent framework agreed by the European Council, there is clearly much greater scope for using enhanced cooperation in the two biggest growth areas of European action: the development of a foreign and security policy and the cross border fight against crime. In the fight against international crime it should be in the interest of all Member States if particular groups of countries carry forward work in particular

380 areas. That, after all, is what was done through the Schengen Agreement. The difference now is that we must, from the beginning, operate within the framework of the European treaties, not outside it. Italy and Germany have suggested joint police operations at the Unions external borders. That kind of cooperation between groups of countries seeking to achieve goals

agreed by all, and in the interests of all, will become common place.

CONCLUSION

We need to get the political foundations of the European Union

right. These foundations are rooted in the democratic nation state.

Efficiency and democracy go together. Poland knows that. Your people have

390 decided that the European Union is the most effective route to deliver

what they want: prosperity, security and strength. We are building a

Europe of equal partners served by institutions which need to be

independent but responsive and accountable. We want a Europe where there

are national differences, not national barriers, where we hold many of our

policies in common, but keep our distinct, separate identities.

The European Union is the worlds biggest single economic and

political partnership of democratic states. That represents a huge

opportunity for Europe and the peoples of Europe. And as a Union of

democracies, it has the capacity to sustain peace in our continent, to

400 deliver unprecedented prosperity and to be a powerful force for democratic

values in the rest of the world.

Our task, with the help of the new democracies about to join the

EU, is to shape a responsive European Union - in touch with the people,

transparent and easier to understand, strengthened by its nations and

regions - a European Union whose vision of peace is matched by its vision

of prosperity.

A civilised continent united in defeating brutality and violence. A

prosperous continent united in extending opportunities to all. A continent

joined together in is belief in social justice.

410 A superpower, but not a superstate.

An economic powerhouse through the completion of the world's

biggest single market, the extension of competition, an adaptable and well

educated workforce, the support for businesses large and small.

A civilised continent through common defence, the strength of our

values, the pursuit of social justice, the rich diversity of our cultures.

The countries represented here today have suffered more than most

in the cause of freedom. I want you, as soon as possible, to share in the European Unions success, and to join as equal partners, as, amid the new reality I have outlined, a new Europe is built.

**1. Important reforms have been decided in Nice. The Conference welcomes the successful conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States and commits the Member States to pursue the early and successful ratification of the Treaty of Nice.**
**2. It agrees that the conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States opens the way for enlargement of the European Union and underlines that, with ratification of the Nice Treaty, the European Union will have completed the institutional changes necessary for the accession of new Member States.**
**3. Having opened the way to enlargement, the Conference calls for a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the European Union. In 2001, the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies, in cooperation with the Commission and involving the European Parliament, will encourage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties; representatives of national Parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion; political, economic and university circles, representatives of civil society, etc. The candidate States will be associated with this process in ways to be defined.**
**4. Following a report to Göteborg in June 2001, the European Council, at its meeting at Laeken/Brussels in December 2001, will agree on a declaration containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process.**
**5. The process should address, inter alia, the following questions:**
**• how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of competencies between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity;**
**• the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne;**
**• a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without changing their meaning;**
**• the role of national Parliaments in the European architecture.**
**6. Addressing the above-mentioned issues, the Conference recognises the need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States.**
**7. After these preparatory steps, the Conference agrees that a new Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States will be convened in 2004, to treat the above-mentioned items in view of the related Treaty changes.**
**8. The Conference of Member States shall not constitute any form of obstacle or precondition to the enlargement process. Moreover, those candidate States which have concluded accession negotiations with the Union shall be invited to participate in the Conference. Those candidate States which have not concluded their accession negotiations shall be invited as observers.**

Mesdames, Messieurs,

En cinquante ans, l'Europe s'est faite. Elle vit en paix, la démocratie règne, notre mode de vie séduit.

L'Union européenne a encore progressé récemment. La croissance a repris. Le chômage reflue. Dans moins de huit mois, l'euro sera une réalité concrète pour 300 millions de citoyens européens. La défense européenne se met en place. L'Union réaffirme sa dimension sociale. Elle se donne des instruments pour protéger la santé et l'environnement. Le Gouvernement français est fier d'avoir contribué à ces évolutions.

Pourtant un certain désenchantement et des incertitudes se font jour, au sein des peuples comme chez certains responsables politiques. Et il est vrai que l'avenir de l'Europe soulève des questions légitimes. L'Europe ne risque-t-elle pas de se défaire si elle s'élargit jusqu'aux frontières de son continent ? Comment l'ouvrir à la mondialisation sans
10 diluer son identité ? Pour réformer ses institutions, doit-elle estomper le rôle des Nations ? Comment faire pour que les citoyens de l'Union s'approprient l'Europe ?

Attentifs à ces interrogations, les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement, réunis l'an passé à Nice, ont décidé d'engager une réflexion en profondeur sur l'avenir de l'Union élargie. Les citoyens européens sont invités à y participer. Nous avons décidé d'ouvrir ce débat en France. C'est dans ce cadre que j'inscris mon propos d'aujourd'hui. Il est la contribution du responsable politique que je suis à cette réflexion.

Je suis Français. Je me sens Européen. Je veux une Europe qui affirme son identité, qui réponde mieux au désir de ses peuples, qui se fasse exemplaire dans le monde.

C'est pourquoi le débat ne doit pas porter uniquement sur la question des institutions et de leur réforme. L'Europe est d'abord un projet politique, un " contenu " avant d'être un " contenant ". L'Europe n'est pas faite seulement de
20 règlements, de directives ou de contentieux. Elle est d'abord une œuvre de l'esprit, un modèle de société, une vision du monde. L'idée européenne inscrite dans la réalité : voilà ce qui compte pour moi. L'Europe que j'aime, celle que je veux avec tant d'autres accomplir, a un projet de société (I), une vision du monde (II), une architecture politique (III).

I. L'Europe doit affirmer un projet de société

Jusqu'à une période récente, l'essentiel des efforts de l'Europe s'est concentré sur la mise en place de l'Union économique et monétaire. Nous en avons tiré de réels bénéfices. Mais il nous faut maintenant élargir la perspective, sous peine de réduire l'Europe à un marché et de la diluer dans la mondialisation. Car l'Europe est bien plus qu'un marché. Elle est porteuse d'un modèle de société, fruit de l'Histoire et qui se déploie au travers de liens toujours plus intenses qui unissent aujourd'hui les peuples européens. Il existe un " art de vivre " à l'européenne, une façon propre d'agir, de défendre les libertés, de lutter contre les inégalités et les discriminations, de penser et d'organiser les
30 relations de travail, d'accéder à l'instruction et aux soins, d'aménager le temps. Chacun de nos pays a ses traditions et ses règles mais celles-ci composent un univers commun.

Ce modèle de société original, nous devons désormais l'inscrire dans les traités et le faire vivre dans nos politiques. La justification de l'Europe, c'est sa différence. Rappelons-nous que l'Europe est une civilisation, c'est-à-dire tout à la fois un territoire, une histoire partagée, une économie unifiée, une société humaine et des cultures diverses qui dessinent ensemble une culture.

1. Cette civilisation repose sur une communauté de valeurs.

Au premier rang de celles-ci, il y a la démocratie et les droits de l'homme. Les " Pères fondateurs " ont voulu et construit l'Europe politique pour délivrer notre continent des impérialismes solitaires ainsi que des totalitarismes meurtriers qui l'ont ensanglanté au XXème siècle. Grâce à eux, l'Europe est désormais une terre de paix. Les ennemis
40 d'hier se sont réconciliés. La désunion a laissé place à la recherche d'une unité renforcée. L'Europe est l'espace de la planète où l'Etat de droit est le mieux accompli. Elle est le seul ensemble politique au sein duquel la peine de mort n'existe plus. Elle est cette terre où le respect de la personne humaine est poussé à son plus haut point. Elle a vocation à porter plus loin ce message.

L'Europe refuse de dissocier la prospérité économique du progrès social. C'est ainsi qu'elle a pu se relever des guerres qui l'ont ravagée. Malgré les inégalités qui subsistent, elle connaît aujourd'hui un très haut niveau de développement économique. Des droits sociaux ont été conquis : le droit à la protection sociale, les droits syndicaux, le droit à une éducation gratuite.

C'est pour proclamer ces valeurs que nous avons doté l'Union d'une Charte des droits fondamentaux. Qu'il s'agisse de dignité et d'intégrité de la personne humaine, de libertés ou de solidarité, d'égalité, de citoyenneté ou de justice, ou
50 encore de droits nouveaux –tels ceux qui s'attachent à la préservation de notre patrimoine naturel–, l'ensemble des principes qui fondent la civilisation européenne sont ainsi consacrés. Cette Charte mérite d'être considérée comme la clé de voûte de la construction européenne. Je souhaite qu'elle fasse partie intégrante du pacte qui unit les nations d'Europe et qui fonde, entre les Européens, une communauté de destin.

2. Cette communauté de destin doit mieux inspirer nos politiques communes.

L'Europe a besoin de plus de solidarité économique. La monnaie unique nous apporte désormais une précieuse stabilité. Depuis deux ans, l'euro a joué son rôle de " bouclier " commun contre les crises financières internationales et les dévaluations compétitives. Pour équilibrer l'édifice de l'Union, il nous faut maintenant nous doter d'un gouvernement économique de la zone euro. La coordination des politiques économiques doit être considérablement

accrue. Je propose que tout Etat membre consulte en amont ses partenaires et tienne compte de leur recommandation
60 avant de prendre une décision ayant des conséquences globales sur la zone. Créons un fonds d'action conjoncturelle, auquel chaque Etat serait éligible, qui permettrait de soutenir tout pays membre frappé par les turbulences économiques mondiales. Il faut s'attaquer enfin aux comportements qui attentent à l'intérêt général européen. La lutte contre le " dumping fiscal " est une priorité immédiate : il n'est pas acceptable que certains Etats membres usent d'une concurrence fiscale déloyale pour attirer les investissements internationaux et les délocalisations des sièges sociaux de groupes européens. A terme, une harmonisation globale de la fiscalité des entreprises est nécessaire.

Cette cohérence économique doit être au service de la solidarité sociale. Les citoyens l'appellent de leurs vœux. L'Europe ne saurait être une simple zone de libre-échange. Depuis quatre ans, le Gouvernement français s'est battu pour réorienter la construction européenne au profit de la croissance et de l'emploi. Des progrès importants ont été réalisés avec l'adoption de l'agenda social européen. Ces objectifs doivent se traduire par des résultats concrets, pour
70 toutes les catégories de travailleurs. Les conditions de travail des salariés doivent être harmonisées vers le haut. Faisons reculer la précarité et combattons les discriminations. Créons les conditions d'un dialogue social avec les syndicats à l'échelle européenne. Un véritable droit social européen fixant des normes communes ambitieuses doit être édifié, notamment en matière d'information et de participation des salariés dans la vie des entreprises, de droit des licenciements, de lutte contre le travail précaire et de politique salariale. Notre perspective doit être celle d'un traité social européen.

De même, les Européens ont besoin, pour garantir l'égalité des citoyens, leur solidarité et l'intérêt général, de services publics forts et efficaces. Je suis favorable à une directive européenne qui définirait un cadre juridique permettant de consolider, sous la responsabilité des États, le rôle des services publics en Europe.

Au service de l'emploi, l'Europe doit avoir une ambition industrielle forte. L'intégration européenne permet des
80 réussites majeures : hier, Ariane et Airbus ; aujourd'hui, EADS dans le domaine de l'aéronautique civile ou, dans la sphère militaire, le projet de gros avion de transport. Ces partenariats sont importants pour nos industries : ils leur offrent les moyens nécessaires à leurs investissements, ils leur confèrent une taille critique sur le marché mondial, ils permettent d'éviter une domination exclusive des Etats-Unis dans des secteurs décisifs.

Dans le même esprit, l'Europe doit s'affirmer comme le continent de la science et de l'innovation. Le savoir est un élément de la conscience européenne. Mais l'éclatement de la recherche européenne en autant d'efforts nationaux trop peu coordonnés réduit aujourd'hui son efficacité. Il est urgent de constituer un véritable espace européen de la recherche, dans des domaines aussi essentiels que la santé ou l'environnement, comme l'Europe a su le faire en matière spatiale, avec l'Agence spatiale européenne.

3. L'unité de l'Europe appelle des droits et protections renforcés pour tous les Européens.
90 Nous devons édifier un espace de droit commun, dont la Charte sera la référence. La Cour européenne de justice devrait pouvoir être saisie, dans certaines conditions, directement par les citoyens. Il nous faut harmoniser les différentes règles nationales de fond et de procédure. Dans l'immédiat, une reconnaissance mutuelle effective des décisions de justice et la création d'une instance arbitrale pour trancher les conflits de droits nationaux constitueraient des avancées importantes ; je pense en particulier à la douloureuse question des divorces de couples binationaux.

L'un des droits fondamentaux du citoyen est la sécurité. L'Europe doit aider à la garantir.

Je pense d'abord à la lutte contre la criminalité. Parce que le crime organisé ne connaît pas de frontières –on le voit particulièrement avec le blanchiment d'argent, le trafic de drogue et toutes les formes contemporaines de traite des êtres humains–, il faut le combattre au niveau de l'Europe. Plusieurs de nos partenaires ont proposé la création d'une police européenne intégrée. Pour ma part, j'y souscris. Je propose la création d'une police criminelle opérationnelle,
100 dont Europol serait le noyau. Confions aussi à une police spécifique la mission d'assurer la protection des frontières extérieures de l'Union et de ses aéroports internationaux.

La sécurité des Européens passe aussi par la mise en place d'un véritable espace judiciaire européen qui, s'appuyant sur une coopération renforcée entre magistrats et sur la poursuite de l'harmonisation du droit pénal des Etats membres, pourrait conduire à terme à la création d'un parquet européen. Celui-ci serait chargé de coordonner les poursuites et l'action publique au niveau européen et faciliterait, notamment, l'exécution des commissions rogatoires sur tout le territoire de l'Union.

La sécurité sanitaire est une autre exigence. Les récentes crises, en particulier celle de la " vache folle ", ont montré les menaces que fait courir aux consommateurs le productivisme à outrance. Nous devons collectivement en tirer une leçon urgente : le citoyen est aussi un consommateur dont il faut renforcer la protection. Dotons l'Union d'un statut du
110 consommateur européen, fondé sur le principe de précaution, la transparence dans l'information et la traçabilité des produits " de la fourche à la fourchette ". Je propose, en outre, dans le domaine de la santé humaine, la création d'un réseau de surveillance et d'alerte sanitaires permettant une réaction immédiate des autorités publiques face au déclenchement d'une crise.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Dans un monde désormais globalisé, notre Europe ne saurait se contenter d'être un îlot de prospérité relative et de stabilité. Ce repli égoïste serait une illusion et un reniement. L'Europe porte un modèle, mais un modèle ouvert au monde, notamment à la Méditerranée et à ses rives. Elle a vocation à orienter la mondialisation dans le sens du droit et de la justice.

II. L'Europe doit peser sur le cours du monde

120 Je veux une Europe forte, qui assume pleinement sa responsabilité dans la redéfinition de l'ordre mondial et qui se donne les moyens de porter son message de paix, de solidarité et de pluralisme.

1. Au nom de ce pluralisme, l'Europe doit faire vivre la diversité culturelle.

La diversité des cultures est un des éléments les plus précieux du patrimoine de l'humanité. Or celle-ci est aujourd'hui menacée. La loi du marché pousse à l'uniformité des modes de consommation et à la concentration des industries culturelles. Bien entendu, certaines formes d'expression –je pense en particulier au cinéma– ont acquis une dimension industrielle. Mais il faut nous préserver, collectivement, de la menace de l'uniformité et de l'envahissement de produits culturels émanant d'une source unique. C'est là un enjeu de civilisation fondamental. C'est là un combat pour les cultures européennes, bien sûr, mais aussi pour toutes les cultures. Un combat porté par l'Europe à l'OCDE –quand elle dénonce l'Accord multilatéral sur l'investissement– et au sein de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce –lorsqu'elle
130 défend la spécificité de la création et des œuvres culturelles. Elle doit poursuivre en ce sens.

L'Europe est consciente de cet enjeu parce qu'elle porte en elle-même une exceptionnelle diversité de cultures. Ces cultures, dans toutes leurs composantes –religieuses, philosophiques, littéraires, musicales ou plastiques– et dans toutes leurs expressions, nous en sommes les héritiers. Elles forment notre patrimoine commun. C'est pourquoi pour nous, Européens, la culture n'est pas une marchandise. Elle est d'abord une part de notre identité.

Pour faire vivre cette identité, l'Europe doit permettre à tous de partager ce patrimoine. Favorisons mieux encore la mobilité des étudiants, des artistes et des chercheurs. D'ici dix ans, tous les jeunes Européens devraient pouvoir accomplir une partie de leur scolarité dans un autre pays de l'Union que le leur. Faisons de l'enseignement d'au moins deux langues européennes, dès le plus jeune âge, une règle. Tout doit être fait –notamment à l'Ecole– pour que nos enfants prennent conscience que leur héritage national s'inscrit dans une richesse plus vaste encore, celle de l'Europe.
140 Parce que la culture est vivante, il appartient à l'Europe de favoriser la création. La culture doit bénéficier d'une politique commune, conçue spécifiquement et non dominée par les règles de la concurrence et du marché intérieur. Dans cet esprit, je propose la mise en place, au niveau européen, de mécanismes de soutien à la création cinématographique, audiovisuelle et informatique et celle de studios européens. Au moment où se multiplient dans tous nos pays les bouquets numériques, l'Europe devrait disposer d'une chaîne de télévision qui lui soit propre, sur le modèle réussi d'Arte.

A mes yeux, l'engagement de l'Europe pour la diversité culturelle est exemplaire de notre vision d'une société internationale ouverte et solidaire.

2. Animée par cette conception, l'Europe a vocation à défendre la paix et la démocratie dans le monde.

Face aux tentations de l'unilatéralisme –c'est-à-dire de la loi du plus fort ou des visions trop simples–, l'Europe doit être
150 un facteur d'équilibre dans les relations internationales. Elle ne veut pas être une puissance dominante mais elle peut mettre sa puissance au service de valeurs.

L'Europe est capable de faire entendre sa voix grâce à une politique étrangère commune. Approfondissons nos " stratégies communes " dans les zones du monde où nos intérêts sont en jeu. Renforçons le rôle du Haut représentant pour la PESC. Veillons à la cohérence de nos diplomaties nationales avec la définition d'une politique qui nous soit commune. Travaillons au rayonnement, à travers le monde, d'une Europe présente et active. L'unification de la représentation externe de la zone euro à travers une présidence élue de l'eurogroupe y contribuera. Mettons-là en place à brève échéance. Par ailleurs, la fusion des réseaux consulaires européens à l'étranger permettrait à des " maisons de l'Europe " d'être au service de tous les Européens expatriés à travers le monde. Ces maisons conforteraient chez eux le sentiment de la citoyenneté européenne.
160 Pour assurer sa sécurité, mais aussi pour contribuer au maintien de la paix dans le monde, l'Europe a besoin d'une défense commune. Ses fondations ont été jetées. Grâce aux récentes décisions, prises sous la Présidence française de l'Union, l'Europe est en passe de se doter d'une force de réaction rapide encadrée par des institutions politiques et militaires permanentes. L'Union demande une doctrine globale d'intervention et d'emploi de cette force. La priorité va aujourd'hui au renforcement d'une politique de prévention des conflits, qui est la mieux à même d'assurer une sécurité durable. Dans le même temps, l'Europe doit définir, en fonction de ses intérêts propres et dans le respect de ses alliances, une stratégie de défense à long terme. Cela suppose en particulier qu'elle adopte une position cohérente face à l'initiative controversée des Etats-Unis de créer un bouclier antimissile.

Au-delà des questions diplomatiques et de sécurité, l'économie et le commerce doivent être organisées de façon plus juste et plus efficace.
170 3. L'Europe doit aider à construire la régulation dont le monde a besoin.

Pour empêcher que les intérêts privés étouffent l'intérêt général, que la recherche du profit à court terme ignore la justice sociale et dégrade l'environnement, il faut définir des " règles du jeu ". L'Union européenne peut tenir un rôle de premier plan dans la définition de cette régulation et se mettre au service de trois priorités.

Il faut donner un cadre stable à l'économie mondiale. Les récentes crises économiques et financières ont démontré que des règles, publiques et privées, sont indispensables au bon fonctionnement de l'économie de marché. Depuis trois ans, pour tirer les leçons de ces crises, d'importants progrès ont été accomplis. Mais beaucoup reste à faire, et d'abord en matière de régulation financière internationale. Renforçons le rôle des institutions de Bretton-Woods dans la gestion et la prévention des crises. Assurons mieux leur transparence et leur responsabilité politique. Premier

actionnaire de ces institutions, l'Union européenne doit y faire entendre sa voix. Réfléchissons, pour les pays de la
180 zone euro, à une représentation coordonnée, voire unique, dans ces institutions. Luttons contre la criminalité financière et la concurrence fiscale déloyale ; les hésitations de la nouvelle administration américaine ne sauraient remettre en cause les travaux du Groupe d'action financière international et de l'OCDE. L'Europe continuera d'affirmer ses positions en faveur de la réforme de l'architecture financière internationale.

Nous voulons un commerce équitable. L'Europe s'est battue pour la création de l'OMC parce que cette organisation traite les conflits commerciaux par des procédures objectives, en nous préservant de l'unilatéralisme. Cette régulation va dans l'intérêt même de l'essor du commerce international. L'Europe devra plaider, à l'OMC, pour une politique commerciale posant des limites claires. La libéralisation du commerce n'a pas à porter atteinte aux services publics, à la diversité culturelle, au progrès social ou à la sécurité alimentaire. Il faut que l'Europe accentue son effort de solidarité envers les pays en développement pour faire reculer la pauvreté. Le Sud a besoin de l'Europe. Celle-ci se
190 battra pour aider ces pays à trouver toute leur place dans les échanges mondiaux. Elle contribuera à alléger le poids de la dette, premier obstacle à leur développement.

Il n'est de développement que durable. La planète est menacée. Notre responsabilité devant les générations futures est engagée. L'Europe, vieille terre industrielle, espace de population très dense, modestement dotée en matières premières, ayant tiré les leçons des chocs pétroliers, sait que la Terre n'est pas un stock inépuisable de ressources naturelles. C'est pourquoi elle est à la tête du combat pour le développement durable, au moment où les Etats-Unis semblent éluder leurs responsabilités. Il lui revient de montrer l'exemple : le développement durable est désormais un objectif prioritaire de la construction communautaire. Près de dix ans après l'acte fondateur de Rio, il faut aller au-delà. Fer de lance de la création d'une autorité mondiale de l'Environnement que mon gouvernement a proposée, l'Europe devrait porter une politique ambitieuse de recherche et de promotion de technologies respectueuses de
200 l'environnement.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

L'Europe a besoin d'institutions dignes de son projet de société et de sa vision du monde. C'est là où la réflexion institutionnelle trouve sa pleine justification.

III. L'Europe politique exige des réformes profondes

Un débat est engagé sur l'avenir de l'Union. Le terme de cette réflexion a été fixé à 2004. Nous savons aussi que les conséquences à tirer de cette réflexion devront l'être à l'unanimité. Le consensus sera donc nécessaire entre les Quinze. Nous devons bien sûr prendre en compte les préoccupations des pays candidats. La plupart d'entre eux bénéficient des institutions démocratiques et vivent leur indépendance depuis une décennie seulement. Il est indispensable de les associer à notre réflexion.

210 Des contributions intéressantes ont déjà été apportés à ce débat. Des " modèles " institutionnels ont été proposés. En Allemagne, par exemple, le SPD a suggéré pour l'Europe une construction fortement inspirée par le système politique de son pays. D'autres propositions ont été faites ou viendront. Au terme du processus, il faudra chercher la ligne d'un compromis acceptable par tous. C'est pourquoi l'on ne peut avancer des architectures institutionnelles ou proposer des formules sans avoir réfléchi, au préalable, au sens politique que l'on veut donner à l'Europe. On ne peut en particulier faire l'économie d'une réflexion sur la place des Nations au sein de l'ensemble européen.

J'apporterai la mienne dans cet esprit. Je ne sépare pas la France de l'Europe. Comme tant d'autres Européens convaincus, je désire l'Europe mais je reste attaché à ma Nation. Faire l'Europe sans défaire la France –ni aucune des autres nations européennes : tel est mon choix politique.

1. Ainsi, je fais mienne la belle idée de " fédération d'Etats-nations ".

220 " Fédération " : voilà un mot qui présente les apparences de la simplicité et les attraits de la cohérence, mais qui recèle en réalité une diversité de sens. Pour certains, ce terme signifie un exécutif européen qui tirerait sa légitimité du seul Parlement européen. Cet exécutif aurait le monopole de la diplomatie et de la défense. Dans ce nouvel ensemble, les Etats actuels auraient le statut des Länder allemands ou des Etats fédérés américains. La France, comme d'ailleurs d'autres nations européennes, ne saurait accepter un tel statut ni cette conception de la " fédération ".

Si, en revanche, on entend par " fédération " une démarche progressive et maîtrisée de partage ou de transfert de compétences au niveau de l'Union, alors on se réfère à la " fédération d'Etats-nations ", selon la formule forgée par Jacques DELORS. C'est là une notion à laquelle je souscris pleinement. D'un point de vue juridique, elle peut sembler ambiguë. Mais je la juge politiquement pertinente, car l'Europe est une construction politique originale, mêlant de façon indissociable en un précipité singulier deux éléments différents : l'idéal fédératif et la réalité des Etats-nations
230 européens.

C'est pourquoi la notion de " fédération d'Etats-nations " traduit avec justesse la tension constitutive de l'Union européenne. Il y a les nations, fortes, vivantes, attachées à leur identité, qui font la richesse de notre continent. Et puis il y a aussi la volonté d'unir, de bâtir un ensemble qui rendra chacun plus fort. Il y a d'un côté l'histoire, marquée par les rivalités et les égoïsmes nationaux, et de l'autre le projet, tourné vers l'harmonie et l'alliance. Des éléments fédératifs très forts existent déjà : la primauté du droit européen, sanctionnée par la Cour de Justice, une Commission indépendante, un Parlement européen élu au suffrage universel, le marché et la monnaie uniques. Mais la coopération inter-gouvernementale occupe encore une place importante et restera indispensable.

Si nous voulons aller vers une telle fédération, il nous faut clarifier les compétences respectives de l'Union et des Etats.

Il faut le faire selon le principe de la subsidiarité. Cela doit être l'occasion de simplifier des traités qui sont devenus
240 indéchiffrables au fil des négociations successives et au gré de l'empilement des politiques communes.

Cette clarification ne doit pas remettre en cause des compétences partagées. Celles-ci favorisent les synergies entre l'action des Etats et celle de l'Union. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, pour la formation, l'éducation et la culture. Ces domaines sont et resteront de la compétence principale des Etats ; mais ils font aussi l'objet, pour le bien de tous, de politiques communes ou de programmes communautaires qu'il faudra développer encore dans l'avenir.

A fortiori, nous devons refuser la renationalisation de politiques jusqu'à présent définies et conduites au niveau de l'Union. Il y aurait un paradoxe à suggérer des pas en avant vers une plus forte intégration européenne tout en commençant par opérer des replis nationaux. Je pense en particulier aux fonds structurels. Quant à la politique agricole commune, elle doit rester au niveau européen mais être réorientée. Tout en préservant la compétitivité de notre agriculture, il faut aider les agriculteurs à produire mieux pour répondre aux attentes de qualité et de sécurité
250 alimentaires. La politique agricole commune doit encourager un développement plus équilibré de l'espace rural, préservant la diversité des terroirs et des pratiques agricoles.

Il conviendra en revanche de mieux assurer dans certains domaines la répartition " verticale " des compétences : le cadre général, fait de principes ou d'objectifs, serait alors défini au plan européen tandis que la mise en œuvre politique et technique serait assurée par les Etats ou les régions, selon les formes constitutionnelles et les institutions administratives de chaque Etat membre. Ainsi évitera-t-on la multiplication des normes de détail jugées souvent à juste titre –je pense par exemple à la chasse– comme excessivement tatillonnes.

Une " fédération d'Etats-nations " implique que les parlements nationaux soient mieux associés à la construction européenne. Renforçons les pratiques actuelles, trop timides, de concertation entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux. Confions à un organe commun –Conférence permanente des Parlements ou " Congrès "– un
260 vrai rôle politique. Réuni en sessions périodiques, il contrôlerait le respect de la subsidiarité par les instances communautaires et débattrait chaque année de " l'état de l'Union ". Ce " Congrès " pourrait jouer un rôle dans l'évolution des règles de l'Union. A l'exception des normes de nature " constitutionnelle ", pour lesquelles les procédures actuelles de ratification resteraient en vigueur, les modifications apportées dans les traités aux règles techniques relatives aux politiques communes pourraient suivre, grâce à ce " Congrès ", des procédures simplifiées. Cette formule remplacerait avantageusement, dans l'Europe de demain, la trentaine d'autorisations de ratification nationale qui aurait été sinon nécessaire. Nous pourrions ainsi faire évoluer nos politiques communes avec plus de souplesse.

Dans la perspective de l'élargissement, les coopérations renforcées seront indispensables. L'élargissement de l'Europe est une nécessité historique ; mais c'est aussi un défi. Avec l'adhésion de nouveaux membres, l'Europe devra
270 apprendre à maîtriser sa diversité. L'Europe à deux vitesses est une perspective inacceptable. Mais la paralysie institutionnelle est une menace qu'il nous faut conjurer. Ceux qui souhaitent aller de l'avant devront pouvoir le faire. C'est pourquoi le mécanisme des coopérations renforcées a été judicieusement assoupli à Nice. Il pourrait évidemment trouver à s'appliquer en matière de coordination économique, autour de l'euro, mais aussi dans des domaines tels que la santé ou l'armement. Ces coopérations permettront à un groupe d'Etats de renouveler la force d'entraînement qui a toujours été indispensable à la construction européenne.

Notre Union tirera aussi sa force de la vitalité de sa vie démocratique.

2. L'Europe doit constituer, pour ses citoyens, un véritable espace politique.

Un espace où vive un débat et où se rencontrent de véritables partis européens, comme l'est déjà le Parti des socialistes européens. Un espace où les peuples d'Europe pourraient ainsi, en élisant leurs représentants, exprimer
280 des choix politiques clairs. Un espace où les responsabilités de ceux qui décident seraient mieux marquées.

L'Europe est devenue un horizon familier à nos concitoyens, mais ceux-ci ressentent le besoin profond de mieux s'approprier l'Europe. Ils veulent en tracer le dessin. Pour eux, l'élection au Parlement européen devra s'affirmer comme le temps fort de la vie démocratique européenne. Je souhaite une réforme profonde du mode d'élection actuel. Recherchons un mode de scrutin combinant, dans chaque Etat membre, la proportionnelle et un système de grandes circonscriptions régionales. Ceci permettrait de rapprocher l'élu de l'électeur.

Entre deux élections, cette vie démocratique ne doit pas s'assoupir. Dans cet esprit, je propose trois pistes. D'abord, la consultation directe de la société civile, grâce à des forums de dialogue. Appuyons-nous sur la richesse du monde associatif en France et en Europe. Appuyons-nous sur les nouvelles technologies de la communication, à l'image du projet d'élection en ligne du premier Conseil étudiant européen. Ensuite, l'organisation régulière, au sein des Etats
290 membres, de consultations sur un sujet politique important, clairement identifié et de nature européenne. Cette consultation se ferait à travers les parlements nationaux ou des forums ad hoc. Enfin, le renforcement du rôle du médiateur européen, dont l'existence reste ignorée par l'immense majorité des citoyens européens. Son rôle serait accru grâce à l'instauration de correspondants nationaux et locaux. Le médiateur serait alors en mesure de remplir pleinement sa mission de résolution amiable des conflits entre les citoyens et les institutions européennes.

Celles-ci ont à l'évidence besoin d'être réformées.

3. Les institutions européennes doivent gagner en cohérence et en efficacité.

Le système institutionnel européen est construit autour du triangle de la Commission, du Conseil et du Parlement européen. Cet équilibre reste essentiel. Des évolutions sont néanmoins nécessaires.

Il faut mieux garantir l'intérêt général européen. C'est là le rôle de la Commission européenne. Son autorité et sa
300   légitimité politiques sont donc à renforcer. A cette fin, je propose la désignation d'un Président de la Commission issu
de la formation politique européenne victorieuse aux élections européennes.

Le Parlement européen, expression de la volonté des peuples, exercerait ainsi plus nettement son rôle d'institution
devant laquelle la Commission est politiquement responsable et par laquelle elle peut même être censurée. En
contrepartie, la responsabilité de l'Assemblée de Strasbourg devrait être mieux définie. Je propose d'instituer, pour le
Conseil européen, un droit de dissoudre le Parlement, sur proposition de la Commission ou des Etats membres. Cela
pourrait jouer en cas de crise politique ou pour lever un blocage institutionnel. Un équilibre de ce type, on le sait,
caractérise la plupart des grandes démocraties représentatives.

Comme la Commission, le Conseil a besoin d'être renforcé parce qu'il ne joue plus suffisamment son rôle. Le futur
traité devrait consacrer pleinement le Conseil européen rassemblant les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement ainsi que le
310   Président de la Commission. Ce Conseil devrait avoir la responsabilité d'approuver un véritable programme de
" législature " pluriannuel, à partir d'une proposition de la Commission et du Parlement européen. Il devrait se réunir de
façon plus fréquente –par exemple tous les deux mois– et consacrer ses travaux, sans à-côtés protocolaires, aux
débats d'orientation et aux grandes décisions de l'Union.

Par ailleurs, le moment est venu de réfléchir à la mise en place d'un Conseil permanent des ministres. Ses membres,
sortes de Vice-Premiers ministres, coordonneraient les questions européennes dans leur propre gouvernement
national. Une telle formation pourrait assurer les fonctions d'impulsion, de préparation et de coordination du travail
européen en amont du Conseil européen. En liaison avec le Parlement européen, elle assumerait mieux son rôle de
co-législateur dans l'élaboration des " lois " européennes. S'agissant de cette dernière fonction, la règle des
délibérations devrait être systématiquement celle de la majorité qualifiée.
320   Telles sont les orientations et les réformes qui pourraient fonder, selon moi, l'architecture institutionnelle de l'Europe de
demain.

Ces voies dessinent la perspective, à laquelle je suis favorable, d'une Constitution européenne. Celle-ci déterminerait
l'organisation et le fonctionnement des institutions européennes. Bien entendu, il ne suffirait pas de baptiser
" Constitution " un nouveau traité. Un tel texte n'aurait de sens que s'il était l'aboutissement de réformes profondes et
non le produit d'une simple réécriture des traités actuels. Il importe en même temps que cette démarche
constitutionnelle exprime un acte politique fondamental : l'affirmation d'un projet commun, l'expression d'une ambition
collective. Cette démarche serait d'abord, bien entendu, conduite par les gouvernements ; mais elle devrait aussi être
l'affaire des citoyens. La Charte des droits fondamentaux serait au cœur de cette Constitution. A l'image de la méthode
retenue avec succès pour élaborer la Charte, la préparation de cette Constitution pourrait être confiée au niveau
330   européen à une Convention réunissant des représentants des différents acteurs de l'Union : États, parlements
nationaux, Parlement européen, société civile. Les décisions finales reviendraient aux États et seraient ratifiées par les
peuples.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Parce que je ne suis pas un Européen tiède, je ne veux pas d'une Europe fade.

L'Europe que j'aimerais construire est une Europe forte, consciente de son identité politique, respectueuse des
peuples qui la composent, assumant ses responsabilités dans le monde, prête à supporter la charge de sa défense,
déterminée à préserver son modèle équilibré de développement économique et social, décidée à définir en toute
indépendance et à défendre avec opiniâtreté ses intérêts diplomatiques, industriels et commerciaux, attachée
passionnément à sa diversité culturelle. L'édification de l'Europe exige de nous le meilleur : l'ambition et l'imagination
340   dans la perspective, l'humilité et la ténacité dans l'effort.

J'ai la volonté de répondre, avec d'autres, à l'appel de l'Europe.

Monsieur le Directeur,

Mesdames et Messieurs

Permettez-moi tout d'abord de vous remercier pour votre invitation. Je suis heureux de m'exprimer dans un établissement dont la réputation est ancienne mais qui a résolument choisi de s'ouvrir aux réalités européennes.

Vous êtes jeunes. Vous avez grandi après la chute du mur de Berlin. Vous n'êtes pas prisonniers des schémas de la guerre froide: l'Union élargie est votre horizon naturel. La discussion sur l'avenir de l'Union européenne est avant tout votre débat.

10 Dans la patrie de Jean Monnet et de Robert Schuman, dans ce pays qui possède une conception ambitieuse du rôle de l'Union européenne dans le monde, je voudrais m'écarter du détail des considérations institutionnelles. Je ne souhaite pas vous parler de la Commission d'aujourd'hui, mais de l'Europe de demain.

Il est des moments où l'Histoire laisse aux peuples un choix décisif. Je suis convaincu que, pour les Européens, ce moment est venu. La mondialisation engendre un bouleversement similaire à celui que causa, voici cinq siècles, la découverte de l'Amérique : le monde se rétrécit ; les échanges d'idées et de biens se multiplient.

20 Isolément, nos Etats Nations n'ont plus la masse critique pour agir utilement. Les peuples qui pèseront sur le cours des choses seront ceux qui auront pris conscience de ce changement d'échelle. Les autres devront se résigner à subir. Face à ce bouleversement, les Européens disposent d'au moins trois sérieux atouts.

Le premier est notre poids économique et commercial : du marché commun au marché unique, du marché unique à l'Euro, nos réalisations sont tangibles. Face aux défis que nous avions à affronter, nous avons su, peu à peu, élaborer des réponses appropriées, originales. En regard du cloisonnement économique qui prévalait en Europe jusqu'à peu et du carcan de régulations qui entravaient

30 les entreprises et les marchés financiers, les progrès de nos économies sont impressionnants.

Notre deuxième atout est l'élargissement qui fera de notre Union une puissance à l'échelle du continent. Avec l'élargissement, c'est la réunification de l'Europe qui se réalise, c'est l'émergence d'un pôle majeur de la vie internationale. Cet ensemble aura pour lui la force. Il aura aussi pour lui, et c'est ce qui fait sa différence, un sens aigu des responsabilités car il a été forgé par l'Histoire. Avec l'élargissement, cinquante ans de division idéologique s'achèvent. C'est aussi la victoire définitive de la démocratie sur le totalitarisme, fondée sur la défaite du nazisme et du fascisme et sur la chute du

40 mur de Berlin. L'Union élargie sera puissante, elle ne sera jamais dominatrice. Enfin, et c'est à mes yeux le plus important, l'Union européenne possède comme troisième atout un capital intellectuel irremplaçable grâce à la diversité de ses cultures, grâce au niveau d'instruction de ses populations et à l'ancienneté de ses traditions démocratiques nationales .

Grâce à ces atouts, nous ne devons pas craindre la mondialisation ; mais au contraire nous pouvons en tirer le meilleur.

Près de 90 % des citoyens européens assignent à l'Union des priorités

ambitieuses : le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité ainsi que la lutte contre le chômage, contre le crime organisé et l'exclusion sociale.

50 Ces mêmes citoyens ne se sentent pourtant guère concernés par la manière dont l'Union fonctionne. C'est le signe qu'il est temps de faire l'Europe autrement.

A dessein, les Fondateurs avaient contourné les questions politiques trop brûlantes. Le rapprochement incombait aux industriels et aux marchands, conformément à la tradition historique de l'Europe où les négociants ont souvent été des précurseurs.

Tout leur génie avait consisté à traduire une ambition politique extrêmement élevée, présente dès l'origine, en une série de décisions plus concrètes, quasiment techniques. Cette sorte de « détour » a permis l'action. Le

60 rapprochement a pu s'opérer pas à pas. De l'affrontement, nous sommes passés à la volonté de coopérer dans le domaine économique, puis à l'intégration. Après les ajustement successifs (Acte Unique, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice), ma conviction est que cette méthode, qui correspondait aux contraintes et aux objectifs du passé, atteint aujourd'hui ses limites. Il faut la moderniser, car dans l'Union européenne, les temps « pré-politiques » sont révolus : derrière les marchands, ce sont les peuples qui aspirent à bâtir l'Union ; c'est la société toute entière qui se sent concernée.

Aujourd'hui, les conditions internationales et internes pour une véritable politisation du processus de construction européenne sont réunies : l'heure est

70 venue de prendre en main notre avenir et de le façonner. L'heure est venue de bâtir l'Europe politique.

En redéfinissant le « projet européen », en faisant apparaître nos objectifs au grand jour, nous pouvons faire en sorte que les Européens s'approprient l'Europe.

Je ne veux pas encore débattre sur la forme ultime que doit prendre l'Union ; je souhaite tenter d'esquisser pour quels projets elle doit exister et ce que nous voulons faire ensemble. De ce point de vue, je partage l'opinion exprimée hier par le Premier Ministre français Lionel Jospin : « l'Europe est d'abord un projet politique »

80 Avant toute autre négociation institutionnelle, nous devons en premier lieu définir quels sont nos **objectifs**. Cette clarification préalable nous permettra de **nous doter ensuite des instruments d'action à la hauteur de nos ambitions. Enfin, il nous appartient de consolider la démocratie commune**.

J'aborderai successivement ces trois points, en espérant que…vous ne considérerez pas comme une provocation de faire, à Sciences-Po, une intervention en trois parties.

**1. Définir des objectifs communs**

Pour plus de clarté, je voudrais distinguer entre les objectifs internes à l'Union et les objectifs que celle-ci devrait avoir vis-à-vis de l'extérieur.

90 **Des objectifs internes**

C'est dans leur propre réussite que les Européens doivent trouver le sens de leur avenir : il existe en effet un « modèle européen », nuancé, diversifié mais qui nous appartient en propre. Il est le résultat d'un équilibre historique original entre la prospérité et le bien-être d'un côté, la recherche d'une société

solidaire et ouverte de l'autre.

Prospérité, solidarité, sont bien nos principaux objectifs internes. Et il faut que nous soyons prospères pour pouvoir être solidaires.

Notre prospérité actuelle ne serait pas ce qu'elle est sans le marché unique et l'Euro : ils ont fait de nous une puissance commerciale de premier rang, de
100 taille à rivaliser avec l'économie des Etats-Unis. Ils ont permis à nos entreprises de se développer dans un environnement sûr, sans entraves aux échanges, ni risques de change. La compétitivité des entreprises s'est accrue, l'inflation est maîtrisée. Ce résultat me rend optimiste : il y a quelques années lorsque j'étais Président du Conseil italien- une telle perspective, avec douze Etats, passait pour irréaliste…

Avec l'élargissement, le futur grand marché intégré comptera sur l'apport de 500 millions de personnes. Cette expansion interviendra dans un contexte de rapide évolution technologique. Je n'ai aucun doute que le résultat en soit bénéfique pour tous.
110 Bien entendu, cet élargissement pose lui aussi dans de nouvelles perspectives, la question des solidarités.

Le moment vient vite où nous devrons débattre de la politique agricole commune de demain, et de la politique structurelle après l'élargissement. Quel doit être le rôle d'agriculteurs dans la société du XXIème siècle ? Comment assurer la compétitivité et le respect des exigences des consommateurs ? Restons-nous d'accord pour aider les régions en retard ? Selon quels critères ? Comment assurer la redistribution dans un ensemble aussi vaste, sans administration décentralisée ?

Seule une stratégie conçue au niveau européen peut assurer les synergies et les
120 équilibres nécessaires aux politiques communes de demain. L'exigence d'une approche politique globale n'est pas contradictoire avec de nouvelles formes de gestion, plus proches du terrain, plus « horizontales » et qui impliquent encore plus directement les collectivités régionales et locales.

Enfin, nous devons penser à ce que signifie aujourd'hui le « E » d'UEM (Union « économique» et monétaire) : les politiques budgétaires nationales sont encore trop souvent conçues sur base des intérêts nationaux, alors même que l'Euro nous place en position de partager les risques. Des questions se posent : tous les Etats prennent-ils les mesures qui assurent durablement la convergence ? Comment privilégier le plein-emploi sans détériorer les autres
130 indicateurs ?

Tout ceci est important car, sans une poursuite continue de la convergence et de l'intégration, le grand marché se désagrégera, et l'Euro ne pourra jouer le rôle mondial pour lequel nous l'avons créé.

Le second volet, incontournable pour préserver le « modèle européen », est de maintenir autant que possible la cohésion de nos sociétés.

Si nous tenons à un modèle social solidaire, « fraternel » comme dit la devise de votre République, nous devons également poursuivre l'intégration : seule la constitution d'une Union politique d'une taille suffisante nous permettra de le défendre à l'échelle mondiale. Il faut en effet être conscient que, dans la
140 plupart des économies développées, aux Etats-Unis et au Japon notamment, mais aussi dans la majeure partie des pays européens, les inégalités de revenu

se creusent.

Mesdames et Messieurs, nos sociétés ne peuvent pas, sans dommage, voir certains s'enrichir rapidement et d'autres rester au bord du chemin. Pour des motifs éthiques comme pour des raisons économiques, nous devons combattre les inégalités qui déchirent nos sociétés.

Sans rêver d'une société parfaitement égalitaire, je tenais à mettre en garde contre le danger de voir les différences se creuser encore. Nos sociétés ne le supporteraient pas. Je crois que, même si le niveau moyen de revenu est

150  aujourd'hui supérieur à ce qu'il était par le passé, nous ne sommes pas loin du point de rupture.

Ensemble, nous pouvons bâtir une « nouvelle économie à l'européenne » dans laquelle l'innovation, la compétitivité, la liberté d'entreprendre sont des valeurs positives mais où l'homme demeure la suprême référence. Il ne s'agit pas, bien sûr, d'harmoniser toutes les règles sociales au niveau européen mais d'intégrer, dans nos préoccupations économiques, comme nous avons commencé de le faire, des objectifs sociaux : l'emploi, la lutte contre l'exclusion et la pauvreté.

Bien des questions restent ouvertes à ce stade : jusqu'où doit aller la flexibilité du marché du travail? Où commence la précarité ? Comment éviter que des

160  millions d'enfants grandissent dans des foyers dont les revenus sont en dessous du seuil de pauvreté ? Enfin, comment intégrer les millions d'immigrés que la société européenne a attirés à l'intérieur de ses frontières ?

Actuellement, comme vous le savez, en matière sociale, les pouvoirs dévolus à l'Union européenne sont limités.

Mais ce n'est pas une raison pour escamoter la discussion sur le type de société que nous voulons et sur les instruments absolument indispensables pour la bâtir. Une telle question n'est pas de celles qu'on traite par défaut. Le grand débat qui s'ouvre doit l'aborder par priorité. Là encore, pour être à la hauteur des attentes sociales de ses citoyens, l'Union a besoin de faire des choix

170  généreux, et de s'y tenir ; en un mot, elle a besoin d'être gouvernée.

De même, nous ne pouvons laisser de côté l'environnement : nous devons nous battre ensemble pour mettre en œuvre, dans l'Union, une économie fondée sur le développement durable. Ce concept paraît abstrait à certains. Mais pour vous les jeunes, il ne l'est pas : c'est l'expression de la solidarité entre les générations.

Dans 15 jours au Sommet de Göteborg, il sera l'objet de l'attention principale des Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement.

Du reste, dans quels domaines plus que dans ceux de l'environnement, de l'économie et du social pouvons-nous apprécier le sens de notre Union, et sa

180  valeur ajoutée ? Les événements récents (ESB, fièvre aphteuse) ont montré les conséquences catastrophiques de politiques à courte vue et étroitement nationales, beaucoup plus coûteuses en réalité que la prévention et l'action concertée à l'échelle européenne.

L'Union a besoin d'être gouvernée, c'est à dire que les décisions communautaires soient prises en réfléchissant aux implications de long terme, en dépassant les échéances immédiates et les contraintes politiques du moment.

Enfin, l'Union doit promouvoir une plus grande cohésion sociale qui suppose

de lutter contre les trafics, le crime organisé, et tous les fléaux qui échappent à
190 l'action d'un seul Etat.

Toutes ces questions, tous ces objectifs internes à l'Union que j'ai bien
conscience d'avoir abordés de manière un peu rapide, Mesdames et Messieurs,
sont éminemment politiques. Ils appellent une méthode de travail politique, et
des réponses conçues avec la pleine participation des citoyens et de leurs
représentants.

**Des objectifs externes**

Après avoir esquissé ce que pourraient être les principaux objectifs internes de
l'Union élargie, j'en viens maintenant à nos **objectifs externes**.

Etre une puissance en devenir, une « puissance potentielle » si j'ose dire, voici
200 le paradoxe qui caractérise la situation de l'Europe dans le monde aujourd'hui.

Nous ne devons pas nous en contenter : l'Union de demain, l'Union qui ira de
la Méditerranée au pôle Nord, de l'Atlantique à la grande plaine d'Europe
orientale, cette Europe là devra parvenir à parler d'une seule voix sur la scène
mondiale. A cette condition, et seulement à cette condition, nous pourrons être
entendus, nous pourrons agir de manière efficace.

C'est absolument essentiel car l'Union a un rôle à jouer dans la « gouvernance
» mondiale : dans les relations entre Etats européens, l'état de droit a remplacé
le jeu brutal de la puissance. Après bien des guerres sanglantes, les Européens
ont proclamé leur « droit à la paix ». C'est pourquoi, nous pouvons jouer un
210 rôle tout particulier : en parachevant l'intégration, nous apportons au monde
l'exemple réussi d'une méthode pour la Paix.

Dans l'Union, le poids respectif des Etats n'est pas le seul critère, les alliances
ne sont pas de mise. En un mot, les rapports de force sont atténués. C'est un
acquis considérable qui pourrait faciliter la mise en place, à l'échelle
universelle, des règles du jeu que la mondialisation exige. Nous avons aussi su
développer les procédures de vote, caractéristiques des processus
démocratiques, là où bien des organisations internationales piétinent à cause
de la nécessité de l'unanimité.

Sans agressivité envers personne, sans arrogance, nous devons être fiers de
220 notre œuvre et, dans notre intérêt commun, travailler à la préserver.

Le premier objectif externe de l'Union devra donc être d'assurer la sécurité des
Européens, de leur donner la stabilité politique à laquelle ils aspirent.

Grâce notamment à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne qui sont à l'origine de la
déclaration de Saint-Malo, l'Union a tiré des leçons des guerres balkaniques de
la dernière décennie. Elle met en place, dans des délais très brefs, une
politique européenne de sécurité et de défense et décide de la rendre
opérationnelle, d'ici 2003, une force de réaction rapide de 60.000 soldats.
Ces engagements doivent encore se concrétiser, ce qui exige une
réorganisation en profondeur des forces armées de nos pays et des choix
230 budgétaires.

Enfin, pour exercer un réel leadership dans le domaine de la sécurité, l'Union
ne devra pas, durablement, escamoter certaines questions passées sous silence
: pour quelle cause serions-nous prêts à mourir ensemble ? Jusqu'où peut-on,
par des montages technocratiques, « exporter de la stabilité » quand faut-il
engager des vies humaines ? Un ensemble dépourvu d'unité politique peut-il,

sur le long terme, agir principalement par la distribution de crédits ? L'Union est-elle dotée des moyens financiers et technologiques d'assurer sa sécurité ? Voici bien des questions pour un vrai débat politique, au sens le plus noble du terme.

240 Elle devra aussi, et peut-être surtout, surmonter la fragmentation et la complexité de ses instruments de politique extérieure.

Ici je veux être clair : l'Union européenne, heureusement, a une politique commerciale respectée, parce que forte et intégrée. Mais une politique commerciale ne suffit pas à faire des relations extérieures ; une politique commerciale ne suffit pas à exister sur la scène mondiale.

Or la politique extérieure de l'Union continue de balbutier. Elle n'est pas encore adulte, éclatée entre les diplomaties nationales, le Conseil des Ministres, le Haut Représentant créé par le traité d'Amsterdam, et la Commission.

250 C'est à mon sens le domaine principal où l'Union politique peut progresser rapidement. A défaut, elle passe à côté d'une formidable valeur ajoutée.

Enfin, et ceci est aussi un objectif externe : il y a urgence à défendre notre environnement, qu'il s'agisse de la préservation de la biodiversité, du développement d'une agriculture durable ou du réchauffement de la planète.

Sur ce dernier point, sachez que ma détermination est entière : l'Union européenne se battra pour sauver l'accord de Kyoto. Il en va de notre leadership. Il en va de notre sens des responsabilités.

Malgré quelques incertitudes, la majorité des scientifiques s'accordent à reconnaître l'urgence d'une action. Il n'est pas acceptable que les pays

260 industrialisés, producteurs massifs de $CO_2$, se dérobent à leurs devoirs.

Comme je l'ai déjà écrit dans la presse française, nous sommes prêts à discuter avec les Etats-Unis de leurs éventuelles difficultés mais nous ne renierons pas cet accord. En l'état actuel des choses, le protocole de Kyoto qui est le fruit d'années de négociations, est la meilleure option possible.

Ainsi, la matière ne manque pas pour des réflexions de fond. Toutes les interrogations de fond, toute tentative d'assigner à l'Union des objectifs à la hauteur du défi de la mondialisation, aboutissent à un seul diagnostic : l'Union a besoin de plus de cohérence et dans de nombreux domaines clés, de plus d'intégration.

270 Un saut qualitatif est nécessaire.

**2. Nous devons doter l'Union des instruments de nos ambitions**

Mesdames et Messieurs, il ne suffit pas de vouloir une Europe forte, une « Europe puissance ». Encore faut-il lui accorder les moyens de mener sa politique, y compris des moyens institutionnels et financiers. Encore faut-il changer notre méthode de négociation, le débat politique ayant une vertu en soi.

**Des moyens renforcés**

La situation actuelle est assez critique : après des décennies de progrès et de succès, l'Union peut rester au milieu du gué. Faute d'impulsion nouvelle, faute

280 d'un sursaut des Etats membres et des institutions communautaires, l'élargissement pourrait n'apporter qu'une unification continentale superficielle.

6

Là où les citoyens cherchent une société plus juste, ils ne trouveraient qu'une zone de libre échange. Je ne souhaite pas voir l'Union se transformer en un groupement d'Etats incapable d'agir et de développer un véritable projet politique.

Contrairement à certains, je ne verrais pas un avenir brillant dans la multiplication de structures dites légères, des « secrétariats » ou des « comités de pilotage », qui ne seraient surtout pas ce serait voulu des autorités
290 politiques.

La démocratie en souffrirait parce que les décisions de ce type d'instances informelles ne seraient ni transparentes, ni soumises au Parlement européen, ni susceptibles de recours devant la Cour de justice.

Les procédures communautaires offrent aux citoyens, quoiqu'en disent ses détracteurs, un grand nombre de garanties. A cet égard, l'apport décisif de la Cour de justice ne sera jamais assez souligné. Et je crois que c'est un trésor réel du traité de Nice, de l'avoir renforcée.

Au bout du compte, je conclus prudemment que la structure actuelle de l'Union, qui abrite à la fois le pilier communautaire et des cercles
300 intergouvernementaux, est probablement dépassée.

J'en donne encore trois exemples :

• Tout d'abord, la gestion de l'Union économique et monétaire n'est ni efficace, ni cohérente : dans le domaine monétaire, la Banque Centrale Européenne est indépendante mais elle n'a pas aujourd'hui d'interlocuteur stable qui représente une vision d'ensemble des orientations économiques de l'Union et de ses membres. Les dernières grandes orientations de politique économique vont dans la bonne direction, mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour disposer d'un vrai « gouvernement économique ». Seule la Commission, sur mandat du
310 Conseil, peut être l'interlocuteur de la Banque centrale : c'est elle en effet qui incarne l'intérêt général communautaire, c'est en son sein que peut s'effectuer efficacement l'évaluation globale de la politique économique de l'Union. Toute autre solution, conçue pour règler le problème de la représentation externe de l'Euro, ne répondrait pas aux besoins.

• En politique étrangère, le Premier Ministre hier, a exprimé un très grand nombre de vérités desquelles je me sens proche. Je voudrais rester dans sa logique avec mon deuxième exemple : en politique étrangère comme ailleurs, il est illusoire d'attendre des résultats d'un
320 système intergouvernemental.

La cohérence et la globalité ne sera atteinte, là comme ailleurs, que par la conjonction des deux branches de l'exécutif : le Conseil qui décide, et la Commission qui exécute. C'est pourquoi je continue de penser que le Haut Représentant, qui fait d'ailleurs un travail remarquable, serait beaucoup plus efficace encore s'il était également membre de la Commission européenne. Tout cela serait de l'exécution sous contrôle permanent du Conseil des Ministres. Mais plus simple, plus cohérent, plus efficace.

o Dernier exemple : l'Europe de la justice et des affaires intérieures. Des domaines aussi sensibles pour les libertés

330 publiques que le droit pénal ou la coopération entre les forces
de l'ordre, échappent au contrôle du Parlement et de la Cour
parce qu'ils sont traités dans des cercles intergouvernementaux.
Est-ce là l'Europe que nous voulons durablement?
Je ressens souvent comme injuste que soit reproché à l'Union son caractère
non démocratique, alors même que, pour certaines des politiques soumises à
ces critiques, les règles communautaires ne s'appliquent pas !
D'une manière beaucoup plus générale, nous devons mener à terme le
processus qui conduit à remplacer le consensus par le vote, procédure normale
dans un espace démocratique.

340 Il s'agit de tendre vers un système de décision qui repose sur le vote, système
efficace et compréhensible par tous. Et de ce point de vue, je ne puis que
répéter combien le résultat du Conseil européen de Nice, en matière
d'extension du vote à la majorité qualifiée, me laisse perplexe.
Mais il s'agit plus encore d'acquérir tout à fait une culture majoritaire, dans
laquelle les décisions reflètent la volonté du plus grand nombre, mais
s'imposent à tous. Trop souvent, nous cherchons le consensus même quand
celui-ci n'existe pas, ce qui entraîne la paralysie. Pour surmonter les réticences
de quelquesuns, il n'y a qu'une solution : voter.
Tout ce qui a été construit de durable en Europe l'a été par la coopération

350 harmonieuse des Etats et des institutions supranationales autour d'une méthode
: la méthode communautaire.
Le génie des fondateurs a justement consisté à proposer une construction
institutionnelle originale qui ne soit ni fédérale, ni intergouvernementale. C'est
bien parce que la Communauté économique européenne a surmonté ce
dilemme entre « super Etat » et « Etats juxtaposés » qu'elle est entrée dans
l'histoire. C'est en ce qu'elle rassemble, au lieu d'aiguiser la confrontation,
qu'elle est une solution d'avenir.
A la fois comme ancien président du Conseil italien et comme Président de la
Commission, voilà ma conception, exigeante, du débat sur l'avenir de

360 l'Europe.
**Une nouvelle méthode communautaire, fondée sur le débat**
Le débat est ouvert de façon large, partout en Europe : il a la vertu de
permettre les explications, de démythifier ce qui est compliqué ou mal perçu.
Le débat éclaire les tendances profondes. Ainsi en est-il de la rédaction de la
Charte des Droits Fondamentaux, proclamée à Nice. Elle est le signe que
l'Union a franchi une étape irréversible. D'une Union des marchés nous
sommes passés, définitivement, par sa proclamation, à une Union des droits et
des libertés. Ces droits et ces libertés forment le socle fondamental de l'Union.
Ils lui confèrent une légitimité indispensable et lancent un processus

370 constitutionnel européen nouveau.
Le débat semble parfois se polariser : ainsi en est-il actuellement de la
question de la répartition des compétences entre l'Union et les Etats. C'est une
question centrale, car un enjeu du débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe est d'offrir aux
citoyens une Europe dans laquelle ils se sentent à l'aise, c'est à dire où ils
jouent un rôle politique à la fois au niveau local, national et européen.
L'enracinement local est nécessaire dans un monde ouvert, globalisé, qui peut

faire peur. Les Nations sont et demeureront un cadre essentiel, en raison de notre Histoire et de nos cultures. Mais sans le niveau européen, nous sommes condamnés au mieux à subir des normes venues d'ailleurs, à subir un monde
380 conçu en d'autres lieux.

C'est pourquoi le besoin se fait sentir de mieux comprendre la répartition des responsabilités en Europe. Toutefois, la réponse, à mon sens, ne doit pas seulement être cherchée en termes de compétences abstraites, dans des cloisonnements étanches ou définitifs.

Nous devons moins encourager les cloisonnements, quels qu'ils soient, que permettre aux différents niveaux de décider de façon complémentaire.

Il faut répondre à l'aspiration générale des populations d'être gouvernées au plus près toutes les fois où c'est possible, et efficacement, ce qui implique, dans certains, cas des décisions à l'échelon central européen plutôt que local
390 ou national.

C'est ce que résume le concept de « subsidiarité » bien compris. L'Union n'a pas à s'occuper de tout : elle doit se recentrer sur des tâches stratégiques, donner des orientations, jouer son rôle global.

Je suis bien conscient qu'un exercice de répartition des compétences entre le niveau national et le niveau européen, comporte un risque : celui de n'être qu'une répétition, par d'autres moyens, des débats et des désaccords sur la substance même du projet européen.

Pour certains, il s'agira surtout de « re-nationaliser » des compétences transférées ou, à l'inverse, d'en « communautariser » de nouvelles, selon des
400 critères tirés de la sensibilité de l'opinion sur tel ou tel sujet, ou des finances publiques.

Pour ma part, j'entrerai dans ce débat sans arrière-pensée, en pensant au fond, et en cherchant au cas par cas, de quelle manière nous pouvons le mieux atteindre nos objectifs : par des compétences séparées ou partagées. Même si cela peut paraître compliqué, nous devons raisonner par fonction et laisser au système de la souplesse.

Je prendrai un exemple pour illustrer ce propos : celui de l'éducation.

Il est clair que la responsabilité première doit rester aux Etats ou aux régions.

Mais le niveau européen a certainement une valeur ajoutée à apporter,
410 notamment :

• en facilitant les échanges, la reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes et l'adoption des grilles harmonisées d'évaluation des compétences acquises ;
• en permettant de confronter les expériences sur des sujets tels que la lutte contre l'échec scolaire, la formation continue, la violence à l'école, etc…
• en offrant des bourses et en encourageant la constitution de centres de recherche performants.

Pour conclure sur la subsidiarité, il me paraît essentiel que le contrôle de celle-ci
420 incombe à la Cour de justice, organe indépendant dont la vocation est d'arbitrer les conflits, à l'instar des cours constitutionnelles de nos Etats.

Confier ce contrôle à une « deuxième chambre » ou « chambre des Nations », constituerait un recul du droit dans l'Union européenne, un pas vers l'arbitraire

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de la conjoncture politique.

Ceci m'amène à mon troisième et dernier point.

**3. Consolider la démocratie commune**

La démocratie européenne n'échappera pas aux grandes questions du droit constitutionnel telles qu'elles ont été forgées, peu à peu, pour les Etats Nations , notamment celles qui ont trait à la séparation des pouvoirs entre exécutif,
430 législatif et judiciaire, si vous me permettez d'employer une expression anglaise, aux « checks and balances » ou encore à celle du consentement à l'impôt.

Toutes ces questions sont ouvertes. Nous devrons y apporter des réponses aussi exigeantes que nos traditions démocratiques nationales. Pour moi, comme pour l'ensemble du collège des commissaires qui compte une grande majorité d'élus, d'anciens ministres, c'est absolument essentiel.

Si les questions sont celles du droit constitutionnel classique, les réponses devront néanmoins être originales. Plaquer sur la réalité communautaire des solutions nationales est une tentation, mais probablement pas toute la solution.
440 Parmi les défis spécifiques que l'UE doit relever, l'un des plus difficiles est celui de la légitimation démocratique de ses décisions. Chacun en ressent le besoin, mais rien n'est plus subjectif.

En réalité, je m'étonne toujours de l'idée tenace que les institutions européennes souffrent d'un déficit de « légitimation » ; car après tout

• le Conseil est composé de membres des gouvernements nationaux ;

• la Commission est nommée par les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement et approuvée par le Parlement européen ; elle peut être censurée par le Parlement.

• la plupart des textes européens sont débattus, soit dans les Parlements
450 nationaux, soit l'enceinte parlementaire européenne, soit dans les deux.

Mais telle est la perception. Le citoyen veut avoir la garantie qu'il ne cède pas des compétences à des institutions moins fiables que celles qu'il connaît au niveau national.

Sans doute nos institutions sont-elles trop compliquées. D'où ce paradoxe : là où les pouvoirs communautaires sont précis (concurrence, commerce extérieur), même s'ils sont étendus, l'autorité suit. Là où ils sont peu clairs ou complexes, l'autorité communautaire peine à s'affirmer.

La question de la transparence au niveau communautaire s'entrecroise d'ailleurs avec une question encore plus complexe, que je pourrais résumer
460 ainsi : comment peut-on gérer les politiques communautaires avec la participation des citoyens, dans une organisation beaucoup plus décentralisée qu'actuellement ?

Je crois en effet qu'il est très difficile d'améliorer le fonctionnement des institutions européennes sans en même temps procéder, dans le cadre des règles existantes, à une révision approfondie des mécanismes de participation des entités nationales et infra-nationales, d'interactions et de gestion décentralisée des politiques communes. C'est tout l'enjeu d'un livre blanc sur la « gouvernance », que la Commission rendra public en juillet.

L'autre aspect essentiel de l'édification d'une démocratie est celui du
470 consentement à l'impôt. Pour moi, toute réflexion d'envergure sur l'avenir de

l'UE doit comporter à son ordre du jour la réforme de son financement.
La question des ressources européennes doit faire partie intégrante du débat
sur la subsidiarité : chaque échelon de décision doit pouvoir compter sur des
ressources identifiées, proportionnées aux missions qui lui ont été confiées.
Dans la perspective de l'élargissement, la création d'un impôt européen (à
définir) remplaçant le système actuel de contributions nationales, source
permanente de conflits entre Etats, serait sans doute une solution opportune,
d'ailleurs souvent évoquée. Des solutions existent, les difficultés étant moins
techniques que politiques : la concentration des marchés financiers et
480 industriels permet d'en imaginer d'autres.
Nous devrions aussi ouvrir un débat sur le niveau du budget européen. Celuici
donne lieu à des critiques assez peu objectives, voire irrationnelles, laissant
entendre que l'UE coûte cher. Pourtant, qui a les ordres de grandeur en tête ?
Qui sait que nous ne consacrons pas même à l'Union européenne 1,27 % de
notre richesse, Politique agricole et Fonds structurels inclus ?.L'ordre de
grandeur actuel serait plutôt de 1,09 %.
Dans le débat qui a débuté et qui doit durer jusqu'en 2004, je discerne deux
approches : certains privilégient le fond, d'autres donnent la priorité aux
institutions.
490 Je ne vois pas de contradiction entre ces deux manière d'aborder la discussion.
Je partage le souci des uns et des autres.
Comme je l'ai dit au début de mon propos, c'est en dévoilant ses objectifs, c'est
en révélant qu'elle est un projet politique que l'Union pourra se construire.
Nous devons donc commencer par débattre entre nous de ce que nous voulons
faire ensemble, comme Lionel Jospin nous y a invités hier. Sans projet
commun, sans politiques communes, il n'y aura pas d'Europe forte.
Mais ensuite, une fois que nous aurons défini la substance, nous devrons
rapidement tirer les conséquences de nos ambitions : sans institutions fortes et
respectées, sans moyens financiers, il n'y aura pas non plus « d'Europe
500 puissance ». Le danger qui nous guette est celui du consensus sur un statu quo
apparent alors même que le monde change, alors même que l'Union change.
C'est pourquoi le Chancelier Schröder va dans la bonne direction lorsqu'il
propose une clarification des rôles respectifs de la Commission et du Conseil
des ministres.
Nous ne devons jamais oublier non plus que sans clarification des rôles des
différentes institutions, ni implication active, dans la construction européenne,
des échelons nationaux et infra nationaux, il n'y aura pas de démocratie. Sans
citoyens qui se sentent politiquement concernés aux trois niveaux local,
national et européen, il n'y aura pas de large adhésion des populations.
510 C'est à la synthèse entre ces deux approches que j'entends travailler. C'est en
ce sens que nous devons poursuivre la discussion pour 2004, et que je souhaite
maintenant répondre à vos questions.

Regeringen fremlægger i dag synspunkter om Europas fremtid og den videre udvikling af dansk europapolitik.

Jeg er glad for denne lejlighed til at sætte disse synspunkter ind i en bredere historisk og international ramme:

Uanset hvor gode holdninger, vi har i Danmark, så vil vi aldrig alene ændre verdens gang. Dét har vi kun en chance for i samarbejde med andre.

Derfor er det Danmarks interesse, at der udvikles et langt stærkere og mere forpligtende internationalt fællesskab.

Den Europæiske Union er det mest forpligtende fællesskab, vi er med i.

10 EU-samarbejdet er vævet så tæt, at det er gjort umuligt mellem os indbyrdes at gentage den nære, blodige fortid. Ved at eksportere varer og ideer til hinanden i stedet for krige og kriser har landene i fællesskab opnået en vældig økonomisk og social fremgang.

Danmarks medlemskab af EU er den helt afgørende forudsætning for, at vi kan varetage vores interesser og præge verden med vore holdninger.

Derfor skal dansk udenrigspolitik have til formål at styrke EU, så vi sammen med vore EU-partnere med langt større kraft kan præge hele den globale udvikling.

Vores egne sidste 50 år med fred, frihed og velstand, risikerer kun at blive en parentes mellem nogle af verdenshistoriens katastrofer, hvis ikke denne opgave

20 lykkes for os:

For vi har i den moderne verden et uafviseligt skæbnefællesskab med andre lande og verdensdele. Deres ufred, ufrihed og fattigdom bliver også vores problem, når sult og had udløser krige og folkevandringer, og giver grobund for stærke mænd med 'nemme', populistiske løsninger.

EU har udviklet sig til det eneste mulige samlingssted, når Europas lande fra nord til syd, fra øst til vest i fællesskab skal møde globaliseringens udfordringer. Og det er ikke mindst gennem udvidelsen af EU, at vi kan bidrage til sikkerhed og velstand på vores eget kontinent.

Alligevel er den folkelige opbakning til EU langt fra en given sag. Det er

30 demonstreret ved to danske folkeafstemninger de sidste 10 år og i Irland for et par måneder siden.

Tvivlen om EU er næppe udtryk for, at nationerne står splittet i to helt uenige befolkningsgrupper. Den er snarere udtryk for modstridende stemninger inde i hovedet på de fleste af os:

Vi har både de stærke følelser knyttet til nationen og en sansning af nytten i det europæiske samarbejde.

Mange af os gik for 30 år siden imod dansk medlemsskab af Det Europæiske Fællesskab, fordi vi frygtede, at synspunkter, der var fjendtlige over for vores ønsker om velfærd og afspænding, skulle blive toneangivende .

40 Men vi har oplevet en udvikling, der blev anderledes positiv. Vi ser et samarbejde, hvor fælles værdier om menneskeret og social retfærdighed står langt stærkere, end vi turde tro for 30 år siden - og hvor gamle diktaturer har fundet - eller er ved at finde - deres plads i fællesskabet som nye demokratier.

Vi står med en ny og spændende virkelighed. En virkelighed, som man kan

vælge at være med i og påvirke indholdet i. Eller være uden for indflydelse på, men alligevel ude af stand til at frigøre sig fra.

Der tales om at bygge bro i dansk europapolitik.

Der kan ikke bygges bro til dem, der fornægter realiteterne om det europæiske samarbejde, og som lever politisk af at nære fordomme og frygt for fremtiden,
50 det fremmede og de fremmede.

Men der kan og skal bygges bro mellem det nationale særpræg, vi vil fastholde, og dét europæiske samarbejde, vi ikke kan undvære.

Min tale i dag er et forsøg på denne form for brobyggeri.

Udgangspunktet må være kampen for en bedre verden. Hvilke problemer ønsker befolkningen vi skal løse? Herfra må vi identificere de kerneområder, hvor et forpligtende fællesskab er nødvendigt for løsningen. Ændringer i traktaten og reformer af EU's institutioner kan være forudsætninger for løsningen. Men de kan aldrig været målet i sig selv. Slet ikke i forsøget på at sparke en folkelig debat i gang.
60 Jeg vil gennem min beskrivelse bl.a. forsøge at give en vision for Europa i 2010. Ikke som en simpel fremskrivning. Heller ikke som et fantasifuldt hjernespind. Derimod som en realistisk vision, der tager højde både for uomgængelige udfordringer og for uafviselige synspunkter fra vore samarbejdspartnere.

**Rå markedskræfter eller internationalt samfund?**

Globalisering er kodeordet for den vældige forandring i økonomi, teknologi, jobmuligheder og levevilkår, der foregår, og som med stor hast spreder sine virkninger til alle hjørner af kloden. Gamle job forsvinder og nye frembringes i meget højt tempo. Hele industrier flyttes rundt mellem lande og verdensdele. Verden som helhed bliver uden al tvivl rigere af udviklingen. Globaliseringen
70 betyder vækst i produktion, handel og produktivitet. Også mange fattige lande får del i denne fremgang.

Globalisering er ikke defineret ved et bestemt indhold og et bestemt resultat. Det eneste, der er helt sikkert, er, at der findes ikke nogen hemmelig sti tilbage til de lukkede nationalstater fra årtier tilbage. Vores globalt gensidige afhængighed er lige så umulig at vende sig væk fra, som det er for ægget at komme tilbage i skallen, når det først er slået ud på den varme pande.

Men globaliseringen stiller både til det enkelte menneske og til det enkelte land større krav om viden og omstillingsevne. Derfor risikerer socialt og uddannelsesmæssigt svage at blive hægtet af.
80 Det kræver både nationalt og globalt et stærkt samfund til at modvirke tendensen til endnu større ulighed i og mellem landene.

Men dén verden, der lige nu udfolder sig for vore øjne, er politisk ustruktureret og økonomisk dereguleret.

En alt for stor del af verden hærges af ekstrem fattigdom, sult, sygdom, underudvikling og undertrykkelse.

I mange u-lande og tidligere sovjetrepublikker forhindrer traditioner og uduelige og korrupte systemer mobilisering af enorme menneskelige ressourcer, mens uklare retstilstande blokerer for investering udefra.

Markedskræfternes frie løb på tværs af grænserne har mange andre

90 konsekvenser end altid at udløse en fri konkurrence til uomtvistelig gavn for forbrugere og borgere.

Det internationale erhvervsliv samles i disse år i firmaer, der i mange tilfælde er større og stærkere end middelstore nationalstater. I mange udviklingslande og tidligere sovjetrepublikker opleves sådanne firmaer let som nye kolonimagter, der rykker ind.

Et ganske lille antal selskaber sidder på det meste af verdenshandlen. Derfor har de multinationale giganter ofte en monopollignende position på væsentlige dele af verdensmarkedet. Mange oplever f.eks., at national kultur trues af amerikansk-domineret underholdningsindustri.

100 De internationale kapitalmarkeder kendetegnes af umådeholden spekulation, hvor enorme værdier skabes og destrueres, og hvor formuer flyttes voldsomt og vilkårligt rundt over grænserne med dramatiske konsekvenser for millioner af mennesker.

Globaliseringen er også skatteparadiser, hvor dem med de hurtige gevinster kan slappe af uden at bidrage til et fællesskab. Der er voldsom og grænseoverskridende økonomisk kriminalitet. Mafiaer organiserer storstilet smugling af mennesker, der drives på vandring af elendigheden i deres hjemlande.

Dét er alle disse fænomener, der hos mange mennesker efterlader et billede af

110 globalisering lig med rå markedskræfter, der skaber ulighed, ustabilitet og konflikt.

Verdens uorden er kendetegnet ved mangel på tilstrækkeligt stærke globale organisationer og aftaler - og ved eksistensen af kun én supermagt, der aktuelt regeres af meget stærk tro på markedskræfterne og de nationale egeninteresser. Det er EU, der har det bedste udgangspunkt for at modvirke verdens uorden. EU er i dag det eneste nogenlunde effektivt organiserede regionale samarbejde i verden.

I de fleste europæiske lande har vi oplevet det anderledes positivt, at der var en balance mellem samfund og marked. Vi har set kvaliteten i, at stat, lov og

120 civilsamfund var en stærk ramme, der kunne afbalancere pengemagten.

Derfor har vi opbygget etEU, der forsøger at anvende disse erfaringer regionalt. EU-kommissionens vetomod fusion mellem General Electric og Honeywell var et slagkraftigt eksempelpå, at EU også globalt kan gå op mod skabelsen af endnu en dominerende multinational gigant.

De vigtigste politiske opgaver i første del af det 21. århundrede er netop at opbygge denne balance mellem samfundsregulering og markedskræfter også internationalt. At vi forpligter hinanden. Og at vi opbygger en international orden uden dominans fra noget enkelt land eller nogen enkelt region.

**International solidaritet - global deal**

130 Under den danske regerings formandskab i den vestlige verdens økonomiske samarbejdsorganisation (OECD) i dette forår fik vi opbakning til at formulere nogle retningslinier for en 'global deal' – en global pagt, der forpligter.

'Global deal' er summen afalt det, som skal blive resultatet af en ny runde
iverdenshandelsforhandlingerne (WTO) og af verdenstopmødet om bæredygtig
udvikling iJohannesburg i september 2002 - 10 årefter Rio-mødet:
Udviklingsbistanden må løftes og de fattigste u-lande må have afskrevet gæld.
Alle rige lande må forpligte sig til at opfylde FN's krav om en u-landsindsats på
mindst 0,7 pct. af nationalindkomsten. Hvis kravet bliver opfyldt vil den globale
udviklingsbistand bliver tredoblet .

140 Øget u-landsbistand måkobles til en langt stærkere indsats mod de globale
miljøproblemer.

Udvikling kræver sundhed. En fælles indsats – især gennem FN – skal rette
effektive angreb på morderiske epidemier som aids, malaria og tuberkulose. Det
handler både om massiv indsats for at forebygge smitte, for at opbygge et
fungerende sundhedsvæsen og sikre, at de multinationale selskaber leverer
livsvigtig medicin til priser, som ludfattige stater og mennesker kan betale.
Udvikling kræver også bedre betingelser for overførsel af teknologi fra den rige
verden.

Men udvikling kræver – allervigtigst - at u-landene ikke mødes af told og

150 importbegrænsninger på vore markeder - og at de ikke afskæres ved snedige
definitioner af såkaldte anti-dumping-regler.

En ny runde i WTO skal netop være en udviklingsrunde med fokus på de fattige
landes adgang og reelle muligheder for at komme ind på de rige landes
markeder på for dem vigtige områder.

De rige lande må uden modydelser åbne for de fattigste lande. EU er gået i
spidsen ved 'Everything-but-arms'-initiativet i foråret 2001, der efter nogle år
giver verdens 48 fattigste lande fuldstændig fri markedsadgang for alle andre
produkter end våben.

Øget markedsadgang for u-landene vil kræve massive opgør med velerhvervede

160 interesser. Det vil forudsætte omvæltninger i EU's landbrugsstøtteordninger og
USA's lokale begunstigelser af landmændene. Det skal vi i de rige lande være
villige til at acceptere, samtidig med at vi giver u-landene praktisk hjælp til at lære
og udnytte de internationale handelsregler bedst muligt.

Men samtidig skal viinsistere på sammenhæng mellem frihandel og international
orden i form afforpligtende globale miljøaftaler og respekt for fundamentale
socialerettigheder - jfr. aftalerne i den internationale arbejdsorganisation ILO.
Detskal vi ikke gøre for ad bagvejen at beskytte vore egne industrier, men for
atsikre, at den globale udvikling bliver miljømæssigt og socialt bæredygtig.

'Global deal' har også et sikkerhedspolitisk perspektiv. Ufred opstår ikke mindst

170 af armod . Men fred kommer ikke automatisk i kølvandet på økonomisk og social
fremgang. Derfor må internationalt økonomisk samarbejde gå hånd i hånd med
aftaler om bilæggelse af konflikter, nedrustning osv.

**International orden og EU's fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik**

International orden kræver stærke globale organisationer og aftaler.

Derfor er der brug for en styrkelse af De Forenede Nationers rolle. Det handler

om større autoritet til Generalsekretæren og til Sikkerhedsrådet. Det sidste forudsætter en reform, hvor Rådets permanente medlemskreds kommer til at afspejle den moderne verdens realiteter - og ikke situationen i 1945.

Det ville være ønskeligt med større økonomi og slagkraft i FN's
180 særorganisationer og bedre samordning mellem FN-systemet, Verdensbanken og Den internationale Valutafond og Verdenshandelsorganisationen (WTO).

Men en stærkere international orden kræver stærke regioner, fordi det er umuligt at bringe 200 lande i verden ind i et mere forpligtende samarbejde uden stærk regional samordning.

I denne sammenhæng er EU's fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik en positiv og vigtig faktor.

Repræsenteret ved Solana som Ministerrådets Høje Repræsentant plus EU-formandskabet og udenrigskommissær Patten – er EU i færd med engagere sig mere aktivt i løsningen af konflikter verden over:
190 Et EU, der optræder anderledes enigt end i starten af 1990'erne, har meget aktivt forsøgt at inddæmme Balkans nyeste etniske konflikt i Makedonien . I nært samspil med USA er EU i færd at spille en mere samlet og selvstændig rolle i forsøgene på at bremse den tragiske og vanvittige konflikt i Mellemøsten . EU har formuleret en samlet strategi for konfliktløsning på det hærgede afrikanske kontinent . Endelig har EU taget et selvstændigt intiativ for at genoplive 'solskinspolitikken' mellem de to Korea -stater og på ny få USA engageret i processen.

EU's fælles militære og civile krisestyringsstyrke er ved at blive opstillet, og kan rykke ud fra 2003 med deltagelse fra europæiske NATO-lande og ansøgerlande.
200 Den militære kapacitet udvikles i tæt samarbejde med NATO og med støtte fra USA. FN's generalsekretær forudser, at EU's krisestyringsstyrke kan udvikle sig til at være FN's hidtil stærkeste arm , når det gælder hurtig og massiv indsats for at standse eller forebygge konflikter rundt om i verden.

Desværre betyder det danske forsvarsforbehold, at vore soldater ikke kan deltage i sådanne militære aktioner under EU's ledelse. Konsekvenserne af det danske forbehold bliver anderledes og mere negative end oprindeligt forudset: Vi kan blive afskåret fra at deltage i fredsbevarende aktioner af samme art som dem, hvor vi i fem årtier har været i front under FN's eller NATO's ledelse.

Men EU's fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik vil i de kommende år blive
210 udfoldet med en palet af fælles politiske, økonomiske og militære virkemidler, hvor 'Danmark kan være med… men ikke til at skabe fred'.

Den fælles politik er ikke mindst i de små EU-landes interesse, fordi den kan dæmpe de stores behov for eller tilbøjelighed til at spille soloroller på den internationale scene. Det vil langsigtet være en logisk konsekvens af EU's stærkere globale rolle at få en fælles EU-repræsentation i FN's sikkerhedsråd og G7/G8-kredsen, en styrket position i Verdensbanken og Valutafonden, og fælles repræsentation i andre internationale forhandlingsfora.

**EU - USA - partnerskab og modspil**

Forholdet til USA - verdens eneste nuværende supermagt og en økonomisk
220 styrke af samme størrelse som EU – er naturligvis af meget stor vigtighed.

Det er åbenbart, at der eksisterer et stærkt, men modsætningsfyldt partnerskab. USA's lederskab i NATO har i årtier været den fundamentale sikkerhedsgaranti for Europa. Vi ønsker at fastholde det amerikanske engagement i Europa gennem partnerskab i et NATO, der udstrækkes til de øvrige nye demokratier i Østeuropa. Vi ønsker et nært samarbejde mellem EU og USA om krisestyring og konfliktforebyggelse.

Samtidig er det åbenbart, at EU har mange fælles synspunkter, holdninger og værdier, som vi i stigende grad vil søge at præge det internationale samfund med, og som er i modsætning til synspunkterne hos den nye amerikanske
230 regering.

Der er meget langt en fælles europæisk tilgang til at regulere markedskræfter og skabe velfærd for at hjælpe de svage på markedet. Og vi er modstandere af dødsstraf og mener ikke, at private borgere skal have lov at gå med håndvåben. Der er en stærk fælles europæisk prioritering af aftaler, der kan løse de fundamentale globale miljøproblemer eller bidrager til nedrustning og afspænding:

Kyoto-protokollen om indsats for klimaopvarmende drivhusgasser er et klart eksempel på konflikt mellem et EU, der kæmper for et internationalt forpligtende aftalesystem, og et USA, der afviser aftaler, der kolliderer med landets snævre
240 nationale, økonomiske interesser.

Men der er også stærke holdninger i Europa om, at ABM-traktaten ikke ensidigt bør opsiges for at starte udviklingen af et omstridt missilskjold.

Europa vil gerne sikre aftalerne om f.eks. forbud mod landminer, om den internationale straffedomstol, om protokollen til håndhævelse af forbudet mod biologiske våben - og vi vil gerne have en stærkere kontrol med udbredelsen af lette våben.

EU er reelt vores slagkraftige, progressive platform i kamp for global menneskelig udvikling.

Det blev illustreret, da det i sidste måned lykkedes EU at formidle et globalt
250 kompromis mellem 179 lande, der fastholder det fundamentale i Kyoto-protokollen - men uden USA.

EU har en helt central opgave i at holde en dialog i gang med USA, forsøge at få amerikanerne med i forpligtende internationale aftaler og modvirke ny isolationisme i USA.

USA og EU har stærke fælles interesser i at sikre en positiv udvikling i verdensøkonomien – derunder vor indbyrdes samhandel. Det er ønskeligt at få en forhandlingsløsning på indbyrdes konflikter mellem EU og USA, der kan placere os på samme side i de globale forhandlinger om handelsliberalisering. Hvis ikke det er muligt at få tilstrækkelig amerikansk forståelse for en 'global
260 deal' til fordel for u-landene, så må EU igen på egen hånd sætte sig i spidsen.

**EU's partnerskab med andre regioner**

EU's samarbejde med andre regioner vil udfolde sig i ringe - efter geografisk nærhed og interessefællesskab:

Samarbejdet – ikke mindst med de nære naboer i øst og syd - må have fredelig konfliktløsning, opgør med autoritære og korrupte samfundsstrukturer, og

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respekt for menneskerettighederne som en meget afgørende del af den fælles dagsorden.

Det vil være af helt central betydning for EU at udvikle et tæt samarbejde med Rusland og Ukraine - og med Tyrkiet i dén årrække, hvor landet er kandidat til
270 medlemskab.

Det skal være et partnerskab, der effektivt understøtter økonomisk, social og demokratisk udvikling af disse store og vigtige nabolande til Den Europæiske Union .

For det er kun en stakket frist for stabiliteten i Europa, hvis udvidelsen med de 12+ blot flytter fattigdomsgrænsen i Europa nogle hundrede kilometer østpå, men til gengæld uddyber den dramatisk.

På samme måde vil stabilitets- og associeringsaftaler med landene langs Middelhavets syd- og østkyst være afgørende for at bringe Nordafrika og Mellemøsten ind i positiv udvikling.
280 Men EU har en central rolle i hele verdenssamfundet.

Det gælder i forholdet til økonomiske magter som Japan, Canada, Kina og Indien.

Kina og Japan indgår sammen med Sydkorea og de vigtigste lande i Sydøstasien i ASEM-samarbejdet med EU, hvor der i september 2002 skal afholdes topmøde i København under det danske formandskab for EU.

ASEM-samarbejdet rummer muligheder for en helt ny og stærkere europæisk-asiatisk dialog om handel, udveksling, forskning, kultur, global sikkerhed og bekæmpelse af kriminalitet over grænserne.

Desuden har EU en åbenbar og central rolle i at understøtte udviklingen af andre
290 regionale samarbejdsorganisationer, så de kan spille bedre sammen med EU om udviklingen af en ny global orden.

ASEAN-samarbejdet i Sydøstasien, Mercosur i Sydamerika og SADC i det sydlige Afrika er gode eksempler på sådanne regionale organisationer.

**Udvidelsen – ophævelsen af Europas deling**

En europæisk union af mere end dobbelt så mange lande som i dag er den smukkeste indsats for nabosolidaritet og den bedste investering i langsigtet tryghed og sikkerhed for vore egne børn og børnebørn, som denne generation af vesteuropæere kan gøre.

EU's mål må være at udvide sin medlemskreds så meget som fællesskabet kan
300 bære, uden at grundlaget udhules og samarbejdet udvandes og svækkes.

EU's udvidelse med de nye demokratier i Central- og Østeuropa er vores vigtigste historiske opgave ved starten af det 21. århundrede. De positive perspektiver for fred, demokrati og velstand i de tidligere kommunistiske diktaturstater kan ikke overvurderes.

Jeg ser med glæde frem til, at vi om få år måske sidder dobbelt så mange lande om bordet i EU's ministerråd: Vel vidende, at det bliver en vældig udfordring at få tyskere, briter, danskere, portugisere, estere, polakker og ungarere og alle de andre til at enes om fælles mindstekrav til f.eks. miljø, arbejdsforhold og selskabsskat.
310 Perspektivet for medlemskab omfatter ikke kun dé 12 kandidatlande, der er i

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gang med forhandlinger - og hvoraf forhåbentlig op til 10 kan blive fulde medlemmer indenfor de næste 3 år.

Det vil styrke de nordiske synspunkter og værdier i EU, hvis også Norge og Island kommer med. Derfor skal de være meget velkomne, hvis de beslutter sig for medlemskab.

Schweiz ville ligeledes være et naturligt medlem, men er måske ikke uden videre med på et ønskeligt fælles europæisk opgør med internationale skattely.

Perspektivet er imidlertid også, at EU's stabilitets- og associeringsaftaler udstrækkes til alle landene på det vestlige Balkan og bidrager til fred, stabilitet,
320 interetnisk samarbejde, demokrati og økonomisk udvikling, så også disse lande kan få et perspektiv om inden for de næste par årtier at søge fuldt medlemskab.

Lige nu ser vi omsider demokratiske, reformvenlige regeringer i Kroatien, Serbien og Albanien. De må støttes og opmuntres i opgøret med den nære fortid. Medlemskabet af EU er i sidste ende den eneste realistiske garanti, der kan stilles op for social og demokratisk stabilitet i Europas nye demokratier. En samfundsudvikling, der bæres frem af perspektivet om at medlemskabet i den europæiske union er den bedste forsikring mod nye etniske konflikter og ukontrollerede flygtningestrømme i Europa.

Økonomisk er EU's udvidelsesproces et plus-plus spil. Det er ikke et spørgsmål
330 om, at vi skal give og andre skal have. Nej, på samme måde som dengang fattige lande som Irland, Grækenland, Spanien og Portugal blev medlemmer, så vi fællesskabet trække de nye medlemslandes levevilkår opad mod de gamles levestandard, og samtidig skabe ny dynamik hos os, fordi vi får nye, mere købedygtige kunder til vore produkter.

Derfor er det vigtigt, at både de nuværende medlemslande og ansøgerlande gør sig umage med at finde de kompromis'er og skræddersyede overgangsordninger, der kan sikre en hurtig og stor udvidelsesomgang.

Tempoet i udvidelsesprocessen må holdes, så skuffelse og tvivl ikke når at få den folkelige opbakning til udvidelsen til at smuldre både i de kommende og de gamle
340 medlemslande.

Det er uden videre klart, at Polens hurtige optagelse er af helt central både symbolsk og realpolitisk betydning. Polen var det første offer for Anden Verdenskrig. Den lemlæstede nation blev efter sejren på ny berøvet friheden. Men det var også Polen, der gik i spidsen i de opgør, der førte til det kommunistiske diktaturs sammenbrud i Østeuropa. Samtidig er Polen det befolkningsmæssigt og økonomisk vigtigste ansøgerland.

Men det er også vigtigt, at såfremt nogle af de mindre ansøgerlande – f.eks. i Baltikum - er endnu tidligere parat, at de så også optages først - som en klar markering af vores vilje til at leve op til løftet om at optage ansøgerlandene, så
350 snart de opfylder betingelserne og er rede.

**Beslutningskraft og nærhed i et udvidet EU**

EU er i sin kerne et meget tæt samarbejde mellem demokratisk valgte regeringer, hvor der er præcise spilleregler for forhandling og kompromis. Spillereglerne er til entydig fordel for de små nationer. De er et stort fremskridt

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fra dengang, hvor det var de skiftende alliancer mellem de store lande, der dirigerede hele den europæiske koncert.

Reglerne betyder, at vi små lande har indflydelse på vores verdensdel, som er større end vi nogensinde før har haft, og større, end antallet af vore indbyggere egentlig skulle berettige til.

360 De små landes fordel vedEU-samarbejdets karakter er endnu tydeligere, hvis de formår at samarbejdeindbyrdes. Derfor vil fremtidens udvidede EU også blive præget af stærkeresamspil mellem de mange små lande. For Danmark vil koordineringen med denordiske og baltiske lande være lige for. Er vi enige, har vi en størrestemmevægt end Tyskland .

EU er medlemsstaternes effektive instrument til at løses fælles problemer - ikke en størrelse, der tager nye store skridt hen mod at blive en forbundsstat.

Det er præcis denne tankegang, der præger Nice-traktaten. Den vil uden tvivl også gennemsyre kommende traktater: Dét udvidede og reformerede EU, der vil blive skabt de næste ti år, vil ikke have overbevisende fælles træk med

370 forbundsstater som USA eller med gamle europæiske nationalstater.

EU vil forblive et helt særligt og historisk set nyt og enestående fænomen.

Forsøgene på at finde ordet for samarbejdets karakter vil fortsat give anledning til en meget følelsesladet debat og mange misforståelser i Danmark.

Den franske statsminister Jospin siger, at Unionen er en 'føderation af nationalstater'. På dansk vil vi kalde det et 'forpligtende fællesskab af nationalstater', men nok mene nogenlunde det samme.

Det er åbenbart, at det største problem i et EU med dobbelt så mange medlemmer er at sikre, at beslutninger kan træffes tilstrækkelig effektivt på dé områder, som ingen nationalstat kan løse alene.

380 **Det vil kræve, at færre beslutninger tages i enstemmighed og flere med kvalificeret flertal.**

Dette er en vanskelig og politisk følsom diskussion, hvor hver enkelt medlemsland må vise mod.

Den danske regering vil være konstruktiv. Vi kan umiddelbart se behov for flere flertalsafgørelser, når det gælder miljøområdet og minimumsregler på skatteområdet.

Vejen frem til at indføre flertalsafgørelser på vitale fællesområder findes nok lettest ved operere med flere minimumsregler og kombinere beslutningen med en skarpere afgrænsning af, hvor EU overhovedet skal blande sig.

390 Alternativet til større beslutningskraft via flere flertalsafgørelser er på sigt, at reglerne om forstærket samarbejde, hvor en gruppe af lande på egen hånd går videre - med andre ord et Europa i flere hastigheder. Det er ikke i det lille lands interesse, at samarbejdet på den måde udvikler sig i flere forskellige rum, hvor vi ikke er med alle vegne, men alligevel påvirkes af beslutningerne dé steder, hvor vi ikke er med.

**Der er behov for at styrke nærhedsprincippet .** Altså at forhindre, at EU unødigt og utilsigtet bevæger sig ind på nye områder og laver detaljeret regulering for medlemslandene, der ikke er påkrævet for at løse fælles problemer.

400 Nogle ønsker, at vi i den næste traktat skal indskrive et katalog, der klart deler kompetencerne på de enkelte politikområder op mellem EU og nationalstaterne. Jeg tror bestemt, at vi kan gøre kompetencefordelingen klarere. Vi kan justere og tydeliggøre, hvor vi vil bevare eller genoprette national kompetence. Vi skal indrette de fælles institutioner, så vore hensigter bedre håndhæves.

Men jeg tror ikke, at vi kan skrive et endegyldigt kompentencekatalog, uden at give uønsket stivhed i samarbejdet og stadige behov for traktatændringer. Det er mere en politisk end en juridisk mekanisme, vi skal stræbe efter. En klarere retningsgivning om afgrænsningen mellem fællesskab og nærhed mellem union og nation.

410 **Opgaver og grænser for EU**

Et forpligtende samarbejde er afgørende for vores og de andres velfærd.

I det følgende vil jeg give et bud på samarbejdets kerneområder og på, hvor jeg mener, at samarbejdet skal være knap så forpligtende

Jeg har argumenteret for, at jeg finder det allervigtigst, at EU kommer til spille en langt større rolle globalt – når det gælder sikkerhed, menneskerettigheder, økonomi, handel, udvikling og miljø.

Lad mig uddybende nævne en række politikområder, som er centrale for samarbejdet:

Der vil i det udvidede EU være stort behov for samordning af den økonomiske

420 politik , så alle medlemslandene kan bidrage til stabil valuta, sunde offentlige finanser, konkurrenceevne, beskæftigelse, ligestilling og social sammenhængskraft. Det er forudsætningen for at velfærdssamfundet kan fastholdes og udvikles.

Det store flertal af EU-lande vil her have den fælles valuta som ankerplads, hvor der i Euro-gruppen og Den europæiske Centralbank fastlægges en kurs mod inflation og valutaspekulation, som bliver retningsgivende for hele EU - også de lande, der er uden for euro'en.

EU skal være bundet sammen af stærke fælles regler og ambitioner på miljø og arbejdsmiljø. Miljøproblemerne er i deres natur grænseoverskridende og kan ikke

430 løses alene med nok så store flertal i de nationale parlamenter. Høje mindstekrav til arbejdsmiljøet skal forhindre, at vi i EU konkurrerer mod hinanden på sundhedstruende arbejdsvilkår.

EU's fælles forbrugerpolitik skal effektiviseres med højt beskyttelsesniveau og anvendelse af forsigtighedsprincippet. EU skal have alle nødvendige magtmidler til afrunde og håndhæve det indre marked, sikre effektiv konkurrence , nedbryde monopoler og karteller. Statsstøtte må afvikles, når den ikke varetager veldefinerede politiske mål om f.eks. miljø og forbrugerbeskyttelse.

Der er brug for fælles EU-regler for at undgå unfair skattekonkurrence , der undergraver velfærdssamfundenes finansiering. Skattely skal bekæmpes. Der

440 skal arbejdes for, at der ikke bare er fælles regler for beskatningsgrundlag og mindstesatser for momsen, men også for renteskat, selskabsskat og konkurrencepåvirkende miljøafgifter.

EU skal i de kommende år udvikle en fælles flygtninge- og indvandrerpolitik og

en effektiv fælles håndhævelse ved at bekæmpe menneskesmuglere, illegal indvandring, asylsvindel og have fælles krav til hjemtagning af afviste indvandrere/asylansøgere. På civilrettens område er der også brug for regelharmonisering for at lette virksomhedernes brug af det indre marked og familiernes stilling ved flytning over grænserne.

Det er Danmarks interesse at være omfattet af fælles regler på disse områder.

450 Derfor må der energisk arbejdes på, at vi i praksis kan deltage i politikudviklingen - også selv om vi på grund af forbeholdet på de retlige og indre anliggender formelt er uden for indflydelse på de fælles EU-beslutninger.

EU's fælles linie skal selvfølgelig også indeholde forstærket indsats for at forebygge flygtningestrømme og for at hjælpe og udvikle i nærområderne. Ingen fælles flygtninge- og indvandrerpolitik vil få langsigtet succes, medmindre den er en del af ny international orden, hvor levevilkårene i de fattige lande afgørende forbedres.

EU skal være rammen om et effektivt europæisk samarbejde om bekæmpelse af grænseoverskridende kriminalitet – ikke mindst økonomisk kriminalitet og

460 miljøkriminalitet. Det er en opgave, som intet land i dag kan klare alene. Og de eksisterende traktatbestemmelser giver os her et godt grundlag for at udvikle samarbejdet.

Et smertensbarn i rækken af fælles politikområder er EU's landbrugspolitik

De nuværende ordninger er de sidste store monumenter over gammeldags og kostbar planøkonomi i Europa 12 år efter Murens Fald.

Vi i Danmark ønsker, at EU fortsat skal have en fælles landbrugs- og fiskeripolitik - men med en anden indretning.

En reform af landbrugspolitikken er påtrængende nødvendig af tre grunde: For det første må EU levere indrømmelser i en 'global deal' med u-landene, så de

470 kan få langt bedre konkurrencevilkår og markedsadgang for deres fødevareproduktion. For det andet vil en ændret landbrugspolitik i et EU med mange ny medlemslande være nødvendig for at begrænse budgetbelastningen og bureaukratiet. For det tredje vil der være krav om omlægning af landbrugsproduktionen, der opfylder befolkningernes berettigede forventning og krav til kvalitet, miljø, fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd. Der er brug for en konsekvent og klar fælles indsats med fokus på sikre og sunde fødevarer.

De første retningsgivende skridt hen mod en markedsorienteret og mere grøn landbrugspolitik bør om muligt tages inden afslutningen af første runde af udvidelsesforhandlingerne for at skabe større klarhed for både de nuværende og

480 de kommende medlemslande.

Landbrugsreformen skal betyde gradvis afvikling af kvoter og produktionsafhængige tilskud og derved afgørende forenkling. Der kan så i en overgangsperiode overvejes produktionsuafhængighed og aftrappet personstøtte til de enkelte landbrug.

Det er klart, at reformen af landbrugs- og fødevarepolitikken i EU vil være smertefuld og politisk vanskelig. Der er en sammenhæng mellem denne reform og fremtidens regionalpolitik i fællesskabet:

Midlerne i de såkaldte strukturfonde til regional udvikling skal i et udvidet EU

mest gå til de nye, fattigere medlemslande i øst – for at bidrage til at løfte deres
490 velstand opad mod niveauet i det 'gamle' EU. Men der vil også være fattige egne
i nogle af de nuværende medlemslande, der fortsat har brug for støtte. En del af
dé midler, der spares ved en konsekvent landbrugsreform, kan anvendes til en
indsats for alternativ udvikling af landdistrikterne, der kan forhindre massiv
affolkning – også i de gamle EU-lande.

Det er ikke kun landbrugs- og fiskeripolitikken, der skal reformes. For at
finansiere udvidelsen skal der saneres og effektiviseres i den store skov af andre
tilskudsordninger . EU-støtteordninger må koncentreres om projekter, som ingen
nation og intet firma løfter af sig selv, men som kan bidrage til det samlede
Europas langsigtede udvikling og konkurrencekraft.

500 Så er der en række områder, hvor vi ønsker et samarbejde, der ikke har samme
forpligtende karakter som på de allerede nævnte områder:

EU skal ikke have nye beføjelser med hensyn til uddannelses- og
beskæftigelsespolitik. Her skal vi først og fremmest have en fornuftig dialog og
lære af hinandens erfaringer – dvs. bruge den såkaldte åbne
koordinationsmetode, der blev fastlagt i Lissabon i marts 2000. På den måde kan
vi sætte fokus på de svage punkter i hinandens systemer og derved tilføre den
politiske proces ny dynamik i de enkelte lande. På den måde kan vi – uden at
overdrage beføjelser – i fællesskab bidrage til, at vi hver især udvikler vores
velfærdsstater bedst muligt.

510 Indretning og finansiering af sundhedsvæsen, ældreomsorg og børnepasning skal
ligeledes forblive under den nationale kompetence. Disse områder afspejler i
særlig grad forskelle mellem landene i valg af velfærdsmodel og fordelingspolitik,
men også bagved liggende forskelle i erhvervs- og familiemønster.

Heller ikke kultur- og fritidslovgivningen skal være et fællesskabsanliggende –
men et område for gensidig inspiration.

Det beskrevne billedepeger ikke i retning af omfattende ændringer i den juridiske
kompetencefordeling mellem union og nationalstat. Men det angiver en klar
prioritering af, hvor det er Danmarks interesse at udvikling og uddybning af det
europæiske samarbejde sker i de kommende år.

520 **Reform af traktat og institutioner**

På topmødet i Nice i december sidste år lagde stats- og regeringscheferne op til
at diskutere i hvert fald fire hovedtemaer op til næste regeringskonference og
traktatrevision i 2004.

Udover det al--lerede--diskuterede behov for klarere arbejdsdeling mellem nationer
og union var temaerne:

- menneskerettighedscharterets stilling i forhold til traktaten
- behovet for en enklere traktat
- en stærkere rolle for de nationale parlamenter i EU's beslutningsproces.

Med dette udgangspunkt - og med de udfordringer, som udvidelsen stiller os
530 overfor – vil der blive foreslået og være behov for væsentlige traktatændringer i
2004.

Det er nu, vi fra dansk side bør give et første bud på ændringerne, så vore
synspunkter kan være med til præge den videre proces:

Diskussionen om EU's fremtid vil gå i gang med fuld styrke under det belgiske formandsskab her i efteråret. Det er en god idé at nedsætte et såkaldt konvent – en forsamling med deltagelse af personligheder fra Europa-Parlament, nationale parlamenter, regeringer, arbejdsmarkedsparter m.fl. – til at diskutere reformer. Det sikrer større folkelig deltagelse i debatten – og bør følges op med et folkeligt debatforum om konventet i Danmark. En konference mellem regeringernes
540 repræsentanter skal derefter konkludere, hvilke traktatændringer, der skal besluttes.

Vi skal undervejs være konstruktive og åbne over for valg af nye modeller for samarbejdet.

Men lad mig sammenfatte nogle bud på, hvilken retning, den danske regering mener, arbejdet skal have:

Ministerrådet er og skal også i fremtiden være det mest centrale EU-beslutningsforum. Det er den eneste logiske konsekvens af min holdning om, atunionen skal forblive et nært og forpligtende samarbejde mellem medlemsstater.

550 Jeg har nævnt behovet for flere flertalsafgørelser i ministerrådet, når vi bliver mange flere medlemmer. Jeg mener også, at større åbenhed om Rådets arbejde er en helt central opgave for borgernes mulighed for indflydelse.

Det er ikke enudfordring, der løses ved at oprette nye ministerråd - f.eks. et råd afeuropaministre. Det vil være uklart ogforskelligt, hvad sådanne ministres beføjelser er i de enkelte lande. Derforvil de i praksis have svært ved både at finde en rolle i forhold tiludenrigsministrenes løbende arbejde i det generelle råd og afgørende at aflastestats- og regeringscheferne fra at lægge de overordnede retningslinier forUnionen.

Det er langt mere relevant at præcisere den centrale placering for stats- og
560 regeringschefernes Europæiske Råd. Opgaven er på én og samme tid at afdramatisere topmøderne og at styrke deres funktion. En mulighed er, at Det Europæiske Råd holder sine møder oftere, men i et kortere og mere forretningspræget format. Møderne kunne f.eks. være fast i Bruxelles hver anden måned.

Samtidig må formandsskabsfunktionen nyvurderes, når EU efterhånden får 25-30 medlemslande. Måske skal formandsskabet i fremtiden varetages af en gruppe af lande i stedet for af et nyt land hvert halve år.

Jeg mener, at Charteret for menneskerettigheder skal indarbejdes i EU-traktaten, fordi dets indhold er nogetoverordnet og bærende i vort videre samarbejde.
570 Charteret er mere detaljeret i formuleringen af menneskerettighederne end den danske grundlov fra 1953. Det er naturligvis på intet punkt i konflikt med vores danske forfatning, men Charteret er mere moderne og vidtgående i sin formulering af de fundamentale menneskerettigheder.

Indskrivning af Charteret i Traktaten i en eller anden form vil understrege, at EU er andet og mere end praktisk, økonomisk samarbejde og fælles varetagelse af udenrigspolitiske interesser. Det vil være i linie med en stadig bredere folkelig opbakning til at gøre internationalt samarbejde mere forpligtende, når det gælder at traktatfæste og håndhæve nogle fundamentale rettigheder om

individets beskyttelse og frihed. Det er en udvikling, der de sidste par år har
580 fundet udtryk i interventionen i Kosovo og oprettelsen af den internationale
straffedomstol.

**Der skal ske forenkling både af EU's traktat, regler og producerer.**

En fuldstændig omskrivning af traktaterne er en uhyre kompliceret sag, fordi det
vil åbne for utrolig mange spørgsmål om, hvorvidt forenklingen af teksten også
tilsigter reelle ændringer i retstilstanden. Men jeg håber, at vi kan gennemføre
en egentlig opdeling af traktaten i de mere grundlæggende bestemmelser på den
ene side og de mere tekniske på den anden.

Vi skal sigte efter en enklere og mere folkelig sammenfatning af samarbejdets
formål – inklusive indarbejdelsen af charteret – i en grundtraktat . Her skal
590 beskrives, at EU er et samarbejde om dét, vi ikke kan løse hver for sig, at
arbejdsdelingen skal bygges på nærhedsprincippet med styrkelse af de nationale
parlamenters rolle, og balancen mellem institutionerne i øvrigt fastholdes i
hovedsagen som nu.

Kommissionen har allerede en central og vigtig rolle som initiativtager til nye
retsakter. Det er Kommissionens opgave at sikre, at forslagene hænger sammen
og tager hensyn til alles - også de små medlemslandes - rimelige interesser. Den
bør prioritere at forbedre Unionens administrative apparat og kompetence, blive
bedre til at planlægge og udføre de fælles projekter, gøre op med svindel og
sanere i tilskud.

600 Kommissionen har netop fremlagt en god rapport om 'governance' –
regeringsførelse i EU-systemet. Det understreger, at Kommissionen kan og skal
skabe større folkelig opbakning til det europæiske projekt gennem åbenhed –
både om sit eget arbejde og om forhandlinger med andre i internationale fora, -
tidlig høring af lande, regioner og folkelige organisationer om initiativer - og ved
at forberede direktiver, der giver de enkelte nationer større spillerum i den
praktiske udførelse.

Både Kommission og Ministerråd skal tænke mere smidigt, end vi har været vant
til. F.eks. havde det vel ikke været utænkeligt at sikre en fælles holdning til
beskyttelse mod børnearbejde i Unionen med større indlagt fleksibilitet for de
610 enkelte lande i den praktiske udførelse. I så fald kunne vi måske have undgået et
skænderi om børns udbringning af danske aviser?

**Styrkelse af de nationale parlamenters rolle er nødvendig.**

EU skal fungere effektivt og demokratisk, og på en måde, hvor alle interesserede
kan følge med i beslutningsprocessen. Det er en uhyre væsentlig diskussion, som
vi i Danmark skal være med til at præge.

Teknisk komplicerede debatter om en EU-forfatning, et kompetencekatalog eller
oprettelse af et nyt 2. kammer i en forvejen kompliceret beslutningsstruktur er
ikke nødvendigvis genveje til at skabe større folkelig opbakning bag projektet. De
risikerer tværtimod at styrke mistro og modvilje og nære myter om hemmelige
620 planer om stærkere unionsudvikling - medmindre vi kan forklare formålet med
ændringerne lysende klart som en styrkelse af borgernes indflydelse på Europa.

Det er ikke den danske regerings opfattelse, at der kræves grundlæggende ændringer i den institutionelle ramme med Ministerråd, Kommission, Domstol, Europa-Parlament og Revisionsret.

Europa-Parlamentet har ikke i folkenes øjne fået en vældig legitimitet, selvom der i sin tid blev indført direkte valg.

I det længere perspektiv kan man overveje kommissær Pattens idé om valg af de enkelte landes repræsentanter til Europa-Parlamentet på de nationale valgdage.

Det vil sikre større samklang mellem de valgte i de enkelte lande og i Bruxelles -
630 og langt højere valgdeltagelse til parlamentsvalget. Patten taler også for at europaparlamentarikere skal have møderet – men ikke stemmeret!- i de nationale parlamenter.

Men der vil ikke i overskuelig fremtid blive skabt en fælles europæisk offentlighed. Følelserne og tilknytningen vil fortsat først og fremmest være til nationen.

Med andre ord: Der eksisterer en langt større demokratisk legitimitet hos de nationale parlamenter. Derfor er der ikke anledning til at give Europa-Parlamentet væsentlige nye beføjelser. Ved den først kommende traktatændring er det vigtigste tværtimod at finde formlen for de nationale
640 parlamenters stærkere deltagelse i EU-udviklingen.

**Det handler både om arbejdsformen i de enkelte parlamenter og om at give dem en rolle i fællesskab i EU-arkitekturen.**

Europaudvalget i det danske folketing har allerede en helt central placering i den nationale beslutningsgang forud for ministerrådsmøderne. De EU-beslutninger, Danmark bliver en del af i forlængelse af mandaterne fra Europaudvalg til regeringen, har samme vidtgående betydning for borgernes hverdag som megen national lovgivning, og det er derfor af stor vigtighed, at der er størst mulig åbenhed om processen. Det er ikke rimeligt, at det kan påstås, at danske interesseorganisationer er mere inddraget i EU's egen lovgivningsproces end i
650 den danske beslutningsproces i EU-sager.

For at sikre større åbenhed og parlamentarisk medvirken er det tillige meget vigtigt, at Folketingets øvrige udvalg løbende drøfter de europapolitiske spørgsmål.

Det vil være naturligt, at de nationale parlamenter får forelagt alle vigtige retsakter med ret til at udtale sig.

Forudsætningen for, at de nationale parlamenter kan udøve deres retmæssigerolle i den demokratiske proces er, at Kommission og Ministerrådtilrettelægger deres arbejdsprocesser med størst mulig åbenhed.

Premierminister Blair og præsident Havel har foreslået oprettelse af et
660 traktatfæstet 2. kammeraf nationale parlamentarikere som garant for stærkere folkelig kontrol og respekt for nærhedsprincippet i kompetencefordelingen.

Det mest nærliggende er at udvikle det eksisterende samarbejde mellem de nationale parlamenters europaudvalg (COSAC) til Nationernes Råd med lige mange repræsentanter for hvert EU-land. Det skal næppe være en forsamling,

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der tager selvstændige initiativer i EU's lovproces. Den skal derimod have beføjelse til at påse, at nærhedsprincippet respekteres. Jeg synes, man skal overveje at give Rådet ret til at udsætte en retsakt, der ikke anses for at respektere princippet - i hvert fald indtil den pågældende retsakt har været behandlet i Det Europæiske Råd.

670 De nationale parlamenters rolle i at skabe folkelig interesse og engagement har ikke kun noget med deres formelle deltagelse i beslutningerne at gøre. Nye råd, nævn, kamre eller arbejdsgange gør det ikke alene. Det handler i høj grad om parlamentarikernes egen indsats i debatten om den europæiske og globale dagsorden. Og det handler om deres dialog med de folkelige organisationer om denne dagsorden. Folk skal mærke, at EU faktisk har en formidabel evne til løse vigtige problemer, hvis løsning ikke ligger inden for nationalstatens rækkevidde. Det vil også skabe større forståelse og velvilje for EU-projektet, hvis nationale beslutningstagere lader være med at bruge EU som 'prügelknabe' for dét, de ikke selv kan komme til at udrette, og i stedet forklarer, at kompromisser er lige så
680 vigtige og nyttige i internationalt som i nationalt politisk arbejde.

For at slutte omtrent, hvor jeg begyndte på denne 'tour d'horizon': Hvad er da essensen i dét, jeg håber og tror om EU 2010 ?

Ved at forpligte os i et stærkt europæisk samarbejde har vi bidraget til en bedre verden.

EU spiller sin naturlige rolle som verdenssamfundets progressive kraft i kampen for en globalt bæredygtig udvikling. EU spiller i samarbejde med FN og NATO en afgørende rolle for international konfliktløsning, afspænding og nedrustning.

Den største del af EU's udvidelse mod øst er gennemført. Den historiske deling af Europa er overvundet.

690 EU-samarbejdet er blevet organiseret mere åbent - og mere effektivt. Mennesker synes, at EU beskæftiger sig med de væsentlige udfordringer.

Vi ikke er blevet mindre danske, fordi vi samarbejder bedre. Vor samfundsmodel har vist styrke og livskraft og er en inspiration for andre europæere.

Derfor har vi fået langt større engagement og opbakning om det europæiske projekt.

I. EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS

For centuries, peoples and states have taken up arms and waged war to win control of the European continent. The debilitating effects of two bloody wars and the weakening of Europe's position in the world brought a growing realisation that only peace and concerted action could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come true. In order to banish once and for all the demons of the past, a start was made with a coal and steel community. Other economic activities, such as agriculture, were subsequently added in. A genuine single market was eventually established for goods, persons, services and capital, and a single currency was added in 1999. On 1 January 2002 the euro is to become a day-to-day reality for 300 million European citizens.

The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical
10 collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defence policy.

The European Union is a success story. For over half a century now, Europe has been at peace. Along with North America and Japan, the Union forms one of the three most prosperous parts of the world. As a result of mutual solidarity and fair distribution of the benefits of economic development, moreover, the standard of living in the Union's weaker regions has increased enormously and they have made good much of the disadvantage they were at.

Fifty years on, however, the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. The unification of Europe is near. The Union is about to expand to bring in more than ten new Member States, predominantly Central and
20 Eastern European, thereby finally closing one of the darkest chapters in European history: the Second World War and the ensuing artificial division of Europe. At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first took the lead.

The democratic challenge facing Europe

At the same time, the Union faces twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders.

Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the Union's broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action. They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also eel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in
30 matters by their nature better left to Member States' and regions' elected representatives. This is even perceived by some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny.

Europe's new role in a globalised world

Beyond its borders, in turn, the European Union is confronted with a fast-changing, globalised world. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights. Just a few years later, however, there is no such certainty. The eleventh of September has brought a rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them.

40 What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law.

Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's
50 heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.

The expectations of Europe's citizens

The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes. There have been frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones. Citizens also want results in the fields of employment and combating poverty and social exclusion, as well as in the field of economic and social cohesion. They want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues which they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together. Just as they also want to see Europe more
60 involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with

trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world.

At the same time, citizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucratically in numerous other areas. In coordinating the economic, financial and fiscal environment, the basic issue should continue to be proper operation of the internal market and the single currency, without this jeopardising Member States' individuality. National and regional differences frequently stem from history or tradition. They can be enriching. In other words, what citizens understand by "good governance" is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life.

In short, citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, developing a
70 Europe which points the way ahead for the world. An approach that provides concrete results in terms of more jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care. There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to undergo renewal and reform.

II. CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN A RENEWED UNION

The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world. In order to address them a number of specific questions need to be put.

A better division and definition of competence in the European Union

80 Citizens often hold expectations of the European Union that are not always fulfilled. And vice versa - they sometimes have the impression that the Union takes on too much in areas where its involvement is not always essential. Thus the important thing is to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States in the light of the new challenges facing the Union. This can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to assigning new missions to the Union, or to the extension of existing powers, while constantly bearing in mind the equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity.

A first series of questions that needs to be put concerns how the division of competence can be made more transparent. Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three types of competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States? At what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here?
90 And should we not make it clear that any powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the exclusive sphere of competence of the Member States? And what would be the consequences of this?

The next series of questions should aim, within this new framework and while respecting the "acquis communautaire", to determine whether there needs to be any reorganisation of competence. How can citizens' expectations be taken as a guide here? What missions would this produce for the Union? And, vice versa, what tasks could better be left to the Member States? What amendments should be made to the Treaty on the various policies? How, for example, should a more coherent common foreign policy and defence policy be developed? Should the Petersberg tasks be updated? Do we want to adopt a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation? How can economic-policy coordination be stepped up? How can we intensify cooperation in the field of social inclusion, the environment, health and food safety? But then, should not the day-to-day administration and implementation of the Union's policy be left
100 more emphatically to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to the regions? Should they not be provided with guarantees that their spheres of competence will not be affected?

Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a redefined division of competence does not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision for this, regions. How are we to ensure at the same time that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? In the future as well the Union must continue to be able to react to fresh challenges and developments and must be able to explore new policy areas. Should Articles 95 and 308 of the Treaty be reviewed for this purpose in the light of the "acquis jurisprudentiel"?

Simplification of the Union's instruments

Who does what is not the only important question; the nature of the Union's action and what instruments it should use
110 are equally important. Successive amendments to the Treaty have on each occasion resulted in a proliferation of instruments, and directives have gradually evolved towards more and more detailed legislation. The key question is therefore whether the Union's various instruments should not be better defined and whether their number should not be reduced.

In other words, should a distinction be introduced between legislative and executive measures? Should the number of legislative instruments be reduced: directly applicable rules, framework legislation and non-enforceable instruments (opinions, recommendations, open coordination)? Is it or is it not desirable to have more frequent recourse to framework legislation, which affords the Member States more room for manoeuvre in achieving policy objectives? For which areas of competence are open coordination and mutual recognition the most appropriate instruments? Is the principle of proportionality to remain the point of departure?
120 More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union

The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses. However, the European project also derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. The national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project. The declaration on the future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, stressed the need to examine their role in European integration. More generally, the question arises as to what initiatives we can take to develop a European public area.

The first question is thus how we can increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the present institutions, a question which is valid for the three institutions.

130 How can the authority and efficiency of the European Commission be enhanced? How should the President of the Commission be appointed: by the European Council, by the European Parliament or should he be directly elected by the citizens? Should the role of the European Parliament be strengthened? Should we extend the right of co-decision or not? Should the way in which we elect the members of the European Parliament be reviewed? Should a European electoral constituency be created, or should constituencies continue to be determined nationally? Can the two systems be combined? Should the role of the Council be strengthened? Should the Council act in the same manner in its legislative and its executive capacities? With a view to greater transparency, should the meetings of the Council, at least in its legislative capacity, be public? Should citizens have more access to Council documents? How, finally, should the balance and reciprocal control between the institutions be ensured?

A second question, which also relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should they be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should they have a role in

140 areas of European action in which the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?

The third question concerns how we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions in a Union of some thirty Member States. How could the Union set its objectives and priorities more effectively and ensure better implementation? Is there a need for more decisions by a qualified majority? How is the co-decision procedure between the Council and the European Parliament to be simplified and speeded up? What of the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union? What is the future role of the European Parliament? What of the future role and structure of the various Council formations? How should the coherence of European foreign policy be enhanced? How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced?

150 Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further?

Towards a Constitution for European citizens

The European Union currently has four Treaties. The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are currently spread across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential.

Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns simplifying the existing Treaties without changing their content. Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities be reviewed? What of the division into three pillars?

Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation of the Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic treaty and the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve separating the texts? Could this lead to a distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the other treaty provisions?

160 Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic treaty and to whether the European Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between Member States in the Union?

III. CONVENING OF A CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

In order to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible, the European Council has decided to convene a Convention composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union. In the light of the foregoing, it will be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the

170 Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses.

The European Council has appointed Mr V. Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman of the Convention and Mr G. Amato and Mr J.L. Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen.

Composition

In addition to its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention will be composed of 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State), 30 members of national parliaments (two from each Member State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. The accession candidate countries will be fully involved in the Convention's proceedings. They will be represented in the same way as the current Member States (one government representative and two national parliament members) and will be able to take part in the proceedings without, however, being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge

180 among the Member States.

The members of the Convention may only be replaced by alternate members if they are not present. The alternate members will be designated in the same way as full members.

The Praesidium of the Convention will be composed of the Convention Chairman and Vice-Chairmen and nine members drawn from the Convention (the representatives of all the governments holding the Council Presidency during the Convention, two national parliament representatives, two European Parliament representatives and two Commission representatives).

Three representatives of the Economic and Social Committee with three representatives of the European social partners; from the Committee of the Regions: six representatives (to be appointed by the Committee of the Regions from the regions, cities and regions with legislative powers), and the European Ombudsman will be invited to attend as
190 observers. The Presidents of the Court of Justice and of the Court of Auditors may be invited by the Praesidium to address the Convention.

Length of proceedings

The Convention will hold its inaugural meeting on 1 March 2002, when it will appoint its Praesidium and adopt its rules of procedure. Proceedings will be completed after a year, that is to say in time for the Chairman of the Convention to present its outcome to the European Council.

Working methods

The Chairman will pave the way for the opening of the Convention's proceedings by drawing conclusions from the public debate. The Praesidium will serve to lend impetus and will provide the Convention with an initial working basis.

The Praesidium may consult Commission officials and experts of its choice on any technical aspect
200 which it sees fit to look into. It may set up ad hoc working parties.

The Council will be kept informed of the progress of the Convention's proceedings. The Convention Chairman will give an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling Heads of State or Government to give their views at the same time.

The Convention will meet in Brussels. The Convention's discussions and all official documents will be in the public domain. The Convention will work in the Union's eleven working languages.

Final document

The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved.

Together with the outcome of national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a starting
210 point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions.

Forum

In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all citizens, a Forum will be opened for organisations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia, etc.). It will take the form of a structured network of organisations receiving regular information on the Convention's proceedings. Their contributions will serve as input into the debate. Such organisations may be heard or consulted on specific topics in accordance with arrangements to be established by the Praesidium.

Secretariat

The Praesidium will be assisted by a Convention Secretariat, to be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, which may incorporate Commission and European Parliament experts.

**Fischer-sample 10/05/00-19/05/00**

*Denmark*

1) *Politiken*, 13/05/00A: "Euro uden returbillet."

2) *Politiken*, 13/05/00B: "Vejen til Europas Forenede Stater."

3) *Jyllands-Posten*, 14/05/00: "Tysk plan for superstat."

4) *Politiken*, 14/05/00A: Klar tale og virkelighedsflugt."

5) *Politiken*, 14/05/00B: "Chefredaktøren skriver: Hvad er – og bliver – EU." Commentary by Tøger Seidenfaden.

6) *Politiken*, 16/05/00: "Prodi jubler over debat."

7) *Information*, 16/05/00: "Uklar tysk vision for EU."

8) *Politiken*, 18/05/00: "Danmark i EU: Virkeligheden på vej ind i dansk EU-debat."

9) *Information*, 18/05/00: "Kronik: Dokumentation: En ny æra." Verbatim of speech.

*England*

1) *The Times*, 11/05/00: "Germans face identity crisis at end of European affair."

2) *The Times*, 13/05/00: "German threat to isolate Britain."

3) *The Independent*, 13/05/00: "Germany wants faster progress towards a federalist Europe."

4) *The Guardian*, 13/05/00: "Berlin minister's federal EU vision."

5) *Financial Times*, 13/05/00: "World news: Europe: Fischer spells out federalist EU vision."

6) *The Times*, 14/05/00: "Euroland giants begin to doubt ailing currency."

7) *The Independent*, 14/05/00: "Euro-prosecutors 'threat to UK laws.'"

8) *The Independent*, 16/05/00: "Podium: Apologies to the UK, but 'federal' is the only way; taken from the speech on the future of Europe delivered by the German Foreign Minister, at Berlin's Humboldt University." Verbatim of speech.

9) *The Guardian*, 16/05/00: "Envoys warn of an inner EU group with closer ties."

10) *Financial Times*, 16/05/00: "World news: Europe: EU blueprint for new treaty signals reforms."

11) *The Times*, 17/05/00: "European 'superpower' plan eclipses euro debate." Letter by Andrew Duff.

12) *The Guardian*, 17/05/00: "Analysis: Green shoots: The Greens have tasted power in Europe, but with the right capturing some of their turf the problem of the green political identity remains."

13) *The Guardian*, 18/05/00: "Britain asked to back flexibility."

14) *Financial Times*, 18/05/00: "Comment & Analysis: Europe's rocky relationship: Robert Graham and Haig Simonian on the weakening axis between France and Germany." Commentary by Robert Graham and Haig Simonian.

15) *The Times*, 19/05/00A: "'Federal' plan leaves Paris cool."

16) *The Times*, 19/05/00B: "Patten call for EU constitution renews Tory fears."

17) *The Guardian*, 19/05/00: "France and Germany keen to rev the euro-engine; Informal summit aims to put strained partnership back on track."

18) *Financial Times*, 19/05/00A: "Comment & Analysis: Thank you, Mr. Fischer: The German foreign minister has lifted the European debate with a sense of vision, ambition and pride." Commentary by Domonique Moisi.

19) *Financial Times*, 19/05/00B: "Jogged off Observer column."

*France*

1) *Le Monde*, 11/05/00: "Une avant-garde pour l'Europe."

2) *Le Figaro*, 12/05/00: "Initiative europeenne de l'Allemagne."

3) *Libération*, 13/05/00: "L'Europe politique selon Joschka Fischer. Le ministre allemande plaide pour une Federation europeenne.

4) *Le Monde*, 13/05/00A: "L'objectif et la methode."

5) *Le Monde*, 13/05/00B: "L'Allemagne relance le debat sur le creation d'une federation en Europe; Le ministre des affaires etrangeres prone l'election directe d'un president."

6) *Le Monde*, 13/05/00C: "La Federation europeenne que propose l'Allemand Joschka Fischer."

7) *Le Figaro*, 13/12/00: "Coup d'eclat du ministre allemand des Affaires etrangeres qui prone une federation europeenne."

8) *Libération*, 15/05/00: "L'Europe de Fischer s'invite dans la cohabitation. L'appel lance vendredi oblige la France a se positionner."

9) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00A: "Danke schon, M. Fischer." Leader.

10) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00B: "Joschka Fischer."

11) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00C: "L'Europe unie selon Joschka Fischer; Nous publions des extraits du discours prononce le 12 mai a Berlin par le ministre des affaires etrangeres allemand. Joschka Fischer developpe son point du vue sur une veritable federation europeenne dotee d'un president elu au suffrage universel, d'un gouvernement et d'un Parlement de duex chambre." Verbatim of speech.

12) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00D: "Hubert Vedrine, ministre des affaires etrangeres; La proposition Fischer dessine une perspective a long terme."

13) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00E: "Les inquietudes de la presse anglaise."

14) *Le Monde*, 15/05/00F: "Le projet d'Europe federale recoit un large soutien en Allemagne; Le chancelier Gerhard Schroder approuve l'initiative lancee par son ministre des affaires etrangeres, Joschka Fischer. L'opposition affirme y retrouver ses propres propositions. La presse salue un texte courageux ou ambitieux."

15) *Libération*, 16/05/00: "Joschka Fischer requinque Bruxelles. La Commission entend en profiter pour relancer les discussions sur la CIG."

16) *Le Monde*, 16/05/00: "Reactions favorables an France apres le discours de M. Fischer."

17) *Le Figaro*, 17/05/00: "Europe Enfin, on nomme 'federal' la construction politique qu'il faut viser; Merci a Joschka Fischer." Commentary by Anne-Marie Idrac.

18) *Le Monde*, 18/05/00: "Chiche, Joschka Fischer!" Commentary by Pierre Lellouche.

19) *Le Figaro*, 18/05/00A: "Union Europeenne. Seminaire franco-allemand demain a Rambouillet; Indignation outre-manche."

20) *Le Figaro*, 18/05/00B: "Union Europeenne. Apres la proposition de Joschka Fischer pour une Federation; relancer le moteur franco-allemand."

21) *Le Figaro*, 18/05/00C: "Union Europeenne. Un besoin de refondation de plus un plus imperieux; Un elargissement trop rapide du continent europeen commande le role moteur de la France et de l'Allemagne." Commentary by Thierry de Montbrial.

22) *Libération*, 18/05/00: "L'initiative du ministre vert allemand est courageuse: il est temps d'ajouter l'etage democratique a la construction europeenne affaibilie par la mondialisation. Construire l'Europe, allons-y Joschka." Commentary by Dominique Voynet, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, and Guy Hascoet."

23) *Libération*, 19/05/00A: "L'eurodepute Jean-Louis Bourlanges (UDF) applaudit Fischer: 'L'UE doit etre une puissance politique.'"

24) *Libération*, 19/05/00B: "Quand Strasbourg s'enthousiasme. Dans l'ensemble, les eurodeputes se felicitent de la relance du debat."

25) *Libération*, 19/05/00C: "La France et l'Allemagne se recontrent ajourd'hui a Rambouillet. Le plan Fischer au menu europeen. L'Union divisee apres la declaration du ministre allemand."

26) *Libération*, 19/05/00D: "Paris embarrasse L'Elysee et Matignon saluent 'la'ambition' de Fischer. Sans l'adouber."

27) *Le Figaro*, 19/05/00: "Union Europeenne. En attendant le chancelier Schroder auhourd'hui a Rambouillet; Genscher: 'Fischer voit loin…'"

28) *Le Figaro*, 19/05/00: "Europe: le frein de la cohabitation." Commentary by Charles Lambroschini."

## *Germany*

1) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/05/00: "Sollbruchstellen sind keine Wunden Joschka Fischer: Rollenkonflikte eines Aussenministers."

2) *taz*, 13/05/00A: "Fischer und Europa."

3) *taz*, 13/05/00B: "Grosse Visionen gegen kleine Zaenkerei."

4) *taz*, 13/05/00C: "Europa neu entwerfen."

5) *taz*, 13/05/00D: "Fischer macht Europa Beine."

6) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13/05/00A: "Mit Verstand und ohne Sinn."

7) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13/05/00B: "Fischer wirbt fuer europaeische Foederation Aussenminister entwrift 'personliche Vision.'"

8) *taz*, 15/05/00A: "Die anderen."

9) *taz*, 15/05/00B: "Keine exklusive Avantgarde; Fischer: EU zur Foederation ausbauen."

10) *taz*, 15/05/00C: "Europa braucht keine Visionen."

11) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15/05/00A: "Stadt, Land, Europa." Commentary by Wolfgang Roth.

12) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15/05/00B: "Frankreich befuerwortet Fischers Vorschlaege Personliche Europa-Rede des Aussenministers."

13) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15/05/00: "Das Ziel ist die Europaeische Foederation." Verbatim of speech.

14) *taz*, 16/05/00: "Eine Idee mit Tuecken."

15) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 16/05/00: "Prodi lobt Fischers Rede zu Europa."

16) *taz*, 17/05/00: "Schaeuble lobt Fischer; in kuerze."

17) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17/05/00A: "Berlin und Paris wollen EU-Reformn vorantreiben."

18) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17/05/00B: "Schaeuble lobt Fischers Europa-Rede."

19) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/05/00A: "Beifall fuers Ganze, Kritik im Detail."

20) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/05/00B: "Eine Idee und ihre Geschichte."

21) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/05/00C: "Oel fuer den alten Motor."

22) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/05/00D: "Union verlangt umfassendes Konzept zur Einwanderung Treffen der Spitzen von CDU und CSU."

23) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18/05/00E: "Kleine Europaeer."

24) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18/05/00: "Kritik an der Kerneuropa-Idee."

25) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19/05/00A: "Gruene in Frankreich sind stolz auf Joschka Fischer."

26) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19/05/00B: Monsieur Fischer und Herr Chirac." Commentary by Gerd Kroencke.

27) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19/05/00: "Soll main Urgrossvater vor den Bundestag?" Commentary by Ferdinand von Bismarck.

## *Spain*

1) *Expansión*, 13/05/00: "El ministro aleman de exteriores propone una federacion de paises europeos Solbes admite que tras la perdida de valor del euro tambien hay razones politicas."

2) *El País*, 14/05/00: "Francia apoya la idea de Europa federal presentada por Fischer."

3) *El País*, 16/05/00: "Oh, Jerusalen!"

4) *Expansión*, 17/05/00A: "El eje franco-aleman busca su razon de ser en Rambouillet."

5) *Expansión*, 17/05/00B: "La guerra de declaraciones contrapuestas entre Francia y Alemania rodea de incertidumbre al euro las diferencias politicas en el seno de la Union Europea socavan la confianza en la moneda unica."

6) *Expansión*, 19/05/00: "La crisis del eje franco-aleman." Commentary by Robert Graham and Haig Simonian.

## **Aznar-sample 24/09/00-03/10/00**

### *France*

1) *Le Figaro*, 27/09/00: "Espagne. Le president du gouvernement espagnol a ete recu hier par la redaction du 'Figaro'; Aznar: le seperatisme menace l'Europe."

### *Germany*

1) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27/09/00: "Spanien und Frankreich gemeinsam gegen ETA."

### *Spain*

1) *El País*, 26/09/00: "Aznar abordara hoy en Paris con Chirac y Jospin la reforma de la UE; propuesta para forzar la bajada del petroleo."

2) *El País*, 27/09/00A: "Fontaine destaca en el congreso la 'firme' condena de la UE al terrorismo; Chirac promete a Aznar que aumentara la cooperacion contra ETA."

3) *El País*, 27/09/00B: "Aznar hace profesión de europeísmo en París pero mantiene trabas a la reforma de la UE."

4) *El País*, 28/09/00: "Aznar alerta del riesgo que supone para Europa el terrorismo nacionalista; afirma en 'Le Figaro' que ETA es la expresion del nazismo actual."


**Blair-sample 04/10/00-13/10/00**

*Denmark*

1) *Information*, 05/10/00: "Nyhedsanalyse: Glidebane mod mindre union."
2) *Politiken*, 06/10/00: "Oprør i Serbien: NATO lader EU føre ordet."
3) *Information*, 06/10/00: "Blair klar med EU-vision."
4) *Information*, 07/10/00A: "Mer magt til briterne."
5) *Information*, 07/10/00B: "Udefra: Europas fremtid." Verbatim of speech.
6) *Information*, 07/10/00C: "Ledende artikel: Holgers Country Club." Leader.
7) *Politiken*, 07/10/00A: "Ledende artikel: Blairs vision." Leader.
8) *Politiken*, 07/10/00B: "Debat: Europa: Europas fremtid." Verbatim of speech.
9) *Information*, 12/10/00: "Nedtælling til EU-udvidelsen er i gang."

*England*

1) *The Times*, 04/10/00: "Prodi starts fight to bolster Commission."
2) *The Independent*, 04/10/00: "Prodi says EU states attempting power grab."
3) *Financial Times*, 04/10/00: "Comment & Analysis: Blair suffers the Danish blues: The bear of public opinion may be stifling any enthusiasm among political leaders for a referendum on UK entry into the euro." Commentary by Martin Wolf.
4) *The Times*, 05/10/00: "Frustrated Poles lose faith in EU as wait drags on."
5) *The Independent*, 05/10/00A: "Mr. Blair's new, practical plans for Europe's future: 'when an official complained that tomorrow's speech was Gaullist, Blair replied: De Gaulle? Top name.'" Comment by Donald Macintyre.
6) *The Independent*, 05/10/00B: "Blair plans to reduce the power of Brussels."
7) *Financial Times*, 05/10/00: "Leader: Brussels' role." Leader.
8) *The Times*, 06/10/00: "Blair to call for Euro senate to control Brussels."
9) *The Independent*, 06/10/00A: "Leading article: The European debate may be moving Britain's way." Leader.
10) *The Independent*, 06/10/00B: "Blair backs multi-speed EU with Eastern states."

11) *Financial Times*, 06/10/00A: "National news: Blair to propose second European chamber Future of the EU Prime Minister sets out alternative to federalist vision with plans to tackle 'democratic deficit.'"

12) *Financial Times*, 06/10/00B: "Comment & Analysis: Mr Blair goes to Warsaw: The answer to Europe's current difficulties is not rhetoric about tomorrow but addressing the problems of today." Commentary by Philip Stephens.

13) *Financial Times*, 06/10/00C: "Shorts: Blair to propose second chamber for EU parliament."

14) *The Times*, 07/10/00A: "The Warsaw way."

15) *The Times*, 07/10/00B: "Blair wins backing for 'more powerful Europe.'"

16) *The Times*, 07/10/00C: "Blair's EU vision."

17) *The Independent*, 07/10/00: "Blair calls for change in role of bigger EU."

18) *The Guardian*, 07/10/00A: "Blair calls for Euro 'superpower.'"

19) *The Guardian*, 07/10/00B: "Commentary: Can a touch of pragmatism bring Europe into new focus?" Commentary by Hugo Young.

20) *The Guardian*, 07/10/00C: "A superpower, but not a superstate': Warsaw speech: Blair makes case for rapid enlargement of EU an sets out vision for responsive, prosperous and civilised Union." Verbatim of speech.

21) *The Guadian*, 07/10/00D: "Europe des patries: Mr Blair's version: do your own thing." Leader.

22) *Financial Times*, 07/10/00A "Blair spells out vision of Europe's future: Prime minister says that the EU can become a superpower without turning itself into a superstate."

23) *Financial Times*, 07/10/00B: "Europe 'must wake up to new reality': Tony Blair's European vision includes a stronger council and speedy inclusion of new member states."

24) *The Times*, 08/10/00: "Blair offers Europe a superpower vision."

25) *The Independent*, 09/10/00A: "Letter: democracy in the EU." Letter by Walter Cairns.

26) *The Independent*, 09/10/00B: "European expansion will require radical reform." Commentary by Sarah Hogg.

27) *Financial Times*, 09/10/00: "Leader: Tony Blair's vision of Europe." Leader.

28) *The Times*, 10/10/00: "Blair's Warsaw speech and teh EU 'superpower.'" Letter by Jeffrey Titford.

29) *The Guardian*, 11/10/00: "Comment & Analysis: Letter: Two cheers for Europe." Letter by Sarah Ludford.

30) *Financial Times*, 11/10/00A: "Comment & Analysis: Blair enters the real debate on Europe: Rather than fear the emergence of a European superstate, Britain should realise it can benefit form changes." Commentary by Douglas Hurd.

31) *Financial Times*, 11/10/00B: "Letters to the editor: Turning a blind eye to confusion over EU." Letter by Michael Pearce.

32) *The Times*, 12/10/00: "Blair on collision course over EU citizens' charter."

33) *The Independent*, 12/10/00: "Blair agrees to lose on seat on EU Commission."

34) *The Times*, 13/10/00A: "Charter of trouble."

35) *The Times*, 13/10/00B: "Blair 'misled nation over EU charter.'"

36) *The Guardian*, 13/10/00A: "Chips are down for EU expansion at casino summit."

37) *The Guardian*, 13/10/00B: "Comment & Analysis: Analysis: A Nice mess: The first wave of east European entrants to the EU will alter the balance of the European constitution. But how will the scales be reset?" Commentary by David Walker.

38) *Financial Times*, 13/10/00A: "Letters to the editor: Eurosceptic countries lack self-confidence." Letter by Miguel G. Orozco.

39) *Financial Times*, 13/10/00B: "Leader: A Biarritz affair." Leader.

### *France*

1) *Libération*, 04/10/00: "Prodi cherhce a reprendre kes renes d l'Europe."

2) *Libération*, 05/10/00: "Aubry presidente, la France isolee; Un intellectuel britanique, proche de Tony Blair, se livre a un travail de prospective sur l'Union europeenne 2010… et Paris en mauvaise posture." Commentary by Francois Heisbourg.

3) *Libération*, 07/10/00: "Blair, champion de l'elargissement."

4) *Le Monde*, 07/10/00: "Union Europeenne: Tony Blair veut accelerer l'elargissement."

5) *Le Figaro*, 07/10/00: "Grande-Bretagne. La reponse aux propisitions de Jacques Chirac et de Joschka Fischer; Blair refuse une Europe fragmente.

6) *Le Monde*, 09/10/00: "Tony Blair plaide, a Varsovie, pour une Europe de nations libres, independantes et souveraines; Dans son discours devant les pays candidats a l'entree dans l'Union, il a rejete le model federal."

7) *Le Figaro*, 09/10/00: "De Belgrade a Biarritz…"

8) *Le Monde*, 10/10/00: "Tony Blair: le rejet de l'euro par les Danois n'aura aucun impact."

9) *Libération*, 11/10/00: "Hypocrisies francaises sur l'Europe; Au-dela des mots, Paris se defie de toute federation europeenne et se retrouve plus proche de Tony Blair que de Joschka Fischer."

10) *Le Monde*, 13/10/00: "Institutions europeennes: le grand marchandage."

### Germany

1) *taz*, 07/10/00: "Blair gegen Superstaat EU."

2) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10/10/00: "Nur kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner?"

3) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/10/00: "Visionaere und Realisten."

4) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12/10/00: "Wenn Schweden ueber Europa nachdenken."

5) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13/10/00: "Verhandlungen in entscheidender Phase."

### Spain

1) *Expansión*, 07/10/00: "La Comision propone implicar a las empresas y las ONGs en la construccion europea Blair responde a Prodi pidiendo mas poder para los estados miembros de la UE."

2) *El País*, 07/10/00A: "El lider laboralista dice que el 'no' danes no afectara a la ampliacion."

3) *El País*, 07/10/00B: "Aznar dice que ha caido 'el ultimo pedazo del muro.'"

4) *El País*, 09/10/00: "Visiones de Europa." Leader.

5) *Expansión*, 11/10/00: "Euroexpansion el peso de cada pais, la reforma de la Comision y la cooperacion reforzada siguen dividiendo a los quince los quince celebran una cumbre europea en Biarritz en medio del atasco de la reforma instituticional."

6) *El País*, 13/10/00: "Europe en la encrucijada." Commentary by Felipe Gonzalez.


### Nice-sample 05/12/00-14/12/00

### Denmark

1) *Information*, 05/12/00: "Politikerne har svigtet."

2) *Jyllands-Posten*, 06/12/00A: "Ledende artikel: Før Nice." Leader.

3) *Jyllands-Posten*, 06/12/00B: "Frankrig: Chirac groggy før EU-topmøde."

4) *Berlingske Tidende*, 06/12/00: "Tyskland – det rare muskelbundt."

5) *Information*, 07/12/00: "EU mod Øst: Kommissær-strid sendes til hjørne."

6) *Jyllands-Posten*, 08/12/00: "Nice-topmøde: Nervekrig om Europas fremtid."

7) *Information*, 08/12/00A: "EU: Visioner: Forandring i familien påkrævet." Commentary by Göran Persson.

8) *Information*, 08/12/00B: "Interview: Romano Prodi (Resultater: Pessimistisk Prodi glæder sig til tiden efter Nice)."

9) *Politiken*, 08/12/00A: "Fakta: Topmøde i Nice: Det slås de om."

10) *Politiken*, 08/12/00B: "Topmøde i Nice: Danmark klar til mere union."

11) *Berlingske Tidende*, 08/12/00A: "Nyrup klar til ny reform af traktaten."

12) *Berlingske Tidende*, 08/12/00B: "Dramatisk start på Nice-topmødet."

13) *Information*, 09/12/00: "Ledende artikel: Et hår og en hær." Leader.

14) *Politiken*, 09/12/00: "Debat: Nicetopmøde: Tal europæisk, din hund." Commentary by Lars Egelund.

15) *Jyllands-Posten*, 09/12/00: "Nice topmøde: Tyskland på vej mod toppen."

16) *Berlingske Tidende*, 09/12/00A: [No title].

17) *Berlingske Tidende*, 09/12/00B: "Knuder på EU-forsvaret."

18) *Politiken*, 10/12/00: "EU: Fra kernefamilie til storfamilie."

19) *Jyllands-Posten*, 10/12/00: "Topmøde-reporter; Heksekedlen i Nice."

20) *Berlingske Tidende*, 10/12/00: "Frankrigs udspil deler EU-landene i store og små."

21) *Information*, 11/12/00: "EU mod Øst: Vokseværk i Parlamentet."

22) *Jyllands-Posten*, 11/12/00A: "Kommissionen: Dansk kommissær i sikker havn."

23) *Jyllands-Posten*, 11/12/00B: "EU set udefra: Verdens øjne hviler på Nice."

24) *Berlingske Tidende*, 11/12/00A: "Nervekrig om EU's fremtid."

25) *Berlingske Tidende*, 11/12/00B: "Vejen til EU's forfatning er lagt."

26) *Jyllands-Posten*, 12/12/00A: "Nice-traktat: Pres på SF efter Nice."

27) *Jyllands-Posten*, 12/12/00B: "Nice-traktat: Tilfredshed i Baltikum."

28) *Information*, 12/12/00A: "Ledende artikel: Stakkels EU." Leader.

29) *Information*, 12/12/00B: "EU mod Øst: Nedtur i Nice."

30) *Information*, 12/12/00C: "EU mod Øst: Problemer: Problemerne står tilbage."

31) *Berlingske Tidende*, 12/12/00: "Eksperter: EU hæmmet af ny traktat."

32) *Politiken*, 13/12/00: "Kronik: Den store, stygge folkestemme." Commentary by Ebbe Kløvedal Reich.

### *England*

1) *The Times*, 05/12/00: "Read my lips – Non can only mean Yes."

2) *The Independent*, 05/12/00: "France angers Britain over EU defence force; Europe on eve of Nice summit, foreign secretary voices fears that Nato could be undermined by plans for even closer military co-operation."

3) *The Guardian*, 05/12/00A: "Britain and France clash over defence: Cook fights plan to let groups of countries mount own initiatives."

4) *The Guardian*, 05/12/00B: "Comment & Analysis: Forget Florida, it's Nice we should be worried about: There is little cause for optimism at this week's EU summit." Commentary by Hugo Young.

5) *Financial Times*, 05/12/00A: "Letter to the editor: Like it or not, we are at home in Europe." Letter by Chris Blanchard.

6) *Financial Times*, 05/12/00B: "Britain angers EU ahead of Nice summit."

7) *The Times*, 06/12/00A: "How joint papers open doors to new countries."

8) *TheTimes*, 06/12/00B: "Ever-closer union dead: Mandelson."

9) *The Times*, 06/12/00C: "Secret plan for EU 'superstate.'"

10) *The Independent*, 06/12/00A: "Downing Street says Tories want out of EU."

11) *The Independent*, 06/12/00B: "The Nice summit: from sovereignty to movies, let the battle begin."

12) *The Guardian*, 06/12/00: "Blair alerted on EU integration moves."

13) *Financial Times*, 06/12/00A: "World new – Europe: Alpine commissioner set for uphill struggle: Reform chief hopes that talks will bring compromises amounting to a 'useful and correct' Nice summit."

14) *Financial Times*, 06/12/00B: "Letter to the editor: EU has underpinned democracy." Letter by J. P. Connell.

15) *The Times*, 07/12/00A: "The nice ambush."

16) *The Times*, 07/12/00B: "Proletarian protesters take over Cote d'Azur."

17) *The Times*, 07/12/00C: "Cook faces long game of Euro poker."

18) *The Independent*, 07/12/00: "Blair flies to Nice under pressure on four fronts."

19) *The Guardian*, 07/12/00A: "Blair bid to avert EU stalemate: PM sees enlargement as priority in reform agenda."

20) *The Guardian*, 07/12/00B: "Comment & Analysis: The national vetoes which must go: The president of the European Commission gives his hopes for Nice." Commentary by Romano Prodi.

21) *Financial Times*, 07/12/00A: "Nice could lead to EU doubling its size: Reform and strengthening of decision-making process top of the agenda at historic summit."

22) *Financial Times*, 07/12/00B: "World news – Europe: EU must not aim too high, warns Swedish premier."

23) *Financial Times*, 07/127/00C: "World news – Europe: Brussels to create agency to improve safety at sea."

24) *The Times*, 08/12/00A: "Jospin hopes charter will become law."

25) *The Times*, 08/12/00B: "Blair undertakes U-turn over German demand for talks."

26) *The Times*, 08/12/00C: "Eastern Europe pleads for EU enlargement."

27) *The Independent*, 08/12/00: "Nice summit: Human rights – rights charter masks division over its future legal status."

28) *The Guardian*, 08/12/00A: "Nice summit: East grows tired of waiting game: Enlargement Pressure builds on EU to move quickly towards a united continent."

29) *The Guardian*, 08/12/00B: "Nice summit: Members back citizens' charter: Human rights Articles aim to give EU 'moral dimension.'"

30) *The Guardian*, 08/12/00C: "Chirac widens split on defence."

31) *The Guardian*, 08/12/00D: "Comment & Analysis: France versus the mighty Americans: They want a transformed Europe to moderate US dominance." Commentary by Martin Woollacott.

32) *Financial Times*, 08/12/00A: "Comment & Analysis: Plotting Europe's new geometry: Enlargement to the east will place Germany at centre of the EU and demands a rethink of the Union's purpose." Commentary by Philip Stephens.

33) *Financial Times*, 08/12/00B: "World new – Europe: Leaders prepare for enlargement EU summit in Nice talks begin on boosting decision-making capability to overcome difficulties of taking on new."

34) *The Times*, 09/12/00A: "Chirac's lecturing style angers delegates."

35) *The Times*, 09/12/00B: "Leaders sharpen wits for 15-hand poker game."

36) *The Times*, 09/12/00C: "'Dirty tricks' benefits row leaves Blair in EU cold."

37) *The Independent*, 09/12/00: "Nice summit: In a locked room. Leaders plot the future of Europe; the talks."

38) *Financial Times*, 09/12/00: "World news – Europe: Pledge to speed entry of ex-Soviet countries EU summit in Nice push for 2004 entry."

39) *The Times*, 10/12/00A: "Call me a Eurosceptic, but give me Boston not Berlin." Commentary by David Quinn.

40) *The Times*, 10/12/00B: "Europe in a disarray at EU summit."

41) *The Times*, 10/12/00C: "A bigger Europe." Commentary by Ken Livingstone.

42) *The Times*, 10/12/00D: "What is the EU for?" Leader.

43) *The Times*, 10/12/00E: "Nice summit: who hopes to join the EU and when, the issues, the objectives, dilemmas and results."

44) *The Times*, 11/12/00: "Big countries grow stronger in Europe."

45) *The Independent*, 11/12/00A: "Nice summit: The Commission – radical reform rejected for a please-all fudge."

46) *The Independent*, 11/12/00B: "Nice summit: The future – leaders agree on a package of reform."

47) *The Guardian*, 11/12/00A: "Jeux sans frontieres: From here it looked as though the Nice summit was all grinning group photos and lofty communiques. But what really went on in the corridors and conference rooms of the Hotel Acropolis – and on the streets outside?"

48) *The Guardian*, 11/12/00B: "Nice summit: The future: Focus turns to power split deeper, wider, debate on EU due in 2004."

49) *The Guardian*, 11/12/00C: "Blair holds on to UK's key vetoes: Revolt by small states stalls summit."

50) *Financial Times*, 11/12/00A: "EU leaders draw up outline deal on treaty revisions UK keeps veto on tax and social security as voting rights dispute sends Nice summit into overtime."

51) *Financial Times*, 11/12/00B: "Comment & Analysis: Europe's meeting of unequals: Storminess at Nice underlines that the EU must choose between clumsy bargaining of national interests and empowering common institutions." Commentary by Quentin Peel.

52) *Financial Times*, 11/12/00C: "Europe: EU leaders agree to try again in 2004 Nice summit future conference to define division of powers between Brussels and governments will not be a preco."

53) *The Times*, 12/12/00A: "Germany triumphs on the EU battlefield."

54) *The Times*, 12/12/00B: "Welcome to the late, late show."

55) *The Times*, 12/12/00C: Blair to EU: We can't go on like this."

56) *The Independent*, 12/12/00A: "Letter: out of step in Europe." Letter by Martin Rosen.

57) *The Independent*, 12/12/00B: "Mr Blair has helped Britain to find a role in Europe; 'this country needs to demonstrate its seriousness as a European player by joining the single currency.'" Commentary by Donald Macintyre.

58) *The Independent*, 12/12/00C: "Blair calls for change after Nice 'circus.'"

59) *The Independent*, 12/12/00D: "Nice summit: the deal – big four emerge triumphant after diplomatic 'coup.'"

60) *The Independent*, 12/12/00E: "Nice summit: the Commission – no reform but new presidential powers."

61) *The Independent*, 12/12/00F: "Nice summit: how the new Europe will work."

62) *The Guardian*, 12/12/00A: "Nice summit: Belgian hero broke deadlock: The deal Nerve-racking end to tiring, tortuous talks."

63) *The Guardian*, 12/12/00B: "Nice summit: How big powers won big benefits: Modest reforsm Defeat and humiliation for integrationists."

64) *The Guardian*, 12/12/00C: "Tories left floundering by EU deal."

65) *The Guardian*, 12/12/00D: "Comment & Analysis: Everyone was a winner at the battle of Nice: For once it wasn't a contest between Britain and the rest." Commentary by Hugo Young.

66) *Financial Times*, 12/12/00A: "National news: EU treaty should return some powers says Blair Commons Prime Minister condemns conservative opposition to agreement in Nice."

67) *Financial Times*, 12/12/00B: "Comment & Analysis: A new dynamic at Nice: The Franco-German axis at the centre of Europe's postwar development is giving way to more fluid alliances based on individual issues." Commentary by Robert Graham and Brian Groom.

68) *Financial Times*, 12/12/00C: "World news – Europe: Future members welcome outcome East Europe enlargement on course."

69) *Financial Times*, 12/12/00D: "World news – Europe: Majority voting slowly wins support of leaders reforms progress in overcoming national objections."

70) *The Times*, 13/12/00A: "Blair misunderstood by Nice treaty critics."

71) *The Times*, 13/12/00B: "Tax veto is 'a threat to Britain's leading role.'"

72) *The Independent*, 13/12/00A: "Oh Mr Hague, you've become such a bore about Europe; 'there is no sense of an alternative vision, just the sound of the Kruschevian shoe being banged.'" Commentary by Anne Mcelvoy.

73) *The Independent*, 13/12/00B: "Europe hits back over Blair's stance on tax."

74) *The Independent*, 13/12/00C: "Summits could be switched to Brussels."

75) *The Guardian*, 13/12/00: "Prodi attacks 'self-serving' Blair: Commission president fears summit failures will harm EU."

76) *The Independent*, 14/12/00: "Letter: a two-tier Europe." Letter by Randhir Singh Bains.

77) *Financial Times*, 14/12/00A: "Comment & Analysis: A doese of Nordi pragmatism: After the trials of Nice, Sweden's EU presidency will deliver results."

78) *Financial Times*, 14/12/00B: "Europe: Britain and Spain 'biggest Nice winners.'"

*France*

1) *Le Monde*, 05/12/00A: "Dossier Europe: la France acheve son mandat sans cocorico; Le sommet de Nice clot six mois d'une presidence terne. Sauf accord a l'arrache, la reforme de l'Union risque de capoter."

2) *Le Monde*, 05/12/00B: "Le president Chirac reste prudent sur les resultats du sommet de Nice; berlin pret a maintenir la parite politique avec la France au sein de l'UE."

3) *Le Figaro*, 05/12/00: "Union Europeenne. Le sommet de Nice, qui s'ouvre jeudi, doit boucler une reforme ambitieuse, indispensable a l'elargissement; Ankara veut aussi son integration militaire."

4) *Le Monde*, 07/12/00: "Nice, en sommet crucial pour l'avenir de l'Europe; Avant de s'elargir a l'Europe de l'Est ainsi qu'a Chyphre et a Malte, les Quinze doivent imperativement reformer leurs institutions politiques. Ils vont tenter de trouver un compromis d'ici a la fin du week-end. Parallelement, les antimondialistes se sont donne rendez-vous le long de la baie des Anges."

5) *Le Figaro*, 07/12/00: "Union Europeenne. Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des Quinze se retrouvent a partir d'aujourd'hui sur la Cote d'Azur; Les enjeux capitaux du sommet de Nice." Commentary by Romano Prodi.

6) *Le Monde*, 08/12/00A: "Jacques Chirac et Lionel Jospin logent au meme hotel."

7) *Le Monde*, 08/12/00B: "Les Quinze abordent en rangs disperses la reforme des institutions; Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Union europeenne ont ouvert, jeudi 7 decembre, le sommet de Nice par une rencontre avec leaurs homologues des treize pays candidate a l'Union. L'elargissement est la toile de fond d'une discussion qui s'annonce difficile."

8) *Le Figaro*, 08/12/00: "Union Europeenne. Le Conseil des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement a officiellement ouvert ses travux hier a Nice, dans un climat de violence qui a vu manifestants et forces de l'ordre s'affronter. Plusieurs policiers ont ete blesses au cours des echauffourees. La charte de droits fondamentaux a ete signee, mais elle n'a pas ete proclamee; La France joue serre a Nice."

9) *Le Figaro*, 09/12/00: "Union Europeenne, Le Conseil des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement poursuit ses travaux a Nice. Les Quinze ont decide hier de creer une Agence alimentaire debut 2002; Le confessional avant la marchandage Petits calculs pour une grande reforme."

10) *Libération*, 11/12/00: "La Pologne impose son nome parmi les grands."

11) *Le Monde*, 11/12/00: "Le droit de veto est un handicap en matiere de negociations commerciales."

12) *Le Figaro*, 11/12/00A: "Verites crues sur l'elargissement."

13) *Le Figaro*, 11/12/00B: "Union Europeenne. Les Quinze negociaient laborieusement, hier soir, a Nice, la mise au point d'un nouveau traite communautaire; Affrontement entre grands et petits pays."

14) *Le Monde*, 12/12/00A: "Europe: accord minimal a Nice."

15) *Le Monde*, 12/12/00B: "Quatre ans pour reflechir a un projet constitutionnel."

16) *Le Monde*, 12/12/00C: "Sur les quatre dossiers de la reforme des institutions, les resultats sont tres inferieurs aux ambitions affichees."

17) *Le Monde*, 12/12/00D: "D'autres mesures pour une Europe plus citoyenne."

18) *Le Monde*, 12/12/00E: "Le sommet de Nice, nouvelle etabe vers l'Europe des vingt-huit; Les quinze chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Union europeenne ont obtenu a løarrache, lundi 11 decmbre, un accord inacheve pour preparer l'elargissement a l'Est. Les grands pays ont consolide leurs positions."

19) *Le Figaro*, 12/12/00: "Union Europeenne. Apres le laborieux sommet des Quinze a Nice; Le jeu du mistigri." Commentary by Charles Pasqua.

20) *Libération*, 13/12/00: "Les eurodeputes ereintent Chirac.

21) *Le Monde*, 14/12/00: "A Strasbourg, Jacques Chirac a du affronter le mecontentement des deputes europeens; Les resultats du sommet de Nice ont suscite la reprobation."

### *Germany*

1) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 06/12/00: "EU-gipfel in Nizza."

2) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 06/12/00A: "Die charta der europaeischen grundrechte vor ihrer feierlichen proklamation." Commentary by Meinhard Hilf.

3) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 06/12/00B: "Regieren in Europa." Leader.

4) *taz*, 07/12/00: "Historische Zufaelle."

5) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 07/12/00A: "Die Affaeren des M. Chirac Frankreich: Der angeschlegene Praesident."

6) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 07/12/00B: "Blick zurueck nach Amsterdam."

7) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 07/12/00C: "Ein datum des Erinnerns und des Aufbruchs."

8) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 07/12/00D: "Schroeder gibt Polen Vorrang bei EU-Beitritt 'Gebot historischer Gerechtigkeit.'"

9) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07/12/00A: "Die Europaeische Union vor dem Gipfeltreffen in Nizza. In Berlin denkt man schon ueber Nizza hinaus."

10) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07/12/00B: "'Ohne polnisches Freiheitsstreben waere die Geschichte der deutschen Einheit weniger gluecklich verlaufen.'" Verbatim of Schröder's speech to the Polish parliament.

11) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07/12/00C: "In Nizza darf es keine 'Ueberbleibsel' geben." Commentary by Romano Prodi.

12) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 07/12/00D: "Schroeder in Warschau: Der EU-beitritt Polens ist ein Gebot historischer Gerechtigkeit."

13) *taz*, 08/12/00: "You got to be free."

14) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 09/12/00. "Die Angst der Europaeer vor Europa." Leader.

15) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 09/12/00A: "Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in Nizza. Ein Erfolg trotz kuenstlich geschuerter Aufregung."

16) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 09/12/00B: "Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in Nizza. Dir Schatten der Vergangenheit holen Europas Zukunft ein."

17) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10/12/00A: "Elefantentreffen."

18) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10/12/00B: "Der EU-Staatsnwalt ist in Nizza steckengeblieben."

19) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10/12/00C: "Zaehes Feilschen um die Zukunft Europas."

20) *taz*, 11/12/00: "Die Kleinen ueben Kofferpacken."

21) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 11/12/00: "Im Wartesaal vom Haus Europa Nizza: Notizen vom einem Gipfel, der einem Marathon gleicht."

22) *taz*, 12/12/00A: "Europaeische Erblasten."

23) *taz*, 12/12/00B: "Europa macht unendlich muede."

24) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/12/00A: "Die Irrationalitaet der Maerkte Das Thema des Tages."

25) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/12/00B: "Salade Nicoise." Commentary by Andreas Oldag.

26) *Süddeutsches Zeitung*, 12/12/00C: "Held im Auftsand der Kleinen Nizza: Die Rolle des Belgiers."

27) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12/12/00A: "War da was vor 1871?" Commentary by Dieter Langewiesche.

28) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12/12/00B: "Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in Nizza."

29) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12/12/00C: "Nach vier Tagen und einer Nacht verabschiedet die EU ein Mini-Reform-Paket."

*30) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14/12/00: "Auf dem Rueckmarsch?"

**Spain**

1) *El País*, 05/12/00: "Para cuando la ampliacion de Europa?" Commentary by Emilio Menendez Del Valle.

2) *Cinco Días*, 05/12/00: "Tribuna Cita europea en Niza." Commnetary by Jose Maria Zufiaur.

3) *Expansión*, 07/12/00: "Editorial El futuro de Europa pasa por las reformas de Niza." Leader.

4) *El País*, 07/12/00A: "El poquer de Niza." Leader.

5) *El País*, 07/12/00B. "Las apuestas por el exito o el fracaso."

6) *El País*, 07/12/00C: "Schroeder pide a los quince que antepongan la construccion europea al interes nacional; el canciller sigue los pasos de Willy Brandt en Varsovia y utiliza argumentos historicos para Niza."

7) *El País*, 07/12/00D: "Niza obliga a los lideres de la UE a superar sus diferencias ante el retor de la ampliacion; la incorporacion de nuevos paises exige que los actuales miembros redistribuyan el poder."

8) *Cinco Días*, 07/12/00A: "Los Quince proclaman la Carta de Derechos del Ciudadano."

9) *Cinco Días*, 07/12/00B: "Editorial Europa, futuro imperfecto." Leader.

10) *Expansión*, 08/12/00: "La reforma de la Union Europea. Alemania, dispuesta a ceder en su exigencia de tener un mayor numero de votos si en 2004 se convoca otra CIG los quince prometen a los candidatos del este 'esfuerzos para evitar el retraso' de la ampliacion."

11) *El País*, 08/12/00A: "Chirac abre la cumbre con la exigencia de que Paris y Berlin conserven el mismo peso; grupos violentos causan graves incidentes en Niza."

12) *El País*, 08/12/00B: "'Si Niza fracasa, es un problema para todos.'"

13) *Cinco Días*, 08/12/00: "Londres, a favor de otra reforma institucional en 2004."

14) *El País*, 09/12/00: "Por una Europa de varias capitales." Commentary by Soledad Gallego-Diaz.

15) *El País*, 11/12/00A: "Alemania logra en Niza la mayor cuota de poder dentro de la UE; Espana acepta perder de capacidad de bloqueo que tienen los paises grandes."

16) *El País*, 11/12/00B: "Francia asume que Alemania sea el pais con mas poder en la UE; Portugal y Belgica bloqueaban de madrugada la cumbre de Niza."

17) *El País*, 11/12/00C: "La cumbre de las dos reconciliaciones."

18) *El País*, 11/12/00D: "Los lideres europeos pactan abrir una nueva reforma 'para aclarar el futuro.'"

19) *El País*, 11/12/00E: "El parlamento se amplia a 732 diputados para contentar a Alemania; Berlin contara con 99 escanos."

20) *El País*, 11/12/00F: "Espana acepta perder la capacidad de bloqueo que tienen los paises grandes; Pique rechaza concretar el reparto de poder en cifras y se dice 'satisfecho.'"

21) *Expansión*, 11/12/00: "La llave el futuro de la Union Europea."

22) *Cinco Días*, 11/12/00: "Los Quince se compromete a acelerar la negociacion con los candidatos del Este."

23) *Expansión*, 12/12/00: "El acuerdo de la cumbre de Niza pasa desapercibido en los mercados financieros el euro pierde un 1,24%, pendiende del resultado electoral en EEUU."

24) *El País*, 12/12/00A: "Corriere della Sera Europa: Una custion de celos." Commentary by Franco Venturini.

25) *El País*, 12/12/00B: "El presidente de la Comision sera elegido por mayoria."

26) *El País*, 12/12/00C: "De Europa al Palau."

27) *Cinco Días*, 12/12/00A: "Italia se felicita por la aprobacion de las cooperaciones reforzadas."

28) *Cinco Días*, 12/12/00B: "Espana no consigue la paridad con los grandes."

29) *Cinco Días*, 12/12/00C: "Editorial Europa, de 15 a 27." Leader.

30) *Expansión*, 13/12/00: "Incertidumbre y gobernabilidad."

31) *El País*, 13/12/00A: "La astuta Europa." Commentary by Sami Nair.

32) *El País*, 13/12/00B: "Todas las cumbres se celebraran en Bruselas tras la primera ampliacion."

33) *El País*, 13712/00C: "El parlamento europeo manifiesta a Chirac su decpcion por el tratado de Niza."

**Jospin&Prodi-sample 26/05/01-05/06/01**

*Denmark*

1) *Information*, 26/05/01: "Frankrig vil tilbage på den europæiske scene."

2) *Politiken*, 29/05/01: "Jospin vil ikek være en lunken europæer."

3) *Jyllands-Posten*, 29/05/01: "Frankrig: Jospin: Nej til EU som forbundsstat."

4) *Information*, 29/05/01: "Jospin afviser forbundsstat."

5) *Jyllands-Posten*, 30/05/01: "Europa-tale: Tysk-fransk uenighed om EU."

6) *Information*, 30/05/01A: "Tysk EU-vision skudt ned."

7) *Information*, 30/05/01B: "Ledende artikel: En ufolkelig sag." Leader.

8) *Berlingske Tidende*, 30/05/01: "Ros til de franske visioner for EU."

9) *Jyllands-Posten*, 01/06/01: "EU: EU-udvidelsen tilbage på sporet."

10) *Politiken*, 02/06/01: "Debat: Europa: EU – mellem statsforbund og forbundsstat." Commentary by Erling Bjøl.

11) *Politiken*, 03/06/01: "EU's fremtid. Analyse: EU's fremtid i støbeskeen." Commentary by Tøger Seidenfaden.

12) *Information*, 05/06/01: "Interview: Lykke Friis ('Vi har det med EU som med folkekirken')."

***England***

1) *Financial Times*, 26/05/01: "Multiple identities: Briatin must adapt to constitutional reforms at home and in Europe." Commentary by Lionel Barber.

2) *The Times*, 27/05/01: "Jospin's vision of EU fans the federal flames."

3) *The Independent*, 28/05/01A: "Leading article: Read between the lines of Mr. Jospin's euro-rhetoric." Leader.

4) *The Independent*, 28/05/01B: "Election 2001: Labour fears the F-word in Jospin's vision for Europe."

5) *The Guardian*, 28/05/01: "Comment & Analysis: Election 2001 Our commentators enter the euro fray from the just-say-no left and the dithering middle ground while Roy Hattersley congratulates Blair on coming clean: There are no certainties." Commentary by Peter Preston.

6) *Financial Times*, 28/05/01: "Jospin to define his stance on Europe Consensus approach French prime minister differs from president Chirac and German leader over how EU should develop."

7) *The Times*, 29/05/01A: "French lesson."

8) *The Times*, 29/05/01B: "Jospin sets out vision of a more French EU."

9) *The Times*, 29/05/01C: "The real rift in Europe is not the Channel."

10) *The Times*, 29/05/01D: "Jospin fuels Europe row with Labour."

11) *The Independent*, 29/05/01A: "Election 2001: Rigging the referendum isn't as easy as the Tories think." Commentary by Donald Macintyre.

12) *The Independent*, 29/05/01B: "Election 2001: Prodi undermines Blair on Europe."

13) *The Independent*, 29/05/01C: "Election 2001: Analysis – very French, very dull but little to fear in the Jospin plan."

14) *The Guardian*, 29/05/01A: "Jospin gives French look to European federation."

15) *The Guardian*, 29/05/01B: "Jospin rejects federal Europe."

16) *Financial Times*, 29/05/01A: "UK rejects French plan for EU tax harmony."

17) *Financial Times*, 29/05/01B: "Jospin rejects German federalist views French prime minister UK Conservatives see advocacy of European superstate."

18) *Financial Times*, 29/05/01C: "Lionel Jospins vision for the EU." Leader.

19) *Financial Times*, 29/05/01D: "'I want Europe but my nation remains important to me.'"

20) *The Times*, 30/05/01: "Cook dismisses Prodi call for European tax."

21) *The Independent*, 30/05/01: "Election 2001: Prodi raises the stakes with call for new EU tax; Europe."

22) *The Guardian*, 30/05/01A: "The future of Europe: Enlargement shakes the ground under the bastions of the EU."

23) *The Guardian*, 30/05/01B: "The future of Europe: Seven leaders with seven visions: A guide to where they think we are going."

24) *The Guardian*, 30/05/01C: "Prodi speech stirs passions in euro debate: President calls for new tax and more integration."

25) *Financial Times*, 30/05/01A: "Nation state finds new champion in Jospin: French leader focuses on more practical issues such as food safety as he sets out his vision for the EU."

26) *Financial Times*, 30/05/01B: "Brussels boys Observer column."

27) *Financial Times*, 30/05/01C: "Prodi calls for tax to finance EU budget."

28) *The Times*, 01/06/01: "Will this Napoleon risk all to unite Europe?"

29) *The Guardian*, 01/06/01: "Election 2001: Euro scare story fears as Blair meets Swedish PM."

30) *Financial Times*, 01/06/01A: "Grand plans and petty squabbles: Narrow self.interest on the part of member states could poison efforts to enalrge Nato and the EU." Commentary by William Wallis.

31) *Financial Times*, 01/06/01B: "Guterres sees gradual EU reform."

32) *The Times*, 03/06/01: "This is a new kind of Europe." Commentary by Larry Siedentop.

33) *The Times*, 04/06/01: "Economics and independence in a united Europe." Letter by Robin Barrett.

34) *Financial Times*, 04/06/01: "A European foreign policy built on sacrifice: Nation states must relinquish some of what makes them unique if the European Union is to attain credibility in the wider world." Commentary by Dominique Moisi.

### *France*

1) *Le Monde*, 26/05/01A: "Trois questions o…Frederic Michel."

2) *Le Monde*, 26/05/01B: "L'Europe raisonnable de Lionel Jospin."

3) *Le Figaro*, 26/05/01: "Les sentiments ambivalnets des Francais." Commentary by Laurence d'Andlau.

4) *Libération*, 28/05/01: "La France prend le debat en marche."

5) *Le Monde*, 28/05/01: "Tony Blair invite les conservateurs britanniques a ne pas tourner le dos a l'Europe; Le premier minstre travailliste continue neanmoins a eviter les debat sur la monnaie unique."

6) *Le Figaro*, 28/05/01: "Union Europeenne. Le premier ministre francasi presnete aujourd'hui ses idees sur la reforme de l'UE; Jospin descend dans l'arene europeenne."

7) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01A: "Tetes chercheuses: Pascal Lamy aupres de Lionel Jospin, et Michel Barnier chez Jacques Chirac."

8) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01B: "Analyse Des reformes institutionnelles qui concilient conservation."

9) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01C: "Verbatim Parce que je ne suis pas un europeen tiede, je ne veux pas d'une Europe fade." Verbatim of speech (Jospin).

10) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01D: "Le debat sur l'avenir de l'Europe dans le colonnes de Monde."

11) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01E: "Le retour de Jacques Delors."

12) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01F: "Lionel Jospin veut faire l'Europe de demain sans defaire la France; Dans le discours qu'il a prononce au Centre d'accueil de la presse etrangere, lundi 28 mai a Paris, le premier minsitre a rappele les valeurs sociales communes aux Quinze et a donne sa vision de la Grande Europe. Il s'est prononce en faveur d'une federation d'Etats-nations et d'une Constitution europeenne."

13) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01G: "Francois Bayrou, president de l'UDF, au Grand jury RTL-Le Monde-LCI; Si Jacques Chirac avait ete depuis six ans le president qu'il faut a la France, je le soutiendrais."

14) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01H: "L'Europe de Lionel Jospin." Verbatim of speech (Jospin).

15) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01I: "Jean.Pierre Chevenement se pose en candidat de l'antimondialisation; Silencieux sur une eventuelle candidature presidentielle, le president du Mouvement des citoyens est presse par ses amis d'incarner, en 2002, le combat contre l'Europe liberale et la mondialisation. Les embarras judicaires de Charles Pasqua pourraient lui assurer un espace electoral plus grand."

16) *Le Monde*, 29/05/01J: "L'Europe de M. Jospin." Leader.

17) *Le Figaro*, 29/05/01: "L'Europe selon Lionel Jospin."

18) *Libération*, 30/05/01: "UE: Jospin trop prudent pour Prodi."

19) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01A: "L'Allemagne et l'Europe francaise."

20) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01B: "En France, le discours de premier ministre ne trouve grace que dans le camp socialiste; Les partenaires de gauche du gouvernement ne menagent pas leurs critiques, tandis que les representants de la droite fustigent une vision trop timoree, notamment sur les institutions."

21) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01C: "A Bruxelles, les eurodeputes sont partages."

22) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01D: "Romano Prodi a Paris."

23) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01E: "Berlin constate le rejet par M. Jospin de son projet d'Europe federale; Certains commentateurs allemands stigmatisent un discours electoral."

24) *Le Monde*, 30/05/01F: "Main gauche, main droite."

25) *Le Figaro*, 30/05/01: "UE. Le president de la Commission critique la conception francaise de l'Europe des Etats; Romano Prodi plaide pour sa chapelle."

26) *Le Monde*, 31/05/01: "Un Etat por la nation europeenne!" Commentary by Jean Matouk.

27) *Le Monde*, 02/06/01: "Europe: les oublis de Lionel Jospin."

28) *Le Monde*, 04/06/01: "Tony Blair ebtre le Grand Large et l'Europe."

29) *Le Figaro*, 05/06/01A: "Grande-Bretagne Face aux travaillistes europholes, les conservateurs ont fait du rejet de l'euro leur theme de campagne; L'Europe dechaine les passions."

30) *Le Figaro*, 05/06/01B: "Europe L'architecture et les pouvoirs futurs de l'Union europeenne en question; Romano: 'Les Etats ne sont pas des creatures divines.'"

*Germany*

1) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28/05/01: "Inhalte statt Institutionen."

2) *taz*, 29/05/01A: "Wahlkampf, wie immmer; Jospins Europa-Rede war kein grosser wurf: es fehlt der mut." Commentary by Daniela Wengärtner.

3) *taz*, 29/05/01B: "Keine Architektur ohne Inhalte; Die wesentlichen Passagen aus der Rede des französischen Premierminsiters Jospin: 'Frankreich und andere europäischen Staaten können eine solche Vorstellung von einer Föderation nicht hinnehmen.'" Verbatim of speech (Jospin).

4) *taz*, 29/05/01C: "Bewusst ahnungslos; Die Sprecher der Bundesregierung sind bemüht, den Eindruck einer Kluft zwischen Frankreich und deutschland möglichst zu verstreuen."

5) *taz*, 29/05/01D: "Ein Europa der starken Nationen; Jospin plädiert dafür, dass der Europäische Rat, das Gremium der EU-Regierungschefs, die Kompetenz erhält, das Europaparlament aufzulösen."

6) *taz*, 29/05/01E: "Europa: Da gehts lang!; Frankreichs Premier Jospin lehnt den Vorschlag von Kanzler Schröder für einen europäischen Bundesstaat ab. Stattdessen spricht er sich für eine Föderation der Nationalstaaten aus."

7) *taz*, 29/05/01F: "Der Euralist." Leader.

8) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29/05/01A: "Fischer und die Folgen."

9) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29/05/01B: "'Wir koennen deutsches Modell nicht hinnehmen.'" Verbatim of speech (Jospin).

10) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01A: "Die Euparede des französischen Premierministers Jospin." Verbatim of speech (Jospin).

11) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01B: "Kritik von Europa-Ageordneten."

12) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01C: "Fischer: Bedeutender Beitrag Jospins."

13) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01D: "Was Jospin will."

14) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01E: "Jospin widerspricht Schröder Festhalten am Institutionengefüge."

15) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29/05/01F: "Es knirscht nach wie vor im Gebälk."

16) *taz*, 30/05/01: "Prodi stützt Jospin; in kürze."

17) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30/05/01A: "Wirtschafts-Regierung Das Thema des Tages."

18) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30/05/01B: "Prodi: EU benoetigt Wirtschaftsregierung."

19) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01A: "'Die Kommission stärken.'"

20) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01B: "Bartoszewski unterstützt Jospin."

21) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01C: "Blair stellt sich gegen Jospin."

22) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01D: "Lob kam nur aus den eigenen Reihen."

23) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01E: "Lob für Jospins europafreundlichen Grundton."

24) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01F: "Spanien begrüsst Vorshläge aus Paris."

25) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01G: "Entlassungsgesetz entzweit die Pariser Koalition."

26) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01H: "Deutsch-französische Konsultationen am 12. Juni."

27) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30/05/01I: "EU-Regelung zu Flüchtlingen rückt näher."

28) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31/05/01: "In Raffgier vereint." Leader.

29) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31/05/01A: "Scharping: Kluge Rede Jospins."

30) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31/05/01B: "Europa im Ideenwettbewerb."

31) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 01/06/01: "Sie kommen nicht zu Wort." Commentary by Timothy Garton Ash.

32) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 02/06/01A: "Gemeinsam gegen die Eurosion." Leader.

33) *Süddeutsce Zeitung*, 02/06/01B: "SZ-Wochenchronik 22/2001 vom 26. Mai bis 1. Juni."

*Spain*

1) *El País*, 27/05/01: "Los socialistas europeos marcan distancias las tesis reformistas britanicas son cada vez menos inluyentes en el continente."

2) *Expansión*, 29/05/01A: "La nueva Europa del primer ministro frances mantiene las politicas agricola y regional bajo competencia de Bruselas Jospin apya la tesis alemana de crear un gobierno economico europeo, pero se aleja de la vision federal."

3) *Expansión*, 29/05/01B: "Romano Prodi y Loyola de Palacio se reuniran hoy con Jacques Chirac y Lionel Jospin la Comision europea y las autoridades francesas analizan la ofensiva de EDF."

4) *El País*, 29/05/01A: "Jospin rechaza el modelo federal de Schroeder y propone una Europa de estados-nacion."

5) *El País*, 29/05/01B: "La Europa de Jospin." Leader.

6) *El País*, 29/05/01C: "Lo que separa a Paris y Berlin."

7) *El País*, 29/05/01D: "Pique: 'espana quiere avanzar por la via de los resultados.'"

8) *El País*, 29/05/01E: "Union Europea contra EEUU."

9) *El País*, 29/05/01F: "Jospin propone una Europa de estados-nacion, frente al modelo federal de Alemania; Francia quiere que la mayoria salida de las urnas europeas elija al presidente de la Comision."

10) *Cinco Días*, 29/05/01: "Ferreo rechazo al modelo federalista aleman."

11) *El País*, 30/05/01A: "La Europa de Jospin; Le Monde." Leader.

12) *El País*, 30/05/01B: "Prodi propone crear un impuesto europeo para financiar el presupuesto de la Union; el presidente reclama mas poder oara la Comision en materia economica, diplomatica y militar."

13) *El País*, 30/05/01C: "Hague proclama que queda solo una semana para salvar la libra; Blair resalta el europeismo del Reino Unido."

14) *Cinco Días*, 30/05/01A: "Lealtad, 1 El debate de los tipos llega a Europa."

15) *Cinco Días*, 30/05/01B: "El presidente exige reformas financieras."

16) *El País*, 31/05/01: "Soltar lastre." Leader.

17) *El País*, 01/06/01A: "Zapatero expondra a Prodi la posicion del PSOE sobre la ampliacion de la UE; el martes se reune en Bruselas con el presidente de la Comision europea."

18) *El País*, 01/06/01B: "Repliegue tactico."

19) *El País*, 03/06/01A: "Las trampas de lso modelos europeos."

20) *El País*, 03/06/01B: "Pulso de poder en la Union Europea." Commentary by William Pfaff.

21) *El País*, 03/06/01C: "El gobierno economico europeo."

22) *El País*, 03/06/01D: "El discurso de Jospin sobre Europa desata la polemica."

23) *El País*, 04/06/01: "Asi no se puede." Commentary by Andres Ortega.

24) *Expansión*, 04/06/01: "Amigos y rivales en el corazon de Europa."


**Lykketoft-sample 21/08/01-30/08/01**

*Denmark*

1) *Jyllands-Posten*, 23/08/01: "Ledende artikel: Dagens chance." Leader.

2) *Politiken*, 24/08/01A: "Holger K. vild med EU-udspil."

3) *Politiken*, 24/08/01B: "EU-visioner med forbehold."

4) *Information*, 24/08/01A: "Lykketoft: EU skal topstyres."

5) *Information*, 24/08/01B: "Vision uden vingesus."

6) *Jyllands-Posten*, 24/08/01A: "SF er tilfreds."

7) *Jyllands-Posten*, 24/08/01B: "EU-politik: En bro til Europa."

8) *Politiken*, 25/08/01: "Baggrund: Fra Danmark til EU – uden nye ideer."

9) *Information*, 25/08/01A: "Ledende artikel: Ayatollah Lykketoft." Leader.

10) *Information*, 25/08/01B: "Interview: Holger K. Nielsen (Holger: Ja til stærkt EU)."

11) *Information*, 25/08/01C: "Analyse: Lykketofts franske tilbøjeligheder."

12) *Jyllands-Posten*, 25/08/01A: "Lykketoft følger det øvrige EU."

13) *Jyllands-Posten*, 25/08/01B: "Borgerlig kritik af Lykketoft."

14) *Politiken*, 28/08/01A: "Lykketoft satser på Baltikum."

15) *Politiken*, 28/08/01B: "Ledende artikel: EU-udspillet." Leader.

16) *Jyllands-Posten*, 30/08/01: "Kronik: Bryd med den uheldige praksis." Commentary by Jens Modvig.

**Laeken-sample 12/12/01-21/12/01**

*Denmark*

1) *Jyllands-Posten*, 12/12/01A: "Fogh: Ingen dansk højredrejning."

2) *Jyllands-Posten*, 12/12/01B: "EU-topmøde: EU's fremtid til debat."

3) *Berlingske Tidende*, 12/12/01: "Dansk strid om EU-konvent."

4) *Politiken*, 13/12/01: EU's fremtid: Borgerne: EU er uinteressant."

5) *Jyllands-Posten*, 14/12/01A: "Ledende artikel: Europas fremtid." Leader.

6) *Jyllands-Posten*, 14/12/01B: "EU-topmøde: Den store studehandel."

7) *Information*, 14/12/01: EU skal diskutere sig selv."

8) *Berlingske Tidende*, 14/12/01: "Vi skal bygge en bro." Commentary by Lars Barfoed.

9) *Information*, 15/12/01: "Fogh: Mere åbenhed i EU."

10) *Jyllands-Posten*, 15/12/01A: "EU-topmøde: Fogh i hårdt EU-opgør."

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| General topoi | Constitutive dichotomies | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Specific topoi* | *Why reforms?* | *How to debate reforms?* | *What reforms?* |
| *Tropes, figures, and argumentative strategies* <br> Part – whole (inclusion) | -(re)uniting Europe (1,2,3) | -national – European debates (5) <br> -elite – popular debates (1,3,4,5,6) | -nation-states – EU (1,2,4,5) <br> -national cultures – European civilisation (4,5) |
| Part – whole (exclusion/ division) | -Europe – rest of world (4,5,6) | -positive debate – sceptical positions (1,2,3,4,5,6) <br> -national – European debates (1,3,4,6) <br> -elite – popular debates (2) | -national emotions – European utility (3,6) |
| Historical narrative | -(re)uniting Europe (1,3) | | -Britain at centre of Europe (3) |
| Definition | -challenge – opportunity (2,3) <br> -withdrawal from – engagement in EU (6) | | -federation of nation-states (4) |
| Inevitability | -no alternative to enlargement (1) <br> -no alternative to EU (1,2,3,4,5,6) | | |
| (Dissolution of) incompatibility | -deepening – widening (1,2,3,) <br> -benefits – risks of globalisation (4) <br> -national emotions – European utility (6) | -procedural/ institutional – substantial/purposive dimensions of debate/reform (2,3,4,5,6) | -national identity – European co-operation (6) <br> -creating Europe without undoing the nations (4) <br> -unity in diversity (4) |
| Change of perspective | -External division between groups – internal duality within each individual (6) | | -becoming EU-member – never having left Europe (2) <br> - EU is neither state nor international co-operation (4,5) |
| Antithesis | -erosion – integration (1) <br> -influence together – be influenced alone (3,5,6) | | -European opinions and values – those of the US government (4,5,6) |

| Analogy | -Globalisation – egg on frying pan (6)<br>-Globalisation – discovery of America (5) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Symmetry | -big ends – big means (4,5,6)<br>-big scene – big actor (4,5,6)<br>-citizen expectations – EU actions (2) | -ends/purposes – means/ institutions (1,2,3,4,5,6) | |
| (Restoration of) harmony | -EU success/potential – public support (1,3,4,5,6) | -EU's – people's priorities (3)<br>-institutional change – people's comprehension (3) | |
| Metaphors of construction | -building bridges (6) | -building/constructing Europe (1,2,3,4,5,6)<br>-laying foundations/ cornerstones (4,5)<br>-following blueprint (1)<br>-building bridges (3,6) | |
| Metaphors of direction | | -leading the way (1,2)<br>-continuing along the path (1,2,3,4,5,6)<br>-direction/momentum around people's priorities (3)<br>-EU no springboard for national interest (2) | |
| Organic metaphors/ metaphors of belonging | | | -deeply rooted will of belonging (2)<br>-heart of Europe (2)<br>-centre of Europe (3)<br>-European family of nations (3)<br>-European core (1) |
| Inertia | -continuous integration (1, 5) | -short- and long-term change (continuation of debate/reforms) (1,2)<br>-(chrono)logical developments (1,2,3,4,5,6) | |
| Wordplay | | -content – container (4) | -superpower, not superstate (3) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antimetabole/chiasmus | | -citizens own Europe – Europe owns them (3) | |
| Meaning of words | | -federalism (2) -constitution (2,6) | -federation of nation-states (4, 6) |
| Doctrine of the mean | | | -intergovernmental – federal (2,3,6) |
| Principle of duality | | | Europe of nation-states – Europe of citizens (1) |
| Authority | | | -the founding fathers (1, 5) |

1 = Fischer's speech, 2 = Aznar's speech, 3 = Blair's speech, 4 = Jospin's speech, 5 = Prodi's speech, 6 = Lykketoft's speech