

# Practices Providing Order

## The Private Military/Security Business and Global (In)Security Governance

Leander, Anna

*Document Version*  
Final published version

*Publication date:*  
2008

*License*  
CC BY-NC-ND

*Citation for published version (APA):*  
Leander, A. (2008). *Practices Providing Order: The Private Military/Security Business and Global (In)Security Governance*. Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, Copenhagen Business School.

[Link to publication in CBS Research Portal](#)

### General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

### Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us (research.lib@cbs.dk) providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 16. Oct. 2024





**Copenhagen  
Business School**  
HANDELSHØJSKOLEN

Department of  
Intercultural Communication and Management

PorcelænsHAVEN 18  
DK-2000 Frederiksberg

Anna Leander  
Associate Professor  
[ale.iki@cbs.dk](mailto:ale.iki@cbs.dk)

Practices Providing Order:  
The Private Military/Security Business and Global (In)Security Governance

By Anna Leander  
Hanse Wissenschaftskolleg Delmenhorst and Copenhagen Business School; Institute of  
Intercultural Communication and Management

Paper presented at the workshop  
“Business and Global Governance – Business in Global Governance”  
Copenhagen Business School 15-16 November 2007

Comment most welcome to  
[Ale.ikl@cbs.dk](mailto:Ale.ikl@cbs.dk)

Practices Providing Order: The Private Military/Security Business and Global Security Governance .....	3
Introduction.....	3
1) Why Look at Practices? .....	4
a) Breaking the Procrustean bed of formalism.....	4
b) Escaping the irrational focus on rational action / re-assembling the social.....	6
2) Understanding whose/what practices matter: Thinking of positions in a “field” ...	8
a) Acknowledging differentiation in the global political economy .....	9
b) Mapping positions in fields.....	10
c) Keeping sight of objects and technology .....	12
3) Understanding why Practices Matter: Thinking of Dispositions beyond the “Field” .....	13
a) Acknowledging the <i>habitus</i> .....	14
b) Accounting for contexts / discourses .....	15
c) Tracing how practices produce and transform contexts .....	17
4) Thinking of Practices as Governance: Ordering, Resistance and Reflexivity .....	19
a) Practices Producing Ordering .....	19
b) Ordering and the Scope for Resistance.....	21
c) Resistance and Reflexivity.....	22
Conclusion: .....	24
References.....	26

# Practices Providing Order: The Private Military/Security Business and Global Security Governance

Anna Leander

## Introduction

This paper explains, or perhaps better rationalizes, why I have ended up thinking that so called “practice” theory provides the most adequate entry point for theorizing about business in/and global governance.<sup>1</sup> But more than this the key ambition is to spell out what it means to work with practice theory and what kind of leverage it gives for understanding the role of business in global governance. The paper therefore begins by an account of two major difficulties thinking in terms of practices are useful for circumventing. The general thrust of that section is to underline why it may be useful to think in terms of practices in the first place rather than sticking with some of its admittedly more parsimonious and less labor intense alternatives. The rest of the paper then tries to outline what it means (in my view) to work with practices. The second section focuses on how we know whose/what practices matter. It emphasizes the importance of allowing for contextual differentiation when mapping activities and their hierarchies. It also underscores the significance of remaining open about who and what is important. It points to the centrality of different forms of capital (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) in defining whose activities matter. But even more strongly it links up with actor-network-theory’s insight that also objects and technologies “act” in social relations. The third section suggests that to fully grasp the why practices work as they do and why specific activities and actors within practices come dominate it is necessary to look at dispositions and taken for granted views. It underlines that although the *habitus* is an attractive way of capturing this, it remains necessary to account for the broader *doxa* or discourses and for the technologies through which they are effective. Finally, the last section pulls together some thoughts on how thinking in terms of practices helps understand “governance” and changes in governance. The paper suggest that thinking in terms of practices underlines governance as order (rather than formal rule), that it facilitates thinking about change/resistance and finally that it underlines the importance of reflexivity in academia and beyond. To give some “real-world-empirical” sense to this account, and to counteract the impression that this is solipsistic theory for theory’s own sake, I anchor my arguments in my work on the private military/security business.

---

<sup>1</sup> For an overview and introduction see (Schatzki et al., 2000). Who exactly is included varies rather substantially. I refer mainly to the thinking of Bourdieu, Foucault, Schatzki and the actor network (ANT) theorist Latour for the reason that I draw most on their work.

## 1) Why Look at Practices?

A decade ago, the private military/security business<sup>2</sup> was much smaller than today and its development largely unknown. This was before the extensive media coverage of the “privatized wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq, before four Blackwater contractors were lynched, burned and hung up on a bridge in Fallujah, before Blackwater contractors shot 17 people in the Nisour square in Baghdad and well before the flood of books hearings, investigations and discussions on private contractor accountability that have pushed the US democrats to place the issue centrally on their political. A decade ago, the private military/security business was discussed mainly among security specialists whether in the armed forces, in the think tank environment or in academia. The occasional “scandal” made it into the media as for example when Sandline shipped arms to Sierra Leone, MPRI “trained” Croat forces in the midst of the war or when Executive Outcomes was hired to impose order in Papua New Guinea. But overall, the business of military services was small and generally considered of marginal significance for international politics and global governance. Today the situation is very different. There is a hype surrounding the private market for force. Scores of publications, meetings, documentaries, articles and investigations come. Yet, in a rather interesting way this is another case illustrating that the more things change the more they remain the same as Giuseppe di Lampedusa puts it in the *Gattopardo*. The private military/security business continues to be kept at the margins of discussions about global security governance. The bulk of scholars in International Relations, International Political Economy and Globalization proceed with business as usual in thinking about security governance. This is tied to the glasses (or perhaps better the blinders) they wear which prevent private military/security business from appearing; the private security business is made invisible. I want to insist on two blinders that I have found particularly frustrating and unhelpful when I have tried to communicate about the private military/security business: formalism and methodological individualism. A good reason to turn to practices is that it helps remove those blinders.

### a) Breaking the Procrustean bed of formalism

The most effective and also one of most common ways of preventing private military business to make its entrance into discussions about global security governance is what I call formalism here for want of a better term. What I have in mind is the tendency to look at the formal procedural set up of governance relations. Scholars look at the extent to which institutionalized negotiation and bargaining surrounding decisions relevant to the governance of military relations have changed. They look at the way the legal authority has shifted from private to public actors in the security realm. They ask to what extent “sovereignty” or more specifically the control of the state over the use of force has been

---

<sup>2</sup> When I talk about military/security business in this paper I refer to firms providing military/security services (including direct provision of security, logistical support, training and intelligence) in the context of armed conflict. The reason I do not refer simply to military services is that the lines between war/peace and inside/outside is sliding in the contemporary context with the consequence that much of what is called as security services (particularly since the firms providing them seem to have decided that they cannot talk about military services as these are of more dubious legitimacy) could also be called military services and vice versa. For introductory discussions of this business see (Avant, 2005, Leander, 2006a, Singer, 2003) .

undermined.<sup>3</sup> I do not suggest that this kind of work is unimportant or uninteresting. There are excellent theoretical and practical reasons for taking an interest in the formal procedures surrounding security privatization. Upholding effective procedures or reforming/creating new ones if necessary, is the only way of holding the private military business accountable (legally, politically and economically). Hence, the heated disputes about what kinds of formal procedures are most effective and appropriate for the business as well as about the extent to which existing laws are sufficient (and just need to be more effectively used) or whether on the contrary we need to reform law and perhaps even rethink it radically. There can be no doubt that as relatives of contractors or their victims, citizens, and tax-payers we have excellent reasons to care about these disputes and their outcomes.

However, the focus on formalism and procedures also has some serious drawbacks and it seems to me that awareness of these could substantially benefit the discussion about formal procedures and their effectiveness. The focus on form and procedure tends to become a Procrustean bed for thinking about the private military/security business in global governance. Procrustes (the stretcher) had an iron bed into which he invited every passerby to lie down. If the guest proved too tall, he would amputate the excess length; if the victim was found too short, he was then stretched out on the rack until he fit, the bed having been adjusted by Procrustes beforehand. Similarly, when the private military/security business is dealt with from a formalistic perspective limbs that do not fit the perspective tend to be cut off. For example, states have formal monopoly authority to decide on the “legitimate use of force” and are likely to continue to enjoy this privilege. At the same time privatization has created practices where the private military/security business is charged with interpreting these rules in practice, with writing them, and with deciding who can use force. On September 16 2007 the Blackwater contractors in Nisour Square were interpreting rules of engagement, they had partly written these rules (as they are defined in the contract it had with the State Department). More broadly Blackwater’s (and other private military/security firms’) have a significant say both over what is legitimate use of force in Iraq (the general understanding of legitimate uses of force as US strategic doctrine is partly written by private companies) and over who can use force legitimately (through firm selection of clients). These practices do not end the formal state “monopoly of the legitimate use of force”. But once that is said, a formalist focus prevents us from thinking about this in detail. In Procrustean fashion it cuts them out of the picture and correspondingly impoverishes our understanding of security governance.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to this, formalism often lures observers to engage in Procrustean stretching of their categories. The stretching of the notions of public and of private has been of particular concern as regards my work on the private military business. Depending on their intent and their focus, observers and participants often try to stretch either of the two categories to fit them into an argument about form. By simply positing

---

<sup>3</sup> E.g. (Doswald-Beck, 2007, Frye, 2005, Hallo de Wolf, 2007, Keohane, 2003, and, 2005a, Krahnmann, 2005b, Scoville, 2006, Shearer, 1998, Walker and Whyte, 2005).

<sup>4</sup> This point is eloquently made in different terms and in more detail by Cutler (2006: 202) who argues that “The analytical and theoretical foundations of international law form obstacles to the development of international economic law regulating corporate conduct because the render multinational corporations legally ‘invisible’”.

that the private military/security business is really a “private” actor or that the state is really “public” they can resolve (or better exclude, ignore and escape from) many of the disturbing practices signaling that this is not the case. The lines between the public and the private are not only “blurred” as it is often pointed out. Blurred would presuppose that there were in fact two distinct realms with unclear boundaries. The situation is more complex as public, state actors are integrated in to the private realm and behaving accordingly and the reverse is true of the private actors. “Civilian technicians assisting in the collection of surveillance data during operations missions [...] civilian maintainers providing battlefield maintenance of a TOW missile, the M1A1, the Bradley, or the Patriot missile [...] and contractors supporting the gathering and interpreting of data from the Joint Air Forces Control Centre and feeding intelligence and targeting information to operators” are not simply private actors (Zamparelli, 1999: 14). Similarly, the police and the armed forces in the Northern Ivory Coast (or vice president Cheney in the US) are not simply public actors. According to an observer with long standing experience in the area: “when I think of the state taking over the provision of security, I think of it as being privatized” (also Bigo, 2000, and, 2001, Förster, 2007). Positing that business is private and state is public may have the virtue of saving a formalistic legal framework. But the connotations of those terms severely distorts our understanding security governance and is hopelessly inadequate when it comes to solving the practical problems faced by those engaging the formal procedures governing real world (in)security.

Shifting attention from the focus on formal processes and authorities to practices is a way of breaking the Procrustean bed of formalism and venturing to look at the stuff that matters for security governance: who ensures what kind of security for whom in what kind of way by what means. As just suggested this may be necessary pre-condition for tackling the indeed very important questions about formal procedures and rules. But before detailing why I say this and what I mean by practices I need to point to a second major blinder the focus on practices is helpful in lifting: the blinders imposed by methodological individualism.

b) Escaping the irrational focus on rational action / re-assembling the social  
A second blinder that keeps insights about the private military/security business from penetrating discussions about global security governance is the tendency to focus attention on only one actor and one relationship at the time. In one of his earliest reactions to the 16 September 2007 Nisour incident, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates came out and underlined that Blackwater and its behavior should be seen as the “bad egg that might spoil the basket”. Similarly, the overwhelming part of critical writing about the industry has focused on identifying the (indeed abundant number of) situations where one firm, in one specific relationship has somehow violated existing norms (e.g. Rasor and Bauman, 2007, Scahill, 2007, Singer, 2003, but also Verkuil, 2007). I do not want to suggest that it is mistaken to point to specific cases where private military/security firms behave in blatant disregard of political, economic, legal and social norms. However, the risk with the bad egg in the basket logic -- whether used to argue that the bad egg must be removed from the basket or to show that the basket is already spoiled beyond salvation -- is that it detracts attention from absolutely essential questions about security governance and the political economy underlying it. It puts the blinds on the questions of how the creation of a collective institution, the market, in the area of security reshapes the overall

landscape of security governance even if it is well governed and the bad eggs removed. The focus on the individual rationality of actions irrationally chops the social world to pieces without providing the tools and time necessary to assemble it again or to note that rationality may be changing.

The bad eggs in the basket figure of thought has had (the no doubt unintended) effect of crowding out critical assessments of the private military/security business and its relation to global governance. This is not only a matter of time and space being exhausted by the effort place in thinking about single firms, cases and occurrences. At a deeper level, it is tied to the prevailing dominance of methodological individualism in social science thinking in which it is embedded. Two decades of rational choice approaches seem to have restricted analytical focus to individual rational actions while at same time eroding the analytical capacity to uncover the foundations of rationality.

For critical analysis of the private military/security business this is damning. From the start it excludes questions that involve situations where what is important is not the actions and strategies of a firm or a government in given situation, but the effects of the creation a new collective institution these individual actions are part and parcel of but which cannot adequately be captured by the individualist focus or by an understanding of the individual case. We can for example look at the Nisour incident, show that Blackwater contractors broke some rules, respected others. But if we stick to the incidence we have little leverage to say anything about transformations of global security governance. If we wanted such a leverage, we would have to place that the incidence in the more general context of security privatization and outsourcing and even more broadly in the context of shifting understandings of the forms and aims of security governance that have accompanied the shift to neo-liberal forms of security governance. We would have to replace Nisour in the context of more general market practices. However, the individualist framing of problems militates against such efforts to reassemble the social world to make sense of strategic choices and the rationality from which they make sense.

More than discouraging the analysis of dynamics and contexts beyond the single case generally, individualist “bad eggs in the basket” strategy for analyzing private security has marginalized work on the normal and unspectacular effects of creating private security markets in particular. Critical work is on what well intentioned firms, staffed with people who follow all the legal, political and social norms of their context entail for security governance is scarce (Leander, 2007c). Critical scholars often dismiss the thought that such a situation could exist and be worthwhile investigating or even thinking about. As a consequence, the analysis is handed over to industry supporters and lobbyists who are allowed to interpret this undisturbed by would be critical objections. This entrenches the view that if we could only manage contracts properly, get the bad eggs out of the basket, and create the proper regulatory structures; there would be no reason to fret about the development of the private military/security business. The logical conclusion is that the proper thing to do is to focus on cases where things somehow went wrong and see how that might have been avoided. That in the process of focusing on these individual cases and the mending the things that went wrong we may be losing sight of the broader picture is conveniently forgotten.

Finally, for reasons purely idiosyncratic to the discussions about private security the bad eggs in the basket way of thinking about the industry has been unhelpful to critical debate and dialogue. By focusing so much attention on cases and examples of the



rationality of private military/security business that “misbehaves”, critical observers have paradoxically undermined the legitimacy of critical argument. It makes it so easy for market advocates to box all critical voices in one category: those who deny the private military/security business any virtue. This kind of sweeping denial jars with the firms’ self-image but also with the image they have with concerned communities. It is hard to argue that EO’s ending of the Sierra Leone civil war, the protection of refugee camps in Goma, or the personal security services offered to the many NGOs and diplomats working in conflict zones around the world have nothing positive. The firms as well as their clients tell a very different story. They talk back and loudly reject simplistic assumptions and generalizations about military firm rationality and behavior. It is even harder to sustain with a straight face that private military services hired to “stop the next Rwanda” as the sector propaganda mouth piece Doug Brooks would phrase it would necessarily be negative (e.g., 2005). When critics are boxed as taking these untenable positions their credibility is severely undermined and communication impaired.

That one might miss the forest for staring at the trees is not exactly a new insight, but it is often forgotten in the analysis of the private military/security business. It is irrational to direct attention exclusively to the rational actions and strategies in given situations and think that one can capture those by only looking at the single case. To think about security governance we clearly need a way of re-assembling the social to think about collective institutions. Similarly to moving away from a focus on formal rules and definitions seems to be of essence if one is not to miss the bulk of what makes the private military/security business relevant to private security government. I have made these two points with reference to work on the private military/security business and its role in global governance. However, they most probably also haunt discussions of private business in other areas global governance as well. The precise ways in which formalism and methodological individualism make firms invisible and critique difficult will no doubt vary greatly. Therefore the remainder of this paper which is construed to discuss how and why thinking in terms of practices may be useful to bring firms back in to a broader picture of global governance may be useful also for people working on other businesses than the (in)security one.

## 2) Understanding whose/what practices matter: Thinking of positions in a “field”

When people say that they think in terms of practices they usually mean that they think about what people say and do. The reason they talk about practices rather than simply about action, agency and speaking is the need to signal that their approach differs quite substantially from the standard individualist based approaches. The speaking and doing in practices includes a bundle of activities, joined by a common recognition of what the practice is about. Hence the notion of practice centrally incorporates taken for granted “inter-subjectively constituted” understandings.<sup>5</sup> Grasping how these understandings (discourses) develop, evolve and what they do is a key part of working with practices; so is studying the how practices (re)produce these understandings. In that sense one might say that work on practices is an attempt to break out of the individualist/holist dilemma.

---

<sup>5</sup> “A practice is a ‘bundle’ of activities [...] practices are open, temporally unfolding nexus of action and a practice is a set of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 2002: 71-73).

Moreover, as work on practices is usually empirically based and includes bodily expression, it has also been understood as a way of breaking the mind/body and the idealist/realist dichotomies (e.g. Brubaker, 2004). This is no place to go into a detailed discussion of how and if this works or to detail the disputes and disagreements within the approach.<sup>6</sup> What matters for now is just to underline that by contrast to the standard accounts of agency and action, a reference to practices signals a work which is not located at the individualist level and where working with and problematizing socially constituted meanings is of essence. The remaining sections of this paper one venture into substantiating what this difference mean for practical work in IPE. Specifically, I will continue to draw examples from the discussions about the role of business in global governance referring to the private military business to illustrate what kind of study thinking of terms of practices produces and how it helps making private business possible. In this section tackle the absolutely fundamental question of how to know which practices matter.

a) Acknowledging differentiation in the global political economy

Focusing on formal institutions and procedures is likely to make it very difficult to capture the role of business in global governance as argued in detail above. Moving on to consider the “practices” that make up the global governance is a step away from that difficulty. However, once that step is taken it is still necessary to settle exactly what practices one should be looking at. Common sense, but also conventional international political economy would warn us against assuming that the role of business in global governance would be the same everywhere. Keohane and Nye’s (2000) distinctions between areas governed by power and those governed by complex interdependence is a classical statement of this point. Indeed that insight is now so much part of common sense in IPE that most works are divided into issue areas. Textbooks cover usually some combination of trade, finance, and production (Cohn, 2008, Frieden and Lake, 1995, Gilpin, 1987, Miller, 2007, Ravenhill, 2005, Stubbs and Underhill, 1994).

In general terms work on practices echoes this emphasis on the need to differentiate. Bourdieu and his followers (who have played a central role in the development of thinking about practices) for example link practices to what they call “fields”. Fields are defined by the fact that those who participate in the field share an understanding of the stakes at stake in the field. Fields can vary in generality and scope and any individual is of course part of many fields at the same time (a family, a work place, a social context, a political system, an international society etc). The fields develop and reproduce their own slightly idiosyncratic rules (through the practices in the field). These may sometimes be written down, but more often they are not. In fact, most of those in the field would find it hard to spell them out. They are rules of the kind one knows and but would find hard to explain. To the extent that they are reflected on, they are intensely struggled over. Finally, the fields are linked to each other and developments in one field tend to be reflected also in other fields.<sup>7</sup> This Bourdieuan notion of a field has very clear

---

<sup>6</sup> For discussions see key works such as (Bourdieu, 1980, Latour, 2005, Schatzki, et al., 2000). For introductions (Swidler, 1986). See also for discussion and applications in IPE (de Goede, 2006, Huysmans, 2006 forthcoming, Larner and Walters, 2004, Leander, 2007d, Pouliot, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Bourdieu’s own work relates extensively to fields. The clearest discussion is in (Bourdieu, 1979). But the discussion most relevant to IPE is his discussion of the economic field (Bourdieu, 1997) There is a

equivalents in other parts of thinking about practices, including e.g. Luhmanian differentiated systems, Wittgensteinian differentiations of different language games and but also as for example in Foucault's *dispositifs*, Deleuze and Guattari's *agencements* and Latour and Callon's *reseaux*. What these notions share is that they “designate a common figure: social things organized in configurations, where they hang together, determine one another via their connections, as combined both exert effects on other configurations of things and are transformed through the action of other configurations, and therewith constitute the setting and medium of human action, interaction, and coexistence” (Schatzki, 2002: xiii).

A key question when it comes to differentiating realms of practices is how to draw the lines around the differentiation. How do we know what the relevant bundle of sayings and doings is when we want to understand for example global security governance? Coming from the practices, the answer is that we have to look at who understands themselves and is understood by others to be part of the field of global security governance. This answer is one that explicitly includes the possibility that the boundaries of a field may fluctuate and change as in time. Bourdieu for example saw shifting the boundaries of fields as key to shifting power relations more on this below. But also Schatzki stresses the openness and fluidity of bundles of practices. More than this, the answer has in common with some of the “regime” literature in IPE that it avoids the trap of excluding private actors simply by predefining the relevant actors as states, a point made by Susan Strange who found it a good reason to sympathize with the literature (1998a). It saps the a priori assumption that the public private division is the most relevant division in any context. But more than this, it also helpfully distracts attention from the inside/outside division that haunts all thinking about IR/IPE. It becomes an empirical question to what extent the inside outside boundary is central for the practices studied. Thinking about the role of private military business in global security governance both of these moves are extremely important. Moving away from a priori assumptions about the relative relevance public and private actors for governance makes it possible to pay serious attention to the sector in the first place. Breaking with the insider outside makes it possible to focus on the transnational “global” nature of the practices in the sector denying the relevance of national traditions or differences.

Thinking in terms of practices differentiated according to fields (or something equivalent) has the potential because of breaking with the “methodological nationalism” that haunts so much of the work in the social sciences. I do not claim that practice theory is the only way of doing this (as indicated above) nor would I contend that all practice theory uses this potential. On the contrary, part of the work in this tradition is proudly and firmly nationalist in its framings (e.g. Dezalay, 2007). The point here is that the potential is there to be developed.

#### b) Mapping positions in fields

Fields do not only need to be identified delimited they have to be filled with the actors who are doing and saying the things that make up the practices in the field. And especially to make get any sense of what practices matter it is necessary to map out the “positions” of actors relative to one another, that is to begin tackling the question of what

---

mountainous secondary literature on fields. For an introduction see (Martin, 2003). For an discussion of the relevance in security (Bigo, 2003, and 2005).

kind of power relations exist in the field. This question is of obvious pertinence to those interested in thinking about the role of private business in global governance. If we say that private business matters for global governance we are implicitly saying that they have some form of power and that their practices matter.

The question is how to tackle this mapping exercise. There are a variety of answers to this question depending on what kind of practice theory one works with. However, the answers have at least two things in common. The first of these is that they emphasize the relational aspect of the mapping. This may seem a rather banal point to underline as any mapping exercise is by definition relational. But it is worth underling because relational has a dual meaning. Actors are placed in relation to each other and hierarchies hence mapped out (meaning 1). However, unlike the assumptions often made in IR/IPE we cannot simply assume that certain resources (for example armed forces, economic wealth, or technical capabilities) will confer “power” and advantages to the actors in the field. Rather, relations in the field (meaning 2) are fundamentally important for establishing where to map the actors. The logic of the field, the rules of the game, decides what kind of resources will confer advantages in a given field and how they will do that. Struggles to reshape or preserve these definitions are therefore rather unsurprisingly a permanent feature practices in any field.

This leads to the second common point about mapping: if it is to work well, the mapping exercise has to remain open about what the nature of the “resources” are. This is the essence of Bourdieu and his follower’s introduction of multiple ideas of capital. Hence they emphasize that not only may economic capital matter, but so may other forms of “capital”. Capital is intersubjectively constituted through the practices in the field. Hence “capital” may stem from the mobilization of a positive bias (symbolic capital) or from being anchored in a social network (social capital) or from having political connections (political capital) or from mastering a cultural code (cultural capital) or from being part of cosmopolitan networks (cosmopolitan capital) etc. etc. There is no a priori and natural hierarchy between them, nor is there any guarantee that they remain stable in time. The mapping exercise is consequently a demanding one as it can only be properly carried out if the field is well enough understood to actually know what kind of hierarchy reigns.<sup>8</sup> In the actor network theory the necessity to remain open about the nature of resources is even greater. Here the emphasis on fluidity, diversity and visibility is much greater. Power and hierarchies here are produced in the constantly changing interactions which make up the social world. They therefore have to be extrapolated from these relationships (Latour, 2006: 118-9). This makes it rather inadequate to talk about “resources”; the world connotes at least minimal permanence. Power is in the relationship itself. Moreover, obviously the relevant (non-)resources are specific to a given network (the ANT field equivalent), but since the network itself is in constant flux so will the power relations be. The mapping exercise is becoming even more demanding. One of the arguments Bruno Latour gives for not trying to replace the actor network theory, the acronym of which is ANT, is that the reference to ants suitably conveys the kind of work shouldered by those working with the approach. Similarly, Bourdieu repeatedly expressed his disdain for those who refused to engage in hard and time consuming

---

<sup>8</sup> For IPE relevant applications of capital in this sense see e.g. (Betensky, 2000, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999, Huysmans, 2002, Kauppi, 1996, Poupeau, 2004, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004).

empirical work. As this paper proceeds the full extent to which these statements are both honest reflections will certainly become clearer.

Hard work however is worthwhile when the result is satisfying. From that perspective, engaging in a relational mapping of positions thinking about the business in global security governance may not be such a bad idea. It makes it possible to retain the insights of the “linguistic” or “epistemological” turn in our discipline. It leaves open the prospect that whose practices matter for the governance of a the hard and material military sphere may be profoundly shaped by “ideas” about security, about government or about markets and the capacity of different actors to draw on these. At the same time it does lead into a form of absurd idealism which denies that for a military firm it may matter quite substantially whether it has a financial base sufficient to launch a major advertisement campaign or to fund a politician/political party. Mapping positions helps incorporate and clarify the significance and of both “material” and “ideational” resources in thinking about whose practices matter.

c) Keeping sight of objects and technology

Before closing this discussion about how to capture whose practices matter, I want to touch upon a subject that is pivotal to one kind of practice theory, the ANT, namely the issue of how to integrate and think about the role of objects and of technology. The reason of course is not only or even mainly that it is important for ANT, but rather that it is an issue which is central in a number of fields where business has a role in global governance. Susan Strange for example insisted heavily in her revision of *Casino Capitalism*, that is in *Mad Money*, that she thought technology was a totally overlooked and still remained to be integrated into thinking about IPE (Strange, 1998b, and 1998c). Similarly, it is impossible to conceive of the private business role in the military/security business without reference to the so called revolution in military affairs. The expansion of contracting is parts of the business is hardly conceivable independently of the reliance on unmanned armed vehicles of different kinds and the increased reliance on “off-the-shelf”, “dual use” technologies. But even on the low tech end of the business there can be no doubt that the development of ever more advanced surveillance, alarm, and remote protection technologies has played a fundamental role in shaping markets. In Kenya for example the distinction between upmarket and lower market security firms is intimately tied to what they can offer and the international (mainly East African) expansion of KK is in no small part tied to its superior equipment and technology (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). There can in other words be little doubt that technology is of central importance and needs to be an integral part of accounts. Not terribly controversial. The question is how.

A central part of ANT is the suggestion that we need to think about objects and technologies as “actors” in networks. The reason is not of course that they somehow think and act independently. Rather the reason is that there is symmetry between people and objects in the sense that both people and objects make things happen. “Things can authorize, make possible, encourage, make available, allow, suggest, influence, hinder, prohibit and so on” (Latour, 2006: 104, my translation). From this perspective, endowing objects and technologies with agency merely amounts to rejecting the “false *asymmetry* between intentional human action and causal material world” (Latour, 2006: 109, my translation). Needless to say this breakdown of the distinction between the material,

object world and the human, social world does not exactly meet with universal approval. Practice theorists not working within the ANT perspective reject it with insistence. Moreover, it goes so much against the grain of how we speak and think that it is really an open question if it is worth insisting on the fact that objects and technology have agency at least with that wording. Latour has to spend the good part of his 400 pages long book introduction to ANT developing and explaining the idea. Perhaps the energy could have been better used?

This said, the substantive idea that objects and technologies do in fact have a status somewhat apart is an important one that deserves to be taken seriously. They cannot merely be thought of as “resources” used by actors. One can try (as Schatzki does) to integrate them as part of the “context” (more on this shortly) in which practices are embedded. This solution makes it possible to keep focus on the extent to which technology and objects make things happen and are essential to understanding whose and what practices matter. It is a rather elegant way of steering clear of the controversies (which I have no way of resolving in this paper and generally not much ambition to tackle) that come from claiming that “objects” and “technology” has agency while at the same time retaining the very important point that technology makes possible, authorizes, prohibits etc and therefore deserves a squarely central place in the analysis. For the purpose of the argument here that is certainly sufficient as it serves the purpose of recalling the extent to which technology and objects need to be an integral and central part of the analysis.

To sum up, to analyze practices it is necessary to acknowledge that the social world, including that of global governance, is highly differentiated and to delimit and specify the field or bundles or networks of practices that are central to the research question asked (for example what the global governance of security looks like and does). It was emphasized that there is absolutely no logical necessity for the conventional dividing lines in political (outside/inside, private/public) to be the most pertinent for the delimitation of a field. This has rather momentous advantages for the study of business in global (security) governance: it is not rendered invisible from the start. The actors then have to be “mapped” into the field. This is necessary to beginning getting a grasp of whose practice (activity) are actually central to the research question; to be concrete to get a sense for what practices (sayings and doings) of what security firms, public security establishment, government administrations, departments and think tanks are central. Finally, the section emphasized the importance of keeping in mind that technology and objects -- the innovations in weapons systems, surveillance technology in short the revolution in military affairs -- have to be integrated centrally in the analysis as they are not only tools in the hands of other actors but profoundly shape interaction. It was suggested that simply for reasons of the energy taken up by the controversies over whether or not this role actually is sufficient to impute “agency” makes it more adequate to think in terms of contexts and this leads straight onto the analysis in the next section.

### 3) Understanding why Practices Matter: Thinking of Dispositions beyond the “Field”

To ask what practice matter and mapping them in leaves the question of why they matter by and large unanswered. Yet this question is both important and intriguing. In the world

of the private military/security business many practices have a truly Orwellian touch. The lobby organization trying to extend the role of private military companies internationally calls itself the “International Peace Operations Association”, calls the military service business “the Peace and Stability Industry”, and edits a journal called the Journal of International Peace Operations. The question is how that is possible. Why is it that these Orwellian practices have become important and widespread? If they appeared totally ludicrous (in particular to those the IPOA tries to influence) they would not matter much and probably be discontinued. So how has a situation where a substantial part of people concerned by security sees these saying and doings as normal come about? To answer this question requires a closer at the taken for granted part of practices which was introduced in the previous section and repeatedly touched upon when the logic of the field and the intersubjectively constituted nature of things (for example capital and resources) were touched upon. This section unpacks these references to taken for granted and intersubjectively constituted in order to get leverage for answering the question of why practices matter. It does so first by recalling the significance of dispositions to think, understand and act in given ways for all practices and their acceptance. It then recalls the extent to which a broader (discursive) context matters for these dispositions. Finally, the section emphasizes that this context is *not* a structure that hovers over and determines practices insisting on the extent to which the context is produced and transformed in practices.

a) Acknowledging the *habitus*

When introducing the notion of practices above I underlined that when people say that they work on practices (rather than actions) they usually want to underline that they problematize the rationality of action. That problematization includes recognizing that rationality differs by context. Fields (or networks) function differently, different things are valued and appreciated and hence what is “rational” also varies by field. It also includes acknowledging that a large part of action is unreflected and habitual. It is not rational at all in any meaningful way. It rests on unarticulated assumptions about how things are and how they word. They are “disposition” to think about, understand and act in the social world in specific ways.

Working with and explicitly acknowledging this second kind of habitual knowledge is one of the hallmarks of practice theory. One way it has been captured and integrated into analysis is through the idea of the *habitus*. Norbert Elias used this notion to capture the transformation of the habitual way of behaving which he saw as pivotal to the “civilizing process”. In minute detailed he traced the transformation of everyday behavior (relating to things like food, speech, and sex) to showing how the self-control and discipline which he considered essential for civilization became a habitual part of these practices (Elias, 1998/1939). But the notion is perhaps better known through the work of Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986, Lahire, 1999, Lawler, 2004, Margolies, 1999, McNay, 1999, Taylor, 1999, Vitellone, 2004). Here the notion plays a central role. It is a concept linking general discourses and values produced in the field and the habitual behavior of individuals. It corresponds to the habits an individual acquires by being in a number of different fields in given positions and integrating the rules of the game. Just as for Elias, the *habitus* is also essential to understand the body and its language. The life style and habits of people are expressed through bodies (bodily *hexis* in Bourdieu’s

terminology). The reason the notion of *habitus* has attracted so much attention, I think, is that it can have a direct bearing on individualist theories of action and is very easily linked to discussions about rationality.

For the discussion here, the *habitus* is also interesting as away of explaining why actors do what they do. But it is also important for a slightly different reason: it is also essential to capture why practices are accepted and continued. In particular, if we want to explain why practices of domination are accepted, often not resisted and (re)produced and continued exactly by those who lose some notion integrating background understandings and actions like the *habitus* is called for. For example, as feminist have observed women often engage exactly the practices that reproduce domination to the point where they literally kill themselves for example by not requesting healthcare, food and by not protecting their daughters (Sen, 1990). Similarly, in the privatizing world of the private military industry, the public security establishments are in many rather self-evident ways losers: statistics and accountancy practices are biased against them, their inefficiency and incompetence is relied on to boost the image of the private sector and their best competence and staff is drained towards the better paid market (GAO, 2005, Leander, 2006a: chap. 7, Markusen, 2003). In spite of this those who might be expected to protest and react do not. In part the reason in both these cases is that there are sanctions and restrictions that make this kind of behavior necessary. But very often it is a choice made because it is considered the right thing to do. Domination more often than not rests on the active complicity of the dominated (*symbolic violence*<sup>9</sup>).

In part we can trace this evolving *habitus* back to the field or bundle of practices that is being studied. To understand why the private military business is so readily accepted by military establishments for example, it is central look at how the degree to which markets have become a central part of military practices. The outsourcing of non-core activities, the privatized technical support and the fluidity of the boundaries resulting from the constant moves between the private and the public has integrated the private military/security business into the military. It is increasingly part of the taken for granted understandings of what military practices are. Consequently, it is reflected in the evolving self-understanding of military professionals who think of themselves as working for private contracts and whose “military ethos” of public service is correspondingly changing.<sup>10</sup> This said, to look at the *habitus* only from the perspective of the field would be too restrictive. It would amount to an implicit claim that the overall acceptance of the market was only tied to activities in the field itself. But the *habitus* of security professionals is also shaped by more general developments. It is therefore necessary to account also for the broader context in which the practices are embedded.

#### b) Accounting for contexts / discourses

To make the point that practices are tied to the broader discursive context is not likely to be particularly controversial. Practices and discourses are closely linked. Many authors, e.g. Foucault, is routinely classified as both and used as an inspiration for work on both. For some authors doing discourse analysis is studying practices (Hansen, 2006). Linking

---

<sup>9</sup> For discussions of symbolic violence see (Bourgeois, 2002, Braud, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> Sapone suggest that this transformation is inherently limited by the illusion of the state monopoly on legitimate force which is foundational for our self-understanding (1999) and that the use of force is therefore bound to remain a contested or fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 1957, Radin, 1996 respectively).



the taken for granted part of activities -- the *habitus* -- to field is unusual; not pointing out that it is linked to a broader context.

The broader context is more often than not thought about and studied as a “discourse” (Foucault), a “*doxa*” (Bourdieu) or a “texture” (Derrida). The idea with these notions is that social life is imbued with taken for granted, “common sense” understandings. They hang together and determine what people do and what they say. A “context is a set of distinct phenomena with power of determination over the entities immersed in it” (Schatzki, 2002: 95). Not all contexts are equally deep in their impact however. Arguably the most important contexts are those which are not problematized. However, many contexts that are not taken for granted, but loudly contested and debated, also weigh on behavior. People reflect on their own lives and situations as well as on that of others. Therefore, “common sense” is unearthed, articulated, challenged and perhaps replaced; the *doxa* is articulated as *orthodoxy* and opposed and possibly replaced by a *heterodoxy* which may in turn become a new *orthodoxy* and perhaps even become normalized to the point of becoming a *doxa*. In fact, these explicitly debated and contested notions also weigh heavily and we consequently need to be aware of the extent to which contexts are “layered” and unequal in their influence.

The study of these processes and of discursive contexts has often had a heavy text bias. The main source for getting at contextual explicit or implicit assumptions has been written texts and public statements. The misunderstanding that studying contexts and discourses is about reading texts and opposed to doing “empirical work” is therefore widespread. This neglects that texts are a form of empirical reality. But more generally it misrepresents what studying contexts is about. Context can also be looked at through things, such as images, media reporting, blogs, public statements and practices in other fields which would (presumably?) pass as “empirical” by most standards (Campbell, 2007, Fairclough, 2003, Neumann, 2001, , 2007). To highlight this Schatzki suggests introducing distinctive terminologies so that “when a context is made out of entities of the same sort as those of which it is the context, I call it a *texture*. When this stuff differs, I call it a *contexture*” (Schatzki, 2002:).

When thinking about why practices become accepted and continued, it is useful to recall both the multiplicity and the layering of potentially relevant contexts. For instance when considering the security practices it is clearly important to take into account the texture provided by practices in directly related areas in which these practices are involved: the increasing reliance on neo-liberal governance in all areas of political, economic and social life for example shapes the way soldiers, administrators in defense departments, security firms managers and members of international (non)governmental organizations understand security governance (Leander, 2005a, and 2006b).<sup>11</sup> Similarly, the texture of risk thinking which is increasingly pervasive across all spheres of society weighs on directly shapes the taken for granted notion reflected in contemporary security practices and in the growing role of the market.<sup>12</sup> Neo-liberalism increases the degree to which private security market appear normal, desirable and necessary; risk thinking

---

<sup>11</sup> I am clearly referring here to neo-liberal governmentality in a Foucauldian way: that is as governance through quasi markets, relying on de-centralization, responsabilization and state withdrawal (e.g. Hindess, 2004). The pervasiveness of this form of governance is well captured in the literature on the “new public management” revolution and its development (e.g. Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 2005, Minow, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> Beck captures this pervasiveness concern which explains the success of his work (1992).

makes the private security stand out as filling an exceptionally important and legitimate function. It ensures against risk (Leander, 2007b). In addition to these textures, contextures created in spheres and practices of a different nature and kind, involving different actors, following different logics are also significant for grasping why practices are accepted, as already indicated in the discussion about technology. But the point could be extended for example to include changes in the way the international financial system operates. The activities of many private security firms depend directly on the existence of a global financial system through which payments can be funded. They also depend on the existence of off-shore financial centres that facilitate obfuscating financial traces and the fluidity of headquarters. This contexture, just as technology, encourages, authorizes, prohibits certain practices and is part of shaping what international security governance is about.

These (con)textures are not always unarticulated as evidenced by the examples just given. There is a lot of public debate about both risk and new public management. There is detailed analysis of their workings, critiques of the way they are conceived and suggestions for how they might be reformed or done away with. Similarly, at least part of the norms and regulations governing international finance and technological systems are largely explicit. Laws and regulations are even written down and just as informal norms they are interpreted, debated and contested. They are not discourses or *doxa*; on the contrary. However, they are part of the taken for granted background of practices. Their disputed and contested nature creates an uncertainty about how exactly this is the case. There can be no question of an easy and straightforward “determination” of practices through this kind of context, *pace* Schatzki. This I would like to insist, is in fact generally the case.

#### c) Tracing how practices produce and transform contexts

Sometimes discourses and *doxa* are treated as if they were rough equivalents of a “structure”. Instead of the classical material or religious or cultural structures we now have a form of “discursive” structures that shape actions or practices in a top down fashion. This figure of thought, misses one of the key advantages about thinking in terms of practices. When discourses and *doxa* are allowed to structure top-down it is rather difficult to discern the relevant difference between analysis incorporating these and various conventional forms of structuralism. The originality of the “practice-turn” evaporates. This is a pity since in fact it does have a distinct, “post-structuralist” relation to “structures”.

This section has so far insisted on the importance of including something like a *habitus* and a context when thinking about practices. It has nowhere suggested that these were somehow God given entities floating above the practices and shaping them. Rather, they are themselves the outcome of practices, of what actors do and say. This was already underlined in the discussion of fields or bundles of practices where the logic of the field and the understanding of hierarchies and resources were traced back to the practices in the field. An analogous reasoning is at work with regard to *habitus* and (con)textures. These are themselves produced, reproduced and transformed in and through practices.

Contexts are hence more fluid than structures. They do not have fixed elements or aspects whose divergent but recurring expressions we can look for in across contexts as did Saussure for language and Levy-Strauss for the organization of family relations.

Rather, the elements need to be constantly upheld and produced in practices. Correspondingly, what the elements of context are might vary radically. They cannot be assumed to be fixed neither in time nor in space. As Latour insists “I have always found it hard to believe that it was necessary to absorb the exact same types of actors, the same entities, the same kinds of beings and the same forms of existence, in the same type of collections as those used by Comte, Durkheim, Weber or Parsons” (Latour, 2006: 375). It is in this sense that one should read the insistence of post-structuralist writers on fluidity, variability and change (Derrida quote??).

This two-way relationship between contexts and practices makes the way discourses and practices are sometimes interchangeably used more comprehensible, if unhelpful (practices are a specific bundle of activities the context is what they are embedded in). It also has some rather interesting implications for analysis. It implies that not only is there no straightforward determination of practices through contexts, but more than this, practices are the stuff of contexts. The practices studied can hence be expected to feed back into the contexts. How they do that, and how important they are for the reproduction of the context, is an empirical question closely tied to how closely the practice and the context is related. But it is certainly a question worth considering.

For example, when we think about global security governance it is of course interesting to think about the extent to which practices reflect their context, as for example how neo-liberalism reshapes what firms do and say in relation to concrete security problems (for example the conflict in Darfur) and how this alters how security governance is practiced. However, it is clearly also interesting to keep an eye on how these practices reshape, reproduce and reframe neo-liberal security understandings (Leander and van Munster, 2007). Similarly, states may be pushing for outsourcing strategies in the defense sector. The practices this makes possible in the security sector in turn reshuffle power positions inside states as the growing market empowers and disempowers people and practices in states unequally (Leander, 2007c). In clear, the bottom up move of tracing how practices produce contexts is at least as important as the top down tracing of how contexts inform and fashion practices. This may sound rather too obvious but it is not: “instead of outlining the visible and modifiable means used to produce power, sociology -- and critical sociology in particular -- has all too often substituted these by an invisible, immobile, and homogenous world of power in itself” (Latour, 2006: 123).

When we try to capture why certain practices matter for example in for global security governance we are forced to account for context. Thinking about context (as a combination of discourses, and other practices) is fundamental because it is the backdrop against which we can understand the habitual practices, including what is accepted, resisted rejected and what is not. This is an essential part of power. Power is never as strong as strong as when it rests on consent and collaboration and does not have to be forcefully imposed. For thinking about governance this classical insight is of essence. Part of our understanding of this kind of *habitual* behavior can be derived from the field itself. But if we want to get a better grasp of how systemic bias is mobilized in the specific bundle of practices / the field, we need to look also beyond the field. Looking beyond the field is even more important if we are interested not mainly in explaining action and strategies, but in looking at issues of governance. As suggested in the last section, practices produce and reshape contexts. This is essential for governance. To

return to the Orwellian world of private security governance, if we restrict ourselves to looking at context to explain why the IPOA can and does behave as it does we have moved some way towards understanding why real world security governance looks the way it does. But if we do not move back upwards, and re-assemble the effects of these practices on the broader context, we are bound miss what these practices do to security governance elsewhere. We effectively deprive ourselves of the luxury of thinking about how governance is changing and how that change might be shaped.

#### 4) Thinking of Practices as Governance: Ordering, Resistance and Reflexivity

This paper has so far given an account of what it means to think in terms of practices. It has emphasized that doing so leads us to map what practices matter and to place these in context that will help deepen and clarify the understanding of how they matter. Through the account, remarks about the analysis of business (and particularly of the private military/security business) and global governance have figured centrally. It is time to pull these remarks together and develop them so that they can be used to clarify how exactly analyzing practices may be useful for the analysis of global governance. This section does this. It starts by clarifying that the notion of “global governance” inherent in the analysis of practices is one of ordering. It proceeds to argue that this understanding of global governance is inherently useful for understanding change as pays explicit attention to the strategies of and the scope for resistance to governance. Finally, the section concludes with a note on the centrality of reflexivity in practice based accounts of global governance.

##### a) Practices Producing Ordering

The analysis of practices provides us with an understanding of how of activity is organized in a given field and why this is so. It provides us with an understanding of what activities, of what kind of actors matter in that field and why. It in other words provides us with an understanding of “order” in that field where order is understood “as arrangement, that is the hanging together of things [...in which..] entities relate, enjoy meaning (and identity), and are positioned with respect to one another.” (Schatzki, 2002: 18 and 38). We find ourselves in the neighborhood of global governance.

One of the most common ways of thinking about “global governance” is as a form of order. Questions about global governance are often asked as questions about “world order”. This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the lasting imprint of Hobbes on political thinking (or the simplistic rendering thereof) generally and on thinking in IR/IPE in particular. What this thinking has done is to constitute two opposing realms of order (inside) and anarchy (outside). Thinking about “global governance” in this context has come to connote thinking about how the international anarchical realm might after all be subjected to a modicum of order. In the wake of the “globalization” debates a normative touch has been added to this discussion as global governance is seen as the hope for taming globalization, or limiting the extent to which the (outside) “anarchy” abroad comes to define also (inside) order (e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002). As eloquently argued by Ashley twenty years ago, this enterprise is bound to fail as long as it is based on the practices of a diplomatic community assuming that there can be no community and no

international authority (Ashley, 1989). As repeatedly underlined above, the analysis of practices moves away from this state centric understanding of order. It is an analysis of order that is open to the possibility that the relevant actors might not be states and even that states may be altogether marginal.

The orders of global governance rendered visible through practices are orders where authority may be located with any actor.<sup>13</sup> In that sense studying global governance in this sense has much in common with the research on “private authority” in IPE (Cutler et al., 1999, Hall and Bierstecker, 2002). For example, to understand the global security governance the emergence of a new cast of private security experts advising armed forces, governments, international organizations, firms and individuals and in the process reshaping the understanding of security problems, adequate responses and appropriate governance forms is of vital important. This creation of private actors who authorities in security is bound to be missed in analysis directed only at those formally *in* authority through their links with states. Practice analysis is really good at capturing substantive changes in authority and particular changes in who is an authority. It will tell us quite a lot about the evolving reasons why authority fluctuates and changes. It will give us good clues about why people “surrender judgment” and accept that practices are organized as they are. It may be less useful when to account for the formal procedural developments of authority, that is the changes in the formal arrangements of institutionalized authority relations. For many political theorists and lawyers who find the formal and procedural more important this may be disappointing. The reason this concern is central to them is that they are more interested in the normative question of how legitimate authority can be created, exercised and controlled than in it’s the empirical question of its actual exercise (Flathman, 1980). As I see it, from a sociological or an IPE perspective these priorities are often inversed. Understanding the empirical and substantial authority is often the aim. Moreover, I would contend that thinking about the formal and procedural should more often be built on such empirical and substantive understandings. This is the only plausible guard against discussions of authority turning into abstract reasoning for reasoning’s sake.

The orders of global governance produced by practices merit one more comment: they are less static than the orders people usually have in mind when they talk about global governance. In the above discussion fluidity and change have been permanently present. It has been emphasized that who is part of a practice changes; that what counts as resource changes; that dominant practices evolve etc. But perhaps most importantly it has been emphasized that order and authority has to be continuously produced. That it exists through these ever changing practices. This emphasis on non-fixity contradicts the static connotation of order. “Ordering” may therefore be a better expression for the kind of global governance an analysis of practices can help us capture.<sup>14</sup> Talking about ordering rather than order has the further advantage that it more adequately captures the degree to which analyzing global governance through practices helps highlight change.

---

<sup>13</sup> In calling this form of order global governance I am making a choice different from that made by others in the discipline. Susan Strange for example reserved governance to talk about rule through state authority and hence talked about “ungovernance” to capture the developments increasing the role of private actors as authorities (discussed by Cohen, 1998: chap?, Strange, 1996). To me this distinction makes to much out of the private public distinction and is unhelpful in a context where privatization has become a form of government rule that often helps and stabilizes states (including in the sphere of security) Leander??.

<sup>14</sup> This point is emphasized in general terms by (Law, 1992) and (Dreyfus, 1992).

#### b) Ordering and the Scope for Resistance

Looking at global governance as a set of ordering practices explicitly directs attention to the constant need to (re)produce order. By the same token, zooms in on the potential for change and for what would often be termed “resistance”. If orders are not permanent creations hovering outside and above actors but constantly created in practices, through interactions, it is not only possible but likely and logical that those involved should pressure for change and resist domination. This is the perspective from which one can understand Bourdieu’s instance that fields are both fields of positions and of struggle. It is also the perspective from which Foucault insistence on the omni-presence of resistance makes sense.

For thinking about the global governance and the role of business this permanent and integral focus on change and on “resistance” is extremely useful. It makes it not only possible but logical and necessary to include an account of the “strategies” of business (and other actors) use when they struggle to reshape ordering practices. For example, there can be no doubt that the military/security business has been strategically, instrumentally and rather effectively engaged in shifting the boundaries of the security field outwards so that more and more activities fall within the realm of their expertise. That is to enlarge the bundle of practices falling within the “security” realm. Post-conflict reconstruction, Security Sector Reform, Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation programs but also border control, immigration, straight forward development aid and diplomacy are part of private security firms have managed to place within the field of security practices and to make fall inside the scope of their own activities (Leander, 2007a). In the process of thus enlarging the field, security sector ordering (governance) is altered. Who has authority to do what, how and to whom have been transformed. As the understanding of security governance has changed so has the regulatory clout of existing institutions. In the present legal discussion about how to increase accountability of private security contractors it is telling that the UN and AU conventions against mercenarism have all but disappeared from view. Instead self-regulation, institutionalized industry standards and the laws of the armed forces occupy a central space. The traditional founding blocs of the formal procedural regulating private uses of force internationally normative framework are effectively sidelined -- but not eliminated -- by practice. Accounting for the business advertising, lobbying, and representational strategies though which these changes occur is what analyzing practices does.

The way practice analysis focuses on strategies of change and “resistance” highlights the permanent presence of change, but also its limits. This understanding contrast with much work on global governance (and other forms of order) where order is assumed to be the norm and change the exception. Indeed change is often thought of as either a potential to be deduced from the normal order or as something occurring primarily during crisis. The first case leads to a searching for the scope conditions that might trigger change and/or make resistance possible. The second looks at “critical junctures” or crisis during which things are unstable and open to change. Thinking in terms of practices breaks down the dichotomous distinction and creates place for change also in seemingly normal times. It highlights that change is always present in that practices that produce order but also limited by the logic of the field and the context. Indeed, both Bourdieu and Foucault decidedly down-play the role of exceptional

circumstances in bringing about change. Foucault's large macro changes (from punishment to discipline e.g.) take place for reasons that are not clearly tied to any crisis or any exceptional circumstance. Even more provocatively Bourdieu explicitly highlights the limited impact of major crisis. The state nobility has successfully reproduced itself French revolution (Bourdieu, 1998). Moreover both authors emphasize continuity.<sup>15</sup> There is no reason to deny that change time might happen more rapidly in certain situations than in others. The point here is that the dichotomies order/change, order/crisis may not be very helpful in accounting for when.

Finally, it bears underlining that resistance and change as thought of in practices does come with a baggage of predetermined normative connotations. Whether one thinks resistance and change are positive or negative depends on what view one has on how ordering arrangements should look. This is not something that practice analysis is particularly useful for formulating. Rather ideas of how orderings should look are better sought in political imagination. i.e. in political theory or philosophy. The analysis of practices is useful for understanding of why resistance and change takes the form it does and how they shift ordering. That however, is a rather essential question for many people, including those working on business and global governance.

### c) Resistance and Reflexivity

Before wrapping up this discussion about what it means to analyze global governance through practices a (very short) note on the particular role of "reflexivity"<sup>16</sup> is warranted. Reflexivity indeed has a far more central place in the work of most scholars working on practices than it does elsewhere, at least in IR/IPE. The two versions we have of reflexivity in our part of the disciplines is (1) Cox's cautioning that since "science is always for someone" it is important to be aware of whom one is working for and (2) a post-structuralist concern with making the author visible resulting in Derderian letting us know the colour of the book he reads in Sarajevo (2001). In work on practices, reflexivity has a far more central place. This is no doubt because of the centrality of meaning and hence an awareness of the role of interpretation and of the interpreter, but also because of the close links to anthropology, ethnography and ethnomethodology.

Reflexivity is a central part of the research strategies in work on practices. It plays a central role in the choice of research topics. Sometimes and particularly for those considering themselves as working in a "critical" traditions for reasons echoing those of Cox namely a wish to emancipate an assumed oppressed group. However, more often the concern is a more generic wish to unveil domination and especially that domination which is usually overlooked in standard framing of topics. It also plays a role in methodology. Reflexivity is the only (and admittedly imperfect) way of limiting the inevitable distortion of an observer of the observed. Observers cannot view the world from nowhere any more than can their objects study. Nor can they control the impact of their presence on the observed. When I talk to security professionals in different contexts

---

<sup>15</sup> Regarding the evolution of government forms e.g. Foucault explains that: "Il n'y a pas remplacement des formes historiques mais...On a en fait un triangle: souveraineté, discipline et gestion gouvernementale, une gestion gouvernementale dont la cible principale est la population et dont les mécanismes essentiels sont les dispositifs de sécurité" (2004 : 111).

<sup>16</sup> The dictionary definition of reflexivity is bending back and self-reflecting. For a more detailed definitional discussion see (Leander, 2005b).

I cannot but remain the Swedish/French, woman academic I am with all the implications that has for what I will be (or not) told and how. Nor can I of course write about it in another language than my own.<sup>17</sup> Thirdly, reflexivity in the analysis of practices is understood as essential because it problematizes the relation between the own research and the researched object. The observer is not assumed to be an outsider looking down at practices and observing their meaning. Somewhat more realistically, observers are acknowledged to have (at least potentially) a part in the meaning production in that world. They may be interacting directly with the world they are depicting as “experts” and certainly they interact with it indirectly through their writings and teaching. Their account of and representations of the world they observe feeds back into that world.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, in highly literate and mediatised societies where experts are constantly debating and expressing their views it would be surprising if there was not a feedback loop.<sup>19</sup> For that reason observers have the responsibility not to naturalize domination and obscure power; that is to be reflexive about their work. I suspect that most people working on practices would agree with Strange that the privileges of academia come with the obligation to work critically and interpret it in this sense.

Reflexivity in the analysis of practices is important also in a second way: it is seen as central for the observed. In that sense most scholars working on practices would no doubt side with Strange in another of her recurring lamentations: that regarding academic hubris. For rather unclear reasons observers often seems to assume that knowledge and even more reflexivity is the preserve of their own breed. Of course, this is not the case. People who engage in a practice almost by definition know more about it than outsiders. They also reflect more about it. People who work with practices usually see their acknowledgement and use of this as something that decidedly distinguishes them from other researchers. They actually do not look down on their researched object. They do not assume that they know about its positions, motivations, roles, values and strategies before they start. Analyzing practices is about uncovering these things. On Latour’s account for example the point of departure of ANT was the crisis of the “sociology of science”, looking down on scientists and deciding beforehand what was of relevance. This crisis could only be triggered, so Latour, because when looking at science, sociologists were by definition looking upwards.<sup>20</sup> The knowledge and reflexivity of those engaged in a practice will obviously NOT provide the answer to ones research questions. There is an obvious difference between the observers wish to analyze, understand and explain and the self-descriptive, reflective accounts of those engaged in a practice. But listening carefully to those accounts is of essence.

---

<sup>17</sup> For an IPE related discussion see (Leander, 2002). For a detailed, empirically relevant discussion of this problem see (Bourdieu, 1993: ??).

<sup>18</sup> For a general discussion of looping effects see (Spanti, 2001)..

<sup>19</sup> Indeed it is to reflect this trend that the current era is sometimes qualified as “reflexive” (e.g. Beck et al., 1994)

<sup>20</sup> “there is in fact, an excellent reason why the case of science was bound to make social theory fail so completely: it was the first time sociologists were really studying *upwards*... until then the sociologists had always looked *down* since the power of science remained at their side and was not itself subject to examination... The cogwheels of the *explanans* had always been forged in harder steel than those of the *explanandum*; no surprise that they so readily shaped proofs and so effortlessly provided data...” (Latour, 2006: 139-140, my translations emphasis in the original text).



To sum up then: analyzing global governance (of security e.g.) through practices means thinking about global governance as a form of order which may involve any number and kind of actors. Practices are used to get a grasp of how substantial authority works. This of course has implications also for formal and procedural authority, but the focus of an analysis of practices is on global governance as the production of sociological and empirical orders. Second, as the emphasis on the production of order suggests analyzing global governance through practices also means that change and resistance become a central and integral part of the account. The struggles and strategies are constitutive of the practices producing order. It was therefore suggested that ordering might actually be a better term for the kind of global governance uncovered by studies of practice. Finally, there has been emphasized that the kind of global governance uncovered by work on practices is highly shaped by reflexivity. This is true in double the sense that reflexivity figures prominently in the research strategy and in the sense that the reflexive competence of those engaged in the practices studied is respected and plays a central role in the analysis.

#### Conclusion:

In this paper I have tried to explain why I have ended up working with practice theory to think about something global governance of security. I began by pointing to two recurring frustrations I had when communicating about the private military/security business. One was that of trying to talk about something that was excluded from the discussion by an excessively formalistic take on what governance meant. The second was the frustration of trying to communicate about changes in the assumptions about what security and security governance was all about in the face of a discussion that was firmly stuck with issues of how to deal with the governance of individual cases. I suggested that looking at practices for me was a way of getting a theoretical leverage to move away from these discussions and raise the issues that seemed important to me. I then proceeded to clarify why I say this. I first pointed to the utility of practice theory being open about what and whose activities, sayings and doings, are part of a specific practice (for example security governance) and on its utility for “mapping” the hierarchy of the relevance of these activities (helping me out of my first frustration). I then suggested that practice theory also usually directs attention to context (as (con)texture). Indeed, to address the question of why activities matter as they do in a practice but also to understand how the practice relates to other practices, it has to take the context into account (addressing my second frustration). In the last section, I pulled this together clarifying what I think analyzing practices means in terms of thinking about global governance, underlining that it meaning thinking about governance as ordering and emphasizing reflexivity.

This argument has already answered the questions posed by the editors of this volume. But to make sure they are clear beyond doubt I want to address them explicitly:

- The **research questions** that can usefully be addressed by this form of theorizing are those concerning the evolving substantive nature of order and authority and its implications.

- Hence, the approach problematizes the **business-governance nexus** as such by placing the mapping of whose activities matter and why for a specific order (governance) at the centre.
- I would place this squarely in the “**understanding**” tradition as it emphasizes the significance of socially constituted meaning. However, scholars in the field and elsewhere have tried to suggest that it overcomes the traditional dichotomy between explaining and understanding approaches (e.g. Brubaker, 2004, Pouliot, 2007). The “**interpretative principle**” it is based on is that the social world is that contextuality is of fundamental importance. This makes it impossible to make a priori assumptions about how practices work and what kinds of order they constitute. Rather, a central aim of the interpretation is to reconstitute this. Theoretical contributions take the form of arguments that make the analysis of practices easier, either because they are conceptual innovations that improve the understanding of underlying concepts (viz example discussions around field, habitus, object actors, dispositifs, assemblages etc. etc) or because they highlight recurring processes/mechanisms that by analogous reasoning can be found across a range of practices.
- The “**key concepts**” vary slightly depending on what practice approach one works with but also depending on how one interprets that approach. I have elsewhere suggested that Bourdieu’s approach can usefully be thought as resting on the triology field, habitus, practice (Leander, 2007d). Latour suggests that his approach centrally rests on the combination actors/objects, networks, and assemblages (Latour, 2005). Schatzki sees his approach as resting on the combination order, practices, assemblages (Schatzki, 2002). And the list could be prolonged. As just suggested conceptual innovation and transformation is central to work in practice theory and to disagreements within it.
- The theoretical implication of the **growing attention to Business and Global governance** is that research based on the analysis of practices becomes increasingly useful and perhaps therefore also more widespread as it actually makes it possible to talk about that question 😊.

## References

- Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C. Williams. (2006) *The Globalization of Private Security: Country Report Kenya*. Aberystwyth: University of Wales.
- Ashley, Richard K. (1989) Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematique of Governance. In *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, edited by Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, pp. 251-90. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
- Avant, Deborah. (2005) *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, Ulrich. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.
- Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. (1994) *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Betensky, Carolyn. (2000) The Prestige of the Oppressed: Symbolic Capital in a Guilt Economy. In *Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture*, edited by Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman, pp. 207-15. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Bigo, Didier. (2000) When two become one : internal and external securitisations in Europe. In *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, edited by Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams, pp. 171-204. London and New York: Routledge.
- . (2001) The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies). In *Identities, Borders, Orders. Rethinking International Relations Theory*, edited by Albert M. Jacobson and Yosef Lapid, pp. 91-116. Minnesota: Minnesota University Press.
- . (2003) Le champ européen de l' (in)sécurité : enquête et hypothèses de travail. In *Vers des périmètres de sécurité? La gestion des espaces continentaux en Amérique du Nord et en Europe*, edited by Michel Fortmann, Stéphane Roussel and Alex Macleod. Montréal: Athéna éditions.
- . (2005) La Mondialisation de l' (in)sécurité? Réflexion sur le champ des professionnels de la gestion des inquiétudes et analytique de la transnationalisation des processus de l' (in)sécurité. *Cultures&Conflicts*:53-100.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1979) *La distinction: critique du jugement sociale*. Paris: les éditions de minuit.
- . (1980) *Le sens pratique*. Paris: les éditions de minuit.
- . (1986) Habitus, code et codification. *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*:40-45.
- . (1993) *La misère du monde*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- . (1997) Le Champ Economique. *Actes de la Recherche en Science Sociales*:48-67.
- . (1998) *State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc Wacquant. (1999) On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason. *Theory, Culture & Society* 16:41-57.
- Bourgeois, Phillippe. (2002) La violence en temps de guerre et en temps de paix. Leçons de l'après-guerre froide: l'exemple du Salvador. *Cultures et Conflicts*:81-116.
- Braud, Philippe. (2003) Violence symbolique et mal-être identitaire. *Raisons Politiques*:33-48.

- Brooks, Doug. (2005) Africa Keeps its Peace. *Foreign Policy*:5-12.
- Brubaker, Rogers. (2004) Rethinking Classical Theory: The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu. In *After Bourdieu. Influence, Critique, Elaboration*, edited by David L. Swartz and Vera L. Zolberg, pp. 17-24. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Campbell, David. (2007) Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the Darfur Conflict. *Political Geography* 26:357-82.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. (1998) *The Geography of Money*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Cohn, Theodore. (2008) *Global political economy : Theory and practice*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Cutler, Claire. (2006) Transnational Business Civilization, Corporations, and the Privatization of Global Governance. In *Global Corporate Power*, edited by Christopher May, pp. 199-226. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Cutler, Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter. (1999) Private Authority and International Affairs. New York: SUNY.
- de Goede, Marieke. (2006) International Political Economy and the Promises of Poststructuralism. In *International Political Economy and Poststructural Politics*, edited by Marieke de Goede, pp. 1-20. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Der Derian, James. (2001) *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. Boulder CO.: Westview Press.
- Dezalay, Yves. (2007) Le marché d'import-export des savoirs d'Etat. Luttés hégémoniques, concurrences professionnelles et stratégiques de reproduction des noblesses d'Etat. In *IPS/COST A24*. Paris, Sciences PO.
- Doswald-Beck, Louise. (2007) Private Military Companies Under International Humanitarian Law. In *From Mercenaries to Markets: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies*, edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, pp. 115-38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dreyfus, Hubert. (1992) On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault. In *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, edited by Timothy Armstrong, pp. 80-94. London: Routledge.
- Elias, Norbert. (1998/1939) *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*. Oxford&Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Fairclough, Norman. (2003) *Analysing Discourse : Textual analysis for social research*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Flathman, Richard E. (1980) *The Practice of Political Authority: Authority and the Authoritative*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Förster, Till. 19-20 October 2007.
- Foucault, Michel. (2004) *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France (1977-1978)*. Paris: Gallimard, Seuil.
- Frieden, Jeffrey, and David Lake. (1995) *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. New York: Routledge.
- Frye, Ellen L. (2005) Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining 'Mercenary' can tame the 'Dogs of War'. *Fordham Law Review* 73:2607-64.
- GAO. (2005) Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers. Washington: Government Accountability Office/US Congress.

- Gilpin, Robert. (1987) *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J. Bierstecker. (2002) *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*. edited by Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Bierstecker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hallo de Wolf, Antenor. (2007) Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from the Perspective of International and Human Rights Law. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 13.
- Hansen, Hans Krause, and Dorte Salskov-Iversen. (2005) Remodeling the Transnational Political Realm: Partnerships, Best-Practice Scemes, and the Digitalization of Governance. *Alternatives*:141-64.
- Hansen, Lene. (2006) *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.
- Held, David, and Anthony G. McGrew. (2002) *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Hindess, Barry. (2004) Liberalism - What's in a Name? In *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*, edited by Wendy Larner and William P. Walters, pp. 23-39. London: Routledge.
- Huysmans, Jef. (2002) Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. *Review of International Studies* 28:599-618.
- . (2006 forthcoming) *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.
- Kauppi, Niilo. (1996) European Union Institutions and French Political Careers. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 19:1-24.
- Keohane, Robert O. (2003) The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 24:1121-42.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2000) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 3rd. edition*. New York: Longman.
- Krahmann, Elke. (2005a) Regulating Private Military Companies: What Role for the EU? *Contemporary Security Policy* 6:1-23.
- . (2005b) Security governance and the private military industry in Europe and North America. *Conflict, Security and Development* 5:247-68.
- Lahire, Bernard. (1999) De la théorie de l'habitus à une sociologie psychologique. In *Le travail sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu. Dettes et critiques*, edited by Bernard Lahire, pp. 121-52. Paris: La Découverte.
- Larner, Wendy, and William P. Walters. (2004) *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*. London: Routledge.
- Latour, Bruno. (2005) *Re-assembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor Network Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2006) *Changer de société, refaire de la sociologie (Re-assembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor Network Theory)*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Law, John. (1992) Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, and Heterogeneity. *Systems Practice* 5:379-93.
- Lawler, Steph. (2004) Rules of engagement: Habitus, power and resistance. In *Feminism after Bourdieu*, edited by Lisa Adkins and Beverly Skeggs, pp. 110-28. Oxford: Blackwell/The Sociological Review.

- Leander, Anna. (2002) Do we really need reflexivity in IPE? Bourdieu's two reasons for answering affirmatively (contribution to a colloquium on Pierre Bourdieu). *Review of International Political Economy* 9:601-09.
- . (2005a) The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies. *Millenium Journal of International Studies* 33:803-26.
- . (2005b) Reflexivity. In *Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, edited by Martin Griffiths. London and New York: Routledge.
- . (2006a) *Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force*. Rome: Centro Militare di Studi Strategici.
- . (2006b) Security as Business: Towards a Technical, De-politicized Use of Force. In *Einstein weiterdenken /Thinking Beyond Einstein. Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers und Frieden im 21. Jahrhundert /Scientific Responsibility and Peace in the 21st Century*, edited by Stephan Albrecht, Reiner Braun and Thomas Held, pp. 333-555. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
- . (2007a) The Dual Securing of Sovereignty: The Sovereignty Game of Outsourcing Military Services. In *Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond*, edited by Rebbecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen. London: Palgrave.
- . (2007b) The Impunity of Private Authority: Understanding the circumscribed efforts to introduce PMC accountability. In *CBS working Paper*.
- . (2007c) Portraits in Practice: The Politics of Outsourcing Security. *Underreview forthcoming*.
- . (2007d) Thinking Tools. In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations*, edited by Audie Klotz. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Leander, Anna, and Rens van Munster. (2007) Private Security Contractors in Darfur: Reflecting and Reinforcing Neo-Liberal Governmentality. *International Relations* 21:201-16.
- Margolies, Joseph. (1999) Pierre Bourdieu: *Habitus* and the Logic of Practice. In *Bourdieu. A Critical Reader*, edited by Richard Shusterman, pp. 45-64. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Markusen, Ann R. (2003) The Case Against Privatizing National Security. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 16:471-501.
- Martin, John Levi. (2003) What is Field Theory? *American Journal of Sociology* 109:1-49.
- McNay, Lois. (1999) Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity. *Theory, Culture & Society* 16:95-117.
- Miller, Raymond. (2007) *International political economy : Contrasting world views*. New York: Routledge.
- Minow, Martha. (2003) Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion. *Harvard Law Review* 116:1229-70.
- Neumann, Iver B. (2001) *Mening, Materialitet, Makt: En Innføring i diskursanalyse*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- . (2007) A speech that the entire Ministry may stand for', or: why diplomats never produce anything new. *International Political Sociology* 1:183-200.

- Polanyi, Karl. (1957) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. 1st edition 1944 ed. Boston: Beacon Paperback.
- Pouliot, Vincent. (2007) "Subjectivism": Toward a Constructivist Methodology. *International Studies Quarterly* 51:359-84.
- Poupeau, Franck. (2004) Sur deux formes de capital international. Les "élites de la globalisation" en Bolivie. *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*:126-33.
- Radin, Margaret Jane. (1996) *Contested Commodities*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rasor, Dina , and Robert Bauman. (2007) *Betraying Our Troops: The Destructive Results of Privatizing War*. New York: Palgrave.
- Ravenhill, John. (2005) *Global Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sapone, Montgomery. (1999) I have rifle with Scope, will travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence. *California Western International Law Journal* 30:1-43.
- Scahill, Jeremy. (2007) *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. Washington: Nation Books.
- Schatzki, Theodore R. (2002) *The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change*. Penn State University Press.
- Schatzki, Theodore R., Karin Knorr-Cetina, and Eike von Savigny. (2000) *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Scoville, Ryan M. (2006) Toward an accountability-based definition of "mercenary". *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 37:541-82.
- Sen, Amartya. (1990) More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing. *New York Review of Books* 37.
- Shearer, David. (1998) Private Military Force and Challenges for the Future. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* XIII:80-94.
- Singer, Peter W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Sparti, Davide. (2001) Making up People: On Some Looping Effects of the Human Kind - Institutional Reflexivity or Social Control? *European Journal of Social Theory* 4:331-49.
- Strange, Susan. (1996) *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . (1998a) *Finance in Politics: An Epilogue to Mad Money*. mimeo, University of Warwick.
- . (1998b) *Mad Money*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- . (1998c) What Theory? The Theory in Mad Money. *Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalism, working paper*.
- Stubbs, Richard, and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill. (1994) *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*. London: Macmillan.
- Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase, and Gert Tinggaard Svendsen. (2004) On the wealth of nations: Bourdieueconomics and social capital. In *After Bourdieu. Influence, Critique, Elaboration*, edited by David L. Swartz and Vera L. Zolberg, pp. 239-63. Dordrecht et. al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Swidler, Ann. (1986) Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review* 51:273-86.

- Taylor, Charles. (1999) To Follow a Rule... In *Bourdieu. A Critical Reader*, edited by Richard Shusterman, pp. 29-45. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Verkuil, Paul. (2007) *Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It: Why Privatization of Government Functions ... Democracy and What We Can Do About It*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vitellone, Nicole. (2004) Habitus and social suffering: Culture, addiction and the syringue. In *Feminism after Bourdieu*, edited by Lisa Adkins and Beverly Skeggs, pp. 129-47. Oxford: Blackwell/The Sociological Review.
- Walker, Clive, and David Whyte. (2005) Contracting Out War? Private military companies, law and regulation in the United Kingdom. *International Comparative Law Quarterly* 54:651-90.
- Zamparelli, Colonel Steven J. (1999) Competitive sourcing and privatization: Contractors on the battlefield. *Air Force Journal of Logistics* XXIII:1-17.