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# Nationalstaternes suverænitet i en supranational og multikulturel verden

*Hvordan øget supranationalt samarbejde i en stigende multikulturel verden presser nationalstatens klassiske rolle eksemplificeret gennem Brexit.*

Kandidatafhandling

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# Indhold

Liste over forkortelser	4
Abstract	5
1. Indledning	6
1.1 Problemformulering	7
1.2. Definitioner og afgrænsning	7
1.2.1. Staten	8
1.2.2. Suverænitet	8
1.2.3. Nationen	9
1.2.4. Repræsentativ styreform og retsstaten	10
1.2.5 Euroskepsis	11
1.4. Afgræsning	11
1.5 Metode	12
2. Teori	13
2.1. Intergovernmentalisme	13
2.1.1. Det Nationale	14
2.1.2. National bevidsthed	14
2.1.3. Den nationale tilstand	14
2.1.4. Nationalismen	14
2.1.5. Geopolitiske interesser	15
2.1.6. Suverænitetsafgivelse eller ej?	15
2.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalisme	16
2.2.1. Dannelse af nationale præferencer	16
2.2.2. Geopolitiske interesser	17
2.2.3. Økonomisk politiske interesser	17
2.2.4. Mellemstatslige forhandlinger	18
2.2.5. Valg af institution	18
2.3. Supranationalisme og multikulturalisme	19
2.3.1. Supranationalismen	19
2.3.2. Multikulturalisme	20
2.4. Teori diskussion	21
3. Redegørelse	23

3.1. Konservatisme	23
3.2 De britiske institutioner -Parlamentarisme, Common-law & velfærdsstaten	24
3.2.1. Parlamentarisme	24
3.2.2. Ingen står over den engelske lov	25
3.2.3. Monarkiets afskaffelse og genoprettelse	26
3.2.4. The Glorious Revolution	27
3.2.5. Common-law	27
3.2.6. Den britiske velfærdsstat	28
3.3. Arven fra Churchill "We are with them, but not of them" 1945-1970	29
3.3.1 Europæisk samarbejde tager form	30
3.3.2. Økonomiske og politiske realiteter	30
3.4. Optagelse i EU & Margaret Thatcher vil have sine penge tilbage! 1970-1997	31
3.4.1. Optagelse i EU	31
3.4.2. Margarets Thatchers årti & The British Budget Question – kampen om rabatten	32
3.4.3. Det Indre Marked	32
3.4.4. No, No, No! 1987-1990	33
3.5. ERM, Thatchers fald, John Major & Maastricht	34
3.5.1. Maastricht-traktaten	35
3.5.2. Udbryderne fra de Konservative og dannelsen af UKIP	35
3.6. David Cameron, Bloomberg-talen, genforhandling, folkeafstemning og Brexit 2010-2016	36
3.6.1. The European Union Bill	37
3.6.2. Et splittet parti	37
3.6.3. Bloomberg talen	38
3.6.4. Genvalg og genforhandling	38
3.6.5."Brexit means Brexit" og Artikel 50 2016-17	39
4. Analyse	41
4.1 Økonomi	41
4.2 Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik	45
4.3 Immigration	49
4.3.1 Velfærdsstaten & immigration	50
4.4 Suverænitet	52
4.5 Identitet	57
4.5.1. Velfærdsstaten & identitet	60

5. Diskussion	63
5.1 Liberal intergovernmentalisme	63
5.2 Intergovernmentalisme	65
5.3 Supranationalisme	67
5.4 Multikulturalisme	69
6. Konklusion	71
Litteraturliste	73
Bilag	78
David Cameron- PM speech on the UK's strength and security in the EU	78
George Osborne- HM Treasury analysis on the EU referendum	92
Boris Johnson- The liberal cosmopolitan case to Vote Leave	104
Michael Gove- The Facts of Life Say Leave: Why Britain and Europe will be better off after we vote leave	113
Nigel Farage- Tale til UKIP partikonference i Llandudno, Wales	125

## Liste over forkortelser

**BNP** Brutto Nationalt Produkt

**BSA** British Social Attitudes (socialt forskningsinstitut)

**DIM** Det Indre Marked

**EEAS** European External Action Service

**EF** Det Europæiske Fællesskab

**EFTA** European Free Trade Association

**ERM & ERMII** Exchange Rate Mechanism

**EU** Den Europæiske Union

**EURATOM** Det europæiske atomenergifællesskab

**EØF** Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab

**EØS** Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde

**MP** Member of Parliament

**NATO** North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NHS** National Health Service

**NP** Nationale præferencer

**PM** Prime minister

**UKIP** United Kingdom Independence Party

**ØMU** Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union

## Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore the historical, cultural and political factors that may have influenced the referendum in Britain in 2016 and thus caused Brexit. This thesis will use the two integration theories Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and the concepts of Supranationalism and Multiculturalism that describe the effects of said concepts have on the nation state. The thesis will use an historical overview to exemplify how the Conservatives, who called for a referendum, have become increasingly eurosceptical and will briefly describe some of the British institutions that have been mostly effected by the supranational European Union and an increasingly multicultural society in Britain. These include: parliamentarism, Common-law and the Welfare state.

The thesis will analyse five speeches given during the referendum campaign, two speeches from leading Remain and Leave politicians, respectively David Cameron, George Osborne, Boris Johnson & Michael Gove, and all from the Conservative Party. The thesis will also analyse a speech given by Nigel Farage from UKIP, as the party has had a significant impact on the question of Britain's EU membership. The analysis will be conducted using the theoretical background and the thesis will try to uncover which theory best might explain Brexit.

After the discussion of the theories and their explanatory efficacy, this thesis concludes that Brexit may be best explained by Intergovernmentalism, Supranationalism and Multiculturalism.

Intergovernmentalism stipulates that states with a long history will have a harder time integrating with other states. This thesis concludes that Britain has a long historical baggage and this is one part of the explanation of Brexit. This long historical baggage is also reflected in the British institutions such as parliamentarism and Common-law. This thesis finds that the supranational nature of the EU and thus being above both the British parliament and legal system has made it undesirable for the Brits to remain in the EU. The thesis finds that this is certainly true for many Conservative politicians.

This leads to the thesis final conclusion, Brexit is a rejection of a multicultural society. The eurosceptic politicians were not able to get a referendum on the political agenda until they combined membership of the EU with immigration. Immigration is not only a non-negotiable part of EU membership, it also entails that most EU citizens immigrating to Britain are rapidly able to receive benefits from the Welfare state on equal terms with native British citizens. The thesis concludes that a more or less forced European multicultural society and the British Welfare state are incompatible in the mind of the Leave voters, as research showed they were most concerned with immigration, and thus Brexit was the result.

## 1. Indledning

Siden EU's skabelse blev der også skabt en fløj, som har været tilbageholdende omkring samarbejdet. Den ønskede ikke at integrere sig så dybt med andre stater. Det, der startede som det Europæiske Fællesskab, har udviklet sig til noget udefinerbart og aldrig før set. EU har visse karakteristika som en stat, men er ikke en stat. Det har føderale træk, som en til dels fælles valuta, men er ikke en føderalstat. I takt med at EF udviklede sig til EU, da har begrebet euroskepsis også taget form.

I sommeren 2016 udviste et flertal i Storbritannien bestemt euroskepsis, da det blev et Leave til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Storbritannien skulle forblive medlem af EU. De mest brugte slogans fra Leave-siden var "*Let's Take Back Control*" og "*We Want Our Country Back!*". Dette tyder på, at Leave-siden anser medlemskabet af EU, som noget der frarøvede Storbritannien dens kontrol, dens suverænitet. At de ydermere ønsker deres land tilbage, er noget mere kryptisk. Storbritannien er ikke blevet frataget briterne, men der kan måske henvises til, at Leave-siden anser EU, som noget der kan frarøve Storbritannien, det, som gør landet britisk. Måske en ide om, at et land kan miste sin identitet som nationalstat ved at integrere sig med de andre medlemslande.

Netop begrebet om suverænitet er meget essentielt i fortællingen om nationalstaten. Dens historie er stadig relativ ny, og mange af de nationalstater, vi i dag synes er så sikkert forankrede på det europæiske kontinent, er måske først dukket op i starten af 1800-tallet efter Wienerkongressen. Det er suveræniteten, der er det skabende element i alle stater, og dertil kommer begrebet nation, som dækker over et bestemt folk på et bestemt territorium (Baudet, 2012, s.58). Hvis suverænitet er et af de bærende elementer i nationalstaten, hvordan passer dette så ind i EU-samarbejdet? Hvordan kan en række suveræne nationalstater skulle ikke bare samarbejde, men integrere sig med hinanden? EU har en række supranationale institutioner, der kan vedtage og håndhæve lovgivning i nationalstaterne uden om de nationale institutioner. Nationalstaterne er naturligvis med til at vedtage dette, men skulle et mindretal af nationalstater være imod, da kan de andre stater og de europæiske institutioner i mange tilfælde overtrumfe nationalstaten.

Måske ligger hele svaret ikke i selve suverænitetsafgivelsen. Storbritannien meldte sig frivilligt ind i EU og har i mange år været med til at udvikle det europæiske samarbejde til den form, det har i dag. En tydelig politisk modvilje begyndte dog for alvor at dukke op efter, at PM Margaret

Thatcher var med at realisere Fællesakten i 1986, og Det Indre Marked begyndte at tage form. For at DIM skulle fungere optimalt var der nu fri bevægelighed for kapital, serviceydelse, varer og sidst men ikke mindst arbejdskraft. Ud over dette er der også blevet harmoniseret en masse lovgivning, for at DIM skulle kunne fungere optimalt uden handelshindringer. Harmoniseringen i EU blev yderligere forstærket ved Maastricht traktaten i 1992, og EF blev til EU. Dette skaber yderligt røre blandt de Konservative, og partiet UKIP bliver dannet som reaktion på dette.

Den påvirkning, som supranationale institutioner kan have på nationalstater, er en ekstern faktor. Nationalstaten kan også have interne faktorer, som kan presse dens klassiske rolle. Storbritannien oplevede efter krigen at blive et multikulturelt samfund, da det daværende imperiums indbygger alle blev statsborgere i Storbritannien. Dermed kunne man nemt komme til Storbritannien for at bo og arbejde. Storbritannien oplevede en stor tilstrømning af migranter fra deres kolonier, så i 1960'erne begyndte man igen at stramme mulighederne for at immigrere til Storbritannien (Ford & Lymperopoulou, 2017, s.3).

Da Storbritannien meldte sig ind i EU i 1972, fulgte der også muligheden for vandrende arbejdstagere med. Det blev yderlig forstærket, da DIM blev indført i 1980'erne, og med Øst-udvidelsen i 2004 oplever Storbritannien en markant immigration fra EU-borgere fra de nye europæiske medlemslande. Dette var uventet, og Nigel Farage, lederen af UKIP, var en af de politikere, der for første gang satte lighedstegn mellem immigration og britisk EU-medlemskab (Leonard, 2015). Immigration fra andre EU-lande kan ikke fravælges, grundet at de fire friheder er nødvendige for, at DIM kan fungere optimalt. Nationalstaten bliver dermed potentielt presset af denne multikulturmisme, der automatisk er del af et EU-medlemskab. Denne tvungne europæiske multikulturmisme blev måske for meget for Storbritannien, måske var Leave-resultatet et tegn på, at briterne ønsker at styrke sammenhængskraften og homogeniteten i Storbritannien.

## 1.1 Problemformulering

Hvilke historiske, kulturelle og politiske faktorer påvirkede folkeafstemningens resultat (Brexit) i Storbritannien i juni 2016- Og hvorfor?

## 1.2. Definitioner og afgrænsning

I de følgende definitioner af begreberne: staten, suverænitet, nationen, repræsentativ styreform og retsstaten, vil dette speciale benytte Thierry Baudets definitioner af disse. Det vurderes, at Baudet har indhentet information fra mange kilder til sine definitioner.

### 1.2.1. Staten

Staten defineres som en centraliseret magt, der har monopol på den territoriale jurisdiktion og overordnede politiske magt (Baudet, 2012, s.31). Dens politiske magt betyder, at staten kan skabe og udøve loven, og det er essentielt, at kun staten lovgiver, så der er en fælles lov, der gælder for alle borgere (Baudet, 2012, s.32-3). En stat kræver borgere, og disse må overgive visse friheder til staten i bytte for både personlig sikkerhed og sikkerhed, for at staten vil forsøre sig selv mod andre stater. Borgerne accepterer, at staten kan kræve deres styrke for at forsøre staten. En stat kan indgå handelsaftaler og allianceer med andre stater på vegne af alle indbyggere, men også føre krig med andre stater. I statens interaktion med andre stater vil staten primært have egne interesser (borgernes) for øje (Baudet, 2012, s.35-6).

### 1.2.2. Suverænitet

At staten har monopol ift. magtens udøvelse inden for dens grænser, kan også beskrives som, at staten er suveræn (Baudet, 2012, s.39). Suverænitet har udviklet sig til at betyde: ingen højere politisk magt. I ordets klassiske forstand er det dog uløseligt bundet sammen med staten, og dermed et begrænset territorium. Grænserne markerer det territorium, der afgrænser en politisk enhed fra andre, og de muliggør også bevarelsen af national loyalitet, der støtter statens suverænitet (Baudet, 2012, s.239).

Den suveræne stat kræver overordnet set fire faktorer er tilstede: effektiv og selvstændig statslig kontrol, borgere og et territorium. Disse tre punkter henviser til statens interne suverænitet. Staten er også suveræn i dens interaktion med andre stater, da den som det fjerde punkt har kapacitet til at indgå i relationer med andre stater. Dette kræver, at en stat også har eksterne suverænitet, og at andre stater anerkender den som legitim (Baudet, 2012, s.40).

Det kan siges, at stater har den suveræne politiske autoritet. Autoritet kan både henvises til, at man har magten til at lovgive, men også henvises til en følelse af respekt folk kan have overfor institutioner. Begge er essentielle for den interne legitimering af staten og dens beslutninger. Hvis staten ikke er legitim i dets borgers øjne, da er det næsten umuligt for denne at opretholde sit magtmonopol. Det er også vigtigt for den eksterne suverænitet, da andre stater oftest ikke vil anse en stat uden folkelig støtte for legitim (Baudet, 2012, s.42).

Staten har også suverænitet ift. militærmagt og forsvaret af statens grænser. Hertil følger også, at staten har suverænitet i dens udenrigspolitik. For at en stat skal kunne opretholde et forsvar, må

den indsamle midler fra dens borgere. Dermed har en stat også magt over beskatningen (Baudet, 2012, s.46).

Suverænitet kan også deles op i formel og praktisk suverænitet. Formel suverænitet, er når en stat konstitutionelt set er selvstændig. Praktisk suverænitet beror der, hvor de politiske beslutninger tages (Baudet, 2012, s.49). Denne sondring er relevant ift. supranationale samarbejder. En stat er dog først ikke længere selvstændig, når denne ikke kan trække suveræniteten tilbage fra det supranationale samarbejde. Dog er den praktiske suverænitet tabt, så længe en stat ikke trækker sig tilbage fra supranationalt samarbejde (Baudet, 2012, s.50-1). Suverænitet og staters indgåelse i internationalt samarbejde kan dog også anskues gennem Hans Branners begreber: formel og reel suverænitet. Den formelle suverænitet er et juridisk begreb, hvor reel suverænitet er et politisk begreb, og beskriver hvor suveræn en stat egentlig er. Ved suverænitetsafgivelse bliver den formelle suverænitet måske mindre, men den reelle suverænitet kan tilgengæld blive forøget ift., at f.eks. medlemslande i EU har indflydelse på de politikker, der bliver ført i andre medlemslande, og naturligvis på EU-niveau (Branner, 2016, s. 40).

### 1.2.3. Nationen

Nationen bliver ofte brugt som synonym med stat, og nationalitet synonym med etnicitet. Nationen skal nærmere forstås som udtryk for politisk loyalitet overfor en stat, der stammer fra en kollektiv identitet. Denne politiske loyalitet har ikke altid været national, men i takt med at nationalstaten har taget form, er den blevet mere national i sit udtryk. Stater behøver politisk loyalitet, men den behøver ikke være national (Baudet, 2012, s.60).

At borger begyndte at opleve national loyalitet betød, at staten kunne udvikle sig til en nation, hvilket gav den mulighed for større stabilitet, da folk følte sig knyttet til fællesskabet af andre grunde end politisk loyalitet. Stalin beskrev i 1913 at "*En nation er et historisk konstitueret, stabilt samfund af folk, der er skabt på basis af fælles sprog, territorium, økonomi og psykologisk sammensætning der manifesterer sig i en fælles kultur*" (Baudet, 2012, s.61). Alle disse faktorer behøver ikke være tilstede, men en borger vil typisk have en følelse af fællesskab selv med fremmede, fordi man antager at dele historie, sprog, territorium, sindelag, kultur osv. Dette blandet med territorial afgrænsning giver et kollektivt 'Vi'. (Baudet, 2012, s.77).

Med nationer, da følger også en nationalitet. Nationalitet er mellemvejen mellem et universelt borgerskab og præbestemt etnisk medlemskab. Nationalitet er lokalt forankret og kan opnås ved fødsel, men det er også åbent for at folk udefra kan opnå medlemskab (Baudet, 2012, s. 76). Til

sammen skaber institutionerne staten og nationen: nationalstaten. Et fællesskab der beror på mere end pragmatiske overvejelser om samarbejde, et fællesskab der kan modstå tidens foranderlighed. Et fællesskab der skaber en stærk kollektiv identitet: "Vi'et".

#### 1.2.4. Repræsentativ styreform og retsstaten

De europæiske landes demokrati er baseret på principperne om repræsentativ styreform og en opbygning af en retsstat. Repræsentationen i form af en statsleder, et parlament m.fl. kræver intern legitimitet. Folket skal acceptere, at en repræsentant repræsenterer dem politisk (Baudet, 2012, s.178). Moderne parlementer fungerer efter princippet om mandater. Et mandat giver repræsentanten muligheden for at handle relativt frit, når denne repræsenterer sine vælgere. Repræsentanten bør dog handle legitimt i sin valgkreds' øjne, for ellers risikerer denne ikke at få tildelt et mandat igen. (Baudet, 2012, s.180-2).

Repræsentativt demokrati kræver social sammenhæng mellem folket og repræsentanten for at være legitim. Det kræver et "Vi" at acceptere at blive repræsenteret. Det kræver bestemt også et "Vi" at acceptere at blive repræsenteret af en, du ikke synes deler dit synspunkt. Det er national loyalitet, der gør, at borgere lader sig repræsentere af nogen, de ikke selv har valgt, indtil de får mulighed for at vælge igen (Baudet, 2012, s.183).

Retsstaten er den anden side af repræsentativt demokrati, der skaber tryghed for borgere, selv om de bliver repræsenteret af, en de ikke selv har valgt. En retsstat defineres som:

- I dens handlinger er staten bundet af loven (Staten kan ikke handle arbitraert, folket har modstandsret, hvis staten ikke overholder loven. Alle er lige for loven i en retsstat.)
- Når staten lovgiver eller ændre lovgivning, så er den bundet af fastlagt procedure (Forbyder arbitraære ændringer til loven. For at en lov skal være gyldig, skal denne debatters offentligt og vedtages ved en lovgivende forsamling).
- En uafhængig retsinstans håndhæver loven (En uafhængig retsinstans sikrer, at domstolen dømmer autonomt ift. magtens andre grene) (Baudet, 2012, s.184-5).

En retsinstans er dog stadig en del af samfundet og kan derfor aldrig være fuldstændige autonom i sit virke, men netop det faktum, at domstolen også er en del af samfundet, vil give den en vis grad af forudsigelighed i, hvordan den dømmer. Det er den nationale domstol, der dømmer ud fra national lovgivning, der er skabt i en national kontekst. Dette giver en juridisk forudsigelighed ift., at dommere ikke blot dømmer efter lovens formelle bogstaver, men at der også er en vis uniformitet i, hvordan de fortolker loven, da de også er del af den nationale kontekst (Baudet,

2012, s.185). Accepten af dommerens afgørelser sker generelt på baggrund af, at de stridende parter begge er del af samme samfund, og derfor accepterer de love, dette samfund har (Baudet, 2012, s.188-9).

### 1.2.5 Euroskepsis

Dette speciale vil benytte Catharina Sørensens definitioner af euroskepsis, da hun har mange års erfaring med forskning i euroskepsis. Euroskepsis er et begreb, som generelt bruges til at beskrive en tvivl over for de fælles europæiske projekter. Euroskepsis er sammensat af euro og skepsis. Euro er et ord, der kan bruges til at beskrive både Europa, EU og møntenheden Euro. Skepsis kan betyde tvivl, mistillid, generelt ikke at tro på noget (Sørensen, 2006, s.5). I specialet vil ordet euroskepsis hentyde til skepsis overfor EU-samarbejdet som helhed. Euroskepsis kan også gradbøjes fra blød skepsis til hård. Blød skepsis henviser til, at personen, der udviser skepsis, ønsker at begrænse integrationen med andre lande; mens hårdere euroskeptikere ingen integration ønsker. Nedenfor defineres de tre forskellige typer euroskepsis i deres rene form, men i virkeligheden er det ikke unormalt, at euroskeptikere udviser flere eller alle former for skepsis samtidig (Sørensen, 2006, s.5-6).

**1) Nytte.** Euroskeptikere kan være skeptiske overfor, om de får nok ud af EU-samarbejdet. Denne skepsis beror især på om enten individet eller staten får nok økonomisk gavn af EU-medlemskabet.

**2) Ideologi.** Euroskepsis kan også have en ideologisk karakter. Denne skepsis opstår ved at, folk tager stilling til samarbejdet ud fra et værdibaseret, politisk perspektiv.

**3) Suverænitet.** Befolkningens skepsis kan også være suverænitetsbaseret. Da vurderer folk, at EU-samarbejdet har en negativ konsekvens for landets nationale suverænitet og/eller nationale identitet.

## 1.4. Afgræsning

I specialets teorigennemgang af liberal intergovernmentalisme, da vil den blot kort beskrive de tre forskellige faser i international forhandling, men vil primært gå i dybden ift. dannelsen af nationale præferencer, da denne del antages som mest centralt for specialet.

Dette speciale vil som hovedregel ikke tage hensyn de forskellige faser og officielle betegnelser, det europæiske samarbejde har haft, men generelt kalde det for EU.

Specialet vil kun beskæftige sig med de officielle Leave og Remain-kampagners retorik.

Kampagnerne er dem, der fik statslig støtte til at føre valgkamp. Det drejer sig om *Britain Stronger in Europe*, som i specialet benævnes Remain-kampagnen, og den officielle Leave-kampagne *Vote Leave*, som i specialet benævnes, som Leave-kampagnen. Som den eneste undtagelse vil en tale fra UKIP lederen Nigel Farage også behandles, da dette parti har haft stor indflydelse på EU-spørgsmålet i Storbritannien.

Specialet vil som udgangspunkt ikke beskæftige sig med begivenheder efter PM Theresa May aktiverede art. 50 den 29. marts 2017, hvor hun bekræftede, at Storbritannien ønsker at forlade EU, og forhandlingerne om udmeldelsen officielt gik i gang.

Specialet er opmærksom på, at Skotland og Nordirland stemte for Remain, men specialets fokus vil være på landsgennemsnittet for Storbritannien, som blev Leave.

## 1.5 Metode

Formålet med dette speciale er at analysere hvilket politiske, kulturelle og historiske faktorer, der påvirkede den britiske folkeafstemnings således at resultatet endte med et Leave, og brexit blev en realitet. Dette speciale vil forsøge at udrede nogle resultater ud fra en historisk redegørelse af Storbritanniens forhold til EU primært anskuet gennem det Konservative partis øjne, samt en komparativ analyse og diskussion af centrale politikeres taler fra valgkampen i 2016. Dette speciale vil benytte to integrationsteorier, intergovernmentalisme og liberal intergovernmentalisme, og teori om begreberne supranationalisme og multikulturalismes påvirkning af staten. Disse teorier er valgt for at kunne supplere hinandens forklaringskraft og belyse forskellige aspekter af brexit-resultatet.

Dette speciale ligger inden for den fortolkende samfundsvidenskabelige praksis og vil derfor benytte den hermeneutiske metode. To grundlæggende betragtninger om den hermeneutiske metode er, at forståelse og fortolkning kommer før forklaring, og det er sociale fænomener og aktører, der er bærerne af meningssammenhænge, hvorfor det er disse, der skal fortolkes (Højbjerg, 2013, s.289). Den hermeneutiske metode er meget optaget af den hermeneutiske cirkel, der beskriver den konstante vekselvirkning, som finder steder mellem del og helhed. Enkelte dele kan kun forstås i kraft af helheden, og omvendt kan helheden kun forstås i kraft af delene. Det er sammenhængen mellem disse to, der er meningsskabende og denne relation gør, at vi er i stand til at forstå og fortolke. I den filosofiske hermeneutik er forskeren også en aktiv del

af den hermeneutiske cirkel, da det ikke menes at være muligt at fortolke uden at inddrage sin egen forståelse (Højbjerg, 2013, s.292).

I den filosofiske hermeneutik er fortolkningen eller forståelse et resultat af, hvad forskerens forståelse har været (Fredslund, 2012, s.77). Derfor menes den hermeneutiske cirkel i høj grad at være en vekselvirkning mellem forståelse og forståelse. Fordomme eller forståelse menes altid at være til stede, når der forskes, og det er disse fordomme, man skal sætte på spil, for at have muligheden for at opnå forståelse i form af horisont sammensmelting (Fredslund, 2012, s.80). De metodiske principper i den filosofiske hermeneutik er: fordomme, situation & horisont og forståelse som horisontsammensmelting. Vores fordomme eller forståelse er de grundlæggende antagelse, vi har. Situationen er det ståsted, hvor vi ser fra, og horisonten er den vidde, som vores udsyn har. Situationen er den kontekst, som vi er indlejret i, og eksempler kan være tid, sted, personlig historie, uddannelse m.fl. Forståelsen sker, når horisonter smelter sammen. Dette er ikke lig med enighed, men et rum med mulighed for forståelse (Fredslund, 2012, s.81-2).

I den hermeneutiske analyse må man sætte sine fordomme på spil for at få dem i spil og have muligheden for horisontsammensmelting. Her forsøger forskeren at gøre sig bevidst om sine fordomme og udfordre dem. Forståelse er en dynamisk proces, der aldrig slutter, så længe viljen og åbenheden til at stille spørgsmål er tilstede (Højbjerg, 2013, s.319-20). Et af hermeneutikkens vigtigste redskaber er anvendelse af teorier til at udfordre ens forståelse og udvide ens forståelseshorisont.

Teorierne som bliver anvendt i dette speciale, er et redskab til at udfordre forståelsen og undersøge deres forklaringskraft. Derfor benytter dette speciale ikke blot integrationsteorier, som er specialiseret til at analysere begivenheder vedr. EU, men også mere generelle teorier som supranationalisme og multikulturalisme for at udfordre specialets forståelsen yderligere.

## 2. Teori

### 2.1. Intergovernmentalisme

I 1960'erne formulerede politologen Stanley Hoffmann den intergovernmentalistiske integrationsteori som en reaktion på neofunktionalismen, der var en af de mest anvendte teorier, som blev brugt til at forklare integrationen i EU. Hoffmann fastslog, at stater altid handler ud fra egne nationale interesser. Derfor anser han staterne som hovedaktørerne i

integrationsprocessen. Det er staterne, der bestemmer, hvor hurtig integrationen mellem staterne sker, og hvor dyb denne integration bliver. (Hoffmann, 1966, s.882-84).

### 2.1.1. Det Nationale

Staterne, der interagere i det europæiske samarbejde, er alle nationalstater, og i den internationale interaktion mellem nationalstater antager Hoffmann, at det *nationale* i nationalstaten kan antage forskellige former. De kan inddeltes i tre kategorier: national bevidsthed, den nationale tilstand og nationalism. Disse tre kategorier beskriver også graden af nationalism, der er tilstede i det *nationale*. Denne grad kan påvirke, hvordan en nationalstat agerer i internationale sammenhænge.

### 2.1.2. National bevidsthed

National bevidsthed er det, der adskiller et folk fra et andet, den sammenhørighed og de karakteristika som kun dette folk føler og har. National bevidsthed opfatter ”fremmede” som hverken positivt eller negativt, men blot anderledes end det hjemlige nationale. I følge Hoffmann vil national bevidsthed ikke diktere udenrigspolitik.

### 2.1.3. Den nationale tilstand

Den nationale tilstand bliver defineret af interne faktorer som arv og karakter og eksterne faktorer som statens position i verden. De interne og eksterne faktorer kan deles yderligere op i objektive faktorer som: socialstruktur, politisk system, geografi og formelle internationale forpligtelser, og subjektive faktorer som: værdier, fordomme, holdninger, statens traditioner og andre staters opførsel overfor staten. Nogle af disse faktorer er dynamiske og kan ændres eller trækkes tilbage, mens andre er statiske og uforanderlige. Fælles for dem begge er, at magthaverne altid må tage den nationale tilstand til efterretning i den politik, som vedkommende fører. Hoffman påstår ikke, at en enhver situation er givet på forhånd på baggrund af den nationale tilstand, men at ovennævnte faktorer vil begrænse det politiske spillerum for magthaverne i internationale sammenhæng.

### 2.1.4. Nationalismen

Nationalismen karakteriserer Hoffmann som en ideologi. Nationalismens højeste mål er at sikre nationen. Dette gør at nationalismen beskæftiger sig meget med nationens plads i verden. Det kan betyde en ekspansiv politik til sikring af nationens territorium, hvor den expansive politik kan være såvel af militær eller af mere værdimæssig karakter. Det kan tillige betyde, at staten vil isolere sig og have ingen eller meget lidt interaktion med andre stater. Nationalismen vil ikke altid tage hensyn til den nationale tilstand, hvis denne ikke stemmer overens med dens teori om, hvordan nationen bedst kan bevares. Så selv hvis den nationale tilstand f.eks. krævede økonomisk

integration, ville nationalismen ikke integrere sig, hvis det kunne opfattes som en trussel mod nationens bevarelse (Hoffmann, 1966, s.867-69).

### 2.1.5. Geopolitiske interesser

Lige meget hvilken kategori det *nationale* i nationalstaten passer i, da vil det altid være statens primære interesse at beskytte deres egne geopolitiske interesser, især den nationale sikkerhed. Intergovernmentalisme foreskriver at for at bevare denne sikkerhed, må staten være suveræn (Nwaneri, 2009). For at beskytte de nationale egeninteresser kan en stat antage at dette kræver, at staten kun integrerer sig i begrænset omfang med andre stater. Især interne faktorer i den nationale tilstand som dens arv eller historisk bagage kan betyde, at staten ikke ønsker et højt niveau af integration. Hoffmann fremfører, at dette især sker, når en nationalstat har en lang historie, en rig kultur og mange traditioner. Disse faktorer samt en stærk og veludviklet identitetsfølelse kalder han en ”tung” historisk bagage. Ydermere fastslår Hoffmann, at hvis en stat ikke blot har en lang historie, men også tidligere haft stor magt, vil denne have en tendens til at være mindre villig til integration, da staten stadig vil have en tendens til at opføre sig som i sin stormagtstid.

### 2.1.6. Suverænitetsafgivelse eller ej?

Hoffmann afviser ikke med intergovernmentalismen, at integration sker, ej heller at supranationale institutioner ikke også har magt i integrationsprocessen. Selv nationalstater med tung historisk bagage afgiver til tider suverænitet til f.eks. EU-domstolen, der kan hjælpe med, at stater overholder indgåede aftaler. Denne afgivelse af suverænitet er dog kun midlertidig i intergovernmentalismens øjne, og den bliver kun afgivet, fordi den altid kan tages tilbage.

Der er også stor forskel på hvilke områder, som stater afgiver suverænitet på.

Intergovernmentalismen fastslår, at staterne er mere villige til at afgive suverænitet og integrere sig, hvis der er tale om mere sekundære politiske områder. Disse betegnes som ”low politics” som f.eks. økonomi, dette område er mindre truende for statens beskyttelse af egne interesser (Hoffmann, 1966, 882). I følge intergovernmentalismen truer ”low politics” ikke en stats suverænitet, mens statens vigtigste område ”high politics”, som omfatter udenrigs-, sikkerheds- og forsvarsopolitik, potentielt kan true statens suverænitet, hvis der afgives magt på dette område (Nwaneri, 2009). Skulle et traditionelt ”low politics” område som økonomi begynde at bevæge sig ind på områder, der er essentielle for en stats selvopfattelse, da kan ”low politics” blive til ”high politics”- alt efter den nationale tilstand ift. værdier, som staten måtte have (Hoffmann, 1966, s.882). Ifølge Hoffmann, vil de forskellige nationale tilstande i de forskellige nationalstater medføre mange forskellige nationale interesser, og dette vil besværliggøre integrationsprocessen,

da en stat naturligvis ikke vil modarbejde egne nationale interesser (Hoffmann, 1966, s. 902). Dog kan eksterne trusler gøre, at nationale interesser enten er sammenfaldende eller overskygges af truslerne. Dette er dog sjældent af langvarig karakter indenfor "high politics" området (Hoffmann, 1966, s.907).

## 2.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalisme

Liberal intergovernmentalisme er en integrationsteori, som politologen Andrew Moravcsik formulerer i løbet af 1990'erne. Denne teori bygger videre på Hoffmanns intergovernmentalisme, hvor staterne er de vigtigste aktører i den europæiske integrationsproces. Moravcsik fremhæver dog økonomiske interesser på lige fod med geopolitiske (Kelstrup, Martinsen, & Wind, 2012, s.195).

Moravcsik antager, at staterne er rationelle aktører, der oftest agerer forudsigeligt ud fra nationale præferencer, der forbliver stabile over tid. Disse præferencer er ikke statiske, men ændrer sig typisk kun langsomt. Liberal Intergovernmentalisme antager, at nationalstaben er civilbefolkningens primære politiske instrument i internationale forhandlinger. Denne agerer på vegne af befolkningen og taler med én stemme. Dette er dog ikke det samme som enstemmighed i den hjemlige politik (Moravcsik, 1998, s.22). Liberal intergovernmentalisme inddeler forhandlinger i tre stadier: dannelsen af national præference, mellemstatslige forhandlinger og valg af institution (Moravcsik, 1998, s.18).

### 2.2.1. Dannelse af nationale præferencer

Det første stade i internationale forhandlinger er statens dannelse af de nationale præferencer (NP). NP'er defineres som et rangordnet sæt af værdier iht. fremtidige og væsentlige resultater, der muligvis kan opnås ved international politisk interaktion (Moravcsik, 1998, s.24). Som tidligere nævnt bliver præferencerne anset for stabile, men ikke statiske. Præferencerne kan ændres over tid eller som følge af den politiske, økonomiske eller ideologiske situation internt i en stat. En stat vil dog ift. separate forhandlinger antage et sæt præferencer og beholde disse (Moravcsik, 1998, s.23). En stats NP'er kan typisk inddeltes i to overordnede kategorier: geopolitiske og økonomiske. Geopolitiske interesser beskriver potentielle trusler mod national suverænitet eller territorial integritet af enten militær eller ideologisk karakter. Økonomiske interesser beskriver den nødvendige, økonomiske gensidige afhængighed, som for alvor kom frem efter Anden Verdenskrig.

### 2.2.2. Geopolitiske interesser

De geopolitiske og økonomiske interesser er oftest sammenfaldende i den europæiske integration, og det kan være svært at se, hvad en stat vægter højest, hvis noget. En geopolitisk forklaring på det økonomiske samarbejde i EU kunne f.eks. være, hvis staten vægter sikkerhedspolitiske hensyn højest i en fiktiv statslig behovspyramide, da vil økonomisk samarbejde med andre stater ikke være et mål i sig selv, men en måde at opnå øget national magt og prestige og dermed en stærkere geopolitisk position (Moravcsik, 1998, s. 26). De geopolitiske interesser ser økonomisk integration som en metode, hvor stater har mulighed for at manipulere "high politics" til egen fordel. Stater er desuden mere villige til at integrere sig økonomisk med andre stater, der er deres allierede i geopolitiske mål (Moravcsik, 1998, s. 27). Alpha og omega for økonomisk integration ud fra geopolitiske interesser er, at hvis integration skaber positive geopolitiske eksternaliteter, da vil staten indgå i den, men hvis der skabes negative geopolitiske eksternaliteter, da vil staten være modvillige overfor integration på trods af evt. økonomiske fordele. Statens sikkerhed vægtes højest og må ikke kompromitteres (Moravcsik, 1998, s.29).

### 2.2.3. Økonomisk politiske interesser

Mens den geopolitiske teori om NP dannelses fokusere på de indirekte virkninger af økonomisk integration, da fokusere de økonomiske interesser på de direkte konsekvenser. De økonomiske interesser er dog ikke rent økonomiske, men beskrives bedre ved at kalde dem økonomiske politiske interesser. Det internationale samarbejde er en måde, hvorpå stater kan skabe politik, der er til alles fordel, siden staters interne økonomiske politikker ofte påvirker hinanden.

Samarbejdet mellem stater, med at skabe gensidig politik regulering, kan være med til at fjerne negativt påvirkende politikker eller skabe positivt påvirkende politikker mellem staterne. Hvis dette kan skabes mere effektivt i internationale forhandlinger frem for unilateral politik, da vil stater have incitament til at integrere sig. En stats økonomiske NP'er dannes ud fra hjemlig debat, her vil producentgrupper ofte have en stor stemme ift. den endelige politik/NP, som staten tager med sig til forhandlingsbordet. Det er ofte pres fra nationale producenter, der driver økonomisk integration, men det kan ikke alene forklarer det. Stater vil altid søge at varetage nationale interesser (borgernes interesser) gennem regulering, økonomisk effektivitet og finansiel ansvarlighed. Formålet ved økonomisk udenrigspolitik er at vedligeholde og forbedre konkurrenceevnen hos nationale producenter, formindsk det statslige forbrug og gøre op for evt. hjemlig politisk "utilstrækkelighed", når hjemmemarkedet eller statsligt tilskud ikke længere kan skabe vækst hos de nationale producenter og dermed velstand i samfundet (Moravcsik, 1998, s.35-7)

#### 2.2.4. Mellemstatslige forhandlinger

Når staterne har besluttet, hvad deres NP'er er, begynder de mellemstatslige forhandlinger. En stats NP'er giver dem et spillerum i forhandlinger, hvor forskellige potentielle aftaler kan opfylde disse, mens andre aftaler vil være i modstrid med NP'erne (Moravcsik, 1998, s.50). En stat forhandler også ift. dens ressourcer eller magt og ikke mindst ud fra, hvor meget den ønsker at indgå en aftale. Den magt en stat har er omvendt proportional ift., hvor meget den ønsker at opnå en aftale. Det samme gør sig gældende ift. NP'erne, jo større præferenceintensitet en NP'er har for en stat, jo mere vil de gå på kompromis for at opnå denne, eller måske trække sig fra forhandlingerne, hvis ikke NP'en opfyldes (Moravcsik, 1998, s.61-3).

De afgørende elementer i den mellemstatslige forhandlingsproces er: truslen om forhandlingssammenbrud, truslen om eksklusion, muligheden for kompromis (sammenfaldende NP'er eller "side payments"). Stater vil typisk afvise aftaler, der er dårligere end, hvad de selv kan opnå unilateralt. Dermed kan en stat true med forhandlingssammenbrud, hvis den vurderer, at aftalen ikke giver nok fordele. Stater er derimod også set gå med til aftaler, der i nuet ikke gav dem flere fordele, end de selv kunne have opnået, men truslen om at blive ekskluderet fra samarbejdet kan få stater til at indgå aftaler alligevel. Kompromiser sker, når NP'er er sammenfaldende, og der dannes koalitioner. De sker selvfølgelig også ift. forbehold, så en blokerende stat ikke får samarbejdet til at bryde sammen. Side payments bliver ofte brugt til at sikre mindre staters støtte, så de opnår nogle af de NP'er, som de vægter højest eller måske muligheden for at få forbehold (Moravcsik, 1998,s.60-1).

#### 2.2.5. Valg af institution

Når der er indgået en aftale, vælger staterne en institution, der skal sikre aftalens implementering og bevarelsen af denne. I EU's tilfælde sammenlægger eller overdrager staterne suverænitet. Det er ellers en umulighed ift. liberal intergovernmentalismes grundtanke om suveræne stater der forhandler, men kan forklares ved, at det kun er en midlertidig overdragelse eller sammenlægning af suverænitet, og staterne til enhver tid kan tage den tilbage. Staterne kan enten sammenlægge suverænitet, hvor staterne i fremtiden skal opnå enstemmighed ved aftaler eller udvidet samarbejde. De kan også vælge at overdrage suverænitet, hvor de giver supranationale institutioner magt til at tage visse beslutninger autonomaet uden interstatslig afstemning eller vetoret (Moravcsik, 1998, s.67-8). Sammenlægningen eller overdragelsen af suverænitet er, som tidligere nævnt, en måde hvorpå staterne kan sikre overholdelsen af aftalerne.

## 2.3. Supranationalisme og multikulturalisme

Thierry Baudet er en hollandsk neo-konservativ forsker og politiker. Han advokerer for en tilbagevenden til nationalstatens suverænitet og påpeger, at repræsentativ styreform og retsstaten kræver national suverænitet, en national identitet og territorial jurisdiktion for at kunne legitimeres i befolkningens øjne (Baudet, 2012, s.243). Baudet anser de største trusler mod nationalstaben for at være supranationalismen og multikulturalismen. Supranationale institutioner som EU udfordrer nationalstaben suverænitet på dens territorium ved per definition at være en højere instans end staten (Baudet, 2012, s.81). Efter Anden Verdenskrig er de fleste europæiske lande i dag blevet multikulturelle med immigration fra lande over hele verdenen. Der forefindes altså flere forskellige kulturer i de europæiske nationalstater. Multikulturalismen er dog ikke blot tilstedeværelsen af andre kulturer i samme stat, men fornægtelsen af at et samfund har eller bør have en dominerende kultur. (Baudet, 2012, s.158). Supranationalisme og multikulturalismen er begge filosofier, der går ind for at udviske grænser frem for at bevare eller forøge dem (Baudet, 2012, s.172).

### 2.3.1. Supranationalismen

En supranational organisation kan gennem ikke enstemmige afstemninger eller interne juridiske procedure:

- Rette vedtagne vedtægter
- Udføre disse vedtægter
- Fortolke disse vedtægter

Den autonomi som supranationale organisationer har, gør at medlemmerne, der i principippet er suveræne nationalstater, kan blive bundet af vedtægter, som de formelt set ikke direkte har været med til at vedtage (Baudet, 2012, s.82).

Intet supranationalt samarbejde kræver en så høj grad af politisk integration mellem sine medlemmer som EU. Som nævnt i de to ovenstående teorier er det en kendt sag, at EU-samarbejdet kræver afgivelse af suverænitet på visse områder (Baudet, 2012, s.86). Den politiske integration i EU har stort set fjernet medlemsstaternes mulighed for løbende at vælge samarbejde til eller fra og efterlader teknisk set kun den formelle suverænitet (Baudet, 2012, s.82). Den praktiske suverænitet beror i høj grad hos EU-institutionerne: Kommissionen, Europa-Parlamentet, Ministerrådet, Det Europæiske Råd og EU-Domstolen. Indenfor EU's kompetenceområder der spænder fra den monetære union ØMU'en til forbrugersikkerhed ifm.

DIM, kan EU's institutioner lovgive på eget initiativ, og denne lovgivning skal implementeres i alle medlemsstaterne (Baudet, 2012, s.153-4).

Et andet område, hvor EU's supranationale institutioner har en stor påvirkning på den nationale suverænitet, er ift. retssystemet. EU har sin egen formålsbestemte domstol, der skal fortolke de sager, den har ud fra det overordnede princip om "en stadig snævrere union" mellem medlemsstaterne (Böttcher, 2009). EU-domstolen har selv fastslået, at EU-lovgivning har direkte virkning i medlemsstaterne (Vand Gend en Loos-dommen 1963) og at EU-lovgivning har forrang over national lovgivning, hvis disse er i konflikt med hinanden (Costa v. ENEL 1964) (Baudet, 2012, s.154). Det er ikke alle supranationale institutioner, der har lige så meget magt eller mulighed for at håndhæve deres beslutninger som EU. Fælles for dem er alle er dog, at de har taget politisk magt væk fra nationalstaterne. De problemer som Baudet identificerer ved supranationale institutioner er:

- Nationale regeringers beslutninger og ønsker kan blive nedstemt af en majoritet, der kommer udefra, følgelig fra andre nationers repræsentanter i de supranationale fællesskab.
- Ikke nationale dommere dømmer i sager, der omhandler national lov og moral. De nationale dommere har ikke længere det afgørende ord.
- Supranationale institutioner og ikke-nationale dommere bliver ikke holdt i skak af de samme "checks and balances" der findes nationalt. De skal ikke stå til ansvar for borgerne, så længe en verdens stat ikke er en realitet (Baudet, 2012, s.171).

### 2.3.2. Multikulturalisme

Multikulturalisme har været en del af debatten om den nationale identitet siden 1950'erne, hvor der kom øget indvandring til EU og andre velstillede lande. Indvandringen har både været fra vestlige lande, men også fra ikke-vestlige lande som Tyrkiet, Nordafrika, Indien, Pakistan m.fl. Disse medbragte en væsentlig anderledes kultur og ofte også en anden religion fra deres oprindelsesland (Chayut, 2012).

Hvor supranationalismen udfordrer nationalstaten oppefra gennem politiske procedure og/eller domstols afgørelser, da udfordrer multikulturalismen den nedefra ved at udfordre den nationale identitet. Multikulturalisme udfordrer nationalstaten ved at fornægte, at der overhovedet bør være en national identitet eller en dominerende kultur som sammenhængskraften i en stat. Lige meget hvilken anden kulturel bagage en borger måtte have, da vil der være en altoverskyggende

national identitet, der gerne skulle føre til national loyalitet og dermed skabe den lim, som kan binde fremmede sammen i fællesskabet. Multikulturalismen mener, at denne følelse af medlemskab af staten ikke kommer fra en fælles national identitet, men derimod ved accepten af at forskellige samfund er anderledes fra ens eget. Multikulturalismen går ind for et samfund af samfund, og derfor skal staten fremhæve forskellen mellem borgerne frem for deres ligheder (Baudet, 2012, s.160-1). Multikulturalismen bifalder opblomstringen af forskellige kulturer på bekostning af den fælles nationale samhørighed (som den dog ofte helt fornægter har eksisteret eller bør gøre det). Disse parallelksamfund kan i yderste instans føre til legal pluralisme, der tillader religiøse og sociale samfundsgrupper at beholde og udvikle deres selvstændige, legale traditioner i deres kulturellefællesskab (Baudet, 2012, s.158-9).

Et ægte multikulturelt samfund kræver:

- Forskellige rettigheder og forpligtigelser til borgere på baggrund af deres kulturelle herkomst.
- Statslig støtte og sponsorering af minoritetskulturer udtrykt ift. størrelse og behov, for at reflektere og bevare forskelligheden af kulturelle identiteter indenfor statens territorium (Baudet, 2012, s.162).

Multikulturalismen kan gradbøjes fra svag til stærk. Svag multikulturalisme ønsker ikke forskellige borgerrettigheder, men en fremhævelse af at der eksisterer forskellige kulturer i samfundet og disses bidrag til nationen generelt. Stærk multikulturalisme ønsker et samfund af parallelksamfund, der har forskellige rettigheder og forpligtigelser på baggrund af borgerens herkomst (Baudet, 2012, s.163).

## 2.4. Teori diskussion

Alle tre teorier tager udgangspunkt i nationalstaten, og hvordan denne agerer internationalt. De beskæftiger sig alle med supranationalt samarbejde, hvor multikulturalismen dog berører en mere intern og nedefra kommende faktor. Alle teorier mener, at nationalstaten er udgangspunktet for al international samarbejde, men de har forskelligt fokus. Både intergovernmentalisme og liberal intergovernmentalisme beskæftiger sig med staters integrationsproces ifm. EU, dog fremhæver de forskellige hovedgrunde til, hvorfor stater integrerer sig eller lader være. I intergovernmentalismen er fokusset primært på "high politics" og geopolitiske grunde. Økonomiske grunde til integration er sekundære og betegnes som "low politics". Denne har også en mere udførlig beskrivelse af, hvad det *nationale* i nationalstaten kan

betyde for integrationen med andre nationalstater. Liberal intergovernmentalisme placerer økonomiske motiver til integration på lige fod med geopolitiske grunde. Denne har også gjort sig tanker om, hvordan og hvilke institutioner staterne vælger til at varetage de aftaler, der indgås. Liberal intergovernmentalisme differentierer også mellem at sammenlægge og overdrage suverænitet. Både intergovernmentalisme og liberal intergovernmentalisme er dog enige om, at staternes suveræniteten er stadig intakt og kan altid trækkes tilbage. Det betyder også, at nationalstaten er intakt i sit virke, selv om den midlertidigt har integreret sig med andre stater.

Baudets tanker om supranationalismen afviser, at nationalstaten kan eksistere under et supranationalt samarbejde. Hans teorier er ikke en integrationsteori og omhandler derfor ikke specifikt processerne i EU, men generelt supranationalismens indvirken på nationalstaten. Baudet fremhæver, at nationalstaten ikke er intakt så længe den indgår i supranationale samarbejder. Det er ikke nok for ham, at nationalstaterne kan trække deres suverænitet tilbage. En nationalstat skal have den praktiske suverænitet og ikke blot formel suverænitet for at være komplet den i klassiske forstand. Hans teori er meget fokuseret på spørgsmålet om nationalitet og national loyalitet, som han mener kommer af fælles lovgivning på et fælles territorium, og dommere der dømmer i en national kontekst. Dette giver en fælles kultur og en klar følelse af "Vi". De andre teorier redegør for, hvorfor stater ønsker at integrere, og hvorfor de gør det. Baudet redegøre for, hvorfor de ikke burde gøre det, i det mindste hvis de ønsker at bevare nationalstaten. Hoffmann kommer også ind på national identitet, men ingen af teorierne behandler emnet så dybdegående som Baudet. Hans tanker omkring multikulturalismen beror ligeledes på truslen mod nationalstaten. Truslen kommer denne gang nedefra gennem immigration fra andre kulturer og en delvis opløsning af national identitet i staten.

Baudet er, ud over sit akademiske arbejde, hollandsk politiker og EU-modstander pga. den trussel, han ser mod nationalstaten. I kraft af sin hollandske nationalitet er han borger i EU og anskuer projektet indefra. Moravcsik og Hoffmann er derimod begge amerikanere og har primært beskæftig sig med EU på et akademisk plan. De anskuer altså projektet udefra. Hoffmann har været vejleder for Moravcsik, hvilket yderligt forklarer, at de to teorier generelt er meget enige. Moravcsik har dog også beskæftiget sig med politisk rådgivning og har været ansat af Kommissionen. Baudet har bestemt en mere juridisk og filosofisk tilgang til nationalstatens rolle i verden, og gør det klart, at han ikke bryder sig om tingenes tilstand. Moravcsik og Hoffmann søger nærmere at forklare nationalstatens integration med andre, men tager ikke specielt stilling til om integration er ønskværdig.

### 3. Redegørelse

Dette speciale vil redegøre kort for Storbritannien og EU's forhold i et historisk perspektiv med fokus på de Konservative, eftersom de løbende er blevet meget euroskeptiske, og i 2016 udskrev folkeafstemningen om Storbritanniens EU medlemskab.

#### 3.1. Konservatisme

Konservatisme var oprindeligt en modreaktion på de forandringer, som liberale i højere grad anså som ønskværdige ift. samfundet. I Storbritannien blev begrebet først brugt som opposition til oplysningsperioden og Den Franske Revolution. Konservatisme anerkender dog, at reform kan være nødvendigt, men dette bør udvikle sig naturligt og i harmoni med det eksisterende samfund og ud fra abstrakte principper. Konservatismens menneskesyn hævder at være realistisk, mennesker er hverken specielt onde eller gode, men et produkt af deres samfund. Mennesket er forenet af deres sprog, historie, traditioner, litteratur osv. Konservatisme anser den menneskelige fornuft for begrænset, og derfor anses klogskab for noget, der er opbygget af generationers erfaringer. Konservatisme anser heller ikke forfatninger, der udformes i et hug, som et ideal at stræbe efter. Forfatninger skal helst udvikles gradvist og organisk. En nation bør derfor heller ikke importere fremmede politiske reformer og traditioner, men hellere læne sig op af det system der har udviklet sig nationalt, og er perfekt tilpasset nationens historie og traditioner (Kingdom & Fairclough, 2014, s.37).

Traditionelle konservative værdier omfatter ofte: orden, socialt hierarki og religion. Specifikt for britisk konservative værdsætter de også: aristokratiet, monarkiet, House of Lords, kernefamilien, privat ejendomsret og det naturlige ved en herskende klasse. Faderen til den moderne konservatisme anses for at være Edmund Burke. Burke fastslog i sin *"Reflections on the Revolution in France"* fra 1790, at status quo generelt var at foretrække. De eksisterende institutioner eksisterede netop fordi, de var de bedste, ellers havde de ikke overlevet.

*"Society is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are yet to be born."*

*Edmund Burke, 1790.*

Som citatet understreger, er samfundet ikke blot de mennesker, der er del af det her og nu, men både forfædre og endnu ikke fødte har også andel i det. Man skal værne om fortidens ideer og bevare samfundet for fremtidige generationer (Kingdom & Fairclough, 2014, s.38).

Social ulighed og fattigdom bliver i konservatismens øjne set som uundgåeligt, men i 1800-tallet begyndte paternalisme at influere den klassiske konservative tankegang. Adlen blev anset som den eneste samfundsgruppe, man kunne stole på til at regere, men denne have også forpligtigelser overfor dem, de bestemte over. Benjamin Disraeli udtrykte i 1854 i sin novelle *Two Nations* at: “*Power has only one duty- to secure the social welfare of people.*”

Disse to nationer af henholdsvis rige og fattige skulle samles til en nation, hvis denne skulle bestå. Dette er ophavet til begrebet One-nation konservativisme. Denne form for konservativisme gjorde sig ingen tanker om, hvor vidtrækkende statslig intervention skulle være, men det gjorde liberal konservativisme. Dens hovedformål var sikringen af den private ejendomsret, have fokus på fri handel, og at statslig intervention som social velfærd ikke må blive for omfattende, for da risikerer man en svækkelse af nationens moral (Kingdom & Fairclough, 2014, s.39).

Dette speciale vil nu redegøre kort for nogle af de britiske institutioner, der ofte bliver omtalt i politiske og identitetsmæssig sammenhæng.

### 3.2 De britiske institutioner -Parlamentarisme, Common-law & velfærdsstaten

I Storbritannien hersker der flertalsdemokrati og en af dets kendetegn er, at Storbritanniens forfatning til dels er uskrevet og har fået lov til vokse frem gennem mange århundrede på meget organisk vis<sup>1</sup>. Opbygningen af det britiske samfund baserer sig på en række skelsættende dokumenter, der alle har været med til at skabe den meget stærke britiske parlamentarisme. Her kan nævnes Magna Charta, Petition of Rights, Habeas Corpus, Declaration of Rights og Bill of Rights.

#### 3.2.1. Parlamentarisme

Storbritanniens parlamentariske demokrati har udviklet sig siden 1200-tallet, da Magna Charta i 1215 for første gang udstak retningslinjer for kongemagten og begrænsede denne. Magna Charta har opnået mytisk status, idet den fastslår, at selv ikke kongen er hævet over loven. Det er dog stadig kongen, som skaber selv samme lovgivning (Lyon, 2003, s.39-40). Magna Charta vedrører også retssystemet, og fastslår for første gang, at man ikke kan fængsle folk uden rettergang. Art. 39 fastslår ”*at ingen fri mand måtte fængsles eller fratas sine rettigheder eller besiddelser*

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<sup>1</sup> Dette overblik over Storbritanniens forfatningshistorie vil ikke specifikt tage hensyn til, hvilket nationer der konkret var med til at vedtage de forskellige love, som dette afsnit omtaler. Wales blev officielt underlagt England i 1536, Skotland og England blev forenet i 1603 med fælles monark, og 1707 ved politisk union. Irland blev del af Storbritannien i 1801, og løsrev sig i 1921, hvor Nordirland forblev del af Storbritannien.

*undtagen ved dom af hans ligemænd eller ved landets love, ...*". Det feudale England havde muligvis kun tænkt at skulle give rettigheder til frie jordbesiddere, men dokumentet har ikke desto mindre fået en ophøjet status i britisk forfatningshistorie (Vilhelmsen).

### 3.2.2. Ingen står over den engelske lov

Den nationale myte om den ophøjede engelske lov bliver bekræftet igen og igen gennem britisk historie. Det fremhæves ikke blot, at den er udviklet gennem mange århundrede, men dens overlegenhed frem for andre systemer bliver også fremhævet. I 1460 skriver advokaten og embedsmanden Sir John Fortescue afhandlinger om kongemagten og loven. Her fastslår han, at undersåtter naturligvis skal være lydige overfor deres konge, men også at denne konge skal regere klogt, retfærdigt, lovformelt og med accepten af sine undersåtter (han skriver "greater subjects" hvilket tolkes som adlen). Fortescue opremser de magter, der har regeret over England, b.la. romerne, danerne, sakserne osv. og skriver:

*"And throughout the period of those nations and their kings, the realm has been continuously ruled by the same customs as it is now, customs which, if they had not been the best, some of those kings would have changed for the sake of justice..."* (Lyon, 2003, s.150)

Fortescue beskriver ydermere kongen som en magt, der regerer ud fra egne vilje og forstand, men altid med sine undersåtters interesse for øje. At konge også er underlagt loven og ikke kan beskatte sine undersåtter uden dennes tilladelse.

*"Unlike kings of other nations, where 'what pleases the prince has the force of law', the powers of English kings derived from law, which the kings were themselves bound to observe by their coronation oaths."* (Lyon, 2003, s.150)

Netop beskatning har altid været et stridspunkt mellem kongen og dennes parlament. Kongen skulle beskytte landet, og ifm. dette måtte han godt opkræve skatter, men disse skulle godkendes af parlamentet. Kongens magt var generelt accepteret til at være indstiftet af Gud, men siden normannernes tid havde der udviklet sig en tradition for, at kongen også skulle regere i samarbejde med parlamentet. Det præcise forhold var dog ikke fastslået ved lov, grundet dens organiske udvikling (Lyon, 2003, s.199).

### 3.2.3. Monarkiets afskaffelse og genoprettelse

Det var både beskatning og det præcise konstitutionelle forhold mellem kronen og parlamentet, der førte til borgerkrigen i 1642-46 og henrettelsen af Karl I i 1649. Under Stuart familiens regeringstid blev parlamentet ofte opløst og typisk først samlet igen, når kongen havde brug for at inddrive ekstra skatter. I 1628 samlede Karl I igen parlamentet, efter det tre gange siden 1610 var blevet nedlagt af den siddende monark.

Stridigheden mellem parlamentet og kronen var nu af mere principiel karakter, og parlamentet fremsatte forslaget om en Bill of Rights, der ville klarlægge, hvilke beføjelser kronen havde uden om parlamentet. Det blev dog til kompromisset Petitions of Rights i 1628. Denne skulle sikre, at kronen ikke kunne inddrive skatter uden om parlamentet, fængsle uden rettergang, indkvartere tropper hos private og indføre undtagelsestilstand. Dette blev som Magna Charta mest af alt i sin samtid anset for at bekraefte gældende lovgivning, men har siden hen fået mytisk status i britisk forfatningshistorie (Lyon, 2003, s.208). Parlamentet blev opløst igen i 1629, og den generelle uro mellem kronen og parlamentet forsætter. I 1642 trænger kongen ind i House of Commons og forsøger at arrestere politiske modstandere, dette mislykkes og kort efter udbryder borgerkrig, hvilket resulterer i henrettelsen af Karl I og kortvarig oprettelse af en republik. Ingen monark har siden da søgt at trænge ind i House of Commons uden invitation (Lyon, 2003, s.217-21).

Monarkiet blev genoprettet i 1660 med Karl II. Der var forsat spændinger mellem kronen og parlamentet. De turbulente år i 1670'erne producerede for første gang to fløje i parlamentet, Whigs og Tories. Whigs var de mere liberale, der ønskede mere magt til parlamentet, så dette kunne blive et reelt modstykke til Kronen. Tories var mere tilbøjelige til at støtte Kongen og hans regering, men troede også på et stærkt parlament. Her kan man se starten på den moderne britiske parlamentsudformning, Westminster-modellen, med to stærke fløje. Westminster-demokratier har oftest flertalsregeringer, og det er regeringen, der fremsætter dagsordenen for parlamentet. Oppositionens rolle er primært reduceret til blot at kunne kritisere regeringens lovforslag. De britiske regeringer er stærke og kompromisser er sjældent nødvendige. Westminster-modellen står i kontrast til konsensus-demokratier, hvor der ofte er mindretalsregeringer, og kompromiser derfor en naturlig del af lovgivningsarbejdet (Nedergaard, 2010, s.21-3).

En af parlamentets vigtigste præstationer i 1670'erne var loven om Habeas Corpus fra 1679. Den fastslog, at en person, der er blevet arresteret, skal stilles for en dommer inden for en vis frist, og hvis der er grundlag for en retssag, skal denne indledes. Habeas Corpus fastslår individets rettigheder overfor staten, og at staten ikke blot kan fængsle folk uden et retsligt grundlag (Lyon, 2003, s.242).

### 3.2.4. The Glorious Revolution

James II blev kronet i 1685 og denne blev starten på The Glorious Revolution i 1688-9. James II var katolik og dette var meget upopulært i Storbritannien. Hans ældste datter Mary var gift med den protestantiske Wilhelm af Orange, der blev inviteret af Whiggerne til at invadere Storbritannien i 1688 for at slippe af med James II. Dette førte til, at monarken endegyldigt blev underlagt parlamentet med Declaration of Rights i februar 1689. Denne fordømte James II's handlinger som forfatningsstridige og søgte at forhindre lignende overgreb skulle ske igen. Der skulle for fremtiden være et kontinuerligt parlament, og dommere kunne ikke længere afskediges efter forgodtbefindende. I december fulgte Bill of Rights der afklarede forholdet mellem kronen og parlamentet. Bill of Rights fastslår, at kronen ikke arbitrært kan fratake og tildele magt. Kronen kan kun få bevilget midler gennem parlamentet, og skal have parlamentets tilladelse til at have en stående hær i fredstid. Denne fastslår ydermere, at der er ytringsfrihed til parlamentariske debatter, kronen må ikke blande sig i valg til parlamentet og kronen må ikke suspendere landets love uden parlamentets tilladelse. Dermed er den britiske parlamentarisme endegyldigt fastslået i lovgivningen (Lyon, 2003, s.254).

### 3.2.5. Common-law

Britisk parlamentarisme har en lang historie, men parallelt og uadskilleligt med denne er indretningen af retssystemet. Denne korte redegørelse har ofte nævnt, at kongen skulle regere lovformelt, og denne blev underlagt parlamentet, det lovgivende organ, gennem lovgivning. Storbritannien er arnestedet for Common-law (sædvaneret), og tillige med parlamentarisme har denne udviklet sig organisk. I 1066 da normannerne erobrede England, blev styret af landet i høj grad centraliseret, og den fælles lovgivning blev baseret på kongens korrespondance med lokale embedsmænd. Dette skabte en harmonisering af forskellige regionale sædvaner. Der blev altså taget hensyn til de love og sikkere, som havde udviklet sig naturligt i hele England (Hybel, 2003, s.231). Kendetegnet ved sædvaneret er, at enkelte forbrydelser gøres strafbare, men ellers er lovgivningen primært dommerskabte. Det britiske retssystem kigger meget på tidligere afgørelser, når der skal afsiges dom. Lovgivningen udvikler sig dermed nedefra gennem domsafsigelser. Dette

er i modsætning til lande, der praktiserer civilret, hvor lovgivningen er skabt oppefra og primært baseret på nedskrevne love eller principper fra en forfatning (Nedergaard, 2010, s.32).

### 3.2.6. Den britiske velfærdsstat


Den britiske velfærdsstat har udviklet sig siden 1800-tallet bl.a. som resultat af den industrielle revolution, hvor borgere skulle frigøres fra deres traditionelle bånd og i stedet bindes til markedet. Den tidlige fattigdomsforsørgelse som arbejdshusene var tiltænkt at holde de fattige i live og i arbejde på en og samme tid. Efter Anden Verdenskrig kom der dog for alvor gennembrud i tankegangen om kollektiv sikring af borgerne mod negative sociale begivenheder (arbejdsløshed, langtidssygdom, handikap m.fl.). Det var den liberale politikker William Beveridge, som var medlem af den nationale samlingsregering under Anden Verdenskrig, der udarbejdede en rapport om, hvordan man skulle komme sociale problemer til livs. Sociale skævheder skulle, især ifølge Labour, udryddes, men den britiske velfærdsstat er et barn af den periode man har døbt 'konsensusperiode'. I den periode dominerede One-nation konservativisme tankegangen hos de Konservative, og velfærd blev set som en måde at udglatte de uligheder som liberalistisk økonomisk politik kunne føre med sig. Disse måtte udglattes for at sammenhængskraften i nationen ikke blev svækket (Bislev, 2011, s.132-133).

Den britiske velfærdsmodel kaldes også den liberale model. Denne model har til hensigt at sørge for en minimumsforsørgelse af sine borgere og sikre et eksistensgrundlag. Den er karakteriseret ved, at forsørgelsen ikke må være så høj, at den fjerner incitamentet til at finde et arbejde og forsikre sig privat mod negative sociale begivenheder. Den britiske velfærdsmodel er institutionel i den forstand, at retten til sociale ydelser er knyttet til statsborgerskab og bopæl frem for tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet. Den liberale model søger at tilskynde borgerne til at udnytte deres tid på arbejdsmarkedet så effektivt som muligt ift. deres ønske om social status. Tanken er, at økonomiske mekanismer i høj grad vil bestemme samfundets udvikling frem for politisk magt. Minimumsforsørgelsen søger at undgå at skabe en underklasse, der norm-og adfærdsmæssigt adskiller sig markant fra resten af samfundet. Da den liberale model er skattefinansieret, har den brug for national loyalitet for at fungere, men den lave ydelse og fokus på privat opsparing vil dog opretholde en klassedeling mellem høj-og lavindkomstgrupperne (Bislev, 2011, s.127).

### 3.3. Arven fra Churchill "We are with them, but not of them" 1945-1970

Året er 1945, og Anden Verdenskrig er slut. Europa skal forenes, og krig skal være en umulighed. Churchill har siden 1930'erne gjort sig tanker om muligheden, at "De Forenede Europæiske Stater" en dag kunne komme til at eksistere. I september 1946 holder han en tale på Zürich universitet, hvor han nævner, at der må bygges en slags Forenede Europæiske stater for at holde krig væk fra kontinentet (Patterson, 2011, s.1-2).

Churchill virkede oprigtigt begejstret for tanken om et forenet Europa, men denne tale indeholdt også tanker om Storbritanniens plads i denne nye verdensorden. Hans berømte tre cirkler blev her optegnet, og disse kom til at påvirke britisk udenrigspolitik i mange år frem. De tre cirkler beskrev, hvordan Storbritannien bedst kunne få indflydelse på sin omverden. Først og fremmest kunne Storbritannien få gavn af sit imperium, dernæst "The Special Relationship" med de engelsktalende folk (USA) og til sidst forbindelser med Europa. Storbritannien skulle være det uundværlige bindeled mellem disse indflydelsessfærer.



Churchill var dog en af hovedarrangørerne bag Haag konferencen, der oprettede Europarådet i 1949. I samme år opfordrede Churchill også til oprettelsen af en fælles europæisk hær med et fælles europæisk forsvarsministerium, der ville stå under europæisk demokratisk kontrol. Churchill udalte dog også i 1951, at Storbritannien var med Europa, men ikke del af det (Patterson, 2011, s.2-5).

*"Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European System. We feel we have a special relationship to both, expressed by the preposition 'with' but not 'of' – we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire" (Geddes, 2013, s.29).*

Storbritannien var kommet ud af Anden Verdenskrig som sejrherre, de var ikke blevet invaderet af nazisterne, mens det europæiske fastland var blevet raseret. Storbritannien havde stået alene ved Dunkerque, og dette endte med at blive "Britain's finest hour" (Liddle, 2014, s.6). Den britiske national følelse var høj efter Anden Verdenskrig, og både Labour og de Konservative antog, at supranationalt samarbejde ville medføre anonymitet for Storbritannien og enden på dens hidtil fremtrædende position i verden. Ingen af partierne ønskede, at Storbritannien blot skulle ende som blot endnu et europæisk land. (Geddes, 2013, s.47).

### 3.3.1 Europæisk samarbejde tager form

Schumannplanen blev foreslægt den 9. maj 1950, og dette ledte til dannelsen af Det Europæiske Kul og Stål-fællesskab i 1951 (Paris-Traktaten). Dette var en supranational institution, der skulle kontrollere nogle af de basale materialer nødvendige for at føre krig. Netop det supranationale element gjorde, at Storbritannien ikke ønskede at deltage. De støttede samarbejdet, men så det som uattraktivt, at Storbritannien skulle være end del af "Monnet og Schumans institutionelle eventyr" (Geddes, 2013, s.48-9).

I juni 1955 begyndte forhandlinger i Messina, som skulle munde ud i Rom-traktaten i 1957. Det var en konference rettet mod udenrigsministre, men Storbritannien sendte blot en embedsmand. Det blev antaget, at forhandlingerne ikke ville føre til noget, og hvis de gjorde, ville Storbritannien få en aftale i stand på et senere tidspunkt (Patterson, 2011, s.11). Forhandlingerne var en succes, men den britiske regering søgte ikke at deltage. Messina forhandlingerne skabte de to Rom-traktater, Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab (EØF) og Traktaten om Det europæiske atomenergifællesskab (EURATOM). Disse, sammen med Paris-Traktaten, lagde fundamentet for EU (Geddes, 2013, s.51).

Storbritanniens reaktion på det europæiske supranationale samarbejde, som de seks grundlæggere havde startet, var at forsøge at skabe et intergovernmentalt samarbejde, der fokuserede på frihandel, og havde til formål at lokke europæiske lande væk fra den påbegyndte supranational integration. I 1959 blev EFTA (European Free Trade Association) skabt med Danmark, Norge, Sverige, Portugal, Østrig, Schweiz og Storbritannien som grundlæggere (Geddes, 2013, s.52-3).

### 3.3.2. Økonomiske og politiske realiteter

Samtidig med at Storbritannien søgte at skabe et frihandelsområde med britisk ledelse, var visse politiske og økonomiske realiteter ved at gå op for landet. I 1956 havde Suez-krisen for alvor sat

spørgsmålstege ved både Storbritanniens position som verdensmagt. Krisen startede ved, at den egyptiske præsident nationaliserede Suez kanalen. Dette førte til, at Storbritannien, Frankrig og Israel invaderede landet. USSR truede derefter med et atomangreb mod de invaderende lande. Da USA ikke støttede angrebet, blev Storbritannien, Frankrig og Israel nødt til at trække sig tilbage. Den britiske regering, med Anthony Eden i spidsen, havde antaget, at USA ville støtte dem som deres tætteste allierede. Commonwealth-landene udviste heller ikke nogen interesse for at støtte Storbritannien militært, da de ikke anså Suez som værende i deres interesser. Harold MacMillan (PM 1957-63) accelererede efterfølgende afkoloniseringen af det britiske imperium. Storbritanniens plads som kolonimagt og leder af Commonwealth-samarbejdet begyndte langsomt men sikkert at miste sin plads i britisk udenrigspolitik (Liddle, 2014, s.269-70).

I starten af 1960'erne blev det klart, at EFTA aldrig blev den konkurrent til EU, som Storbritannien havde forestillet sig. Medlemslandene i EU klarede sig bedre end Storbritannien, f.eks. steg reallønnen i EU-landene med 75% mellem 1958-1968 mod kun 38 % i Storbritannien.

Commonwealth og Imperiet kunne ikke længere give Storbritannien samme indflydelse som tidligere. Det specielle forhold med USA var en anelse tvivlsomt efter Suez-krisen, og Storbritannien frygtede, at USA måske ville vende sig mod EU frem for dem. Det var med denne baggrund, at Storbritannien ansøgte om medlemskab af EU i 1961 og igen i 1967. Begge gange blev dette blev vetoet af De Gaulle (Geddes, 2013, s. 53-56).

### 3.4. Optagelse i EU & Margaret Thatcher vil have sine penge tilbage! 1970-1997

#### 3.4.1. Optagelse i EU

Edward Heath vandt i 1970 valget, og nu var der en konservativ regering med en pro-europæisk formand. Heath anså ikke Commonwealth-samarbejdet for specielt vigtig for Storbritanniens udenrigspolitik, ej heller det såkaldte specielle forhold med USA. Han støttede fuldt ud britisk deltagelse i det europæiske samarbejde, og selv om hans forbehold overfor Commonwealth og USA ikke var delt af størstedelen af hans parti, så var de Konservative nu ”Europa-partiet” (May, 2013, s.47). Heath genoptog forhandlingerne fra 1967, og var personligt meget engageret i at sikre et medlemskab. Frankrig havde fået ny præsident, Georges Pompidou, som var meget støttende overfor Storbritannien som nyt medlem. Dette fik forhandlingerne tilbage på rette spor, og den 1. januar 1973 blev Storbritannien officielt medlem af EU. På trods af at Heath var noget af det mest pro-EU, de Konservative længde havde set, var selv han meget forbeholden overfor en økonomisk og monetær union (May, 2013, s.53-4). I 1974 afløste en Labour regering den

Konservative, og der blev afholdt en folkeafstemning om Storbritanniens EU-medlemskab i 1975. Det blev et ja med to tredjedeles flertal og med en valgprocent på 64 % (Geddes, 2013, s.64-5).

### 3.4.2. Margaret Thatchers årti & The British Budget Question – kampen om rabatten

Margaret Thatcher blev leder af de Konservative i 1975 og vandt valget i 1979. De Konservative var i 1979 et pro-EU parti, og Thatcher havde selv været med til at føre kampagne på ja-siden i 1975. Hun så store geopolitiske fordele i et samlet Europa mod USSR ifm. den Kolde Krig, og var en stor tilhænger af Fællesmarkedet og støttede realiseringen af DIM, hvor hun så mulighed for at udbrede sin neo-liberale politik til resten af EU (Geddes, 2013, s.67-9).

Ved slutningen af 1970'erne var Storbritannien den anden største bidragsyder til EU-budgettet på trods af de havde tredje laveste BNP pr. indbygger af de 9 medlemslande. Denne ulighed kunne til dels findes i landbrugsstøtten, der udgjorde langt størstedelen af EU's budget. Storbritannien havde ikke en specielt stor landbrugssektor og fik derfor ikke lige så meget tilskud tilbage for deres medlemsbidrag (Sevaldsen, 2010, s.252-3). Thatcher vedblev at tage det britiske spørgsmål op ved de store statslederkonferencer i EU, og hun blev opfattet som meget lidt diplomatisk i sin kamp for rimelighed ift. Storbritanniens bidrag til EU-budgettet. Der kom endelig en aftale i 1984 ved Fountainbleau-mødet, hvor Thatcher sagde de berømte ord: At hun ville have sine penge tilbage!

*"We are not asking the Community or anyone else for money, we are simply asking to have our money back." (Geddes, 2013, s.145).*

Rabatten blev en 66 % tilbagebetaling af den forskel, der er mellem, det Storbritannien betaler, og det den får igen gennem budgettet (Geddes, 2013, s.151). Thatcher anså i høj grad EU-medlemskabet som et nul-sums spil og forsvarede britiske nationale interesser ved hver en lejlighed. Dette var nærmere et udtryk for indenrigspolitik, og hendes sejre for Storbritannien over Bruxelles blev fremhævet kraftigt i de hjemlige medier. Efter hendes meget offentlige budget-sejr, gik hun i al stilhed med til Jacques Delors forslag om at fordoble EU-budgettet (Liddle, 2014, s.11).

### 3.4.3. Det Indre Marked

Nu da det britiske budget spørgsmål var blevet afgjort, kunne EU arbejde videre med planen om DIM. Udvidelsen af Fællesmarkedet til at blive et ægte frihandelsområde blev i høj grad støttet af Thatcher. Hun så det som muligheden for at indføre rendyrket neo-liberalisme ift. frigivelsen af markedsøkonomiske kræfter på EU-niveau (Geddes, 2013, s.68-9). Storbritannien var skeptisk ift.

overførslen af yderligere kompetencer til de europæiske institutioner i form af øget brug af kvalificeret afstemning, men accepterede det mod oprettelsen af DIM, som de var store tilhængere af. DIM skabte den frie bevægelse af arbejdskraft, kapital, varer og serviceydelser mellem EU medlemslandene. For at DIM skulle fungere optimalt, skulle fysiske, monetære og tekniske handelshindringer mellem medlemslandene fjernes. Dette blev til tider med britiske øjne opfattet, som om EU blandede sig i britisk lovgivning i DIMs navn (Geddes, 2013, s.70-71). Ifm. oprettelsen af DIM søgte Thatcher at realisere det gennem intergovernmentale forhandlinger, men dette blev nedstemt i Rådet. Fællesakten gjorde i 1986 DIM til en realitet, men hverken Thatcher eller hendes rådgivere havde kunnet forudset, hvilken integrationsmotor DIM ville blive. Efter hendes genvalg i 1987, begyndte hun i stigende grad at udvise euroskepsis (Liddle, 2014, s.11-12).

#### 3.4.4. No, No, No! 1987-1990

Thatchers sidste tid som premierminister var meget præget af hendes kamp mod yderligere EU-integration. I 1988 holdt hun Brügge-talen på Europa Kollegiet. Denne tale blev skelsættende for de euroskeptiske elementer, der for alvor havde begyndt at slå rod hos de Konservative. En af de mest citerede sætning fra denne tale er:

*"We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels."* (May, 2013, s.115).

Thatcher nævner dog lige efter dette meget brugte citat, sit ønske om et stærkt, europæisk fællesskab ifm., at Europa netop er blevet genforenet efter jerntæppets fald. Hun er derimod meget klar omkring, hvordan dette stærke fællesskab skal organiseres og styres, det skal være et intergovernmentalt samarbejde. Den dominerende kraft i dette samarbejde skal være stærke, nationale parlamenter. Dette ser Thatcher som Europas styrke. Denne tale repræsenterede lige så vel Thatchers frustration med Delors, der havde udtalt at 90 % af fremtidig lovgivning ville komme fra Bruxelles, og hans nylige besøg hos den britiske fagforening. Denne håbede at kunne blokere nogle af de ændringer Thatcher havde indført via EU, og havde modtaget Delors med sang. Delors bekræftede deres forhåbninger, og sagde, at med DIM ville der komme en stor udvidelse af arbejdstagers rettigheder og social politik. Thatcher så dette som indgriben i britisk indenrigspolitik, og hendes tale blev derefter (Patterson, 2011, s.152-3).

DIM var ikke blevet det frihandels paradis, som hun havde håbet på. T værtimod var der i EU planer om at indføre en politisk dimension ift. arbejdstagers sociale rettigheder og et monetært samarbejde med ØMU'en. Ved Det Europæiske Råds møde i Rom oktober 1990 afveg hun kraftigt fra sin planlagte tale og angreb i stedet de andre medlemslande, Delors og Labour for deres integrationsiver.

*"Yes, the Commission wants to increase its powers. Yes, it is a nonelected body and I do not want the Commission to increase its powers at the expense of the House of Commons ... Mr. Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the EP, to be the democratic body of the Community, he wanted the Commission to be the Executive and he wanted the Council of Ministers to be the Senate. No. No. No.*

*Perhaps the Labour Party would give all those things up easily. ..." (Geddes, 2013, s.71).*

### 3.5. ERM, Thatchers fald, John Major & Maastricht

ØMU'ens første fase indebar, at landene i højere grad skulle strømme deres økonomiske politikker. Landene skulle gensidigt overvåge hinandens økonomier for at sikre en mere ensartet udvikling. Centralbankerne skulle konsultere hinanden i spørgsmål om pengepolitikken, og landene skulle deltag i et fælles valutasamarbejde.

Thatcher var meget forbeholdende overfor tanken om at melde Storbritannien ind i ERM II, der var en forløber for ØMU'en. Efter stærkt internt partipres gav Thatcher efter og meldte Storbritannien ind i 1990, men med store betænkeligheder. ERM-samarbejdet kom også til at koste Storbritannien dyrt. Storbritannien håbede på at kunne binde pundet til den tyske D-mark og dermed opnå samme lave inflation og stabile økonomi som Tyskland. Optagelsen endte dog med at forlænge den britiske recession og medførte spekulationer mod det britiske pund. Storbritannien endte med at måtte devaluere pundet, da den ikke kunne holde kursen inden for det påkrævede ERM niveau. De trak sig fra samarbejdet den. 16. september 1992, også kaldet "Black Wednesday". Thatcher var dog ikke længere Premierminister på dette tidspunkt. Det var John Major (May, 2013, s.76-9).

### 3.5.1. Maastricht-traktaten

Major udtalte, at han ønskede at se Storbritannien i hjertet af Europa, men fortsatte Thatchers regeringsstil mht. europæiske spørgsmål og udvidet integration. Allerede i 1991 sikrede Major et forbehold mod det fremtidige ØMU-samarbejde, og dette blev indskrevet i Maastrichttraktaten. Mange medlemslande ønskede også at fremme integration på social politiske områder som velfærd og arbejdsmarkedsret. Dette var Storbritannien ikke interesseret i, og fik, hvad der effektivt set blev endnu et forbehold. Det sociale kapitel blev taget ud af Maastrichttraktaten, og de 11 andre medlemslande samarbejdede på dette område udenom Storbritannien.

Storbritannien havde også held til at holde retslige- og indre anliggender og fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik på et intergovernmentalt niveau. Desuden blev alle referencer til et fæderalt mål for unionen fjernet fra traktaten, og subsidiaritetsprincippet blev indført. Maastricht-traktaten indeholdt dog også mange supranationale elementer. Det Europæiske Parlament fik udvidet sine beføjelser, kvalificeret flertalsafstemning blev indført på flere punkter i Ministerrådet, og på symbolsk vis blev alle medlemslandenes borgere nu også borgere i Den Europæiske Union. Major prøvede at nedtone disse supranationale elementer, men ikke desto mindre blev traktaten først ratificeret i det Britiske Parlament i august 1993, halvandet år efter den var blevet underskrevet (May, 2013, s.80-3).

Maastricht-traktaten blev for alvor startskudtet til euroskepsis blandt de Konservative, og partiet var ekstremt splittet. Major kunne ikke holde sammen på sit parti. Den euroskeptiske fløj var meget højrøstet i debatten omkring traktaten, og i sidste ende blev den kun ratificeret, fordi Major truede med at gå af. Major prøvede at få styr på sine fløj ved at afholde afstemningen om formandsposten i 1995, som han vandt, men det skabte heller ikke fred i partiet. Ved valget i 1997 var alt mere eller mindre kaos, og flere Konservative kandidater gik imod den officielle partilinje vedr. Europapolitikken. Det overordnede indtryk var et parti, der var ved at få hinanden i stykker. Dette blev starten på 13 år med en Labour-regering (1997-2010) (May, 2013, s.84-6).

### 3.5.2. Udbryderne fra de Konservative og dannelsen af UKIP

The Anti-Federalist League blev startet i 1991 på London School of Economics, og skiftede navn til UKIP i 1994. Denne interesseorganisation skulle udvikle sig fra et enkeltsagsparti til et parti med bredere støtte blandt primært den engelske befolkning. Partiet blev dannet i kølvandet på Maastrichttraktaten og ønskede at forhindre at en europæisk, føderal superstat skulle reducere Storbritannien til blot en landsdel i dette foretagne. UKIPs grundlægger var Dr. Alan Sked, der var en af grundlæggerne af Brügge-gruppen, som var en euroskeptisk tænkentank kraftigt influeret af

Thatchers Brüggetale. Partiet ønskede at indføre hård euroskepsis i britisk politik og ikke den blødere form, der hidtil havde hersket. UKIP ønskede ikke blot at reformere EU-samarbejdet, men at Storbritannien helt skulle forlade fællesskabet (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, s. 21-2). Partiet havde meget lidt succes i starten og blev i 1997 overskygget af The Referendum Party, som var dannet og støttet af multimillionæren Sir James Goldsmith, der også havde været en del af Brügge-gruppen. Sir James brugte omkring 20 millioner pund af sin personlige formue på at opstille modkandidater til alle de MP'er, der nægtede at støtte forslaget om en folkeafstemning om Storbritanniens EU-medlemskab. Partiet fik ikke nogen MP'er, men hjalp nærmere Labour med at gøre deres jordskredssejr endnu større (Geddes, 2013, s.240). UKIP har primært haft succes ved Europaparlamentsvalgene, og har haft svært ved at omsætte denne vælgerstøtte til de britiske parlamentsvalg. Nigel Farage blev valgt til leder i 2006, og UKIP udviklede sin profil til ud over hård euroskepsis også at være modstander af immigration og være mere populistisk i sin tone samt ofte at udtrykke bekymring om national identitet og den måde, det britiske samfund har ændret sig (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, s.76). Det er især Farage, der akkrediteres for at have bundet euroskepsis og modstand mod immigration uløseligt sammen hos vælgerne og dermed skabt bredere støtte til UKIP. Efter Brexit blev en realitet i 2016, har UKIP haft svært ved at holde sammen på partiet, og det er usikkert om de kommer til at spille en rolle i fremtiden i britisk politik (Goodwin, 2017).

### 3.6. David Cameron, Bloomberg-talen, genforhandling, folkeafstemning og Brexit 2010-2016

Valget i 2010 endte med et konservativt flertal, men David Cameron opnåede ikke de 326 pladser, som er nødvendige for et flertal i det Britiske Parlament. Han valgte at gå i koalition med Liberal Demokraterne, som havde fået 57 pladser ved valget. Dette skabte et af de sjældne "hung parliament". Det britiske valgsystem (flertalsvalg i enkeltmandskredse) skaber normalt en flertalsregering, men tre gange i nyere britisk valghistorie har et enkelt parti ikke fået flertallet af pladserne i parlamentet. Sidste gang det skete var i 2010, hvor de Konservativ og Liberal Demokraterne dannede regering sammen (Geddes, 2013, s.102). Liberal Demokraterne er principielt det mest pro-EU parti af Storbritanniens tre største partier, men EU blev ikke et stridsspørgsmål i regeringsgrundlaget for den Konservative/Liberale regering i 2010. EU-afsnittet i regeringsgrundlaget udtrykker et ønsket om, at Storbritannien skal spille en positiv rolle i EU og sikre, at det er gennem EU udfordringer som fattigdom og klimaforandring tackles. Dog er der mest af alt fokus på, at hvis mere suverænitet skal overgives til EU, skal det være på basis af en

folkeafstemning. Der er også hentydninger til national suverænitet og Storbritanniens forbehold mht. til samarbejdet med Retlige og Indre anliggender (RIA), der med Lissabon-Traktaten blev et overstatsligt samarbejde (Geddes, 2013, s.104).

### 3.6.1. The European Union Bill

I 2011 blev The European Union Bill vedtaget i det Britiske Parlament. Dette var en videreførelse af regeringsgrundlagets løfte om, at der ikke ville blive overført yderligere suverænitet til EU uden en folkeafstemning. Loven fastslog, at hvis der var tale om suverænitetsafgivelse til EU, så skulle det igennem en folkeafstemning. Ydermere skulle parlamentet vedtage en lov, hvis EU ønskede at gøre brug af passerelle princippet<sup>2</sup> ift. ændring af lovgivningsproceduren. Det blev også slætt fast, at EU-lov kun havde virkning i Storbritannien, hvis parlamentet har behandlet den og vedtaget den som britisk lov. Denne lovgivning var et forsøg på at forhindre EU integration ad bagdøren, men mange konservative mente, at den kom for sent, og det Storbritannien i virkeligheden havde brug for, var at genovervejede hele deres EU-medlemskab (Geddes, 2013, s.105-6).

### 3.6.2. Et splittet parti

I oktober 2011 fremsatte medlemmer af parlamentet et Commons backbench motion (et forslag fra et parlamentsmedlem, der ikke er minister, talsperson eller skyggeminister) om en folkeafstemning vedr. Storbritanniens EU-medlemskab. Dette kom efter at eurozone-krisen stadig hærgede og fylde meget i den offentlige bevidsthed. Finansminister George Osborne brugte ofte eurozone-krisen som en forklaring på Storbritanniens skuffende vækst. De Konservative blev på det kraftigste opfordret af regeringen til at modsætte sig forslaget, men 81 konservative backbenchers endte med at stemme for forslaget ud af 307 konservative (Liddle, 2014, s.203-4). I juni 2012 sendte 100 konservative backbenchers et brev til Cameron, hvor de bad ham om at love en folkeafstemning om det britiske EU-medlemskab. Cameron nægtede først, men hurtigt efter skrev han i en artikel i the Sunday Telegraph, hvor han fastslog, at de to ord EU og folkeafstemning hængte sammen for ham (Liddle, 2014, s.215-6).

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<sup>2</sup>I EU's traktater forefindes der passerelle paragraffer. Disse gør det muligt under vise omstændigheder at ændre lovgivnings procedure uden formelt at skulle ændre traktaterne. Brugen af denne type ændring kræver enstemmighed, men ikke national ratifikation. De nationale parlementer har dog mulighed for at komme med indsigelser inden der stemmes i EU-regi. Ydermere, hvis det er ift. områder, hvor nogle medlemsstater har forbehold, har disse ikke mulighed for at stemme. Dette skal også godkendes med et simpelt flertal i Europa Parlamentet.

### 3.6.3. Bloomberg talen

I 2013 stillede Cameron sig på podiet ved Bloomberg for at redegøre for sine visioner omkring det fremtidige forhold mellem den Europæiske Union og Storbritannien. Cameron var ikke begejstret for at holde denne tale, og det var kun den interne spittelse blandt de Konservative, der havde fremprovokeret den. Han starter med sætte fokus på vigtigheden af EU medlemskabet, derefter opremser han fem principper, som han ser skal ændres, for at Storbritannien skal forblive medlem af EU.

Det første er konkurrenceevne, DIM er kernen af EU og kernen af Storbritanniens medlemskab.

Det andet er fleksibilitet, EU bør kunne tilpasses medlemmernes ønske om, hvor dybt integrationen skal stikke. Han ønsker ikke, at Storbritannien skal være del af målsætningen om en stadig snævrere union. Det tredje princip er suverænitet, selvbestemmelse skal tilbage til medlemslandene på områder, hvor det ikke giver mening at have supranational styring. Det fjerde princip var demokratisk legitimitet. De nationale parlementer bør spille en større rolle i EU, siden de er direkte ansvarlige overfor deres befolkninger. Det femte og sidste princip, som Cameron ser nødvendigt at gennemføre, omhandler det monetære samarbejde, eurozonen. Han kalder det rimelighed, hvad end eurozone landene indfører af lovgivning for eurozonen, må denne lovgivning ikke have negative virkninger på de lande, der står uden for eurosamarbejdet (Liddle, 2014, s.216-8).

### 3.6.4. Genvalg og genforhandling

I 2015 blev Cameron og de Konservative genvalgt, denne gang som en majoritetsregering.

Dermed var det en politisk realitet, at Cameron skulle genforhandle betingelserne for Storbritanniens medlemskab af EU og afholde en folkeafstemning om de nye vilkår. I februar 2016 fremlagde Cameron resultaterne af forhandlingerne med EU.

- Storbritannien ikke længere vil være del af EU's overordnede mål om "en stadig snævrere union" mellem det europæiske folk. – "*Britain will be permanently out of ever closer union – never part of a European superstate.*"
- Det Britiske Parlament kan nedlægge veto mod lovgivning fra Bruxelles. – "*We have also put power back in the hands of Westminster and other national parliaments. A new red card will mean that the UK Parliament can work with others to block unwanted legislation from Brussels.*"
- Britiske økonomiske interesser skulle beskyttes og eurozonen måtte aldrig kunne underminere DIM. Ydermere blev det garanteret, at briterne for altid kunne beholde

pundet, og skatteyderne aldrig skulle bidrage til Eurozone hjælpepakkerne. –”*We have ensured that the UK’s economic interests are protected. We have made sure that the eurozone cannot act as a bloc to undermine the integrity of the free trade single market.*”

- Cameron fik forhandlet, at konkurrencedygtighed skulle være et konkret EU-mål. –”*We have secured a declaration outlining a number of commitments in this area. For the first time, the European Union will now say competitiveness is – and I quote – “an essential objective of the Union.”*”
- Ekstra muligheder for at begrænse migrationen fra andre EU-lande, adgang til det britiske velfærdssystem, og større mulighed for at udvise arbejdsløse EU-borgere. –”*This finally puts an end to the idea that people can come to our country and get something for nothing.*”

(Cameron, 2016a)

### 3.6.5. "Brexit means Brexit" og Artikel 50 2016-17

Den officielle valgkamp blev skudt i gang den 15. april 2016, og Cameron havde givet partimedlemmer lov til at føre kampagne for Leave, selv om regeringen officielt støttede Remain. To centrale personligheder fra de Konservative kom til at dominerer Leave-kampagnen. Både Boris Johnson, tidligere borgmester i London og nu MP, og Michael Gove, justitsminister, besluttede begge at støtte Leave (Bale, 2016, s.438-9).

Nedbringelsen af den høje immigration var en af Leave-kampagnens hovedargumenter, hertil kom ønsket om mere grænsekontrol, mere frihandel, pengene til EU-budget kunne i stedet bruges på det offentlige, og lovgivning skulle udelukkende komme fra Westminster (VoteLeave, 2016).

Remain-kampagnen søgte at argumentere for, at det var mere sikkert at blive i EU ift. bekæmpelse af terror og grænseoverskridende kriminalitet, at det var økonomisk bedre at forblive i EU i både ift. privat økonomi og for at tiltrække udenlandske investorer til Storbritannien, og sidst men ikke mindst forsøgte de at argumentere med, at Storbritanniens magt ville være større som medlem af EU (StrongerIN, 2016).

De Konservative var i 2010 gået til valg med løftet om at reducere immigration til Storbritannien fra ”hundredtusinder” til nærmere ”titusinder”. Det præcise tal i 2010 var 215.000. Der kunne dog ikke gøres noget ved immigrationen fra de andre EU-lande, og dette var ikke en problemstilling i starten. De Konservative søgte i stedet at reducere immigrationstallet ved at stramme reglerne for immigranter fra ikke EU-lande. Theresa May var indenrigsminister og forsøgte at nedbringe immigrationen gennem lovgivning. De Konservative følte sig meget presset af UKIP, og i et forsøg

på at mindske dennes indflydelse har de nok nærmere givet den større vigtighed. May begyndte endda at komme med forsigtige forslag til, hvordan man kunne nedbringe immigrationen fra EU. Dette endte med at blive et af de områder, som Cameron genforhandlede, men UKIP havde for alvor fået ejerskab over immigrationsspørgsmålet, og vælgerne syntes ikke længere de Konservative var det bedste parti til at håndtere immigration (Bale, 2016, s.391- 395). Da tiden for folkeafstemningen kom i juni 2016, havde nettoimmigrationen i maj 2016 været på 330.000, det næsthøjeste niveau i britisk historie. Dette var på trods af, at de Konservative siden 2010 havde forsøgt at nedbringe den (Bale, 2016, s.442).

Den 23. juni 2016 stemte den britiske befolkning om deres EU-medlemskab. Resultatet var, at Leave-siden vandt med 52 % af stemmerne. Der var en stemmeprocent i alt på 72,2 %, men de nationale resultater reflekterede ikke denne sejr til Leave. I Skotland og Nordirland havde Remain et klart flertal, mens der i England og Wales var et flertal for Leave (BBC, 2016). Dagen efter valget gik Cameron af som PM, og flere fremtrædende konservative forsøgte at erstatte ham. Både Johnson og Gove forsøgte sig, men det blev tidligere Indenrigsminister May, der bliver ny PM (Bale, 2016, s.445). Den 29. marts 2017 aktiverede hun artikel 50, der skal begynde forhandlingerne om Storbritanniens udmeldelse af EU.

<b>Resultat</b>	<b>Leave %</b>	<b>Remain %</b>	<b>Stemmeprocent</b>
<b>England</b>	53, 4	46,6	73
<b>Wales</b>	52,2	47,5	71,7
<b>Skotland</b>	38	62	67,2
<b>Nordirland</b>	44,2	55,8	62,7

(BBC, 2016)

## 4. Analyse

Det følgende afsnit vil komparativt analysere fem taler, der blev holdt ifm. den britiske folkeafstemning i 2016. To taler er fra henholdsvis de officielle Remain og Leave-kampagner, på Remain-siden behandler specialet taler fra daværende PM David Cameron og Finansminister George Osborne (Osborne får selskab i talen af tre ministerkollegaer. Der vil i specialet ikke blive taget hensyn til om det er Osborne, der taler eller hans kollegaer). På Leave-siden behandler specialet taler fra tidl. justitsminister Michael Gove og MP/tidl. borgmester af London Boris Johnson. Dertil vil specialet yderligere analysere en tale holdt af Nigel Farage fra UKIP. Talerne vil blive behandlet samlet under emnerne: Økonomi, Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, Immigration, Suverænitet og Identitet.

### 4.1 Økonomi

Økonomi, handel og DIM fyldte meget i valgkampen, og både Remain og Leave-siden brugte Storbritanniens økonomi og fremtidige vækst som argument for deres sag. Cameron har primært ikke fokus på økonomiske argumenter i sin tale. Han nævner i starten, at forbliven i EU vil sikre Storbritannien velstand, og fremme Storbritanniens prestige på den verdenspolitiske scene gennem økonomisk magt. Dette er en klassisk grund til at samarbejde eller sammenlægge suverænitet ifølge liberal intergovernmentalisme. I et af de første afsnit formulerer Cameron de ovenstående hensyn, under afsnittet om hans personlige holdning, således:

*"I believe that, despite its faults and its frustrations, the United Kingdom is stronger, safer and better off by remaining a member of the European Union. Better off? Certainly." (Cameron, 2016b, linje22-3).*

Storbritannien bør altså fortsætte med at indgå i EU ud fra både "high politics", og "low politics" argumenter (jf. Hoffmann). Storbritannien er stærkere i EU og mere sikker (argumentet om sikkerhed vil blive behandlet i næste afsnit). Cameron argumenterer for, at gennem EU kan Storbritannien bedst generere velstand til dens borgere. Dette er, som Moravcsik foreskriver det, en af hovedgrundene til, at stater indgår i internationalt samarbejde. Hoffmann kommer også ind på, at den nationale tilstand kan kræve økonomisk samarbejde. Cameron udbygger sit argument med følgende:

*"We are part of a single market of 500 million people which Britain helped to create. Our goods and, crucially, our services – which account for almost 80% of our economy – can trade freely by right. We help decide the rules. The advantages of this far outweigh any disadvantages." (Cameron, 2016b, linje 24-6).*

Cameron søger at fastslå, at Storbritannien har mere at skulle sige, hvis de er med i EU. Prisen ift. den hjemlige nationale tilstand for ikke at være med er højere end prisen for deltagelse. Dette behandler Moravcsik også under mellemstatslige forhandlinger, hvor det er set, at stater går med til aftaler, der måske ikke er til deres fordel nu og her, men frygten for eksklusion vejer ofte tungere. Det økonomiske argument, som Hoffmann typisk betegner som "low politics", viderefører Osborne i høj grad i kraft af sin rolle som finansminister i en anden tale. Cameron benytter også disse tal som finansministeriet har udregnet. Camerons tale er i høj grad domineret af udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske hensyn, mens Osborne naturligvis lægger meget vægt på økonomiske argumenter. Han fremsætter følgende argument:

*Britain would be permanently poorer if it left the European Union. ... Wages would be lower and prices would be higher. And that means that Britain would be poorer by £4,300 per household. ... And that is the long-term cost – in the short term we'd face a profound economic shock and real instability. This Treasury analysis is serious and sober – and it's conclusive. British families will pay a heavy economic price if we leave the EU. (Osborne, 2016, linje. 853-60)*

Ovenstående økonomiske argument er en henvisning til, at Storbritanniens nationale tilstand kræver, ifølge Osborne, at forblive i EU af hensyn til dens økonomi. Osborne nævner også, at hvis man er af den holdning, at et evt. økonomisk chok efter Brexit er en pris, der er værd at betale, er dette naturligvis en fair holdning at have. Dog skal Leave tilhængere ikke skal lade som om, Brexit ikke kommer til at koste. Her er det nærmere nationalismen, der taler i sådan et Leave argument, hvor selv om den nationale tilstand ville have det bedre af at forblive, da kræver nationalismen, at Storbritannien forlader EU grundet ideologiske overvejelser (Osborne, 2016, linje. 873-4). Både Cameron og Osborne henviser til Storbritanniens omfattende servicesektor, der står for 80 % af Storbritanniens BNP, da DIM inkluderer frie bevægelighed af service i hele EU, kan især denne sektor risikere at påvirkes negativt af Brexit (Cameron, 2016b, linje 24-6 & Osborne, 2016, linje746-7).

Osbornes tale søger generelt at redegøre for andre tilknytninger til EU og især DIM, skulle Brexit blive en realitet. De modeller der omtales er: Canada, Norge og handel på WTO betingelser (Osborne, 2016, linje. 534-543). Han fastslår også, at den grundlæggende præmis ift. økonomisk politik må være at skabe velstand til borgerne i form af jobs, større indkomst og lave, stabile priser på varer (Osborne, 2016, linje. 551-2). Dermed bliver det gjort meget klart, at grunden til Storbritannien bør forblive i EU er pga. økonomiske politiske hensyn (jf Moravcsik), som Finansministeriet ser bedst varetaget inden for EU. Talen gennemgår ovenstående alternative tilknytninger til EU og forkaster dem af forskellige grunde (Osborne, 2016, linje. 821-832).

Handelsaftaler er et meget centralet argument for Leave-siden, både Farage, Johnson og Gove nævner dem. Farage kommer ind på, at det tager meget lang tid at forhandle handelsaftaler i EU-regi, og at Storbritannien kan som den femte største økonomi i verden selv kan forhandle hurtigere og bedre aftaler. Han nævner specifikt de 54 Commonwealth-lande med et samlet indbyggertal på 2,2 milliarder som mulige fremtidige, tætte handelspartnere (Farage, 2016, min.15:38-16:02). Udover at denne betragtning er et eksempel på en måde, hvorpå Storbritannien kan skabe velstand til dens borgere i et andet regi end EU, så er det også en henvisning til Storbritanniens tunge, historiske bagage. Deres tid som imperium og overhovedet i Commonwealth-samarbejdet har sat dybe spor i den britiske bevidsthed. Farage kommer ikke nærmere ind på fremtidige handelsplaner, men det gør Johnson og Gove.

Johnson fremhæver især DIM som hæmmende for Storbritanniens økonomi, og faktummet at Storbritanniens EU medlemskab gør, det umuligt for landet selv at indgå handelsaftaler. Han nævner, at DIM ikke har skabt den økonomiske vækst, der på det nærmeste blev lovet, da det blev realiseret. Faktisk fremhæver han, at Storbritanniens eksport af varer har været lavere i den 20-årige periode, der fulgte efter realiseringen af DIM kontra den 20-årige periode inden 1992 (Johnson, 2016, linje. 1024-1031). Som der blev redegjort for tidligere i specialet, var Thatcher meget skuffet over, at DIM ikke blev den neo-liberale motor, som hun havde håbet på, og denne skuffelse er delt af mange konservative politikere. Johnson fremhæver, at den føjelighed de mange harmoniserende regler, som DIM kræver, ikke er prisen værd ift. den økonomiske værdi, som han mener, DIM skaber til Storbritannien (Johnson, 2016, linje. 1033-56). Altså ser han ikke grund til at overdrage suverænitet og penge til EU-institutioner i bytte for bl.a. adgang til DIM, da han ikke ser de økonomiske fordele, som Moravcsik beskriver, får stater til at integrere sig.

*"In trying to compute the costs and benefits of belonging to the Single Market, we should surely add the vast opportunity cost of not being able to do free trade deals with the most lucrative and fastest-growing markets in the world – because we are in the EU." (Johnson, 2016, linje 1082-4).*

I dette tilfælde ser Johnson, at Storbritanniens nationale tilstand vil have mere gavn af ikke at være medlem af EU. Selv om økonomi primært hører til i Hoffmanns "low politics" kategori, og stater er mere villige til at integrere sig på dette område, skal det naturligvis være i statens interesse ift. dens borgers velstand at indgå i samarbejder med andre stater. Johnson mener, at EU hæmmer Storbritanniens handelsmuligheder med lande udenfor EU, og i visse tilfælde ligefrem har skadet dem. Dette mener han kommer fra, at britiske interesser ikke bliver varetaget, når der forhandles i EU-regi. Både Hoffmanns og Moravcsiks grundlæggende præmis er, at stater handler rationelt ud fra egne interesser, når de samarbejder internationalt. Johnson ser dog ikke muligheden for at varetage Storbritanniens interesser effektivt som medlem af EU.

Gove fremfører mange af de samme argumenter, som Johnson gør. Han udtrykker også samme skuffelse over, at DIM ikke er blevet den frihandelsmotor, som beregnet, men nærmere Delors' integrationsmaskine (Gove, 2016, linje. 1529-30). Delors er ikke blot en upopulær figur i konservative kredse, men har også været en meget kritisk tur gennem de britiske medier, da han var kommissionsformand og fik genstartet integrationen i EU. Hans vision for EU var meget præget af målet om en social union og ikke blot et fællesmarked. Han har også engang udtalt, at snart ville 90 % af al lovgivning komme fra EU, og at integrationslogikken bag DIM utvivlsomt ville føre til en uundgåelig møntunion (Liddle, 2014, s.56). At både Gove og Johnson, flere årtier efter Delors var formand, stadig nævner ham, tyder på at briternes historiske hukommelse er lang, når det angår potentiel indgriben i den britiske suverænitet.

Ifm. en fremtidig tilknytning gør Gove meget ud af at pointere, at de andre statsledere i EU aldrig vil udelukke Storbritannien fra en eller anden form for frihandel med EU. Dertil pointere han, at Storbritannien er et for stort og attraktivt marked til, at det kan være i de andre EU-staters interesse at straffe Storbritannien for Brexit (Gove, 2016, linje 1440-51). Han argumenterer klart og tydeligt for, at stater handler rationelt og ud fra egne interesser om at skabe velstand, som Moravcsik og Hoffmann fastholder, og dette vil EU-medlemslandene også gøre i tilfælde af Brexit. Han pointerer ydermere specifikt ifm. handelsaftaler, at det vil være i Storbritanniens interesse at kunne forhandle disse alene. Gove fastholder, at det vil foregå hurtigere end i EU-regi og vigtigst

af alt, da vil Storbritannien kunne fokusere udelukkende på, hvad der skaber britisk velstand uden at skulle gå på kompromis med 27 andre staters behov og NP'er.

*"But if we vote to leave we can take control of our trade negotiations and seal those deals more quickly.... - to create more jobs for British workers, greater opportunities for British exporters, and cheaper prices for British consumers.*

*Instead of having to wait until every concern raised by 27 other nations is addressed during negotiations we can cut to the chase." (Gove, 2016, linje*

*1469-74).*

Storbritannien har historisk ofte haft øget frihandel som NP ved forhandlingsbordene i EU-regi, og deres interesse for EU har ofte været med økonomisk vinding for øje frem for nogen ideologisk funderet støtte til det europæiske samarbejde. Gove argumenterer yderligere for, at have muligheden for at lave egne frihandelsaftaler ikke blot vil gavne Storbritanniens borgere, men også give staten mulighed for at hjælpe ulande. Han fremsætter, at Storbritannien vil kunne hjælpe fattige lande i Asien og Afrika ved at sætte lav told på deres eksport til Storbritannien, der tillige ville skabe lavere priser for britiske forbrugere (Gove, 2016, linje 1477-85). Dette altruistiske argument kan stamme fra Storbritanniens tid som imperiemagt, hvor britiske skattekroner blev brugt i en lind strøm til at opretholde deres oversøiske imperier. Storbritannien har netop pga. deres imperium haft en stor import af fødevarer fra hele verden, og dette har de måtte betale for i EU<sup>3</sup>. Disse potentielle win-win handelsaftaler har historiske rødder, samt er en uløselig del af Storbritanniens arv og deres nationale tilstand, som alle politikere må tage hensyn til ifølge intergovernmentalisme. Det er også en måde at skabe velstand til borgerne gennem samhandel, og som liberal intergovernmentalisme forskriver, er det statens hovedformål for overhovedet at interagere med andre stater.

## 4.2 Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik

Goves tale har ikke mange henvisninger til geopolitiske hensyn i form af udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. Han kommer meget kort ind på sikring af Storbritanniens grænser mod potentielle terrorister, kriminelle osv. (Gove, 2016, linje 1571-4). Farage kommer med et lignende

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<sup>3</sup> Der er i EU importtold på varer fra tredjelande, dette er ifm. Landbrugsstøtten og projektet med at gøre EU selvforsyndende. Derfor har Storbritannien til tider oplevet økonomisk ugunst fra deres omfattende ikke-EU handelsforbindelser pga. denne told (Crowson, 2011, s.96).

argument, han sætter dog et meget klarere lighedstegn mellem immigration og faren for terror, og nævner Paris som eksempel på dette (Farage, 2016, min. 20:53-21:32). Gove og Farage sætter dog mest fokus på manglende suverænitet til at bestemme immigrationen til Storbritannien og den samfundsmaessige konsekvens, dette kan have for f.eks. velfærd, derfor vil deres udtalelser blive behandlet i senere afsnit. Osborne kommer slet ikke ind på disse hensyn, men hans tale går også udelukkende på finansministeriets argumenter for at blive EU, og det er derfor naturligt, at denne fokusere alene på økonomiske argumenter eller "low politics".

Johnson kommer med mere konkrete iagttagelser ifm. britisk udenrigspolitik. Han betragter ikke EU som det element i Europa, der sikrer fred, og fremhæver i stedet NATO som den institution, der har sikret freden i Europa og opretholder den (Johnson, 2016, linje 1144-1151). NATO er en intergovernmental organisation, og dette er den type internationalt samarbejde, som briterne traditionelt altid har fortrukket, da det ikke kræver overnationale institutioner til at sikre samarbejdet. Dette slår Johnson også fast med følgende udtalelse om Storbritanniens fremtidige samarbejde med andre stater i udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske sammenhæng:

*"We can help lead the discussions on security, on counter-terrorism, on foreign and defence policy, as we always have. But all those conversation can be conducted within an intergovernmental framework, and without the need for legal instruments enforced by the European Court of Justice." (Johnson, 2016, linje 1167-70).*

Johnson pointerer, at et intergovernmentalt samarbejde med relevante stater med al sandsynlighed stadig vil være muligt efter Brexit uden behovet for en supranational instans til at holde dem alle i skak. Desuden vil Storbritannien stadig have en fremtrædende rolle i dette, hvis ikke den mest fremtrædende.

Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik er som nævnt en af statens vigtigste opgaver, og da det er staten, der styrer militæret, kan lave lovgivning, samt opretholde og beskytte grænser, så udfordrer det øgede EU-samarbejde på dette område statens rolle. Johnson kommer ind på denne problematik, da han nævner EU's øgede udenrigspolitiske kompetencer siden Lissabontraktaten.

*"In recent years Brussels has acquired its own foreign minister, its own series of EU embassies around the world, and is continuing to develop its own defence policy..... We need to look at the legal reality, which is that this is a*

*continuing and accelerating effort to build a country called Europe.” (Johnson, 2016, linje. 915-920).*

Dette er dilemmaet med principielt suveræne stater, der overgiver suverænitet til en supranational instans. Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik er medlemsstatsskompetence, men netop siden Lissabontraktaten har EU f.eks. fået en ”Udenrigsminister”, der har diplomatisk omgang med stater uden for EU på vegne af alle medlemslandene, og militæroperationer under EU’s kommando sker også oftere. Som Johnson pointerer, da er dette pres fra EU som supranational instans overfor staten og dens traditionelle rolle som forhandler på vegne af dens borgere, et eksempel på den konflikt som medlemsstater kan opleve, når de indgår i et samarbejde, der konstant udvides. Dette vil uddybes yderligere i afsnittet om suverænitet. Hoffmann fremsætter også, at statens sikkerhed, og dermed borgernes, er statens vigtigste opgave. For bedst at kunne varetage dette, må staten være suveræn i anliggender, der angår ”high politics”. Derfor ses integration på områder som udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik sjældent, og de er oftest i intergovernmentale sammenhænge, hvor suverænitet sammenlægges frem for overgives. Dog kan sikkerhedssituationen i landet skabe behov eller accept for integration også på dette område. Dette er det argument, Cameron fremsætter i sin tale. Cameron fremstiller EU som et af de vigtigste instrumenter, der er med til at beskytte Storbritannien, samt fokuserer udelukkende på de intergovernmentale elementer, som EU også indeholder, hvilket er mindre kontroversielt i forhold et klassisk ”high politics” område. Dette er især sandt på områderne udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, som stadig primært er medlemsstatsskompetence.

*“The European Union – and the close culture of intergovernmental cooperation between governments which it embodies – is a vital tool in our armoury to deal with these threats.” (Cameron, 2016b, linje 249-50).*

Camerons tale indeholder flest hentydninger til udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, og dette er talens primære fokus. Dette falder meget naturligt, da han er statsminister, og dermed er han den direkte repræsentant for staten. At beskytte sine borgere er essensen af staten, som denne opgave redegjorde for tidligere, og Cameron ser også denne beskyttelse af borgerne i Storbritannien som sin allerhøjeste prioritethjemmel (Cameron, 2016b, linje 278-9). Derfor er det geopolitiske sikkerhedshensyn, der primært fylder Camerons tale. Han nævner b.la. eksterne trusler som terror, et krigerisk Rusland og problemer med menneskesmuglere, men også klimaforandring, altså grænseoverskridende udfordringer og trusler, som en stat ikke selv kan

håndtere effektivt, lige meget hvor lukkede dets grænser er. Størstedelen af Camerons tale er opbygget omkring disse fire punkter:

*"First, what happens in Europe affects us, whether we like it or not, so we must be strong in Europe if we want to be strong at home and in the world.*

*Second, the dangerous international situation facing Britain today, means that the closest possible cooperation with our European neighbours isn't an optional extra – it is essential...*

*Third, keeping our people safe from modern terrorist networks like Daesh and from serious crime that increasingly crosses borders means that we simply have to develop much closer means of security cooperation between countries within Europe...*

*Fourth, far from Britain's influence in the world being undermined by our membership of the EU, it amplifies our power, ..." (Cameron, 2016b, linje 166-177).*

Disse fire punkter omhandler i høj grad den magt, Storbritannien kan og bør opnå ift. deres nationale egeninteresse og frem for alt eksterne trusler. Hoffmann beskriver disse som en af de primære grunde til, at stater ønsker integration med andre stater. Både intergovernmentalisme og liberal intergovernmentalisme antager, at staters primære mål med interaktion med andre stater netop er at opnå mere magt, prestige og beskyttelse af sine borgere. Om disse mål bedst opnås gennem økonomisk politik eller mere klassiske militære samarbejder afhænger af, hvilken national tilstand der hersker i staten. Cameron gør det meget klart, at han ser EU som den bedste mulighed for, at Storbritannien kan opnå de sikkerhedspolitiske mål, han ønsker for staten. Cameron udtales direkte, at han foretrækker den ægte magt, som sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde med andre stater kan give Storbritannien til at beskytte sine borgere mod terrorisme frem for suverænitet i sin reneste form, som hans modstandere mener, Brexit vil kunne give Storbritannien tilbage (Cameron, 2016b, linje 340-42).

Camerons fokus er ikke kun udelukkende på eksterne trusler som terror eller konflikt med andre stater. Han fremhæver, modsat Johnson, EU som en fredskabenende mægler mellem europæiske stater, der har haft lange konflikter. Cameron siger, at det er i Storbritanniens egen nationale interesse at undgå fremtidige konflikter mellem europæiske lande (Cameron, 2016b, linje 220-

22). EU har en vigtig rolle i fredsprocessen i Nordirland, og dette ville bestemt ikke være i britisk interesse, hvis denne blodige konflikt skulle begynde igen.

### 4.3 Immigration

Immigration er i nyere tid blevet et fremtrædende emne i britisk politik, og er som tidligere nævnt, er blevet kædet sammen med Storbritanniens EU medlemskab. Dette kræver fri bevægelighed for alle EU-borgere, så de frit kan arbejde, bo og uddanne sig i alle EU-lande. Som beskrevet i introduktionen, oplevede Storbritannien en markant stigning i immigration fra Østeuropa, da de seneste ti nye stater blev medlem af EU. F.eks. kom der i perioden 2004-13 1.5 millioner indbyggere fra de nye medlemslande til Storbritannien. I samme periode fik UKIP mere indflydelse og har siden 2014 været det største britiske parti i Europa-Parlamentet. De Konservative gik også til valg i 2010 på løftet om at mindske immigrationen, men dette lykkedes ikke. Immigration bliver derfor slet ikke nævnt i Camerons tale, da Cameronregeringens nederlag ift. nedbringelsen af antallet af immigranter i Storbritannien er et politisk ømtåligt emne. Ydermere er det også et af Leave-kampagnens hovedargumenter for udmeldelse. Osborne nævner kun fri bevægelighed som en uundgåelig konsekvens af medlemskabet af DIM og intet om immigration (Osborne, 2016, linje. 534-5).

Den fælles immigrationspolitik mellem EU-landene udfordrer endnu et af statens kerneområder, som også blev berørt tidligere. Kontrollen og beskyttelsen af nationale grænser og kontrol med hvilke individer, der må bosætte sig i landet, på den ene eller anden måde, beror ikke suverænt hos medlemsstaterne. En stat, der er medlem af EU, kan ikke nægte en anden EU borger adgang til landet. Farage er en stor ynder af at høre sit pas frem og fremhæve, at de første ord på et britisk pas er: Den Europæiske Union. Dermed har ca. en halv milliard mennesker en fri adgang til Storbritannien, på trods af denne ikke selv har sanktioneret dette (Farage, 2016, min. 22:55-24:12). Denne problematik fremhæver Gove også:

*"At the moment, any EU citizen can come to the UK to settle, work, claim benefits and use the NHS. We have no proper control over whether that individual's presence here is economically beneficial, conducive to the public good or in our national interest. We cannot effectively screen new arrivals for qualifications, extremist connections or past criminality. We have given away control over how we implement the vital 1951 UN Convention on asylum to the European court. We cannot even deport convicted murderers." (Gove, 2016, linje. 1548-1552).*

Gove fremstiller Storbritannien som en stat, der klart føler sig presset ift. kontrollen med grænser og immigration, hvor meget ufravigelig lovgivning kommer fra en supranational magt<sup>4</sup>. Dette er dog typisk ikke et reelt økonomisk problem, da langt de fleste immigranter bliver nettobidragsydere, da de betaler mere ind til fælleskassen via skat, end de trækker ud gennem velfærd (Leonard, 2015, s.9). Et problem er dog, at Storbritannien på nuværende tidspunkt ikke kan udvise individer, som ikke er til økonomisk gavn for samfundet, heller ikke altid selvom de har begået grov kriminalitet. De kan heller ikke ”sortere” folk, der kommer til landet, hvis disse kommer fra EU-lande. Storbritannien er ikke medlem af Schengen-samarbejdet, og har derfor aldrig ophævet paskontrolen for EU-landene. Selv inden den stigende immigration fra andre EU-lande og modstanden mod dette blev et politisk emne, har Storbritannien udvist en stærk tradition for kontrol med dens grænser. Dette kan også ses i et af Leave-sidens mest brugte slogans: ”*Take back control of our borders*”. Her skal det ikke blot forstås bogstaveligt, da Storbritannien sådan set altid har haft grænsekontrol. I overført betydning skal det forstås som, at Storbritannien skal kunne bestemme, hvem der kommer, hvem der må blive, og hvad de må få, mens de er der. Cameron nævner også, at Storbritannien har beholdt deres grænse- og paskontrol også for EU-borgere. Han fremhæver dette som argument for, at Storbritannien har kontrol over, hvem der kommer til landet (Cameron, 2016b, linje 293-5).

#### 4.3.1 Velfærdsstaten & immigration

Ifm. hvad udefrakommende må eller kan få i Storbritannien, er velfærdsstaten et emne, som hurtigt bliver kædet sammen med immigration fra EU-lande. Dette er grundet i, at EU-borgere ikke blot har ret til at komme til Storbritannien, men at de som vandrende arbejdstagere også har ret til samme understøttelse fra staten, som deres indfødte britiske kollegaer kan modtage<sup>5</sup>. Gove kommer ind på det i det forrige citat, hvor han nævner, at immigranter kan modtage velfærd og benytte NHS, det britiske sundhedsvæsen som er en meget populær del af velfærdsstaten. Farage har også meget fokus på immigration. Som skrevet tidligere, nævner han det ifm. en øget risiko for terror, og han kommer også ind på det ifm. løndumping pga. indvandring fra EU-landene

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<sup>4</sup>Storbritannien havde selv tiltrådt Geneve-konventionen, men siden deres optag i EU, da har EU-domstolen overtaget fortolkningen af denne konvention efter Charter om grundlæggende rettigheder blev del af EU-lov i 2000 (implementeret 2009). Dette betyder bl.a. at flygtninge, der søger asyl, har lov at rejse ind i EU og søger, i stedet for at søger asyl i et EU-land udenfor landets territorium, som det foregår i f.eks. USA, Canada og Australien (Full Fact, 2016).

<sup>5</sup>Der er en kort optjeningsperiode ifm. dette, da det kun er vandrende arbejdstagere, der har ret til ydelser. Dette var en af punkterne, som Cameron havde genforhandlet inden folkeafstemningen og søgte at gøre optjeningsperioden markant længere.

(Farage, 2016, linje 5-35-6:02). Dertil kæder han også immigration fra EU sammen med en potentiel forringelse af velfærdsstaten.

*"We do what normal countries all over the world do. We take back control of our borders and we decide who comes to live, work and settle in this country. And it is, this is the number one issue in British politics and the government of course realise that....But the truth is it's not possible as a member of the EU to control this. It is not possible as a member of the EU for our government to plan ahead for primary school places, for health provision, for housing, for any of our public services and what we see six years in to David Cameron being PM is immigration, net-migration still running at near record levels." (Farage, 2016, min. 17:41-18:55)*

Han konstaterer, at det er praktisk talt umuligt for den britiske regering at planlægge hvilke midler, der skal bruges hvor ift. velfærd, når de ikke kan beregne, hvor mange skolepladser, sengepladser på hospitaler m.m., der skal bruges i de kommende år. Farage udtrykker, at "normale" stater har denne kontrol. De er ikke bundet af en supranational institution, hvor meget af den praktiske suverænitet ift. grænsekontrol og immigration beror. Både Farage og Gove kommer ind på, at denne immigration fra EU i fremtiden kan blive endnu større i takt med, at EU optager eventuelle nye medlande som Tyrkiet, Bosnien, Albanien, Serbien, Makedonien og Montenegro (Farage, 2016, min 19:56-20:27 & Gove, 2016, linje 1553-55).

Johnson kommer ind på mange af de samme problematikker som Farage og Gove ifm. immigration, og at regeringen er magtesløs ift. til at stoppe immigrationen fra EU, samt at den offentlige velfærd er ved at knække af det pres, som denne immigration udsætter den for (Johnson, 2016, linje 934-7). Johnson uddyber dog også denne problematik ift., at Storbritannien ikke har plads til ønsket immigration i form af betalende studerende fra Commonwealth-landene eller hospitalspersonale.

*"In our desperation to meet our hopeless so-called targets, we push away brilliant students from Commonwealth countries, who want to pay to come to our universities; we find ourselves hard pressed to recruit people who might work in our NHS, as opposed to make use of its services – because we have absolutely no power to control the numbers who are coming with no job offers and no qualifications from the 28 EU countries. I am in favour of immigration;*

*but I am also in favour of control, and of politicians taking responsibility for what is happening; and I think it bewilders people to be told that this most basic power of a state – to decide who has the right to live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels.” (Johnson, 2016, linje 938-45).*

Storbritannien har ikke plads til ønsket immigration i den forstand, at den nuværende regering har haft som mål at nedbringe immigrationen til landet. Johnson afslutter også dette citat med at fremhæve, at en af de mest basale opgaver, en stat har er, at bestemme, hvem der må bo i landet, og hvem der ikke må. Dette påpeger han, at Bruxelles har taget fra Storbritannien, og nu ligger den magt uden for den britiske stats kompetencer i kraft af EU's overvejende supranationale natur. Dette er den centrale problematik ved supranationale institutioner ifølge Baudet, at de ofte overtager opgaver fra staten, som ikke altid er blevet eksplisit aftalt gennem traktater eller bevidst suverænitetsoverdragelse. Supranationale instanser har ofte mulighed for selv at ændre procedure eller vedtægter uden en ny traktat.

Både Johnson, Farage og Gove anser immigrationen i kraft af den frie bevægelighed, der følger med EU-medlemskabet, som en af de vægtigste grunde til at forlade samarbejdet, da det er en supranational instans som reelt bestemmer over størstedelen af indvandringen til Storbritannien og ikke staten selv. Dette tab af den praktiske suverænitet vil blive analyseret i næste afsnit, da dette også er blevet diskuteret ofte i løbet af valgkampen. Immigration medfører pr. definition multikulturalisme, da immigranterne alle kommer fra forskellige lande, kulturer, religioner m.fl. Hvor supranationalisme kan udfordre velfærdsstaten gennem supranationale lovgivning, kan multikulturalisme udfordre velfærdsstaten nedefra, da immigration udefra kan svække den sociale sammenhængskraft og det ”Vi” som en skattefinansieret velfærdsstat kræver. Dette vil blive analyseret under afsnittet Identitet.

#### 4.4 Suverænitet

Cameron kommer meget kort ind på suverænitet, da han nævner, at nogle af hans modstandere ønsker at bevare adgangen til DIM.

*”If so, we would have to accept freedom of movement, a contribution to the EU budget, and accept all EU rules while surrendering any say over them. In which case, we would have given up sovereignty rather than taken it back.”*

*(Cameron, 2016b, linje 70-2).*

Dette, fastslår han, kommer ikke til at ske uden accept af de fire friheder, al EU-lovgivning vedr. DIM og et bidrag til EU-budgettet. Osborne kommer med lignende argumenter ifm. gennemgangen af Norge-modellen. Her opremser han at: statsministeren ikke længe ville være med til at beslutte retningen for EU i Det Europæiske Råd, britiske ministre ville ikke længere være med til forhandlinger i Ministerrådet, men Storbritannien ville stadig skulle implementere al lovgivning ifm. DIM, hvis de var med i EØS (Osborne, 2016, linje 644-51). Han fastslår tillige, at vedr. økonomisk politik er målet som nævnt tidligere at skabe velstand til borgerne, men at politikere kan have andre mål, som de mener overgår målet om velstand (Osborne, 2016, linje 553-4). Dette tolker specialet som en hentydning til Leave-sidens store fokus på suverænitet.

Cameron nævner også suverænitet ifm. NATO. Her bruger han NATO-samarbejdet som et eksempel på, at samle suverænitet i en international organisation giver reel magt, og dette er vigtigere end teoretisk suverænitet (Cameron, 2016b, linje 246-8). Dog er NATO et udelukkende intergovernmentalt samarbejde, hvor EU også har supranationale elementer i sit samarbejde. Der er ingen tvivl om, at Cameron anskuer EU-samarbejdet som intergovernmentalisme beskriver det: et internationalt samarbejde af suveræne stater.

*“The European Union – and the close culture of intergovernmental cooperation between governments which it embodies...” (Cameron, 2016b, linje 249-50).*

Igen er det påfaldende, at EU's supranationale natur ikke også nævnes, men Storbritannien har altid foretrukket at sammenlægge suverænitet i intergovernmentale samarbejder frem for at overdrage til supranationale institutioner. Dette ses gennem hele deres forhold med EU, fra de forsøgte sig med EFTA til Thatchers gaullistiske tilgang til EU og sidst men ikke mindst Camerons genforhandling, hvor han fik et ”forbehold” om målet for en stadig snævrere union. Han nævner ofte, at han ønsker Storbritanniens fremtid indenfor EU som et stolt og selvstændigt land. Ifm. nogle af Storbritanniens seneste militære bedrifter går han endog så vidt at udtrykke sig således:

*“These are the actions of a proud, independent, self-confident, go-getting nation, a nation that is confident and optimistic about its future, not one cowed and shackled by its membership of the European Union.” (Cameron, 2016b, linje 374-5).*

Dermed søger han at fastslå, at Storbritannien ikke bliver mindre selvstændigt i kraft af sit EU-medlemskab. Det er ikke selve konceptet EU, han kæmper for, men nærmere hvad det kan give Storbritannien og dens borgere. Han afslutter også sin tale med igen at fremhæve, at den store,

modige og patriotiske beslutning er at stemme Remain (Cameron, 2016b, linje 493). Det er dog påfaldende, at hverken Cameron eller Osborne forsøger at tage diskussionen om suverænitet. De italesætter begge, at Storbritannien kan få mere indflydelse i EU, men undgår at tale for meget om suverænitet, hvad end den måtte være formel eller praktisk.

Farage har en andet anden holdning til spørgsmålet om britisk suverænitet i EU. Han anser det for umuligt, at Storbritannien kan være suveræne, indtil de melder sig ud af EU. Den formelle suverænitet er intakt for Storbritannien, da de stadig kan melde sig ud af det supranationale EU-samarbejde, men han gør det klart, at han anser den praktiske suverænitet for tabt, indtil dette sker.

*"Well let me tell you with total certainty that when we vote to leave this EU, when we have put through our divorce with this political union.... We will once again be an interdependent nation.... We will set the rules for our financial services industry and any law, any law that is made by our government and our parliament, we once every five years will have the opportunity to vote for new set of politicians who will get rid of those rules.... We will become a proper, functioning, parliamentary democracy." (Farage, 2016, min. 11:56-13:45).*

Ifm. den praktiske suverænitet gør han meget ud af at fremhæve Storbritanniens parlamentariske demokrati som rygraden i et suverænt Storbritannien. Han fremhæver det monumentale i, at britisk lovgivning efter Brexit nu udelukkende vil blive vedtaget i det Britiske Parlament. Hvis det britiske folk er uenige i disse love, kan de hvert femte år udskifte parlamentarikerne, og disse kan derefter opnævne, ændre eller vedtage ny lovgivning. Farages opfattelse af suverænitet beror altså på, om en stat har den absolutte jurisdiktion og lovgivningsmagt indenfor dens grænser, og hvorvidt staten er i stand til at opretholde grænserne, som blev behandlet i afsnittet om immigration. Han opsummerer denne holdning i følgende citat:

*"... Do we think we are up to running our own country, our own parliament, controlling our own borders? Do we believe in Britain? Do we want our country back?" (Farage, 2016, min. 24:33-24:56).*

Igen er denne sondring mellem praktisk og formel suverænitet meget skarp i hans ytringer. Han udtrykker, at Storbritannien er tabt for briterne indtil udmeldelse af EU, naturligvis i overført betydning, men han får udtrykt, at EU på en eller anden måde har taget Storbritannien fra briterne. Modsat Osborne og Cameron, mener Farage ikke, at den indflydelse som EU kan give,

kan opveje det tab af praktisk suverænitet ift. parlamentet i Westminster som enelovgiver på britisk territorium. Gove og Johnson bruger også meget taletid på at italesætte problemet med de europæiske institutioners magt og indflydelse på bl.a. det Britiske Parlament. Som der blev redegjort for tidligere, har den britiske parlamentarisme en meget lang historie, og briterne har i mange århundrede været vant til, at Westminster har det endelige ord ift. britisk lovgivning.

Gove gør meget ud af britisk suverænitet overfor EU's institutioner. Han er især kritisk overfor EU-domstolens rolle, både som integrationsmotor, men også ift. den effekt den har på det Britiske Parlament og domstol.

*"The Court has the power and freedom to interpret the Treaties as it wishes - which is always in the service of greater European integration, regardless of what our deal might say about "ever closer union".... And if we try to object, the European Court of Justice - the supreme court of the EU - can force us to submit to the judgment of others regardless of what our population, our parliament or even our own judges might think is right. It is a fact that the European Communities Act 1972, and subsequent judgments, make clear that EU law, as decided by QMV and interpreted by the ECJ, trumps the decisions of, and laws passed by, democratically-elected politicians in Britain." (Gove, 2016, linje. 1327-44).*

EU-domstolens rolle er meget kontroversiel i Storbritannien, da den først og fremmest er formålsbestemt og er mere fremadskuende end den britiske Common-law<sup>6</sup>. Common-law har dybe rødder i britisk historie og er karakteriseret ved hele tiden at se tilbage og dømme ud fra præcedens frem for overordnede principper og værdier. Common-law afspejler i høj grad en af konservatismens grundlæggende præmisser. Den pagt, som samfundet har med sine nuværende, tidligere og fremtidige borgere, reflekteres i Common-law traditionen ved hele tiden at se tilbage på tidligere domsafsigelser. Dette skaber en høj grad af forudsigelighed, og muligheden for pludselig omvälvninger mindskes. Gove fremhæver, at EU-domstolen til en hver tid kan underkende de domsafsigelser, som en britisk domstol er kommet frem til inden for en britisk retstradition og afsagt i en britisk kontekst.

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<sup>6</sup>Skotland har en blanding af civil ret og Common-law. Inden den politiske union i 1707 var skoterne meget inspireret af Frankrig og Romerretten ift. indretning af deres juridiske system (Todd, 2013).

EU-domstolen kan ikke blot tilsidesætte den britiske domstol, som den dømmende magt i Storbritannien, men også den lovgivende magt, parlamentet er ikke suverænt iht. EU-lovgivningen. Som der blev redegjort for tidligere, har EU-lov forrang frem for national lovgivning. Gove fremhæver, at EU-domstolen har beføjelser til at fortolke traktaterne ift. dens overordnede formål, der er at drive integrationen i EU frem. I Goves øjne betyder denne fortolkende domstol, at den bliver lovskabende. I Storbritannien er der ikke en stærk tradition for en fortolkende Højesteret, og dets flertalsdemokrati lægger det primære fokus på parlamentet som den vigtigste demokratiske instans. Det er parlamentet i Westminster, der er det reneste udtryk for folkets vilje. Han fremhæver til sidst i citatet, at EU-domstolen kan tilsidesætte selv lovgivning, der er skabt af demokratisk valgte politikere. Derfor er det et stort problem for britisk suverænitet, at en domstol kan gibe ind i ikke bare den dømmende magts virke, men også i den lovgivende magt. Den udøvende magt, i form af den siddende regering, bliver naturligvis også påvirket tillige med den lovgivende. Lande med Westminster-modellen lægger måske især mærke til, hvis deres regering ikke kan handle suverænt. Westminster-modellen skaber typisk stærke flertalsregeringer, der kendetegnes ved ofte at kunne gennemføre den politik, de ønsker. Dermed kan de i højere grad holdes direkte ansvarlige hos deres vælgere end hos konsensus-demokratier, hvor den siddende regering ofte bliver nødt til at indgå mange kompromisser, når de laver lovgivning.

Specialet har tidligere redegjort for, at Baudet anser den politiske autoritet for at ligge hos staten, der er den eneste instans, der burde lovgive indenfor dets territorium. Den politiske autoritet kan også henvise til, at borgerne anser nationale institutioner for legitime. Legitime institutioner er uhyre vigtige for det repræsentative demokrati og i vid udstrækning for retsstaten. Problematikken ift. at en ikke-national, ikke-folkevalgt instans som EU-domstolen m.fl. kan gibe ind i den britiske stats lovgivningsarbejde, uddyber Johnson i sin tale.

Han indleder sit afsnit om de europæiske institutioner med udtalelsen, at EU siden sin oprettelse har udviklet sig til at være stadig mere centraliseret, intervenerende og anti-demokratisk (Johnson, 2016, linje. 906-7). Omfanget af det europæiske samarbejde uddyber han i næste afsnit, hvor han opremser mange af de store politiske områder som enten udelukkende eller delvist er EU-kompetence. Han nævner følgende områder: handel, told, konkurrence, landbrug, fiskeri, miljø, forbrugerbeskyttelse, transport, energi, den frie bevægelighed, sikkerheds- og retspolitik, kultur, turisme, uddannelse og ungdom (Johnson, 2016, linje. 910-4). Denne opremsning af omfanget af EU-samarbejdet leder hen til Johnsons hovedpointe:

*"Look at that list of Lisbon competences – with 45 new fields of policy where Britain can be outvoted by a qualified majority – and you can see why the House of Commons Library has repeatedly confirmed that when you add primary and secondary legislation together the EU is now generating 60 per cent of the laws passing through parliament. The independence of this country is being seriously compromised. It is this fundamental democratic problem – this erosion of democracy - that brings me into this fight." (Johnson, 2016, linje 921-6).*

Afstemninger, der foregår ved kvalificeret flertal i EU-regi, har Storbritannien historisk set altid haft det svært med. Grunden til dette skal måske findes i briternes opfattelse af, hvad et europæisk samarbejde burde være, som blot er et frihandelsområde, eller måske skal grunden findes i deres demokratiske tradition. Flertals-demokratiers vigtigste demokratiske institution er parlamentet. I Storbritannien har man i mange århundrede talt om *"The Sovereignty of Parliament."* Flertalsdemokratier har som beskrevet sjældent nogen særligt omfattende domstolskontrol i form af en fortolkende højesteret. Den har typisk heller ikke et reelt to-kammer system, hvor begge kamre har lovgivnings- og vetoret. Flertalsdemokratier har typisk ikke oplevet overgreb eller svigt fra statens side. Eksempler på dette kan f.eks. være fascisterne i Spanien eller nazisterne i Tyskland. Her har store dele af borgerne i disse lande oplevet, at deres rettigheder er blevet groft krænket eller helt frataget dem. Disse lande har derfor nu, som et opgør med fortiden og forhindring af en gentagelse, stærk domstolskontrol med den lovgivende magt og typisk også mere end et kammer eller en stærk PM, så de forskellige instanser kan holde hinanden i skak (Hansen, 2010, s.61-2). Parlamentet er derfor det mest legitime udtryk for folkets vilje, og den som varetager denne bedst. Denne meget stærke og lange tradition for et parlament, har som institution altid haft folkelig opbakning, og kan være grunden til, at Johnson sætter lighedstegn mellem det Britiske Parlaments lovgivningsmagt og selve det britiske demokrati.

#### 4.5 Identitet

Alle de taler, som dette speciale har udvalgt til analyse, indeholder referencer til britisk identitet som enten argument for, det er naturligt at forblive i EU eller, at den gør EU-medlemskab til en umulighed. Når alle disse taler nævner identitet eller folkets karakter, kan dette ses som et udtryk for Hoffmanns intergovernmentalisme, der forskriver, at politikere må tage hensyn til den nationale tilstand.

Selv Osborne nævner i sin ellers meget faktuelle tale, at det land, han elsker, er åbent, sikker i sine værdier og klar til at forme landets fremtid samt stærkt, stolt og succesrigt (Osborne, 2016, linje 878-82). En grund til, at Storbritannien overhovedet er endt med en afstemning om EU, kan findes i deres lange, tunge historiske bagage. Hoffmann forudsætter, at stater med en tung historisk bagage ofte kan være mindre villige til at integrere sig, hvis disse ydermere tidligere også har været en stormagt, har de ofte svært ved at finde sig til rette med de kompromiser, internationalt samarbejde som oftest kræver af stater. Cameron lægger meget vægt på britisk identitet, dens karakter og historie. Han har afsnit i sin tale som f.eks. *A proud, confident nation* eller *The character of the British people* (Cameron, 2016b). I Camerons tale for Remain ses heller ikke nogen vidtløftige principper om europæisk fællesskab eller håbet om at skabe en føderal stat. Cameron fastslår meget pragmatisk, at EU er til økonomisk fordel for Storbritannien og en fredsskabende faktor i Europa.

*"So, we have always seen the European Union as a means to an end – the way to boost our prosperity and help anchor peace and stability across the European continent – but we don't see it as an end in itself" (Cameron, 2016b, linje. 137-8).*

Denne pragmatiske tilgang taler sit tydelige sprog, og der er generelt ikke de helt store følelser forbundet med ideen om det europæiske projekt. Storbritannien har altid følt sig adskilt fra det europæiske kontinent, Storbritannien er noget særligt og unikt ifølge Cameron:

*"If there is one constant in the ebb and flow of our island story, it is the character of the British people. Our geography has shaped us, and shapes us today. We are special, different, unique. We have the character of an island nation which has not been invaded for almost a thousand years, and which has built institutions which have endured for centuries. As a people we are ambitious, resilient, independent-minded..... But above all we are obstinately practical, rigorously down to earth, natural debunkers. We approach issues with a cast of mind rooted in common sense. We are rightly suspicious of ideology, and sceptical of grand schemes and grandiose promises." (Cameron, 2016b, linje 128-136).*

Som Cameron fremhæver er briterne et ø-folk og har været geografisk adskilt fra det europæiske kontinent. Storbritannien er ikke blevet invaderet siden 1066, og dermed har udefra

komende påvirkninger mere eller mindre været begrænset til, hvad briterne ønskede at lukke ind i deres samfund. Cameron nævner også de fælles britiske institutioner, som har bestået i århundrede, dette ses som en henvisning til Common-law og parlamentarisme. Han beskriver også en britisk mistro overfor ideologi, vidtløftige løfter og storsslæde planer. Briterne, fastslår Cameron, gør altid brug af almindelig sund fornuft og lader sig ikke rive med af revolutionære tanker. Disse karaktertræk, som Cameron beskriver, vil bestemt give visse forudsætninger for den nationale tilstand, som kunne besværliggøre integration med andre stater. Cameron søger dog at bruge det som et argument for at blive i EU ved at fastslå, at EU er til Storbritanniens fordel, og dette kan briternes bestemt se grundet deres rigelige mål af sund fornuft.

Under afsnittet *What happens in Europe affects us* opremser han en lang liste af krige og konflikter i Europa, som Storbritannien har deltaget i, fra da romerne indtog de britiske øer til Anden Verdenskrig. Især her nævner han, da Storbritannien stod ene og alene mod den nazistiske trussel i 1940, men vandt The Battle of Britain mod det tyske Luftwaffe og aldrig blev invaderet, som størstedelen af det europæiske kontinent blev (Cameron, 2016b, linje 193-4). Denne sans for historien og tidligere generationers indflydelse ses meget tydeligt i dette citat:

*“We are the product of our long history – of the decision of our forebears, of the heroism of our parents and grandparents. “ (Cameron, 2016b, linje 123-4).*

Ud fra Camerons måde at udtrykke det, er Storbritannien en nation med en meget stærk identitet, en lang historie og meget bevidst om, hvad der adskiller den fra andre stater. Denne tale tager bestemt ikke bare den nationale bevidsthed, men også den nationale tilstand med i dens argumenter. Storbritannien har en stor arv fra tidligere generationer, og det har mundet ud i mange traditioner, værdier, holdninger og tanker om briternes karakter. Dette konstante tilbageblick vidner om, hvor meget konservatismens grundtanker også præger Storbritannien. At Cameron er konservativ i sin tankegang er naturligvis ikke nogen overraskelse, men hans tale er ikke blot vinklet til andre konservative, men til hele landet, og siden han vælger så mange historiske elementer tyder det på, at briterne har stor sans for historie, og fortiden kan måske betyde lige så meget som fremtiden. Dette forsøger Cameron at tage højde for, når han gør brug af et af det stolteste øjeblikke i britisk historie, som argument for at involvere sig i EU og kontinentet.

Farage benytter også henvisninger til både Første og Anden Verdenskrig ifm. sin fremhævelse af, hvor vigtigt parlamentarisk demokrati er:

*“It is called parliamentary democracy and It is something so precious. It is something so fundamental that those that went before us in the twentieth century twice, risked that in some cases sacrificed everything that they had, to make sure that we and indeed the rest of Europe could live as free parliamentary democracies and that is what out looks like.....” (Farage, 2016, min. 11:56-13:45).*

Hvor Cameron bruger Anden Verdenskrig som et eksempel på, at Storbritannien er del af Europa, benytter Farage samme historiske eksempel til at argumentere for at forlade EU, da det ville true parlamentarisk suverænitet og overflødiggøre britiske soldaters ofre.

Gove bruger også historien som argument for at Storbritannien både kan og bør melde sig ud af EU. Han understreger, at det faktisk er Storbritannien, der har opfundet demokratisk selvstyre, og dermed er det naturligt for briterne i følge deres historie at regere sig selv og ikke være del af, hvad han senere kraftigt hentyder til, et moderne imperium på linje med Det russiske Imperium, Romerriget eller Det osmanniske rige (Gove, 2016, linje 1231-58). Parlamentarisk demokrati er en uadskillelig del af den britiske arv, og som der blev uddybet i afsnittet om suverænitet, er de britiske institutioner som parlamentet og retsvæsenet uadskillelige dele af den britiske identitet og arv. Briterne gennemgik en borgerkrig for deres parlamentarisme. De har siden 1600-tallet haft et parlamentet, der ikke var underlagt kronen. Deres retsvæsen har endnu længere historiske rødder. Disse stærke, folkekære institutioner koblet med en stærk sans for historie og arv fra tidligere generationer er et træk ved det britiske folk, som ingen politiker kan sidde overhørig.

#### 4.5.1. Velfærdsstaten & identitet

En skattefinansieret velfærdsstat som den britiske kræver en kollektiv identitet for at fungere. Den kræver solidaritet borgerne imellem, for at alle er indforstået med at skulle betale til en fælleskasse, som derefter søger at udjævne sociale uligheder til en vis grad. National loyalitet er i høj grad med til at sikre den sociale sammenhængskraft, da borgerne i en nationalstat ikke blot føler politisk loyalitet overfor staten, men også føler, at de er del af et fællesskab med de andre borgere, der beror sig på mere end blot politik. Som der blev redegjort for tidligere kan denne kollektive identitet mellem borgere bl.a. stamme fra fælles sprog, kultur, historie, sindelag osv.

Multikulturalisme fornægter derimod, at der behøver at være en overordnet, kollektiv identitet for at bevare sammenhængskraften i et samfund. Den mener, at støtten til en fælles stat stammer fra, at staten er med til at bevare de mange forskellige samfund, som multikulturalisme kan medføre. Dog, vil en velfærdsstat have svært ved at fungere i et rent multikulturelt samfund, da denne forskriver, at man primært er medlem af sin egen kultur. Derfor vil borgernes loyalitet primært ligge hos deres egen kultur. Multikulturalisme kan udfordre den kollektive identitet og dermed svække solidariteten mellem en stats' borgere eller personer med fast tilknytning til staten. Dette behandler både Farage, Gove og Johnson i deres taler.

Gove nævner denne nødvendige sammenhængskraft i samfund ifm. en opremsning af eksempler på, hvad briternes bidrag til EU's budget kunne bruges på i stedet. Her nævner han: øget støtte til landmænd, forskning, infrastruktur, lærepladser, militær, skattelettelser m.fl., men han nævner meget specifikt, at disse penge kunne bruges på NHS, skoler, social omsorg og dermed forstærke den sociale solidaritet (Gove, 2016, linje 1512-20). Gove mener, at solidariteten blandt Storbritanniens borgere ikke er stærk nok i øjeblikket. Dette fastholder han kan løses ved en målrettet indsats med øgede midler til offentlige, britiske institutioner og ikke mindst en styrkelse af velfærdsstaten. Han fokuserer primært på, at udmeldelsen af EU vil give mulighed for at bruge flere penge på velfærd, hvilket vil øge sammenhængskraften i Storbritannien. Han kommer ikke konkret ind på, hvorfor der er behov for at øge solidariteten. Farage giber dette spørgsmål om, hvad et multikulturelt samfund indebærer anderledes an end Gove, han kommenterer det ret direkte:

*"And I think we've got to recognise that actually mass migration into Britain on this scale is not good for our country. It is not good for our quality of life. It is not good for social cohesion in our societies and our population inextricable heading for toward 70 or 75 million will not make this a better, richer or happier better place to be. But as EU members, as EU members there is nothing we can do about it." (Farage, 2016, min.19:20-19:55)*

Farage sætter et klart lighedstegn mellem masseimmigration til Storbritannien og den sociale sammenhængskraft. Storbritannien er en gammel nation, og som nævnt tidligere, har briterne en stærk identitet gennem bl.a. deres fælles historie og institutioner. Farage anskuer et potentelt multikulturelt samfund som en trussel mod sammenhængskraften i det britiske samfund, fordi briterne har en forholdsvis lang historie ikke blot som stat, men som en nationalstat.

Nationalstaten kræver, som der blev redegjort for tidligere, et fællesskab, der beror på andet end blot politisk støtte til staten. Det ovenstående citat kommer lige efter Farages udtalelser vedr. den britiske velfærdsstat, som blev brugt i afsnit 4.3.1. velfærdsstaten & immigration. Dermed kobler han meget tydeligt de potentielle problematiske elementer som immigration kan afstedkomme ift. de økonomiske og planlægningsmæssige opgaver i en velfærdsstat, men også hvordan multikulturalisme kan påvirke det britiske samfund, som helhed ift. socialt sammenhold. Farage slutter af med, at han ikke mener, at denne massive immigration vil gøre Storbritannien et bedre, rigere eller lykkeligere sted at være.

Johnson påpeger, at briterne ikke identificerer sig med andre europæer, ej heller det europæiske samarbejde som helhed. Han nævner det europæiske flag, og fastholder, at briterne ikke føler loyalitet overfor dette flag (Johnson, 2016, linje 1118-9). Han påpeger også, at Brexit vil betyde, at briterne igen har fuld kontrol over deres skattepenge. De kan dermed blive brugt udelukkende på britiske interesser (Johnson, 2016, linje 1207-8). Hans hovedpointe i dette afsnit er, at den fælles europæiske identitet ikke er blevet skabt på trods af ihærdige forsøg:

*“There is simply no common political culture in Europe; no common media, no common sense of humour or satire; and – this is important – no awareness of each other’s politics, ....” (Johnson, 2016, linje 1107-8)*

Johnson fornægter at en fælles europæisk politisk identitet reelt findes, og derfor har i hvert fald briterne begrænset solidaritet med andre europæiske borgere, eftersom de ikke deler en politisk kultur med dem. De har en del historie og visse kulturelle elementer tilfælles med Europa, men medlemskabet af en supranational politisk organisation kræver ifølge Johnson mere for, at briterne kan acceptere, at andre EU-borgere kan tage del i deres velfærd på lige fod med dem, fordi de alle er del af samme politiske union. Ydermere kræver en omfattende velfærdsstat solidaritet med sine medborgere for at fungere.

Multikulturalisme bliver kun indirekte nævnt af Cameron, da han fremhæver, at Storbritannien faktisk er en politisk union bestående af 4 forskellige nationer, og Cameron beder på det kraftigste skotterne om at lægge selvstændighedssnakken i graven (Cameron, 2016b, linje 416-8). Ud over dette har han ikke nogen henvisninger til multikulturalisme. Som specialet nævnte under afsnittet immigration, da er det emne et som regeringen forsøger at undgå, derfor henviser Osborne heller ikke til det.

En skattefinansieret velfærdsstat, som den britiske, kræver livslang skatteindbetaling fra sine borgere i bytte for sociale ydelser. Immigranter i Storbritannien, fra de andre EU-lande, får meget hurtigt en del af denne fællesydelse, men de vil ofte af naturlige grunde ikke have samme loyalitet overfor staten og solidaritet med deres britiske kolleger. Immigranter er pr. definition ikke del af det "Vi", som en velfærdsstat ellers kræver for at være legitim i dens borgers øjne. Man betaler gerne for at hjælpe andre, som er del af sammen "Vi", men solidariteten rækker sjældent til at ønske at inkludere udefrakommende folk, som man ikke kan identificere sig med på samme måde. Multikulturalisme fastholder, at dette ikke er et problem ift. at acceptere staten, men en nationalstat og velfærdsstat kræver et "vi" for at fungere optimalt.

## 5. Diskussion

Dette special har gennem analysen forsøgt at afdække de historiske, kulturelle og politiske faktorer som havde indflydelse på folkeafstemningen og dets resultat: Brexit. Specialet vil nu diskutere, hvilke faktorer der har vægtet højest, og teste teoriernes forklaringskraft.

### 5.1 Liberal intergovernmentalisme

Da Moravcsik formulerer liberal intergovernmentalisme, var EU et veletableret politisk og økonomisk overstatsligt samarbejde, der netop har udvidet samarbejdet fra et fællesskab til en union med Maastrichttraktaten. Derfor er det måske naturligt, at han ikke arbejder så intensivt med muligheden for, at stater vælger helt at trække sig ud af samarbejdet igen. Han arbejder nærmere med det modsatte. Han fremsætter, at truslen om eksklusion kan få stater til at nedprioritere egne NP'er, og at truslen om forhandlingssammenbrud også kan drive de mellemstatslige forhandlinger igennem modstridende NP'er frem for alternativet, som er ingen integration. Moravcsik behandler suveræniteten hos nationalstaterne, som værende intakt gennem hele samarbejdet, da de altid kan trække den tilbage. Dermed er suverænitet i EU ikke en umulighed ud fra et liberalt intergovernmentalistisk synspunkt. Moravcsik sonder ikke skarpt mellem praktisk og formel suverænitet, men fastholder, at suverænitet altid er tilstede hos de nationalstater, som indgår i EU-samarbejdet. I betragtning af mængden af Leave-sidens argumenter der kredser om suverænitet, tyder det på, at liberal intergovernmentalisme ikke fuldt ud kan forklare resultatet af folkeafstemningen. Denne teori foreskriver dog, at en nationalstats præferencer kan ændres over tid eller som følge af den politiske, økonomiske eller ideologiske situation internt i en stat, men fastslår også, at en stat vil have vanskeligheder ved at skabe velstand uden international samhandel. Det behøver ikke nødvendigvis være i et overstatsligt

forum som EU, men siden Storbritannien er medlem af EU, vil der komme en overgangsperiode ifm. udmeldelsen, hvor staten med al sandsynlighed vil blive påvirket negativt ift. deres økonomi (Cox, 2017). Ydermere så står Storbritannien som del af et politisk fællesskab med 27 andre stater og over en halv milliard borgere umiddelbart stærkere geopolitisk. Ud over at være en vigtigt del af NATO og FN's sikkerhedsråd har de også tætte forbindelser gennem EU med de største lande i Europa som Tyskland, Frankrig, Italien og Spanien, og er dermed i kraft af EU allierede gennem mere end blot NATOs musketerpagt.

Ud fra både Johnsons, Goves og Farages argumenter om at frihandelsaftaler kan komme på plads hurtigere uden for EU-regi, tyder det på, at Leave-siden har anskuet den økonomiske værdi af Storbritanniens EU medlemskab med en del nyttebaseret euroskepsis. Leave-siden har gjort det meget klart, at den økonomiske nytte af et EU medlemskab ikke var høj nok, og Storbritannien vil klare sig økonomisk bedre uden for EU (jf. analyse Gove, Johnson & Farage afsnit 4.1 økonomi). Dette fokus på prisen for medlemskabet har briterne historisk set haft længe. Det mest berømte eksempel er, da Thatcher bad om at få Storbritanniens penge tilbage. Leave har gjort meget ud af at fortælle, at uden EU vil Storbritannien kunne bruge 350 millioner pund på NHS hver uge i stedet for at sende dem til Bruxelles. Denne påstand har stået på siden af en Leave-kampagnebus, som har kørt rundt i hele landet (Merrick, 2017).

Dog tyder en undersøgelse fra British Social Attitudes (BSA) på, at det var vælgerne, som stemte Remain, der vægtede argumenterne om de økonomiske fordele indenfor EU højst. Leave-vælgerne var typisk mere bekymret for immigration (Curtice, 2016, s.8). Liberal Intergovernmentalisme giver tilsyneladende ikke en tilfredsstillende forklaring på, hvorfor afstemningen blev et nej på trods af, at Leave-siden også havde økonomiske argumenter, der talte for en udmeldelse, men disse var ikke deres taleres hovedfokus. Liberal intergovernmentalisme kunne bedre forklare, hvis Storbritannien havde valgt at forblive i EU, da denne teori foreskriver, at stater integrerer sig pga. mulighed for økonomisk vækst og geopolitiske sikkerhedshensyn. Dette er måske også grunden til, at Remain-siden havde så stor fokus på netop økonomi og sikkerhed. Både Camerons og Osbornes taler har i høj grad mange af liberal intergovernmentalismens betragtninger med ift., hvorfor stater overhovedet har fordel af integration af politisk og økonomisk natur. På kort sigt har Storbritannien umiddelbart hverken geopolitiske eller politisk økonomiske fordele af Brexit. Pundet er i skrivende stund svagt, inflationen stiger, forbruget er faldende og Storbritanniens økonomiske vækst er lavere end forventet (Cox, 2017).

## 5.2 Intergovernmentalisme

Intergovernmentalisme koncentrerer sig meget om det *nationale* i nationalstaten, som især bliver synliggjort, når en stat indgår i internationale samarbejder. Storbritannien har ofte i EU kæmpet en kamp mod integration på overstatsligt niveau og har altid foretrukket at sammenlægge suverænitet frem for at overdrage den. Hoffmann forklarer, at en stat med en lang og tung historisk bagage vil have en national tilstand, der kan besværliggøre integration med andre stater. Storbritannien har tillige en fortid som stormagt med et kolossalt imperium, som Hoffmann ligeledes beskriver, vil besværliggøre integration. En tidligere stormagt kan have svært ved at gå på kompromis med andre stater, da den har været vant til mere eller mindre selv at kunne bestemme slagets gang. Hoffmann mener, at dette besværliggør integration, men ikke at staterne skulle fravælge integration helt. Intergovernmentalisme foreskriver også, at staterne, der indgår i samarbejdet, forsøt er suveræne.

Dog påpeger Hoffmann ligeledes, at integration på "high politics" områder kan være svært på overstatsligt niveau. Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik er et af statens kerneområder, og Cameron benytter mange argumenter for, at Storbritannien vil være mere sikker indenfor EU, og at disse samarbejdsområder desuden foregår på intergovernmentalt niveau (Cameron, 2016, linje 249-54). Leave-siden har dog modargumenter af samme skuffe på disse punkter. De fastholder, at Storbritannien fortsat vil have adgang og stor indflydelse i intergovernmentalt udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitiske samarbejder som f.eks. NATO (Johnson, 2016, linje 1167-70), med kontrolleret immigration vil faren for terror formindskes (Farage, 2016, min 20:53-21:32), og sidst men ikke mindst vil den interne sikkerhed for briterne blive forbedret, hvis uønskede kriminelle immigranter fremover kan udvises (Gove, 2016, linje 1551-2). Om sikkerhedssituacionen i Storbritannien eller Europa reelt kræver, at Storbritannien forbliver medlem af EU eller ej, står derfor hen i det uvisse ift. til de to kampagners meget modstridende synspunkter. Hoffmann fastholder, at "low politics" typisk er et område, hvor integration mellem stater ikke er specielt problematisk, da det typisk ikke干涉erer med "high politics" områder.

Briternes euroskepsis kan bestemt også spores at være stigende i takt med, at det europæiske samarbejde har udviklet sig til en politisk union tillige med dens oprindelige mål om et økonomiske fællesskab, der skulle umuliggøre krig mellem medlemsstaterne. Dog har et egentligt "low politics" område som arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed udviklet sig til noget nær "high politics", da dette omfatter velfærdsydser, som er meget mere tæt forbundet med den britiske identitet, historie og statsborgerskab, hvilket Leave-siden gør meget ud af i deres taler, mens

Remain-siden nævner det bemærkelsesværdigt lidt, som dette speciale skrev i analyseafsnittet Immigration.

Den tunge historiske bagage, som Hoffmann nævner, kan bl.a. ses i Storbritanniens tradition for parlamentarisme. Dens lange historie (tillige med Common-laws udvikling), har analysen også fastslået, er en uløseligt del af den britiske identitet. Dette aspekt af den nationale tilstand kan og har gjort den stadig dybere integration i EU problematisk ift. briternes anskuelse af demokratisk legitimitet, der i høj grad hænger sammen med deres parlaments suverænitet og domstolens mulighed for at dømme ud fra tidligere britiske domsafsigelser og i en udelukkende britisk kontekst. Dertil kommer, at mange af de andre nationalstater i EU har en anden demokratisk-og retstradition. Dette giver nationale tilstande, som kan have svært ved at finde kompromisser. Blandt EU's oprindelige medlemslande (Frankrig, Tyskland, Belgien, Luxemburg, Nederlandene, Italien) findes der konstitutionelle demokratier med en højesteret, som forventes at fortolke den lovgivende magts beslutninger ud fra en overordnet forfatning. Dermed er EU's institutioner i høj grad opbygget efter dette forbillede, da dette var den herskende demokratiske tradition i de stater som grundlagde EU. Desuden har f.eks. Belgien og Nederlandene tradition for konsensus-demokrati frem for Westminster-modellen, som hersker i Storbritannien, så også her er der forskel på den demokratiske styreform.

EU's mål om en stadig snævrere union og en domstol, der aktivt søger at fremme dette mål, står også i skarp kontrast til Storbritannien, der er en stat meget præget af konservativisme. Den forskriver langsom og organisk udvikling i en national kontekst og i harmoni med tidligere generation. Desuden opfatter konservativisme som nævnt status quo som mere eller mindre det ypperligste, hvis ikke, så ville tidligere generation bestemt have ændret situationen. Dette kan have gjort det svært for briterne at føle sig tilpas i et fællesskab, der på blot 60 år har udviklet sig med rivende hast. Intergovernmentalisme synes at komme nærmere en forklaring på Brexit, da den nationale tilstand i Storbritannien i form af dens historie, traditioner og konservative arv muligvis har besværliggjort integrationen med de andre EU-stater. Ud over dette, så er EU i stigende grad også bevæget sig ind på "high politics" områder som udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, og DIM, som ellers hører ind under "low politics", påvirker den britiske velfærdsstat, som er tæt forbundet med den britiske identitet og fællesskab. Disse faktorer har uden tvivl besværliggjort Storbritanniens integration ift. deres nationale tilstand med de andre nationalstater og deres nationale tilstand indtil den til sidst blev umulig i nogle politikeres og vælgeres øjne. Dette er muligvis, hvad Brexit resultatet afspejler.

### 5.3 Supranationalisme

I dette speciales definition af suverænitet sondres mellem praktisk og formel suverænitet. Hvor ingen af medlemslandene i EU har fået frataget deres formelle suverænitet, er den praktiske suverænitet ifølge Baudet tabt for dem indtil en udmeldelse. Baudet anser nationalstaters praktiske suverænitet for tabt, så længe de indgår i et supranationalt samarbejde. Den praktiske suverænitet er i følge Baudet der, hvor de politiske beslutninger tages. Dette har siden EU's skabelse i stigende grad foregået i EU-regi. Der er samtidig kommet flere områder til, hvor kvalificeret flertal benyttes som beslutningsprocedure frem for muligheden for vetoret for de enkelte lande. I analysen af talerne tyder det på, at denne suverænitetsafgivelse har været et vægtigt argument for at forlade EU-samarbejdet.

Den potentielle problematik ift. suverænitetsafgivelse er iøjnefaldende ved sit mere eller mindre komplette fravær i Remain-sidens taler. Cameron fremhæver f.eks. de dele af EU-samarbejdet, hvor Storbritannien forsøgte at få veto (Cameron, 2016, line), samtidig med dette benytter både Cameron og Osborne ordet indflydelse ifm. Storbritanniens fremtid i EU. De støtter begge et forsøg på medlemskab, og det tyder på, at de ikke skelner mellem formel og praktisk suverænitet på samme måde som Leave-siden. Suverænitet i EU kan dog også anskues fra en anden vinkel. Det kan diskuteres, om der findes et globaliseret, handlende land, som i dag er i stand til at handle suverænt. Hans Branners reelle suverænitet beskæftiger sig med, hvor meget en stat er i stand til at påvirke andre staters politik gennem internationalt samarbejde. Det tyder på, at Remain-siden anser reel suverænitet som vigtigere end formel suverænitet, og søger dermed indflydelse på andre staters politik, og den politik som EU fører via Storbritanniens EU-medlemskab.

Det er til gengæld ret klart, at Leave-siden ikke har samme syn på suverænitet og suverænitetsafgivelse. Deres argumenter hælder mere til Baudets formelle og praktiske suverænitet. Farage taler om at tage vores land tilbage, og et af Leave-sidens slogans er "*Take back control*". Som det fremgår af analysen, tyder Farages retorik på, at han anser Storbritannien for ikke-suverænt, så længe det er medlem af EU. Han udviser stor suverænitetsbaseret euroskeptisisme både ift. naturligvis Storbritanniens mulighed for at handle suverænt, men også ifm. den nationale identitet. Hertil kan også nævnes Storbritanniens lange tradition som parlamentarisk demokrati siden 1688. Gove og Johnson har også en del suverænitetsbaseret argumenter, der fremhæver, hvor ikke-suverænt de opfatter Storbritannien som nationalstat og medlem af EU.

Baudets opfattelse af en nationalstat, der i den klassiske opfattelse ikke er suveræn ift. til den udøvende, lovgivende og dømmende magt, så længe den deltager i supranationale samarbejder, tangerer Leave-sidens argumentation. Dette klassiske billede af nationalstatens virke synes ikke at kunne passe med en politisk union af udefinerbar størrelse som EU og dets påvirkning af alle magtelementerne i magtens tredeling. Dermed kunne suverænitetsafgivelse til supranationale institutioner som Kommissionen, EU-domstolen m.fl. måske forklare Brexit resultatet. De Konservative har i mange år italesat EU's overstatslige institutioner og deres virke som negativt ift. den britiske selvbestemmelse. Denne suverænitetsbaseret euroskepsis stammer fra de europæiske supranationale institutioner, da deres indblanding i den britiske stats virke af mange bliver anset for udemokratisk, da disse institutioner ikke er nationalt forankret, og de tillige er influeret af andre nationaliteter. Mange af dem er heller ikke omfattet af direkte demokratisk kontrol, da at borgerne ved regelmæssige intervaller kan udskifte de ledende skikkelser i tilfældige af utilfredshed eller ønsket om en ny politik, som Farage kommer ind på (Farage, 2016, min 11:56-13:45). Farage udviser bestemt ideologisk euroskepsis i form af sin kritik af mangelfuld demokratisk kontrol med EU's institutioner og deres forhold med borgerne i EU. Leave-siden har klart en generel aversion overfor de europæiske supranationale institutioner, måske især fordi disse bliver overvåget og støttet af EU-domstolen, som er formålsbestemt med en dynamisk, aktivistisk fortolkningsstil. Denne aversion eller euroskepsis er bestemt ideologisk funderet, eftersom Storbritanniens parlament og domstol har et meget anderledes magtforhold, end det som ses mellem EU's lovgivende og dømmende institutioner.

Europapolitik og EU har dog sjældent været et fremtrædende emne hos briterne, når de f.eks. gik til valg. Det er typisk den nationale økonomi, NHS og uddannelse, som traditionelt tog førstetopladserne inden folkeafstemningen i 2016 (Ipsos mori, 2014). Derfor kan hele forklaringen på Brexit formentlig ikke findes udelukkende i utilfredshed med suverænitetsafgivelsen til supranationale institutioner. Arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed som ufravigeligt krav ved EU-medlemskab skaber immigration, som Storbritannien ikke kan fravælge, hvis de skulle have lyst. Forklaringen på Brexit kan måske findes i det mere eller mindre tvungne multikulturelle samfund, som EU fører med sig. Immigration havde en ret fremtrædende plads i vælgernes bevidsthed op til parlamentsvalget i 2015 (Ipsos mori, 2014). Disse områder er, som beskrevet i specialet, i de senere år blevet koblet uløseligt sammen med Storbritanniens EU medlemskab.

## 5.4 Multikulturalisme

Brexit kan måske nærmere tolkes som et fravælg af det multikulturelle samfund, som b.la. Storbritanniens EU-medlemskab har ført med sig. Dog har Storbritannien været et multikulturelt samfund siden Anden Verdenskrig, hvor der var brug for arbejdskraft, og Storbritanniens kolonier fik dobbelt statsborgerskab for at lokke folk til landet. Disse regler blev dog strammet i løbet af en årrække. I 1980'erne blev de strammet yderligere og definerede britisk statsborgerskab ud fra en territoriel tilknytning, men immigration har siden da været et politisk emne (Ford & Lymeropoulou, 2017, s. 3). Remain-siden valgte ikke at omtale immigration og multikulturalisme med andet end de allermest overfladiske sidebemærkninger, og dette bekræfter dette speciale i, at immigration var et stærkt argument for Leave-siden, og dermed at briterne potentielt er skeptiske overfor dette.

Leave-sidens politikere er dog ikke lige så afvisende overfor immigration fra Commonwealth-landene. Johnson beskriver denne type immigration som værende at foretrække frem for EU-borgere. Han beskriver begavede og betalende studerende fra Commonwealth-landene og personale til NHS, der ønsker at komme til Storbritannien, og gør meget ud af, at den studerende ønsker at betale til universiteterne og potentielt sundhedspersonale ønsker at arbejde i NHS frem for blot at benytte dens tilbud (Johnson, 2016, linje 938-40). Farage nævner også visse kvaliteter, som immigranter til Storbritannien burde have f.eks. relevante kvalifikationer, ren straffeattest og deres egne sundhedsforsikring (Farage, 2016, min 22:55-24:12). Gove har ligeledes samme tanker og ønsker omkring, hvilke immigranter der potentielt er velkommen i Storbritannien. Han nævner dygtige læger og forskere, teknikere og iværksættere, som alle kan forbedre og bidrage til f.eks. NHS og Storbritanniens vækst. Mest signede af alt starter han denne opremsning med at omtale personer fra Commonwealth som familiemedlemmer (Gove, 2016, linje 1564-66). BSA er i deres senest rapport kommet frem til, at briterne deler denne mere selektive holdning til immigranter. De ser gerne (i prioriteret rækkefølge), at de kan tale engelsk, at de forpligter sig til en britisk livsstil, har relevante kvalifikationer, som landet har brug for og har en god uddannelse (Ford & Lymeropoulou, 2017, s.9).

At Commonwealth-landene fortrækkes af Johnson og Gove, som ligefrem omtaler dem som familie, kan kun forstås ud fra en historisk baggrund. Det britiske imperium var et utroligt populært projekt i Storbritannien og selv efter imperiets opløsning, har det forsøgt haft en

fremtrædende plads i britisk bevidsthed<sup>7</sup> Politisk mistede imperiet og Commonwealth efter Anden Verdenskrig langsomt sin betydning for britisk udenrigs- og handelspolitik, men har beholdt sin mytiske status hos mange konservative politikere. Farage er også hurtig til at nævne Commonwealth som et substitut for DIM. Johnson nævner Commonwealth-borgerne som foretrukne immigranter, og Gove kalder dem for familie på trods af, at mange af landene befinder sig på den anden side af jorden, og har en markant anderledes kultur og religion. Men briterne deler historie med disse lande og i kraft af, at de var den dominerende magt i imperiet, har de i høj grad også forsøgt at præge disse lande med britiske institutioner og karakter.

At være knyttet gennem historie kan dog ikke være den eneste grund til, at Leave-siden er mere begejstret for Commonwealth immigranter frem for EU-borgere. Som kort nævnt, var netop denne immigration efter Anden Verdenskrig på et tidspunkt meget politisk kontroversielt indtil immigrationsreglerne blev strammet. En forklaring på denne evt. afvisning af det multikulturelle samfund, som kommer gennem EU, er måske nærmere den velfærd, som immigranter fra EU kan få del i, og at immigration fra EU ikke kan afvises. DIM kræver fri bevægelighed af arbejdskraften, men for samtidig at sikre, at arbejdstagere har lige vilkår med indfødte borgere, får man som vandrende arbejdstager som sagt del i samme sociale ydelser, som indfødte borgere har ret til. Multikulturalisme foreskriver som nævnt, at et samfund af samfund ikke er et problem for statens eksistens, dog kræver en nationalstat og endnu vigtigere en velfærdsstat en høj grad af social samhørighed og solidaritet. Det kræver et stærkt fællesskab før borgere frivilligt afleverer penge til omfordeling gennem skatten og opretholdelsen af et fælles, socialt sikkerhedsnet. Som dette speciale analyserede i afsnit 4.5.1. velfærdsstaten og identitet, er velfærdsstaten både en del af britisk identitet, men samtidig er dens forudsætning netop en fælles identitet eller et "Vi" for at være legitim i dens borgers øjne, da den er skattefinansieret. Det "Vi" kan have været presset af den ufravigelige immigration, som et EU-medlemskab medfører gennem DIM.

Dette argument fremfører Farage i høj grad, da han nævner, at det sociale sammenhold er presset af denne immigration (Farage, 2016, min 19:20-55). Gove fremsætter ligeledes argumentet, at der bør bruges flere penge på velfærd for at fremme social solidaritet, og Johnson fremhæver, at der ikke er en fælles europæisk kultur, og dermed ikke et europæisk "Vi", som briterne føler, de er del af (Gove, 2016, linje 1520 & Johnson, 2016, linje 1107-9). Som specialet nævnte, er langt de fleste immigranter faktisk netto-bidragsydere ift. deres skatteindbetaling

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<sup>7</sup>Det kan b.la. ses med f.eks. Commonwealth games, der kan sidestilles med de olympiske lege, blot kun for Commonwealth-landene.

kontra, hvad de får af velfærd. I en velfærdsstat handler det dog mindre om penge kontra, hvem der får nytte af velfærden, og hvor denne forbruges henne (her hentydes der til f.eks. børnepenge, som kan sendes ud af landet). At begrænse EU immigrationen var en af Leave-vælgernes vigtigste argumenter for at forlade EU, og størstedelen mener generelt, at immigration til Storbritannien har været skadeligt for nationen (Curtice, 2016, s. 9).

I betragtning af, at sammenkoblingen mellem immigration til Storbritannien og EU for alvor fik debatten om et forsøgt medlemskab i gang, og både en genforhandling og folkeafstemning blev gennemført med udmeldelse som resultat, da vurderer dette speciale, at forklaringen på Brexit til dels kan findes i briternes fravælg af et tvunget multikulturelt samfund med europæere, og denne afvisning tyder på at være koblet sammen med deres velfærdssamfund, der kræver et "Vi" for at fungere. Dette "Vi" kræver som beskrevet tidligere et fællesskab bestående af fælles sprog, historie, karakter, arv osv. Som beskrevet tidligere i afsnittet, anser briterne en forpligtigelse til en britisk livsstil, som en af de vigtigste kriterier immigranter bør opfylde. Dette speciale ræsonnerer, at størstedelen af briterne ikke kunne finde dette "Vi" med de EU-borgere, som er immigreret til Storbritannien, og dermed ønskede at begrænse denne immigration, og forhindre skabelsen af et endnu mere multikulturelt samfund uden en fælles overordnet identitet.

## 6. Konklusion

Dette speciale har undersøgt, hvilke historiske, kulturelle og politiske faktorer der kunne ligge til grund for, at Brexit er blevet en realitet. Specialets historiske gennemgang har afdækket Storbritanniens lange tradition for parlamentarisme, og det faktum at parlamentets suverænitet blev stadfæstet allerede i 1688. Storbritannien har sidenhen udviklet sig til et flertalsdemokrati, som lægger stor vægt på netop parlamentets suverænitet, og har ikke tradition for, at samme parlamentet bliver overvåget af den dømmende magt. Storbritanniens retssystem er opbygget efter sædvaneret eller Common-law, som har en endnu længere historie end parlamentarismen, og blev centraliseret efter den normanniske invasion i 1066. Storbritannien er desuden en stat med en lang historie og en veludviklet identitet, hvorfra dens tid som stormagt i kraft af dens mange kolonier har sat dybe spor i den nationale bevidsthed.

Tillige er de Konservative løbende blevet meget euroskeptiske. Selv Cameron som støttede, at Storbritannien forblev i EU, gjorde det først, efter at han havde genforhandlet det britiske medlemskab. I den forbindelse måtte han siges at udvise både nytte-, ideologisk-og suverænitetsbaseret skepsis. Leave-siden udviste stadig denne hårde euroskepsis selv efter

genforhandlingen, og grunden til dette, vurderer specialet, skal findes i briternes lange historie og deres meget veletablerede institutioner, samt ønsket om at begrænse immigrationen og skabelsen af et multikulturelt samfund.

Intergovernmentalisme beskriver, at en lang historie og fortid som kolonimagt vil besværliggøre integrationen i internationale sammenhæng. Dette kan specialet spore helt tilbage fra Storbritanniens modvilje mod at deltagte i det europæiske projekt fra start af, og hvor de i stedet forsøgte at gøre det intergovernmentale EFTA til en succes. Briterne har altid fortrukket at sammenlægge suverænitet frem for at overdrage den. Brexit er ikke blot modvilje overfor integration, det er en afvisning af den. Dette er også et udtryk for britisk modvilje overfor supranationalisme. I takt med EU er blevet mere supranational i sin opbygning, har briterne og især de Konservative udvist en højere grad af suverænitetsbaseret euroskepsis. Denne underminering af nationalstatens klassiske rolle og suveræniteten af britiske kerneinstitutioner som parlamentet og domstolene, mener dette speciale at have spillet en stor rolle i Brexit. Det har bestemt haft stor betydning for de politikker, som ønskede Storbritannien ude af EU. UKIP blev dannet som reaktion på Maastrichttraktaten. EU-modstanderne havde dog ikke succes med at få gjort en folkeafstemning til en realitet, før EU-spørgsmålet blev kædet sammen med immigration.

Specialet har understreget mange gange, at en skattefinansieret velfærdsstat kræver et stærkt "Vi" for at kunne opretholdes. Et multikulturelt samfund, som kan følge med medlemskab af EU, kan true denne fællesskabsfølelse. Borgerne i samfundet kan have svært ved at identificerer sig med fremmede, hvis disse ikke deler de basale fællestræk ved en nation som: sprog, historie, sindelag og kultur m.fl. En mangel på solidaritet borgerne imellem vil svække "Vi"et" og undergrave støtten til en institutionel velfærdsmodel. Som nævnt i specialet, har briterne og Leave-politikerne generelt en selektiv holdning til hvilke type immigranter, de ønsker at lade komme ind i Storbritannien. En sådan selektion af EU-borgere er ikke mulig som medlem af EU, og eftersom det var Leave-vælgerne, som gik mest op i at begrænse immigration, da konkluderer dette speciale, at en stor del af forklaringen på Brexit findes i afvisningen af det multikulturelle samfund. Denne afvisning ser specialet grundet i, at mange briter følte det undergravede det britiske "Vi" og dermed velfærdsstaten. De andre sider af Brexit, mener specialet, skal findes i Storbritanniens lange historie, som har besværliggjort deres integration i EU, og at den påkrævede suverænitetsafgivelse ift. især parlamentet og domstolen gjorde, at briterne ikke fandt det ønskværdigt at forblive i EU.

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## Bilag

1 David Cameron- PM speech on the UK's strength and security in the EU  
2 Prime Minister David Cameron set out what the UK's European Union

3 membership means for British strength and security in the world. 9<sup>th</sup> May 2016

4

### 5 **Introduction**

6 In 45 days' time, the British people will go to polling stations across our islands and cast their  
7 ballots in the way we have done in this country for generations.

8 They will, as usual, weigh up the arguments, reflect on them quietly, discuss them with friends  
9 and family, and then, calmly and without fuss, take their decision.

10 But this time, their decision will not be for a Parliament, or even two.

11 They will decide the destiny of our country, not for 5 years or for 10, but in all probability for  
12 decades, perhaps a lifetime.

13 This is a decision that is bigger than any individual politician or government.

14 It will have real, permanent and direct consequences for this country and every person living in it.

15 Should we continue to forge our future as a proud, independent nation while remaining a  
16 member of the European Union, as we have been for the last 43 years? Or should we abandon it?

17 Let me say at the outset that I understand why many people are wrestling with this decision, and  
18 why some people's heads and hearts are torn.

19 And I understand and respect the views of those who think we should leave, even if I believe they  
20 are wrong and that leaving would inflict real damage on our country, its economy and its power in  
21 the world.

### 22 **Where I stand**

23 I believe that, despite its faults and its frustrations, the United Kingdom is stronger, safer and  
24 better off by remaining a member of the European Union. Better off? Certainly.

25 We are part of a single market of 500 million people which Britain helped to create. Our goods  
26 and, crucially, our services – which account for almost 80% of our economy – can trade freely by  
27 right. We help decide the rules. The advantages of this far outweigh any disadvantages.

28 Our membership of the single market is one of the reasons why our economy is doing so well,  
29 why we have created almost 2.4 million jobs over the last 6 years, and why so many companies  
30 from overseas – from China or India, the United States, Australia and other Commonwealth  
31 countries invest so much in the UK.

- 32 It is one of the factors – together with our superb workforce, the low taxes set by the British  
33 government, and our climate of enterprise – which makes Britain such an excellent place to do  
34 business.
- 35 All this is alongside – let us note – our attractive regulatory environment. According to the OECD,  
36 it is second only to the Netherlands, itself an EU member – giving the lie to those who claim that  
37 the British economy is being strangled by regulation from Brussels.
- 38 If we leave, the only certainty we will have is uncertainty.
- 39 The Treasury has calculated that the cost to every household in Britain would be as high as £4,300  
40 by 2030 if we leave. £4,300.
- 41 The overwhelming weight of independent opinion – from the International Monetary Fund to the  
42 OECD, from the London School of Economics to the Institute for Fiscal Studies – also supports the  
43 fact that Britain will suffer an immediate economic shock, and then be permanently poorer for  
44 the long-term.
- 45 The evidence is clear: we will be better off in, and poorer if we leave.
- 46 As Charles Dunstone, the founder of Carphone Warehouse, an entrepreneur not averse to risk,  
47 has said: “In my experience there are calculated risks, there are clever risks, and there are  
48 unnecessary and dangerous risks. And from all I can conclude, Brexit sits firmly in the latter  
49 camp.”
- 50 So the onus is on those who advocate leaving to prove that Britain will be better off outside the  
51 EU. Those advocating Brexit have spent many years preparing for this moment. And yet they  
52 seem unable to set out a clear, comprehensive plan for our future outside the EU.
- 53 Some admit there would be a severe economic shock, but assert nonchalantly that it would be ‘a  
54 price worth paying’.
- 55 Others are in denial that there would be a shock at all. And they can’t agree what their plan for  
56 post-Brexit Britain would look like.
- 57 One minute we are urged to follow Norway, the next minute Canada. A few days later Switzerland  
58 offers the path forward, until it becomes clear that their arrangement doesn’t provide much  
59 access for services to the EU’s single market – and services, as I’ve said, are almost 4 fifths of the  
60 British economy.
- 61 Most recently, the Leavers have noticed that a number of European countries that sit outside of  
62 the EU have negotiated separate trade arrangements with the EU.
- 63 They called this collection of countries the ‘European free trade zone’.
- 64 But in fact, this doesn’t exist: it is a patchwork of different arrangements, all of them far inferior  
65 to what we have now.
- 66 They have gone on to suggest that Britain might join this non-existent zone, just like Albania.
- 67 Seriously? Even the Albanian Prime Minister thought that idea was a joke.
- 68 The Leave campaign are asking us to take a massive risk with the future of our economy and the  
69 future of our country.

- 70 And yet they can't even answer the most basic questions.
- 71 What would Britain's relationship be with the EU if we were to leave? Will we have a free trade  
72 agreement, or will we fall back on World Trade Organisation rules?
- 73 The man who headed the WTO for 8 years thinks this would be and I quote "a terrible  
74 replacement for access to the EU single market."
- 75 Some of them say we would keep full access to the EU single market.
- 76 If so, we would have to accept freedom of movement, a contribution to the EU budget, and  
77 accept all EU rules while surrendering any say over them.
- 78 In which case, we would have given up sovereignty rather than taken it back.
- 79 Others say we would definitely leave the single market – including, yesterday, the Vote Leave  
80 campaign – despite the critical importance of the single market to jobs and investment in our  
81 country.
- 82 I can only describe this as a reckless and irresponsible course. These are people's jobs and  
83 livelihoods that are being toyed with.
- 84 And the Leave campaign have no answers to the most basic questions.
- 85 What access would we try to secure back into the single market from the outside? How long  
86 would it take to negotiate a new relationship with the EU? What would happen to the 53 trade  
87 deals we have with other markets around the world through the EU?
- 88 The Leave campaign can't answer them because they don't know the answers. They have no plan.
- 89 And yet sceptical voters who politely ask for answers are denounced for their lack of faith in  
90 Britain, or met with sweeping assurances that the world will simply jump to our tune.
- 91 If you were buying a house or a car, you wouldn't do it without insisting on seeing what was being  
92 offered, and making sure it wasn't going to fall apart the moment you took possession of it.
- 93 So why would you do so when the future of your entire country is at stake?
- 94 The British people will keep asking these questions every day between now and 23 June, and  
95 demanding some answers.
- 96 Nothing is more important than the strength of our economy.
- 97 Upon it depends the jobs and livelihoods of our people, and also the strength and security of our  
98 nation.
- 99 If we stay, we know what we get – continued full access to a growing single market, including in  
100 energy, services and digital, together with the benefit of the huge trade deals in prospect  
101 between the EU and the United States and other large markets.
- 102 If we leave, it is – genuinely – a leap in the dark.
- 103 But my main focus today will not be on the economic reasons to remain in the EU, important  
104 though they are.

- 105 I want to concentrate instead on what our membership means for our strength and security in the  
106 world, and the safety of our people, and to explain why, again, I believe the balance of advantage  
107 comes down firmly in favour of staying rather than leaving.
- 108 Because this decision is a decision about our place in the world, about how we keep our country  
109 safe, about how Britain can get things done – in Europe and across the world – and not just accept  
110 a world dictated by others.
- 111 **A proud, confident nation**
- 112 So today I want to set out the big, bold patriotic case for Britain to remain a member of the EU.
- 113 I want to show that if you love this country, if you want to keep it strong in the world, and keep  
114 our people safe, our membership of the EU is one of the tools – one of the tools – that helps us to  
115 do these things, like our membership of other international bodies such as NATO or the UN  
116 Security Council.
- 117 Let us accept that for all our differences, one thing unites both sides in this referendum campaign.
- 118 We love this country, and we want the best future for it. Ours is a great country.
- 119 Not just a great country in the history books, although it surely is that.
- 120 But a great country right now, with the promise of becoming even greater tomorrow.
- 121 We're the fifth largest economy in the world. Europe's foremost military power. Our capital city is  
122 a global icon. Our national language the world's language.
- 123 Our national flag is worn on clothing and t-shirts the world over – not only as a fashion statement,  
124 but as a symbol of hope and a beacon for liberal values all around the world.
- 125 People from all 4 corners of the earth watch our films, dance to our music, flock to our galleries  
126 and theatres, cheer on our football teams and cherish our institutions.
- 127 These days, even our food is admired the world over.
- 128 Our national broadcaster is one of the most recognised brands on the planet, and our monarch is  
129 one of the most respected people in the world.
- 130 Britain today is a proud, successful, thriving nation, a nation the world admires and looks up to,  
131 and whose best days lie ahead of it.
- 132 We are the product of our long history – of the decision of our forebears, of the heroism of our  
133 parents and grandparents.
- 134 And yet we are a country that also has our eyes fixed firmly on the future – that is a pioneer in the  
135 modern world: from the birth of the internet to the decoding of the genome.
- 136 **The character of the British people**
- 137 If there is one constant in the ebb and flow of our island story, it is the character of the British  
138 people.
- 139 Our geography has shaped us, and shapes us today. We are special, different, unique.

- 140 We have the character of an island nation which has not been invaded for almost a thousand  
141 years, and which has built institutions which have endured for centuries.
- 142 As a people we are ambitious, resilient, independent-minded. And, I might add, tolerant,  
143 generous, and inventive.
- 144 But above all we are obstinately practical, rigorously down to earth, natural debunkers.
- 145 We approach issues with a cast of mind rooted in common sense. We are rightly suspicious of  
146 ideology, and sceptical of grand schemes and grandiose promises.
- 147 So we have always seen the European Union as a means to an end – the way to boost our  
148 prosperity and help anchor peace and stability across the European continent – but we don't see  
149 it as an end in itself.
- 150 We insistently ask: why? How?
- 151 And as we weigh up the competing arguments in this referendum campaign, we must apply that  
152 practical rigour which is the hallmark of being British.
- 153 Would going it alone make Britain more powerful in the world? Would we be better able to get  
154 our way, or less able?
- 155 Would going it alone make us more secure from terrorism, or would it be better to remain and  
156 cooperate closely with our neighbours?
- 157 Would going it alone really give us more control over our affairs, or would we soon find that  
158 actually we had less, and that we had given up a secure future for one beset by years of  
159 uncertainty and trouble with no way back?
- 160 Would going it alone open up new opportunities, or would it in fact close them down and narrow  
161 our options?
- 162 **Stronger in the world**
- 163 That is certainly the approach I have taken to judging whether Britain is stronger and safer inside  
164 the European Union or leaving it.
- 165 And I have just one yardstick: how do we best advance our national interest?
- 166 Keeping our people safe at home and abroad, and moulding the world in the way that we want –  
167 more peaceful, more stable, more free, with the arteries of commerce and trade flowing freely.
- 168 That is our national interest in a nutshell – and it's the question that has confronted every British  
169 prime minister since the office was created: how do we best advance Britain's interests in the  
170 circumstances of the day?
- 171 If my experience as Prime Minister had taught me that our membership of the EU was holding  
172 Britain back or undermining our global influence, I would not hesitate to recommend that we  
173 should leave.
- 174 But my experience is the opposite.

175 The reason that I want Britain to stay in a reformed EU is in part because of my experience over  
176 the last 6 years is that it does help make our country better off, safer and stronger.

177 And there are 4 reasons why this is the case.

178 First, what happens in Europe affects us, whether we like it or not, so we must be strong in  
179 Europe if we want to be strong at home and in the world.

180 Second, the dangerous international situation facing Britain today, means that the closest possible  
181 cooperation with our European neighbours isn't an optional extra – it is essential. We need to  
182 stand united. Now is a time for strength in numbers.

183 Third, keeping our people safe from modern terrorist networks like Daesh and from serious crime  
184 that increasingly crosses borders means that we simply have to develop much closer means of  
185 security cooperation between countries within Europe. Britain needs to be fully engaged with  
186 that.

187 Fourth, far from Britain's influence in the world being undermined by our membership of the EU,  
188 it amplifies our power, like our membership of the UN or of NATO. It helps us achieve the things  
189 we want – whether it is fighting Ebola in Africa, tackling climate change, taking on the people  
190 smugglers. That's not just our view; it's the view of our friends and allies, too.

191 Let me go through them in turn.

## 192 **What happens in Europe affects us**

193 First: Europe is our immediate neighbourhood, and what happens on the continent affects us  
194 profoundly, whether we like it or not.

195 Our history teaches us: the stronger we are in our neighbourhood, the stronger we are in the  
196 world.

197 For 2,000 years, our affairs have been intertwined with the affairs of Europe. For good or ill, we  
198 have written Europe's history just as Europe has helped to write ours.

199 From Caesar's legions to the wars of the Spanish Succession, from the Napoleonic Wars to the fall  
200 of the Berlin Wall.

201 Proud as we are of our global reach and our global connections, Britain has always been a  
202 European power, and we always will be.

203 We know that to be a global power and to be a European power are not mutually exclusive.

204 And the moments of which we are rightly most proud in our national story include pivotal  
205 moments in European history.

206 Blenheim. Trafalgar. Waterloo. Our country's heroism in the Great War.

207 And most of all our lone stand in 1940, when Britain stood as a bulwark against a new dark age of  
208 tyranny and oppression.

209 When I sit in the Cabinet Room, I never forget the decisions that were taken in that room in those  
210 darkest of times.

211 When I fly to European summits in Brussels from RAF Northolt, I pass a Spitfire just outside the  
212 airfield, a vital base for brave RAF and Polish pilots during the Battle of Britain.

213 I think of the Few who saved this country in its hour of mortal danger, and who made it possible  
214 for us to go on and help liberate Europe.

215 Like any Brit, my heart swells with pride at the sight of that aircraft, or whenever I hear the tell-  
216 tale roar of those Merlin engines over our skies in the summer.

217 Defiant, brave, indefatigable.

218 But it wasn't through choice that Britain was alone. Churchill never wanted that. Indeed he spent  
219 the months before the Battle of Britain trying to keep our French allies in the war, and then after  
220 France fell, he spent the next 18 months persuading the United States to come to our aid.

221 And in the post-war period he argued passionately for Western Europe to come together, to  
222 promote free trade, and to build institutions which would endure so that our continent would  
223 never again see such bloodshed.

224 Isolationism has never served this country well. Whenever we turn our back on Europe, sooner or  
225 later we come to regret it.

226 We have always had to go back in, and always at a much higher cost.

227 The serried rows of white headstones in lovingly-tended Commonwealth war cemeteries stand as  
228 silent testament to the price that this country has paid to help restore peace and order in Europe.

229 Can we be so sure that peace and stability on our continent are assured beyond any shadow of  
230 doubt? Is that a risk worth taking?

231 I would never be so rash as to make that assumption.

232 It's barely been 20 years since war in the Balkans and genocide on our continent in Srebrenica. In  
233 the last few years, we have seen tanks rolling into Georgia and Ukraine. And of this I am  
234 completely sure.

235 The European Union has helped reconcile countries which were once at each others' throats for  
236 decades. Britain has a fundamental national interest in maintaining common purpose in Europe to  
237 avoid future conflict between European countries.

238 And that requires British leadership, and for Britain to remain a member. The truth is this: what  
239 happens in our neighbourhood matters to Britain.

240 That was true in 1914, in 1940 and in 1989. Or, you could add 1588, 1704 and 1815. And it is just  
241 as true in 2016.

242 Either we influence Europe, or it influences us.

243 And if things go wrong in Europe, let's not pretend we can be immune from the consequences.

244 **The international situation means cooperation with Europe is essential**

245 Second, the international situation confronting Britain today means that the closest possible  
246 cooperation with our European neighbours isn't an optional extra.

- 247 It is essential for this country's security and our ability to get things done in the world.
- 248 We see a newly belligerent Russia. The rise of the Daesh network to our east and to our south.
- 249 The migration crisis. Dealing with these requires unity of purpose in the west.
- 250 Sometimes you hear the Leave campaign talk about these issues as if they are – in and of  
251 themselves – reasons to leave the EU.
- 252 But we can't change the continent to which we are attached. We can't tow our island to a more  
253 congenial part of the world.
- 254 The threats affect us whether we're in the EU or not, and Britain washing its hands of helping to  
255 deal with them will only make the problems worse.
- 256 Within Europe they require a shared approach by the European democracies, more than at any  
257 time since the height of the Cold War.
- 258 It is true, of course, that it is to NATO and to the Transatlantic Alliance that we look to for our  
259 defence.
- 260 The principle enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty – that an attack on one is an attack on all –  
261 that remains the cornerstone of our national defence.
- 262 That fundamental sharing of national sovereignty in order to deter potential aggressors. That is as  
263 valid today as it was when NATO was founded in 1949.
- 264 It is an example of how real control is more important than the theory of sovereignty.
- 265 The European Union – and the close culture of intergovernmental cooperation between  
266 governments which it embodies – is a vital tool in our armoury to deal with these threats.
- 267 That is why NATO and top military opinion – British, American, European – is clear that the  
268 common purpose of the EU does not undermine NATO, it is a vital reinforcement to it.
- 269 And they are equally crystal clear: Britain's departure would weaken solidarity and the unity of  
270 the west as a whole.
- 271 Now some of those who wish us to leave the EU openly say that they hope the entire organisation  
272 will unravel as a result.
- 273 I find this extraordinary.
- 274 How could it possibly be in our interests to risk the clock being turned back to an age of  
275 competing nationalisms in Europe?
- 276 And for Britain, of all countries, to be responsible for triggering such a collapse would be an act of  
277 supreme irresponsibility, entirely out of character for us as a nation.
- 278 Others suggest that Britain stalking out could lead to and I quote "the democratic liberation of an  
279 entire continent".
- 280 Well, tell that to the Poles, the Czechs, the Baltic States and the other countries of central and  
281 eastern Europe which languished for so long behind the Iron Curtain.

282 They cherish their liberty and their democracy. They see Britain as the country that did more than  
283 any other to unlock their shackles and enable them to take their rightful place in the family of  
284 European nations.

285 And frankly they view the prospect of Britain leaving the EU with utter dismay. They watch what is  
286 happening in Moscow with alarm and trepidation.

287 Now is a time for strength in numbers. Now is the worst possible time for Britain to put that at  
288 risk. Only our adversaries will benefit.

## 289 **Security risks**

290 Now third, the evolving threats to our security and the rise of the Daesh network mean that we  
291 have to change the way we work to keep our people safe. Security today is not only a matter of  
292 hard defence, of stopping tanks – it is also about rooting out terrorist networks, just as it is about  
293 detecting illegal immigrants, stopping human trafficking and organised crime. And that makes  
294 much closer security cooperation between our European nations essential.

295 I have no greater responsibility than the safety of the people of this country, and keeping us safe  
296 from the terrorist threat.

297 As the Home Secretary said in her speech a fortnight ago: being in the EU helps to makes us safer.

298 We shouldn't put ourselves at risk by leaving.

299 One of her predecessors, Charles Clarke, reiterated that only this morning.

300 And the message of Jonathan Evans and John Sawers, former heads of MI5 and MI6 respectively,  
301 is absolutely unmistakable: Britain is safer inside the European Union.

302 During the last 6 years, the terrorist threat against this country has grown.

303 Our threat level is now at 'Severe', which means that an attack is 'highly likely'. Indeed such an  
304 attack could happen at any time.

305 But the threat has not only grown, it has changed in its nature.

306 The attacks in Paris and Brussels are a reminder that we face this threat together – and we will  
307 only succeed in overcoming it by working much more closely together.

308 These terrorists operate throughout Europe; their networks use technology to spread their poison  
309 and to organise beyond geographical limits.

310 People say that to keep our defences up, you need a border. And they're right.

311 That's why we kept our borders, and we can check any passport – including for EU nationals – and  
312 we retain control over who we allow into our country.

313 But against the modern threat, having a border isn't enough. You also need information, you need  
314 data, you need intelligence. You need to cooperate with others to create mechanisms for sharing  
315 this information.

316 And, just as the Home Secretary said a fortnight ago, I can tell you this: whether it's working  
317 together to share intelligence on suspected terrorists; whether it's strengthening aviation

318 security; addressing the challenge of cybercrime; preventing cross-border trade in firearms;  
319 tackling the migration crisis; or enhancing our own border security, the EU is not some peripheral  
320 institution, or a hindrance we have to work around – it is now an absolutely central part of how  
321 Britain can get things done.

322 Not by creating a vast new EU bureaucracy. Nor by sucking away the role and capabilities of our  
323 own world beating intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

324 But because their superb work depends on much closer cooperation between European  
325 governments and much faster and more determined action across Europe to deal with this new  
326 threat.

327 As the historian Niall Ferguson observed, it takes a network to defeat a network.

328 And European measures are a key weapon.

329 The European Arrest Warrant allows us to bring criminals and terrorists, like one of the failed 21/7  
330 Tube bombers who had fled to Italy, we can bring them back to the UK to face justice straight  
331 away.

332 Our membership of Europol gives us access to important databases that help us to identify  
333 criminals.

334 And we have begun to cooperate on DNA and fingerprint matching across borders, too. These  
335 tools help us in real-time, life-or-death situations.

336 One of the Paris attackers, Salah Abdeslam, was only identified quickly after the attack because  
337 the French police were able to use EU powers to exchange DNA and fingerprints with the  
338 Belgians.

339 Before this cooperation, DNA matching between 2 countries didn't take minutes, it could take  
340 over 4 months.

341 In the last few months alone, we have agreed a new Passenger Name Records directive, so that  
342 EU countries will have access to airline passenger data to enable us to identify those on terror  
343 watch-lists.

344 These new arrangements will also provide crucial details about how the tickets were bought, the  
345 bank accounts used and the people they are travelling with.

346 And the EU has recently switched on a new database, called SIS II, which is providing real-time  
347 alerts for suspected jihadists and other serious criminals.

348 Now I don't argue that if we left we would lose any ability to cooperate with our neighbours on a  
349 bilateral basis, or even potentially through some EU mechanisms.

350 But it is clear that leaving the EU will make cooperation more legally complex – and make our  
351 access to vital information much slower and more difficult.

352 Look at for instance Norway and Iceland: they began negotiating an extradition agreement with  
353 the EU in 2001 and yet today it is still not in force.

354 And of course, we will miss out on the benefits of these new arrangements, and any that develop  
355 in future.

- 356 Now you can take the view that we don't need this cooperation – that we can just do without  
357 these extra capabilities.
- 358 That in my view is a totally complacent view. Especially in a world where the difference between a  
359 prevented attack and a successful attack can be just 1 missing piece of data; 1 piece of the jigsaw  
360 that the agencies found just too late.
- 361 You can also decide, as some on the Leave side seriously do, that even though working together is  
362 helpful for keeping us safe, it involves giving up too much sovereignty and ceding too much power  
363 over security cooperation to the European Court of Justice.
- 364 My view is this: when terrorists are planning to kill and maim people on British streets, the closest  
365 possible security cooperation is far more important than sovereignty in its purest theoretical  
366 form. I want to give our country real power, not the illusion of power.
- 367 **Britain's power in the world**
- 368 Fourth, Britain's unique position and power in the world is not defined by our membership of the  
369 EU, any more than it is by our membership of the Commonwealth or the UN Security Council or  
370 the OECD or the IMF or the myriad other international organisations to which we belong.
- 371 But our EU membership, like our membership of other international organisations, magnifies our  
372 national power.
- 373 Britain is a global nation, with a global role and a global reach.
- 374 We take our own decisions, in our own interests. We always have done, we always will do.
- 375 In the years since we joined the EU, we have shown that time and again with British, national,  
376 sovereign decisions about our foreign and defence policy taken by British prime ministers and  
377 British ministers.
- 378 Liberating the Falkland Islands in a great feat of military endeavour. Freeing Kuwait from Iraq.
- 379 And, more recently, our mission to prevent Afghanistan continuing to be a safe haven for  
380 international terrorists.
- 381 As I speak here today, we are flying policing missions over the Baltic states. Training security  
382 forces in Nigeria. And of course, taking the fight to Daesh in Syria and Iraq.
- 383 So the idea that our membership of the EU has emasculated our power as a nation – this is  
384 complete nonsense.
- 385 Indeed, over the last 40 years, our global power has grown, not diminished.
- 386 In the years before we joined the EU, British governments presided over a steady retrenchment of  
387 our world role, borne of our economic weakness.
- 388 The decision to retreat East of Suez and abandon our aircraft carriers was taken in 1968.
- 389 Since then, starting with the transformation of our economy by Margaret Thatcher, we have  
390 turned around our fortunes.
- 391 In the 21st century, Britain is once again a country that is advancing, not retreating,

- 392 We have reversed the East of Suez policy, we are building permanent military bases in the Gulf,  
393 we are opening embassies all around the world, particularly in Asia.
- 394 We have a new strategic relationship with both China and India, have committed to spending 2%  
395 of our GDP on defence – 1 of only 5 NATO nations to be meeting that target.
- 396 Our expertise in aid, development and responding to crises is admired the world over.
- 397 We are renewing our independent nuclear deterrent.
- 398 Our 2 new aircraft carriers will be the biggest warships the Royal Navy has ever put to sea.
- 399 These are the actions of a proud, independent, self-confident, go-getting nation, a nation that is  
400 confident and optimistic about its future, not one cowed and shackled by its membership of the  
401 European Union.
- 402 On the contrary, our membership of the EU is one of the tools – just one - which we use, as we do  
403 our membership of NATO, or the Commonwealth, or the Five Power Defence Agreement with  
404 Australia, New Zealand and our allies in South East Asia, to amplify British power and to enhance  
405 our influence in the world.
- 406 Decisions on foreign policy are taken by unanimity. Britain has a veto.
- 407 So, suggestions of an EU army are fanciful: national security is a national competence, and we  
408 would veto any suggestion of an EU army.
- 409 And as we sit in Britain's National Security Council, time and again I know that making Britain's  
410 actions count for far more means working with other countries in the EU.
- 411 Let me just take 3 specific examples of what I mean.
- 412 When Russia invaded Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, there was a real risk of a feeble European  
413 response, and of a split between the United States and Europe.
- 414 I convened a special meeting of the key European countries in Brussels, agreed a package of  
415 sanctions, and then drove that package through the full meeting of EU leaders – the European  
416 Council – later that same evening. I could not have done that outside the EU.
- 417 An example of Britain injecting steel into Europe's actions; delivering sanctions which have been  
418 far more effective because 28 countries are implementing them, not just the UK. And at the same  
419 time, we maintained that crucial unity between Europe and the US in the face of Russian  
420 aggression.
- 421 On Iran, again, it was Britain that pushed hardest for the implementation of an EU oil embargo  
422 against that country.
- 423 And it was the embargo which helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, and ultimately led to the  
424 UN sanctions that led to Iran abandoning its ambition to build a nuclear weapon. Who led those  
425 negotiations? It was the EU, with Britain playing a central role.
- 426 And on Ebola, it was Britain that used a European Council to push leaders into massively  
427 increasing Europe's financial contribution to tackling the disease in West Africa, thereby helping  
428 to contain and deal with what was a major public health emergency.

- 429 If Britain left the EU, we would lose that too!
- 430 The German Chancellor would be there. The French President. The Italian Prime Minister. So  
431 would the Maltese, the Slovak, the Czech, the Polish, the Slovene, as well as all the others.
- 432 But Britain – the fifth largest economy in the world, the second biggest in Europe – would be  
433 absent, outside the room.
- 434 We would no longer take those decisions which have a direct bearing on Britain.
- 435 Instead we would have to establish an enormous diplomatic mission in Brussels to try and lobby  
436 participants before those meetings took place, and to try and then find out what had happened at  
437 them once they broke up.
- 438 Would we really be sitting around congratulating ourselves on how ‘sovereign’ we feel, without  
439 any control over events that affect us?
- 440 What an abject act of national retreat that would be for our great country, a diminution of  
441 Britain’s power inflicted for the first time in our history not by economic woe or military defeat,  
442 but entirely of our own accord.
- 443 And when it comes to the strength of our United Kingdom, we should never forget that our  
444 strength is that of a voluntary union of 4 nations. So let me just say this about Scotland: you don’t  
445 renew your country by taking a decision that could, ultimately, lead to its disintegration.
- 446 So, as we weigh up this decision, let’s do so with our eyes open.
- 447 And, of course, there is something closely connected to our power and influence that is absolutely  
448 vital: and that’s the view of Britain’s closest friends and allies.
- 449 Before you take any big decision in life, it’s natural to consult those who wish you well, those who  
450 are with you in the tough times as well as in the good.
- 451 Sometimes they offer contradictory advice. Sometimes they don’t have much of a view.
- 452 That’s not the case here.
- 453 Our allies have a very clear view. They want us to remain members of the European Union.
- 454 Not only our fellow members of the EU – they want us to stay, and could be resentful if we chose  
455 to leave.
- 456 The Leave campaign keep telling us that there is a big world out there, if only we could lift our  
457 sights beyond Europe.
- 458 But the problem is they don’t seem to hearing what that big world is saying.
- 459 There is our principal and indispensable ally, the guarantor of our security – the United States –  
460 whose President made the American position very plain, as only the oldest and best friends can.
- 461 And then there are the nations to which we are perhaps closest in the world, our cousins in  
462 Australia and New Zealand, whose prime ministers have spoken out so clearly.

463 The Secretary-General of NATO says that a weakened and divided Europe would be “bad for  
464 security and bad for NATO”.

465 Only on Thursday, the Japanese Prime Minister – whose country is such a huge investor and  
466 employer in the United Kingdom – made very clear that Japan hoped the UK would decide to  
467 remain in the EU.

468 So too have big emerging economies like Indonesia.

469 And then there are our major new trading and strategic relationships – China and India – in whom  
470 some of the Leave campaign claim to invest such great hopes, at least when they’re not saying  
471 they want to impose hefty tariffs on them. They too want us to remain in the EU.

472 So, from America to Asia, from Australasia and the Indian sub-continent, our friends and our  
473 biggest trading partners, or potential trading partners, are telling us very clearly: it’s your  
474 decision. But we hope you vote to stay in the European Union.

475 By the way, so too are our own Dependent Territories – Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands – with  
476 whom we have such a special bond and for whom we have a special responsibility.

477 **Conclusion**

478 And so? Next month we will make our choice as a nation.

479 I am very clear.

480 Britain is stronger and safer in the EU, as well as better off.

481 And the EU benefits from Britain being inside rather than out.

482 This is a Europe that Britain has helped to shape.

483 A continent that Britain helped liberate not once in the last century, but twice.

484 And we always wanted 2 things from the EU.

485 One: the creation of a vast single market; one we thought would benefit our economy  
486 enormously and spread prosperity throughout our neighbourhood.

487 And two: a Europe in which Britain helped the nations which languished under Communism  
488 return to the European fold; nations who still look to us as a friend and protector and do not want  
489 us to abandon them now.

490 We’ve got both of those things.

491 We did all that.

492 And imagine if we hadn’t been there.

493 Who would have driven forward the single market?

494 Who would have prevented Europe from becoming a protectionist bloc?

495 Who would have stopped the EU from becoming a single currency zone?

- 496 Who would have stood up and said no to those pushing for political union?
- 497 Who would have done these things?
- 498 Because the truth is that if we were not in it, the European Union would in all likelihood still exist.
- 499 So we would still have to deal with it.
- 500 Now we have the opportunity to have what we have always wanted: to be in the single market,
- 501 but out of the euro.
- 502 To be at the European Council, with our full voting and veto rights, but specifically exempted from
- 503 ever closer union.
- 504 To have the opportunity to work, live and travel in other EU countries, but to retain full controls at
- 505 our border.
- 506 To take part in the home affairs cooperation that benefits our security, but outside those
- 507 measures we don't like.
- 508 And to keep our currency.
- 509 That is, frankly, the best of both worlds.
- 510 No wonder our friends and allies want us to take it. To lead, not to quit.
- 511 It is what the Chinese call a win-win.
- 512 The Americans would probably say it's a slam dunk.
- 513 We are Britain.
- 514 No one seriously suggests any more that after 40 years in the EU, we have become less British.
- 515 We're proud. We're independent.
- 516 We get things done.
- 517 So, let's not walk away from the institutions that help us to win in the world.
- 518 Let's not walk away from the EU, any more than we would walk away from the UN, or from NATO.
- 519 We're bigger than that.
- 520 So, I say – instead, let us remain, let us fight our corner, let us play the part we should, as a great
- 521 power in the world, and a great and growing power in Europe.
- 522 That is the big, bold, and patriotic decision for Britain on 23 June.
- 523 [George Osborne- HM Treasury analysis on the EU referendum](#)
- 524 George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 18<sup>th</sup> of April 2016
- 525
- 526 Good morning.

527 It's great to be here at the brilliant National Composite Centre in Bristol, and good to be joined by  
528 my colleagues Liz, Stephen and Amber.

529 The engineers, scientists and designers who work here deliver world-leading research and  
530 innovation in composites for some of Britain's most important industries.

531 One sector that particularly benefits from the work of the National Composite Centre is  
532 aerospace. The South West is a great showcase for Britain's successful aerospace industry.

533 Half of everything our aerospace sector exports is sold to the European Union, and our aerospace  
534 industry relies on imports from Europe to make their finished products.

535 We're here to talk about Europe today.

536 In a little over two months' time the people of the United Kingdom will decide whether our  
537 country should remain in the European Union or leave it.

538 It's the biggest decision for a generation – one that will have profound consequences for our  
539 economy, for living standards and for Britain's role in the world.

540 But what many people are saying at the moment is that they don't have enough facts and  
541 information to make an informed decision.

542 And so it's up to all of us who fought so hard to give people this referendum, so they could take  
543 this momentous decision, to provide those facts and that information.

544 That's why today the government is publishing a comprehensive Treasury analysis of the long-  
545 term economic impact of EU membership and the alternatives.

546 This is a sober and serious look at the costs and benefits of remaining in the EU, or leaving it.

547 Not just for Britain, but for the individual families of Britain.

548 To put it simply: are you better off or worse off if Britain leaves the EU?

549 Has your family got more money each year, or less?

550 And is there more or less money available to your government to spend on public services and  
551 lower taxes?

552 To find the answer to those questions, the Treasury has gone back to first principles and looked at  
553 the current costs and benefits of our membership of the European Union – essentially what we  
554 put in and what we get out.

555 We've also looked at how that would change if the EU were to reform along the lines it has  
556 committed itself to.

557 And we've looked at the costs and benefits of leaving the European Union.

558 Not the immediate shock – a future Treasury study will look in detail at that.

559 But rather the long-term impact that our exit from the EU would have on family finances and the  
560 nation's finances.

- 561 We've done that by examining in detail what the alternatives to EU membership look like for  
562 Britain's economy. We know now pretty clearly what those alternatives might be, although we  
563 don't know which one Britain would pick, or our European neighbours would accept.
- 564 There's seeking membership of the European Economic Area, where you get access to part of the  
565 single market but you have to pay into the EU and accept free movement, without any say over  
566 either. That's the Norway model.
- 567 There's relying on our existing membership of the World Trade Organisation where, like Russia or  
568 Brazil, you put nothing into the EU but get nothing out in terms of preferential access. That's the  
569 WTO model.
- 570 And then there's the halfway house of trying to negotiate a bilateral trade deal with the EU,  
571 where you get some trade access but you're not part of the Single Market. That's the Canada  
572 model.
- 573 It's a complete fantasy to claim we could negotiate some other deal, where we have access to the  
574 EU's single market but don't have to accept the costs and obligations of EU membership. Other  
575 member states have made it very clear in recent weeks that's not on offer – and how could it be?
- 576 How could other European countries give us a better deal than they have given themselves?  
577 Never forget that while 44% of our exports go to the rest of the EU, less than 8% of their exports  
578 come to us.
- 579 So, in today's analysis we look at the costs and benefits of our existing membership of the EU, and  
580 test that against the three realistic alternative models – like that of Norway, the WTO and Canada.
- 581 Shortly I will ask my colleagues Liz, Stephen and Amber to go through each alternative in turn.
- 582 But first let me say something about the underlying economic assumptions that were made, and  
583 upon which the analysis rests.
- 584 We assume that the underlying objective of economic policy is to increase living standards  
585 through the creation of jobs, rising household incomes, and low and stable prices for consumers.
- 586 You may have other policy objectives that you think trump those objectives – but the purpose of  
587 economic policy is higher living standards.
- 588 It's well established in economic literature that those higher living standards are ultimately driven  
589 by long term improvements in productivity: in other words, increasing the value of what British  
590 workers produce per hour. And it is also a well-established doctrine of British economic thinking  
591 over centuries that greater economic openness and interconnectedness helps raise productivity.
- 592 That's because greater openness to trade and investment increases competition, enhances  
593 incentives for firms to innovate, and gives them access to finance – this enables them to invest  
594 and employ people, and it gives consumers access to more choice and lower prices.
- 595 Now I accept there are those who advocate a completely different economic approach – a closed,  
596 command economy, and no free trade or competition or private business.
- 597 But that's never been the consensus in Britain, or the rest of the world these last few decades.

- 598 And those most prominent in advocating our withdrawal from the EU do so, in part, with the  
599 claim it will lead to freer trade and freer markets – so they share these basic assumptions about  
600 the advantages of economic openness too.
- 601 In this document, the Treasury therefore assess the alternatives to EU membership, and see  
602 whether they enhance or diminish our economic openness and interconnectedness and by how  
603 much.
- 604 First, is market access increased or reduced? In other words, do British businesses and consumers  
605 face tariffs, quotas and unfair competition or other barriers?
- 606 Second, is Britain's economic influence enhanced or curtailed? What say do we have over the  
607 rules and standards that apply to the goods and services we trade in?
- 608 Third, are the costs to Britain greater or less? What do we end up paying for a different trading  
609 relationship? We know the answer to these tests with Britain's current membership of the EU.
- 610 When it comes to market access, there are no tariffs or quotas applied to British exports to the  
611 500 million consumers who live in the European Union.
- 612 But a Single Market is about more than the absence of quotas and tariffs – it means common  
613 standards, so there aren't invisible barriers and obstacles to trade.
- 614 So, for example, when a highly skilled car maker is building a car, they know it can be sold directly  
615 and without any hindrance into the continent of Europe.
- 616 It also means a British-based architect or engineer can get off the plane in Munich or Madrid and  
617 immediately start doing business.
- 618 And it means that any European airline can offer the best service at the best price to provide that  
619 journey.
- 620 That's what the Single Market means – and the Treasury analysis shows EU membership has  
621 increased trade with EU members by around three quarters.
- 622 Greater openness leading to higher productivity and rising living standards.
- 623 We also know that our current EU membership gives us influence over the rules and standards of  
624 that Single Market – we have votes over what they are, our Commissioners can help design them,  
625 our Ministers and elected MEPs can shape them, and on key issues like common tax standards we  
626 have an absolute veto.
- 627 But we are not in the single currency and we are not in the Schengen free border area – so we  
628 have a special status in the EU.
- 629 That gives us the best of both worlds: influence over the single market without the obligations  
630 that membership of the euro and open borders would bring.
- 631 And we know what the costs and the financial rewards of being in the EU are.
- 632 We pay into the EU budget, but our citizens, businesses and universities also receive money from  
633 the EU budget.
- 634 The net direct cost is equivalent to a little over 1 pence for every £1 we raise in taxes.

635 But we have also received over £1 trillion of overseas investment into Britain, much of it driven by  
636 the fact we are in the EU and its Single Market.

637 Indeed, we have received more of this overseas investment than any other EU member state –  
638 and that drives better jobs and rising living standards too, bringing money into the exchequer to  
639 spend on public services.

640 So, we know how our existing membership of the EU performs against these tests of openness  
641 and interconnectedness.

642 We also know the advantages that future reform of the EU can bring for Britain.

643 For the EU is not perfect. The Single Market can be expanded, the costs can be reduced, and the  
644 influence of Members States can be enhanced.

645 That's what the new settlement, negotiated by the Prime Minister, supported by the Cabinet,  
646 delivers.

647 The Treasury analysis shows that achieving EU-wide reforms to deepen the Single Market and  
648 complete major ongoing trade deals offers a huge prize for Britain.

649 It could add up to 4% to our GDP over the coming 15 years – that's thousands of pounds more for  
650 each British household.

651 So, Britain's membership of the European Union contributes to the openness of our economy –  
652 and that leads to higher quality jobs, rising living standards and lower prices.

653 And we know there will be better jobs, higher living standards and even lower prices if Europe  
654 reforms.

655 That's the future on offer if Britain remains in a reformed EU – a future where we are stronger,  
656 safer and better off.

657 What does the Treasury's rigorous economic analysis show about the alternatives?

658 Let me hand over to my colleagues Liz, Stephen and Amber. They will go through each of the  
659 alternative models – like that of Norway, the WTO and Canada – and look at what they would  
660 mean for British families.

661 **Elizabeth Truss, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs**

662 The document published today shows how one of the big advantages of being in the European  
663 Union is the ability we have to shape the rules.

664 Our record shows that reforms are more likely with Britain around the EU table:

665 Throughout the 80s we drove trade liberalisation in Europe, with action to break down barriers to  
666 the free movement of goods, services, capital and people which meant the creation of the Single  
667 Market as we know it today.

668 In the early 90s, it was Britain who pushed to dismantle national barriers to air travel and open  
669 Europe's air transport up to competition, which led to the creation of low cost carriers, and  
670 helped cut the cost of air travel by 40% in just 8 years.

- 671 And in the last decade it's been Britain pushing to deepen the Single Market in digital services –  
672 simplifying rules for cross-border online purchases, and supporting a package to end mobile  
673 roaming charges in the EU.
- 674 So, we've proven we can influence the rules from the inside. The question is could we shape them  
675 from the outside? If we left the EU some say we could be like Norway.
- 676 Norway isn't in the EU, but it is in another group called the European Economic Area
- 677 On paper, it looks pretty similar to our relationship with the EU.
- 678 We would still be in a European club – albeit a different one.
- 679 We'd still pay contributions to support other EU member states.
- 680 We'd still implement EU legislation.
- 681 But there would be a crucial difference.
- 682 We'd have no say over the rules.
- 683 Our Prime Minister would no longer have a seat at the European Council, where EU leaders take  
684 decisions about the future direction of the continent.
- 685 No British Minister would be there when farming issues were decided – or indeed any other issue  
686 that impacts our country.
- 687 We would have no vote in the Council of Ministers – the body where the 28 EU Member States  
688 decide on legislation.
- 689 But we'd still have to implement their decisions on the internal market, and follow their rules on  
690 State Aid and competition.
- 691 The current EEA members take this on the chin.
- 692 For Norway, that means losing a vote share that inside the EU would be worth 1%.
- 693 That's a pretty low price.
- 694 But what about Britain?
- 695 Our vote share would drop from one of the highest, alongside France and Germany, to zero.
- 696 Our strong, reforming voice would be silenced.
- 697 That's what I call a loss of British sovereignty.
- 698 But it's not just the lack of influence that worries me about the Norway model.
- 699 It's the fact that the EEA tariff-free trade doesn't cover key areas like the vast majority of  
700 agriculture and fisheries, so Britain's farmers would be hit.
- 701 It's the fact that EEA members aren't part of the EU customs union, so British firms would face  
702 new customs checks and bureaucracy if they wanted to trade with Europe.

- 703 Every time Norway exports a product to an EU country, they have to fill in a form with 50 boxes  
704 and guidance that is 78 pages long.
- 705 This must be frustrating for Norway, even though many of their exports are raw materials, making  
706 these forms easier to comply with. But it would be a nightmare for Britain as many of our exports  
707 are complex finished products like cars or machinery.
- 708 All this new bureaucracy would significantly reduce our openness and interconnectedness –  
709 reducing the competitiveness of British firms and acting as a drag on our productivity.
- 710 And being part of the EEA means still accepting EU regulations, contributing to the EU, and  
711 permitting the free movement of people,
- 712 So, if we decided to be like Norway, we'd have worse access to the Single Market. We'd keep  
713 paying into Brussels but we'd be a rule-taker instead of a rule-maker.
- 714 The Treasury has run the numbers and joining the EEA would significantly reduce our openness to  
715 trade, and as a result, productivity and investment would fall.
- 716 Let's be clear on this – because we know that increasing productivity is the key to increasing living  
717 standards. If productivity falls we will see lower wages in Britain; consumption will fall and people  
718 will be permanently poorer.
- 719 The analysis published today shows that following this path would mean a long-term reduction in  
720 GDP of around 4% every year.
- 721 And this long-term reduction in GDP will hit our tax receipts as people and businesses earn less.
- 722 The impact on tax receipts of joining the EEA would be £20 billion a year within 15 years' time.  
723 Not a one-off hit, but an ongoing painful reduction as our country raises less money, and has less  
724 money to spend on public services.
- 725 Those are the facts on the European Economic Area.
- 726 So, the analysis shows if we want to minimise the significant damage to our economy from  
727 leaving, we would, effectively, have to re-join another European club on worse terms – no vote,  
728 no power, still paying into the EU, and with much less protection against the abuse of free  
729 movement.
- 730 For a country the size of Britain, with the strong voting clout we already have in the EU, this would  
731 represent shooting ourselves in the foot.
- 732 **Stephen Crabb, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions**
- 733 Next, I want to talk to you about global trade. There are some who imply there's a tension  
734 between trading with Europe and trading with the rest of the world.
- 735 That is simply wrong. Both are good and we need to do both.
- 736 And that's exactly what we will do if we remain a member of the EU.
- 737 Yes, nearly half of our exports go to Europe, but our exports to the rest of the world have gone  
738 from £150 billion to £290 billion in just 10 years – that's a 95% increase.

739 And to those who say that's proof we don't need the EU, just look at where they've increased the  
740 most.

741 We currently benefit from trade deals the EU has negotiated with over 50 other countries.

742 And as today's document explains, those deals have been great for Britain.

743 Our exports to South Korea have grown by over 100% in just four years since the EU Free Trade  
744 Agreement was signed. Exports to Chile have grown almost 300% in a decade.

745 Those other countries will have given up a lot in negotiations to gain access to a bloc with 500  
746 million customers and a quarter of the world's GDP.

747 But if we vote to leave, we'll only have two years before all the trade deals we have via the EU  
748 would fall away. The clock would be ticking, yet renegotiating trade deals with more than 50  
749 countries as a single country would take many, many years.

750 And that's if we can even get the talks off the ground: the US Trade Representative recently said  
751 the United States is "not particularly in the market for free trade agreements with individual  
752 countries".

753 Some argue there's no need to worry – we could just fall back on the existing World Trade  
754 Organisation rules. Now let me be absolutely clear. The WTO is a brilliant organisation and one  
755 that Britain is proud to be a member of.

756 But their rules are a sort of 'minimum standard' for global trade – and they fall way short of the  
757 Single Market and Free Trade Agreements we currently access through the EU. Under WTO rules  
758 we'd face common export tariffs.

759 The EU would charge an average tariff of 36% on dairy products. 12% on fish. 12% on clothes. 10%  
760 on cars.

761 Our services exporters would be hit too – as they'd lose their automatic right not to be  
762 discriminated against through being part of the Single Market.

763 And we'd have to decide where to set British import tariffs.

764 Would we choose to set high tariffs on food, to protect British farmers?

765 Or would we set low tariffs on food, to protect British consumers?

766 Regardless of what we decided on import tariffs – there's a catch.

767 WTO rules would require us to offer the same tariff to all countries.

768 So, if we wanted to offer low tariffs to our neighbours in Ireland, we'd have to do the same for all  
769 other 160 countries in the WTO.

770 So, for example, we'd have to offer low tariffs to countries like Brazil and Argentina while they  
771 apply high tariffs on our key exports, like Scotch Whisky at 20% in Argentina, and cars at 35% in  
772 Brazil.

773 Trade deals are about give and take, but we'd have turned up to the table having already played  
774 all our cards. The analysis published today shows that the WTO scenario represents the most  
775 extreme break from the EU, and it is also the alternative that is the worst for the British economy.

776 The sharp reduction in trade would be accompanied by a reduction in foreign direct investment  
777 into the UK as we'd no longer have the same degree of unrestricted access to the EU Single  
778 Market of 500 million consumers. Think of all the global firms that have headquarters in the UK so  
779 they can sell into Europe – if we leave the EU, they could leave Britain.

780 The Treasury's rigorous analysis of the trade and investment impact of the WTO option shows  
781 that after 15 years Britain's economy would be around 7.5% smaller.

782 And the fiscal cost of the WTO option is the most painful of all – in the long term our country  
783 would have to cope with annual tax receipts that are £45 billion lower. Every year.

784 Conclusive proof that when it comes to trade, openness and economic growth, it's better to go for  
785 the best deal available rather than the lowest common denominator.

786 **Amber Rudd, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change**

787 As the document today explains, one of the most valuable benefits of EU membership for Britain  
788 is the Single Market. And that Single Market is not just in goods, but in services too.

789 So, what does a Single Market in services mean, and why does it matter?

790 It matters because 80% of our GDP comes from the services sector, and 80% of our workforce are  
791 employed in the services sector.

792 Britain is the country that designs the building, arranges the finance, insures the business, draws  
793 up the contract, produces the TV series, creates the advertising campaign and audits the  
794 accounts. High skilled service industries like these are vital for our future.

795 The Single Market means that all of our exports can be sold to Europe tariff-free.

796 And crucially it isn't just tariff barriers that the EU has eliminated for Britain.

797 The Single Market seeks to eradicate non-tariff barriers too. So a British architect or a British  
798 lawyer can go and work in any other European country and have their professional qualifications  
799 recognised.

800 And the creation of passporting rights in the 90s means that financial services firms like banks,  
801 insurers and investment managers can establish themselves anywhere in the EU, and trade across  
802 the whole Single Market, with lower cost and lower complexity.

803 The figures speak for themselves.

804 Our service industries are growing at a rate of nearly 3% a year on average.

805 Our services exports have increased from £130 billion to £220 billion in the past decade alone –  
806 with Europe being by far our biggest market.

807 I accept the European Single Market for services is not yet complete – that's why commitments to  
808 complete it formed such a key part of the Prime Minister's recent negotiation.

809 But the results clearly show that the Single Market has benefitted our services sector.

810 Now I want to look at the final alternative scenario the Treasury has modelled: a negotiated  
811 bilateral agreement.

812 They've looked closely at countries like Switzerland and Canada who've negotiated bilateral trade  
813 deals with the EU.

814 The Canada free trade agreement seems to be the most popular with those who want to leave, so  
815 let's look at its benefits and costs, and contrast it to EU membership.

816 It's been held up as the most comprehensive Free Trade Agreement the EU has ever made.

817 It's a vast, detailed agreement that runs to over 1500 pages – although 800 of those pages are  
818 exemptions and barriers to free trade.

819 And remember it's not in place just yet.

820 Canada spent 7 years negotiating the deal, waiting outside the door as those on the inside  
821 decided whether to agree.

822 But when it comes into force it may work well for Canada and for the EU.

823 However, I'm not so sure it would work well for us.

824 Their deal does offer some liberalisation in services it's true. But the Canadians export about a  
825 tenth of the value of services to Europe than we do.

826 And the Treasury analysis finds that around 50% of our service exporters would face materially  
827 less access to the EU market than they currently enjoy if we were to replicate the Canadian deal.

828 In addition, Canada doesn't have access to the financial services passport.

829 This would be a real problem for Britain. If we left the EU and lost access to passporting rights the  
830 evidence suggests that financial services jobs would move out of Britain.

831 But it's not just services where the Canadian deal wouldn't work for us.

832 On agriculture, key sectors are excluded from the Canadian deal.

833 Take beef for example. We currently export over 90,000 tonnes of beef a year to Europe tariff-  
834 free, and if we wanted to sell more then we could.

835 The Canadian agreement allows them a quota of 50,000 tonnes, above which they would be  
836 subject to some tariffs equivalent to around 70%.

837 If we voted to leave then a reciprocal deal would badly hurt British beef farmers.

838 And how about another example – cars. Our car manufacturing sector is thriving, but as you've  
839 already heard from Stephen, the EU places a 10% tariff on cars from outside the EU.

840 This would cost our industry more than £1 billion a year, and the Canadian deal only eliminates  
841 them after 7 years.

842 So even though the Canadian Free Trade model is put forward as the best and most  
843 comprehensive option by those who want to leave, it's clear there are some crucial gaps for a  
844 country like Britain.

845 The Treasury analysis published today shows that a Free Trade Arrangement like Canada's would  
846 have a significantly negative impact on our trade, investment and productivity.

847 After 15 years Britain's economy would be around 6% smaller, compared to 3.8% smaller were we  
848 to join the EEA.

849 So even the best bilateral trade deal the EU has agreed with an outside country is significantly  
850 worse than the access you'd get to the Single Market through the EEA.

851 **George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer**

852 So, you've heard today the serious and sober Treasury analysis, which sets out the costs and  
853 benefits of Britain's membership of the European Union.

854 The costs of accepting common European standards; and the benefit that gives us of unique  
855 access to a Single Market of 500 million people.

856 The costs of being one voice among many when it comes to setting those standards; and the  
857 benefits of the influence that gives us to shape those rules to our advantage, and extend our  
858 trade access around the world, so that when it comes to our economic environment, Britain is a  
859 rule-maker not a rule-taker.

860 The costs of directly contributing a little over 1 penny in every 1 pound of taxes; and the direct  
861 benefits of the billions of pounds of foreign investment which flow more to Britain than any other  
862 European country and boosts our public finances.

863 Deliver the economic reform we've agreed in the European Union, and the benefits are even  
864 clearer.

865 The analysis shows that our economy could be 4% greater if we extend that Single Market and do  
866 more free trade.

867 These economic costs and benefits of EU membership, with or without this brighter, positive  
868 future need to be weighed against the economic costs and benefits of all the plausible  
869 alternatives for Britain.

870 The Norway model – where we gain partial access to the Single Market, but face customs barriers  
871 and have no influence over the rules we're forced to abide by.

872 Where we lose trade and investment, but still have to pay into the EU and accept free movement  
873 of people. The WTO model, where barriers are erected by our nearest and most important  
874 markets, everything we make from food to cars to clothing and all the services we provide – with  
875 severe consequences for our industry and the size of our economy.

876 The Canadian model, where our services that make up 80% of our economy cannot do business  
877 freely with Europe, and the integrated supply chains that are a feature of our advanced  
878 manufacturing face customs barriers for the first time in half a century.

- 879 Under any of these alternative models of the kind of relationship Britain might have with its  
880 principal export markets our influence is diminished; we trade less; we receive less investment;  
881 our openness and interconnectedness to Europe is reduced.
- 882 And you'd have to believe that we could more than compensate for that loss of trade and  
883 investment with Europe, by increasing trade and investment with the rest of the world.
- 884 But the evidence shows that our trade deals with more than 50 other non-EU countries would be  
885 jeopardised, and our ability to influence global trade rules would be hugely reduced.
- 886 We'd do less trade with the rest of the world outside the EU, not more.
- 887 The Treasury has modelled the economic impact of alternatives to EU membership.
- 888 As you've heard from my colleagues, the biggest impact comes if we just rely on being a member  
889 of the WTO.
- 890 The least impact comes if we try to form a relationship like Norway, but then we have to pay into  
891 European budgets and accept free movement – the very things those who want to leave claim  
892 they want to be rid of.
- 893 That's why those most prominent in advocating British exit from the EU say we'd try to form an  
894 arrangement like Canada.
- 895 But we're not Canada – our comparative advantage is in services and advanced manufacturing.  
896 50% of all our services exports go to the continent of Europe.
- 897 So, the economic analysis shows that this Canada-style arrangement comes at a real economic  
898 cost for Britain.
- 899 The central estimate is that in the long run GDP would be over 6% smaller and Britain would be  
900 worse off by £4,300 per household.
- 901 The people of Britain want to know the facts before they vote on 23 June.
- 902 The Treasury's analysis steps away from the rhetoric and sets out the facts.
- 903 Britain would be permanently poorer if it left the European Union. Under any alternative, we'd  
904 trade less, do less business and receive less investment.
- 905 And the price would be paid by British families. Wages would be lower and prices would be  
906 higher.
- 907 And that means that Britain would be poorer by £4,300 per household.
- 908 That is £4,300 worse off every year, a bill paid year after year by the working people of Britain.
- 909 And that is the long-term cost – in the short term we'd face a profound economic shock and real  
910 instability. This Treasury analysis is serious and sober – and it's conclusive.
- 911 British families will pay a heavy economic price if we leave the EU.
- 912 And don't believe the flimsy claim that at least we would get some money back by not paying our  
913 1 penny in every £1 we raise in taxes to the European budget.

914 If we left the EU, we'd lose tens of billions of pounds in money for our public services, because our  
915 economy would be smaller and our families poorer.

916 The most likely bill our public services would pay if we left the EU is £36 billion.

917 That's the equivalent of 8 pence on the basic rate of income tax.

918 Higher taxes and a smaller economy is not a price worth paying.

919 Of course, I know there will be many attempts by those who advocate exit to dismiss this Treasury  
920 analysis.

921 But it's rigorous, it's rooted in the facts and its conclusions are similar to every other credible  
922 independent analysis done around the world – from the recent global outlook of the IMF to the  
923 academic research of the London School of Economics.

924 And I would conclude by saying this:

925 It is a perfectly honest position to say that Britain would be worse off but that is a price worth  
926 paying.

927 But don't pretend to the British people that leaving the EU comes at no economic cost.

928 There is a price to be paid if we leave – a £4,300 price that families will pay year after year.

929 Don't let's leave the EU on a false prospectus.

930 Let's have the facts and the figures in front of us as we all make this huge decision on 23 June.

931 For me, in the end, it's not just about the economics. It's about who we are as a country.

932 The Britain I love is open, confident in its values and ready to shape the future of our world.

933 I don't want Britain to be like Norway or like Canada or anyone else.

934 I want us to be like the Great Britain we are.

935 Strong. Proud. Prosperous.

936 Stronger, safer and better off in the European Union.

937

938 Boris Johnson- The liberal cosmopolitan case to Vote Leave  
939 MP Boris Johnson, 9<sup>th</sup> of May 2016

940

941 I am pleased that this campaign has so far been relatively free of personal abuse – and long may it  
942 so remain – but the other day someone insulted me in terms that were redolent of 1920s Soviet  
943 Russia. He said that I had no right to vote Leave, because I was in fact a "liberal cosmopolitan".

944 That rocked me, at first, and then I decided that as insults go, I didn't mind it at all – because it  
945 was probably true. And so, I want this morning to explain why the campaign to Leave the EU is  
946 attracting other liberal spirits and people I admire such as David Owen, and Gisela Stuart, Nigel

- 947 Lawson, John Longworth – people who love Europe and who feel at home on the continent, but  
948 whose attitudes towards the project of European Union have been hardening over time.
- 949 For many of us who are now deeply sceptical, the evolution has been roughly the same: we began  
950 decades ago to query the anti-democratic absurdities of the EU. Then we began to campaign for  
951 reform, and were excited in 2013 by the Prime Minister's Bloomberg speech; and then quietly  
952 despaired as no reform was forthcoming. And then thanks to the referendum given to this  
953 country by David Cameron we find that a door has magically opened in our lives.
- 954 We can see the sunlit meadows beyond. I believe we would be mad not to take this once in a  
955 lifetime chance to walk through that door because the truth is it is not we who have changed. It is  
956 the EU that has changed out of all recognition; and to keep insisting that the EU is about  
957 economics is like saying the Italian Mafia is interested in olive oil and real estate.
- 958 It is true, but profoundly uninformative about the real aims of that organization. What was once  
959 the EEC has undergone a spectacular metamorphosis in the last 30 years, and the crucial point is  
960 that it is still becoming ever more centralizing, interfering and anti-democratic.
- 961 You only have to read the Lisbon Treaty – whose constitutional provisions were rejected by three  
962 EU populations, the French, the Dutch and the Irish – to see how far this thing has moved on from  
963 what we signed up for in 1972. Brussels now has exclusive or explicit competence for trade,  
964 customs, competition, agriculture, fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-  
965 European networks, energy, the areas of freedom, security and justice, and new powers over  
966 culture, tourism, education and youth. The EU already has considerable powers to set rates of  
967 indirect taxation across the whole 28-nation territory, and of course it has total control of  
968 monetary policy for all 19 in the eurozone.
- 969 In recent years Brussels has acquired its own foreign minister, its own series of EU embassies  
970 around the world, and is continuing to develop its own defence policy. We have got to stop trying  
971 to kid the British people; we have got to stop saying one thing in Brussels, and another thing to  
972 the domestic audience; we have got to stop the systematic campaign of subterfuge – to conceal  
973 from the public the scale of the constitutional changes involved. We need to look at the legal  
974 reality, which is that this is a continuing and accelerating effort to build a country called Europe.
- 975 Look at that list of Lisbon competences – with 45 new fields of policy where Britain can be  
976 outvoted by a qualified majority – and you can see why the House of Commons Library has  
977 repeatedly confirmed that when you add primary and secondary legislation together the EU is  
978 now generating 60 per cent of the laws passing through parliament.
- 979 The independence of this country is being seriously compromised. It is this fundamental  
980 democratic problem – this erosion of democracy - that brings me into this fight.
- 981 People are surprised and alarmed to discover that our gross contributions to the EU budget are  
982 now running at about £20bn a year, and that the net contribution is £10 bn; and it is not just that  
983 we have no control over how that money is spent.
- 984 No one has any proper control – which is why EU spending is persistently associated with fraud.  
985 Of course the Remain campaign dismisses this UK contribution as a mere bagatelle – even though  
986 you could otherwise use it to pay for a new British hospital every week. But that expense is, in a  
987 sense, the least of the costs inflicted by the EU on this country.

- 988 It is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public  
989 that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands – and then find that they miss their targets  
990 by hundreds of thousands, so that we add a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all  
991 the extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services.
- 992 In our desperation to meet our hopeless so-called targets, we push away brilliant students from  
993 Commonwealth countries, who want to pay to come to our universities; we find ourselves hard  
994 pressed to recruit people who might work in our NHS, as opposed to make use of its services –  
995 because we have absolutely no power to control the numbers who are coming with no job offers  
996 and no qualifications from the 28 EU countries. I am in favour of immigration; but I am also in  
997 favour of control, and of politicians taking responsibility for what is happening; and I think it  
998 bewilders people to be told that this most basic power of a state – to decide who has the right to  
999 live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels.
- 1000 And, as I say, that is only one aspect of a steady attrition of the rights of the people to decide their  
1001 priorities, and to remove, at elections, those who take the decisions. It is sad that our powers of  
1002 economic self-government have become so straitened that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has  
1003 to go around personally asking other finance ministers to allow him to cut VAT on tampons, and  
1004 as far as I can see we still have not secured consent.
- 1005 It is very worrying that the European Court of Justice – Luxembourg, not Strasbourg – should now  
1006 be freely adjudicating on human rights questions, and whether or not this country has the right to  
1007 deport people the Home Office believes are a threat to our security; and it is peculiar that the  
1008 government is now straining at the gnat of the Convention and the Strasbourg court, whose  
1009 rulings are not actually binding on UK courts, while swallowing the camel of the 55-article charter  
1010 of Fundamental rights, which is fully justiciable by the European Court in Luxembourg, when you  
1011 consider that it is the rulings of this court that are binding and that must be applied by every court  
1012 in this country, including parliament.
- 1013 It is absurd that Britain – historically a great free-trading nation – has been unable for 42 years to  
1014 do a free trade deal with Australia, New Zealand, China, India and America.
- 1015 It is above all bizarre for the Remain campaign to say that after the UK agreement of February we  
1016 are now living in a “reformed” EU, when there has been not a single change to EU competences,  
1017 not a single change to the Treaty, nothing on agriculture, nothing on the role of the court, nothing  
1018 of any substance on borders – nothing remotely resembling the agenda for change that was  
1019 promised in the 2013 Bloomberg speech.
- 1020 In that excellent speech, the Prime Minister savaged the EU’s lack of competitiveness, its  
1021 remoteness from the voters, its relentless movement in the wrong direction.
- 1022 As he said - ‘The biggest danger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate  
1023 change, but from those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has  
1024 experience of heretics who turned out to have a point.
- 1025 ‘More of the same will not see the European Union keeping pace with the new powerhouse  
1026 economies. More of the same will not bring the European Union any closer to its citizens. More of  
1027 the same will just produce more of the same - less competitiveness, less growth, fewer jobs.
- 1028 ‘And that will make our countries weaker not stronger.
- 1029 That is why we need fundamental, far-reaching change.’

- 1030 He was right then.
- 1031 We were told that there had to be “fundamental reform” and “full-on” Treaty change that would  
1032 happen “before the referendum” – or else the government was willing to campaign to Leave.
- 1033 And that is frankly what the government should now be doing. If you look at what we were  
1034 promised, and what we got, the Government should logically be campaigning on our side today.
- 1035 We were told many times – by the PM, Home Sec and Chancellor - that we were going to get real  
1036 changes to the law on free movement, so that you needed to have a job lined up before you could  
1037 come here. We got no such change.
- 1038 We were told that we would get a working opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Human  
1039 Rights – which by the way gives the European Court the power to determine the application of  
1040 the 1951 Convention on Refugees and Asylum, as well as extradition, child protection and victims’  
1041 rights. We got nothing.
- 1042 We were told that we would be able to stop the Eurozone countries from using the EU institutions  
1043 to create a fiscal and political union. Instead we gave up our veto.
- 1044 The Five Presidents’ report makes it clear that as soon as the UK referendum is out of the way,  
1045 they will proceed with new structures of political and fiscal integration that this country should  
1046 have no part in, but which will inevitably involve us, just as we were forced – in spite of promises  
1047 to the contrary – to take part in the bail-out of Greece. They want to go ahead with new EU rules  
1048 on company law, and property rights and every aspect of employment law and even taxation –  
1049 and we will be dragged in.
- 1050 To call this a reformed EU is an offence against the Trades Descriptions Act, or rather the EU  
1051 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive that of course replaced the Trades Descriptions Act in 2008.  
1052 The EU system is a ratchet hauling us ever further into a federal structure.
- 1053 We have proved to ourselves time and again that we cannot change the direction. We cannot  
1054 change the pace. We cannot interrupt the steady erosion of democracy, and given that we do not  
1055 accept the destination it is time to tell our friends and partners, in a spirit of the utmost cordiality,  
1056 that we wish to forge a new relationship based on free trade and intergovernmental cooperation.
- 1057 We need to Vote Leave on June 23, and in the meantime, we must deal with the three big myths  
1058 that are peddled by the Remain campaign.
- 1059 The first is the so-called economic argument. The Remainers accept that there is a loss of political  
1060 independence, but they claim that this trade-off is economically beneficial.
- 1061 The second argument we might broadly call the peace-in-Europe argument – that the EU is  
1062 associated with 70 years of stability, and we need to stay in to prevent German tanks crossing the  
1063 French border.
- 1064 The third argument is more abstract, but potent with some people. It is that you can’t really want  
1065 to leave the EU without being in some way anti-European, and that the Remain camp therefore  
1066 have a monopoly on liberal cosmopolitanism.
- 1067 All three arguments are wholly bogus.

1068 The most important mistake is to think that there is some effective and sensible trade-off  
1069 between the loss of democratic control and greater economic prosperity. The whole thrust of the  
1070 Remain argument is that there is a democratic cost, but an economic benefit – that if we accept  
1071 that 60 per cent of our laws are made in Brussels, we will see some great boost in our trade and  
1072 our exports and in the overall economic performance of the EU. This is turning out to be simply  
1073 false.

1074 The loss of democratic control is spiritually damaging, and socially risky – and the economic  
1075 benefits of remaining subject to the Single Market law-making machine, as opposed to having  
1076 access to the Single Market, are in fact very hard to detect.

1077 What the government wants is for us to remain locked into the Single Market law-making regime,  
1078 and to be exposed to 2500 new EU regulations a year. What we want is for Britain to be like many  
1079 other countries in having free-trade access to the territory covered by the Single Market – but not  
1080 to be subject to the vast, growing and politically-driven empire of EU law.

1081 There is a good deal of evidence that this is the more sensible position to be in. Take the two  
1082 relevant 20 year periods, before and after the creation of the Single Market, in other words from  
1083 1973 to 1992, and from 1992 to 2012.

1084 Now when the single market dawned, we were told that it was going to be a great dynamo of job  
1085 and wealth creation – 800 billion euros, the Cecchini report said, of extra European GDP. We were  
1086 told that it was going to send exports whizzing ever faster across borders. So what happened?

1087 Did Britain export more to the rest of the EEC 11, as a result of the Single Market? On the  
1088 contrary, the rate of growth slowed, as Michael Burrage has shown this year. British exports of  
1089 goods were actually 22 per cent lower, at the end of the second 20-year period, than if they had  
1090 continued to grow at the rate of the 20 years pre-1992. And before you say that this might be just  
1091 a result of Britain's sluggish performance in the export of manufactured goods, the same failure  
1092 was seen in the case of the 12 EEC countries themselves.

1093 We were told that goods would start pinging around the EEC as if in some supercharged  
1094 cyclotron; and on the contrary, the rate of growth flattened again – 14.6 per cent lower than the  
1095 previous 20 years when there was no single market.

1096 So, what was the decisive advantage to Britain, or any other country, of being inside this system,  
1097 and accepting these thousands of one-size-fits-all regulations? In fact you could argue that many  
1098 countries were better off being outside, and not subject to the bureaucracy. In the period of  
1099 existence of this vaunted single market, from 1992 to 2011, there were 27 non-EU countries  
1100 whose exports of goods to the rest of the EU grew faster than the UK's; and most embarrassingly  
1101 of all – there were 21 countries who did better than the UK in exporting services to the other EEC  
1102 11.

1103 So where was this great European relaunch that was supposed to be driven by the 1992 Single  
1104 Market? In the 20 years since the start of the Single Market, the rate of growth in the EU  
1105 countries has actually been outstripped by the non-EU countries of the OECD. It is the  
1106 independent countries that have done better; and the EU has been a microclimate of  
1107 scandalously high unemployment. This year the US is projected to grow by 2.4 per cent, China by  
1108 6.5 pc, NZ by 2 pc, Australia by 2.5 pc and India by 7.5 pc. The Eurozone – 1.5 per cent.

1109 All that extra growth we were promised; all those extra jobs. The claims made for the Single  
1110 Market are looking increasingly fraudulent. It has not boosted the rate of British exports to the

1111 EU; it has not even boosted growth in exports between the EU 12; and it has not stopped a  
1112 generation of young people – in a huge belt of Mediterranean countries – from being thrown on  
1113 to the scrapheap.

1114 What has that corpus of EU regulation done to drive innovation? There are more patents from  
1115 outside the EU now being registered at the EU patent office than from within the EU itself. The  
1116 Eurozone has no universities within the top 20, and has been woefully left behind by America in  
1117 the tech revolution – in spite of all those directives I remember from the 1990s about les reseaux  
1118 telematiques; or possibly, of course, the EU has been left behind on tech precisely because of  
1119 those directives.

1120 There are plenty of other parts of the world where the free market and competition has been  
1121 driving down the cost of mobile roaming charges and cut-price airline tickets – without the need  
1122 for a vast supranational bureaucracy enforced by a supranational court.

1123 I hear again the arguments from the City of London, and the anxieties that have been expressed.  
1124 We heard them 15 years ago, when many of the very same Remainers prophesied disaster for the  
1125 City of London if we failed to join the euro. They said all the banks would flee to Frankfurt. Well,  
1126 Canary Wharf alone is now far bigger than the Frankfurt financial centre – and has kept growing  
1127 relentlessly since the crash of 2008.

1128 As for the argument that we need the muscle of EU membership, if we are to do trade deals –  
1129 well, look, as I say, at the results after 42 years of membership. The EU has done trade deals with  
1130 the Palestinian authority and San Marino. Bravo. But it has failed to conclude agreements with  
1131 India, China or even America.

1132 Why? Because negotiating on behalf of the EU is like trying to ride a vast pantomime horse, with  
1133 28 people blindly pulling in different directions. For decades deals with America have been  
1134 blocked by the French film industry, and the current TTIP negotiations are stalled at least partly  
1135 because Greek feta cheese manufacturers object to the concept of American feta. They may be  
1136 right, aesthetically, but it should not be delaying us in this country.

1137 Global trade is not carried on by kind permission of people like Peter Mandelson. People and  
1138 businesses trade with each other, and always will, as long as they have something to buy and sell.

1139 But it is notable that even when the EU has done a trade deal, it does not always seem to work in  
1140 Britain's favour. In ten out of the last 15 deals, British trade with our partners has actually slowed  
1141 down, rather than speeded up, after the deal was done.

1142 Is that because of some defect in us, or in the deal? Could it be that the EU officials did not take  
1143 account of the real interests of the UK economy, which is so different in structure from France  
1144 and Germany? And might that be because the sole and entire responsibility for UK trade policy is  
1145 in the hands of the EU commission – a body where only 3.6 per cent of the officials actually come  
1146 from this country?

1147 In trying to compute the costs and benefits of belonging to the Single Market, we should surely  
1148 add the vast opportunity cost of not being able to do free trade deals with the most lucrative and  
1149 fastest-growing markets in the world – because we are in the EU.

1150 When you consider that only 6 per cent of UK business export to the EU 28; and when you  
1151 consider that 100 per cent of our businesses – large and small – must comply with every jot and  
1152 tittle of regulation; and when you consider that the costs of this regulation are estimated at

1153 £600m per week, I am afraid you are driven to the same conclusion as Wolfgang Munchau, the  
1154 economics commentator of the FT, who said, “whatever the reasons may be for remaining in the  
1155 EU, they are not economic.”

1156 And so, I return to my point; that we must stop the pretence. This is about politics, and a political  
1157 project that is now getting out of control. To understand our predicament, and the trap we are in,  
1158 we need to go back to the immediate post-war period, and the agony and shame of a broken  
1159 continent.

1160 There were two brilliant Frenchmen – a wheeler-dealing civil servant with big American  
1161 connexions called Jean Monnet, and a French foreign minister called Robert Schuman. They  
1162 wanted to use instruments of economic integration to make war between France and Germany  
1163 not just a practical but a psychological impossibility.

1164 It was an exercise in what I believe used to be called behavioural therapy; inducing a change in  
1165 the underlying attitudes by forcing a change in behaviour. Their inspired idea was to weave a cat’s  
1166 cradle of supranational legislation that would not only bind the former combatants together, but  
1167 create a new sensation of European-ness.

1168 As Schuman put it, “Europe will be built through concrete achievements which create a de facto  
1169 solidarity.” Jean Monnet believed that people would become “in mind European”, and that this  
1170 primarily functional and regulatory approach would produce a European identity and a European  
1171 consciousness.

1172 Almost 60 years after the Treaty of Rome, I do not see many signs that this programme is working.  
1173 The European elites have indeed created an ever-denser federal system of government, but at a  
1174 pace that far exceeds the emotional and psychological readiness of the peoples of Europe. The  
1175 reasons are obvious.

1176 There is simply no common political culture in Europe; no common media, no common sense of  
1177 humour or satire; and – this is important – no awareness of each other’s politics, so that the  
1178 European Union as a whole has no common sense of the two things you need for a democracy to  
1179 work efficiently. You need trust, and you need shame. There is no trust, partly for the obvious  
1180 reason that people often fail to understand each other’s languages. There is no shame, because it  
1181 is not clear who you are letting down if you abuse the EU system.

1182 That is why there is such cavalier waste and theft of EU funds: because it is everybody’s money, it  
1183 is nobody’s money.

1184 If you walk around London today, you will notice that the 12-star flag of the EU is flying all over  
1185 the place. That is because this is Schuman day. It is the birthday of the founder of this project, and  
1186 the elites have decreed that it should be properly marked.

1187 Do we feel loyalty to that flag? Do our hearts pitter-patter as we watch it flutter over public  
1188 buildings? On the contrary. The British share with other EU populations a growing sense of  
1189 alienation, which is one of the reasons turn-out at European elections continues to decline.

1190 As Jean-Claude Juncker has himself remarked with disapproval, “too many Europeans are  
1191 returning to a national or regional mindset”. In the face of that disillusionment, the European  
1192 elites are doing exactly the wrong thing. Instead of devolving power, they are centralizing.

1193 Instead of going with the grain of human nature and public opinion, they are reaching for the  
1194 same corrective behavioural therapy as Monnet and Schuman: more legislation, more federal  
1195 control; and whenever there is a crisis of any kind the cry is always the same. "More Europe, more  
1196 Europe!"

1197 What did they do when the Berlin wall came down, and the French panicked about the  
1198 inevitability of German unification? "More Europe!" And what are they saying now, when the  
1199 ensuing single currency has become a disaster? "More Europe!"

1200 They persist in the delusion that political cohesion can be created by a forcible economic  
1201 integration, and they are achieving exactly the opposite. What is the distinctive experience of the  
1202 people of Greece, over the last eight years? It is a complete humiliation, a sense of powerlessness.  
1203 The suicide rate has risen by 35 per cent; life expectancy has actually fallen. Youth unemployment  
1204 is around 50 per cent. It is an utter disgrace to our continent.

1205 That is what happens when you destroy democracy. Do the Greeks feel warmer towards the  
1206 Germans? Do they feel a community of interest? Of course not.

1207 In Austria, the far-right have just won an election for the first time since the 1930s. The French  
1208 National Front are on the march in France, and Marine le Pen may do well in the Presidential  
1209 elections. You could not say that EU integration is promoting either mutual understanding or  
1210 moderation, and the economic consequence range from nugatory to disastrous.

1211 The answer to the problems of Europe today is not "more Europe", if that means more forcible  
1212 economic and political integration. The answer is reform, and devolution of powers back to  
1213 nations and people, and a return to intergovernmentalism, at least for this country – and that  
1214 means Vote Leave on June 23.

1215 And of course, there will be some in this country who are rightly troubled by a sense of  
1216 neighbourly duty. There are Remainers who may agree with much of the above; that the  
1217 economic advantages for Britain are either overstated or non-existent. But they feel uneasy about  
1218 pulling out of the EU in its hour of need, when our neighbours are in distress; and at this point  
1219 they deploy the so-called "Peace in Europe" argument: that if Britain leaves the EU, there will be a  
1220 return to slaughter on Flanders Fields.

1221 I think this grossly underestimates the way Europe has changed, and the NATO guarantee that has  
1222 really underpinned peace in Europe. I saw the disaster when the EU was charged with sorting out  
1223 former Yugoslavia, and I saw how NATO sorted it out.

1224 And it understates the sense in which it is the EU itself, and its anti-democratic tendencies that  
1225 are now a force for instability and alienation.

1226 Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for some  
1227 member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are  
1228 intensifying and not diminishing.

1229 In the next six weeks, we must politely but relentlessly put the following questions to the Prime  
1230 Minister and to the Remain campaign...

1231 1 How can you possibly control EU immigration into this country?

1232 2 The Living Wage is an excellent policy, but how will you stop it being a big pull factor for  
1233 uncontrolled EU migration, given that it is far higher than minimum wages in other EU countries?

- 1234 3 How will you prevent the European Court from interfering further in immigration, asylum,  
1235 human rights, and all kinds of matters which have nothing to do with the so-called Single Market?
- 1236 4 Why did you give up the UK veto on further moves towards a fiscal and political union?
- 1237 5 How can you stop us from being dragged in, and from being made to pay?
- 1238 The answer is that the Remain campaign have no answers to any of these questions, because they  
1239 are asking us to remain in an EU that is wholly unreformed, and going in the wrong direction.
- 1240 If we leave on June 23, we can still provide leadership in so many areas. We can help lead the  
1241 discussions on security, on counter-terrorism, on foreign and defence policy, as we always have.  
1242 But all those conversation can be conducted within an intergovernmental framework, and  
1243 without the need for legal instruments enforced by the European Court of Justice. We will still be  
1244 able to cooperate on the environment, on migration, on science and technology; we will still have  
1245 exchanges of students.
- 1246 We will trade as much as ever before, if not more. We will be able to love our fellow Europeans,  
1247 marry them, live with them, share the joy of discovering our different cultures and languages –  
1248 but we will not be subject to the jurisdiction of a single court and legal system that is proving  
1249 increasingly erratic and that is imitated by no other trading group.
- 1250 We will not lose influence in Europe or around the world – on the contrary, you could argue we  
1251 will gain in clout. We are already drowned out around the table in Brussels; we are outvoted far  
1252 more than any other country – 72 times in the last 20 years, and ever more regularly since 2010;  
1253 and the Eurozone now has a built-in majority on all questions.
- 1254 We will recapture or secure our voice – for the 5th biggest economy in the world – in  
1255 international bodies such as the WTO or the IMF or the CITES, where the EU is increasingly  
1256 replacing us and laying a claim to speak on our behalf. If you want final and conclusive proof of  
1257 our inability to “get our way” in Brussels – and the contempt with which we will be treated if we  
1258 vote to Remain – look again at the UK deal and the total failure to secure any change of any  
1259 significance.
- 1260 Above all – to get to the third key point of the Remainers – if we leave the EU we will not, repeat  
1261 not, be leaving Europe. Of all the arguments they make, this is the one that infuriates me the  
1262 most. I am a child of Europe. I am a liberal cosmopolitan and my family is a genetic UN  
1263 peacekeeping force.
- 1264 I can read novels in French and I can sing the Ode to joy in German, and if they keep accusing me  
1265 of being a Little Englander, I will. Both as editor of the Spectator and Mayor of London I have  
1266 promoted the teaching of modern European languages in our schools. I have dedicated much of  
1267 my life to the study of the origins of our common – our common -European culture and  
1268 civilization in ancient Greece and Rome.
- 1269 So, I find it offensive, insulting, irrelevant and positively cretinous to be told – sometimes by  
1270 people who can barely speak a foreign language – that I belong to a group of small-minded  
1271 xenophobes; because the truth is it is Brexit that is now the great project of European liberalism,  
1272 and I am afraid that it is the European Union – for all the high ideals with which it began, that now  
1273 represents the ancient regime.

- 1274 It is we who are speaking up for the people, and it is they who are defending an obscurantist and  
1275 universalist system of government that is now well past its sell by date and which is ever more  
1276 remote from ordinary voters.
- 1277 It is we in the Leave Camp – not they – who stand in the tradition of the liberal cosmopolitan  
1278 European enlightenment – not just of Locke and Wilkes, but of Rousseau and Voltaire; and though  
1279 they are many, and though they are well-funded, and though we know that they can call on  
1280 unlimited taxpayer funds for their leaflets, it is we few, we happy few who have the inestimable  
1281 advantage of believing strongly in our cause, and that we will be vindicated by history; and we will  
1282 win for exactly the same reason that the Greeks beat the Persians at Marathon – because they are  
1283 fighting for an outdated absolutist ideology, and we are fighting for freedom.
- 1284 That is the choice on June 23
- 1285 It is between taking back control of our money – or giving a further £100bn to Brussels before the  
1286 next election
- 1287 Between deciding who we want to come here to live and work – or letting the EU decide
- 1288 Between a dynamic liberal cosmopolitan open global free-trading prosperous Britain, or a Britain  
1289 where we remain subject to a undemocratic system devised in the 1950s that is now actively  
1290 responsible for low growth and in some cases economic despair
- 1291 Between believing in the possibility of hope and change in Europe – or accepting that we have no  
1292 choice but to knuckle under
- 1293 It is a choice between getting dragged ever further into a federal super state, or taking a stand  
1294 now
- 1295 Vote Leave on June 23, and take back control of our democracy.
- 1296
- 1297 Michael Gove- The Facts of Life Say Leave: Why Britain and Europe will be better  
1298 off after we vote leave  
1299 Michael Gove MP 19 April 2016
- 1300 One of the most striking things about the debate on Britain's future relationship with Europe is  
1301 that the case for staying is couched overwhelmingly in negative and pessimistic terms, while the  
1302 case for leaving is positive and optimistic.
- 1303 Those of us who want to Leave believe Britain's best days lie ahead, that our country has  
1304 tremendous untapped potential which independence would unleash and our institutions, values  
1305 and people would make an even more positive difference to the world if we're unshackled from  
1306 the past.
- 1307 In contrast, the In campaign want us to believe that Britain is beaten and broken, that it can't  
1308 survive without the help of Jean-Claude Juncker and his Commission looking after us and if we  
1309 dare to assert ourselves then all the terrors of the earth will be unleashed upon our head. It treats  
1310 people like children, unfit to be trusted and easily scared by ghost stories.
- 1311 RESTORING A SENSE OF PROPORTION TO THE DEBATE

1312 Indeed, if you listen to some of those campaigning for Britain to stay in the European Union, you  
1313 would think that for Britain to leave would be to boldly go where no man has gone before.

1314 In fact, of course, it would be to join the overwhelming majority of countries which choose to  
1315 govern themselves. The In campaign ask repeatedly 'what does out look like?' - as if the idea of  
1316 governing ourselves is some extraordinary and novel proposition that requires a fresh a priori  
1317 justification.

1318 Democratic self-government, the form of Government we in Britain actually invented, has been a  
1319 roaring success for most of the nations who've adopted it. While we enjoyed democratic self-  
1320 government we developed the world's strongest economy, its most respected political  
1321 institutions, its most tolerant approach towards refugees, its best publicly funded health service  
1322 and its most respected public broadcaster.

1323 Under democratic self-government countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA and New Zealand  
1324 all enjoy excellent economic growth, global influence, the ability to control their own borders, to  
1325 act independently either to close their borders or open them to more refugees, and strong,  
1326 durable, trusted security links.

1327 And democratic self-government has manifestly brought benefits to India, Japan, Norway,  
1328 Switzerland, South Africa, South Korea and scores of other nations all making their way in the  
1329 world.

1330 **STAYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IS THE REAL DANGER**

1331 Indeed, the truth is that it is membership of an organisation like the European Union which is an  
1332 anomaly today.

1333 The former President of the Commission himself, Manuel Barroso, likes to describe the EU as an  
1334 'empire ... because we have the dimension of empires'. The facts suggest he has a point though  
1335 not quite the one he intended.

1336 It is a fact that the EU is a multi-national federation with no democratically elected leader or  
1337 Government, with policies decided by a central bureaucracy, with a mock parliament which  
1338 enjoys no popular mandate for action and with peripheries which are either impoverished or  
1339 agitating for secession.

1340 It's a fact that also describes Austria-Hungary under the Habsburgs, the Russian Empire under  
1341 Nicholas the Second, Rome under its later Emperors or the Ottoman Empire in its final years.

1342 It is hardly a model for either economic dynamism or social progress. Which is why we should not  
1343 be surprised that the countries of the EU are proving neither particularly economically dynamic or  
1344 socially progressive.

1345 It's a fact that youth unemployment in Spain is 45.3%, in Portugal it is 30.0%, and in Greece it is  
1346 51.9%.3 It's a fact that in Spain, Portugal and Greece eurozone austerity policies have meant  
1347 cutting spending on health, welfare and public services.

1348 It's a fact that not a single one of the world's top 20 universities is in the Eurozone.

1349 It's a fact that euro bailouts have meant taxpayers money from across the EU has gone into  
1350 paying off the bankers who got European nations into a mess in the first place.

- 1351 And yet we are somehow expected to believe that if Britain left the organisation which gave us  
1352 the economic disaster of the euro and turned the world's richest continent into its slowest  
1353 growing, that it's this country which would be acting irrationally.
- 1354 The only thing that's irrational is the picture the In campaign paints of life as an independent  
1355 nation.
- 1356 Some of the In campaigners seek to imply, insinuate and sometimes just declare, that if we left  
1357 the EU we would not be able to take the train or fly cheaply to European nations. If, by some  
1358 miracle, we somehow managed to make it to distant Calais or exotic Boulogne we would find that  
1359 - unique among developed nations - our mobile telephones would no longer work. And heaven  
1360 help us if we fell ill, as citizens from a country outside the EU we would be barred from all of  
1361 Europe's hospitals and left to expire unmourned in some foreign field.
- 1362 But the consequences wouldn't end with the Continent becoming a no-go zone. According to  
1363 some In campaigners, independence also means the devastation of large areas of our national  
1364 life. Our football teams would be denuded of foreign players, so Premier league matches would  
1365 have to become - at best - five-a-side contests. And we'd better not schedule those fixtures for  
1366 dark evenings because there'd be no electricity left for the floodlights after our energy supplies  
1367 would had suffered a shock akin to the meltdown of a nuclear power plant.
- 1368 The City of London would become a ghost town, our manufacturing industries would be  
1369 sanctioned more punitively than even communist North Korea, decades would pass before a  
1370 single British Land Rover or Mr Kipling cake could ever again be sold in France and in the  
1371 meantime our farmers would have been driven from the land by poverty worse than the Potato  
1372 Famine. To cap it all, an alliance of Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump, emboldened  
1373 by our weakness, would, like some geopolitical equivalent of the Penguin, Catwoman and the  
1374 Joker, be liberated to spread chaos worldwide and subvert our democracy.
- 1375 I sometimes think that the In campaign appears to be operating to a script written by George R.R.  
1376 Martin and Stephen King - Brexit would mean a combination of a Feast for Crows and Misery.
- 1377 It's a deeply pessimistic view of the British people's potential and a profoundly negative vision of  
1378 the future which isn't rooted in reality.
- 1379 The idea that if Britain voted to leave the European Union we would instantly become some sort  
1380 of hermit kingdom, a North Atlantic North Korea only without that country's fund of international  
1381 good will, is a fantasy, a phantom, a great, grotesque patronising and preposterous Peter  
1382 Mandelsonian conceit that imagines the people of this country are mere children, capable of  
1383 being frightened into obedience by conjuring up new bogeymen every night.
- 1384 **LEAVING MEANS A FRESH START**
- 1385 The truth is that the day after Britain voted to leave the European Union we would not fall off the  
1386 edge of the world or find the English Channel replaced by a sulphurous ocean of burning pitch.
- 1387 Quite the opposite. We would be starting a process, a happy journey to a better future. But,  
1388 crucially, a journey where we would be in control, whose pace and direction we would determine  
1389 for ourselves. And whose destination we could choose.
- 1390 By contrast, if we stay in the EU we give up control. Because just as leaving is a process, not an  
1391 event, so staying in the EU means accepting a process, not settling for a resting place.

1392 Before I explain how the process of leaving would work for Britain and Europe, let me first say a  
1393 little about the risks of staying.

1394 **STAYING MEANS BEING A HOSTAGE NOT SETTLING FOR THE STATUS QUO**

1395 If we vote to stay, the EU's bosses and bureaucrats will take that as carte blanche to continue  
1396 taking more power and money away from Britain. They will say we have voted for 'more Europe'.  
1397 Any protests on our part will be met with a complacent shrug and a reminder that we were given  
1398 our own very special negotiation and our own bespoke referendum and now we've agreed to stay  
1399 and that's that. Britain has spoken, it's said "oui" and now it had better shut up and suck it up. In  
1400 truth, if we vote to stay we are hostages to their agenda.

1401 Brussels has already set out their official timetable for the next great transfer of powers from EU  
1402 members to EU institutions after our referendum is safely out of the way. It's all there in the "Five  
1403 Presidents' Report".

1404 It's a fact that under the Qualified Majority Voting rules of the Lisbon Treaty, which the  
1405 Conservative Party campaigned against, the Eurozone countries have a permanent and  
1406 unstoppable majority allowing them to set the agenda and overrule British interests.

1407 Worse, under the terms of the recent deal we've struck with the other EU nations we've  
1408 surrendered our veto on their next leap forward.

1409 Some might argue that we're insulated from that process because we're outside the Eurozone  
1410 and we're no longer committed to the goal of "ever closer union". Wrong. The Eurozone nations  
1411 can vote together to impose rules on every EU state - whether in or out of the euro. And we can't  
1412 veto that.

1413 Deleting the phrase 'ever closer union' offers no protection.

1414 It's a fact that as a phrase - or doctrine - in its own right, 'ever closer union' has only been cited in  
1415 0.19% of cases before the ECJ and has not been relevant to any of the ECJ's seminal judgments  
1416 that expanded its power.

1417 The In camp cannot name a single decision of the court that would have been decided differently  
1418 had the phrase never been in the Treaties. The Court has the power and freedom to interpret the  
1419 Treaties as it wishes - which is always in the service of greater European integration, regardless of  
1420 what our deal might say about "ever closer union". The inclusion of the phrase has not been a  
1421 driving factor in the EU's expansion. Removing it makes no difference and will not stop the next  
1422 EU power grab.

1423 And if we try to object, the European Court of Justice - the supreme court of the EU - can force us  
1424 to submit to the judgment of others regardless of what our population, our parliament or even  
1425 our own judges might think is right.

1426 It is a fact that the European Communities Act 1972, and subsequent judgments, make clear that  
1427 EU law, as decided by QMV and interpreted by the ECJ, trumps the decisions of, and laws passed  
1428 by, democratically-elected politicians in Britain.

1429 Further, the European Court now has the perfect legal excuse to grab more power - the Charter of  
1430 Fundamental Rights, which goes even further than the older post-war European Convention on  
1431 Human Rights.

- 1432 Of course, we were promised that we had a cast-iron opt-out. The Blair Government originally  
1433 said the Charter would have all the force in our law of 'The Beano'. In which case Dennis the  
1434 Menace must be the single most powerful figure in European jurisprudence, because the ECJ has  
1435 now informed us that our opt-out was worthless and has started making judgments applying the  
1436 Charter to UK law.
- 1437 The ECJ can now control how all member states apply the crucial 1951 UN convention on asylum  
1438 and refugees because the Charter incorporates it in EU law. So, Britain has lost control of a vital  
1439 area of power and the European Court will increasingly decide how our policy must work.
- 1440 The ECJ has recently used the Charter to make clear that it can determine how our intelligence  
1441 services monitor suspected terrorists. How long before the ECJ starts undermining the Five Eyes  
1442 intelligence sharing agreements that have been a foundation of British security since 1945 and  
1443 which are the source of jealousy and suspicion in Brussels?
- 1444 The ECJ recently used the Charter to make clear that the European Court - not our Parliament -  
1445 will decide the issue of whether convicted felons can vote and if so how far this right should be  
1446 extended.
- 1447 The ECJ used the Charter to tell us that the European Court will decide whether we can deport  
1448 Abu Hamza's daughter-in-law. It has even used the Charter to increase the price of insurance for  
1449 women.
- 1450 How long before the ECJ uses other provisions in the Charter to erode even more of our  
1451 independence?
- 1452 How far will the European Court go? We know it does not see itself bound by anything other than  
1453 a drive to deepen integration.
- 1454 It has consistently ignored and overruled any body which stands in its way. Even decisions made  
1455 and agreed by every EU state have been overturned if the court thinks they impede integration.
- 1456 The Court has rejected deals on human rights which the EU nations agreed at the time of the  
1457 Lisbon Treaty. It has also overridden the deal that the Danes did with the EU on citizenship in  
1458 1992.
- 1459 We know that it is entirely up to the European Court itself how to interpret the terms of our  
1460 recent new deal - there is no appeal and nothing we can do about its decisions, just as there was  
1461 nothing we could when it sank our supposed opt-out from the Charter.
- 1462 Don't just take it from me. The former Attorney General - and In campaigner - Dominic Grieve said  
1463 only last year: "the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that  
1464 could be very inimical to some of our national practices".
- 1465 It is clear that if we vote to stay we are voting to give away more power and control to  
1466 unaccountable EU institutions this year and every year.
- 1467 If we vote to stay the EU can then press ahead with the plans outlined in the "Five Presidents'"  
1468 Report" which I mentioned a moment ago.
- 1469 Those plans include:
- 1470 • The transfer of powers over tax - so we lose vital fiscal freedoms.

- 1471     ● The transfer of powers over the financial system - so we are less able to guard against a repeat  
1472     of the 2008 financial crisis.
- 1473     ● The transfer of powers over the heart of our legal system - so we are less able to safeguard the  
1474     integrity of the contract and property law which is crucial to attracting global investors.
- 1475     If we vote to stay we also risk paying even more of the bills for the euro's failure. We were told in  
1476     2010 that we would not be liable for any more euro bailouts. Yet in 2015 those assurances turned  
1477     out to be wrong.
- 1478     If we vote to stay, British taxpayers will inevitably be paying ever higher bills for years to come as  
1479     the EU uses its growing and unchecked power to transfer resources to subsidise failure.
- 1480     If we vote to stay we are not settling for the status quo - we are voting to be a hostage, locked in  
1481     the boot of a car driven by others to a place and at a pace that we have no control over.
- 1482     In stark contrast, if we vote to leave, we take back control.
- 1483     **ONCE WE VOTE TO LEAVE WE DECIDE THE TERMS OF TRADE**
- 1484     The day after we vote to leave we hold all the cards and we can choose the path we want.
- 1485     The leader of the In campaign, Stuart Rose, has acknowledged that there will be no turbulence or  
1486     trauma on Independence Day. "Nothing is going to happen if we come out ... in the first five years,  
1487     probably," he confessed, and admitted "There will be absolutely no change."
- 1488     And just as it is the case that when Britain votes to leave nothing in itself changes overnight, so  
1489     the process and pace of change is in our hands. There is no arbitrary deadline which we must  
1490     meet to secure our future - and indeed no arbitrary existing "model" which we have to accept in  
1491     order to prosper.
- 1492     It has been argued that the moment Britain votes to leave a process known as "Article 50" is  
1493     triggered whereby the clock starts ticking and every aspect of any new arrangement with the EU  
1494     must be concluded within 2 years of that vote being recorded - or else...
- 1495     But there is no requirement for that to occur - quite the opposite.
- 1496     Logically, in the days after a Vote to Leave the Prime Minister would discuss the way ahead with  
1497     the Cabinet and consult Parliament before taking any significant step.
- 1498     Preliminary, informal, conversations would take place with the EU to explore how best to  
1499     proceed.
- 1500     It would not be in any nation's interest artificially to accelerate the process and no responsible  
1501     government would hit the start button on a two-year legal process without preparing  
1502     appropriately.
- 1503     Nor would it be in anyone's interest to hurry parliamentary processes.
- 1504     We can set the pace. We will repeal the 1972 European Communities Act, which automatically  
1505     gives EU law legal force. But we can change it on our terms at a time of our choosing.
- 1506     After we establish full legal independence we can then decide which EU-inspired rules and  
1507     regulations we want to keep, which we want to repeal and which we wish to modify.

1508 It is also important to realise that, while we calmly take our time to change the law, one thing  
1509 which won't change is our ability to trade freely with Europe.

1510 **BRITAIN CONTINUES IN THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ZONE**

1511 The In campaign often argues that we would find it impossible to reach a trading agreement with  
1512 EU nations after we vote leave.

1513 While there are, of course, some questions up for negotiation which will occupy our highly skilled  
1514 Foreign Office civil servants, resolving them fully and properly won't be any more complicated or  
1515 onerous than the day-to-day work they undertake now navigating their way through EU recitals,  
1516 trialogues and framework directives.

1517 Indeed, if we vote to stay, that work will only grow more complex, and negotiations in the EU will  
1518 only become more burdensome. But if we vote to leave, the need for this bureaucratic  
1519 processology will come to an end.

1520 The core of our new arrangement with the EU is clear.

1521 There is a free trade zone stretching from Iceland to Turkey that all European nations have access  
1522 to, regardless of whether they are in or out of the euro or EU. After we vote to leave we will  
1523 remain in this zone. The suggestion that Bosnia, Serbia, Albania and the Ukraine would remain  
1524 part of this free trade area - and Britain would be on the outside with just Belarus - is as credible  
1525 as Jean-Claude Juncker joining UKIP.

1526 Agreeing to maintain this continental free trade zone is the simple course and emphatically in  
1527 everyone's interests.

1528 As our European friends adjust to the referendum result they will quickly calculate that it is in  
1529 their own interest to maintain the current free trade arrangements they enjoy with the UK. After  
1530 all they sell far more to us than we do to them. In 2015, the UK recorded a £67.7 billion deficit in  
1531 the trade of goods and services with the EU, up from £58.8 billion in 2014.

1532 German car manufacturers, who sell £16.2 billion more to us each year than we sell to them, will  
1533 insist their Government maintains access to our markets. French farmers, who sell us £1.37 billion  
1534 worth of wine and other beverages, £737 million more than we sell to them, will insist on  
1535 maintaining access to our supermarkets. Italian designers, whose fashion houses sell the UK £1.0  
1536 billion of clothes will similarly insist on access to our consumers.

1537 It has been suggested that, in a fit of collectively-organised and intensively-sustained international  
1538 pique, all 27 nations of the EU would put every other priority aside and labour night and day for  
1539 months to bury their own individual differences and harm their own individual economic interests  
1540 just to punish us.

1541 Now I accept that some in the Brussels elite will be cross at our temerity in refusing to accept  
1542 their continued rule.

1543 But the idea that the German government would damage its car manufacturers - and impoverish  
1544 workers in those factories - to make a political point about Britain's choices; or the French  
1545 Government would ignore its farmers - and damage their welfare - to strike a pose; or the Italian  
1546 Government would undermine its struggling industries just to please Brussels, is ridiculous.

1547 And the idea that all of them - and 24 other nations - would have as their highest economic  
1548 priority in the months ahead making it more difficult to sell to Britain - and the belief that they  
1549 would bend all their diplomatic, political and financial muscle to that sole end - is preposterous.

1550 Why would any of them wish to commit an act of profound economic self-harm? And if any of  
1551 them did, why would the other EU nations let them?

1552 It is sometimes claimed that we will only get free trade if we accept free movement. But the EU  
1553 has free trade deals with nations that obviously do not involve free movement. You do not need  
1554 free movement of people to have free trade and friendly co-operation.

1555 Indeed, worldwide, it's been countries outside the EU's bureaucracy which have been selling  
1556 more and more goods to EU nations. Over the last five years exports of goods from the United  
1557 States to the EU increased faster than the exports from the UK to the EU.

1558 Indeed, the amount we sold to Europe actually declined after the EU moved to setting more and  
1559 more common bureaucratic rules in the name of the so-called 'Single Market'. After joining the  
1560 EEC in 1972 our trade with it did grow. And in 1993, 51.7% of our exports went to the EU.

1561 After 1993, however, our trade with the EU flatlined then declined. Now 56.3% of our exports go  
1562 to countries outside the EU. Of course, increased trade isn't the property of politicians, it's  
1563 testament to the endeavours and hard work of British entrepreneurs and British workers.

1564 And it's certainly no thanks to the EU's trade negotiators.

1565 **CUTTING DEALS ON OUR TERMS - AND IN A WAY WHICH HELPS THE POOREST**

1566 The EU after years of trying still doesn't have trade deals with the US, China or India.

1567 But if we vote to leave we can take control of our trade negotiations and seal those deals more  
1568 quickly.

1569 We can strip out the protectionism and special interests that drag down EU negotiations, and  
1570 focus more energetically on reducing barriers to trade - to create more jobs for British workers,  
1571 greater opportunities for British exporters, and cheaper prices for British consumers.

1572 Instead of having to wait until every concern raised by 27 other nations is addressed during  
1573 negotiations we can cut to the chase.

1574 It's striking how successful countries outside the EU have been at negotiating trade deals.  
1575 Switzerland has opened markets of \$40 trillion while Canada has negotiated 10 trade deals since  
1576 2009 alone.

1577 Critically, new deals could include enhanced arrangements for developing nations. At the  
1578 moment, the EU maintains a common external tariff on goods of up to 183%. That means produce  
1579 from Africa or Asia's poorer nations costs far more to import than it should. By maintaining such a  
1580 punitive level of tariffs on imports the EU holds developing nations back.

1581 An independent Britain could choose to strike free trade agreements with emerging economies  
1582 and lower tariffs, extending new opportunities to developing nations and in the process, allowing  
1583 prices in Britain to become cheaper. Leaving the EU would thus help the poorest nations in the  
1584 world to advance and it would help the poorest people in this country to make ends meet. This is

1585 just one of a number of ways in which leaving the European Union allows us to advance more  
1586 progressive policies.

1587 **STRENGTHENING OUR ECONOMY**

1588 Taking back control of our trade policy would strengthen our country's economic power. But  
1589 that's not the only direct benefit of voting to leave.

1590 If we left the EU we would take back control over nineteen billion pounds which we currently  
1591 hand over every year - about £350 million each and every week.

1592 Now it is true that we get some of that money back - £4.4 billion through a negotiated rebate -  
1593 and £4.8 billion in money the EU spends in this country on our behalf.

1594 But it is also vital to note that the amount we give to the EU is due to go up - and up - and up.

1595 From £19.1 billion this year to £20.6 billion in 2020-21. Since 1975, we have already sent the  
1596 staggering sum of over half a trillion pounds to Brussels. If we vote to stay we will send about  
1597 another £200 billion to Brussels over the next decade.

1598 It is also important to recognise that our rebate is not a permanent and unalterable feature of our  
1599 membership anchored in the treaties. It's a negotiated settlement - which has had to be re-  
1600 negotiated before - and which could be eroded, whittled away or rendered less and less  
1601 significant in future negotiations. One of the reasons we have the rebate is fear Britain might  
1602 leave. Once we've voted to stay then it will be open season on that sum.

1603 I also acknowledge that some of the money we send over we get back - whether in support for  
1604 farmers or scientists - although we don't control exactly where it goes. And we don't know how  
1605 efficiently that money is allocated to those who really need it because of the opaque nature of  
1606 the EU's bureaucracy.

1607 Indeed, there's a lot of evidence the money sticks to bureaucratic fingers rather than going to the  
1608 frontline.

1609 The physicist Andre Geim, the genius who won the Nobel prize for his work on graphene, said of  
1610 the EU's science funding system, 'I can offer no nice words for the EU framework programmes  
1611 which ... can be praised only by Europhobes for discrediting the whole idea of an effectively  
1612 working Europe.'

1613 In any case, no-one arguing that we should Vote Leave wants us to reduce the amount we give to  
1614 our farmers or our scientists. Indeed, some of us believe we should give more. The only British  
1615 citizens we want to deprive of European funding are our MEPs. We'd like to liberate them to  
1616 flourish in the private sector.

1617 Yet, even if we acknowledge the rebate and the sums already spent here, £10.6 billion of  
1618 taxpayers' money is given to the EU in a year.

1619 That's twice the UK's science budget and twice Scotland's school budget.

1620 Just think what we could do with this money.

1621 It could be invested in new infrastructure, apprenticeships and science.

1622 It could be deployed in our NHS, schools and social care.

1623 It could pay for tax cuts, enterprise allowances and trade missions.

1624 It could pay for fourteen Astute Class Submarines.

1625 It could enhance this nation's security, productivity, social solidarity and competitiveness.

1626 And the economic benefits of Leaving wouldn't end there.

1627 We would also be able to reduce the regulatory costs imposed on British business.

1628 The cost of EU regulation on British companies has been estimated by the independent think tank  
1629 Open Europe at about £600 million every week.

1630 Now some of those costs are incurred in a good cause. But many EU regulations - such as the  
1631 Clinical Trials Directive, which has slowed down and made more expensive the testing of new  
1632 cancer drugs, or absurd rules such as minimum container sizes for the sale of olive oil, are clearly  
1633 not wise, light-touch and proportionate interventions in the market.

1634 They also show how the so-called Single Market is, as Jacques Delors promised, a vehicle for  
1635 expanding the power of the EU, not a tool for expanding free trade.

1636 If we leave the EU, we can, progressively, reduce the burden of EU regulation and help generate  
1637 new jobs and industries. We can also insulate ourselves from new EU rules that other nations are  
1638 planning which are designed to hold back innovation.

1639 It is striking that EU institutions have already repeatedly tried - and will of course continue to  
1640 attempt - to fetter the tech companies that are changing the world economy.

1641 As Harvard's Professor John Gillingham has pointed out, the development of fifth generation (5G)  
1642 telecoms technology and the arrival of the "internet of things" promise massive productivity  
1643 gains. But the EU has tried to stand in the way of the companies driving this change.

1644 Professor Gillingham argues that the EU's stance is 'guerrilla warfare' which is 'futile as well as  
1645 self-defeating. It can only accelerate the rate of European decline.'

1646 And the figures back him up.

1647 The EU and its members are projected to grow more slowly than other advanced economies in  
1648 the years ahead. Eurozone members are projected to grow at 1.5% while the US is projected to  
1649 grow at 2.4%, China at 6.5%, New Zealand at 2.0%, Australia at 2.5% and India at 7.5%.

1650 But it's not just freedom from EU regulation that leaving would liberate us to enjoy.

1651 **WE WILL TAKE BACK CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION**

1652 We could also benefit economically from control of immigration.

1653 At the moment, any EU citizen can come to the UK to settle, work, claim benefits and use the  
1654 NHS. We have no proper control over whether that individual's presence here is economically  
1655 beneficial, conducive to the public good or in our national interest. We cannot effectively screen  
1656 new arrivals for qualifications, extremist connections or past criminality. We have given away  
1657 control over how we implement the vital 1951 UN Convention on asylum to the European court.  
1658 We cannot even deport convicted murderers.

- 1659 Further, there are five more countries - Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey - in  
1660 the queue to join the EU - and the European Commission, as we have just experienced ourselves  
1661 during the recent negotiation process, regards 'free movement' as an inviolable principle of EU  
1662 membership.
- 1663 Yesterday's report from the Treasury is an official admission from the In campaign that if we vote  
1664 to stay in the EU then immigration will continue to increase by hundreds of thousands year on  
1665 year. Over 250,000 people came to Britain from Europe last year. As long as we are in the EU we  
1666 cannot control our borders and cannot develop an immigration policy which is both truly humane  
1667 and in our long term economic interests.
- 1668 It is bad enough that we have to maintain an open door to EU nationals - from the shores of Sicily  
1669 to the borders of the Ukraine - it's also the case that as the price of EU membership, we have to  
1670 impose stricter limitations on individuals from other nations whom we might actively want to  
1671 welcome.
- 1672 Whether it's family members from Commonwealth countries, the top doctors and scientists who  
1673 would enhance the operation of the NHS or the technicians and innovators who could power  
1674 growth, we have to put them at the back of the queue behind anyone who's granted citizenship  
1675 by any other EU country.
- 1676 I think we would benefit as a country if we had a more effective and humane immigration policy,  
1677 allowing us to take the people who would benefit us economically, offering refuge to those  
1678 genuinely in need, and saying no to others.
- 1679 And my ambition is not a Utopian ideal - it's an Australian reality.
- 1680 Instead of a European open-door migration policy we could - if a future Government wanted it -  
1681 have an Australian points-based migration policy. We could emulate that country's admirable  
1682 record of taking in genuine refugees, giving a welcome to hardworking new citizens and building a  
1683 successful multi-racial society without giving into people-smugglers, illegal migration or  
1684 subversion of our borders.
- 1685 So, leaving could mean control over new trade deals, control over how we can help developing  
1686 nations, control over economic rules, control over how billions currently spent by others could be  
1687 spent, control over our borders, control over who uses the NHS and control over who can make  
1688 their home here.
- 1689 **BETTER FOR EUROPE**
- 1690 Leaving would also bring another significant - and under-appreciated - benefit. It would lead to  
1691 the reform of the European Union.
- 1692 At different points In campaigners like to argue either that Brexit would lead to EU nations using  
1693 their massive muscle to punish us, or that Brexit would lead to contagion and the collapse of  
1694 Europe - just as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union collapsed following secession from those unions.
- 1695 Manifestly both cannot be true. An EU without the UK cannot simultaneously be a super-charged  
1696 Leviathan bent on revenge and a crumbling Tower of Babel riven by conflict.
- 1697 But both points have a grain of truth. There will be anger amongst some in European elites. Not  
1698 because the UK is destined for a bleak, impoverished future on the outside. No, quite the  
1699 opposite.

1700 What will enrage, and disorientate, EU elites is the UK's success outside the Union. Regaining  
1701 control over our laws, taxes and borders and forging new trade deals while also shedding  
1702 unnecessary regulation will enhance our competitive advantage over other EU nations. Our  
1703 superior growth rate, and better growth prospects, will only strengthen. Our attractiveness to  
1704 inward investors and our influence on the world stage will only grow.

1705 But while this might provoke both angst and even resentment among EU elites, the UK's success  
1706 will send a very different message to the EU's peoples. They will see that a different Europe is  
1707 possible. It is possible to regain democratic control of your own country and currency, to trade  
1708 and co-operate with other EU nations without surrendering fundamental sovereignty to a remote  
1709 and unelected bureaucracy. And, by following that path, your people are richer, your influence for  
1710 good greater, your future brighter.

1711 So - yes there will be "contagion" if Britain leaves the EU. But what will be catching is democracy.  
1712 There will be a new demand for more effective institutions to enable the more flexible kind of  
1713 international cooperation we will need as technological and economic forces transform the world.

1714 We know - from repeated referenda on the continent and in Ireland - that the peoples of the EU  
1715 are profoundly unhappy with the European project. We also know that the framers of that project  
1716 - Monnet and Schumann - hoped to advance integration by getting around democracy and never  
1717 submitting their full vision to the verdict of voters. That approach has characterised the behaviour  
1718 of EU leaders ever since. But that approach could not, and will not, survive the assertion of deep  
1719 democratic principle that would be the British people voting to leave.

1720 Our vote to Leave will liberate and strengthen those voices across the EU calling for a different  
1721 future - those demanding the devolution of powers back from Brussels and desperate for a  
1722 progressive alternative.

1723 For Greeks who have had to endure dreadful austerity measures, in order to secure bailouts from  
1724 Brussels, which then go to pay off bankers demanding their due, a different Europe will be a  
1725 liberation.

1726 For Spanish families whose children have had to endure years of joblessness and for whom a  
1727 home and children of their own is a desperately distant prospect, a different Europe will be a  
1728 liberation.

1729 For Portuguese citizens who have had to endure cuts to health, welfare and public services as the  
1730 price of EU policies, a different Europe will be a liberation.

1731 For Italians whose elected Government was dismissed by Brussels fiat, for Danes whose opt-out  
1732 from the Maastricht Treaty has been repeatedly overridden by the European Court, for Poles  
1733 whose hard-won independence has been eroded by the European Commission, a different Europe  
1734 will be a liberation.

1735 For Britain, voting to leave will be a galvanising, liberating, empowering moment of patriotic  
1736 renewal.

1737 We will have rejected the depressing and pessimistic vision advanced by In campaigners that  
1738 Britain is too small and weak and the British people too hapless and pathetic to manage their own  
1739 affairs and choose their own future.

- 1740 But for Europe, Britain voting to leave will be the beginning of something potentially even more  
1741 exciting - the democratic liberation of a whole Continent.
- 1742 If we vote to leave we will have - in the words of a former British Prime Minister - saved our  
1743 country by our exertions and Europe by our example.
- 1744 We will have confirmed that we believe our best days lie ahead, that we believe our children can  
1745 build a better future, that this country's instincts and institutions, its people and its principles, are  
1746 capable not just of making our society freer, fairer and richer but also once more of setting an  
1747 inspirational example to the world. It is a noble ambition and one I hope this country will unite  
1748 behind in the weeks to come.
- 1749
- 1750 **Nigel Farage- Tale til UKIP partikonference i Llandudno, Wales**  
1751 Givet den 27. februar 2016.
- 1752 Det var ikke muligt at finde en transskribert tale af Nigel Farage, dette speciale har derfor selv  
1753 transskribert centrale citater fra denne tale og angivet minutter. Talen i sin fulde udstrækning  
1754 kan findes på: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pehGu7dp1tw>
- 1755 Standing up and saying, the same thing that we have been saying, standing up and saying: Let's  
1756 make June the 23<sup>rd</sup> 2016 Independence Day. Let's do it! 0:53-01:04
- 1757 But my real worry, was this talk that's been going around of a double referendum 02:15-02:23
- 1758 This is the time to go to the polling station to win back our democratic freedom and rights as  
1759 British people! 03:04-03:12
- 1760 There are millions of old Labour voters out there who are truly patriotic. There are now rumblings  
1761 within the Trade union movement with people being to realise that actually all those fabled rights  
1762 that come to us from the European Union, really what we have seen are the displacement of  
1763 British workers and the average wages of Britons being driven down by too much cheap labour  
1764 coming into Britain from southern- and eastern Europe 05:35- 06:02
- 1765 It's a battle of right and wrong, it's a battle of who governs our country 06:11-06:21
- 1766 What he came back with is pretty pathetic, but what is worse than that, Is his quite deliberate  
1767 attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the British public by telling us what he has been granted  
1768 is legally binding. 06:52- 07:10
- 1769 But this deal, this deal is not legally binding, because it can be struck down by the European  
1770 parliament, it can be ruled out of court by the ECJ and the people with whom he has made this  
1771 gentlemen's agreement won't even be in their positions in a few years' time, but the most  
1772 laughable thing, the most laughable thing is the PM said that with this deal, that I would now vote  
1773 to join the EU. 07:55-08:25
- 1774 So, the PM gets up in the house of common and says we are going to have a referendum on June  
1775 the 23<sup>rd</sup> on whether Britain joins the EU. There are one or two changes that we are going need to

1776 make. I know that we governed ourselves for the last thousand years but I tell you what. Let's  
1777 sign up to an organisation who will now make 75% of the laws that we used to make in this  
1778 parliament and let's make the ECJ across Westminster Square redundant and let's hand over the  
1779 ultimate law of the land to a court in Luxemburg staffed by people who aren't even judges. 08:33-  
1780 09:15

1781 It gets better, no longer will we be in charge of managing our steel industry or our financial services  
1782 sector and we have decided that frankly owing 200 miles of the North Sea for our fishing rights is  
1783 a bit outdated, so we are going to share it out with the rest of Europe. We will of course  
1784 increasingly have this organisation speaking for us in terms of foreign policy and any law, any law  
1785 that is made that we don't like we can't do a single thing about. And for all of this, the really good  
1786 news is that is going to cost us 55 million pounds a day to join the club - 09:22-10:05.

1787 ...Big banks like Goldman Sachs and big politics, and this week has seen the launch of Project Fear.  
1788 We've heard in Wales that without membership of the EU all agriculture would cease. I thought  
1789 the Welsh were farming before we joined the Common market, but perhaps I am wrong. We're  
1790 told that in many cases that all trade would stop, that millions of jobs would be at risk and we've  
1791 even been told the lie that to have access to the Single market we will have to continue with the  
1792 free movement of people. 10:23-11:00

1793 Well let me tell you with total certainty that when we vote to leave this EU, when we have put  
1794 through our divorce with this political union. What out will look like, we will be back in control of  
1795 our country. We will once again be an interdependent nation. That is what out looks like....we will  
1796 make the rules that govern our steel industry, we will reclaim our territorial waters and look after  
1797 our fishing industry. We will set the rules for our financial services industry and any law, any law  
1798 that is made by our government and our parliament, we once every five years will have the  
1799 opportunity to vote for new set of politicians who will get rid of those rules. It is called  
1800 parliamentary democracy and It is something so precious. It is something so fundamental that  
1801 those that went before us in the twentieth century twice, risked that in some cases sacrificed  
1802 everything that they had, to make sure that we and indeed the rest of Europe could live as free  
1803 parliamentary democracies and that is what out looks like. We will become a proper, functioning,  
1804 parliamentary democracy. 11:56-13:45

1805 We are, ladies and gentlemen, the fifth biggest economy in the world. We are and have for  
1806 centuries been a global, trading nation. And we should set, we should set our own trade  
1807 agreements with the rest of the world and perhaps a very good place to start would be the 54  
1808 countries and the 2,2 billion people that live within the Commonwealth. 15:38-16:02

1809 And what out looks like is we take back control. We do what normal countries all over the world  
1810 do. We take back control of our borders and we decide who comes to live, work and settle in this  
1811 country. And it is, this is the number one issue in British politics and the government of course  
1812 realise that. Which is why repeatedly since 2010 the PM and the home secretary Theresa May  
1813 endlessly make promises to bring levels of net migration in Britain down to tens of thousands a  
1814 year. You've heard it again and again and again. But the truth is it's not possible as a member of  
1815 the EU to control this. It is not possible as a member of the EU for our government to plan ahead

1816 for primary school places, for health provision, for housing, for any of our public services and  
1817 what we see six years in to David Cameron being PM is immigration, net-migration still running at  
1818 near record levels. 17:41-18:55

1819 And I think we've got to recognise that actually mass migration into Britain on this scale is not  
1820 good for our country. It is not good for our quality of life. It is not good for social cohesion in our  
1821 societies and our population inexorable heading for toward 70 or 75 million will not make this a  
1822 better, richer or happier better place to be. But as EU members, as EU members there is nothing  
1823 we can do about it.19:20-19:55

1824 And please don't think that if you vote to Remain it will carry on as it is. Just two weeks ago  
1825 Bosnia applied to be a member state of the European Union, and Ms Merkel, the real boss of  
1826 Europe- at least she was wobbling a bit now perhaps, but Ms. Merkel and others including our  
1827 own PM, who is one of the chief cheerleaders, they have decided they want Turkey to join the  
1828 European Union within the next five years...19:56-20:27

1829 And beyond the argument of simply about numbers and what it is doing to our quality of life.  
1830 There is perhaps a bigger argument beginning to emerge, because surely one of the first duties of  
1831 a British government should be to do everything within their power to protect our people from  
1832 the horrors that we saw in Paris and the indignities we saw in Köln and the best and safest way for  
1833 us to prevent such things is to leave the EU and take back control of our borders and who comes  
1834 to Britain. 20:53-21:32

1835 Theresa May, home secretary. Talked about the need for net migration to come down and the fall  
1836 in living standard, and now says remain and the emergency brake will work.

1837 ...That is a British passport... that is a British passport, you've all got one of them, but have you've  
1838 noticed what the first two words on it are? It says European Union and there are 508 million  
1839 people now entitled to have that passport and they can all, if they wish, come to Britain. That is at  
1840 the heart, that is at the heart of our migration problem in this country. And what we need to do,  
1841 what we need to do is to say: we want to be part of the international community, we want to  
1842 have a rational immigration policy that allows us to get skilled workers to come to Britain, people  
1843 who come who haven't got criminal records, people who come and bring their own health  
1844 insurance, people who come and don't qualify for benefits, but we cannot do that if we are now  
1845 joint citizens with 27 other countries and I want to after the referendum make this a real British  
1846 passport without the words European union. 22:55-24:12.

1847 But ultimately, ultimately, this referendum is down to one thing. Do we believe that we are good  
1848 enough? Do we have the self-confidence? Do we think we are up to running our own country, our  
1849 own parliament, controlling our own borders? Do we believe in Britain? Do we want our country  
1850 back? 24:33-24:56