



It's
funny
because
it's
true

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Abstract

This thesis is a critical study in satires relationship to the public sphere. The thesis aims to investigate and discuss how satire can be understood as a critical institution in the public sphere. Critical satire has been an uprising phenomenon, and shows such as Den Korte Radioavis and Tæt på sandheden, in Denmark, and American programs like The Daily Show, Last Week Tonight, The Colbert Report have received increasing attention.

The thesis uses Habermas theoretical framework of the public sphere, to analyze the state of the public sphere in present society, and use it as a foundation to discuss the satirical praxis' potential in society. The public sphere has evolved since Habermas wrote his work "The Structure Transformation of the Public Sphere, 1962", and the public sphere in contemporary society possesses challenges, which has given roots to the growth of satire. Satires ability to unfold truths in a public which is confronted with a massive flow of information, involving political spin, countless media news and social media, gives it a critical potential to clarify the public.

Through Hannah Arendt and Heidegger, we analyze how satire can let the audience rediscover truth and relate it to common sense through the open region between truth and untruth, an experience that allows us to rethink moral propositions, statement and set structures in society. Under the assumption that satire relates to Hannah Arendt's understanding of common sense, as a movement towards the lived life, the thesis try to illuminate the gap between the public opinion and the private opinion based common upon common sense understood as a six sense evolved through experiences and observations from the lived life.

It's funny because it's true

A philosophical investigation in Truth, Satire and the public sphere

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Introduction

“Satire, og alt humor i det hele taget, ligger jo, i den gråzone imellem hvad vi betragter offentligt, som socialt acceptabelt, og det som vi i virkeligheden - derhjemme - nede i maven mener, er socialt acceptabelt”

- Danish Comedian, Michael Schøt

Satire has historically always been the voice that screamed, spat and fouled at the established power and norms of society. It is the abyssal laughter that dances with concepts of right and wrong, fiction and reality, power and helplessness. It does not fear morality, as its nature, by essence, already is dirty. In contemporary society, the position of satire has evolved and constituted itself as a critical voice experienced in the growth of critical programs including the “Daily Show”, “The Colbert Report” and “Last Week Tonight” in an American context, and Den Korte Radioavis and tæt på Sandheden in a Danish context.

Satire entangles in a relationship with taboos and sensitive topics, and satire mercilessly critiques topics involving immigration, feminism, sickness, political hypocrisy, political correctness, to name a few. Satire challenges the boundaries of what is discussed in a public forum, but at the same time, it also talks to the audience sense of humour and appeals to their emotions through laughter. The ambiguous nature of satire and its interconnectedness with societal norms and power structures, sparked our interest, and beyond enjoying its entertaining nature, we were caught by the recent tendency of Danish satire to be more engaged with the public sphere, thus playing a more significant role in the public debate than satire have had for years (Bruun, 2012). The topics discussed in Danish satire involves the political agenda of both politicians, opinion formers and societal institutions, as well as a majority of the content is both a presentation and interpretation of current affairs.

We believe that the satirical praxis has a deeper relationship to the public sphere than mere entertainment and that it is a gateway to discuss and understand how the public sphere functions, in regards to opinions, movements, critique, etc. This relationship with the public sphere, an understanding of the everyday life of citizens, is something that in present society seems to be crucial for large corporations and organizations. An example of how the satirical praxis relationship to the public sphere

showed to be superior that of a large organisation, is the case of Amnesty International. The case will be discussed further in chapter two, but to briefly summarize, Amnesty International ended up threatening Radio24syv, the radio station that host the Danish satire program Den Korte Radioavis , with a lawsuit because Den Korte Radioavis had involved a blogger who works for Amnesty, Amalie Have, in their satirical universe and continuously made fun of her. The case backfired for Amnesty International, as their feeling with the public opinion was off, which had a terrible effect on their public image. The case was intriguing, as a large and well-structured organization like Amnesty was able to misinterpret the public opinion entirely and suffered the unpleasant consequences for their public image. The case hinted towards valuable knowledge about the public hidden in the satirical universe, as Amnesty would not have acted as they did if they understood the public sphere better. The case of Amnesty International, furthermore, can serve as an underlining of how important it is for major organisations that interact with, or as a response to, matters of public interest, to be aware of the public's sense of the world.

Our first impression and feeling of the enhanced phenomenon of satire were that it was bound to a lack of trust towards authorities within the public. As politicians were ranked the lowest and journalism third lowest in a grand survey on the most and least trustworthy occupations(Radius, 2018), the pieces seemed to fit. Nevertheless, after doing research on the public sphere, the political realm and satire, our impression changed, and we thought that the low trust towards politicians and the struggling media was inadequate to understand both the state of the public sphere and the nature of the satirical praxis. Instead, the focus of the thesis became how we could understand the satirical praxis, and what position it possessed in the public debate. It became clear that the public sphere, in general, was more complicated. Amnesty International coming in trouble because they had an inadequate understanding of the public, was an indication that the phenomenon could not be connected solely to the political praxis or the media.

The curiosity of the thesis is as deeply rooted in the public sphere as in the satirical praxis. Therefore, satire is most appealing for the investigation, when it is in a critical position towards actors and actions in the public sphere, and we are interested in discussing satires critical potential when holding such position. We have chosen to focus on cases which correlate to a critical position towards society, public figures,

political actions etc. and the more harmless sketches that do not have any immediate critical function, but merely try to make people laugh, is not essential for the discoveries we want to make, as the thesis is not about what makes satire funny, but its critical potential and relationship to the public sphere. In that understanding, we believe that the investigation into political satires critical potential, also possess an understanding of the public sphere, which can prove valuable to organisations and actors that have their praxis in the public sphere. Amnesty International, would have been able to act more appropriate and intelligent had their insight of the public been more in-depth.

The growth of political satire and the changed content, which possesses a sharper critical, *kynical*, nature and more controversial design, inspired questions of whether satire empowered, the critical potential of the public sphere, and what it was, that satire offered, that a non-satirical critique could not accomplish.

One of the ways we want to illuminate satire as a phenomenon, is through its relationship to truth, a relationship which can be found in historical figures involving the jester, a figure that could articulate truths to the king that no one else dared say, as well as in the famous novel, *The Emperor's New Clothes*, by HC Andersen, where only the cheeky child can speak the truth. It is also shown in Den Korte Radioavis (DKR) that sensitive topics are discussed with a malicious joy incomparable to regular radio. Satire and its relationship to truth and the public will be investigated on the basis of the following research question:

1. How does truth unfold itself within the satirical praxis?
2. How can we understand the satirical praxis as a critical institution in the public sphere?

The first question is treating the phenomenon of satire, how the satirical praxis' critique and communication seems to be of a different nature, than non-satirical critique, and that common knowledge, truth etc. often is used to portray actions within the public. However, when the jester voice truth to the king, something everyone knows, but only the jester can say out loud, or when the child reveals that the king is actually naked and that the cloth is an illusion, then what kind of truth is it that reveals itself? A question

which will be analyzed by discussing how truth can be understood within the public, and subsequently, how it is related to the satirical praxis.

The second question should be seen as a continuation of the first question, how do satires relation to the public and truth form its critical potential as an institution within the public sphere, and what is its contemporary role in the society?

Disposition

Our thesis is divided into three sections, the first examining and describing the public sphere and how communication and critique can be understood. The section will outline Habermas' work "The structural transformation of the public sphere", in which his, for this thesis, main concepts are defined, and where his definition and criteria for a well-functioning public sphere is explained, in the section, Habermas theory will be used as a framework. The critical public will be further discussed through a selection of essays from Hannah Arendt's "Between past and future", which provides a perspective on the reciprocal influence between public, politics and critique. Hannah Arendt works with various topics within a functioning and non-functioning democratic state. Her works are less focused on institutional qualities of society than Habermas, as she works with concepts of reality, sense of the world, truth and common sense, to name the ones most prevalent in this thesis. Hannah Arendt's concepts are used to analyse both satire and the public sphere, where Habermas' primary function will be as a theorist of the structure of society and the public.

The second section will investigate incidents from influential and successful modern satire shows, mainly "Den Korte Radioavis " and "Tæt på Sandheden", and use these cases to provide an entry point to a discussion of satire as a cultural offering that affects the public agenda (Boukes, Mark. 2018), and thus influences public discourse. This will be done with a variety of academic papers, such as (Dadlez, Eva. 2011; Medell, C. W. 1920; Young et al. 2014) as well as Peter Sloterdijk's "Critique of Cynical Reason". Peter Sloterdijk and his discussion of cynical reason stand as one of the cornerstones of the thesis' second section. His work discusses the satirical form and its importance in critique, and the cheeky cynicism he works with is fundamental to our understanding of the satirical expression. The second section is analytical and works with four empirical

cases of the satirical praxis, which are used to discuss and analyze the appeal and immediate attraction of political satire, its critical potential and relation to truth, i.e., what it is that satire do and how it does it. This will include a discussion of truth, as in what it is that signifies truth as truth, and how it can be understood in the public sphere, understood through the lens of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, with some of the reflections being further developed in the third section.

Where the second section is structured by an engagement in the phenomenon and the empirical case, the third and final section is characterised by a double movement, where we on the one hand engage further in the phenomenon of satire, and on the other hand are distancing ourselves from it, allowing for a more broad reflections on the possible limitations and pitfalls of satire.

Theoretical field

"Ironien er en pil i mig; trækkes den ud, dør jeg"

- Søren Kierkegaard

This thesis writes into an academic field, which investigates humour and satire in the public sphere, which, at least in an American context, have been provided with much more empirical content in the last 20 years (Kilby, 2018). More recently, in Denmark, we have experienced a similar political satire boom. Due to this boom, satire has been the subject of more academic scrutiny, with the 'international', or American, satire shows, such as "The Daily Show", "The Colbert Report" and "Last week tonight", seemingly being the preferred subject of investigation (see e.g. Hart & Hartelius, 2007; Polk et al., 2009; Dadlez, 2011). In a Danish context, however, the new boom of political satire has fewer years behind it and has yet to make a similar impact on academia. Nevertheless, political satire has been subjected to reflection and discussion outside the realm of academia, shown recently through (Arzrouni, 2019; Lyngsøe, 2019; Krasnik, 2019; Jørgensen, 2019) which indicate that satire, at the very least, is debated in a Danish context.

A way to understand studies of political satire, is to roughly divide the field into two comprehensive categories, one that works with the fundamental structure of laughter, more accurately what it is that makes people laugh both psychologically and

physiologically, and a brand that works with satire as communication and a factor in the public sphere, both in correlation with education, politics and general human interaction.

In the first category, we have come across three significant theories of laughter, the superiority theory, the relief theory and the incongruity theory:

The Superiority theory is ascribed to the English 17th-century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. The theory claims that a state of joy or happiness can be founded in the joy of feeling superior, which will result in a release of laughter.

The relief theory, elaborated by multiple scientists, and popularized by Sigmund Freud, argues that people contain nervous energy in their lives because they continuously suppress feelings and impulses, which are prohibited by societal norms. Laughter understood through the relief theory, exhibits a safe zone that provides room for release, both because topics that are typically considered taboo can be addressed by humour, but also because laughter itself is a physical reaction, which can release nervous energy.

The Incongruity theory is shared by many philosophers, including Hegel and Schopenhauer; in theory, laughter is a response to an unexpected outcome. When arguments or logical processes end in unexpected outcomes, either because of social norms or the linguistic structure of argument, it results in physiological response which manifests itself in laughter.

The second category can be found in contemporary scholars,(see. young et al, 2012; Morreall, 2014; Dadlez, 2011) that discusses political satire. Their approach to discussing satire is more focused on what humour does than its origin. The thesis builds upon that way of perceiving the phenomenon of satire since we find that none of these theories to be efficient in a direct correlation with the praxis of satire, because of their rigged nature. Thus we believe that all and neither of the theories encapsulates the phenomenon of satire fully.

In the second and more recent category, Young et al. (2012) address satire as something that works within social norms and political discourses, in other words, satire works within the society and have no effect outside the sphere it was meant to address. It is a consensus that Satire works as a different kind of communication than classical critique, and that it works within a sphere with a different set of rules from

what we find in 'un-humorous' critique. The topics that can be talked about and the audience's reaction is different from a classic, unfunny critique. The 'sphere' which is humour/satire, is, therefore, a sphere that possesses possibilities to reach people in a way regular dialogue cannot. As expressed by Young et al. (2012)

'Do not ask, does it 'work,' but rather, 'does it play?' ' Does it tap into audience emotion? Does it ignite passions? Such engagement with a text can be considered as a creative form of engagement, through which political concepts and practices are brought to mind or reconstituted in the minds of the audience.'

In this view, political satire can reconstruct societal structures within the minds of the audience if they respond to it if they can feel themselves and their fellow people in the satirical work. Here political satire can have a forming effect on the people, as it can help to expand the horizon of the audience.

Satire as a phenomenon that has a forming effect on the audience, is different to the relief theory, as the relief theory works around releasing accumulated frustration, and the enjoyment received from unleashing tension built by constant control exerted in the daily social life. In contrast, in the way Young et al. discusses satire, it is argued that satire, when it plays, 'ignite passion' into the audience, not because it releases built-up tension, but instead because it expands the horizon by reframing known topics in a satirical manner, which can be used both in educational purposes and to rethink political opinions etc.

The view on Satire presented by Young et al. does not fit any of the theories stringently. However, if we were to connect it to one of the main theories, then the incongruity theory comes closest because it makes a connection between the unexpected and laughter, and therefore opens up for the possibility of creation or learning through an unexpected view on a topic or action.

Morreall (1981) also sees the three major theories of laughter as being too narrow and argue that none of them works as a comprehensive theory of laughter. In his paper "Humor, philosophy and education (2014)" he argues that the superiority theory has given humour a bad reputation and that the Incongruity theory, with some refinement, opens for a supporting tool in education, as it gives us another way of perceiving the

world. However, some people also advocate for caution, as an increased tolerance towards certain kind of jokes might implicitly affect the tolerance towards sexism, racism and etc. A view that can be found in (Ford et al., 2001) who argues that humour can influence people general tolerance towards normative structure, jokes involving sexism will also influence the individual apart from the joke, and increase tendencies of sexism, racism and etc. It is an interesting point of view, as it incorporates humour into the general discourse, but it still acknowledges it as being different from simple conversations. It would be less appealing if it talked about how sexist talk or racist talk, would increase the tolerance towards the topics, but instead focuses on "jokes" that are different from ordinary conversation. Furthermore, the study invites the question that if sexist jokes create sexism, does enlightening jokes creates enlightenment?

What we can observe from the modern research of satire, is that it mainly works with satire as a communicative tool that has normative implications, and which is more complicated than a stringent theory of laughter. It inspired our approach towards satire, which incorporates discussion of the publics, truth and communication in society.

Introduction to empirical material

The cases chosen in the thesis, are empirical cases from the satirical praxis in which something caught our attention in regards to satires critical potential or relationship to truth. It is mainly episodes from Den Korte Radioavis that caught our attention and led us to investigate and analyze them further, but there is also a case from Tæt på sandheden, in which something was at stake. *Whenever a phenomenon does affect us, the hermeneutic circle is opened.* (Borren, 2013, p. 240) Hannah Arendt interpretation of the hermeneutic circle can be used to describe our choice of empirical, as it was cases who piqued our interest and inclined us to dive deeper into the matter.

Hence, the empirical material in the thesis and our focus is mainly represented through "Den Korte Radioavis " but also involves "Tæt på Sandheden". Various comedians, including Louis CK, will be referenced for the sake of providing examples of certain aspects of satire and joke-telling. We also considered the Danish comedian Michael Schøts show "Schøtministeriet", which is a weekly approximately ten minutes long speech that reflects humorously on a subject that has been present in the past week. The

reach of his speeches varies significantly from week to week, with the lowest receiving around twenty thousand views to some of the more popular receiving well over a hundred thousand, and one specific speech as much as five hundred and eight thousand views (Schøts NyUgesTale 89, Flygtninge i DK). Though the show will not be treated analytically, it does underline the present popularity and presence of political satire.

One of the most famous and influential political satire shows in the new millennium, in a Danish context, is Den Korte Radioavis, which aired the first time 3, 2015. The show has revived the radio award, Radio prix, for best satire every year since it aired the first time, as well as the award for best radio program three years in a row. The show has furthermore won the award for best comedy of the year as well as "Den Gyldne Grundtvig" which is a culture prize given to people or organizations who have contributed to public enlightenment (Odder Højskole: Den gyldne grundtvig). One of the characters of the show, Kirsten Birgit Schiøtz Kretz Hørsholm, was nominated for "Dane of the year" in 2016 (Lindberg, 2016). The other satirical program chosen to represent contemporary satire is "Tæt på sandheden" by Jonatan Spang, whom last year won comedian of the year for his weekly political satire show. Jonatan Spang also won the award for his politically satirical one-man show "Danmark". Tæt på Sandheden has been the talk of the town both in Denmark, when they participated in a press conference held by the now resigned politician, Anna Mee Allerselev, but also in Sweden, where his sketches on political correctness went viral. The two shows are chosen in regard to popularity, quality and actuality. Popularity, because one of this thesis claims is the increasing popularity of political satire; quality, because it is one of the thesis claims that satire, when it is best, can transcend the realm of entertainment and become something more; and actuality, because it has become apparent to us, that political satire is highly context-dependent, wherefore remembering or at least being able to examine the context, becomes quintessential for a proper analysis of the material.

Satire, humour and philosophy

"A serious and good philosophical work could be written, consisting entirely of jokes."

- Ludwig Wittgenstein

The nature of satire is particular and imprecise at the same time. Satire is, on the one hand, merely satirical shows and sketches that make fun of people and actions in society but is at the same time something different than common critique and something different than just jokes. Satire possesses a relationship to humour and boundaries, but one cannot say that everything which is funny, is satire. The reason why philosophical praxis is useful in discussing the complicated phenomenon of satire is that philosophy is able to illuminate the phenomenon through multiple perspectives. The philosophical tradition has a history of investigating difficult topics, and in the case of satire, the question of how to address it is as crucial as the inquiry.

There lies a bond between satire, humour and philosophy with a tradition that goes from Plato, Diogenes and Juvenal, to Voltaire, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard to Sloterdijk and Critchley. There are different facets in each of the engagements in humour and satire from a philosophical point of view, where some treat humour and satire as an aesthetic category, others were intrigued by the amusement caused by humour, and of what caused the amusement, others again saw humour as a response to the absurdity of the human condition and irony of the world.

As is often the case, philosophers are intrigued by what is difficult to comprehend in theory but is generally understood in praxis, as is the case with many philosophical accounts of love, beauty, and humour. Where philosophy seeks to explain the unexplainable, satire show us the things we cannot explain.

Methodological approach:

Every inquiry is a seeking.

Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought.

- Heidegger

When approaching the phenomenon of political satire and investigating how it can be understood and how it appears in the public sphere, the hermeneutic phenomenological tradition which builds upon the works of, among others, Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, is inspiring in its understanding of the world.

Hermeneutic phenomenologists use the notion of the world as the meaningful context within which human existence unfolds. The key presupposition

of Arendt's phenomenological anthropology is that human existence is above all worldly existence. In this respect, her anthropology is clearly though implicitly indebted to Heidegger's early work. (...) Heidegger called the human being Dasein in order to avoid the metaphysical notion of the subject and argued that Dasein's primary existential way of being or of relating to the world, others, and itself (expressed in the so-called 'existentials'), is in-der-Welt-sein, being-in-the-world (Borren, 2013, p 235)

Ascribing to the position of hermeneutic phenomenology, the understanding that we are beings in the world, and that phenomena encountered appear to us from our position in the world, becomes a precondition for the examination of the phenomenon itself. A condition which also entails in the view of Arendt: *"men are both natural and worldly beings: there is no dualism between 'consciousness' and 'nature' running through human beings* (Borren, 2013, p234). The individual and his inner life, relationship to truth and mind cannot be separated from the world since the individual as a being is always already a being in the world. This perspective has influenced our approach and analysis, by the thought that we are together in a world, and that we can discuss both how being in the world affects other beings in the world, but also in the sense that our existence is being in the world in a constant relationship with phenomena. Human beings' way of being in the world, is always interpreting; we *do* not understand, we *are* understanding, i.e. understanding is not an activity but a condition for human beings (ibid). Hence, the discussion of satire is a discussion of how satire appears to us, from the precondition, that we are in constant relationship with the world and are formed and affected by this relationship. We cannot objectively understand the phenomenon of satire, but we can analyze it and discuss it from our being in the world. Continuing this line of thought entails a perception of people's actions and relationship to the world, as mutually affecting, there lies a co-dependency between human beings and the world. Since being in the world is always also being with other beings in the world, every action that, intentionally or unintentionally, shape or reshape the world will necessarily, simultaneously, shape or reshape other beings in the world. A perspective which has influenced our work with the public sphere, since the public sphere is primarily shaped

by public authority and institutions who influences narratives, i.e., to shape or reshape the world.

The process of working with political satire in the public sphere, from the first trigger to the further examination of the phenomenon, is analogue to the way a phenomenon for Arendt starts the hermeneutic circle. The procedure is eloquently expressed by Borren's (2013) reading of the methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology:

Whenever a phenomenon does affect us, the hermeneutic circle is opened. It starts with a careful, phenomenological analysis of the lived experience of the world, which is full of uncritical, pre-reflective, and prejudiced understanding of meaning. Subsequently, we need to distance ourselves from these prejudices [...] through a critical examination of them. Arendt accords a unique role to the faculties of imagination and storytelling in the process of critical reflection. Whereas specific triggers, i.e. taste or the shock of the new, engage us with phenomena (Borren, 2013, p240)

Our exertion with the phenomenon of political satire, can be understood through this description, in the sense that the first interest, the opening of the hermeneutic circle, was aroused by something unexpected, the shock of new, which guided by our curiosity made us engaged in the phenomenon of political satire and hence triggered the hermeneutic process. It was a realization, a hunch, that the political satire of today was notably different in its sharpness and brutal nature, compared to earlier Danish satire, and that this specific change could serve as an explanatory model for the turmoil of modernity. The immediate understanding of the phenomenon and its relation to the world was "*full of uncritical, pre-reflective, and prejudices of meaning (Ibid)*". We questioned our intuitive understanding of satire, and little by little distanced ourselves from our immediate understanding, by diving into the already existing literature on humour, public opinion, truth, the public sphere, etc., all of which seemed interrelated with satire. After trawling through the theory on the interrelated phenomena, all of which served to open up our mentality towards the nuances of the phenomenon, which lead us in various directions, we "*return[ed] to an elucidated version of the implicit*

understanding we started with (ibid)" thus engaging in the contingent and open-ended process of understanding (Arendt, 1961), rooted in our initial intuition.

The public sphere inspired by Habermas

"Only by our externalization, by entering into social relationships, can we develop the interiority of our own person."

- Jürgen Habermas

The satirical praxis is public in nature, in the sense that it addresses life in public by engaging with people, institutions, politics and actions done in the public realm, and work with current affairs of society, inspired establishing a foundation for the discussion of political satire, i.e. theory of the public. We decided to incorporate Jürgen Habermas work on the public sphere, 'The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere' (1962), as his conceptualizing of the public sphere provides a tool to limit and understand the sphere in which we investigate the satirical praxis, that is, the public sphere. Habermas describes the historical evolution of the public and defines the public sphere as a sphere in which opinion and understanding evolve through critique, dialogue and discussion. The public sphere is not a place per se, i.e. it is not physical, not a specific location as the agora, but a conceptual description of a sphere in which citizen can engage with one another. The public sphere is the 'place' in which public opinion and, hence, public critique of public institutions, the state, government etc. is constituted. The theory of the public sphere is used in defining the framework in/by which the satirical praxis operates, and institutes the main research field of our thesis, as it will work with satires effect on the public sphere. Habermas comes from the tradition of critical theory, which can be dated back to Karl Marx and Immanuel Kant. Critical theory is normative, in the way that it does not claim its own independence from opinions and power structures. *"Kritisk teori skal ikke blot registrere den sociale virkelighed, som den er, men tillige bidrage til realiseringen af samfundet, som det bør være (Sørensen, A. 2012, p. 245)".* The theory differs from other theories of society, in which a fundamental claim for objectivity is essential. In opposition, Critical theory works by critically analyzing the topic of research, and does not strive for objectivity, but rather to attribute to society by enlightening the citizens. In the classic critical theory, Marx inspired analyses of the society through politics, economics and sociology, and Immanuel Kant inspired through

the greek word *Krinein*, which is connected to the proper or healthy selection, categorizing and judging (ibid).

The tools to offer proper judgement to analyze the social sphere and the political realm is often found in the humanities, heavily depending on philosophy, but also anthropology, political theory, economy etc.

Critical theory has undergone several changes throughout the years, and maybe most notable through the communicative paradigm introduced by Habermas, which is our inspiration for the framework of the public sphere. "*Afgørende for kritisk teori bliver således ideen om en førvidenskabelig livsverden, hvor taler og lytter kan gøre sig forståelig overfor hinanden (ibid).*" His theory works with the subject-subject relation, and he argues that modern structures, including technological systems, different kind of communications in media etc. influences the subject-subject relationship and changes the foundation for communication.

He breaks with the classical critical theory in the sense, that it is not about a historical materialism(Karl Marx), or about an accurate recognition through proper judgement, selection and recognition(Immanuel Kant), but instead about communication, and the goal of the critique should be to highlight structures around the communication between subject-subject, and thus try to understand the present premises for communication between subjects, in opposition to earlier subject-object relation found in critical theory. However, in contradiction to the subject-subject relation, there is also systems, economics, bureaucracy etc. These systems are instrumental and strategic, which involves an egoistic and goal-oriented approach(Ibid P276). A perspective that will function as a way of discussing the character of communicative actions. Habermas distinguishes between the cultural reproduction that takes place in the lifeworld, and the material reproduction, which takes place in the instrumental and strategic sphere. Habermas points out that both are necessary to modern society, but that the balance and areas they cover are essential to discuss(Ibid, P277).

Habermas argues how the new condition for citizens with the marketization of communication, political debates, talk shows etc. can compromise content, but also create new possibilities for communication in the form of social media etc.

Habermas offers a way to illuminate areas of our modern dialogue that, to a certain degree, prevents proper communication between subjects, which also points towards some of the implications in using Habermas' theory as a structural framework. Habermas argues that people through ideal speech are able to deliberate towards a balance in society and create a proper critique against the state, economy and public authority. It is a selective choice to incorporate Habermas understanding of the public sphere, as a place that offers insight and truth if the conditions for ideal speech are met. The idea of ideal speech is amongst others not shared by Sloterdijk, who argues that the idea of pure communication without factors like power and emotions are unthinkable (Sloterdijk,1983). Sloterdijk is sceptic towards the idea that when two people argue, and through rational reason and ideal speech one of them explains the other why he is wrong, the person who was proved wrong, is in principle the winner, because he through deliberation has grown wiser. Sloterdijk argues that the idea of two people discussing purely in search of truth unaffected by factors like pride, desire to be powerful, hidden agendas etc. is a utopian fantasy, and in his view, the ideal speech will not happen just because the circumstances are right. It is a proper critique, but the reason why we have chosen to work with Habermas understanding of the public sphere is not to argue that his understanding of ideal speech is unquestionable, but instead as a way to discuss communication in public. We are inclined towards his normative understanding of clean communication having a positive effect on truth and opinion in the public sphere, and therefore uses his theory of the mutually beneficial discussion in the public sphere as ideal, because we, like Sloterdijk, finds that despite all this "*To preserve the healing fiction of a free dialogue is one of the last tasks of philosophy* (1983, p. 16)."

Chapter 1: The public sense of the world

"In a time of deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act."

- George Orwell

Habermas - Institutions, deliberation and the public sphere

Jürgen Habermas' work "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962)", in which Habermas investigate both the birth, uprising and downfall of the bourgeois public sphere, have been a significant contribution to both the humanities and social sciences. As a *"sphere between civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally guaranteed (ibid, p. xi)"* the public sphere was driven forward by a capitalistic interest in information from trade partners paving the way for both the uprising and the downfall of the ideal state of the public sphere. As Habermas (ibid, p. 15) puts it:

On the one hand, this capitalism stabilized the power structure of a society organized in estates, and on the other hand, it unleashed the very elements within which this power structure would one day dissolve. We are speaking of the elements of the new commercial relationships: the traffic in commodities and news created by early capitalist long-distance trade.

The rise and expansion of long-distance trade became the reason businessmen got engaged in both letter exchange and news, and the merchants of the big cities soon orchestrated the first mail routes (ibid, p. 16). Habermas points out that this early news traffic was only for the few merchants, and the news was yet not public. The merchants were, then, the creators of 'news', but an actual press did not see the light of day before the end of the seventeenth century; *"there existed a press in the strict sense only once the regular supply of news became public, that is, again, accessible to the general public (ibid)".* This accessibility by, and distribution to, the general public is for Habermas a precondition for us to discuss a press and, culture and, as we shall see, satire as such. The press became the very medium in which the new critical public sphere of civil

society rose, accompanied and helped by the bourgeois, which "*was the real carrier of the public* (ibid, p. 23)". The new public was from the outset a reading public, and the reading and discussion of literature "*provided the training ground for a critical public reflection*(ibid, p. 29)", thus enabling the bourgeois public sphere to meet the new challenge of critiquing public authority (ibid, 24).

That which served representation in the public sphere gained publicity by the critical publics judging and choosing, and the discussions and debates about mostly literature facilitated a gathering of critical private people who discussed their private opinions (ibid, 26.) These opinions of the critical public of what was submitted to the public's judging and choosing were analogous to what was later called the 'public opinion'. Hence Habermas writes "*Criticism itself was presented in the form of öffentliche Meinung* (Ibid, 26)". The bourgeois public sphere should, then, be understood as the sphere in which private people can engage and discuss matters of public relevance, i.e. the sphere where "*private people come together as public* (ibid, 27)". This sphere was institutionally secured in France by "*salons*" and in Great Britain by "*Coffee houses*", which in both countries "*were centers of criticism - literary at first, then also political* (ibid, p. 32)". Even though the two vary in a few ways - in the British coffee houses women weren't allowed, whereas the french salon by and large were shaped by women; the salon was mostly for the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, nobility and aristocracy, were the coffee houses also embraced the broader middle class - they both served the same institutional purpose of their time, why they will be treated more or less the same type of socio-spatial locations, since "*they all organized discussion among private people that tended to be ongoing; hence they had a number of institutional criteria in common* (ibid, p. 36)". The coffee houses and salons became the hub for deliberation in the 18th century, and instead of social and economic status being the indicator for authority, the better argument served as same. Habermas does, however, states that even though these ideal deliberative institutions did not always realize their ideal, the ideal itself "*had become institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim. If not realized, it was at least consequential*" (ibid). The coffee houses and salons served as a rallying point where areas of the public, that until then was more or less undebated, unquestioned, could become problematized. This ability to nurture reflection and discussion regarding public affairs,

that hitherto have been undebated, is an institutional criterion that the salons share with satire.

This function of the deliberative institutions was further intensified with the commodification of art, literature and philosophy and removed the monopoly of interpretation occupied by the church and state authorities (ibid). This commodification removed the distinct "*aura of extraordinariness* (ibid)" of art and literature, thus making it accessible for a bigger part of the public, or as Habermas writes (ibid, 37):

The private people for whom the cultural product became available as a commodity profaned it inasmuch as they had to determine its meaning on their own (by way of rational communication with one another), verbalize it and thus state explicitly what precisely in its implicitness for so long could assert its authority.

The commodification of art and literature served the process of making it available to the public, and because the public now started to discuss and debate art, the transformation of the 'holy' art into the 'common' culture began. The transition of art, literature and philosophy also entailed a less exclusive debating public, because "*The issues discussed became "general" not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility: everyone had to be able to participate* (ibid, 37). The public as a culture debating public was now born, driven forward by the very same tendency that became the catalyst for its downfall, capitalism.

The downfall of the culture debating public began when free time became spare time. The time the private person spent in the salons possessed for Habermas a political character, in the Greek understanding of the word, since it was "*emancipated from the constraints of survival requirements* (ibid, 160)". The private life was a precondition for the debates in the salons and coffeehouses, since their structure was, at least partly, based on the engagement and interaction between the private people, which united them into public (ibid). The literary public who met in the salons grew into the realm of consumption, transforming their free time into mere complimentary time for their time spent on the job (ibid), i.e. to spare-time. Spare-time, or leisure, is apolitical by nature since it doesn't manage to constitute a world where the subject is emancipated from the

constraints of survival needs (ibid). To put it differently, what was once a realm where subjects could be emancipated by the constraints of everyday needs, i.e. a political realm, has become apolitical. What was once 'time to' has become 'time off', what was once free time has become spare time. This transformation Habermas describes in the following way:

In the course of our century, the bourgeois forms of sociability have found substitutes that have one tendency in common despite their regional and national diversity: abstinence from literary and political debate. On the new model, the convivial discussion among individuals gave way to more or less noncommittal group activities. (ibid, p. 163)

The lack of literary and political debate is one of the key indicators for Habermas that the public sphere has transformed from a culture debating to culture consuming public. Where the culture debating public sphere presupposed an engagement in a culture which took place in private, the culture consuming public presupposed neither engagement nor privacy, nor does it entail further discussion afterwards (ibid). Culture in the 20th century started assuming the form of a consumer good, and where the commercialization of culture was once the precondition for the widening of the critical public debate, it has now entered the realm of the debate. The commercialization of culture had the advantages that secured that culture was available to a broad population, and the 'consumption' of culture was a precondition to participating in the debates. Even though the public had to pay for their cultural goods, it didn't assume commodity per se, because a substantial part of the purchased cultural good was the subsequent conversation about the cultural goods (ibid, 164), let it be theatre, concerts, books or satire.

Today the conversation itself is administered. (...) -the rational debate of private people becomes one of the production numbers of the stars in radio and television, a salable package ready for the box office; it assumes commodity form even at "conferences" where anyone can "participate." Discussion, now a "business," becomes formalized; the presentation of positions and counterpositions is bound to specific prearranged rules of the game; consensus about the subject matter is made

largely superfluous by that concerning form. What can be posed as a problem is defined as a question of etiquette; conflicts, once fought out in public polemics, are demoted to the level of personal incompatibilities. Critical debate arranged in this manner certainly fulfils essential social-psychological functions, especially that of a tranquillizing substitute for action; however, it increasingly loses its publicist function (ibid, p. 164)".

Habermas, points towards observations done in his time, that indicates how political debates, cultural discussion, etc., have been made to talk shows, timed debates, easily consumed content, which neither requires a considerable amount of knowledge to understand nor a high amount of engagement. The culture produced in the 20th century have been guided by a strategy of sales(ibid, 165), and even the cultural debates that were once a substantial part of cultural goods have assumed commodity, becoming "*a salable package ready for the box office(ibid, 164)*". In the process of trying to achieve the highest box office, the culture, as well as distribution of same, lost it's critical and aesthetic relevance(ibid, 165) since "*the laws of the market have already penetrated into the substance of the works themselves and have become inherent in them as formative laws (ibid)*". The market has eased access to cultural goods, making culture a commodity not only in its form but also in content (ibid, 166). Had the market mechanisms that led to mass production of cultural goods merely made it more economically accessible, then the process of bringing the people up to the level of culture (ibid) might have continued; instead, culture was lowered to that of the masses (ibid) making it as easy to digest as possible to catch a broad audience. Because of the 'wide' audience approach 'mass culture' has earned its name, according to Habermas, because it aims at increasing sales by adopting to the consumer, providing products fit for the need of enjoyment in one's spare-time(ibid). This lowering of the *psychological*, instead of merely the economical, entrance requirements into leisure promises it's consumers entertainment, but by the cost of any noticeable effects and consequences (ibid), as Habermas writes "*Serious involvement with culture produces facility, while the consumption of mass culture leaves no lasting trace; it affords a kind of experience which is not cumulative but regressive (ibid, p. 166)*".

This tendency towards the collapse of the public sphere can also be traced back to similar psychological facilitation - which characterised the new consumption of culture - in the press. Here, too, a depoliticization of the content followed from commercialization.

The mass press was based on the commercialization of the participation in the public sphere on the part of broad strata designed predominantly to give the masses in general access to the public sphere. This expanded public sphere, however, lost its political character to the extent that the means of "psychological facilitation" could become an end in itself for a commercially fostered consumer attitude (ibid, 169).

Habermas points towards a change in the general landscape of media and newspapers, where the maximization of sales was paid by removing political and moral content from the papers (ibid). The news-reading public expanded and the politically reasoning press with their "*delayed reward news [such as] Public affairs, social problems, economic matters, education, and health* (ibid, 170)" *lost threshold in favor of the "immediate reward news (comics, corruption, accidents, disasters, sports, recreation, social events, and human interest* (ibid)". Finally, the newspapers on the one hand dress up their limited political or editorial material, assigning to it the form and inventory of the entertainment literature, making it as easy to digest as possible, whilst their belletrist contributions, on the other hand, "aim for the strictly 'realistic' reduplication of reality 'as it is' on the level of cliches and thus, in turn, erase the line between fiction and report (Ibid)". The disappearance of the, once dominant, critical discussions of the culture engaging public, becomes intensified by the change of focus in mass media, because the critical discussions tend to give way in favour of the consumers exchange about taste and preferences (ibid, 171), and the new, transformed public sphere is thus a public sphere only by appearance (ibid).

It now becomes apparent that the two major institutions constituting the public sphere, the press and the hitherto socio-spatial opportunities for cultural debate, in Habermas view have had suffered from commercialization. Furthermore, the commercialization of the two has a somewhat reciprocal relationship, as a great deal of

the cultural debates happened with the press as a medium. The discussions in the coffee clubs and salons were thus dependable upon a press that delivered content with 'delayed impact'.

Hannah Arendt - Authority, mass culture, truth and politics

"The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their mind to be good or evil."

- Hannah Arendt

Hannah Arendt was a philosophical and political thinker from the nineteenth century, who theorized over various topics regarding the human condition that are related to governance and the interpretations of grand concepts like authority, freedom, truths, politics etc.

In the book 'Between Past and Future', the concepts are discussed separately in independent essays, which has inclined us to follow this approach loosely. Arendt does not deliver clear answers to these grand concepts but shows the concepts through a discussion of different thinkers and selected historical periods. For Arendt (1961), the question regarding authority is one of the essential questions in relation to governance and power.

"WHAT IS AUTHORITY? In order to avoid misunderstanding, it might have been wiser to ask in the title: What was-and not what is- authority? For it is my contention that we are tempted and entitled to raise this question because authority has vanished from the modern world. Since we can no longer fall back upon authentic and indisputable experiences common to all (ibid, p. 91)"

Understanding Hannah Arendt claims of lack of authority in the modern world, it is essential to understand what she means by an authority. "Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some sort of power or violence (ibid, p. 92)". Authority is not the same as power, but the sentence "Authentic and indisputable experiences common to all" is essential to understand the essence of the concept. She refers to an understanding of authority partly established through tradition. Arendt

works with an understanding of authority that is established through a common belief shared by the population; in other words, an established hierarchy concerning matters of general interest.

“If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments. (the authoritarian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself) (ibid, p. 93)”

Therefore authority is not connected to power, neither too bright arguments that convince the individual of its intrinsic logic, but lives by the historical hierarchy that is already established and not questioned. The relationship between the one who feels awe towards the authority and the authority can be understood as the relationship between the patient and the doctor. In this relationship, it is a relatively inherent belief that the doctor has "authority" in regards to the care of the human body. It is not a relationship built upon force neither is it build around clear arguments, even though the doctor will often be able to provide those, but before the examination even begins, one finds himself to believe in the doctor's capability (ibid). Arendt believes that authority has lost its common meaning and that it possesses a problem for living together in the world, as living in the world with others, as Arendt puts it:

“we have ceased to live in a common world where the words we have in common possess an unquestionable meaningfulness, so that, short of being condemned to live verbally in an altogether meaningless world, we grant each other the right to retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and the only demand is that each of us remain consistent within his own private terminology (ibid, p. 95)”

The point is not that a critical approach towards structures and history is undesirable, but that man in the critical aftermath of the radical critique of religion and totalitarian approaches in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, has found himself in a place with no common ground. The view can transcend to the satirical work done in DKR, as many

of the structures and people, which DKR criticize in their program, are often challenged by their ever-changing, non-consistent, historyless characters. In the same sense that she discusses authority, Arendt reflects on the way she perceives culture and mass society in her time.

Arendt published the work "Between Past and Future" in 1961, within which she examines the phenomenon of mass culture, which she describes as a term that in *"itself clearly derives from the not much older term 'mass society'; the tacit assumption, underlying all discussion of the matter, is that mass culture, logically and inevitably, is the culture of mass society (ibid., p 94)."* To understand how Hannah Arendt understands the culture, it is then necessary to look at its relationship to art, which partly established a culture.

"a discussion of culture is bound to take the phenomenon of art as its starting point because artworks are cultural objects par excellence. Yet while culture and art are closely interrelated, they are by no means the same." (...) Culture, word and concept, is Roman in origin. The word "culture" derives from colere - to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and preserve - and it relates primarily to the intercourse of man with nature in the sense of cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation. As such, it indicates an attitude of loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the domination of man (ibid, p. 207-209)."

The critical distinction is the distinction between a loving and caring attitude that preserve and cultivate in opposition to a thought of domination and conquering the world. It is a sharp distinction that is used to critique the utilitarian approach towards culture and art, in which it is measured purely by an evaluation of their ends and their value. Arendt describes this problem in correlation with two main problems art is encountering in the mass society, a society that is established not through the mass as in quantity of people, but in mass as in a labor force who has acquired more time to leisure, because of less time consumed by intensive labor work, and therefore demands to be incorporated into the culture (ibid, p. 199).

The issue Arendt rises regarding culture, the way to preserve it and use it for the public good, is a constant turning point in the public sphere. It is still discussed how

culture should be preserved and how to engage it. However, Arendt believes that the increased demand for entertainment is a more complicated issue.

“In this predicament those who produce for the mass media ransack the entire range of past and present culture in the hope of finding suitable material. This material, moreover, cannot be offered as it is; it must be altered in order to become entertaining, it must be prepared to be easily consumed. Mass culture comes into being when mass society seizes upon cultural objects (...) eats them up and destroy them (ibid, p. 204)”

The problem is not the demand for entertainment, as it will and always has been needed, but the problem is that mass media does not merely incorporate cultural values but changes them. If a work done by Shakespeare is expected to be as easily digested as a mere talk-show, then one has to change the essence and structure of Shakespeare's work, which will create something that might be entertaining but does not do Shakespeare just. The utilitarian approach of using culture for snob-value or for entertainment is dangerous because it threatens to invade the realm of politics. It poses a problem according to Arendt because of a lack of care for the cultural content.

“Could it be that philosophy in the Greek sense - which begins with “wonder,” and ends (at least in the Plato and Aristotle) in the speechless beholding of some unveiled - is more likely to lead into inactivity than love of beauty?(...) And finally, could it be that this right love of beauty, the proper kind of intercourse with beautiful things- cultura animi which makes man fit to care of the things in the world and which Cicero, in contradistinction to the Greeks ascribed to philosophy - has something to do with politics (ibid, p .211)?”

The claim is that cultivation or the ability to see something's inherent worth has to be incorporated into politics because politics possess a particular nature that not necessarily is capable of governing man in a constructive way alone. Arendt hence describes art *“The common element connecting art and politics is that they both are phenomena of the public world (ibid, p. 215)”* The feeling and belonging art can create,

which becomes cultural elements, is a feeling beyond the logic of pure means and is a feeling that transcends the social hierarchy, and is a sense of the world. According to Arendt, it becomes a problem when politics lose their feeling with the common, and more accurately the common sense.

"The difference between this judging insight and speculative thought lies in that the former has its roots in what we usually call common sense- which the latter constantly transcends. (...) Judging is one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass (ibid, p. 218)."

Common sense is here seen in regards to both truth and what could be called sound judgement. One way to understand common sense is in accordance with Plato, who believed it to be absolutely necessary for the good ruler. The common sense that Plato discusses, is a combination of experience and knowledge, and is indispensable for the educated individual, and can be seen by the subject's ability to make sound judgement in everyday praxis, and can in that way be perceived as an opposition to the pure theoretical knowledge, which in itself does not possess the common sense of the lived life. Arendt discussed common sense as a sense of the world, and as Borren explains:

"It is a typical feature of Arendt's analyses of any phenomenon – be it common sense, freedom, authority, power, etc. – that she often starts from an investigation of what this phenomenon is not or of what its absence or lack amounts to and only then proceeds to descriptions of what that phenomenon is or means in positive terms, analogous to the theological method of a via negativa (Borren, 2013)."

What Arendt defines as not being common sense is turning away from the world, in this way politicians and public figures can often make statements or twist reality in a way so, they turn away from a sense of the world, and from the lived life of everyday people. Common sense is usually defined as:

a set of obvious, self-evident beliefs and judgments, equally accessible to all. Although the concept's long history is often associated with epistemological and anthropological discourses [...] it is always politically charged ab initio, as it sets the beliefs and judgments of laypeople against those of experts, professionals, scientists or philosophers, thereby involving a claim regarding the hierarchical relations between the masses and the elites. (Snir, 2015, P 188)

The quote summarizes a generalized understanding of common sense, which is closely related to Plato's understanding, in the sense that it is working with self-evident truths learned through the lived life. Often common sense is an understanding found amongst people, for example, in the marketplace, and it is in opposition to theoretical truths but is self-evident truths of the lived life amongst people. That way of using common sense as something self obvious obtained through the lived life, is often found in satirical work as a critique of the political praxis, which can seem distant from the lived life, as the rhetorical discourse within politics seems to detach itself from the lived life, and move to a realm of absurdity, which is comparable to Hannah Arendt's question regarding the obstruction of common sense as turning away from a sense of the world.

If we were to connect these arguments and take this analysis further, then the lack of connection between the common ground of men, culture and art can empower the problem of politicians lacking “common sense “a universal way of judging, which require that they are in sync with the public realm, and understand the lives and problems of ordinary men, an ability that goes beyond an utilitarian approach of means and ends.

Arendt describes the long and complicated relationship established between truth and politics. She points towards the history of politicians and illustrates their desire for pragmatic solutions, and that the idea of an inherent truth or something beyond the ends, is neglected. A vast majority of the politician's power comes from the ability to be a good salesman, the ability to represent what they believe people want (Arendt, 1961, p. 229). *“If we understand political action in terms of the means-end category, we may even come to the only seemingly paradoxical conclusion that lying can very well serve to establish or safeguard conditions for the search for truth (ibid, p. 224).”*

Whether truth is the most important factor or a pragmatic approach is not an uncomplicated matter. Arendt describes two different approaches to truth, one of which is discussed through an elaboration on a redescription of the latin saying "*fiat justitia, et pereat mundus*" where Arendt have replaced *justitia* with *veritas*. As a response to this, Arendt states that " *that the sacrifice of truth for the survival of the world would be more futile than the sacrifice of any other principle or virtue (ibid, p 229)*" This can be brought back to the perseverance of culture; any world destined to live beyond the lifespan of mortal men must be truthful. In this line of thinking society will vanish, no permanent existence of values, culture, coherence etc. Is possible without men being willing to speak the truth, to what they believe is the truth. Therefore, the society cannot be saved by lying, because lying is the damnation of societies future survival (ibid, p. 225).

Another approach to truth in society is inspired by Thomas Hobbes,' whose perspective on truth is radically different. According to Hobbes, the society itself is bound by negative freedom. Every restriction on man is a hindrance on his freedom, and man is driven by his instincts, lust and ambition. Therefore, man doesn't care about the truth; what he cares about is how the truth correlates to his own goals. Therefore, man doesn't care about performance or consistent history; he only cares about how he can obtain the greatest pleasure in life (ibid, p. 226).

Arendt mainly works with a definition of truth as; "*The modern age, which believes that truth is neither given nor disclosed to but produced by the human mind, has assigned, since Leibniz, mathematical, scientific, and philosophical truths to the common species of rational truth as distinguished from factual truth (ibid, p. 226).*" One of the problems in a clear definition of truth is that truth is defined by its opposition falsehood and error. Factual truth can be 'wrong' as in error, whereas philosophical truth can be abstract and distinct.

There is a connection between factual truth and opinions in politics, where there is a tendency to transform the factual truth into a matter opinion, for example, through the marketplace or with the help of statistics. This predicament ultimately ends in a blurring of the factual truth and the opinion, and to navigate between 'right' and 'wrong' becomes difficult. "*Facts and events are infinitely more fragile things than axioms, discoveries, theories-even the most wildly speculative ones-produced by the human mind(...) Once they are lost, no rational effort will ever bring them back (ibid, p. 227).*"

Arendt does not unravel the essence of moral behaviour, but discuss the phenomenons that are created amongst others by politicians, to expose the problems that are created in correlation with a misunderstanding of the political function, which is the misinterpretation that politics is about guarding and protecting the truth. The historic conflict between truth and politics, something that can be dated back to the writings of Plato.

"The citizen's ever-changing opinions about human affairs, which themselves were in a state of constant flux, the philosopher opposed the truth about those things which in their very nature were everlasting and from which, therefore, principles could be derived to stabilize human affairs (ibid, p. 227)."

If we use this quote analytically, then we say that the protection of universal principles, traditions, and factual truth are necessary to protect them from the ever-changing tides of public discourse, which creates opinions that are changeable, but not necessarily true. The conflict that can arise in the act of governing is that governments are not always concerned with a healthy relationship to truth.

"All governments rest on opinion(...) The shift from rational truth to opinion implies a shift from man in the singular to men in the plural, and this means a shift from a domain where, Madison says, nothing counts except "solid reasoning" of one mind to a realm where "strength of opinion" is determined by the individuals reliance upon the number (ibid, p. 229)."

Because governments rest upon "opinion" and not "truth", and because the politician use rhetorics to have an impact on the opinion, then reality can become distorted. The destruction of 'reality', is something Arendt describes when politicians use rhetorics to mislead on purpose. The intention can be targeted at merely the opposition, but the act can twist reality, so in the end, even the man behind the deception will be deceived (ibid).

Arendt describes how politicians, media, power institutions, etc. intentionally substitute, change or mislead to change reality with the intentions of personal or

organization benefits. In our thesis, we call the movement of turning away from the truth, by misleading, substituting, lying, etc., for twisting reality.

We believe that the twisting of reality also can be found in correlation with mass media, that in its interpretation of the world can produce a fragmented reality. Here misleading is a more accurate phrase than lying, the act of neglecting or denying the importance of facts can empower an image, which is beneficial to the politician or media. It is difficult to distinguish between the intentional misleading, a case where the person purposely wrongly represent a problem's urgency to create a beneficial image, and on the other hand to be deceived by the discourse and his own former manipulation, so he believes the interpretation he communicates.

To further enhance this tendency, then one can claim that the self-deceived politician is often more successful because it appears more truthful and heartfelt if one is able to convince oneself. The successful liar is one who sticks close to the truth. What happens is an absolute totalitarian dedication to truth, is a mentality towards not what is, but rather to be hostile towards all attempts to nuance the truth itself.

It has frequently been noticed that the surest long-term result of brainwashing is a peculiar kind of cynicism- an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well this truth may be established. In other words, the result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as truth, and the truth be defamed as lies, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world- and the category of truth vs falsehood is among the mental means to this end- is being destroyed (ibid, p. 257).

If we expand this view not only on totalitarian governments but also apply it to mental approaches towards information, then one might be able to see the similarity between the brainwash applied by the 'outside', and the approach one can establish to keep the twisted reality alive and the truth out by intentionally 'brainwashing' oneself. It can appear truthful because there is an actual belief behind the conviction.

In opposition to this tendency, we find the truth-teller. The truth-teller is a person free from the political sphere, who is without incitement to any political agenda

(ibid, p. 236). The truth-teller has historically always been in a tight spot, for one if we look at the connection between state secrets and authentic truth.

he who reveals authentic secrets has always been treated as a traitor. (...) (Even in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia it was more dangerous to talk about concentration and extermination camps, whose existence was no secret, than to hold and to utter "heretical" views on anti-Semitism, racism, and Communism) (ibid, p. 236).

The truth-teller often offend something established by pointing out the truth, which we believe in our society often will be to point out a lie that is disguised as truth. The sphere that the truth-teller is forced to enter if he/she wants to break with the illusion or opinion presented as truth is a very unpleasant zone because he/she is forced to let his/her persona be public available for evaluation. For, the truth-teller will be measured, investigated, questioned and more. The truth-teller is often found to be someone who works in a completely different sphere than the politician, because of the radicality which is needed to be in opposition to the established illusion/opinion. The truth-tellers position can be one in solitude like the philosopher, the separated sphere like the judge, or the impartiality of the historian.

We find it difficult to trust the politician who claims to be a truth-teller because he/she communicate in the political discourse that represents the suspected twisted reality. Therefore one can find it difficult to judge whether it is just a changing of the twisted reality that is happening, or if it is a sincere aim to right the wrong and unravel the lies.

The realm that is challenged by the truth-teller is not limited to the political realm, but is found in any realm that is involved with power and opinion, and as a consequence can be found in various aspects of society.

The public sphere today

“Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible. We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; quite the contrary, we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us.”

— Jean Baudrillard

The political communication and the media landscape has gone through extensive evolutions since Habermas wrote his work on the public sphere. Most noteworthy, one can point towards the changed structure of communication with the growing globalization and social media, which has changed the channels the citizens can communicate through. Hence, the entrance to the public sphere is different, as it now cannot only be entered through the physical presence in the salon or through the media, but it is also possible to broadcast content and opinions through social media via the internet. The amount of content and information available the public sphere has massively increased compared to the time Habermas wrote his work on the public sphere. Information in the public sphere is more diverse and less controlled, and opinions and content differ markedly, which makes the public sphere more diverse.

Habermas interpretation of the public sphere found in the 17th and 18th-century salons is made up of a public, who through dialogue and ideal speech discuss matters of general interest, and are able to create a coherent opposition to other societal structures including economics interest, the state and bureaucracy. The physical presence of the salon, in which the public can meet and discuss, are not present today, in Habermas interpretation of the 1700 bourgeois society. It is not only about a physical place, but also the conditions for ideal speech free of interest, which is damaged when the dialogue in the public sphere is clouded by other interest than enlightenment through political communication. When everyone is able to establish content in the public sphere, through social media and other platforms on the internet, it cannot only be understood as a place for discussing general matters but also becomes a place where attention becomes a valuable resource and can be used as capital. It can be seen in correlation with private people who builds up attention capital, bloggers, opinion creators, which are not companies, politicians, academics, craftsman or actors, but rather people whose

capital is the attention they receive in the public sphere. Companies and organisations have to wander in the market of attention and work towards building up attention and a positive image and sometimes involves themselves in partnerships with prominent people with a high amount of attention capital.

In this section, however, we also want to discuss a keyword that seems apparent in the public sphere of today. A theme that is heavily discussed within satire and in general affects the public sphere as a whole: political correctness. Political correctness is not a fundamental change, in the sense that it is not a technological foundation, like social media, which changes the way people can and do communicate in the public sphere, nor is it structural as with an increased input or output of communication or marketization of the public sphere. It is a political question of how the communication should be articulated in the public sphere and is a theme bound to different opinions, hence not bound to a technical change.

In the public sphere, political correctness often manifests itself in regards to sensitive topics and affects rules of communication. The concept of political correctness can be dated back to the 1970's American university culture and was, in the beginning, a phrase used to articulate against degrading statements towards minority groups and oppressed groups in society. However, political correctness can also be understood as something else, as there will and always have been normative structures regarding what is offensive and what is not offensive to articulate in the public sphere. Political correctness is a value system that operates within linguistics and challenge and redetermines phrases or words, which is believed to be offensive, and therefore a euphemism, a concept used to describe the recreation of one word that is correlated with tabu or offensive behaviour. Franzini,(2012, p. 3) describes how this behaviour in the extreme can lead to linguistics abominations.

Kids learn to refer to bathroom functions as "number 1" or "number 2" and may later adopt these more mature phrases, respectively: "taking a wizz" and "dropping a deuce." Even adults will refer to the bathroom itself as "the little boys' (or girls') room." This tendency to avoid the correct biological terminology for body parts and functions creates a lifetime of over sensitivities and a heavy reliance on euphemisms(Ibid P, 3).

The sensitivity and redefinition of different parts of the language is a classical critique of the political correctness, as it is feared that the opportunity to clearly expressing one's thoughts might be compromised by the structural change of the language. A critique of euphemism is found in Louis Ck's joke about "the N-word". The joke goes as follow:

Everybody has different words that offend them. Different things that they hear and get offended by. To me, the thing that offends me the most is when I hear someone say "the N-word" not nigger, by the way, I mean "the N-word," literally whenever a white lady on CNN says "the N-word" that's just white people getting away with saying "nigger". They found a way to say "nigger", "N-word", it's bullshit because when you say "the N-word" you're putting nigger in the listener's head. That's what saying a word is. You say "the N-word", and I go "Oh, she means nigger," you're making ME say it in my head. Why don't YOU fucking say it instead and take responsibility? (chewed up, Louis CK, 2008)

The joke can be seen in the perspective of Franzini(2012), who discusses how a new word can take on the meaning of the word it replaces, and therefore the intentions and thoughts connected to it, does not change even though the word change, but the new word will simply replace the old word. For example, when "whore" is replaced by "hooker", then replaced by "prostitute", then replaced by "sex worker", it shows how the content bound to the phrase, still has the same normative implications. Louis CK points out how the same insinuations can be used by people just adapting a new word for it, and he criticizes it for making the receiver feeling dirty for the associations the new word creates, when it is okay to say the N-word, but wrong for the receiver to think nigger in his head. The problem can be correlated to a discussion of morality, in which morality sometimes can be more or less reflected. The symbolic action of changing the word nigger to the N-word can be seen as a normative string on the receiver, rather than a more reflected moral position in which the individual has thought about the problem, and herself/himself found the conclusion that the N-word is the best way to handle racism morally.

The praxis of political correctness is in political debates sometimes associated with a certain kind of rhetorics. In political and public debates, it can be perceived to be a position used to deem certain characterisations and opinions "wrong" in the public sphere. Therefore it can be used to dismiss a particular point of view, before the dialogue begins, by deeming the topic politically incorrect. Political correctness defends and questions the way people articulate gender, their relationship to female students, to the way people portray cultures etc. To list some of the topics adhering to the discussion of political correctness in a danish context, they have included whether it is okay to discuss men and woman in the university culture, when a danish biology teacher was told that some of his students were offended by his definition of men and women in his teachings (Haugaard, M. 2019); whether it is okay to do parties that portray or talk about cultures in certain ways, when students of Copenhagen University was offended by Mexican and Indian costume parties (Boier, P. & Jensen, C., 2018), whether it is okay to read, listen or watch people that have offended or violated political correctness in history, which can be seen in critical perspectives towards the philosophy curriculum, because it does not include enough women (Winther, T.M. 2018), and because the historical figures had the wrong opinions towards women and minority groups, a position which also can be seen in Amalie Have's suggestion to boycott Michael Jackson because he violated children (Have, 2019). The reason why we have chosen to involve political correctness in our description of the public sphere today, is because of the way it influences some of our empirical material, as "krænkelseskulturen", which have become the favoured expression to characterise the prevalent political correctness, mostly used by the adversaries, have been a recurrent topic within the satire we analyse later in the thesis. "Krænkelseskultur" refer to a discourse, in which people are overly sensitive and easily offended.

In a Habermasian view, the possibility for private people to interact with one another, in a proper way, is crucial, as they need it to establish a critical public, which through deliberation is community and training ground to critique and stand in opposition to public authority. The public sphere has to be critical in its core, to handle the information flow, which does not only involve deciphering the information but also involves a critical perspective towards the selection of particular news, i.e. the choice of this story over that one. By selecting which news to bring and which not to bring, the

news media always already present a particular fragment of society, guided by different criteria - be that political, economic or a preference for sensation and conflicts. An example would be the amount of attention Rasmus Paludan received in the news coverage, whereas his ideas and persona left a substantial mark on the public sphere, and in the same way the public sphere has to be critical when prominent figures with high influence use other channels of communication, such as facebook or twitter to promote different opinions and perspectives in the public.

The public sphere might be more accessible than ever before, in the potential for finding information or providing information. However, the deliberation that Habermas argued happened in the salon, does not seem present in the same way, and the public's common feeling of togetherness and critical potential is different. To understand why and how the public sphere might be lacking a room for discussing matters of general matters amongst private people, then it first has to be discussed why the media does not fulfil that role. Communication is attached and affected by the area in which it operates; for example, people express their opinions differently and use different wording in private, than when speaking in public. Therefore, when topics are discussed in public, they are affected by factors found in the public sphere, which can form the content. There is always a set of expectations and rules bound to communication, such as political correctness, a certain tone of voice, etc., that consciously or unconsciously affect the speaker. A citizen or radio host communicating through radio or television, especially if it is live radio (Nyre, 2015), enters a certain kind of communicative action. In live radio, the receiver can in principle be everyone, as the implied listenership is more distinctive than on, e.g. a podcast (ibid). The implied listenership makes the speaking subject more cautious and can make the communicative situation more precarious. The setting affects how the subject express their private beliefs, and it differs from dialogue in the salon or in private, not to offend someone, and to some degree the communication is formed in regards to what public sphere finds acceptable, as the variety of topics which can offend people are vast, including political convictions, discourses regarding the appropriate way of addressing culture, gender, income, positions, sickness etc. Apart from the fact that communication through the media affects the way people express their beliefs, there is also the fact that only a minimal amount of people are represented in the media, and can as such not be the room in

which private people can interact and test their views and opinions, and through deliberation and argumentation create an enlightened critical public. However, the increased channels of communication also possess the viability of private people gathering through the internet or social media to establish a critical function of the public sphere. It is discussed amongst scholars whether the free room for communication, assimilating the saloon and acting mediator between the private and the public sphere, could be fulfilled by the internet, as social media and internet is an essential factor in understanding how the public landscape is structured. Social media possess elements in coherence with Habermas criteria for communicative dialogue involving equality, easy accessibility, opportunity to communicate across social hierarchies etc. However, some studies claim that people are very cautious with the topics they discuss on social media. Kruse et al. (2018) for once investigated whether social media can be seen as a revitalized public sphere corresponding to Habermas ideal communication. They found that the majority avoided discussing politics on social media; some due to the lack of civility and others because they felt that "*social media should not be a place for negativity or arguments, and that any topics that could be considered sensitive, offensive, controversial [...] should be avoided.* (ibid)" Furthermore, some scholars have pointed to a problem regarding the way the algorithms works on social media such as twitter or facebook, where the audience is receiving a portfolio of news and updates, structured by clicks, likes and interaction with other users, that is more or less aligned with their existing beliefs (Oremus, 2016). Because of this, the audience does not experience opposing beliefs, which reduce the potential for discussion. Kruse et al. (2018) suggest that many intentionally shape their social media feed as what they call a "hug box", i.e. a safe space where they will be supported in their political convictions, by unfriending or unfollowing people and sites that post something of which they disagree. Enhancing one's own opinion and avoiding the conflict of confrontation by not discussing matters of general interest with the opposition, is not in coherence with Habermas understanding of a critical debating public. As Kruse et al. conclude "*social media's lack of civil discourse [...], indicated that social media were an inappropriate setting for civil political discourse. [...] We find limited evidence for their role in encouraging civil political discourse, and therefore for revitalizing the public sphere* (Kruse et al., 2018, P 79-80)" Therefore, the individual can lack the mediation between

the public sphere and his private life, as matters of general interest is mainly discussed at home or in private, or on social media, which doesn't seem to adhere to ideal speech, which aims for rational arguments and is not hindered by instrumental communication or clouded interests.

When the public spheres critical voice, articulated from deliberation in the process of private people interacting, is not well functioning, then reality can be challenged. Hannah Arendt offers a way to understand some of the problematic mechanisms between information and the public sphere. Reality can become distorted when public figures intentionally disturb the receiver's impression of a specific case or incident in a way that benefits the sender. It involves intentionally encouraging a wrong idea regarding an incident, political discourses, opinions, priorities etc. It is problematic in more than one sense, as described earlier, the destruction of 'reality', Arendt argues, is targeted at the opposition, but the act can twist reality and leave a mark of disturbance, so in the end deception spreads, and establish itself in the public sphere and spreads distrust, or competing truths. Traits that share the problem of distinguishing reality from simulated reality and twisted reality empower the simulated reality and lack of transparency in the public sphere. Hence, it becomes more appealing for individuals to twist reality in the public sphere, when the public's critical potential is low, as the risk is less present. It can both be correlated to the rapid information flow, in which news quickly will be substituted with new information, and it can be correlated to the decreased risk of being "found out" when twisting information, statements, opinions or images in the public sphere. The praxis of politics has according to Arendt, always been the praxis of salesmanship, and the public sphere today is influenced by new tools used in politics such as spin doctors or press advisors, who helps the politicians having a desirable image to the public.

The public sphere is complicated, and the felt unreliability of politicians and journalists (Radius, 2018) indicates that the public is aware of the politicians' tendency to bend the truth to appear more appealing. However, with politicians announcing matters of politics on social media and the possibility to be connected with the current affairs one smartphone, it seems that the access to political and current affairs has never been easier. Hence, it is possible to talk about a pseudo-public sphere, as the public sphere through an increased amount of information channels, makes itself very present

in the citizens' life, but on the other hand, alienate the citizen, as there seldom is any deliberation between citizens in the public sphere. Instead, private individuals are receiving a vast amount of information, without engaging in the public. The phenomenon of being alienated from the public sphere is something we argue for in the theses, is empowered when the public spheres critical potential is low. The alienations can be explained by Hannah Arendt's description of turning away from a sense of the world, when actions, has no recognition or resonance in the people's lives but feels distant and strange.

Understanding the public sphere, as a sphere with rapid changing news, overloaded with information and as a market of attention. Having the complications of being very present in people's mind, but alienating to their sense of the world, is the primary understanding used to discuss political satire in the public sphere.

Section Summary

Jürgen Habermas' definition of the public sphere has been integrated as the fundamental backbone in which the analysis will take place, where the public sphere is an imaginary space separated from the state, constituted by the interaction of private people. The opportunity for clear communication in the public sphere can be more or less productive according to Jürgen Habermas definition of ideal speech, which is correlated to the citizens' opportunity to meet and through dialogue discuss opposing opinions to further critical knowledge to create political change. Habermas, discuss in "the transformation of the public sphere" how the saloon, was a socio-spatial, physical place, in which the bourgeois came together and could discuss across social hierarchies, and create an enlightened critical public.

Hannah Arendt discussions of politics, truth and the political realms relationship to truth, as well as her discussion of common sense as closeness to the lived life, will be essential in our analysis of satire and actions within the public sphere.

In the section the Public Sphere today, we discuss how the public sphere has changed markedly since Habermas work, with the technological introduction of internet, social media etc. Has created more channel to communicate through, and everyone has access to establish information in the public sphere, which has changed

the structural foundation of communication in the public sphere. In opposition to the salon, which offers a room in which people meets physically and discuss general matters, the public sphere today is mainly non-physical, and the access to information makes attention a valuable resource amongst prominent public figures, we argue that it can be discussed as a market for attention. The public sphere as a market for attention has some challenges in the form of clashing interest when the public becomes not only a space to discuss matters of general interest, but also a space affected by economic interest. Because of the public spheres structure, companies and organisation, have an economic incentive in understanding the public, as it was discussed in the case of Amnesty International, attention becomes an essential factor, which inclines companies to seek out people or companies with high attention capital, to support their praxis. We will discuss later in regards to amnesty international, that interfering in the public without a deep understanding, can have severe consequences. In the massive flow of information constituting the public, in which truths and opinions spontaneously arise side by side, it can be difficult to distinguish reality from simulated reality.

Chapter 2: Satire as Critique

"Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: he alone suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as fitting, the most cheerful."

- Friedrich Nietzsche

Satire is a vivid phenomenon, and in Denmark alone, it has taken many forms. In the late 90's and throughout the better part of the new millennium, the form of satire that dominated the field aimed at portraying various odd social characters, who were ridiculed in some way or another. Some were more a-political than others, but none of them had politics as such as the *modus operandi*. These count "Banjos likørstue", "Casper og Mandrilaftalen", "Tak for I aften", "Danish Dynamite", "Rytteriet", "Krysters kartel", and "Drengene fra Angora". In 2012, Hanne Bruun writes that "*political satire is presently a struggling branch of the satirical sketch comedy tradition in Danish public service television* (p. 158)", and elaborates that political satire was dominant in Denmark

from 1968 up until the late 1990s, but then shifted into what Bruun calls social satire, a category which encapsulates all the above-mentioned shows .

The struggle Bruun describes has, however, shifted since then. It is difficult to mark a precise point in time for where this shift happened, but February 2. in 2015 when "Den Korte Radioavis (DKR)" aired the first time seems as good as any. Their first news story "*Asylansøgere stjæler, men ikke så meget som forventet*" certainly had a different kind of sting than what was common at the time. Even though DKR did not initiate this shift single-handedly, they certainly popularized it. DKR was nominated for "årets komiker", which is a vote based award show in both 2017, where they won, and nominated again in 2018, where they were beaten by Jonatan Spang's "Tæt på sandheden", our other case. Hitherto, no political satire shows received the award.

While this is not in itself an argument confirming the uprising of political satire, it does indicate such an uprising, while confirming that the political satire created in the years after 2015 were, at the very least, more appreciated by the general public than before.

To understand the satirical uprising and its growing appreciation amongst the public, we will in the following chapter investigate and discuss the sphere in which satire function as well as reflect on how satire differs from conventional communication. The chapter will analyse the satirical ontology and pose the questions: what can satire do? What is the essential nature of satire before it meets with the empirical world? The second part of the chapter will analyse satire to its function in the public sphere, and work with it in correlation with empirical examples.

The satirical ontology

The satirical praxis operates in the public sphere, as the audience is private people listening to or viewing their sketches and programs, and as such, it should always be understood as something reacting to public statements, political statements or the public in general. Nevertheless, the way the topics are treated by the satirical praxis is not the same as in classical news, the form the communication take is different, and allows for a critical potential different than classical news.

Before satire can emancipate itself from the realm of normal dialogue and become something different, in its own sphere, it needs to have the satirical nature; it must present itself in a humorous way. The path is often vigorously narrow, and if it steps outside the path and doesn't appeal to the audience making them laugh - or at least force some delicate smiles - its way of overcoming taboos and norms of society cannot succeed, and the feeling of the satirical act can appear more untasty than breaking norms in a non-satirical fashion. However, when properly executed, it moves into another sphere and creates a different room for communication, where smile and laughter is a legitimization of its satirical praxis. This is where the satirical ontology is present, in this sphere, things feel differently, act differently, and rules are different. The reason why the satirical critique of public figures is not perceived as ill tasted public shaming is because of the satirical bodily raw, engaging nature. The words and meanings might be specific, but they are not the same when the form is changed. Sloterdijk conceptualize in his work, *Critique of the cynical reason*, how the satirical form talks to experiences and hence can show us something different, he describes satire as; *“an alternative that addresses itself first to consciousness, and only afterwards to behavior. It demands a radical priority of self-experience over morality.”* (Sloterdijk, 1983, p. 120)

Satire & Sloterdijk

Peter Sloterdijk is a German professor in media and philosophy, who since his first magnum opus *“Critique of Cynical Reason(1983)”*, has stood as the one who disregarded the history of pessimism characterised by the Frankfurt school (Goldbæk, 2014). Peter Sloterdijk and the conceptual apparatus presented in ‘*Critique of Cynical Reason*’ will in this chapter function as an analytical framework as we enter the realm of satire.

An essential part of Sloterdijk’s understanding of satire is his distinction between the cynical/cynicism and the kynical/kynicism, whereas the meaning of the latter is tied to the primordial understanding of cynicism, *kynikos* in greek, which stems from *Diogenēs ho Kynikos* (Diogenes the cynic), which in Sloterdijk's conceptual framework is distinct from the former, and more modern understanding of cynicism, described as an enlightened false consciousness which is:

“that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain. It has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to, put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered. (Sloterdijk, Critique of cynical reason, P 5)”.

Enlightened false consciousness is to act despite knowing better, and where the Marxist understanding of ideology as false consciousness is characterised by the sentence “they do not know it, but they are doing it” the subject position in the enlightened false consciousness know very well that he is doing it - but he does it anyway.

As the semantics of the concept gives away, the enlightened false consciousness is a byproduct of an enlightenment tradition, which did not succeed in delivering on its promise. The inherent logic of the ideal debate in enlightenment - i.e. a free dialogue between two parts who seek consensual truth rather than to ‘win’ the argument - is two-fold. On the one hand, there lies the idea that the better argument will always come out victorious, and the other that the lesser argument will be abandoned in favour of the better (Sloterdijk, 1983). In reality, however, this is rarely the case. In the, as Sloterdijk calls it, *academic idyll* “*everything but truth is at stake: hegemonic positions, class interests, established doctrines, desires, passions, and the defense of ‘identities’*” (ibid, p. 13)”. The enlightenment did not come easy and many different institutions, be that the church, the state, the plebeian or the bourgeoisie, continuously battled against it - therefore, the enlightenment hit back. By trying to expose their opponents' opinion as mere ideology, by demasking, undermining and revealing, the enlightenment attempts to achieve the same end as satire, the means, however, are far apart.

With satire, we return the other end of Sloterdijk's conceptual framework, namely that of cynicism. Cynicism is much interlinked with satire, and its father, Diogenes, can easily be understood as a satirist of his time. For Sloterdijk “[t]he essence of cynicism consists in a critical, ironical philosophy of so-called needs, in the elucidation of their fundamental excess and absurdity (Sloterdijk, 1983, p. 193)”, and where the face of the master-cynic is a crooked smile, the face of the satirical cynic is a stuck-out tongue - a joyful no, by which the cynic is not in danger of nodding when he wants to shake his

head (Ibid). The kynic stands between the shameless and the spontaneous, between the naive and the artistic, and being at this spot, the kynic proves that "*often we bring the truth to light only at the cost of rude impertinence* (ibid, p. 142)". One could easily be lured into perceiving the cynic and the kynic as a dichotomy, but this would be missing the mark. Even though cynicism only can be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality (Ibid, 194) they too are related, and for Sloterdijk it is, no solely but also, a matter of whether cheekiness comes from below or above, the former being ascribed to kynicism and the latter of cynicism.

The cynical reason is based on the critical point of view inherited from the critique of ideology and religion, but it has a melancholic unconsciousness bound to its very nature, it is not engaged in the topic, but is instead distanced from the world. Historically Sloterdijk points out that power has always been cynical, in the sense that the military-general plans the war knowing people will die, but he cannot be emotionally engaged in every person, the same goes for the operating doctor, who knows he has to distance himself from the fact his actions might either save or kill someone, but he uses a cynical clinical approach to the operation. A kynical response from the soldier to the general could be - the general sits, and has a board with figures in front of him and push some figures in front, and say: "these will force the way for the second cavalry", and the soldier asks "who are these figures"? The general then mumbles "well they are no one exactly," and the soldier responds "great, then no one has fought already, and we can go to the next step of planning!"

The kynical response is a way for the soldier to exhibit the situation and points towards the fact that he might be just a wooden figure for the general, but for himself, it is about life and death. Sometimes the only way to deal with cynicism is kynicism, as a logical argument, could be met with cynicism, they are at war, people die etc. However, in the situation, there is still a truth, which cannot be denied.

Sloterdijk emphasizes how the cynical nature has been adopted by a large part of society and has come to be the norm rather than the exception.

Whereas the process of civilization, whose core is constituted by the sciences, teaches us to distance ourselves from people and things so that we experience them as objects, physiognomic sense provides a key to all that which reveals our

proximity to the environment. Its secret is intimacy, not distance; it dispenses not a matter-of-fact but a convivial knowledge of things. It knows that everything has form and that every form talks to us in multiple ways (Ibid P, 175)

The form, the way of expressing the topic, the lack of engagement, is what creates the cynical melancholia. Sloterdijk argues that the everyday cynic, is the unhappy worker, he is cynical about his life and society in general, always critical towards them, but never rebellious, as he only distances himself from his frustration, and does not engage in it. However, to understand the different form and approach to the subject, one has to touch upon the opposition of cynicism found in Sloterdijk's understanding of kynism.

"philosophical" ideology critique is truly the heir of a great satirical tradition, in which the motif of unmasking, exposing, baring has served for aeons now as a weapon. But modern ideology critique—according to our thesis, has ominously cut itself off from the powerful traditions of laughter in satirical knowledge, which have their roots in ancient kynicism. (...) it has even put on suit and tie so as to completely assume an air of bourgeois respectability. It has given up its life as satire, in order to win its position in books as "theory." (Ibid P, 16)

When critique puts on suits and ties, it delineates itself from the form, from the materialistic, bodily, satirical engagement, which was a core foundation of the philosophical critique, and has hence lost its fertility - its power create. When critique lets itself become satire, that is, when it lets itself become kynical - it lets itself be engaged. The melancholic grey existence is challenged with the raw engagement found in kynism. The engagement is something present in DKR, as Kirsten Birgit is a character that embraces the bodily form of sarcasm, indignation and insistence on telling stupid people that they are stupid. The fictional character share similarities with a favourite kynic of Sloterdijk:

Eulenspiegel is the modern model of the kynic, an enlightener of the crude sort who is not intimidated even by thrashings. He does not hide his malicious joy behind good manners as the more refined enlighteners of the bourgeois epoch do,

and he has fun exposing and embarrassing stupid people. Because he is a pantomimic enlightener, he does not experience the inhibitions that force subtler people to hide their "nasty" emotions. He embodies a robust intelligence that does not censor its impulses. He stands, like all kynics, halfway between the impudent and the spontaneous, between the naive and the artful, and because he oscillates so ambivalently between honesty and nastiness with his vulgar assent, conventional morality does not have an easy time with him (Sloterdijk, 1983, p. 142)

Kirsten Birgit is a middle-aged woman, very dominant, rough, loud talking and generally a big personality, taking up a lot of space both physically, as she is rather voluminous, and explicitly, as she has an opinion on all topics, is easily emotionally swayed, and can be rather verbally aggressive when challenged. The character is almost a split personality, as she, on the one hand, has tremendous knowledge of classical areas of fine culture, including opera, politics, arts, literature and philosophy, and on the other, possesses a childlike nature, as she is easily emotionally affected, extremely vain, and to some degree, highly unreflected of her own person, constitute the other part of the character. She is easily loveable, because of her strong and honest person, not honest as in not lying, but honest as in being true to the nature of her character. She is not afraid of confrontation, and in relationship with her editor, Rasmus Bruun, she always appears as a powerhouse of dominance. She can be understood as a modern kynic. She is always emotionally connected to the point of critique; she will yell, scream, use toxic sarcasm, and be furious over several issues. She engages in every topic with her whole character ready for war. In that sense, she lives the critique, uses the bodily approach not hiding her emotions, her joy of taunting the stupid, her fierceness with the bourgeois veil.

In contrast, the lack of kynical approach is a perspective that can be found in many of the sketches and characters of DKR, as the problem of constantly changing opinions and lack of authority is portrayed through the praxis of the character Rasmus Bruun, and in interviews with characters in the public sphere. In an interview with the creators of DKR, Rasmus Bruun was described as a historyless and boneless man, which is uncomfortable vague in his personality, and with opinions that shift as quickly as the wind. Tendencies, the creators of the character, believe are present in the public sphere and in the lives of modern people. In contrast, Kirsten Birgit is a character with strong

beliefs and dedication towards art and history. Even though she is rough and vulgar, she still appears more lovable than the spineless Rasmus Bruun.

With his recreated use of the Diogenes character, Sloterdijk shows us how kynical Satire is a product of the society it criticizes. Diogenes' way of being is a product of Athenian social life. In his introduction of the Diogenes character, we receive a hint towards one of the perspectives we take from Sloterdijk, which is that kynicism, and with it, the form of political satire that we in this thesis investigate is a product of, or response to, the society in which it opposes. The first kynic, Diogenes, was and could only have been, because of the way life was lived in the Athenian society. Diogenes was, in a dialectic understanding, the antitheses to the ideology that dominated the Athenian academy, where he lived in deep poverty and challenged philosophers like Plato, which he believed preached a philosophy different from his actions. Kynicism was the early state of ideology critique, and the kynical satire that Sloterdijk investigates can be found in Den Korte Radioavis, as their entire praxis is in opposition to the public sphere in which they operate. Here, as described in the section discussing the media hyper-reality, then the modern Diogenes DKR, is a show that embraces the shadows and melancholia of the effects the media reality, and political praxis has on the public sphere. However, a direct correlation to Diogenes is not possible, as the characters of the show are fictional, and not real persons dedicating their life to the kynic life like Diogenes. But, in the fictional setting Kirsten Birgit has a nature closely assimilating Eulenspiegel, and is hence a modern kynic as Sloterdijk would phrase it. The universe created in DKR, challenge the understanding of what is real as well as what is decent. Moreover, the critique is not only their sketches but the entire universe created over many programs, is in correlation with a public struggling with these problems.

Good satire that resonates with the audience claims the privilege of going beyond the usual rules, because the laughter claims a truth in itself, it can be referred to a common knowledge or forgotten part of people's lives that becomes apparent in the laughter, something that go beyond the ever-changing discursive rules for appropriate communication in the public sphere. However, when satire does not resonate with the audience, then it might be judged even harder than regular communication for breaking these normative rules, as it can be found demeaning and untasteful. Therefore, the connection to an experience of something true or common felt about the society or the

case is paramount to the good satirical praxis. The legitimization found in laughter is constituted through the audience engagement, as they, to a certain degree, gets involved in the message by responding to it with smiles.

A true joke, a comedian's joke, suddenly explosively lets us see the familiar defamiliarized, the ordinary made extraordinary and the real rendered surreal, and we laugh in a psychological squeal of transient delight, like an infant playing peek-a-boo: nurse to uncooperative patient, "we have to see if you have a temperature"; Uncooperative patient to nurse, "Don't be silly, everybody has a temperature" (Simon Critchley, 2002, 10),

It changes the view on the situation, and if the audience laughs, then it indicates that they find the different view or twist on reality amusing, and acknowledge that it somehow tells something about the situation. It can be difficult always to pinpoint precisely what is in play, but the laughter legitimizes that something is at stake. A great example of dragging the audience in with satire is done by Louis CK, with his joke about morals;

Everybody has a competition in their brain of good thoughts and bad thoughts. Hopefully, the good thoughts win. For me, I always have both. I have like, the thing, I believe the good thing, that's the thing I believe and then there is this thing. And I don't believe it, but it is there. I'll give you an example, okay? Like of course, of course, children who have nut allergies need to be protected, of course. We have to segregate their food from nuts, have their medication available at all times, and anybody who manufactures or serves food needs to be aware of deadly nut allergies, of course, but maybe. Maybe if touching a nut kills you, you're supposed to die. Of course not, of course not, of course not. Jesus. (...) if you're fighting for your country and you get shot or hurt, it's a terrible tragedy, of course, of course, but maybe, maybe if you pick up a gun and go to another country and you get shot, it's not that weird. (Louis Ck, oh my god, 2013)

Sensitive topics are being treated with a humorous twist, which drags people along into the surreal world, in which classical themes are being tossed around, and logic is

challenged. Later in the stand-up of Louis CK, the audience earlier compliance through laughter is used to compare different sensitive topics, the joke regarding the military was close to the boundary of what the audience was willing to laugh at, as some people began to interrupt with angry noises. However, Louis CK used the earlier compliance to diffuse the resistance *"Listen, listen, you all clapped for dead kids with the nuts, for kids dying from nuts, you applauded, so you're in this with me now. Do you understand? You don't get to cherry-pick those kids did nothing to you (ibid)."*

It is quite clear how the topic of nut allergy is used to bring people along in the satirical representation, to create a step of sequential actions, which gradually worsen, so a joke about an even more tabooed topic, which in this situation is death in the army, can be exposed. Therefore, in the laughter by the audience, there is a certain truth, something that might be denied in normal dialogue, but in the joke, they cannot deny the unfolding of a reality which makes them laugh. This is also the case, in the way people resonates in the satirical universe created by DKR, in which rumours often play a significant part of the gossip unfolded when the mike is supposedly off in the program. Here, the way the characters delightfully crave all kind of rumours is a way of unfolding the press' hunger for sensational news about more or less unimportant things about public figures. The experience of truth is something that the satirical form can unfold, as people experience a form of recognition and discovery when the characters exhibit the world in a way, that tells us something about the public sphere or our sense of the world.

The feeling of truth or discovery is an essential part of the satirical ontology, the form described through Sloterdijk in our above discussion of satire, possesses the possibility of presenting the world in a different way, a cynical way, that can tell something about the world, like in the case with the soldier and the general. His comments regarding the wooden figures can show that they are just wooden figures to one man, and about life and death for another, a scenario that arguably allows for an unfolding of truth. However, truth is always a complicated matter, as claiming truth can be a normative action, and one has to take care in the way truth is defined and used. The interaction with truth, that good satire allows for, is a truth that can unfold itself for the audience, a truth which shows itself in the discovery of something that makes one laugh. Opposing to traditional claims on truth, in the satirical nature truth is something that is experienced, and it is not the comedian telling the audience what is right and what is

wrong, which will be perceived as ill-tasted moralistic preaching. However, as the satirist work the society, truth can be shown by the special relationship that the satirical praxis has to reality when it breaks with normal communication and do not find its legitimization in norms and logic, but rather in laughter. Thinking of truth as something that can unfold itself, is inspired by Martin Heidegger, and his concept is used to understand how we believe the satirical praxis can engage with the world in a way, which allows for an experience of truth.

Heidegger: Truth as Aletheia / Being as Dasein

Martin Heidegger is widely regarded as one of, if not the, most influential thinkers of the 20th century, and his conception on both truth - or un-concealment, *aletheia*, being - or there-being, *da-sein* - shall serve as both tool and perspective in our work with humour and satire.

In his short but potent work *"On the Essence of Truth"* Heidegger examines the very core, the essence of truth, *"the one thing that in general distinguishes every 'truth' as truth"* (Heidegger, 1961, 1943). For Heidegger, truth is not, as one would intuitively suppose, epistemological since the very notion of knowledge needs to rest upon a preconception of what truth is. Therefore truth must be a matter of ontology, a matter of being. Being for Heidegger is expressed in his concept dasein. Dasein is not just another word for or form of being, even though Heidegger's use of expressions such as hütte-dasein cause one to perceive it as such. In such a conception, hütte-dasein would be a being who lives in a cottage. Dasein means something very specific and something very abstract at the same time. Da-sein is a creation of Heidegger's hand for the purpose of crafting a metaphysical language that is fit and proper for the analysis he wishes to make. Da-sein is a creation of *Da*, which is often translated to the English *there*, and *sein*, which is the German verb for 'to be', and is often translated into being. The *Da* in Dasein is thus to be understood as a thereness, it is spatial, as in the Danish phrase "at være til stede" . Hütte-dasein would thus not be Heideggerian for "To be in a cottage" but rather a reference to Heidegger's notion that we can sometimes be drawn into sudden re-alization and re-flection of our being (*sein*). This can happen almost instantly, for example, while facing great danger, experiencing great art or beauty, or when experiencing the calm, peaceful feeling undisturbed in a cottage, which suddenly makes

one re-reflect of the nature of our being. We then become beings that engage with our own being. We then become *dasein*. The engagement in being means for Heidegger the process of "*letting beings be*" (ibid) which does not mean the day-to-day conception of the phrase as in leaving it alone or to quit caring for it, quite the opposite - "*To let be is to engage oneself with beings*(ibid, p. 6)". It is not passivity, but activity that Heidegger calls for, an engagement and care for being which "*let beings be as the beings they are* (ibid, p. 6)". This letting beings be is, therefore, an active process, were the engagement of *dasein* let beings "become" the beings they are, and the reason why Heidegger uses the more passive 'be' instead of the active 'become' is to avoid causing the reader to think of the being as something that needs to change, quite the opposite is the case, *Dasein* let the being be by resisting to change and convey it.

The active engagement that Heidegger calls for in the un-concealment of truth is present in Louis CK's work when he writes his above-presented joke about morality, because he engages with topics by presenting moral phenomenons, he uncovers the moral complexity without a desire to change morality, but rather in the process of engaging with the sensitive topics, something stands out. Therefore, the active involvement with the topic can un-conceal a hidden truth for the humorist, which then will be available for the audience to discover in their meeting with the phenomenon, in this case in the standup show. The process of uncovering a truth by engaging with a topic and presenting it in a way so the audience is able to discover a truth, that they didn't realize was concealed, is a process that Sloterdijk points towards being an important function of the satirist, and an important function of defending both morality and truth. Sometimes, morality needs to be broken or challenged and the same with truth. In the case of Louis CK, he addresses the moral expectations every time he uses the phrase 'of course': *of course if you're fighting for your country and you get shot or hurt, it's a terrible tragedy, of course, of course.* (Louis CK, 2013) He points towards the expected and obvious moral stance. However, when he uses the phrase 'but maybe', he opens up for the opportunity to discuss the 'of course', the predetermined correct response to the topic, *but maybe, maybe if you pick up a gun and go to another country and you get shot, it's not that weird.* (Louis Ck, 2013). It is not about military, it is about how people share a strong normative inclination to take a specific moral relationship to the topic without engaging with it, it is not only a relationship between the individual

and the case, in which the individual reflects on the proper moral response according to their conviction but a relationship between their normative expectations and themselves. The Joke uncovers how morality to a certain degree is a set of hidden expectations for correct behaviour, which is something that should be challenged to bring forth the opportunity for a more reflected approach towards moral behaviour, and why Sloterdijk addresses the need for the constant satirical critique of morality in society.

This idea of Heidegger's, that the beings *are* inherently, and that the human interpretation of beings alter it, leads us to a discussion of the Heideggerian conception of truth, *alethia*, which we are to understand as un-concealment. The crux for Heidegger is not *when* something is true, or under what conditions statements and propositions are true or false, but what truth is primordially, thus his title "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" (on the essence of truth). Truth is, according to Heidegger:

[N]ot a feature of correct propositions which are asserted of an "object" by a human "subject" and then are "valid" somewhere, in what sphere we do not know. Rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds.
(ibid, p. 7)

Beings unfold, and if we let them, we will experience this. Heidegger cares for the experience of truth. Not as in > I experience this as being true <, but the opening up of the world, the unfolding of which we only ever so rarely let us self experience in our daily life. Because the human being is always already in the world, we are thrown into it without either cause nor necessity, and in our making sense of the world, we tend to conceal it - to distance ourselves from it. We divide the world in which we are thrown into thinking subject and the object of which we think.

By becoming sensible to the world and letting beings be, *dasein* enters the realm of "the open region". In this realm, *dasein* finds itself in both truth and untruth, in the process of both concealing and disclosure. This apparent oxymoron of both concealing and disclosing can be interpreted in different ways, which sometimes seems intended, but in this thesis, we will understand it in the following way. Concealment is a precondition for there even to be disclosure and must logically come before; hence

Heidegger writes "*The concealment of beings as a whole(...) is older than every openness of this or that being*(ibid. p 9)", so even though the two are opposite, there lies a bond of mutual necessity. One could here easily be lured to comparing this with the worn-out quasi-philosophical phrase which goes something like "for there to be good in the world, there needs to be evil", but one should resist such a comparison since such a phrase is at best about the perception of either good or evil, but for there to be disclosure of anything, it actually needs first to be veiled. In Louis CK's standup show, we experience the open region, when he jokes about morality and society, as he simply let these thoughts and things be for his audience to experience, in the surreal realm between truth and untruth.

For Heidegger, the truth understood as *aletheia* is reached by letting be, i.e. the truth is already there one just have to discover it. This practice of discovering truth is parallel to the practice of laughing at a joke. To come closer to explaining the experienced world and his philosophy, Heidegger has all but created his own lyrical language.

Martin Heidegger writes poetically because he sees the language of poetry as the primordial language of thinking (Løwenstein, 2017). Thinking should become more like poetry, less abstract and closer to the i-mediated experiences, like the experience of laughing at a joke. But while poetry can shed light on the world and our being in it, it is internally founded. Where poetry verbally forms, colour and reframe the society according to the tone the poet feels himself in, i.e. a process of going from internal feeling to description of the world, satire and cynicism go the other way. The satirist, such as Diogenes, look at society and reshape himself to be opposing that - that is, satire is always context-dependent. Without knowledge of the Athenian antique society, Diogenes is a crazy homeless man. Without knowledge of the history of communist Russia, George Orwell's *Animal Farm* is a mere fable showing that power corrupts and that swine are pigs. However, satire and poetry do share a common trait: the practice of both reshape how we think. A great poem is to be beautiful and illuminate our world, making it appear to us as such. The latter and the former are equally important for poetry, but the latter can not be without the former. A poem cannot tell the truth without also touching the audience. This does not necessarily mean that every beautiful poem makes us think or produces an unconcealedness of entities, but rather that the

poems that make us think are often beautiful. The same goes for satire, it is not every funny joke that makes us think, but rather that the jokes that make us think are often funny. We then suggest, with help from Sloterdijk, that the language of truth as un-concealment in the political realm is not like it is in the private sphere, poetry, but instead satire. Satire is in its very essence public since demasking never can be a private affair (Sloterdijk, 1986) as well as jokes only is jokes as such when someone gets them (Crictly 2002). A precondition for satire is thus both publicity and a shared frame of reference. We thus have both the process of discovering truth, the process which happens when the audience laughs at a joke which makes them think, and uncovering truth, the process of the humorist who let beings be.

If we return to our main satirical case, Den Korte Radioavis , we see a similar conception of truth. One of the ways the concept of alethia becomes apparent is in the four quarterly news readings aired during the show. The news read by Kirsten Birgit are, as dasein, operating in the open region between truth and untruth, which makes us experience the world - between concealment and disclosure. In the news reading, DKR mixes actual news and quote what actual people have set to traditional newspapers with their own, homespun take on the same news story. One of these goes as follow:

Mangelfuld brystkræftoperation kunne være opdaget tidligere. Der gik hele 11 måneder før en læge gjorde opmærksom på den mangelfulde brystkræftbehandling på Ringsted sygehus. Og det er alt for længe mener Kræftens Bekæmpelse "jeg finder det fuldstændig uacceptabelt at man kan melde ind til en offentlig styrelse, at der er noget galt, som kan bringe patienter i fare, og så kan der gå 11 måneder før man reagerer på det," siger cheflæge og professor ved Kræftens Bekæmpelse Niels Kroman til DR. Men der er faktisk en rigtig god forklaring på det, siger Mette Harslev der er sundhedsretlig professor ved Københavns universitet. Det er nemlig slet ikke meningen at klagesystemet skal være hurtigt. "Klagesystemet er ikke tiltænkt den rolle at det er et sted hvor man lynhurtigt når en klage kommer ind opsnapper, om der er et eller andet galt ude på sygehusafdelingen" siger Mette Harslev til DR og fortsætter til den Korte Radioavis : "Klagesystemet er nærmere tiltænkt den rolle, at det er et sted hvor man meget langsomt kan behandle

patienters klage, så de til sidst giver op” afslutter Mette Harslev til den Korte Radioavis (DKR, feb. 18, 2019).

The mixture between what the people quoted rightfully have said to Danmarks Radio (DR), and what the same person says when they ‘elaborate’ their quote to DKR, is what here is intriguing. The elaboration becomes interesting from a Heideggerian perspective because it challenges how one designates something true as true. Looked at from the correspondence theory of truth, where true/not true is understood more in the terms correct/incorrect instead of concealed/unconcealed, then there is no trace of truth in the elaboration to DKR. Seen from a Heideggerian perspective, where truth as *aletheia* is discovered in the open region between truth and untruth, it suddenly looks different.

As elaborated previously, satire lets its audience experience something that is already known anew, shedding on it a different light and dragging phenomena, propositions or statements into a different realm which is common and shared by the audience. When DKR elaborates on Mette Harslev’s statement that “Klagesystemet er nærmere tiltænkt den rolle, at det er et sted hvor man meget langsomt kan behandle patienters klage, så de til sidst giver op” they are conveying her actual, negative statement that “Klagesystemet er ikke tiltænkt den rolle at det er et sted hvor man lynhurtigt når en klage kommer ind opsnapper, om der er et eller andet galt ude på sygehusafdelingen”, and instead formulating it as a positive, that is, when Mette Harslev is saying what is not the purpose of “Klagesystemet”, DKR formulate what then must be the purpose. When DKR reformulate the statement, creating the positive formulation the negative, they add to it a cynical dimension, making “Klagesystemet” appear as a calculated instrument with a purpose of deceiving the public. This does not mean, however, that DKR is then exposing what is *really* the purpose of “klagesystemet” just as Diogenes when ridiculing the platonic idea of the human, is not arguing that men and chicken are the same. The critique performed by DKR is a ridicule of the nature of the statement, of the bureaucratic and cold way of addressing a fact, that is, that a complaint regarding medical cancer treatment was 11 months underway before processed, by referring to the system in which the complaint is being processed as never being intended to be fast. By engaging in such a statement, the satirical praxis then cheekily asks “well, if it was not intended to be fast, was it then intended to be slow”? As Simon

Critchley writes when arguing for the validity of humour "raillery and ridicule can be defended insofar as they enable instruction in reason by making its use pleasurable (Critchley, 2002, p. 81)", *that is, ridicule - and with it, satire - can make our use of reason, and with it our critical sense, pleasurable by making using it funny.*

We then see how a part of the satirical way of operating is via an engagement in phenomenons, statements or proportion to drag something into a precarious place between truth and untruth, in which we are left to determine its truthfulness not according to whether it is right or correct, but instead according to whether it unfolds something that was before veiled, disguised by clever semantics or prevarication.

Summary of the satirical ontology

We argue that the satirical form can be understood partly through the use of the kynic, who engage honestly in the critical practice with almost bodily politics, by using his actions, expression, feelings of joy, malicious tendencies, rude characteristic etc. and embrace these societal ill-perceived traits, as a part of their character. The kynic becomes something beyond a cynic bourgeois critique, which wears suit and ties, and are afraid of admitting these raw bodily and childlike tendencies, and distances themselves from the topic they are criticizing, by not actively engaging it with their whole persona. We use the reference of Diogenes and Eulenspiegel, to showcase characters that Sloterdijk perceive as true kynics, and compare them to characters in the satirical program DKR. Heidegger serves the purpose of explaining how truth can be experienced when we enter the open region between truth and untruth, as when Louis CK is doing standup and present topics like morality through jokes, that are neither true representations of his opinions on the matter, but are neither completely fictional nor unbiased. In the open region, when things beings be, the satirical expression allows for an experience, an experience that comes before thinking, as people first experience the way the satirist represent the world, and only afterwards reflects on it, which allows for discovering truth in that experience. Hence, the kynical expression is best understood through kynics like Diogenes and Eulenspiegel, which allows for a protection against moral critique, as the kynic embrace tendencies that are perceived morally tasteless, and when the satirical praxis manages to enter the open region between truth and untruth, it allows for the audience to re-experience or reveal a truth about a topic.

Satire as a critical institution

In the former chapter, the satirical ontology was discussed. In this chapter, we will analyse and discuss how satire manifests itself in the public sphere, and through empirical examples, we will show its current position, function and impact as a critical institution in the public sphere. The approach to the topic will first be through an analysis of DKR, which constitute our main empirical case.

DKR and the saloon

The premise of "Den Korte Radioavis , (DKR)" is that the microphone is only on during the three to four news readings, each of them lasting approximately 5 minutes. The rest of the daily, hour-long episodes, the microphone is off, and the two main characters, Rasmus Bruun and Kirsten Birgit Schøtz Kretz Hørsholm (Kirsten Birgit) discuss everything from black holes to classical music. The interplay between the two characters, which happen in the time between the news, is of vital importance to understand the satirical sting of DKR.

The way the communication between Rasmus Bruun and Kirsten Birgit unfolds in DKR has similarities to Habermas interpretation of the political dialogue found in the salon because the audience supposedly is listening to two characters talking off-mike, a constellation which allows DKR to challenge topics that classically are very sensitive. As described earlier in the reflection on Habermas:

criticism itself was presented in the form of "öffentliche Meinung". The bourgeois public sphere should, then, be understood as the sphere in which private people can engage and discuss matters of public relevance, i.e. the sphere where "private people come together as public ". This sphere was institutionally secured in France by "salons" and in Great Britain by "Coffee houses", which in both countries were centers of criticism.

In many ways, their show assimilates the function of a critical public, as two private people are having a discussion somewhere between the private and public sphere, in

which they do access the possibility of discussing their private thoughts, but still doesn't need to act as if they talk to the entire public sphere.

Therefore, they to a certain degree can go beyond topics that might be restricted in the public debate, either because of its sensitive nature, or because of its political consequences, by pretending not to care how their conversations will be perceived by others. In the quote Habermas point towards how the saloon act as a place of political communication because private people can discuss matters of public relevance, however, it seems that the room of discussing matters of general matters, lacks to a degree in the public sphere. Hence, the assimilated dialogue can be perceived as representing the public spheres critical potential, as the opinions shared and rhetorical approach is bound to an understanding of the opinion of the public sphere etc. Therefore, DKR assimilates the critical function of the salon, which can critically discuss things in the public sphere. However, it cannot be equated directly as the show is fictional. They use the satirical approach to challenge topics, that ordinary is difficult to critique.

The rhetorics used in DKR, are worded in a way which is not normally seen on television or heard on the radio. The difference is that the predetermined rules and fears of being perceived wrong by the wide audience effects the free communication. It can, therefore, be argued, that this kind of communication does not mirror the ordinary man, because it always is shrouded in a certain act or performance. The function of the saloon was that it gave the individual an opportunity to meet and discuss topics of general matters, without exposing himself to the entire public sphere, it could to a certain degree act as a mediator between the private sphere and the public sphere.

As DKR is a satirical program, it does not have the same relationship to morality as for example, news reading, but rather finds its legitimization in laughter. It is not judged as harsh as a news podcast, and if the majority is entertained by their sketches or opinions, then the critique of being insensitive or border crossing will be met with the counterargument, that it is the point for the program to push these boundaries, say the things we are normally afraid to say, to go beyond race, go beyond gender, go beyond sexuality . The program director Mads Brugger said in an interview:

"Jeg vil have, man er vildt begejstret eller edderspændt rasende. Når folk sviner mig til over et eller andet radioprogram, kan jeg blive enormt glad for, at vi har sendt noget, der har gjort det ved dem. (Kjeldtoft, 2017)

It is almost an essential part of the satirical praxis to be confrontational, to critique the society it operates in, and if everyone simply agrees and enjoy it, and it posses no sharpness, then it is not critical satire, but rather pure entertainment. In the same way, Diogenes cannot be a true kynic without standing in opposition to the society in which he lives.

The communication clearly shifts, when Kirsten Birgit reads the news and takes on a formal voice informing the listener of various topics. She now operates in the public sphere and not in the salon, the shift is clear the second she is back in the usual setting with her tone and language when the news reading is over, and she casually discusses matters with her editor, Rasmus Bruun. The communication between the two characters is situated similar to the setting of a dialogue, whereas the news-reading is more in line with traditional media with its one-way communication from media to the receiver.

In the understanding of DKR as a critical institution that assimilates the public's critique, then a pressing question becomes, how the public's critique can unfold itself, without a decisive public to articulate it. It can be difficult to gather a coherent public critique, when the private person and the public sphere, to some extent, is fragmented. One way is to highlight the essence of the satirical praxis, which is to criticize and act as opposition to power. However, power can be difficult to define in a twisted media-reality, in which politicians sometimes act as people of power, and other times involve themselves in shows like "vild med dans". Another way is to discuss the satirical praxis societal critique, is through the conception of common sense, as their discussions often challenge and use the question of common sense, to criticize or represent something disturbing or laughable about a topic. Satire taps into the audiences common sense as a way of showing stupidity and twisted reality in the public sphere.

Common sense is in opposition to speculative philosophy and abstract theory, which might be logically consistent in the theoretical sphere, but has to bend down to the rules of the common in their meeting with the world, and if in opposition to common sense, then it is only consistent in abstracto, but not in the lived life. In an

understanding of common sense as reason ignited from the lived life, satirical work can force the political abstracto into the perception found in the lived life, and convert the expression so the common man can relate it to his life. Hence, the critical institution of satire works with a common sense derived from the lived life and fights the abstracto turning away from a sense of the world. It is difficult, to mirror the public spheres critical essence, when the critique is not coming directly from deliberation in the public sphere, from for example the salon, but to some degree DKR is able to voice a critical voice from the lived life to challenge when instances turn away from the lived life and twist reality in the public sphere.

Satirical Critique of Twisting Reality

*“Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische”
- Wittgenstein*

Exposing the political reality through the satirical sphere unfolds itself in a DKR episode from February 23. 2018 involving Morten Østergaard, the party leader for 'Radikale Venstre', a danish liberal-left party and Rasmus Bruun, one of the two main characters of DKR. In the episode, Rasmus Bruun interviews Morten Østergaard because he, for a short time, moved to Vollsmose and Gellerupparken, to get a greater understanding of the area. Prior to his decision to stay in the “ghetto”, Radikale Venstre held an opposing position towards a political decision to allocate a greater amount of resources to the anti-gang department, popularly known as "Bandepakken". After Morten Østergaards experience in the ghetto areas, he told the media that he had changed his opinion about the matter, and that Radikale Venstre now supported the proposal to which they previously voted against, and that the change stemmed from his experience in the ghetto areas.

In correlation with these statements, Rasmus Bruun calls Morten Østergaard to discuss the basis for an interview. In the pre-interview, Rasmus Bruun shows his appreciation for Morten Østergaards decision to stay in the ghetto, and he finds the initiative admirable. After small-talking for around ten minutes, Rasmus Bruun pretends to believe that Morten Østergaard has spent three months in these vulnerable areas. Morten Østergaard rather awkwardly replies "der er vidst lige noget du ikke har fanget helt... tre dage blev det til i Vollsmose, og et par dage i Gellerup" to which Rasmus

Bruun replies "nej, tre måneder, ikke?!" Morten Østergaard then replies "Ehh, knap og nap. Tre dage". After a few minutes of embarrassing conversation, the pre-interview finish, and they agree that Morten should call Rasmus back for the real interview. However, when Rasmus realizes that Morten Østergaard only spent three days and not three months in the ghetto, he panics. In an execrating oblivious voice, he states that there is no story to tell and that it is a purely political stunt. He starts to breathe heavily, and do not know what to do, and when Morten Østergaard calls back, he makes his assistant pick up the phone and cover for him. The assistant tells Morten that something drastic suddenly happened with Rasmus, which have resulted in him having to leave immediately (DKR, February 23., 2018)

There are quite a few things at stake in this episode, and it is, together with Kirsten Birgit's hour-long interview with Rasmus Paludan, regarded as some of the best work by the hand of DKR. To understand the mechanism used in the episode, an Investigations into what makes something funny is helpful, even though it is not per se within the scope of this thesis. Reflections on the matter help to decipher how DKR moves the topic into the open region and creates an experience that makes truth open for discovery.

Bjerg (1998) suggest that humorous laughter can be divided into two different situations with different triggers of laughter; the spontaneous situation, meaning that the laughing subject finds herself in a situation where she expects the reality she observe to match her own perception of reality, and the constructed situation, meaning a situation in which the laughing subject is aware she is witnessing a constructed situation. In these two, laughter can occur when the one who laughs finds a mismatch between the reality observed and her own perception of reality, in the constructed situation because she is so deeply in the construction that, when the humorous 'thing' occurs, she is reminded of what she briefly forgot - that what she is watching is just a construction, merely theatre, not real - and in the spontaneous situation, where the humorous 'thing' is perceived as being unreal in the context where it was first perceived, i.e. when one sees the Danish prime minister flipping burgers only then to realize, that it was just someone looking like the prime minister.

Now, to return to our case under scrutiny, it becomes interesting when examining the interview with Morten Østergaard through a lens suggesting that the humorous

aspect occurs from the clashing of world views. The division between constructed and spontaneous situations blurs in the episode, which is why the structure of the interview will be analyzed. The listener is, we have to suppose, well aware that he is listening to a satire show. This would suggest that we find our self in a constructed situation. However, Morten Østergaard is not playing a character detached from himself in the same way that Rasmus Bruun is. On the contrary, the story he shares is the same story he has shared with other journalists, and the interview is experienced as a real interview, suggesting that we are closer to the spontaneous situation.

The situation thus finds itself in an odd place between a constructed and a spontaneous situation - something that can be found in several other situations in DKR. If we start off by viewing the situation as if it was spontaneous, and then compares it to the example of prime minister flipping burgers, then what happens in that example is, that the laughing subject experience something that does not match with her perception of the world; "the prime minister is flipping burgers, isn't she?" Then realize that it was not, in fact, the prime minister, but merely someone looking like her, and the experience of the situation is then corrected; "the prime minister does not flip burgers, someone who looks like the prime minister does". However, in the case examined something different happens. When we laugh at the burger-flipping prime minister, we imagine a world in which this is actually the case - we might even, if we stay in the belief for long enough, imagine an entire pre-history matching the experience and fill in the blanks "maybe it is a publicity stunt?". In the case of Morten Østergaard, the situation is that Morten Østergaard has changed his mind after living in Gellerupparken for three days. What Rasmus Bruun does is, that he present us with an alternate situation in which the situation is matching a commonsensical perception of the world, i.e., Morten Østergaard lived in Gellerupparken for three months and have on that account changed his view. The situation matches a commonsensical view on the world (three months in a ghetto would most likely do something to a politicians views on the matter), but we are then confronted with a correction from Morten Østergaard "Der er noget, du ikke har fanget. Tre ... dage ... blev det til i Vollsmose", and the situation now changes character - the prime minister IS actually flipping burgers, and instead of realizing that the world matches our perception, thus annulling what we first found absurd and replacing with something not absurd, the contrary happens - we find that the world is in fact absurd.

If we then try to interpret the situation as if it is constructed, what in Bjerg's (1998) terminology happens is that we forget that we are witnessing a construction. This could arguably be the case since the first couple of minutes, as the interview goes like any other interview might have, i.e. nothing happens that explicitly inform the subject that this is a construction, until Rasmus Bruun reveal that he was under the conviction that Morten Østergaard have stayed in Gellerupparken for three months, which then, again in Bjerg's understanding, would be the triggering factor that reveals to the subject that she was witnessing a construction, that what she experienced was not real. However, what is of particular interest to this case when seen from the perspective of the constructed situation is, that the situation at first is in fact not constructed per se, and what they discuss is a particular incidence that has been widely covered in the press. The constructed situation in this particular incidence is double, and the initial constructed situation happened before the interview began. This can be clarified further through the Heideggerian concepts *dasein* and *aletheia*, of truth as a discovering procedure. To underline, with their own words, how this discovering procedure unfolds in DKR, let us briefly examine the following from an interview with the two humorists:

»Det handler om at få politikere til at afsløre sig selv,« siger Rasmus Bruun. »Det er blevet så svært i almindelige, kritiske interview. Der skal helt andre metoder til.« »Det handler om at latterliggøre politikere, der tror, de kan fylde os med bullshit,« siger Frederik Cilius. »Lytterne troede, at Morten Østergaard spillede en aftalt rolle i fredags, men det gjorde han ikke, han prøvede bare at være sjov og frisk og gik lige i fælden. Vi vil ikke grine med politikerne, vi vil grine ad dem! Det skal gøre ondt på dem. Det er ligesom, da de skulle afsløre spioner i det gamle Sovjet: Vi ved fra fødende kvinders smerte, at de ender med at sige av på deres eget sprog. Så ondt skal det gøre.« (Krasnik, 2018)

Notice the phrase “Det handler om at få politikere til at afsløre sig selv”. That is what is at stake in the interview with Morten Østergaard. With Heidegger, we could say that by letting Morten Østergaard be, Rasmus Bruun is uncovering a truth that was hitherto veiled. By playing along, seemingly being baffled by the boldness of Morten Østergaards decision to move to the ghetto, the truth unfolds in the interview. Rasmus Bruun's

critique is double, as he both portrays how the media that gave coverage to Morten Østergaards 'stunt' uncritically took it as if it was impressive, while also, when the twist arises, exposes the episode as a mere calculated, political stunt which should serve the purpose of legitimizing a tactical political shift. Now, Rasmus Bruun does not accuse Morten Østergaard of doing this, nor does he explicitly say it. Instead, he shows it by suddenly dragging in a new premise for his admiration, namely that he thought Morten Østergaard spent three months in the ghetto. While this is, as previously argued, the moment when the constructed situation becomes apparent, it is also the point where the before veiled truth is exposed. Instead of bluntly stating that Morten Østergaards move to the ghetto is just a publicity stunt - merely theatre, DKR constructs a fictional setting in which the stunt is not theatre, and then removes the premise, exposing it as theatre. To return to Bjerg's theory of laughter, we concur that the laughter arises when the laughing subject recollects that what she was witnessing was merely theatre. However, what happens in the interview is more complex, since DKR constructs a new situation (the interview with the false premise) around an already constructed situation (Morten Østergaard have changed his mind in three days), and let the two constructions collapse together. The interview thus happens in the precarious realm between truth and untruth, in which the discovery procedure of *aletheia* takes place. Rasmus Bruun lures Morten Østergaard into a different sphere, a sphere in which one does not have to lie to speak untruthfully, where what is untrue can be right at the same time.

In the case the satirical praxis' way of unfolding a truth, without saying it, but by letting the audience discovering it, is at play. A journalist could ask the questions of whether it was a political stunt, or, if it was not, whether the fact that three days in Vollsmose was able to change Morten Østergaards opinion indicates that the research done on the topic had been inadequate or inconclusive. However, by asking those questions, we are still moving in the sphere of classical critique, and the critique can be drowned in rhetorical movements, talk, or disagreements. Moreover, classical critique can have trouble penetrating the twisted reality. The satirical praxis is in opposition not about rhetorical movements and normal dialogue but is about showing something, letting people experience a topic through an unfolding of something hidden.

In the episode, the satirical work exhibited a rhetorical action into the common-sense world, by assimilating an ordinary citizen who believed something, and later realizes he was deceived. Political statements in abstracto can be hard to uncover because it can be difficult to figure which logic and position to use as evaluation. However, the satirical movement can move statements rhetorically into other logics or understandings, by for example applying a common sense or a connection to the lived life, which can broaden the critique so that the case can be understood anew. In the same way, Diogenes shows Alexander the great's humanity, when Alexander is walking by him in the streets of Athen and stops in front of Diogenes lying dirty in the sidewalk. Alexander The Great asks Diogenes whether he can do anything for him, as he in his power can give Diogenes anything he wants. Diogenes tells him that all he wants is for Alexander The Great to move on because he is blocking the sun. On the same note, Rasmus Bruun, the satirist, not the character, is not swayed by people in power. When having a, seen from an outsider to the show pleasant conversation, Rasmus Bruun is still determined to ridicule Morten Østergaard. For the kynic, it does not matter whether the person he ridicules is of power or not; if you are blocking the sun you are standing in the way, and if you seek to veil tactics with sincerity, you have to be called out.

The incident shows how the kynical approach posses a critical potential, which is lost without satire. Sloterdijk uses the example of a child in a classroom, which cannot argue with the teacher, as the teacher will rhetorically dismantle the student, however the student can stick his tongue out and laugh at the teacher, a cheekiness from below, that challenge the teacher, not in a rhetorical way, but through an experience. In the same way, when ideology critique or critique of power puts on suit and tie, as Sloterdijk says, it loses some of its critical potential. Journalists have a certain position in the public sphere, and their critical potential is hindered by their suits and ties, as their critique is affected by the position from which they exhibit their critique. The media has a low trustworthiness in the public sphere, hence when political journalist refer to common sense or the lived life to critique a political action, their position can be problematic, as the reality and simulated reality in the media can be hard to tell apart, which is also why it is difficult to criticize politicians when they twist and simulate reality, as they are one amongst many. That is why DKR as a critical institution, in the

incident of Morten Østergaard, try to criticize someone who turns away from a common sense of the world.

Arendt's understanding of common sense can help define the movement away from common sense, as her understanding is that common sense is experiences and opinions weighed together, which brings forth the common sense. Arendt explains common sense with an example of the statesman that receives counselling from several different officials with opposing opinions. The statesman needs to make a decision based upon all the information, and the decision will be based upon his common sense through balancing the different views and inputs. In the same way, the public sphere can establish a common sense through deliberation and arguing different views against each other, with experience from the lived life. Arguably, the discussion in the salon creates the possibility of people moving closer to a sense of the world. However, intentionally moving away from a sense of the world, is in clear opposition to the conceptualisation of common sense we are working with, in this thesis.

An example of politicians distancing themselves from common sense, and arousing no resonance amongst the people, can be found in an episode of 'Debatten', the 14. of March 2019. In the talk show, they discuss the many cases of politicians hiding party funding from private entities. The law on "Bekendtgørelse af lov om økonomisk støtte til politiske partier" §10b, states that any funding above 20,000 kroner should be open to the public with name and address. However, in some cases, the benefactors circumvent the law by donating the legal amount multiple times, and thus remained anonymous. This action was not illegal to the letter of the law but seemed to be illegal according to the spirit of the law. In the episode of 'Debatten', a politician is asked (Martin Gertsen), whether politicians should abide by the law in the case of anonymous founding? The politician's response is vague, and he begins a political eluding manoeuvre by not answering clearly. A former politician (Özlem Cekic) within the talk show replies, that such behaviour is what is wrong with politics and that the reason why people distrust politicians is, that they are so far away from the reality that they need time to think about whether politicians should abide the law or not.

In an interview with the creators of DKR, they discuss the motivation for the program, which is mainly driven by hatred to the bullshit floating around in the public sphere.

“bullshitten kommer ikke bare fra politikerne. Der er også oceaner af bullshit i mediernes måde at agere på, ikke mindst mediechefers måde at tale på, for ikke at tale om private virksomheder generelt, ja, hele offentligheden er fyldt med bullshit, vrøvl, forstillelse, sort snak og ævl, der skjuler virkeligheden (Krasnik, Weekendavisen, 2018, 2 marts).”

The reality Martin Krasnik articulates in the interview with Frederik Cilius and Rasmus Bruun, is the intuitive reality close to the lived life, experienced in opposition to turning away from a sense of the world. In a Heideggerian perspective, that feeling of reality is something true that will unfold itself with a particular relationship to *dasein*, to existence. Therefore, the exact definition of common sense is ambiguous because it is something that needs to unfold itself in a situation. That relationship to reality, the unfolding of truth, is not present when reality is twisted, and to establish the relationship of letting something be, on its own, and experiencing the truth in it, is difficult when everything is surrounded by different active opinions, discourses, spin in the media.

Satirical Critique of Political Journalists

The exhibition of the journalistic praxis and the media reality are common themes in the satirical praxis, as they possess a position, which should enlighten the public and critique the government, often ascribed to as the fourth branch of government or the watchdogs of society. However, the position of public enlightenment and watchdogs, regulators of the public sphere, is criticized by the public sphere, a critique which corresponds to the low trust towards the journalistic praxis (Radius, 2018). The critique against the media reality is often through the media, as the private person mainly finds his news about the public sphere in the media. The critique hence suffers, from the fact that it performs from the sphere, which is criticized for being untrustworthy, something also argued in the Morten Østergaard section, why satire could voice a critique, that has a different position than journalists critique. The concept of the truth-teller, which Arendt introduces, is interesting in regards to Jonathan Spang's participation in a press

conference. Arendt argues that the truth-teller comes from a different sphere than it criticizes, as it needs to have a different character to challenge established structures. It is difficult for the truth-teller to be a politician and critique the political realm, because it is still a critique coming from the same sphere, and hence cannot radically change the sphere from which it functions and criticize. However, the truth-teller from the non-political sphere has another critical potential, but will also be profoundly challenged in the critique, as the truth-teller has to put his persona at stake. Jonathan Spang presents a case of moving outside his sphere, and challenging the journalistic praxis, as an outsider, in a press conference with Anna Mee Allerslev.

To briefly introduce the case, Anna Mee Allerslev, Copenhagen mayor of Employment and Integration, allegedly used her position to obtain economic benefits by renting the Copenhagen City hall to her wedding without payment (Batchelor, 2017)

The case escalated in the media, and she retired from her position. In the process, she tried to save her reputation by setting up an interview, in which she walks down the street and talks about mundane things and ‘accidentally’ runs into her mother. Nevertheless, the damage was done, and she had to retire. At the press conference, in which she had given journalists 15 minutes to ask a question about the case, Jonatan Spang was present and ostentatiously performed questions intuitively unrelated to the press conference, like “*Sex and the city or game of thrones*”? or “*what is your relationship to frozen food*” (“*Tæt på Sandheden Episode 7*”)?

The incident accumulated a shit storm by journalists and organisations, who argued that the satire was both out of place and wasted the proper journalists time and opportunity to question Anne Mee Allerslev about essential questions. Some of the comments from journalists involved:

“De burde have tænkt, ”arh, det er nok ikke os fra satireholdet, der skal stille vores spørgsmål nu. Det er de professionelle, politiske journalister, der skal komme til”, Jarl Cordua. “En eller anden journalist spørger simpelthen til frysemad. Sikke noget pis.”, Kasper Kildegaard(Stie, Hans-Henrik, oct. 25., 2017)

The following Saturday, Jonatan Spang's show ‘Tæt på Sandheden’ aired, in which he addressed these accusations and his reasons for the questions.

The reason for the, so it seemed, infantile questions was, that the questions Jonatan Spang asked Anna Mee Allerslev, were questions related to the interview she had orchestrated to redeem her respectability, in which she walked nonchalant down the street answering the very same, in the eyes of the journalists, infantile questions. The goal was to a certain degree, to show how ridiculous it was to do such a PR-stunt while a case of corruption was investigated. Therefore, Anna Mee Allerslev was ridiculed for her attempt to remove attention away from her case, but there was a more in-depth critique of the relationship established between norms and journalism.

Jonatan Spang invaded the realm of political journalism, which ridiculed the process, by posing silly questions that offended the established rules of a political press conference. His questions were offending, not towards Anne Mee Allerslev, but towards the political journalists, because he was associated with comedy, he did not belong in the room. He was clearly in every aspect an outsider, he did something abnormally and hence offended the established order. He acted as a truth-teller in the sense that he was an outsider and challenged the established truth. Nevertheless, he was not a truth-teller in the same way someone might have been a truth-teller in the rebellion in Nazi Germany, who articulated their criticism of the rule and put their life and persona in play with words.

It was through a performance, his persona itself which questioned something, as the infantile questions to Anne Mee Allerslev was utterly unimportant. It was the fact that the questions had no meaning, which was important. It was an example of the critical potential in the satirical praxis, as an articulated critique of political journalism still would move within the sphere of journalism, and to some degree move within the same order, which might already be twisted. Therefore, had Jonatan Spang tried to behave as a critical journalist in the press conference, or had he written a critical paper about the media reality, then he would assimilate the praxis of journalists, and the critical content would be associated with the media reality, and would be part of reality which is consumed by twisted reality. His actions now insist on penetrating the journalist's sphere with his act as a satirist, had he written the critical paper, then he had used the same channel customarily used to criticize within journalists, and it would not have burst the frame and norm for journalism. His behaviour came closer to the character of Diogenes, that would masturbate on the marketplace and sleep in a barrel.

Diogenes believed actions and performance in itself had the most substantial critical potential. In the same sense, Spang's provocative behaviour in itself is a tool, in contrast to a calm articulated written paper. In the critique of the media reality, the truth-teller has to move from not only a different sphere but also present the critique in a different form.

In his show, he unfolded the tension of the week between the press conference and his show, by discussing his reasons for intruding on the press conference, which was a critique of the media and the journalistic praxis. The critique of the journalists was a critique of the performance of the journalistic praxis, as part of the press conference had similarities to a performance enforcing the role of the journalist and the place they occupy in society. The press conference was not only about establishing a proper communication to evolve an understanding of the topic and to understand Anne Mee Allerslev but rather it could be experienced as an attempt to get the right sentences to write headlines. In a Habermasian view, the press did not fulfil the role of a critical institution, but was driven by strategic goals and not by transparent communication. A point that correlates to Habermas critique of the commercialized media, as their goal is clouded by the divided interest of the journalists and the critique is that the enlightenment of the citizen is less important than their appearance. With the declining trust towards journalists, the situation is intensified as it becomes vital to protect their authority when the trust towards their occupation is declining.

In his show following the press conference, Jonatan Spang approached the critique he had received since the press conference, which by and large concerned the relevance of his questions, which took time away for the proper journalists to ask a proper question. To counter the critique, Jonatan Spang discussed the relevance of the political journalists' own questions and pointed towards the fact that most of them were concerned with the fact that Anne Mee Allerslev would still figure on the voting list due to her late severance. It was early pointed out by Anne Mee that she did not intend to continue even in the scenario she would get a sufficient amount of votes. Nevertheless, journalists kept asking her about whether there was a possibility of her continuing if she got enough votes, and more or less the same question was asked in different ways. The relevance of the fifth time the question was asked, in a slightly different formulation,

might be reasonably irrelevant, one might say as unimportant as the question regarding her favourite tv show.

It was clear that Jonathan Spang's position was that of an outsider. As described earlier by Arendt, the outsider is in a predicament, because he represents something unpredictable and dangerous, and is therefore questioned and investigated intensely. He comes from another sphere, something that is usually cut off from the political sphere and journalism, which have an established set of norms and understandings. In the Anne Mee Allerslev press conference, it resulted in two things, it resulted in a hostile environment towards his persona and in a significant amount of public interest.

In the aftermath, it was commented by other comics, Jan Gintberg amongst others, that the outrage of the journalists was incredible, compared to other comical stunts (Jan Gintberg, "Det er sjovt! - eller er det?", 2017). Gintberg could not remember in his career, to have released such a significant amount of outrage, even though he has done plenty of offending acts in the public sphere.

The outrage and the great resonance amongst the audience of the show had a deeper aspect than the performance of the journalist but were also about the fundamental structure of the media reality. The media occupy an enormous portion of the public sphere as it manifests itself through most of the channels of information; however, the understanding of the public sphere that the media creates, is what Habermas calls a pseudo-public sphere. Pseudo, in a sense, that it gives the feeling of a public sphere, as people relate to stories in the media, use the news to understand what is going on etc. Nevertheless, a well functioning public sphere involves the citizens and through communication, dialogue and critique, it will create a critical potential that can challenge the political realm etc. The pseudo-public sphere is dangerous because it resembles the feeling of a critical public but actually is not. When the media occupy such a great deal of the information in the public sphere, it can be experienced as if they were the public sphere. In other words, that the public sphere is the news coming through the media. However, the public sphere is the essence of all the private people involving themselves in public, and in comparison, the media only represent a fraction of the actual public sphere. The satirical sketch of invading the press conference did not only ridicule journalists, but it also showed something. It showed that incidents and

happenings in the public sphere, is not the property of journalist and that journalist writes about happenings, but they are just one amongst many parts of the public sphere.

The truth-teller can drag content out of a sphere and show it through another sphere. If the critique of journalists had been made through an article featuring Jonathan Spang against political journalists, then it is doubtful that the reaction had been as vigorously, because the critique would have worked in the same sphere as journalism, but by appearing physically in the room with a strong expression and form, Jonatan embraced the topic and made it closer to the lived life and the public sphere, as Diogenes who physically critiqued people in Athens by his sole, dirty, rough appearance, a critique that embrace not only mere words, but also possess a satirical expression and form, which makes it harder to ignore. By putting his character at stake, by challenging the established structures in journalism, he forced attention towards the questions, what is political journalism actually? What functions does it have? Moreover, what function do we want it to have?

Satirical Critique of Political Hypocrisy

By day, colonizer, at night, colonized; by occupation, vaporizer and administrator, during leisure time, valorized and administered; officially a cynical functionary, privately a sensitive soul; at the office a giver of orders, ideologically a discussant; outwardly a follower of the reality principle, inwardly a subject oriented toward pleasure; functionally an agent of capital, intentionally a democrat; with respect to the system a functionary of reification, with respect to the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), someone who achieves self-realization; objectively a strategist of destruction, subjectively a pacifist; basically someone who triggers catastrophes, in one's own view, innocence personified. (Sloterdijk, 1983, P 113)

Sloterdijk's beautiful quote refers to the life of a double agent in society. A figure whose loyalty is so blurred, that he himself does not know who or what he serves. In this part of Sloterdijk's philosophy, he correlates with Arendt's thoughts and perspectives on implications in the political sphere. In Arendt's discussions of truth and politics, she argues that reality, as we have put, can become twisted to a degree, that people cannot

distinguish between fabricated reality and factual reality. However, Sloterdijk's distinction is interesting as his focus is targeting the perception of the persona, the blurred lines between perception and the lacking consistency between beliefs and actions, between inward and outward, between function and intention, and is thus a further elaboration of the cynical reason of modernity, i.e., the enlightened false consciousness of knowing what you do, but to do it anyway. As Sloterdijk puts it:

"They know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them that it has to be so. Others would do it anyway, perhaps worse(1983, p. 5)."

It is expressed through the insistence of dividing the actions and opinions in the same life, being a communist privately, but working for a capitalistic lobby organisation professionally, and not accepting the cynical implications of the behaviour. The behaviour of the double agent is, like the enlightened false consciousness of the cynic, immune to both reaction, enlightenment (ibid, p 113) and traditional ideology critique (ibid, p. x), as they are never engaged sincerely with a perspective on the world, but is ever-changing in their perception, attitude and conception of their self. Because they are immune to these traditional and - to some extent - academic forms of critique, they become problematic in respect to the desired, ideal capability of the public sphere, that is, the capability of judging and choosing. When shielded from traditional critique, a different type of critique becomes necessary to restrain those in power; for to what good is claims of morality against someone who, as Sloterdijk puts it "*can very well do with the right hand what the left hand never allowed* (ibid, p. 113)"?

It is a common theme for the satirical praxis to challenge the cynical reason of the double agent, and in this section, we shall use the curious case of Henrik Sass Larsen and how he was ridiculed in DKR. In doing so, the figure of the double agent becomes relevant in order to identify the function and necessity of the satirical critique in this particular case.

DKR has for a long time discussed and ridiculed Henrik Sass Larsen's for not attending several meetings with the Public Accounts Committee, for which he was paid

360,000,- KR. A year. In response to the great attention and critical approach towards his lack of attendance, not only from DKR but also from the tabloid media, Henrik Sass Larsen declared that he suffered from depression, from which he received treatment, a statement that, among other, should justify his lack of attendance. DKR did not, however, decide to withhold further criticism of Henrik Sass Larsen, unlike the majority of the media. On the contrary, they intensified their critique, now with new ammunition for the same target.

The course of actions had an ambiguous nature, as Henrik Sass Larsen with the one hand serves as an extension of the will of his constituents, and when running for parliament present himself as fit and proper for this trusted vocation, and with the other hand choose to be judged as a fragile individual that have had personal problems. That is, Henrik Sass Larsen was at the same time strong and fragile, privately suffering from depression, publicly a powerful politician.

As Arendt early in her political discussion "On Truth and Politics" mentions, the politician should be understood as someone who will bend the truth, lie or deny factual truths, in the process of creating an image of himself; hence she writes:

"image-making of all sorts, in which, again, every known and established fact can be denied or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image; for an image, unlike an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality but to offer a full-fledged substitute for it (Arendt, 1961, p. 252)."

The process of image-making for Arendt becomes performative, in the way that keeping the false and fabricated image intact slowly, but given enough time surely, becomes the main focus of both the deceived and, more relevantly for this case, the deceiver (ibid, p. 253). Following both the line of thought of Sloterdijk, in which the double agent himself have difficulties in knowing where one stands, and of Arendt, in which he who makes images himself becomes deceived, we from theoretical stand must assume that Henrik Sass Larsen - even though he, we believe, deliberately use or misuse his psychological condition to create an image of himself fitting for the situation he finds himself in - is not doing this in the act of cruelty or baseness, but merely, in the words of Sloterdijk because the force of circumstances and the instinct for self-preservation are telling him

that it has to be done (Sloterdijk, 1983). In short, when insisting on being fragile and resilient, a man of power and powerless at the same time, Henrik Sass Larsen widens the gulf *"between loyalties and insights[...] that makes it difficult to know where one stands. (Sloterdijk, 1983, p. 114)"*. He resists being judged as the politicians Henrik Sass Larsen, because of the private person Henrik Sass Larsen.

Kirsten Birgit challenge his behaviour in a series of episodes from DKR (especially February 25.-27, 2019.), and through the episodes, whenever someone questions her of demands something from her, she fakes deep despair and burst violently and suddenly into tears, and while crying yells, that she has had a depression and that everybody should be cautious with her, only then to instantly stop crying and continue the conversation as if nothing happened. The act takes the form of the satirical kynical approach, and instead of attacking the morality of Henrik Sass Larsen, they instead, by exaggeration, present Kirsten Birgit as a calculated opportunist, who is fragile just when she is about to lose an argument, only then to become herself again. By this act, she ridicules the position of the double agent, the insistence on withholding two, contradictory, images at the same time. The act transcended the normative implications, which often is correlated to depression and sickness, as discussions quickly become moralistic and dogmatic. However, the sarcastic, emotional approach adopted by Kirsten Birgit showed through raw kynism, show weak and smarmy Henrik Sass Larsen position could be perceived. The power in the satirical approach, is for once, that the position Kirsten Birgit adopts is not challenged morally to the same degree as a non-satirical position. However, the truth the agitated Kirsten resonated in the listeners, was the legitimization of the praxis, not the normative implications.

A reference to the satirical power would, in this instance be the case of Diogenes challenging Platons claim:

Greek kynicism discovers the animal body in the human and its gestures as arguments; it develops pantomimic materialism. Diogenes refutes the language of philosophers with that of the clown: "When Plato put forward the definition of the human as a featherless biped and was applauded for it, he tore the feathers from a rooster and brought it into Plato's school saying, 'That is Plato's human' (Sloterdijk, 1983, P 143)

It is the same animal body, the same raw power of kynism which Kirsten Birgit uses to criticize Henrik Sass Larsen behaviour, as she sarcastically burst out in cries of despair claiming that she cannot do her work because she is depressed. However, the distinction between the institution of power and the victim was discussed heavily throughout the course of episodes that challenged Henrik Sass Larsen's persona. He was to a degree perceived as a victim, as the private person Henrik Sass Larsen was investigated both in accordance with the media and ridiculed in DKR. The discussion raises the question of whether DKR is a critical institution or a bullying program. Sloterdijk argues that the cynical reason is exemplary present in the movement when the position of power use cynicism to confront critique from below. Henrik Sass can only be a victim of a position of power if he is perceived as a non-public figure, a private person and fragmented from his political praxis, however that movement is illusionary as Sloterdijk argues, that the distinction cannot be made. To claim a position of power, and claim the rights of a person without power at the same time, is the cynical reason for the double agent par excellence. Henrik Sass Larsen was politically active throughout the entire course and hence by his practice demanded the responsibility and power that comes along with the position, but in other cases, he wanted to be seen as the private individual Henrik Sass Larsen who was depressed. It is key to highlight his position of power as the cynical movement must come from below and be in opposition to a position of power, to possess the cheeky critical potential inherent in the satirical praxis. Hence, when cheekiness shift sides and move from below to above, and people in power use it to legitimate or confront criticism, then it becomes cynical. An example of the cheekiness from above, "master cynicism" as Sloterdijk calls it, is when Stalin cheekily said, that "the death of one man is a tragedy, but the death of a million is statistics", or when Marie Antoinette as a response upon being told that the starving peasants did not have any bread replied "let them eat cake". Then it becomes master cynicism, as a way to remove the importance and seriousness of a critique or action. In opposition to the child who cheekily ridicules the master, to exhibit the potential power of revolution and resistance, and hence posses a critical potential in the form of reminding the master of the power of cheekiness from below (Sloterdijk, 1983, p. 110).

Satirical Critique of Pharisees

In the section "the public sphere today," it was discussed how the modern public sphere partly could be understood as a market for attention. It was argued that since the amount of information and impressions in the public sphere have been intensified, it has created an overload of information, which have made attention of both consumers and voters a scarce resource, exposing attention to market type mechanisms. Habermas argued in 1961 that the commercialisation of both the press and the cultural distribution created incentives for lowering the complexity. Since then, as argued, the public sphere has changed and have adopted technological development, which has lowered the entrance requirements for addressing an audience.

"Before, one needed to get on television or on the radio or in to a newspaper or in with to achieve attention beyond the reach of one's voice from a soapbox. Now, within minutes and without expense, an opinion entrepreneur can freely broadcast commentary to anyone with Internet access (Freese, 2008, original italics)"

The opinion entrepreneur, be that bloggers, influencers or public intellectuals, can potentially broadcast an opinion or statement, which within minutes have reached a substantial amount of people. A great example of the new distribution channels impact on the communication in the public sphere, is the President of The United States, Donald Trump's use of twitter, and the fact that his tweets from time to time become subject for global news coverage. The new media's impact on the public sphere has changed the boundary between public and private, and this change will appear in this section as a subject for our analysis.

A position closely related to the public sphere as a market for attention is the phenomenon of the opinion entrepreneur, someone who becomes a public figure by involving themselves in the public sphere mainly through private content and opinion. The full-time blogger is an interesting phenomenon in this respect, as their views and opinions, on the one hand, are of individual character, what they stand for, and on the other hand, the very product they sell and hence become subject to their

self-preservation. The full-time blogger is in a precarious situation in their involvements in public discourses regarding politics and moral discussions, as their profession makes them liable towards behaviour like that of the double agent, as they live off their persona in the public sphere, and their private persona becomes a place between private and public, and will like the politician be open to critical voices from the public sphere, as their actions influence the public. The more attention public figures pose, the more powerful a position they hold, and the more critique they will attract. The phenomenon of the private person living of their persona and opinions, through attention, in the public sphere, can be understood as something between a private person, a brand and a company. Whenever these public figures become involved in critique, the gap between private and public, person and brand become questions for discussion. Influence on the public sphere is not about the label of the subject but is revealed through the amount of attention and exposure the subject has when trying to influence the public. Hence, the satirical critique of power can be seen in the critique of entities that fill out space in the public sphere and has power through the amount of attention they consume. A case of a public figure being criticized on the foundation of their power through attention capital involved the blogger Amalie Have. Amalie Have is a young woman, who with her, currently, 93,000 followers on the social media 'Instagram', must be said to have a substantial attention capital. Her usual subjects of interest are activism, women's right, sexual consent, rape, gender, power critique as well as moral questions adhering to these.

In an episode from DKR, During an off-mike discussion, Kirsten Birgit and Rasmus Bruun debates a commentary in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende (Have, 2019), in which Amalie Have argues that people should quit listening to Michael Jackson due to the recent film "leaving neverland", a documentary in which two adults talk about being abused by Michael Jackson as kids . The discussion leads to Kirsten Birgit calling the blogger and activist Amalie Have, who wrote the piece, and when she did not pick up her phone, Kirsten Birgit leaves a tirade on her voicemail telling her that she, when she read her commentary, sensed hypocrisy lying around somewhere. Kirsten Birgit then continued to list up a number of artist from Amalie Have public Spotify playlist, as well as each of their sentences, which count murder, assault, paedophilia and sexual misconducts. Amalie Have was subsequently a frequent topic in Den Korte Radioavis ,

due to her consistent strong didactic statements, which suggested how to behave morally correct, something that Kirsten Birgit contested, claiming that Amalie have preached in one way and lived in another, in other words, it was claimed that she was a hypocrite and a pharisee.

The reasons as to why this particular case is attracting for the investigation of the satirical function and capability in present society, is due to the, as argued earlier, increasing tendency of political correctness in the public sphere. In a well functioning public sphere, the ability by the public to judge and choose is of vital importance, as the process of laymen to judge art, literature or music, provides a training ground for the discussion of political matters of public interest, that is, by practicing debate of culture and being left to oneself to judge it's value, left to one's own reason on the matter; as Habermas writes:

"The opinion of the public that put its reason to use was no longer just opinion; it did not arise from mere inclination but from private reflection upon public affairs and from their public discussion(Habermas, 1961, p.94). "

The capability for *private* reasoning, judging and reflections, as well the partaking in the *public* discussions on matters of general interest, is both fundamental for a well functioning public sphere. What we argue is, that when it for Habermas' public sphere anno 1961 is the lowering of entrance requirements into leisure, i.e. making cultural goods fit for consumption rather than foster debate, we today see a tendency that, though being vastly different, at worst, has similar consequences. When an attitude or opinion is arrived to, not as a product of private reflection, but instead as a product of what the 'correct' opinion on the matter is, the impact of the following public discussion is weakened.

Let us now return to the case of Amalie Have and the critique of her by DKR. Amalie Have claims in her commentary in Berlingske tidende, as well as on her private facebook page, where she elaborate on her statement in the newspaper, that we as consumers have certain moral obligations when choosing who we decide to endorse, in her own words "som forbrugere skal vi tage et aktivt valg om, hvem og hvad vi vælger at støtte (Have, Amalie; facebook post of february 13, 2019)". When DKR decides to

examine the music Amalie Have listened to via her Spotify playlist to see to whether Amalie Have lived up to the morality she advocates, then there are several things at stake. The to us essential perspective is, that DKR test the genuineness of the moral position of Amalie have. It is, in other words, not the presented proposition per se that is subjected to satirical criticism, but instead the relationship between the proposition and the one who advocates it. Satire is, and have for centuries been, suspicious towards double standards and hypocrisy. In this case, however, where we seek to understand the case in light of the prevalent political correctness in the realm of public discussion, the satirical critique seems to have yet another element. As argued above, it is quintessential for the well being of the public discussion that the participating public prior reflects on public affairs, since the private reflection qualifies the public discussion, elevating it from being mere opinion, thus ensuring the possibility of beneficial discussion, contrary to an exchange of unreflected beliefs. Where it for Habermas is the reduction of complexity in both the press and the cultural offering which have lead to the lack of reflection in the private sphere, we in this thesis argue that political correctness in the public sphere foster a pre-reflective, automatic reaction towards various moral and political affairs. Thereby the public sphere, not entirely but more so, becomes a public sphere of opinions stemmed from an idea of what one ought to think of this and that, instead of being a product of private reflection. When DKR investigate the music Amalie Have in private listen to, that is in the space in which the private reflection prior to her public opinion on judging and choosing musicians based on their moral character should take place, DKR displays that her opinion on the matter is an opinion by appearance only. By exposing the convergence between the public and private opinion of Amalie Have, DKR shows that her opinion has not grown from a private reflection, that is in relating oneself to the matter of concern with the lived life as the foundation, i.e. the opinion is internally founded, but is instead emanated from an exterior pre-defined morality, which has not manifested itself in the lived life of Amalie Have. When opinion becomes related to the accepted principles of either fringe or mass society instead of by private reasoning, actions and opinions shift character from being a matter of interior responsibility to be a matter of exterior obedience. The assumption that whatever someone broadcast in the public sphere is based on a priori reflection, thinking and use of judgement is what gives validity to the public discussion of matters

of general interest, since if one does not assume that the other is saying what he himself believe is true, no productive discussion, i.e. a discussion that produces something, can take place.

Amnesty International, who had a professional relationship with Amalie Have in a campaign against victims of rape, demanded to make Radio24Syv withdraw the episodes regarding Amalie Have, as well as publicly apologizing for harassing her. The relationship between Amnesty and Amalie can appear complicated because Amalie Have is a private person, but she is also an entity with 93,000 followers, who like a brand offers Amnesty attention capital. Therefore, challenging the critique of Amalie Have, becomes a protection of their investment, as it is undesirable that their co-brand lose attention and legitimacy. On the other hand, Amnesty is an organization supporting women's rights and recently conducted an investigation into harassment of women in the online public debate (Amnesty, 2017). Because the case was so involved in morality and had many nuances, an accurate description of the satirical critique is desirable. Amalie Have was criticized for being an influential public figure, who preached a moral conviction, which she herself did not fulfil. The case is intriguing, as it can be perceived from Habermas understanding of commercialization of the public debate, as the question of morals and the forum in which it is discussed, itself is involved with the market. When Habermas discuss how talk shows, political debates etc. had been commercialized, as the goal was not only political communication but also entertainment for people's leisure time. A comparison can be made to the case of Amalie Have, as the political statements can be seen as not only a desire to change the society in a specific direction but also a desire to create attention capital. The problem with clouded interest in the public sphere, in correlation with political communication and morals, is that it questions whether statements are political communication or strategic communication. Political communication as in an enlightened dialogue with the intention of improving the public sphere, or strategic communication driven by economic incentive. It is not essential what the intentions are behind the communicator, but it is crucial that public critique can challenge contradictions between action and communication in the public sphere

*Stikker man numsen frem får man taget temperaturen, Som Poul Borum
Sagde[...] Stiller man sig op på en papkasse i den offentlige debat og udråber et*

eller andet, så har man ret og pligt til at prøve de udtalelser som vedkommende kommer med, sådan er det. Og det er et demokratisk - og offentlig debat-fundament, som ligger til grund for hele den offentlige samtale. (DKR, 28. February, 2019)

The statement can be viewed in regards to the preservation of truth in the public sphere, which is a vital function of any critical institution, and truth is also the consistency between action and postulate. The case of moral being clouded by the inclusion of strategic communication can be correlated to Sloterdijk's emphasize on the importance of challenging moral etiquette through satire, as morals that are not challenged to some degree can "rot" if they are never questioned.

If moral is left untouched, then its value or power of impact can succumb. In the case of Amalie, the apparent critical function of DKR is to criticize her hypocritical actions. The importance of the critique is amongst other that when posing claims of morality to the public sphere, inclining them to boycott and shame something or someone, it needs to be discussed and challenged, for future similar claims to have any value. If claims that lead to public shaming is not challenged and is easily articulated without any risk of critique, then the public sphere could be filled up with statements without sincerity or importance, and hence turn away from the lived life and cloud the public sphere. To some degree, it adds impotence to the moral movement of mobilizing the public sphere, as it becomes an unimportant act, in opposition to the problematic but powerful movement it is, when morals are challenged and discussed

Amalie Have is a specific case, but it corresponds to a broader question regarding political correctness, which is a topic that frequently makes it into the content of the satirical praxis - especially in DKR. To some degree, the case of Amalie Have touch upon a nerve in the public sphere that claims a particular relationship to morals and language.

For the philosopher, the human being who exemplifies the love of truth and conscious living, life and doctrine must be in harmony. The core of every doctrine is what its followers embody of it. This can be misunderstood in an idealistic way as if it were philosophy's innermost aim to get people to chase after unattainable ideals (Sloterdijk, 1983; p 101).

In the case of Amalie Have, and in the tendency she represents, it is the unattainable nature of its ideals, the life which is preached that has an unattainable nature. The ideal preached, is bound to an abstract idea of correctness, and is not lived and acted upon. What satire challenge is hence the hypocritical action, but also the idea of correctness. One of the satirical praxis important tasks is breaking with taboos. When morals are left untouched, a taboo can establish itself, the taboo of not agreeing to the moral postulate. In the earlier Louis CK joke, he let his audience experience their grave moral obligation to the army, as the audience reaction was more severe when joking about the military than when joking about children dying of nut allergy. One can talk about the "correct" moral conviction, something that the individual incorporates unquestionable. These predetermined moral convictions, which are not reflected upon by the individual, but are incorporated as the correct behaviour, is a turning away from the lived life, in the sense that the common sense or intuition of the individual is not used to reflect about the issue, but the answer is incorporated from a public discourse. It is a way of challenging political correctness, as it is sometimes seen as hindering for the reflection on moral opinions, but rather indoctrinate a value system amongst the audience, and hinders the opportunity for free discussion. The critical function of satire is to bring these problems back to a sense of the lived life, as Satire has its validity in common sense, and can let people experience and rejudge tendencies and structures existing in society, by bringing them closer to our common sense.

Chapter 3: Potential, role and boundary in the public sphere.

After having been through several cases, each one of them expressing the kynical satirical critique in a concrete example, we now broaden the scope and lift the perspective from the particular cases and instead investigate how satire in general, with an offset in the cases, function in the public sphere. In this process, we also wish to discuss the preconditions and limitations of satire.

Satires form has proven to have a critical potential different from other critical voices in society. In the previous chapter, we have discussed how satire is relatable to common sense, more precise how Hannah Arendt's definition of common sense, as

closeness to the lived life. In the cases, we have discussed how the satirical praxis criticize people for breaking with common sense when they turn away from the lived world. It includes people twisting reality, being hypocrites, lying, using the media to portrait them in specific ways, as well as criticising political journalists for insisting on their unique importance. Hereby, the examples have shown how satire can function as a mediator, in which the critic is already persistent in the public sphere, but without a voice to perform it. An example could be the case of Morten Østergaard, in which he, to a certain degree, was revealed and criticized for his way of portraying himself through the media. The argument is in that case that the satirical praxis only works because there is something to reveal, something that is not already in the open. The critique does not need to be something that the audience necessarily have thought about, but it must be a critique that resonates amongst them when they experience it. If satire does not resonate amongst people and reveal truth, then it has no critical potential, and can in that line of thought not create the truth, but can only function as an institution of revelation. The distinction is essential to understand how we now will discuss the satirical praxis' role and limitations in the society, in opposition to an institution that does not need to resonate with truth to function.

Satire and Common Sense

The satirical praxis can be understood as having a relationship to Arendt's understanding of common sense, i.e. the knowledge gained through lived experience and intersubjectivity. In Arendt's description, common sense is almost like a sixth sense that combines the other senses and learnings, and when satire is successful in its critical praxis, it relates to that sixth sense. Hence, moving towards common sense is a movement towards the lived life, in which we, as beings in the world, are able to communicate, live together and understand each other. When things in the public sphere are twisted, as when the reality is twisted, it challenges the factual truth of the public sphere. Here satire is a critical institution that works in correlation with common sense, as the twisting of reality, according to Arendt, implies a turning away from the world.

By disabling discourse between people, isolation encloses people in their own minds and thus condemns them to radical solipsism. Ultimately, isolation, like the super/nonsense of totalitarian ideological truth, undermines one's sense of self and sense of reality. (...) Without a shared world, people are left to a sense of unreality, perhaps best compared to the experience of dreaming or sleepwalking. The world, then, has become one-dimensional or uniform. Only the experience of sharing a world with equal others whom both recognize us and our place in that world ensures that we acquire a sense of reality (Borren, 2013, p230)

Arendt here shows how the movement towards the lived life in accordance with common sense, is not an individual action. In the assumption that we are existences in the world and are thus affected by our surroundings, our own movement towards reality and a world living with others are affected by the public sphere. Therefore, the challenge of factual truth - which are the natural consequences of twisting reality -, brings us to a state of isolation, as the feeling of sharing the world with others, and sharing truths with others, is shattered. In the process of criticizing the movement away from the lived life, a movement that occurs through twisting reality, we argue that satire has a relationship to truth. As we have been through, the conception of truth apparent in the realm of satire is not truth as correctness, as it is in the correspondence theory, i.e. its accuracy or falseness in describing the relationship between propositions, but rather truth as unconcealment or *Aletheia*, hence truth is something already there, which can reveal itself through engagement. This makes us turn to what Arendt calls philosophical truth, or Truth with a capital T. This Truth with capital T has undergone severe scrutiny for years, as a theoretical construction, and is criticized for distancing itself from the practical life by several figures, including Diogenes who believed that truth should be shown rather than theorized. Arendt as well poses scepticism towards the philosophical truth and argues that philosophical truth is inherently impotent, and has little to no power in the public realm.

Arendt explains that philosophical truth is concerned with man in singular, and is thus apolitical by nature (Arendt, 1961). Truth as in philosophical truth has no power in the public realm because it does not concern man in the plural. For Philosophical truth to be demarcated as truth in the public sphere, it needs to be common and shared. The

truths that satire tap into in its praxis to relate to the audience are truths that are integrated into the lived life. Sloterdijk argues how Diogenes as a satirical figure was in opposition to the abstraction, which clouded the truths in practical life.

Desperately funny, he resists the "linguistification" of the cosmic universalism that called the philosopher to this occupation. Whether monologic or dialogic "theory," in both, Diogenes smells the swindle of idealistic abstractions and the schizoid staleness of a thinking limited to the head(Sloterdijk, 1983, p102)

Let us return to Plato's postulate, that man is a featherless biped, to which Diogenes responds by plucking a chicken and states, "Here's the Platonic Human!". It is a classic example of a satirical kynic using the satirical form to reveal the abstract truth to common sense and the lived life and highlighting its impotence. In this thesis we argue that DKR has a similar function, when they, as in the case of Amalie Have, challenge postulates presented in the public sphere, that only in abstracto can be realized as true, but when ridiculed and brought in to the sphere of the lived life, proves to smell more like swindle than truth. Postulates, narratives and propositions which show us a world that only in abstracto is understandable, but can't be related to our common sense, crumbles when faced with folly. This is also the case when politicians twist the world and move it away from common sense, as is the case with Morten Østergaard, who presents us with a world, that only can be understood in abstracto, but can't be related to our common sense.

However, the philosophical truth is not always denied but can be integrated into the common, and hence manifest itself in a realm where it is powerless in abstracto. An example of a philosophical truth manifesting itself in the public sphere, becoming not only true for the man in singular but also effect full and influential in the lived world, was "it is better to suffer wrong than do wrong (Arendt, 1968)" which was presented and defended by Socrates. Why, or, maybe more accurately how, did this truth become manifested as Truth? Is it because it is self evident, which the question of 'why' hint towards, since it presupposes that the reason truth becomes accepted as Truth is depending on the nature of the truth itself, i.e. by an evaluation of "how true the Truth is", which, at least for Arendt, is not the case. The question is a how, and the answer provided by Arendt is both delicate and straightforward "teaching by example is, indeed,

the only form of 'persuasion' that philosophical truth is capable without perversion or distortion (ibid)". The truth must undergo a transformation from theoretical truth to exemplary truth, a transformation that for Arendt is only liable to moral philosophy.

Arendt thus informs us with two presuppositions for philosophical truth to be effective as truth in the public realm. Firstly, that the philosophical truth is 'taught by example'. This is not to be understood as merely providing examples of the given philosophical truth, but to set an example of oneself, as when Socrates refused to flee from his death sentence. This type of living one's philosophical truth and letting oneself be the example of the truth is analogous to Sloterdijk's description of Diogenes, who also impersonated the philosophical truth he proclaimed. Secondly, Arendt argues that only moral philosophy is capable of this transformation, that is, the "transformation of a theoretical or speculative statement into exemplary truth (Arendt, 1961, p. 12)". Given that satire can unfold philosophical truth, the question which now presents itself is whether satire to some degree adheres to moral philosophy. Satire as a critical praxis can be seen as having a behavioural effect on deviance away from moral and the lived life, in the sense that it becomes more difficult to twist reality or break with common sense if the consequences are greater. However, whether satire can serve as a tool to nourish the transformation from speculative statement into truth, is another question. If we think of moral philosophy as the philosophy of how man ought to behave, considerations on good and evil, right and wrong and of what virtues are essential to man as a living, dying man with other living and dying men, then satire has a corrective effect pointing out deviance from the virtues, but it does not possess a creative potential for starting new truths and integrating them into the common sphere by example. This becomes clear in the cases investigated in the analysis. In all the cases the satirical praxis is in a critical position, in opposition to something. As shown when criticizing Amalie Have for not living up to the categorical imperative, when ridiculing Henrik Sass Larsen for his hypocrisy when he calls in sick, and when letting Morten Østergaard expose his move the ghetto as a stunt.

Hence, it is not creating or suggesting a way of living or truth, and then by example through its praxis legitimizing that truth. Arguably satire has its limitations outside the function of critical praxis, in the perspective of creating truths in the public sphere. However it can still be argued that the critical praxis itself, shows a particular

relationship to life, as Diogenes to some degree showed a truth in his life, as it was lived entirely true to the kynical thought, but whether he created a truth in the same sense that Sokrates teaches a truth by dying as an example, is questionable.

By understanding philosophical truths accordingly, then arguably exemplary truths are truths integrated into the public sphere, by the common, and hence is closer to the lived life, as they are ways of living and acting, which are worth being taught and inherited in the public sphere. These truths can be seen as examples, partly inspired by history, poetry, etc., and will be truths that are practical and close to our common sense. These exemplary truths integrated into the public sphere often concerns itself with not deviating from the lived life. As, lying, hypocrisy, unfairness etc. are traits that are inherently unconstructive for the public sphere. The consistency of Diogenes' life, in which he lived the philosophical critique of the society, is what made him a true kynic. In opposition, it is true that the hypocritical critic does not intrinsically possess the same critical potential as a truth delivered by example. Hence, when DKR challenge Amalie Haves public appearance, they reveal a truth about the nature of Amalie Haves criticism critic, as Amalie Have does not live her critique, and hence is not teaching us a truth by example, but is uttering an opinion.

Satire, is then not only to criticize, but also a test in the public whether a truth is obtainable by the common, and in that sense the satirical praxis is helping to maintain, reinforcing and protecting morals and truths by testing whether something can pass the examination of ridicule, and if it still stands after being challenged by the satirical praxis, then it is in a better position than before.

Ridicule is necessarily built on specific supposed facts, whether true or false and on their inconsistency with indeed acknowledged maxims, whether right or wrong. It is, therefore, a fair test, if not of philosophical or abstract truth, at least of what is truth according to public opinion and common sense (Hazlitt in Dadlez, 2011)

That is, ridicule is testing the validity of truths, not in abstractum, but in the everyday lived life. The ridiculing of, e.g. Amalie Have, would not have been as successful if it were not for the already acknowledged maxim that it is wrong to preach one thing and practice another. That is, there lies in society an already established attitude towards, not exclusively but maybe primarily, questions of morality. This attitude towards

questions of morality is by no means neither static nor universal, but fluctuating and divergent. It is hence not a priori given that an attitude would be this or that, but merely an expression that is to indicate that there in a given society lies a tendency to perceive this or that as right or wrong. This line of thought has some implications which seem necessary to investigate. To do this, we will now return to our earlier examination of the Heideggerian concept *Aletheia*, un-concealment and *dasein*, there-being. The Heideggerian perception on the way humans, by an engagement in the world, can come closer to truth shall form the basis for our understanding on how satire can, as Hazlitt puts it, be a fair test of what is truth according to common sense. When we understand, in the spirit of Arendt, common sense as the opposite of turning away from the world, an engagement in the world, which Heidegger sees as the discovering procedure necessary for unfolding truth, invites a reflection on whether satire as a ridicule of political matters of general interests can foster such an engagement in society, letting us return from the twisted reality.

We thus see that satire can function as a corrective for society when it moves too far away from the lived life and becomes veiled and twisted. Following the argument above, namely that whatever we find funny have something to do with what we find true - or untrue, for that matter, then it must also be the case that one can, by examining what we find true - of whom we laugh and why also can say something about the present *zeitgeist* of the public. Hence, the study of political satire is also, to some extent, a study of the public sphere. The public sphere's great response to DKR's process of illuminating Rasmus Paludan through a critical interview, and challenging Morten Østergaard's intentions, showed a potential demand and interest towards critically examining public figures' relationship to truth. Arguably, the extensive growth and even more precise the most popular episodes from the universe of DKR, is a way to highlight hidden demands within the public sphere, as the interest and support towards these ideas and structures, highlights something that is missing in the public sphere, or something that creates discontent.

The satirist is a critic and a way of testing propositions and truth through ridicule and cynicism in the public sphere. However, as we argued earlier, the satirist relates his critique to common sense, and use it as a foundation for his praxis, and his critical position is established through already existing truths in the public sphere. The satirist

hence is connected to an anchor, which is the common sense in society, and to some degree cannot leave that position and become Socrates and establishing a new truth, which is a limitation of being bound by common sense. It refers to a world we share, a sense of reality and a togetherness, but not the act of creating new propositions and integrating them into the common.

The preliminary, pre-reflective understanding of common sense is the indispensable and non-substitutable source of true, reflective understanding. Yet preliminary understanding also includes prejudices and traditional mores. Arendt is well aware of the danger the latter implies. For example, she points to the tendency of common sense to turn a blind eye to new, unexpected, and unprecedented events by reducing them to what is already familiar. (Borren, 2013, p241)

As mentioned earlier, DKR has been criticized for being too rough (Azroni, 2019) and too powerful (Larsen, June 20, 2019; for a more academic analysis, see Andersen et. al., 2018) The defense against this accusation, which has been presented by both Jørgen Ramсков, managing director of Radio24syv, Mads Brügger and Mikael Bertelsen, program directors of Radio24syv, have been that DKR is a satirical program, and hence should not be judged as if they were proper news coverage, i.e. that the show is not to be taken seriously. This insistence on not being taken seriously from what might be called the satirical position is both what permits satire but also its limitation. As an institution, satire is not subject to either press ethics nor traditional media law, and thus, de jure, is permitted to move beyond the traditional news media. However, in claiming this position of institutionally being perceived as satire, DKR also becomes subject to the boundaries of this position de facto. The satire examined in this thesis can pose critique, point towards societal norms, attitudes, propositions and events, and with cheeky ridicule show that this or that does not correspond to common sense. It cannot, however, serve as an alternative to whatever it criticises and hence is limited to resistance, instead of progress, because it can not - or will not, due to its insistence on not being taken seriously, teach by example. Because satire is correlated to common sense, is an extension of the common, and hence the critique cannot go beyond the common sense of the public sphere. Whenever satire breaks with common sense, it

loses its critical position and will, as have been the case with DKR, be deemed inappropriate. The satire of DKR is limited to adhering to common sense, and have difficulties in transgressing it. This point can be further underlined by once again perceiving Hannah Arendt's preconditions for philosophical truths to become manifest as truth. For Arendt, it is quintessential that whomever state this or that philosophical truth 'teach by example', that is, that one live the truth he advocates. Then - and only then - can a truth, which as in the example of Socrates did not initially, and when it was merely verbal, ignite any change of the common sense of antique society, become manifest in the public sphere. A similar point can be made by comparing the leading figure of DKR, Kirsten Birgit, to Sloterdijk's interpretation of Diogenes. Kirsten Birgit is a fictional character, embodied by but not equivalent to comedian Frederik Cilius. In that sense, Kirsten Birgit is a mask which Frederik Cilius put on, but the mask does not correspond to Frederik Cilius himself, nor is it an accumulation of the team behind DKR, who have frequently stated that they do not agree with everything the character states, which again underline the insistence on not being taken seriously. Diogenes has a different position than Kirsten Birgit, as he is Diogenes and wears no mask. He used the kynical expression, the same tools that the satirist use, but he does not claim the satirist position, i.e. Diogenes does not speak as the satirist Diogenes, but as Diogenes himself. This distinction between Diogenes and Kirsten Birgit becomes vital in discussing their ability to manifest speculative statements and philosophical truths as true in the public sphere, since Kirsten Birgit can not embody her critique and teach by example, where Diogenes' "decision to live in harmony with the doctrines he preached (Shea, 2010 p 150") was what gave him the true kynical bite.

The critique of DKR, which proclaim that they are a powerful autonomous institution, can be discussed, in according to this thesis, as misplaced, because DKR only can function as an extension of the common. They do not create new propositions, ideas, truths, but voice a real critique amongst the public sphere, which is why they are successful, as the critique resonance amongst the audience. Hence, they should not be seen as the creators of change, but rather as a symptom of the public sphere. Arguably, the ruthless programs nature can be used to understand the desire of the public sphere, a desire for a ruthless critique against actions that go against common sense and the lived life in the public sphere.

Hence DKR can be understood as an institutionalized critical voice in the public sphere, which helps maintain the truths found in the lived life through common sense. Institutionalized in a sense that they are supported through public service, and hence through the demand that Radio24syv are by law demanded to incorporate satire in their airtime. We argue that it helps the public in the notion of choosing and judging statements and opinions in the public sphere, and hence is constructive for the communication in the public sphere, as they are critical towards deviance from common sense, and help reveal twisted reality, political spin, bullshit etc. The satirical praxis, in the case of DKR, can possess the position of truth-teller and point towards people deviating from common sense, but they cannot be a leading figure. Their praxis points towards what people should not do, as in do not abandon the lived life and twist reality, and they are therefore a mainly critical institution, that inflicts behaviour by pointing towards what's wrong. They do not act as an inspirational institution, which points towards how to live life, and by example, show the way for others. Hence, their function is cleaning the public sphere. They do not and cannot, in their satirical form, guide or tell people how to live their life, and what truths are essential and what is not, they rely on the common sense of the public, they do not change it.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to investigate which function political satire plays in the current, Danish public sphere. Political satire has grown in impact in the previous years, and by forcing statements and propositions broadcasted in the public sphere by politicians and opinion entrepreneurs to relate themselves to common sense, political satire can show how said propositions are from common sense. Dragging political actions into the realm of common sense shows the incongruity between the two, thus underlying two different senses of the world. It is discussed through Heidegger how satire can reveal a truth, in the open region, as the audience can experience the truth in the moment, and force them to rethink set structures in society. Political satire can be understood through Diogenes the kynic as the critique of both has a similar form an expression. The suspicion of those in power that characterise Political satire is parallel to Diogenes' suspicion towards high and grand theory, and this suspiciousness inhabited by both makes them mentally alert

regarding skin, swindle and everything that all in all seem to well thought out to be true, too detached from the lived life. The thesis has attempted to shed light on the condition of the public sphere today, where propositions and opinions seem to be increasingly grounded on, amongst other, political correctness instead of private reflection, which is not beneficial for the public discussion as it becomes less potent. For the public discussion to get closer to the more optimal conditions that Habermas finds in the salons of the 17th and 18th century, the current public sphere seem to require a vigilant institution that see to hold statements, propositions and actions accountable to the lived life, making everything that does not seem to be grounded on private reflection subject for cheeky critique. It has been argued that the satirical praxis can with its cheeky nature let its audience see the familiar defamiliarized, providing a space between truth and untruth where its audience relates to what is already know anew, thus fostering a more active engagement. Because of this, we have argued that satire, as a critical institution, has a positive effect on the current public sphere.

The thesis has used to empirical cases, "Den Korte Radioavis " and "Tæt på Sandheden", as the foundation of our analysis, where the former has played the most significant role. Because DKR seems to have the biggest impact on the public debate, is more ruthless and critical, the thesis has included a reflection of the limitation of DKR. By comparing the Kirsten Birgit character to Diogenes and Socrates, it became apparent Kirsten Birgit is limited. Through Arendt's understanding of the impotence of philosophical truth in the public sphere, the thesis has argued that DKR is not able to create new, philosophical truths. Because the fictional Character of Kirsten Birgit can not teach by example, she can not manifest speculative, philosophical truths as true in the public sphere. Furthermore, because satire relates itself to common sense, it will more often than not refer to something that, though it might be forgotten, has already been realized. Therefore, satire will have a tendency to lean more towards the reactionary than the progressive.

Perspectivation

In this thesis, it has been attempted to investigate satire through its role and function in the public sphere, as well as the other way around, to investigate the public sphere

through the satirical critique. By bringing the audience closer to common sense, it is argued how political satire can help redefine a political narrative and give the audience an experience of rediscovery because the satirical form is different from classical critique, its cheeky rhetoric perform compelling critique against hypocrisy and can help rediscover moral reflection.

In this section, however, we wish to shift the perspective a bit and try to elaborate on how the investigation at hand is also of interest to organisations and corporations. In the recent years, terms such as corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility and triple bottom line have been a prevalent part of management studies, and common to all is, that they seek to identify or encapsulates how corporations as such are or should be responsible towards public society. Some have argued that *“giving back to the community”* is *“Good business* (Seehan, 2013; Kaler, 2000: 161)”, and the fact that *“Fortune 500 companies currently [2014] collectively spend upwards of \$15 billion a year on CSR* (Ong et al. 2018)” might support such a claim. Furthermore, looked from the other side of the desk, the 19 to 39 year old Danish citizens find that corporations have a larger responsibility than the politicians when it comes to climate changes, and 84.9 pct. of the asked population felt that corporations had a responsibility to contribute to the sustainable development (Advice, 2019). With all this in mind, it does not seem to posit an issue to claim, that corporations both as a result of their own incentive and due to increasingly popular demand becomes more involved in the public sphere, as their responsibility exceed that of the shareholders. As corporations seemingly increasingly involve themselves in issues of public relevance and matters of general interest, understand the new playing field, i.e. the public sphere, and the rules that guide it, i.e. common sense, becomes of vital importance.

In the case of Amnesty International, it was discussed how being in disharmony with common sense when speaking in the public sphere, can have negative consequences for an organization's brand value. Trends and political convictions in the public sphere do not necessarily apply to common sense and a movement towards the lived life, and when organisations and corporations act upon, for example, political correctness, they sometimes loosen their feeling for common sense. Hence we argue that it might be beneficial for organisations and corporations, when they involve in

matters of public interest, to attempt to make judgement calls based on the lived life, instead of this or that exterior public discourse.

Though satire has been the entry point in examining the discrepancy between what we have described as common sense, and what might be called the political class, i.e. politicians, public office holders, political commentators and opinion entrepreneurs, we do not hold the conviction that satire is the *only* way of discovering this discrepancy. A number of practices can provide such an unfolding, and beside the more classical examples, literature, music, movies and theatre, we would also like to highlight partaking in the smaller assemblies in the local community, be that sports clubs or the likes, or simply engage in conversations with others in café and pubs. Though being a varied mix, all the listed have in common, that they bring private people together as a plural public a hence allowing for the possibility of reflections with an offset in the lived life.

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