


Facebook and Democracy

What are the effects on democracy in using Facebook as a
Public Sphere of debate?



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0. Abstract

The already-contested Habermasian ideal of 'public sphere' loses its value more and more in the face of social web platforms. Facebook allows for political, social and commercial content, turning the online space into a public sphere of deliberation within a social and advertising context. Jurgen Habermas did not consider social power as a potential negative influence in the conducting of an ideal public sphere of democratic debate. Rendered by many as liberating sphere for democracy. (Street, 2001; Curran, 2000; Keane, 2000), online platforms are also seen as dangerous for democracy due to the rise of e-commerce (Curran, 2000) and identity privacy issues (Sheedy, 2011). Considering Facebook an ideal space for deliberation has multivalent and complex effects on democracy that require further research.

In order to investigate these effects, this paper developed an extended and mediated normative ideal of democratic agency in the public sphere. The basis of this ideal is a critical perspective of communicative power laid down by two different authors: Jeffrey Flynn(2004) with his wide reading of the concept as opposed to Jurgen Habermas' s narrow one and Amy Allen(2002) with her proposal to render Hannah Arendt's communicative power as complementary to Michel Foucault's strategic one. Within the developed ideal, communicative power would not only be a tool of law legitimation (Habermas, 1984), but also a weapon against social power (Flynn, 2004). As a prerequisite, a genealogical analysis of strategic power relations is needed. (Allen, 2002) The case of Facebook is carried against the criteria imposed by this ideal.

The paper first looked at the strategic exercise of power relations that enabled the use of Facebook as a public sphere. The inquiry focused around whether consent was given before entering a power relation and whether such relations had a positive or negative affect on the users' identity making. The paper argues that way strategic uses of power happened in the past also influences the nature of existing power relations, therefore the first question's answer helps in elucidating the second question too. Within the second new pseudo - public sphere was characterised in regards to rationality, neutrality, pluralism and consensus. Once the findings of the two research questions were summed up, the resulting debate was looked at. Based on theoretical grounds, the thesis found that Facebook introduced itself as a pseudo public sphere by disregarding users' consent to enter social power relation. Caging their identity-formation process enabled performative identities in online and offline settings alike. In present, consent is

acknowledged, but avoided with perfected techniques. Performative identities have led to the rise of clicktivism(White, 2010). Second question showed the new public sphere as characterized by orchestrated consensus, avoidance of criticism, virality as the quality criteria encouraged and pluralism as a resource for the reorganization of users into new audiences. Deliberative democracy based on the premises of the two research questions becomes an opportunity for those who pay with their money or identity. In return, they learn how to gain and exercise social power in their own interest. Debate either works as a tranquilizer for democratic action, either as an enabler for irrational extremist one.

The thesis further took a normative stance and used the developed ideal of democratic agency to suggest an alternative. Due to the use of communicative power as a weapon against social power, the platform suggested would have to be at the opposite end of Facebook's business model. In this respect, the separation of political, social and economical contexts is the primary condition for the development of an online space that could live up to the extended and moderated normative ideal of a public sphere of democratic debate. Moreover, other highlights of the proposed model include the elimination of aggregating algorithms based on past interaction, a privacy - by - design approach to data and procedural/normative transparency.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

The Westphalian world order characterised by sovereignty of the states and the right to political self-determination has been traditionally seen as the governance model of the last 3 centuries.(Derek, 1999). The post Westphalian context is the outcome of globalization and capitalism, blurring the separation between state and the rest of the non-governmental actors. The exercise of power in the global governance model involves, on top of governmental relation, ““*non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market*”. (Sarkar, 2015)”. Business aimed at global growth are of particular importance as they seek to impose their systems of rule throughout local markets penetration to succeed. Such businesses are more than just object of the law, as the old theory around Westphalian nation states would argue, but the law is also the object of private authority (Cutler, 2011:137)

Globalization and global capitalism in particular allowed for the creation of connections unlimited by nation borders or cultural frameworks. Networks, according to Castells, constitute the *new social morphology of our societies*. (2000:489) The meaning Castells gives to network society in an interview with Harry Kreisler¹ is that of a ‘*society where the key social structures and activities are organized around electronically processed information networks*.” In conjunction with global capitalism, the network society also includes the network economy. On top of facilitating different operations for companies(Schwartz, 1999), the digital spaces gave birth to the information economy, or more specific - knowledge economy. This knowledge economy transfers human knowledge to machines in order to generate economic value. (Drucker, 1969) Therefore, the digital sphere became a space that facilitates global business operations and helps capitalize on automated human knowledge.

But the network society did not stop at giving businesses only the chance to benefit from the internet age. Yochai Benkler points in “The Wealth of Networks” (2006) at the decentralization of media access and the emergence of non - proprietary information production forms², emphasizing the potential of peer-production. Examples like Debian³ can only confirm the authors’ claim. Such peer-sourced information soon turned towards the political sphere.

¹ Interview with Harry Kreisler available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GBB7U5mv0w>

² Such as FLOSS - Free/Libre/Open/Source/Software

³ A free operating system run by over 10.000 volunteers <https://www.debian.org/>

Supporters of the internet as a liberating sphere for democracy noted it being a solution to problems that in past obstructed political participation such as “time, size, knowledge and access” (Street, 2001:217 in Grbesa, 2003:118). Curran(2000 in Grbesa, 2003) notes the web’s as a popular empowerment tool and Keane (2000 in Grbesa, 2003) argues it supports the increase of macro public spheres. In other words, “*websites provide infrastructure for deliberation which may eventually lead to real actions*” (Grbesa, 2003 : 118) For example, the Danish national broadcasting channel DR uses Facebook as a platform for debate. At the starting of the program named ‘Debatten’⁴⁵, the host invites spectators to join the debate on Facebook where respected analysts are also debating. Habermas (1989) considered that the rise of media turned its audience into a culture consumption one due to one way communication channels and hence destroying the ability to critically deliberate. But, is it enough for the media to provide its audience to channels of deliberation? Critics have argued that not everyone has access to the Internet in order to take a stance in deliberation and democracy is shaped by individual preferences rather than collective goals. Another issue is e-commerce as an indicator of power relations shaping technologies and not the other way around (Curran, 2000 in Grbesa, 2003)

The internet as a public sphere becomes a blurry idea due to its complexity, repressive and in the same time productive character. Social network sites (SNS) such as Facebook serve as the best example. They incorporate both social, political and commercial purposes, involving a vast diversity of actors in the users’ spectrum. While ‘Debatten’ is encouraging the use of Facebook as a public sphere of deliberation, two thirds of Danish local politicians active on the platform refuse to engage in political debate due to the arguments’ tone. ⁶

While Jurgen Habermas (1989) noted the conflict arising between economic and law order, he failed to acknowledge that the public sphere might also be situated in a highly social context. Hence, social power has an influence into how the debate is carried forward. In a post-westphalian context, Facebook is used to deliberate politics is the space for businesses to advertise their products, for the entertainment industry and for users to socialise with each other. The fact that a profit - driven corporation enables its users to socialize and use the same place as a public sphere of debate raises questions on the quality of democratic debate it allows for. Is it really a public sphere of deliberation? Was not the concept itself already blurry enough and unadapted to the social and economic contexts? Can one still talk about rational,

⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/Debatten/>

⁵ <https://www.dr.dk/tv/se/debatten>

⁶ <http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/regionale/oestjylland/haard-tone-paa-facebook-faar-politikere-til-opgive-debatten>

homogeneous, neutral and consensus driven debate, as the ideal public sphere coined by Jurgen Habermas looked like? And, most importantly, how does such a public sphere placed within a social media platform like Facebook affects the state of democracy?

Chapter 2 - Method and Methodology

In this chapter I will explain two main points, the method and the methodology of this thesis. The 'Method' section will present the road from setting the problem formulation and research questions to the conclusions of this inquiry. Firstly, this section will start by elucidating the problem formulation and proposed research questions. A description of the chapters and the connections between them will be made. The analytical approach engaged in this paper will be then presented. Lastly, the thesis' purpose will be discussed by pointing at why is the topic relevant, for who and how exactly does it help the field. The second section of this chapter, 'Methodology', will discuss concepts of epistemology and criteria of quality, objectivity and the relationship between empirics and theory.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Research Questions and Problem Formulation

The fact that Facebook can be used both as a tool for deliberation but also as a repressive tool towards the public sphere is the starting point of the paper. Why would some politicians accept DR's proposal and some would comment on Facebook's pitfalls for deliberation? It would seem that its political dimension is a double edged knife, nevertheless it has great impact on the state of current democratic regimes. The political identity of individuals is shaped by their social interaction. (Hendricks and Hanse, 2015) What happens when this interaction takes place on a platform incorporating social, commercial and political content alike? Moreover, virality as the underlying weapon in a market of attention makes it difficult for the individual to select what his limited attention should be pointed to when facing an unlimited information flow. In order to understand the type of political deliberation pursued on Facebook, the paper will look at users' opinion formation and the nature of the public sphere Facebook represents. Both points of inquiry are dependent on the type of power exercised on the platform.

The question arises in respect to the valence of power relations exercised on the platform when being used a public sphere of deliberation. Is it a cage or a liberating tool for the construction of a sound democratic platform for political debate? In the light of the above, the problem is formulated as follows:

What are the effects of using social media platform Facebook as public sphere for deliberation on deliberative democracy?

Two research questions will help in constructing the conclusion:

- 1) What type of power relations enabled the use of Facebook as a public sphere?
- 2) What are the characteristics of the new type of public sphere?

2.1.2. The Chapters

Chapter 3 will review existing literature. Given the critical accounts brought against Jurgen Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere and the rise of complexity in social media usage, this paper finds the classical theory around deliberative democracy outdated. In order for the research questions to be answered, a normative and moderated ideal of agency in the public sphere will be first developed as a skeleton of reference. Firstly, general criticism regarding the characteristics of the habermasian public sphere are presented. Second, the emphasis is put on communicative theory and Jeffrey Flynn's (2004) reading, a wider one, is given as a better alternative. If developing the ideal at this point, the paper would only be based on Flynn's (2004) critical account of communicative power. He does not offer enough recommendations on what the outcome of this application should be or what conditions are necessary for its success. Hence, communicative power is looked at from Hannah Arendt's perspective, more exactly Arendt's critics. Amy Allen's (2002) dialogue between Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt is offered as a solution. Allen(2002) argues that in order to find out how to exercise communicative power on a public sphere correctly, one must not disregard the strategic nature of power. Hence, she suggests that before applying Arendt's communicative view of power, an inquiry into how strategic power relations rendered a public sphere possible should be made, using the foucauldian genealogical method. Therefore, this paper's ideal has as a prerequisite this genealogical analysis of strategic power relations. This prerequisite offers a better understanding on how Arendt's communicative power should be applied, which

together with Flynn(2004) wide reading, will help in developing the final normative and moderated ideal of agency in the public sphere.

In Chapter 4, Facebook will be presented in respect to its most important features, categorized as connectivity and connectedness features. (van Dijck, 2013). Furthermore, data collection is looked at in regards to the type of collected data and the purpose of collection, this section also including a description of Facebook's business model. The section regarding data privacy includes a discussion about the default privacy settings, facial recognition and consent regarding user activity tracking. Further, the connection between algorithms and emotions is made and Facebook's use of these two concepts is described. The way Facebook is being used by governmental bodies is also presented in section 5 of this chapter. The last part involves a study by Hendricks and Hansen (2015) discussing the lemming effect, the framing of information and the polarization of debates.

Chapter 5 starts with the first research question aimed at the genealogical inquiry into what enabled Facebook to be used as a public sphere. In order to enable this conversation, strategic power exercise on Facebook will be looked at genealogically regarding the valence of power relations for identity creation and the degree of consent given when entering the power relation. The second research question will look at the characteristics of the new public sphere enabled by such strategic power relations in terms of rationality, neutrality, plurality and consensus-drive. Using the findings of the two questions, the resulting debate will be described regarding its scope and participant's identity. This chapter will end with a summing up of the findings and the connection between the two and the limitations of the analysis.

Chapter 6 provides a discussion based on the findings of this paper and introduces a proposed model for an online platform that could live up to the normative and moderated ideal of democratic agency. As mentioned earlier, the way this idea will be applied is by using the findings of the research questions, along with using communicative power as a tool for law legitimation and for counteracting strategic action. Recommendations for further research will be presented at the end of this chapter.

The paper will conclude with Chapter 7 that will sum up the findings of this thesis.

2.1.3. Analytical Approach

The way the argument will unfold will be in a deductive-iterative line of reasoning. Therefore, Chapter 3 represents the formation of a theoretical normative and moderated ideal for democratic agency in the public sphere. The case of Facebook is applied on its main hypothesis, that the platform can be used as a public sphere of deliberation. During this analysis, the theory has gone through several sessions of reiteration. The two research questions test whether the hypothesis is confirmed or not and suggestions are made by applying the ideal on a theoretical model of online public sphere.

2.1.4. Relevance of Research

The importance of developing such an inquiry is multi folded. Firstly, right wing political parties are rising in the European continent (Dahlgren, 2016). Populist discourses have existed in a long time, but it is important to also look at the dynamics of opinions formation on Facebook and understand whether the platform's inscribed technological features are related to such phenomena of polarized debates. Sociologists and political analysts alike could use the findings of this paper to develop suggestions for social media platforms like Facebook that would counteract the development of political extremism.

Secondly, the use of big data by businesses has been widely criticized for shady consent policies and surveillance accusations. As a result, EU has reformed its 1995 Data Protection Act with the General Data Protection Regulation released in April 2015. This proves that the issue of digital privacy is an acknowledged one by regulatory bodies, on top of concerned citizens and NGOs. Businesses have until April 2017 to comply with the new set of regulations. Therefore, understanding the importance of user autonomy that is also discussed in this paper is relevant for businesses that want to adopt a privacy-by-default design. Thirdly, but not last, this paper makes a good read for the concerned citizen that has the intention to use Facebook as deliberation tool. Awareness should be raised about the underlying principles that keep these platforms alive in the first place and whether such principles are conflicting the democratic goal.

Thirdly, it is hoped that the normative part of this paper can help the readers develop alternative online spaces of discussion that would not make the same mistakes as those identified by this paper's analysis. Social entrepreneurs or NGOs can find this read useful if they are concerned at all with providing society with an online place of democratic deliberation.

2.2. Methodology

2.2.1. Critical theory as triple hermeneutics

While single hermeneutics involve research on individuals' interpretation of themselves, double hermeneutics involve the interpretation of interpretative individuals. (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009) On the other hand, a triple hermeneutics framework involves a "*critical interpretation of unconscious processes, ideologies, power relations, and other expressions of dominance that entail the privileging of certain interests over others, within the forms of understanding which appear to be spontaneous generated.*" (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009 : 176)

This paper is an inquiry into the power relations present on Facebook when the online platform is used as a sphere of deliberation. The scope is therefore aimed at understanding and interpreting the unconscious effects on individuals and the debate they enable. While the transforming concept norm of 'sharing' has a positive discourse surrounding it, this paper seeks for a deeper understanding of what the pattern of sharing translates into, both for the public sphere and democracy at large. It therefore draws attention to the political dimension of this phenomena, questioning the value of using the platform in deliberation for the quality of democracy. The interests of the corporation are constantly addressed when interpreting the effects of the platform's use for political deliberation purposes. Therefore, this study tries to understand this process outside common patterns of understanding social media 'sharing' and instead looks at political implication. The triple hermeneutical nature situates this analysis in a critical theory framework.

2.2.2. Epistemology and Criteria of Quality

In terms of epistemology, knowledge produced by this paper is controlled by subjective values of the author's judgements. This paper's intention is to overcome false consciousness by transforming it into an enlightened one. But 'false' and 'enlightened' are subjective terms, and work as mediators between life and the knowledge produced by its interpretation. The interpretations laid on the effects of Facebook in political identity, public sphere and democracy are held against a suggested normative and moderated ideal of democratic agency. The fact that this ideal was constructed within this thesis carries subjectivity to the frame of reference the analysis is enabled.

The quality of this paper is connected to the improvement it can bring to existing interpretations of Facebook's relationship to democracy. As mentioned in last part of the conclusion, understanding what is the power that, strategically used, erodes the state of democracy is the first step in changing the situation. Moreover, understanding how this power functions and what are its effects adds up to the theorization and implementation of alternatives. But this suggestion is a fallibilistic one, as it is recognized that the assumed objective reality has a momentary character. Hence, the introduction of new EU regulation around data protection laws is just one of the many factors that can change the validity of the findings. Epistemological fallibilism recognizes that my generated knowledge is valid in the present time frame and might be subject to changes in the future. In other words, it refers to *"the degree to which our interpretations, valuations, our practices, and traditions are temporally indexed"* (Kompridis, 2006:81)

2.2.3. Objectivity - Situated knowledge

As already mentioned, the knowledge produced by this paper is controlled by subjective values of the author's judgements. This paper's interpretation will produce a 'situated knowledge' that should be taken as one of many possible, and not under the assumption that it is the only knowledge that can be produced around the subject of enquiry. Donna Haraway makes a great explanation of this paper's relation to produced theory: *"I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims"* (Haraway, 1991:195)

Regarding the ideological and theoretical background of this paper's author, each influence can be compared with the roots of a tree. In this way, the tree itself will be the generated theory the paper comes up with, but as a result of the combination of interests existing prior to my research. To exemplify, the investigation of social media as a democratic public space and the desire to develop alternative to the existent models is rooted in the author's past involvement with ASOSIO.⁷ The prior knowledge gathered during a bachelor in Business Management with a strong emphasis on sociology theory and the master combining philosophical theory with the field of business also shaped the critical perspective on the general state of capitalism and ideals of business models. These factors influence the choice of study object, the

⁷ Copenhagen - based startup aiming to construct a community - focused platform based on user autonomy

perspective on the issue, the conclusions, suggestions for alternatives and further research.

2.2.4. The Empirical

From the 'Method' section it is clear that this thesis does not rely on a solid empirical basis in the classical sense. There is no physical data collection such as survey results or interview transcripts. Still, this paper has an object for the theory to test in the case of Facebook. The collection of data involved therefore collection of publicly available information such as public statements of Mark Zuckerberg or other head figures of the platform and content from the company's own website. Such information presented in Chapter 4 can be considered primary data, while further studies presented in the same chapter, secondary data. Such studies include the use of emotions on Facebook (Berger and Milkman, 2011) and the study of individual behaviour online (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015⁸) This paper is therefore a mostly theoretical one in that it presents publicly available information studies around the subject, with a strong emphasis in the development of a normative and moderated ideal of democratic agency in the public sphere. The development of this ideal involved a strong focus on communicative power. The concept was looked at through the lenses of Jurgen Habermas, its critics with an emphasis on Jeffrey Flynn, Hannah Arendt, from which the concept initially emerged from, and Amy Allen(2002) who offered an alternative to Arendt's critics.

In what regards the relationship between theory and empirics, worth mentioning is the time frame in which publicly available information was gathered. Being a Facebook user for 5 years, the thesis author has come in contact with several pieces of information regarding the platform's collection and use of data throughout this 5 years period. The lenses this information was looked at with differed according to the different stages the author went through. From merely a user in the beginning, to the business management student, to a sociological view and finally a philosophical one. This involuntary unconscious analysis of data publicly available influenced the generation of the theory and the way analysis was carried. If the author would have been completely estranged from the Facebook environment, perhaps the normative and moderated ideal of deliberative agency in the public sphere would have touched on different aspects of the deliberative democracy. Facebook's analysis would have also differed and so would have the suggestion of the ideal's application. Therefore, the exposure to news around

⁸ Pre printed edition

Facebook in the light of academic articles in business, sociology and philosophy influenced the generation of this thesis' theory.

Chapter 3 - Towards an ideal

The purpose of this theoretical chapter is, as mention in the 'Method' section, to develop an extended and enriched account of the democratic ideal of deliberation that could serve as model for online public spheres. Firstly, I will start by emphasizing the existing literature around public sphere as theorized by Jurgen Habermas. In order to assess the new post-Westphalian digital environment and the public sphere it enables, it is important to understand the classical public sphere theory first. Secondly, the shift will go towards his critics the main point will be around communicative power as a tool for law legitimization. Jeffrey Flynn (2004) is the critic this paper focuses most on. Criticizing Habermas' reading as a narrow faulty one, he suggests a wider reading of communicative power. His suggestion does mention social power as a enemy communicative power should fight against. Still, his account is insufficient and needs further directions. For this reason, communicative power will also be looked at from Hannah Arendt's view. The third part will look at a dialogue between Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt to prove that their views of power as a cage, respectively liberating tool, are in fact complementary, not opposed. (Allen, 2002) Arendt's claim that power is always communicative will be balanced by an acceptance of strategic power relations involved in genealogy. Hence, In order to develop a sound democratic normative ideal of agency in the public sphere, a genealogical inquiry into strategic use of power relations will be a prerequisite. (ibid.) On top of this condition, the ideal will be empowered by Flynn's aforementioned critique.

3.1. The Habermasian Public sphere

In his 1962 book, "Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft" ("The structural transformation of the public sphere") Jurgen Habermas investigated the changes in the relationship between bourgeoisie, the press, the state and civil society from the 17th until the 20th century. Analysing the 17th century British family, he notes that the appearance of the salon enabled the individual to differentiate between family (intimate sphere) and 'society friends'(private sphere). The privatization of life brought about the choice between taking the role of 'homme' or the one of 'bourgeoisie'. a new way of

relating to oneself that enabled critical rationality. From salons towards the press, critical rationality was embraced by wider publics with the emergence of the letter and diary. In the political realm, the ambivalence of the public sphere emphasized the political intent of the critical-rational public. The same person was *bourgeois* and *homme*. This brought into question whether the public sphere facilitated private individuals to communicate through critical debate about their subjectivity (associated with humanity) or whether it allowed owners of commodities to have a rational-critical debate on the regulation of their private sphere. (Habermas, 1989). Comparing the dynamics of the economic and political law system, Habermas notes that “*The laws of the market, of course, prevailed because they were intrinsic; this was precisely why classical economics endowed them with the appearance of an ordre naturel. The laws of the state, in contrast, needed to be explicitly enacted.*” (Habermas, 1989:80)

The death of the bourgeois public sphere is associated with the mutual infiltration of public and the private spheres. On both levels, political and economic, the concentration of capital and state interventionism were interconnected and provoked the blurred lines between the two spheres. As the utopian liberal market failed to function on a power neutral basis, state interventionism developed in order to regulate economic exchange relationships. (Habermas, 1989) Power imbalances started to concretize in the market, with a particular group seeing political means as a method in reaching their economical goals. (ibid.) Concentration of capital and state interventionism are explained as preserving this economic system that otherwise would have crashed under its own weight. The realm that resulted was therefore caused by the ‘publification’ of private law going hand in hand with the “privatization” of public law and its nature was neither public, nor private.

Investigating the political and economic purpose of the new framework that replaced the bourgeoisie public sphere, Habermas shifts his attention towards the media, in particular mass media. He discusses the move from a culture debating to a culture consuming public. The bourgeois ideal type assumed that out of the audience-oriented subjectivity’s well-founded interior domain a public sphere would evolve in the world of letters. Today instead of this, the author argues, the latter has turned into a conduit for “*social forces channeled into the conjugal family’s inner space by way of a public sphere that the mass media have transmogrified into a sphere of culture consumption.*” (Habermas, 1989:162)

Compared to the individual that reads something in the privacy of his/her home and then shares opinions in the public, now the culture-consuming individual has its first contact with information in public already. Therefore, the move from private to public is not longer required, the social setting existing without having it to be constructed through debate. Further

commentary is rendered useless as engagement in the debate drops considerably. The new media's channels of information enable one-way communication only. Television, radio, cinema do not offer the possibility of debate, constructing an audience that digest second-hand thoughts rather than constructing their own. (Habermas, 1989). Newspapers no longer present unbiased dialogues for the sake of rational reason, according to the German author, changing the nature and purpose of the debate: *"Discussion, now a 'business', becomes formalized; the presentation of positions and counter-positions is bound to certain prearranged rules of the game; consensus about the subject matter is made largely superfluous by that concerning form. What can be posed as a problem is defined as a question of etiquette; conflicts, once fought out in public polemics, are demoted to the level of personal incompatibilities. Critical debate arranged in this manner certainly fulfills important social-psychological functions, especially that of a tranquilizing substitute for action;"* (Habermas, 1989: 164) Moreover, new types of criteria to curate content are adopted and 'yellow journalism' appeared in the American press became popular on the European continent by the end of 19th century. Habermas describes the phenomena as being *"ready-made convenience, patterned and predigested. Editorial opinions recede behind information from press agencies and reports from correspondents; critical debate disappears behind the veil of internal decisions concerning the selection and presentation of the material. In addition, the share of political or politically relevant news changes, Public affairs, social problems, economic matters, education and health [...] are not only pushed into the background by 'immediate reward news' (comics, corruption, accidents, disasters, sports, recreation, social events and human interest) but as the characteristic label indicated, are also read less and more rarely"* (Habermas, 1989: 169-170) This audience of entertainment *"with relatively little education"* (Habermas, 1989:165) changed the nature of the literary public sphere too, turning it into a field of easily accessible text. The common reader of mass media is not the semi-illiterate, nor the old high class society member, but those "groups whose status was still in need of cultural legitimation" (Habermas 1989: 174) The author therefore talks about a public that is driven in its consumption of culture by gaining legitimization of their pursued status. The mass media becomes a tool of identity creation.

To sum, this section presented Habermas' historical account of the life and death of bourgeoisie public sphere. A new type of subjectivity and critical rationality developed in the family realm of 17th century British salons. The letter and diary were the basis through which newspapers appeared. The public sphere soon lost its power neutral basis through the publication of private life and the privatization of public realms. The new type of hybrid sphere

enabled the appearance of mass media which turned the culture debating public into a culture consumption one by means of one way communication channels. Engagement in the debates dropped, entertainment substituted political action and mass-media became a tool of identity creation. In order to understand the tool Habermas proposes to legitimize laws within the public sphere, the next section will present the authors' theorization of communicative action and communicative power.

3.2. Communicative power and communicative action

Habermas' definition of rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in "*how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge*" (Habermas, 1984) His communicative action theory is therefore perceived as performative, situating language as a central concept in coordinating action. This form of coordination is aimed at reaching understanding and when understanding is reached, the speaker and listener engage in communicative action.

Making the distinction between communicative action and strategic action, the author points at their different goal and *modus operandi*. Within strategic action, the purpose of the individuals engaged is not mutual understanding, but achieving personal goals brought in conversation. One actor would appeal to the other's fears and motivations in order to change a behaviour towards individual goals. On the other hand, communicative action seeks, according to Habermas (1998), to coordinate the actions and pursuit of personal goals based on a mutual understanding of the value of the goals. Whereas strategic action succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the actors freely agree that their goal (or goals) is reasonable, that it deserves cooperation.

Habermas argues that an act of speech is successful when it receives affirmative position, without the actor having to argument for its claims. The 'lifeworld' comprises of beliefs and meanings that are always already in play, hence, they do not have to be argued for. Otherwise, the speech turns into discourse, meaning claims have to be tested for validity. Claims are checked for validity using the three criteria: truth, sincerity and rightness. A discourse that reaches mutual understanding by meeting all these criteria is called 'strong communicative action' (Habermas, 1998). On the other hand, he points out at instances of weak communicative action that have certain validity criteria replaced by nonlinguistic media such as money and power. While power and money can be relieving for missing validity criteria, they can also impede the undistorted reproduction of the lifeworld. Modernization can therefore become pathological through the colonization of the lifeworld by money and power (universities driven by

market strategies) or through its juridification, with law penetrating more and more of the lifeworld (citizens becoming bureaucracies' clients.)

Habermas sees the law in the end as part of the solution rather than the problem. The model of democracy developed by Habermas involves a procedural use of reason: *"Practical reason no longer resides... in the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding"* (Habermas, 1996: 266-7 in Flynn, 2004:437) The ideal of democracy is therefore pursued by ensuring that legal norms are valid when, on the one hand, *"taking into consideration strategically asserted particular interests in a manner compatible with the common good"* (Habermas, 1996: 283 in Flynn, 2004:437) and on the other hand by taking into account the bringing of *"universalistic principles of justice into the horizon of a specific form of life imbued with particular value constellation"* (ibid.) He argues that an ideal of democratic institutions would allow citizens to deliberate the laws and author them, therefore stopping law to take on the pathological functions described above.

"While 'The Theory of Communicative Action' focused on aspects of the colonization of the lifeworld' by the system, the deliberative politics of Between Facts and Norms depicts a way in which the normative resources of the lifeworld, through the medium of law, can be marshaled to effectively contend with money and power. " (Flynn, 2004) "Between Facts and Norms" aims at developing a democratic ideal based on deliberative politics using communicative power as a normative tool that leads to public sovereignty.

Communicative power is a way of ensuring legitimization of state power by means of public discourse through its transformative effect of natural laws into administrative ones. The author agrees that in complex societies "public opinion does not rule" but rather points administrative power in particular directions; or, as he puts it, it does not "steer" but "countersteers" institutional complexity (Habermas, 1996). Nevertheless, communicative power is seen as the way in which citizens can influence the governing of the state and adoption of laws.

Inspired by Hannah Arendt's term, Habermas' communicative power is a collective one that appears when individuals get together and disappears when they disperse. The burden of political legitimacy is placed on informal 'weak publics' or with no legal decision-making power. The quality of public sphere's arguments becomes crucial for the success of deliberative politics. They are seen as a close-to-grassroots field of discovery for institutionalized deliberative bodies that, in turn, look for the stronger argument in the field and use it as

justification. These institutionalized bodies in the legal system are the ones who hold the ability to make decision, yet lack the proximity to the reality of the public. The lack of decision-making power of weak informal publics is perceived as beneficial in that it releases the burden of having to take a decision, loosening and unrestricting communication, thus: *“new problem situations can be perceived more sensitively, discourses aimed at achieving self-understanding can be conducted more widely and expressively, collective identities and need interpretations can be articulated with fewer compulsions than in the case of procedurally regulated public spheres”* (Habermas, 1996:308 in Flynn, 2004: 440).

Summing up, Habermas' situates language at the centre of rationality. Reaching understanding through rational use of language and coordinated action is referred to as communicative action. He distinguishes between strategic and communicative action in respect to the goals pursued: personal goals versus mutual understanding. Discourse is then presented as taking either a strong, either a weak communicative action shape. While strong communicative action meets all the validity criteria of an argument, the weak type relies on mediums such as money and power. Communicative action takes place in the realm of the lifeworld⁹ and is the tool through which the lifeworld reproduces itself through. Weak communicative action can be an impediment for the lifeworld's undistorted reproduction though. He proposes the law as a tool for citizen to deliberate and author in order to make sure that systems of power and money do not colonize the lifeworld using weak communicative action. Communicative power is a way of ensuring legitimization of state power by means of public discourse through its transformative effect of natural laws into administrative ones. It is of collective nature and disperses when individuals separate. Its theorization requires additional clarifications. For this reason, Jeffrey Flynn(2004), while not the only one, will be the main Habermasian critic this paper will focus on. Before turning to critical accounts of communicative power, I will offer criticism of the public sphere's characteristics .

3.3. Critics of the Public sphere

Habermas' account of the public sphere involved that the public sphere is a neutral, independent space *“made up of private people gathering as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state”* (Habermas, in Calhoun, 1992:21). The debate was characterized as taking place in a *“free, rational and (in principle) disinterested way”* (Curran, 2000 in Grbeša, 2003:111). Such idealized version of the public sphere involved that there is one homogenous

⁹ the 'lifeworld' comprises of beliefs and meanings that are always already in play, hence, they do not have to be argued for. (Habermas, 1996)

such space in which rationality is the ultimate goal in discerning a successful debate. Yet many critics that I will present next voiced concern around this topic. Despite such criticism, Calhoun (1992:2 in Grbeša, 2003) recognizes the importance of the progressive character of the 18-19th century public sphere. Concerning its legitimacy, the model no longer accounted for the identity of the speaker, but instead: “...*practical reason was institutionalized through norms of reasoned discourse in which argument, not status or traditions, were to be decisive*”.

I will further present criticism brought against the Habermasian public sphere in regard to its neutrality, homogeneity and consensus as ultimate goal. Rationality will be discussed when Flynn will be presented with his stance on deliberative democratic politics.

In what concerns Habermas' claim for neutrality of the bourgeoisie public sphere, he was highly criticized (Fraser, 1992; Susen, 2011; Benhabib, 1992) for lacking an account of excluded groups such as women. His rationality ideal has therefore been rendered as gender-blind, denying the patriarchal character of the historical context. The author accepted the critique and his blindness over the topic (Habermas, 1992 in Susen, 2011). Moreover, the over-emphasis on rationalization as the best option has been regarded as 'malestream' conception of the world and social development (Ku, 2000 in Susen, 2011)

The homogeneity of the public sphere was challenged by the concept of 'oppositional public sphere' (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994 in Grbeša, 2003). According to this model, the public sphere is composed by several public sphere fighting for priority to bring a problem in the debate, among others. Kean (2000:60 in Grbeša, 2003:113) notes that there are different sized, overlapping and interconnected public sphere. For Fraser, the public sphere is the arena of competing interests of different groups. Moreover, Fraser (1992) coins the term of 'subaltern counterpublics' that have the role of challenging established hegemonies that would need to be re-hegemonized to avoid de-hegemonization. She defines subaltern counterpublics' purpose as one that brings up a “*signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs*”. (ibid:123)

The debate's purpose and way of constructing the rational ideal have a great influence on the inquiry. The deliberative democracy model strives for rational consensus as an outcome by means of a procedural normative tool. Chantal Mouffe argues instead for pluralism and antagonism, hence for her rationality and consensus are concepts to be suspicious about: “... *as language games/ community life forms are incommensurable, participants hailing from different communities would sometimes be talking at cross - purposes. Any agreement they come to would then be more the product of power politics or clever rhetoric than real consensus*”

(Kapoor, 2002 :464). Calhoun (1992) sees the diversity of interests as a positive influence in creating a field of discursive connections.

3.3.1 Jeffrey Flynn's reading of Communicative power

In order to now shift the attention on the concept of 'communicative power', this paper will present Flynn's (2004) critical account of the deliberative politics model. Flynn (2004) sees deliberative politics in relation to the public sphere as a two track model being both a problem-solving process, but also a power generating process. He notes 3 aspects of the public space: its communicative and organizational structure, its capacities and its outcomes and effects.

In regards to the first point, he argues that the informal character of the public sphere creates an internal relation to communicative action. When the actors involved are growing in numbers, the deliberation needs thematization and gains an organizational structure. *"Although the public sphere as a social space is unorganized, the associations of civil society play the informal role of 'filtering' political discussion and institutionalizing problem-solving discourses."* (Flynn, 2004:441) The continuous involvement of individuals and organizations in the public sphere are therefore crucial for the life of the informal public space.

In terms of capacities, the public sphere allows weak publics to identify problems in need of political action. The argument for this statement lays in its proximity to the private life of individuals along with the flexibility and multi-functionality of informal language. It becomes a normative requirement for individuals to pursue a communicative rather than strategic attitude. Here is where Flynn notes the first gap in Habermas' focus on the issue: *"Indeed, this is one area where Habermas needs to further elaborate on the communicative orientation that this model requires of citizens. This is a strong normative requirement given that the members of modern democracies tend to take up the client or consumers role more often than that of citizen"*. (Flynn, 2004:443)

Thirdly, the author draws on the outcomes and effects of communication within the public sphere. These are normative reasons, public opinion and influence. In regards to public opinion, Flynn relates this issue to the degree *"to which citizens' proposals and the flow of information and reasons are being more or less rationally dealt with."* (2004:443) From a normative point of view though, the researcher points that it is unclear whether "procedural criteria alone can guarantee rational outcomes" (ibid.)

Flynn(2004) differentiates between a narrow and a wide reading of communicative power. The first one is a wide reading and ties the public sphere's role to its internal connection to communicative power. It identifies Habermas' weak 'motivating force' as derived from

communicative power's cognitive level. Communicative power results in a motivating force associated with exercising one's freedom to agree or disagree with a validity claim to reasons, moreover into the formation of political beliefs. (Habermas 1984 in Flynn, 2004).

He argues that Habermas takes a narrow one that is flawed. This is due to communicative power being both a way to legitimize laws and disempower regimes, yet the locus of power is at an administrative level that actually has the ability to exercise power through justification and adoption of laws. He notes that Habermas tends towards this reading of power originating in the weak publics, but shifts to the parliamentary principle.. Flynn then points at *"whether this move limits the generation of communicative power solely to parliamentary bodies"* and notes that Habermas weighs institutionalization over communication. (Flynn, 2004: 446)

What Flynn(2004) turns back to is suggesting a wide reading of communicative power as the best option for maintaining the radical-democratic nature of Habermas' theory. He makes a reference to administrative power and one to social power. In terms of administrative power, Flynn(2004) points at Habermas' preference to account for the making, applying and implementing law as being governed by different kinds of reasons and arguments. This entails that *"while legislators have access to the full range of normative, pragmatic and empirical reasons, the administration is supposed to be bound to the instrumental rationality of implementing the law efficiently"* (ibid.) The consequences for generation of communicative power are presented. If we are to consider communicative power linked to the process of law-making, administration has to be open to normative reasons in implementing the law. As Habermas also notes, *"insofar as the implementation of programmatic goals requires the administration to perform organizational tasks that at least implicitly require a further development of law, the legitimation basis of traditional administrative structures no longer suffices"*. (Habermas, 1996:193 in Flynn, 2004: 450) Flynn therefore calls for a democratization of administration and allowance of the citizens' reason-generating force into all steps of the mechanism.

The second point he makes is related to social power. Habermas admits the possibility of social power being both facilitating and restrictive to communicative power. Flynn (2004: 450) comments that *"Social power is facilitative insofar as it represents the fulfillment of the social and material conditions that are preconditions for exercising one's political autonomy, But social power is restrictive insofar as it allows some actors (e.g. business, organizations, and pressure groups) to transform their social power directly into political power by influencing the*

administration or by manipulating public opinion". Here is where Flynn (2004) addresses first that communicative power of the public sphere is a counterforce towards Habermas' ideal.

Flynn (2004) suggests that a flexible wide reading would help counteract the restrictive character of social power in the public sphere through communicative power as its rival. For this to be reached, weak public would have to develop communicative power that would counteract both administrative and economic systems' actions and effects, while not overtaking their functions. In a clear call for action, he then places the burden of achieving this not on democratic theorists, but instead on the public in need to reclaim their public space.

To sum, critics have been pointing at flaws of deliberative democracy in terms of its neutrality, homogeneity, consensus as ultimate goal and rationality. The sphere is rather seen as a non-neutral sphere, in which power relations interfere, therefore consensus will only be an irrational outcome. Narrowly read, communicative power is flawed. Flynn proposes a wide reading of the concept but points at the dangers of social power. According to him, social power can be used to manipulate public opinion and influence administration, hence turning into political power. He proposes the democratization of administration and battling social power through communicative power set against administrative and economic ones without overtaking their functions.

Until now, the theory presented would help in developing a moderated and extended normative ideal for democratic agency, filtered through Habermasian critique. Flynn(2004)'s mentioning of social power is not enough to understand how to use communicative power against social power misuse. Therefore, in order to use communicative power for the ideal, a further step will be taken and communicative power will be critically traced to its roots - Hannah Arendt. In this way, more constructive critique will be brought around the concept of communicative power. Amy Allen's (2002) recommendations will also be taken into account.

3.4. A dialogue: Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt

Amy Allen (2002) looks at power, subjectivity and agency by investigating Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt's accounts around this topic. She argues, that while the two authors might seem to hold opposing views, they can be brought in dialogue. Both focus on one side of power only, either strategic, either communicative. As a result, they tend to omit alternative views that could contribute to their theory. Therefore Amy Allen suggests that their theorizations of power is complementary and represents two sides of the same coin. Firstly, she

introduces the main points of the authors' theories. Secondly, she bridges the two and shows how, taken together, they can form a more complete perspective on power.

The first point in Michel Foucault's theorization of power is his complaint against the general belief that power resides in the hands of the sovereign and "*is extended outward in social space only by being wielded over individuals in and through the sovereign's commands*" (Allen, 2002: 133) Foucault points therefore at the need to look at power where it loses intensity, periphery. Power analysis should be concerned with power "*at its extremities, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional forms and institutions*" (Foucault, 1980: 96 in Allen, 2002:133) He doesn't reject that there are regulated and legitimate power sources at the sovereign centre, but draws attention on the other levels too.

The other point Foucault makes is that power is not only negative, repressive, but power is also productive, it "*traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse*". (1980:119 in Allen, 2002:133). Allen reminds the reader that Foucault does not seek to portray power as merely productive, just to expand one's understanding of power as both repressive and productive.

Foucault's addition is a model of disciplinary power, characterized as "*diffuse, capillary, omnipresent and both productive and repressive*". (Allen, 2002: 134) This is not to say that the judicial model should be disregarded, but just that it should be complemented by the disciplinary power one. Both are seen as endemic to contemporary Western societies. For the author, disciplinary power is no longer about the old type of physical punishment of the judicial, but is represented by a non-coercive process. Punishment is no longer about crushing, dismembering and overpowering the body, but shifts towards training, exercise and supervision. Foucault's claim is that democratization has functioned in hiding the disciplinary power that is the seamy underside of democratized sovereignty, judicial power. His solution is one that does not follow the rules of the sovereign that colonised power. Instead, in order to fight against the disciplinary power that helps king's sovereignty maximizing its strength, he proposes that "*it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty one should turn, but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty*" (Foucault, 1980:107 in Allen, 2003: 134)

In what regards the repressive and productive character of power, Allen (2002) argues that this aspect is key in understanding the relationship between power, agency and subjectivity in Foucault's work. For Foucault, the individual is nothing but one of the prime effects of power. For the French philosopher, the individual can both be subjected to a set of power relations and

in the same time become its subject. Subjectivity is therefore enabled through this process. Allen marks that Foucault's distinction between agency and subjectivity is not too clear, but she suspects that Foucault (ibid.) would agree with her claim that power is a precondition of agency due to the following statement in regards to the exercise of power as: *"a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action"*. Allen (2002) does not accept Foucault's critics claim that the author is nothing more than an effect of power. In return, she suggests that Foucault offers a historical and cultural -specific account of the conditions needed for subjectivity and agency in modern society, with limitations that she will try to fill in the final part of her paper that I will also present. In other words, she suggests that

the individual is not dead, but by finding out what is killing it, we might find out how to keep it alive.

The importance for this paper of setting a dialogue between the two thinkers lays as follows. While a genealogical reading of Facebook can show what type of power relations have shaped the public sphere's coming into being, the ideal of agency will be based on communicative power's strong assets. These strong assets will be chosen so that they counteract particularly those elements that "kill the individual".

Allen further turns to Hannah Arendt's account of power in the public sphere. Arendt is a critic of the command-obedience model too, similar to Foucault going against sovereign power. Both philosophers aim to "cut the King's head". (Allen, 2002:132) Hannah Arendt (1958) draws perspectives on two lives: *vita activa*, the life of action and *vita contemplativa*, the life of contemplation. *Vita Activa* is composed of labor, work and action. The first two make sure we adapt to the environment, but the third is the process of coming up with something new and pursue them in social settings. In political terms, man engages in political deliberation and decision making in the public sphere. On the other hand, *Vita Contemplativa* is constructed of will, philosophical thought and judgement.

The philosopher sees the public space as the locus of identity creation. *"In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world."* (Arendt, 1958: 179) Acting alone can not be

constitutive of one's identity, nor can self-expression. The two have to go in concert in order for the public space to represent their identity formation locus. Moreover, she also notes on the forces influencing identity - making: "*nobody is the author or producer of his own life story... the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the two-fold sense of the word, namely its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author*" (ibid: 184) Hannah Arendt seems to be approaching the foucauldian subjectification of the individual to power relations surrounding him/her. Action happens in relation to others, it is dependent on unknown consequences while the doer is the sufferer also. "*To do and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin*" (ibid, 190)

The second important point Arendt makes concerns the originary notion of power. She argues that power is non-coercive. When power is coercive, it does not reach its full potential. Here is where Habermas' got his inspiration from when developing the theory of communicative action based on communicative power. Power can not be possessed, it exists only in 'actualization'. "*It springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse*" (ibid: 200) Power, as the ability to act in concert, makes the public sphere possible, therefore it becomes a requirement for agency. Moreover it is a requirement for subjectivity too as the PS is the place where individuals come together united by a common interest.

Common sense seems to be therefore the basis on which one perceives the other and oneself in a particular way: "*Without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one's self nor the reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond doubt... The only character of the world by which to gauge its reality is its being common to us all, and common sense. . . is the one sense that fits into reality as a whole our five strictly individual sense and the strictly particular data they perceive*" (ibid, 208) Moreover, the author notes that failure to establish a common sense between participants of the public sphere could result in a distorted view of reality.

Looking at the relationship between thinking and the public sphere, Allen(2002) points at Kant: "*the external power that deprives man of the freedom to communicate his thoughts publicly, deprives him at the same time of the freedom to think.*" Hannah Arendt approves with Kant's claim and further makes the distinction between political thinking - judging others' standpoints with the purpose of reaching one's opinion over a matter and philosophical thinking - an internal dialogue with oneself aiming at truth rather than opinion. While political thinking is

rooted in the common sense uniting one with others, philosophical thinking goes beyond common sense.

“The operations of the intellect, like those of political thinking or judgment, are dependent upon our common sense, which is in turn dependent upon the preservation of a public space within which individuals can come together and act, which is in turn dependent on power for its constitution and preservation” (Allen, 2002:140) Power is therefore a condition of the thinking, both in political and intellectual terms. Yet what Arendt argues is that, on the other hand, reason-focused thinking, or philosophical thinking is not influenced by others, the individual has to be free from its environment, common sense and the power associated with them. She moreover emphasizes that, along with political thinking and intellect, philosophical thinking is also dependent on speech. Language is an enabler for thinking and reason, making the latter go astray if communication is lacked. Moreover, Arendt sees thinking in itself as dangerous due to its ability to challenge status-quo, but regards non-thinking even more dangerous. Blindly accepting imposed values, individuals risk to not even notice the substitution or its character. Hannah Arendt (1978:192) therefore discusses the inherited political dimension of philosophical thinking: *“When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. In such emergencies, it turns out that the purging component of thinking is political by implication. For this destruction has a liberating effect on another faculty, the faculty of judgement, which one may with some reason call the most political of man’s mental abilities”* Not only that philosophical thinking makes judgements better, but it also involves communication in a public sphere nurtured by power, that is related to identity formation. Therefore, for Arendt as well as Foucault, power is connected to both subjectivity and agency.

A bridge

In showing the similar lines of thought the authors are taking, Allen (2002) points at two major themes: the characteristics of power and the relationship between power and subjectivity. Concerning the first, both authors agree that power can not be stored, acquired, but only exercised in relations among individuals. Moreover, both recognize that power is not bad or good, but productive when they see the individual both as a producer and a sufferer. They part ways in power’s normative valence: while Foucault always sees power in strategic terms from which one must escape from, Arendt focuses on the communicative aspect of power that has an aim in itself. (ibid.) Secondly, both strategic (Foucault) and communicative (Arendt) power are

seen as a precondition for subjectivity and agency. Both authors recognize the important role power plays in identity formation. But while Foucault see this relationship as caging for the individual's formation, Arendt perceives it as an antidote against evils.

Allen points that, taken individually, both Arendt's and Foucault's account are insufficient. In discussing power as the product of consent, she notes Foucault dismissal of the statement, while Arendt full support of it. For Foucault, power "*is not a function of consent*"¹⁰ and even though it "*can be the result of a prior or permanent consent . . . it is not by nature the manifestation of consensus*"¹¹. She criticizes Arendt for not accounting for the strategic dimension of politically motivated actors trying to condition individuals' agency while following personal interest. Allen (2002) proposes that Foucault could be a good complementary part explaining this issue.

Moreover, in what concerns the productive character of power and relationship with subjectivity and agency, Allen also notes that Arendt falls shortly on her analysis. While the individual is indeed formed by his self-expression and deed in the political public space, much of what he/she is before entering this realm is a product power exercised within other non-political social institutions such as the school and family. Foucault again is filling the gap through his analysis of exercises of power at the peripheral level, in all types of social institutions, including the aforementioned ones.

What Allen(2002) aims with her comparison is offering Arendt as a remedy to Foucault's grim scenario, by understanding "*how the collective power that is generated in the public spheres can serve as a resource for individuals who are struggling to resist the kinds of problematic and disturbing power relations that Foucault exposed*" (2002:144) Furthermore, the author defends her unusual position of coupling Arendt and Foucault by pointing that Foucault, if living, might have agreed with her. She notes that, despite his own view of negative effects of omnipresent power relations, Foucault himself agreed during a roundtable discussion, that "*sometimes we have to rely on such and such type of community in order to resist a greater danger which comes from another community*". (Foucault, 193:7 in Allen, 2002:144) He therefore recognized the solidarity power that can spring from communities of resistance in order to turn against the non-coercive/disciplinary power he focused his work on. Therefore, taken alone, the authors' accounts of power are incomplete and need the other in order to productively criticize each other. She proposes to look at productive power from two

¹⁰ Foucault, 'Afterword', pp 219-29 in Allen, 2002:143

¹¹ Foucault, 'Afterword', pp 220 in Allen, 2002:143

perspectives, both in a negative but most importantly in a positive way in order to learn how to overcome the cage Foucault focuses so much on.

3.5. A moderated and extended normative ideal for democratic agency in the public sphere

This ideal is one that is filtered through Habermas critics concerning the public sphere and communicative power. The base of its development are sections 3.3. and 3.4. of this chapter. Therefore, the critique concerns the homogeneity of the public sphere, its drive for consensus, degree of neutrality and use of communicative power as a tool for law legitimization. In order to correctly apply the ideal revolved around communicative power, one first has to understand the strategic use of power that brought a power system like the public sphere into place (Allen, 2002). When applied in the last part of this thesis, this ideal will make use of such knowledge gathered during the response to the paper's first research question.

3.5.1. Prerequisite

The necessity of genealogically analyzing strategic use of power relations becomes a prerequisite for this ideal. While Flynn(2004) offers a sound alternative to Habermas' reading of communicative power, such alternative reading is rendered as insufficient. As Allen(2002) suggest, one first has to understand what kills the individual to figure a way of saving it. Therefore, these suggestions of ideal model are to be applied only once an inquiry into the history of strategic power relations exercised in the public sphere's coming to being has been conducted.

3.5.2. Homogeneity

Firstly, striving for opinion homogeneity in the public sphere should no longer be pursued. The reason behind this suggestion are the incentives aimed at influencing the public opinion. Such incentives lead to information manipulation and use of persuasion. Persuasion is seen as a negative use of communicative power that relies on trust in untested beliefs and results in undemocratically gained political influence. (Flynn, 2004). Instead, pluralism should be cherished and constructive criticism should be embraced. Oppositional public spheres(Livingstone and Lundt, 1994), along with subaltern counterpublics (Fraser, 1992)

should be considered in finding solutions of the identified problems. Having different public spheres involves that the individual may be part of more than one deliberation group. Following Flynn's wide reading of communicative power, one should be able to assess the conflicts arising between the different public spheres he/she is involved with. An identity that is built on contrasting common senses will give rise to cognitive dissonances that might or not be acknowledged by the individual, but will have a great effect on his/her ability to fully and correctly contribute to the debate of a public sphere. Pluralism also involves one's ability to challenge a sphere's common sense, a point that introduces the next paragraph on consensus.

3.5.3. Consensus

Within a public sphere, actors should think critically about the debate, rather than have as an end goal the reaching of a consensus. The debate itself should constitute the purpose of a deliberation and focus should fall on the quality of arguments and type of power involved in building them. Its outcome, rather than consensus, should lean towards Chantal Mouffe's concept of antagonist agonism, but with a strong emphasis on the procedural and normative.

In order to understand the type of power involved in building arguments, one should first think critical towards oneself and then apply the same mechanism on those around him. Hannah Arendt's communicative power should be used by making reference the differentiation between political thinking and philosophical thinking. While the first one relies on pre-set common sense, philosophical thinking aims at eliminating frames of thought. Therefore, when the individual is encouraged to learn from his mistakes, it should be done so without making reference to what the outcome of the process should be in political terms or what is considered as being politically-correct by the community.

In what concerns one's awareness of his/her debate techniques, an individual has to first be able to understand and differentiate between strategic and communicative power. By being transparent about the three mentioned above, the public sphere can inscribe such knowledge of differences into its members. Differentiating the two and further understanding their goals would also mean that communicative power can fight the strategic use of social power¹² described in Flynn's wide reading. Once this knowledge exists, the individual has to be able to critically analyse his own interests and their source in order to abstain himself/herself from pursuing strategic power. The use of self critique involves identifying different interests that might not belong in a democratic debate over a particular topic. For example, the sphere should make its

¹² When social power is used in a repressive way towards communicative power and turns into political power by influencing the administration and public opinion (Flynn, 2004)

individuals see when arguments enter the debate from a customer's point of view, rather than a citizen's one. Such self-awareness would also contribute to meeting Flynn(2004)'s normative requirement of actors pursuing communicative power solely for the public sphere to reach the ideal.

Thirdly, being critical towards the ones around can be enabled by combining the knowledge obtained from self-awareness with that of counteracting strategic power. By philosophically thinking about oneself and understanding the power relations involved in one's formation, the individual can better understand the interests of those around him too. Knowing what strategic action looks like and how to combat it will also help in pursuing a more rational communicative debate. Moreover, a differentiation between strong and weak publics' power would help to better acknowledge, understand and counteract the power imbalances arising within a debate. Even though this ideal does not promote Flynn's(2004) description of the habermasian narrow reading of communicative power that he suggested this differentiation for, his point is a solid one in this context. Hence, rather than empowering the weak publics to balance the strong ones, this ideal suggests the disempowerment of strong publics. A way of doing so is by following Flynn's suggestion from his wide reading to democratize the administration by giving citizens' rational arguments access to the law creation *and* implementation levels. (emphasis added) Therefore those proposing laws should also find practical solutions based on correct problem identification and be allowed to get involved in their implementation.

3.5.4. Neutrality

Therefore the public sphere's neutrality should be put under scrutiny and the sphere should provide all necessary tools to be scrutinized. As a domain on which power relations and clever rhetoric are dictating the outcomes of deliberation (Mouffe), the public sphere should be transparent and promote critique.

Procedural and normative transparency should be pursued in what regards the process of decision-making, the identified conflict of interests of its members, who decides and what constitutes criteria of validity of arguments. Transparency of the sphere is very important, but its importance comes from its use - rational critique.

The sphere should promote critique towards its genealogy, its current actors' interests and ways of pursuing them, but also towards the actors itself. In order to embrace critical thinking, one should let go of the common sense Hannah Arendt is talking when describing the

basis of political thinking. Instead, one should pursue an independent philosophical thinking over the matter.

Firstly, a public sphere should be open towards what type of dynamics, factors and power relations helped in its formation. By using Foucault's methods of genealogy, a sphere should be about to provide a critical account of itself by making clear to its members what were the actors involved in its creation, what their interests were, how did they manage to mobilize the debate around the topic and how was power made use of during the process. This would allow an agent to choose among public spheres based not only on the common interest they share, but also on their history. Therefore, a democratic agent should seek those communities that employ purer exercise of communicative power and let go and combat those who are mostly instrumental, strategically driven. In order to do so, the agent needs to develop critical rationality to oneself and those around him.

In this proposed ideal, the use of communicative power is suggested at the level of desired outcomes it should lead to and which grounds should be based on. A procedural description is not thoroughly made by this paper and it represent a point of further research. The next chapter will present the case of Facebook and includes a description of its main features, data collection policy, use of emotions and algorithms, issues of digital privacy and academic research of governmental use of Facebook, along with Hendricks and Hansen's (2015) study of individual behaviour online.

Chapter 4 - The Facebook Case

4.1. Rise of Social Media

The public sphere is a concept that has many interpretations and conceptualizations and is in itself a contested terrain. This conflict of ideas is supplemented by the complexity of contemporary contexts in which the concept of public sphere is used. What the following section will aim at is investigating the complexity of modern public sphere in the shape of the social media space, with a focus on Facebook.

Social media websites (SoMe) have developed as facilitators of social connections. The rise of SoMe has been fueled by and determined in turn the shifting of casual, day by day habits into formalized inscriptions. (van Dijck, 2013) Actions as gossiping, checking up on friends, playing a backgammon game or showing them holiday photos moved from the physical world

into the realm of the digital and became available to the wider publics. As Jose van Dijck (2013:7) puts it: “*Social media platforms have unquestionably altered the nature of private and public communication.*” Starting with the late 1990s, platforms such as Blogger, Myspace, Facebook, Youtube, Twitter aimed at conquering as much as possible from the Web 2.0 cake. Some, like Facebook, have successfully gathered over 1.71 billion monthly active users as of June 30th, 2016.¹³ Others, like Myspace, have vanished under competition pressure.

4.2. Introduction to Facebook

4.2.1. Features

Dutch author Jose van Dijck (2013) separates Facebook’s features into two categories according to their coding qualities: first, those features that relate to connectedness and secondly, those referring to connectivity. The first group aims at “*directing users to share information with other users through purposefully designed interfaces*” (2013 :47), while the second type is aimed at sharing user data with third parties.

Connectedness

The Facebook user profile allows for disclosure of photos, personal information and creation of lists of preferred books, films, music, interests. Facebook defines a user’s timeline as the “*space on your profile where you can see your own posts, posts from friends and stories you're tagged in organized by the date they were posted.*”¹⁴ If the user wants to ‘find out more’ about this feature, the screen depicted in Figure 9 will appear. The timeline is therefore part of a user’s profile and both allow for several actions as shown in the red square. In terms of information that can be shared, the user can edit basic information, add life events, photos and statuses. The display of such information is not only aimed at one’s friends network, but also towards oneself in what can appear as going through the user’s own life magazine. Facebook constitutes therefore a “self-representational act” (Toma, 2013) for oneself and the ones around him. On top, the user can join groups, communicate with their friends via chat, calls and video-calls. Social interaction is channeled by the interface through aforementioned Timeline and NewsFeed - reaching updates from friends and liked pages. ‘Friends you might know’ is a feature through which the platform suggests friends based on algorithmically computed relationships. ‘Photo Tagging’ is another feature that helps users trace their friends’ appearances in others’ photos. The aforementioned examples are all part of the first category of features van Dijck (2013) identified.

¹³ <https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/>

¹⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/help/1462219934017791>

Connectivity

The second one includes Open Graph and the Like button. These two features are relevant in the context of Facebook's business model, being the ones that help Facebook capitalize on its massive storage of user data. More about these features will be presented in the following paragraphs describing Facebook's collection of data and its Business Model.

4.2.2 Data collection on Facebook

Type of data collected

Facebook collects a wide range of data. They are rather explicit about the diversity of sources data can be extracted from. Facebook collects data on the 'things you do and information you provide', 'things other do and information they provide', 'your networks and connections', 'device information', 'information from websites and apps that use our Services', 'information from third - party partners' and finally information from the companies owned or operate by Facebook.¹⁵ More details about each type of data collected can be found in Fig 10.1 and Fig 10.2. of the appendix. Some particular examples will be also discussed in the Privacy section of this chapter, more specific the collection of offline users' data.

Purpose of data collection

Data collection is the basis of Facebook's ability to offer a free user membership on the platform. The use of data has multiple purposes, of which I will present two of relevance for this paper. Firstly, Facebook collects data about its users' preferences in order to accurately suggest friends, groups and events based on its algorithms. The user is more likely to interact with content suitable with his/her preferences and therefore create more data through engagement. But why would Facebook collect data in order to encourage more data creation? The second use of data collection is sharing data with third parties. 85% of Facebook revenue comes from the platform being used as an advertising space and a big part of the process is carried through OpenGraph. The other 15% is earned by Facebook charging 30% of all profits made via its platform. Van Dijck (2013: 48-49) explains: "*The Open Graph API allows external websites to deploy user data collected on Facebook to create personalized experiences on their own websites. Social plug-ins, as they are called, aim at connecting disparate corners of the Web and pulling them all together.*" In other words, the ads we see on other websites are inspired

¹⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/policy.php>

and personalized by our activity and likes on Facebook. While initially having social experiences closed down for the interaction on the platform only, Facebook now opened up to integrate external contexts into the users' experience. One way of doing so is by placing the well known Like button on pages outside Facebook. Third parties therefore have access to users' information from Facebook and Facebook *"records any user's presence on a site with a Like button, including nonmembers and logged out users; a Like box allows Facebook to trace how many users and which of their friends have pushed the button"* (ibid: 49). Therefore, the first purpose of Facebook's collection of data has an end in itself - generation of more data.

4.2.3. Advertisement - based Business Model: Second purpose of data collection

Giving third parties access to users' data has another purpose - Advertisement. In the past, advertisements had their own ads area on the right side of the NewsFeed. In the present, the number of ads on the right side diminished and instead Facebook incorporated 'suggested posts' into the general flow of updates. Figure 1 is an example of how the interface looks like for the average user. Figure 2 shows the newly incorporated options of users to edit their ads profile. It has been launched in 2014 and aims at offering a more targeted experience.

The ability to have an Advertisement displayed on the platform is what makes Facebook's business model. Pixels are sold to both businesses and political leaders who want to expose their product/service/idea to the world. Data collected is turned into precious information. With the help of algorithms, Facebook, commercial and political advertisers can get their message across in a targeted manner towards the masses. Political campaigns are seen as being part of a business marketing strategy, but with some particularities. As suggested by the platform itself: *"Whether you're an elected official, a challenger, a political party or a political action group, Facebook can give your campaign an edge during every phase of the election. From organising supporters and raising money to persuading and turning out key voters, it's never too early to start using Facebook to connect with the people who matter most to your campaign."* Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show the tips given by the platform for campaigners in respect to "Organising between elections", "Activate the people who love what you're doing", "Help people decide" and getting people "Out and vote!". In the same screenshots the reader can observe how Facebook offers its collected data for targeting purposes: *"You can advertise to people across devices based on their age, gender, location, interests and more"* (Fig. 7.2)

Another purpose of collecting users data is, as stipulated in Facebook's Terms of agreement, the potential use for research purposes: *"We conduct surveys and [research](#), test features in development, and analyze the information we have to evaluate and improve*

products and services, develop new products or features, and conduct audits and troubleshooting activities."¹⁶

4.2.4. Virality orchestration and Market of attention

Being able to orchestrate virality through the collection, sharing and influencing of generated user data is the business model of social platform Facebook. The platform's 'Trending' section is nothing more than journalistic curation, rather than neutral selection of popular information, as they suggest it to be: *"Trending shows you a list of topics and hashtags that have recently spiked in popularity on Facebook."*¹⁷ In a recent scandal, along with suppressing right-wing news, the "news curators" were instructed to include non-trending topics to assure for the sake of inclusion, but also to exclude from the trending section news about Facebook itself.¹⁸ Despite denying "systematic political bias", the giant decided to send its employees for retraining and to reconsider some of its practices on the matter.¹⁹ Facebook proves therefore to be acting like a classic media outlet and makes no exception from journalistic bias.²⁰ Facebook virality orchestration is cherished and explained to others also on their page as described in the prior section. The sharing imperative Facebook is promoting not only aims at advertisement but also at enlarging the user's social circle. Among friends' and liked pages' updates, there are ads and suggested posts along with suggested friends, groups, events etc. This ever growing volume of available information is aimed at one major finite resource, the prerequisite of engagement: user's attention.

The balance between information supply and the attention it demands is becoming more and more unstable. The finite amount of attention increases its value through the ever growing volume of available information. What Simon (1971) calls a 'wealth of information' causes the 'poverty of attention'. Hence, a need appears to *"allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it."* (Simon, 1971:40-41) Therefore, the selection process of information one should pay attention to becomes a crucial one. Simon's mentioning of this phenomena is the first reference to what the present paper will consider as being a "market of attention". The outcome of virality - popularity, can be considered the social currency of this market. Being popular is associated with receiving high levels of attention and

¹⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/policy.php>

¹⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/help/1401671260054622>

¹⁸ <http://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006>

¹⁹ <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/23/facebook-admits-rogue-employees-may-have-shown-bia/>

²⁰ <http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/facebook-bias/>

social media platforms like Facebook act as a market of attention for different actors wanting to trade.

The above introduction was presented in order to put in a framework the study object of this paper: the use of Facebook as a public sphere of deliberation. Yet Facebook targeted marketing is of great importance when discussing the quality of deliberative politics in the Post-Westphalian world order. The attention of the Facebook user is turned into the attention of the citizen and his/her engagement has outcomes other than the purchase of a product : the adoption of a political ideology. The next section will investigate the connecting bridge between data and information on Facebook and the use of emotions to orchestrate virality.

4.3. Algorithms and Emotions

4.3.1. Algorithms

Van Dijck's notion of programmability as *"the ability of social media platforms to trigger and steer users creative or communicative contributions, while users, through their interaction with these coded environments, may in turn influence the flow of communication and information activated by such platform"*. (2013:5) Algorithms represent 'coded instructions' (ibid) based on one's registred activity and preferences. In the case of Facebook "Friend suggestion" button functions on the basis of inferred data regarding similarities between the user and the prospective friend. Moreover, the existent ads on Facebook's NewsFeed are inspired and personalized by our likes on other websites outside Facebook. Worth remembering is the double goal Ads and suggested posts can have: commercial and/or political. For Example, EdgeRank and GraphRank have the role of filtering users data and turning it into a *"meaningful stream of information for the user"* (ibid.) What officially is looked at as 'personalized and optimized online experience' can translate into orchestrated sociality, product placement, targeted advertising, campaigning, depending on who is paying for the service. Understanding the 'likes' we give on and off Facebook, along with our interaction on the platform, represents valuable information Facebook has the key to. Lending the key to different actors and showing by empirical example²¹ and theoretical instructions²² how to use what is behind the doors is how Facebook earns its money.

²¹ Bond et al, 2012, *A 61 - million - person experiment in social influence and political mobilization*, Nature Journal (489: 295 - 298), doi:10.1038/nature11421

²² See for example Fig 7.1. And Fig. 2 on Facebook for Politics. Similarly, Facebook for Business

4.3.2. This is getting emotional..

What was initially built as a intranet for college students turned into a space where important groups organized for political action. The website was though not built to be a public space of debate. How did Facebook become such an important key in organizing social uprising and what enabled its appearance as public sphere? Gerbaudo (2015 in Poell and van Dijck, 2016) studied two Facebook pages of great importance in 2011 protests in Egypt and Spain. He looked at the impact they had in key moments of the uprisings and what tools they used to note that the admins orchestrated 'moments of digital enthusiasm'. The pages' administrators were in control of the likes, comments and shares of the posts, restricting them to their will. Moreover, Poell and Van Dijck (2016:230) conclude that the website's architecture allowed the admin to orchestrate such moments by "*constructing hopeful emotional narratives*".

The examples of the successful uprisings given above gained publicity and were put in the public eye using a particular tool : emotions. (Poell and van Dijck, 2016;) The use of emotions on Facebook is not restricted though to social issues publicity, but to popularity on social media in general. (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015; Berger and Milkman, 2011) A psychological study connecting information diffusion to emotions shows that positive rather than negative emotions are those that trigger most responsiveness. (Berger and Milkman, 2011) Moreover, "*content that evokes high-arousal positive (awe) or negative (anger or anxiety) emotions is more viral. Content that evokes low-arousal, or deactivating, emotions (e.g. sadness) is less viral.*" (ibid: 1) An understanding of emotional patterns that makes content go viral is therefore crucial for intense online social interaction on a particular topic. This is not the only study in this area of research. Facebook itself developed research by manipulating its users' Newsfeed content stream. In 2010, a research study²³ used the platform and the US mid-term elections to look at whether one's friends voting in election would determine political mobilization in its circle. A second controversial study²⁴ looked at the degree of emotional contagion between people on the platform. The results show that users changed their mood according to the emotions displayed on their Newsfeed. The publishing of the study gave rise to critical voices. The publishing body, PNAS²⁵ , responded through an editorial expression of

²³ Bond et al, 2012, A 61 - million - person experiment in social influence and political mobilization, Nature Journal (489: 295 - 298), doi:10.1038/nature11421

²⁴ Kramer et al, 2013, Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks, PNAS, vol. 111(24), 8788-8790; doi:10.1073/pnas.1320040111

²⁵ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

concern²⁶ that defended its position arguing that the researchers only had access to data collected by Facebook for which users' gave their consent when they created a profile. Still, it deemed Facebook's data collection as involving "*practices that were not fully consistent with the principles of obtaining fully informed consent and allowing participants to opt out*".²⁷ Moreover, it happened that Facebook only added the "research" purpose in its Terms and Conditions 4 months after the study has been published.²⁸

To sum up this section, Facebook's suggestion - based features such as Page Suggestion or Friend Suggestion or their Advertising Service are backed up by algorithms and cookies storing user's data on activity on and off the platform. Therefore Facebook knows user's points of interests, how the user's past interaction looked like in the past with the topic but also what emotions it should trigger in order for the user to keep producing valuable responses to available content. Some uses of algorithms are stipulated in the Terms and Conditions of the user membership. Some, like the monitoring and use of emotions or the nature of the privacy policy are not that clearly mentioned. Still, they are both used to create the context in which the average user swims in daily. Manipulating users for the sake of research is just one of the data practices deemed at least inappropriate in what concerns the SoMe platform. The next section will investigate parts of Facebook's privacy policy in regards to default privacy settings, facial recognition and offline users data collection.

4.4. Digital Privacy on Facebook

4.4.1. Opt-out by Default

Facebook's purpose of having open-by-default settings is, according to van Dijck (2013:54), one that connects with its business model: "*Facebook wants its preferred meaning of sharing, implying complete openness and maximum exchange of data with third parties, to become the "shared norm."*" Fig. 3, fig.4 and fig. 5 presents the evolution of the default privacy settings of the platform over time. First picture represents the privacy settings of the average user on the platform in 2005. The second one presents the norm of the year 2009, in November, while the last picture shows the privacy settings default in April 2010. There is no data after this year for the presented diagram. Still, the extent these settings have been changed over the course of only 5 years can be understood. In 2014 though, the company made an adjustment to the privacy default setting of creating a new post - from it being public to being available for

²⁶ http://www.pnas.org/content/111/29/10779.1.full?ijkey=8e749956ef468d6ec964db80a335d97f5c0697f5&keytype2=tf_ipsecsha

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-users-after-emotion-manipulation-study/#2a1143c110c1>

friends only.²⁹ They chose to do so for new users only; changes from private to public affect old users too though. In present times, the situation is slightly adjusted, in that more openness has been enabled with even new type of data being collected. The impact Facebook's influence over the meaning of 'sharing' is felt not only in cultural and social aspects, but also economically and legally. New ways of monetizing are accepted, like the fast growing data-mining industry proves (van Dijck, 2013), but also the stretching legal limits of what type of data is collected and how it is used. One such example is the 'Tags Suggestion' feature based on facial recognition of users.

The social platform has a dedicated goal of getting every single person on the planet connected on Facebook.³⁰ But at which cost does this goal come at? Mark Zuckerberg told reporter Dan Fletcher during a Time interview back in 2010 that privacy is "an evolving norm".³¹ What van Dijck (2013) notes though is that what is changing is not the concept of privacy, but that of 'sharing'. In direct connection with privacy, it is the sharing of personal information that shifts its antonym. Over the past years, the default settings of Facebook's privacy settings have been turning from completely closed to completely open as described in the paragraph above.

In present times, users have to opt-out of the sharing imperative, rather than opt-in. Even though it might seem that the user should be well aware of what the open-by-default privacy settings are, what do they mean and what implications they have for both digital and non-digital world, this is just an utopian situation. *The majority of users never bother to read the terms they have to click-to-agree; most users tend to stick to defaults or are apathetic about privacy settings* (Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 2010; Madejski, Johnson, and Bellovin 2010 in van Dijck, 2013). And, even if they did, in the case of emotional manipulation research presented above, Facebook only added the 'research purpose' to their Terms and Agreements 4 months after the study has been conducted, in May 2012.³²

4.4.2. Facial Recognition

Starting with the year 2011, the platform implemented a tool that pre-tags user's friends using Facebook's new facial recognition software. Facebook states on the platforms' help page that *"We currently use facial recognition software that uses an algorithm to calculate a unique number ("template") based on someone's facial features, like the distance between the eyes,*

²⁹ <http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2014/05/22/facebook-changes-default-privacy-setting-for-new-users/#13f56418725f>

³⁰ <http://www.businessinsider.com/zuckerbergs-3-5-and-10-year-facebook-plan-2014-10?r=US&IR=T&IR=T>

³¹ <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798,00.html>

³² <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-users-after-emotion-manipulation-study/#34df485810c1>

nose and ears. This template is based on your profile pictures and photos you've been tagged in on Facebook. We use these templates to help you tag photos by suggesting tags of your friends”³³ This means that the new photo is compared to old photos that have been tagged and the face from the new photo is looked for in the old tags. Moreover, the tool suggests the name of the user who is more likely to be in the newly uploaded photo, according to his/her facial characteristics. What is interesting to this feature is not only its focus on facial recognition, but also the conditions under which consent can be given to do so. Not all users can have the option to opt-out, yet the option exists: “If this feature is turned on for you, you can choose whether or not we suggest your name when people upload photos of you. Adjust this in your [Timeline and Tagging settings](#)”³⁴ The wording leaves the impression that it is the face-recognition feature Facebook is talking about. Instead, what they are referring to is the feature of having the option to opt-out of it. As Fig. 6 shows though, the privacy setting itself exists, yet it is not available to use for every average user. The upper part of the photo is a screenshot from a second source explaining the use of facial recognition, while the bottom is the actual setting being “Unavailable”. In these conditions, it is hard to understand the ‘consent’ argument Facebook is defending itself in front of a lawsuit³⁵ filed under Illinois Law concerning the users’ privacy.

4.4.3. Logged out users, non-users and EU users who have explicitly opted out

... they are all being tracked, report argues³⁶. Belgian researchers from Centre of Interdisciplinary Law and ICT (ICRI) and the Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography department (COSIC) at the University of Leuven, and the media, information and telecommunication department (SMIT) at Vrije Universiteit Brussels, conducted the investigation which proves that Facebook tracks all the above-mentioned categories of users and non-users. The ‘Like’ button placed on more than 13 million websites, including health and government ones, gives the platform the right to place cookies on a website visitor’s computer. Based on this mechanism, the report claims that Facebook tracks logged out users, internet users who are not even members of the social media platform, and even EU Facebook users who have chosen to deactivate the tracking option.³⁷ The purpose of the tracking is gathering data for advertising purposes, offering a maximized set of data for targeted marketing. In a 2014 statement, Brian Boland, vice president of Facebook’s ad product declared that what they have

³³ <https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ <http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/5/11605068/facebook-photo-tagging-lawsuit-biometric-privacy>

³⁶ <http://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/icri-cir-advises-belgian-privacy-commission-in-facebook-investigation>

³⁷ https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/fb_tracking/

heard most from people is that they want targeted advertising.³⁸ In the light of the information presented above, it would be interesting to find out first who are the 'people' Boland made reference to.

4.5. Governmental (mis)use of Facebook

The rise of Facebook as a perceived public sphere has also provided the governments with a new tool for interaction with its citizens. The different strategies employed by government officials have different goals and desired outcomes. Political advertising represents just a broad term and can blindly be associated merely with political campaigns. Still, governments use Facebook for plenty other various reasons. In the next section I will discuss the cases of predictive censorship and control of dissent.

4.5.1. Censorship

Data collection has gained huge support due to its commercial value. But commercial value is not the only value data comes with. An important use of data is governmental surveillance of its citizens. Most often, this surveillance has as purpose the censorship of what is perceived as dangerous citizen activity for the challenging of status - quo. I will further describe two ways in which censorship can take place when empowered by online data collection: spiral of silence and predictive individual censorship.

A spiral of silence is the tendency of an individuals not to speak about policy issues in public when they perceive the environment as not widely sharing similar opinions. (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) Situating the concept in the online environment, a study conducted by Elizabeth Stoycheff had some interesting findings in regards to the social media context. The investigated case was the willingness of people to talk about the Snowden - NSA story offline and online. Among others, it found that people were less willing to discuss the story in social media than they were in person, that people were more willing to discuss the story if they knew the audience agrees with their view and that Facebook and Twitter users were less likely to discuss the story in offline environments, especially if they knew their online friends do not share similar views (Stoycheff, 2013). The findings of this study prove that surveillance can have auto-censoring effects on the population in the online context and that their self-censoring in the online contexts determines the same effect in offline environments.

³⁸ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/technology/facebook-to-let-users-alter-their-ad-profiles.html?_r=1

Secondly, online surveillance can be used by totalitarian regimes to develop what Morozov coined as ‘predictive censorship’. Explaining the system as opposed to online targeted advertising he notes the only difference between the two as being that: “*one system learns everything about us to show us more relevant advertisements, while the other one learns everything about us to ban us from accessing relevant pages*”.(2011:97) He then gives the example of GreenDam, a Chinese governmental tool to prevent the online users from accessing particular websites, viewing naked photographs or composing text files. Despite the software not being imposed but only in schools and some internet cafes due to poor design, domestic and international criticism, Morozov notes the dangers that the mere idea of having such a tool brings about : “*Every second it can imbibe the insights that come from millions of users who are trying to subvert the system and put them to work almost immediately to make such subversions technically impossible.*” (2011: 99)

4.5.2. Dissent Control

The second type of purpose governmental use of the social media is aiming at is controlling those against the system without actual censoring them. Enabling online propaganda armies is a common practice modern authoritarian regimes like China choose. For example, the 50 Cent Party is the term referencing the army of trolls hired by the Chinese government in order to “generate positive guidance of public opinion”. A rather cheeky funny response came from columnist Liang Fafu who was advocating for the real-name registration system on the internet in order to see who these internet commentators actually were.³⁹ But authoritarian systems are not the only one employing such tactics. Being seen by many ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’, Israel strengthened its public diplomacy with the development of the Electronic Hesbara Force. The EHF’s main actor is the national union of Israeli students that launched a program paying \$2,000/student for 5 hours of online propaganda per week “from the comfort of home”, for the period of a year.⁴⁰ Still, ‘war rooms’ are being mobilized with the purpose to explain (translation from Hebrew for ‘hesbara’) the massacre on Gaza.⁴¹ Operating in 30 languages, the hesbara is aimed at attacking, among others, the BDS’ (Boycott, Divest, Sanctions) supporters who take the anti-apartheid model as example to support Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

³⁹ <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/05/internet-spin-for-stability-enforcers/>

⁴⁰ <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-students-get-2000-spread-state-propaganda-facebook>

⁴¹ http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ae0_1405460103

Such digital armies of either trolls, either undercover public diplomats are carrying powerful digital battles by supporting each other and attacking in group. The flow of information that is streamed is based on the power of the masses to silence the independent unorganized dissents. Divide et impera, or rather, organize and conquer is the slogan. The complexity of this process is high and it is supplemented by knowledge of human behaviour in the face of social pressure. The following section will describe the theorization of “Infostorms” and its effects/causes related to the online user.

4.6. The Games we play

Vincent F. Hendricks and Pelle G. Hansen describe in their 2015 second edition of “Infostorms” some important effects on individuals’ opinion formation in socially-rich contexts such as the internet. This study is of high relevance for this paper due to social media platform Facebook being a frame in which these effects are very likely to be experienced in. The effects spring from situations with too much or too little information available; on top, they look at how does the presentation and selection of information influence the agent’s opinion formation. Social proof is something they take for granted and, as Facebook’s research on political mobilization and emotional contagion proves, they are not wrong in doing so.

4.6.1. Bystanders

Firstly, pluralistic ignorance and the bystander effect are causes of what the authors argue is too little information coupled with social proof. It is defined as a situation in which “*a group of decision- makers attempts to form an opinion at one and the same time based on a public signal*” (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:65) In other words, one individual in a group assumes no one in a group possess a piece of information and therefore he/she should not be expected to possess it either. When all individuals think the same, everyone ends up ignoring that they might possess the information. The effect this phenomena leads to is the bystander effect, explained by our authors in the following: “*The bystander effect expresses that the more individuals who are gathered in one place, the less is the likelihood of people coming to the aid of a person in need*” (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015::69) Therefore, pluralistic ignorance increases as the number of group member increases and the likelihood of escaping the social proof of being silent decreases.

4.6.2 Lemming effect

At opposite end is a situation in which the individual chooses to give bigger weight to information coming from the group rather than following the one possessed by him/herself. It is defined as a phenomenon that may occur “*when a number of people doubt the sufficiency of their own information and subsequently the preceding decisions and actions of others in the hope that it can lessen the doubt*” (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:87) At individual level, this phenomenon affects ones’ capacity to distinguish whether an informational cascade is pushing all those in doubt towards the edge of the cliff - a lemming effect. In the online space, this has great implications due to the algorithmical silencing of those who do not follow the herd. Authors predict the digital future as depicting only “*thumbs of approval and no finger for dissent*”. (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:111)

4.6.3. Framings

In what concerns the presentation of information, individuals and groups are also highly affected in their online interaction by this practice. The authors starts from emphasizing that today’s society is ruled by the positive freedom imperative, to personally act on and define our own goals compared to the negative one implying the absence of constraints on our actions (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015). Going against Western negative freedom - based democracy, the two authors argue that political freedom does not merely imply free choice, right information and a competitive environment. The dangers of portraying political information in a particular way might weigh economic competitiveness over right information, for example. The balance between the 3 dimensions can not be achieved. Instead, they propose Ulysses’ model of consumer democracy based on “*wisdom, sufficient knowledge and insight applied to choose the right frame*”.(Hendrick and Hansen, 2015:161). It is therefore choosing the frame that amounts for freedom of choice, not that of choosing information that will, most likely, be presented in a strategic way.

4.6.4. Polarized debates

Lastly, the authors talk about polarized people and polarized debates. Making reference to Sunstein (2013 in Hendrick and Hansen, 2015:166), they describe the basic idea of the process as moving “*groups, and the individuals who compose them, toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by their own pre-deliberation judgements*”. The mechanism that enables polarization is the bringing together of likeminded people that deliberate without being subjected to opposite and contrasting views. Polarization is therefore subject to one’s

willingness to engage with opposing views, hence connected to a high degree of information selection. In this situation, the likeliness of extreme views and groups to appear increases considerably (Cooper, Kelly, Weaver, 2004 and Sunstein, 2009 in Hendricks and Hansen, 2015). Hendricks and Hansen (2015:173) describe a study that shows the reasons most users don't engage with contradicting viewpoints are *"the homophily of the users and the composition of the social network"*. Citing the study authors of whom some work for Facebook, Hendricks and Hansen point the study's conclusion: *"(...) our work suggests that the power to expose oneself to perspectives from the other side in social media lies first and foremost with individuals."* (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015:2 in Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:173)

The polarization of individuals has been explained as having at least two reasons, one of which is social comparison. (Sunstein, 2009 in Hendricks and Hansen, 2015) Once an individual or group of individuals have empowered each other's political views, the desire of the individual to be positively perceived, even as 'the best', by the group arises. Therefore, the individual will try to construct itself in favour of what the dominating position in the group is (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015) Identity is therefore subjected to the social context and the dominating view it comes with. Another reason of polarization is thought as being authoritative arguments. Here, it is not a particular view that is being put on the pedestal, but a type of argument. Hendricks and Hansen offer the example of the 'Occupy' movement. Convincing its supporters that it is not the public, but the financial system carrying the guilt of collapse, the whole conversation and set of debates shifted in that direction. Therefore Individuals construct themselves in accordance with, among others, the strongest argument in a debate group or the type of arguments promoted by the debate.

Chapter 5 - Analysis

In order to understand whether Facebook lives up to the ideal based on communicative power developed in section 3.5 of Chapter 3, first an inquiry into what enabled the use of Facebook as a public sphere of debate is needed. Secondly, an investigation into the new sphere's characteristics will be unfolded. Following Allen's (2002) suggestion, the first question will look at how strategic power relations shaped this environment. While Arendt and Foucault agree on the peripheral, non-coercive, productive and has a role in individual's formation, they split ways when they discuss the valence of this role and whether entering into the power relation is consented or not. I will therefore take as main points of concern the issue of consent

and the valence of power relation in the identity making of the individual to interrogate the following section. The second research question will look at the characteristics of the new public sphere enabled by such strategic power relations in terms of rationality, neutrality, plurality and consensus-drive. Once the results of the analysis were laid out, they will be put together with the first question's answer and the resulting debate will be described. The two effects that will be discussed will regard the scope of the debate and the relationship between debate and participant's identity.

5.1. RQ1 - What type of power relations enable Facebook to be used as a Public Sphere?

The first research question aims at delimiting the nature of power relations on what users regard as a Facebook public sphere. While Flynn(2004) proposed an alternative way of reading power and made suggestions of best - practice based on his reading, Allen (2002) set a prerequisite for applying communicative power. Amy Allen (2002) suggests that in order to find out how to use communicative power for the formation of the individual devoted to the deliberative democracy ideal, one has to understand the strategic power that formed the individual in the first place. She proposes a dialogue between Michel Foucault who sees all power as being strategic and Hannah Arendt who only focuses on power's communicative dimension. Enabling a dialogue between the two authors, Allen (2002) argues, offers one as the antidote for the other's unilateral perspective. Therefore, by investigating the Facebook political actors by using a genealogical foucauldian analysis of strategic power, one could understand how to use Arendt's communicative power as a liberating tool for individual's subjectivity and democratic agency. Therefore, in order to find out how is power exercised when individuals use Facebook as a public sphere, the reader has to first understand what brought Facebook to be used as a public sphere in the first place.

According to Allen (2002), both Foucault and Arendt agree on the fact that power is peripheral, non-coercive, productive and has a role in individual's identity creation. The research question's inquiry would only be resolved if Facebook is analyzed at the separating point between Arendt and Foucault. This is constituted by their different views of power as being the result of consent or not and having a either positive, or negative valence on the identity creation of the individual.

Foucault's focus on the strategic nature of power comes from his theorization of disciplinary power as peripheral, non-coercive and productive, but in the same time unconsented and caging for individual's identity formation. The valence of power relations is where he parts ways with Arendt. Following Allen's (2002) suggestion, this paper will take the strategic way to identify how the use of Facebook as a public sphere was born.

Based on power's productive character, the use of power on users' subjectivity and agency in the past, genealogically speaking, also determines the power effects on individuals in the present. Whether power produced individuals as a cage or a liberating tool will determine the way users produce, in their turn, the surrounding power environment. This will determine what are the existent power-relations that keep Facebook to be used as a public sphere still. For this reason, each section will have two sub-sections: power relations' valence and the issue of consent will be discussed in the past and in the present.

The importance of the findings lays in their ability to contribute to a characterization of the resulting public sphere, as compared to the developed ideal of agency. Moreover, identifying power relations' nature when using Facebook as a public sphere will also help in the development of a normative suggestion for the use of communicative power on online democratic platforms of deliberation in chapter 6.

5.1.1. Consent to enter in a relation of power

For Foucault, power *"is not a function of consent"*⁴² and even though it *"can be the result of a prior or permanent consent . . . it is not by nature the manifestation of consensus"*⁴³.

Therefore, if the power exercised on the pseudo - public sphere of Facebook is based on prior or permanent consent without being the result of consensus, it would make the case for power to be exercised in a strategic way. In legal terms, consent is, considered as being active, therefore not relying on silence, inactivity or pre-ticked boxes.⁴⁴ Moreover, for Facebook to have consent from its users, the platform has to be clear about, among others, the type of data it collects, the type of processes it subjects it to and the purpose of data collection.

Section 4. 6 of Chapter 4 around Hendricks and Hansen's (2015) study of "Why do we like?" shows clearly that online social settings have a strong influence on individual's behaviour online. Social proof therefore is an important element in identity creation. Leveraging social proof and one's desire of belonging, Facebook makes use of the data profile of a user to direct

⁴² Foucault, 'Afterword', pp 219-29 in Allen, 2002:143

⁴³ Foucault, 'Afterword', pp 220 in Allen, 2002:143

⁴⁴ Article 7(a) of Directive 95/46/EC - General Data Protection Act April 2016

his online behaviour towards increasing engagement with content (van Dijck, 2013). Algorithms will therefore try to couple the best suitable content for the user.

On top of this, the Facebook users also has the opportunity to control what others post on his Timeline (posts, photos and photo tags). It would therefore seems that the degree of control the user is being given to decide what meaning is for her/him is rather high. The underlying element of users' decision to filter content is what they see as being meaningful. Meaningfulness is connected to the platform's *choice of display* of particular content in a particular order on the users' Newsfeed, along with *suggestions* of particular interests, groups, friends.

Because Facebook functions as a market of attention⁴⁵, having the right data on past activity and knowing what emotions to trigger gives knowledge of the right content to be displayed so that the user is more likely to engage with it. In other words, gives Facebook knowledge on what is 'meaningful' for a particular user. Consent of being in a power relation on Facebook is therefore equal to consent of 'meaning creation'. In order to find out what enabled Facebook to be used as a public sphere of debate, a genealogical analysis will be made in regards to the degree of consent in the case of data use for research purposes and Newsfeed structure. Further, the case of tagging suggestions and ads profile will be interrogated to understand the use of power relations for the maintenance of Facebook use as a public sphere.

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The Facebook research studies⁴⁶ presented in section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 have shown that several critical voice have been raised once the conducting of the studies has been made public. The publishing body placed the hot potato on Facebook's right of collecting data and argued that researchers only analysed it.⁴⁷ Still, Kashmir Hill writing for the Forbes⁴⁸ proves that at the moment of publishing, the platform did not mention anything about research purposes and it was only after 4 months that this point was introduced in the data collection section. It can therefore be argued that consent for carrying the emotional manipulation study was not obtained in its full sense, not even half-sense. Not only it was not an active approval, but it was not even

⁴⁵ See section 4.2.4.

⁴⁶ Bond et al, 2012, *A 61 - million - person experiment in social influence and political mobilization*, Nature Journal (489: 295 - 298), doi:10.1038/nature11421

⁴⁷ Editorial expression of concern http://www.pnas.org/content/111/29/10779.1.full?ijkey=8e749956ef468d6ec964db80a335d97f5c0697f5&keytype2=tf_ipsecsha

⁴⁸ Hill, June 30th 2014, *Facebook Added 'Rsearch' To User Agreement 4 Months After Emotion Manipulation Study*, Forbes, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-users-after-emotion-manipulation-study/#60b3bab610c1>

asked or mentioned. After the users have already been subjected to orchestrated meaning creation for testing purposes, Facebook informed them of the case. The choices given were to accept the situation as it was or to give up on the Facebook profile.

The second case is that of the introduction of algorithms such as Beacon and the manipulation of the Newsfeed to create meaningful flows of information. Less than two weeks after Facebook initially introduced Beacon, action group named MoveOn.org managed to organize 50.000 users against the change. (van Dijck, 2013). The service was shut in 2008 after a class action lawsuit was filed and further settled in court⁴⁹. If in 2008, the lack of consent over user data sharing was acknowledged as an issue, in 2009 the changing of the Newsfeed did not have similar results. One million people joined the "Change Facebook back to Normal!" group⁵⁰, but due to the increase in the platform's data-base, their impact was not sufficient. Officially though, after the 2008 settlement, Facebook was forced to spend \$9.5 million on a new Privacy Foundation, with appointed users as its board members. (ibid.) While default privacy settings were evolving to an all -open type as exemplified in section 4.4.1 and by Fig.3, 4 and 5 in the Appendix, the corporation decided to show its care for users' governance. Zuckerberg opened two groups to help drafting what was to be the Facebook Principles and Facebook Bill of Rights and Responsibilities. (van Dijck, 2013). Users could log and vote on the 'ballot page' what these principles and bill should entail. The process had to be finished within 30 days and include over 30% of its at the time 200 million users.(ibid.) Even though that the governance initiative failed, Principle 9 was added: *"Facebook should have a town hall process of notice and comment and a system of voting to encourage input and discourse on amendments to these Principles or to the Rights and Responsibilities"*^{51 52}(van Dijck, 2013:61) At the time of writing, September 2016, Principle 9 as stated on Facebook reads: *Facebook should have a process of notice and comment to provide transparency and encourage input on amendments to these Principles or to the Rights and Responsibilities.*⁵³ The 'townhall' character of the process seems to have vanished along with the platform's consideration for user consent in the proposed (and implemented) changes. As it shows, no consensus has managed to be established over what

⁴⁹ Lane et al v Facebook Inc. et al
https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/California_Northern_District_Court/5--08-cv-03845/Lane_et_al_v_Facebook_Inc._et_al/

⁵⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/oct/27/new-facebook-newsfeed-protest>

⁵¹ <http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/facebook-drafts-new-governing-documents-process-for-user-voting-on-policy-changes/217785>

⁵² <http://www.siliconvalleyiplicensinglaw.com/facebook-adopts-townhall-format-to-allow-users-to-comment-and-vote-on-new-statement-of-rights-and-responsibilities/>

⁵³ <https://www.facebook.com/principles.php>

type of changes should or should not be made to the platform and how meaning should be created.

The two cases presented above are examples of Facebook implementing changes with no consent and with a simulated try to reach consensus. Despite such lack of consent, users kept being subjected to data collection for research purposes and implementation of data processing algorithms. Consent was not considered, as it would have affected the maximization of connectedness and connectivity. Consequently, users started expressing themselves on the topic of the shared interest and debates also approached political interests. Aggregating algorithms facilitated the grouping of users based on their interests, whether they consented to such grouping or not. (van Dijck, 2013) When political debates rose, like-minded people were put together according to their political interests. Yet no consent was given that one should be coupled with like-minded political actors.

The lack of consent is the characteristic Foucault was using in describing strategic use of power relations. The strategic side comes from the purpose pursued by Facebook in its treatment of consent - generation of as much user data as possible. The reader can therefore guess that, in terms of consent, Facebook has been subjecting its users in a strategic exercise of power. Strategic power relations characterised by lack of consent from the subject have been carried forward towards producing huge groups around a shared interest. On the political side, such groups, made of individuals coming together on other grounds than their will, enabled debates and so the use of Facebook as a political sphere has begun.

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Facebook's strategic use of power relations in regards to user consent over platform changes has had implications for the debates carried on the online website. As interests turned towards the political sphere, the platform started being used a public sphere of debate. This section will look at how does Facebook treat consent once the platform began being used as a public sphere of debate. The case of photo tagging and ads profile is being presented below.

In a frame of political debates, not only old ways of avoiding consent were perfected for old features, but new features were also introduced.

Facial-recognition software described in section 4.4.2. brings about the topic of consent of data that is being considered "sensitive". Biometrical data is being collected and photo tags are being suggested based on this collection. It is suggested by the platform, as shown in the

upper part of Fig. 6 in the Appendix, the user can opt out from this feature. Still, the lower part of the figure shows the impossibility of this opting-out claim. Again, the user is faced with either the option of accepting the norm or leaving the platform. Despite the impression that the user has a saying in what content is being posted about him/her, this feature shows the opposite. This is a case in which Facebook is recognizing the importance of users' consent over the topic, yet it denies it strategically. Again, consent of choosing what personal content is displayed does not lay in the hands of the Facebook user.

Moreover, once Facebook started being used as a public sphere, it seems like the platforms want to take into consideration users' desires regarding the information flow of the Newsfeed. This happened even though that a research disregarded Facebook's effect on what do users choose to interact with, in an almost apologetic manner: "our work suggests that the power to expose oneself to perspectives from the other side in social media lies first and foremost with individuals".⁵⁴ Evidence presented earlier in Chapter 3 within the Digital Privacy section along with the just analysed degree of consent on algorithms usage clearly shows that social connections are not based on the user's choice of how one's online interaction is shaped. Let us still look at the last example of this section. .

Editing of one's advertisements profile has been recently added as an option for the Facebook user. Here one can select which interests should Facebook base their targeting of ads on (both political and commercial). Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the option of choosing which interests should be considered when ads are to be suggested. Still, the whole of section 4.4.3. In Chapter 4 is presenting the findings of a report that proves logged out users, non users and EU users who have explicitly opted out from tracking services are still being tracked. Therefore, even though the user has the choice of editing his advertisement profile and know where each preference is constructed from, this action has little impact over what Facebook chooses to advertise to the user. Instead of being orchestrated, here consent is given for the wrong setting.

Concluding the findings of this section, the paper will sum up the consent Facebook asked in subjecting its members. Before Facebook started being used as a democratic public sphere of deliberation, consent was not required from its users. The platform managed to implement meaning creation processes through unconsented implementation of algorithms, changes in its privacy policy and use of data for research purposes. As the number of users grew, Facebook was less and less affected by protesting voices. The shallow tries of

⁵⁴ Bakshy, Messing & Adamic, 2015:2 in Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:174)

orchestrated failure to establish consensus over platform principles and adoption of changes managed to please regulatory law bodies only. Moreover, issues about consent were only truly raised when law was invoked. The goal of avoiding such talks is the goal of the platform to have its users produce as much data as possible and for the platform to be able to collect it and hence capitalize on it. Facebook business model⁵⁵ is where the strategic use of consent was leading. Unconsented use of sorting algorithms created huge communities around shared interests, among which political issues as well. (van Dijck, 2013) This marked the use of Facebook as a public sphere of debate. Once the platform started being used as a sphere of debate, Facebook began showing interest in consent to the extent of pretending it allows for user autonomy of decision. The purpose of this superficial approach was the perpetuation of its already-successful business model. Moreover, as the platform grew, opponents represented a smaller and smaller percentage of the total of subscribers. Facebook carried forward its approach to consent that enabled the use of public sphere in the first place. Therefore, what maintains Facebook's political debate use is the same strategic character of consent it brought it into being. Political debates are carried in an environment in which meaning creation is not the outcome of user consent.

In order to further understand the type of power relations present while using Facebook as a public sphere of debate, the paper will investigate the valence of power relations.

5.1.2. Valence of power relations in connection to identity creation

The implications of Facebook's business model⁵⁶ for the creation of meaning are highly considerable in discussing the valence of power exercised and the nature of its effects on the user's subjectivity, hence identity creation. The section above proved that consent is not something that Facebook has as priority when considering meaning creation for its users. Firstly, it will be proved that Facebook as a social platform has a role in identity creation by having an effect on user's subjectivity and agency. Further, it will be looked at how did Facebook got to be used as a public sphere of deliberation through its influence on the users' identity making. The last part of this section will discuss the mechanism through which Facebook ensures its usage as a platform of deliberation.

⁵⁵ See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4

⁵⁶ See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4

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In order for a power relation to exist, the individual has to be able to become an agent. According to both Arendt and Foucault (Allen, 2002), power is exercised upon individuals that have the ability to act. But acting means requires subjectivity (ibid.). If power is a requirement for acting individuals, then it is also one for one's subjectivity. Identity formation is subsequently affected by power relations..

On Facebook, affecting one's subjectivity means inscribing meaning into the user. Berger and Milkman (2011) showed that virality of content is connected to the use of particular emotions. Therefore, in order for content to reach virality, engage a big number of users and pursue its purpose of producing as much data as possible for the business model to work, it has to be first rendered as meaningful for the one engaging with it. Facebook recognized the potential of emotions as a tool in achieving virality and was involved in a study that manipulated users' Newsfeed to conclude that political mobilization of users is subject to their social network's voting behaviour.⁵⁷ Therefore, emotional use of content began to be used in order to achieve the highest rate of engagement with the content. Algorithms were used in order to provide the user with a meaningful stream of information, meaning that was programmed based on collection of data regarding users' interests and past activity. (van Dijck, 2013) By using such algorithms, combined with use of emotions, the platform managed to subjectify users. Their subjectification was observed in virality orchestration, a process that is being spelled out on their website in the advertisement page.⁵⁸ This claim can simply be recognized in Facebook's first sentence on the aforementioned page: "Meet the people who'll love your business!". As proved by the section above, meaning creation is not a function of consent, still it manages to subjectify the user.

On Facebook, agency is acting with a click. Liking, sharing and commenting are indicators that the user finds a piece of information meaningful, therefore are subjectified by it and act upon their subjectification. The difference between online agency and offline agency lays in the effort the subject has to put in in order to act. Because Agency is not as complex as in real life, power is a lot more effective and subjectivity turns into agency a lot faster. Being convinced of information as being meaningful turns into online support a lot easier because all actions the user has to take is click.

⁵⁷ Bond et al, 2012, *A 61 - million - person experiment in social influence and political mobilization*, Nature Journal (489: 295 - 298), doi:10.1038/nature11421

⁵⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/business>

The ease of acting is not the only difference between online and offline agency. The audience is also changed: *“Facebook adds the dimension of having to manage identity across a web of undifferentiated associations (for example, family, friends and co-workers”* (Marichal, 2012:108) Therefore, being an agent in the online space involves combined audiences of different actors that would constitute the social proof influence. The nature of interaction is dependent on how the space is structured (Goffman, 1959 in Marichal, 2012). While in real life, interaction requires a degree of concealment in the sense that a story said to one’s boss is different than the same story to one’s wife. Therefore, the openness of different Facebook audiences stops the user from fully revealing its persona. Due to this diversity of audiences and interests, a performative nature of identities emerged on Facebook that would help the user please all in his/her social network. (Marichal, 2012). A relevant example is a Facebook group called “War”, whose only description is “why”: *“The group was simply a means of drawing likeminded users to serve as the audience for the performance of political identity”* (Marichal, 2012:107)

Section 4.6 of Chapter 4 around Hendricks and Hansen’s (2015) study of “Why do we like?” shows that online social settings have a strong influence on individual’s behaviour online. Social proof therefore is an important element in identity creation, both in inscribing meaning, but also in performing meaning. This proves the social character of power relations exercised by Facebook in influencing users’ subjectivity and agency through meaning creation.

Enhanced by aggregating algorithms, audiences with a political interest were part of the Facebook users’ social network.(van Dijck, 2013) Due to the social proof effect mentioned above, such audiences became audiences for users that turned into performers of an identity that took a political nature, such as the “War” group. Social performative identities therefore enabled political performative identities. (Marichal, 2012) Subjectivity through meaning creation enabled by social power relations gave rise to action fueled by the same social proof. In political terms, such online activism has been termed as clicktivism (White, 2010) or slacktivism (Morozov, 2011) carried out with the purpose of a *“mad shopping binge on the online identity supermarket that is Facebook - that makes online activists feel useful and important while having precious little political impact* (Morozov, 2011:190)

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The rise of clicktivism(White, 2010) and slacktivism(Morozov, 2011) showed the rising interest of Facebook subscribers in political issues. When expressing oneself on Facebook, the individual is already carrying pre-inscribed ideas from past experiences, it does not enter a debate as a tabula rasa. In real life it happens the same, the individual being subjected to particular power relations in the past that inscribed upon him particular norms. Whether using emotions or rationality to reach the individual, he/she is constructed by its past environments and experiences. The difference on Facebook is that the platform knows exactly what is efficient for each individual to subject him/her to a norm. Using the findings from emotional manipulation studies and interests identified through data collection, the platform frames information accordingly. Self-expression therefore takes place in an environment designed to agree with the user's opinions. Moreover, Facebook not only sets the frame for the user so that performance of its identity is encouraged in order to keep the audiences entertained. It also, offers the performance tools, as Marichal (2012: 106) puts it: *"Nevertheless, Facebook as a setting does provide tools for performance. Through photographs, icons, symbols and so on, users can receive cues on appropriate behaviour through things like how many people 'like' a group, or how many members join. Facebook also provides a range of presentation styles: textual differences, photos, video and narratives"*. Such tools of performance are aimed at engaging both the audiences and the performer in order for as much data to be created around their interactions. Data is directly connected to Facebook's business model, being the fuel behind its advertising tools. Therefore, the Facebook business model is based on performative identities and the platform encourages this practice as much as possible.

Political identity performances have several effects for the identity creation of the user. I will further discuss the cases of polarized individuals and of spirals of silence.

In the light of performative identity, such individuals will seek to please their already-given audience. The individual will lean into extremism without rationally having arguments explaining his behaviour. (Hendricks and Hansen 2015) Argumentation is no longer required because the surroundings are already convinced and there is no one around to voice dissent. Lemming effects as those described in section 4.6.2. of Chapter 4 are easy to predict due to the vast amounts of information and algorithmical herding of like-minded users. As Figure 7.2. Shows, Facebook teaches political campaigners to "Help people decide!". This orchestration

affects directly the online citizen's subjectivity by clustering its opportunities of development when presented with different contexts and perspectives. What Hendricks and Hansen(2015) described as polarized individuals find in Facebook's network dynamics a great environment for development. As explained at the end of Chapter 4's section 4.6.4., polarization has as effect the construction of the individual in accordance with the strongest argument of a debate or the type of arguments accepted. Making the connection between populism and the rise of extremism Dahlgren (2016) points that the challenging need to distinguish between the "*media's attempt to cater to the popular tastes of audiences and the effective existence of an upswing in populist tendencies*". Moreover, Bos and Brants (2014 in Dahlgren, 2016) argue that what was coined as media populism is the effect of profit-driven journalists. In the light of 62% of adults⁵⁹ relying on Facebook to get informed on the news, the platform's recent scandal⁶⁰ regarding the Trending section presented in section 4.2.4 (Chapter 4) and business model based on virality orchestration. The strategy of the platform becomes clear. Power relations are used to subjectify and turn individuals into online agents for the sake of the business model, despite such orchestration might come at the expense of political destabilization. Rising political extremism from polarized Facebook users is one of the effects of this virality orchestration.

The next section will investigate the effect of bystanders as described by Hendricks and Hansen. It will therefore test whether it applies on the effect power relations have on the Facebook user's identity creation. The situation of diverse and unknown audiences on the Facebook platform not only pressures the creation of user identity due to social proof, but also due to fear of the unknown. Rather than performing a particular semi-identity to please all as explained in the section above, the individual might choose not to express at all if he/she feels no one else knows what to say. In other words, one individual in a group assumes no one in a group possess a piece of information and therefore he/she should not be expected to possess it either. When all individuals think the same, everyone ends up ignoring that they might possess the information. The effect this phenomena leads to is the bystander effect, explained by our authors in the following: "*The bystander effect expresses that the more individuals who are gathered in one place, the less is the likelihood of people coming to the aid of a person in need*" (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015:69) Therefore, pluralistic ignorance increases as the number of group member increases and the likelihood of escaping the social proof of being silent decreases.

⁵⁹ <https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/26/most-people-get-their-news-from-social-media-says-report/>

⁶⁰ <http://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006>

Section 4.5.1. In Chapter 4 presented two cases of censorship : an online spiral of silence and authoritarian predictive individual censorship. Firstly, self expression on Facebook is more likely to happen if the user knows the audience will agree with his view.(Stoycheff,2016). In other words, silence is more likely to happen when the discussion environment is perceived as having different opinion. Moreover, if the Facebook user knows that his online audience disagrees with his/her point of view, not only he will not post anything about it online, but he will not discuss the topic in offline environments either. (ibid.) Therefore the user associated the online audience he is programmed to have according to collected data with his offline audience constructed in the absence of algorithms. The behaviour one had in the online environment reflected on his offline self-expression of thoughts. The spiral of silence (Noelle - Neumann, 1974) experienced in online context turns into one offline. Even though Facebook's algorithms work towards bringing like-minded people together, some users might get interested in some topics from offline spheres that can not be intercepted by Facebook's data mining. Therefore, they will not know what stance of the audience is concerning that issue. Knowing that fear of dissent makes Facebook users keep their thoughts to themselves both online and offline(ibid.) , the implications of algorithms for self expression are immense. Both self expression online and offline are clustered by user' dependency of the network's common sense on the issue in what this paper see as self-censorship. Hence, it is very unlikely that a user that fears dissent from his Facebook network and chooses not to talk about it in the offline world will create his/her identity as an actor in the public sphere.

Secondly, the example of authoritarian regimes censoring their online users individually according to their online activity is connected to self-expression on Facebook. As Morozov notes in Chapter 4, the difference between such systems and targeted advertising is that "*one system learns everything about us to show us more relevant advertisements, while the other one learns everything about us to ban us from accessing relevant pages*".(2011:97) Facebook is more than a platform for online targeted advertising, it is a market of attention.⁶¹ On top of displaying ads, Facebook works for itself to display content that would trigger as much engagement as possible from its users. In doing so, the platform stops the user from seeing content that might not be relevant in terms of past activity, but which could lead to developing new interests. In a scandal dating end of July 2016, the platform admitted to block links sending to Wikileaks files of DNC.⁶²

⁶¹ See section 4.2.4. In Chapter 4

⁶² <https://www.rt.com/news/353340-facebook-blocked-wikileaks-dnc/>

The identity formation of the online Facebook user debating on the pseudo - public sphere is highly influenced by the use of the platform. Inscribing meaning onto the users proves its ability to subjectify them, while their online engagement through clicks shows the effect on their online agency. Firstly, the platform's use was not attribute political nature. In this case, the effect on users' identity was a performative (Marichal, 2012) character inscribed by the diversity of audiences and their unknown takes on a matter. Once these audiences politicized, the performance became political too. The use of Facebook as a public sphere was enabled by structures and tools enabling performative identity. Further, the maintenance of this use has been done by further encouraging political performances online. Teaching political campaigners how to embrace populist discourses and marketing tools, Facebook used its power relations in order to feed, again, into its business model based on advertising.⁶³ The structure and tools provided for identity performance, along with social proof, enabled the polarization of individuals into extremist political views. On the other hand, users refuse to act when they have the perception that those around them don't act either. Bystanders effects feed into spirals of silence that have an encapsulating role for the identity creation process both in online and offline settings. Power relations of social nature are therefore carried out by the strategic use of emotions for the creation of meaning (subjectivity) and of algorithms for the strategic use of clicks (agency). The cognitive force Flynn(2004) mentions in his wide reading of communicative power is used to cage the individual.

Summing up..

Further, this section will sum up the findings of this research questions regarding the way power is exercised when Facebook is used as a public sphere of deliberation. In what concerns the platform's approach to consent, the implementation of algorithms for meaning creation was not subjected to consent in the past. When such misconduct was noticed, the corporation orchestrated an attempt to offer a platform for democratization of governance. Failure resulted in the platform continuing its implementation of unconsented changes. When concerns were raised over the implementation of photo tagging and tracking offline users, non-users and those who opted out, the platform already had enough social power to ignore the concerns. With their strategic avoidance to implement effective mechanisms of consent, Facebook managed to turn data collection into a accepted unconsented norm in order to feed its

⁶³ See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4

business model. Such example confirms Foucault's characterization of strategic power as independent of consent.

Secondly, the valence of power effects in the identity creation of the individuals has also proved to have a strategic nature.. First, it made sure it has the capability to influence users' subjectivity through delivering meaning. Secondly, encouraging individuals to become actors and like, share, comment on content. This proved that indeed power does affect the identity creation of the Facebook user by affecting its subjectivity and agency. This confirmation and Facebook's construction of the space of interaction faced the user with diverse audiences and influence of social proof. (Marichal, 2012) Provided the tools and environment, identity became a performance. (ibid.) These dynamics enabled the use of Facebook as a public sphere and once political discussion rose in popularity, the performance of identities became political. In order to pursue the same sharing imperative directed at their business model, political identity was encouraged in the forms of clicktivism (White, 2010) or slacktivism (Morozov, 2011) In order to keep the use of Facebook as a public sphere, the platform now provides tools for pre-setting audiences. This feeds into engaging as many as possible and making the dissemination of information effective. Data production and hence collection is the ultimate purpose and performative identities are the perfect tool. By enabling polarization of individuals and bystanders effects, Facebook political identity formation is characterised by political extremism and spirals of silence. Despite being an effective tool for profit-maximization, Facebook's approach to consent and the effect of exercising power on the creation of individuals identity are encapsulating the natural healthy social development of humans. By clustering the frame in which the individual develops its identity online, the identity itself is clustered.

The power existent on Facebook is social power. The analysis of Facebook's approach to consent and its enabling and encouragement of performative identity (Marichal, 2012) ensure the platform's business model is sufficed. Exercised in a strategic way, it is what rendered the platform alive in the first place and it is what keeps individuals active in using it as a deliberative space. Social power is what Facebook has been build on as a social platform, but analysis of early power relations's use show its strategic character. From disregarding consent to enabling performative identities, the platform managed to turn social power against its users. In order to encourage being used as a public sphere of deliberation, Facebook also teaches its users to strategically use social power through clicktivism (White, 2010). Therefore the strategic use of social power that feeds into the platform's business model made Facebook into being used as a public sphere and is being reinstated every time users choose to use social power in the same strategic manner.

5.2. RQ2. What are the characteristics of the new type of pseudo - public sphere?

According to the first question's answer, strategic exercise of social power is what enabled and keeps active the use of Facebook as a public sphere of debate. The second research question will look at what is the nature of Facebook's pseudo - public sphere dimension as determined by unconsented participation in social power relations and individuals' identity being caged by such subjectification to power. In order for me to analyze this I will look at 4 characteristics of the public sphere: rationality, neutrality, pluralism and consensus.

5.2.1. Rationality

As a democratic public sphere, Facebook is supposed to promote rational flow of ideas within political debates. Habermas' model is a procedural one that guarantees such rationality can be achieved. Facebook proves the opposite. Despite having laid out their type of collected data and use of it, the rationality of the online citizen is far from being reached. If such information would reach the user in a purely communicative form of action, without any strategic use of argumentation, perhaps there would be higher chances of success. But, as proved by the findings from the first research question, the type of action on Facebook is far from being a communicative one. This has an effect on how efficient is a procedural approach to gaining rationality on the Facebook public sphere. The giant lives up to the procedures, yet it manages to act strategically on other side. The platform uses programmable algorithms that predict the wishes of its users in order to maximize the generation of data. (van Dijck, 2013) It then suggests either what advertisers have paid for, either what seems to be more 'meaningful flow of information'. (ibid.) Rationality of the lifeworld is overtaken by the rationality of money and power, therefore changing its meaning. The way the individual creates its identity is according to the sharing imperative and what the social surrounding dictates to be socially - accepted. As shown in Figure 7.1 and 7.2, emotional framing of information is very important in order to get supporters during a political campaign on Facebook. In this context, rationality is not what characterizes the public sphere of debate.

5.2.2. Neutrality

The social surrounding after which the individual chooses to construct itself is dictated by the very platform that enabled it. Therefore, not only is the online citizen irrational in its decision making, but his/her irrationality is encouraged by Facebook's lack of neutrality as a social platform.

The power relations existent on the platform are dependent on these 2 mediums: money and power. Social power is used in a strategic way to either produce profit, either to be turned in political power. Facebook therefore becomes both a market and a system of administrative power. As mentioned above, programmable algorithms assume. The way they will assume is in line with either seizing more money either more power. Through their assumption, they take some pieces of information for granted, such as the desire of the individual to be with like-minded people and incorporate it in Facebook's suggestions. Rather than letting users' social networks develop in an organic way as it happens in real - life, Facebook encourages their maximum expansion in a declared effort to "connect the world". Algorithmical bias is not the only type of bias Facebook is inscribed by definition with. The recent scandal regarding the 'Trending' section being filtered against conservative news shows the lack of objectivity. Facebook proves therefore to be acting like a classic media outlet and makes no exception from journalistic bias.⁶⁴

5.2.3. Pluralistic

Challenging the homogeneity of the Habermasian public sphere, Fraser proposed micro meso and macro publics as oppositional spheres with competing interests and counterpublics as those challenging status quo. Facebook welcomes all these different interests on its platform because they come in numbers. The more interests, the more users. Once on the platform though, Facebook has to monetize on their presence. Therefore it will seek to make user generate data by facilitating the creation of common interest communities. Accordingly, users will be coupled with other like-minded users in order to boost engagement.⁶⁵ The stronger the community, the more support it will generate and therefore the louder its voice will be. But, as support lays within one click, many communities gained online support even though in reality they have none. More and more interests appear on Facebook's market of attention⁶⁶, competing for the users' time. In the light of performative identity and multitude of interests, new

⁶⁴ <http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/facebook-bias/>

⁶⁵ As the previous research question showed, users are more likely to express themselves in front of audiences that they know already agree with their point.

⁶⁶ See section 4.2.4. In Chapter 4

public spheres can be created by the platform by simply enabling algorithms in a particular direction. Because the way they gain publicity is via emotions and clicks, such groups are superficially supported by users who are part of sometimes other hundreds of other publics operating at different levels and even in counteraction with each other. Therefore, the use of Facebook as a public sphere does not encourage homogeneity of interests for the sake of diversity and constructive criticism (Calhoun, 1992), but rather due to potential of grouping into new consensu-driven communities. Due to the performative identity effects on individuals, the oppositional public spheres often encounter similar actors who are not concerned about the debate itself, but rather about their perception in front of the audience. Hence, while pluralism is embraced on Facebook, its use as a public sphere deteriorates the quality of oppositional public spheres and the debate carried forward.

5.2.4. Consensus

Habermasian critics that were presented in chapter 3 mentioned that the public sphere is not consensus - driven. (Mouffe, in Kapoor, 2002) Instead, in the context of pluralistic spheres, it is a negotiated compromise. On Facebook, consensus is not negotiated but rather orchestrated by keeping opposing voices as far away from each other as possible. Prior sections have proven the interests followed by this categorization and showed the impact on individual identity making. Targeting the users' fear of dissent, the platform developed algorithms that facilitate the political polarization of all users and even translate in self-censorship in the offline world. (Stoycheff, 2016) Not only does the platform act in such way with its users and their political interests, but it also offers the resources for political campaigners to act in the same direction, in a strategic manner. Due to the productive character of power relations exercised on Facebook (Foucault, Arendt in Allen, 2002), consensus can be reinforced by the user's social network and therefore disseminated into other social spaces too. Consensus lays in the context of Facebook as being in the hands of some, rather an outcome of deliberation. In this respect, reaching consensus means reaching a common sense by getting rid, rather than arguing against the opposition and reaching for those whose interests make them more inclined to adopt the proposed common sense with no critical inquiry. Because common sense is based on judgement and opinions (Arendt in Allen, 2002) , it becomes a weapon of mass control in the hands of those who pay to get access to relevant information about how their interests can be sold to the right audience. In the example of online israeli 'hesbara' counteracted by the online BDS movement⁶⁷ presented in section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4,

⁶⁷ Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions - <https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds>

the governmental - powered body has 'weapons' that BDS does not possess. Even though they both have access to Facebook marketing techniques, the organization of 'war rooms' and payments to students for their online activity aims at masking administrative power by what it would look like as public opinion. Orchestrating public opinion is therefore enabled by the orchestration of common sense.

Summing up

The main findings of this research questions regard the characteristics of the Facebook pseudo-public sphere. The rationality of the online activist is highly affected by emotional framing of information⁶⁸. This is determined by the platform's lack of neutrality when used as a political sphere of debate. Due to its business model, the platform dictates the surroundings in which the debate takes place according to its status of a system of power and money. Pluralism is only embraced on the platform due to the high numbers of users it involves. The reason, linked to Facebook's business model, is the regrouping of different shared interests into audiences for advertisers and other identity performers. Whoever pays for the service, gets to enable an audience for his/her discourse. Pluralism is of great use to Facebook, but not because of its constructive critique. Out of the contrary, due to the ease of orchestrating consensus. Orchestrating public opinion is an easy task on Facebook due to programmable algorithms of sorting users into desired audiences, orchestrating meaning and virality.

5.3. The Facebook Debate

On Facebook, the strategic use of social power is turned into economic and political power. Therefore, the conflict is not between economic power of businesses and administrative power of the state (Habermas, 1989). Rather, communicative power needed to legitimize laws has to fight social power used to manipulate public opinion when driven by economic and political imperative. Activists that try to destabilize systems of power unfortunately fail to see that it is social power they have to fight against in the end, and not stop at defeating administrative and economic one. Rather, by using the same types of campaigns, activists feed into social power. On Facebook, social power is what defines the platform from its roots, it is what enabled it in the first place and is what keeps it alive. Facebook is therefore built as a public sphere of

⁶⁸ Kramer et al, 2013, Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks, PNAS, vol. 111(24), 8788-8790; doi:10.1073/pnas.1320040111

debate on the basis of a strategic use of social power. Communicative power is used as a mere paravan. In order to understand how to use communicative power against strategic social power, one has to first understand the purpose and the effects of strategic social power.

Purpose

The first research question showed that the reason social power has been exercised in a strategic manner is due to the platform's development of a business model. Once this has been established, it gave rise to performance identities.(Marichal, 2012) Moreover, the second question showed that the sphere's pluralism is only encouraged due to its potential to attract large numbers of users who can be later organized in different audiences for different marketeers. This turned the platform that is being used now as a platform of debate into a market of attention⁶⁹. Users' attention is limited and valuable. The tension arising due to the scarcity of attention faced with so much information flow has outcomes for the debate purpose.

In reality, a public sphere is driven by and drives in its turn the type of deliberation. It is a circular self-empowering system based on the premise that the public sphere is alive only when individuals come together and are active.(Flynn, 2004) When Facebook is used as a public sphere of deliberation, the debate has to share the users' attention with commercial and social imperatives and hence borrows similar techniques as its competitors to gain attention. Marketing techniques and performative identities distract the purpose of the political deliberation, as they are both driven by hunger particular meanings' virality. When Facebook enabled its business model⁷⁰ and started offering political campaigners information about the desired targets, it also enabled campaigners to subjectify their target-groups. On Facebook therefore, individuals not driving the debate, but the person behind the debate drives individuals. Therefore, users are made active to feed the platform's business model. Performative identities, on the other hand, look at the debate as a way of performing in front of an audience. /Marichal, 2012), agreeing with the strongest argument available. (Hendrick and Hansen, 2015). The political quality of the debate is therefore deteriorated by the use of commercial technique to boost the virality of a debate and the performative nature of individuals' identities. The Facebook political debate's purpose is double folded, according to who is using it as a tool: to subjectify as many as possible for the political marketeer and to serve as an audience for the performative individual.

⁶⁹ See section 4.2.4. In Chapter 4

⁷⁰ See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4

Effects:

The uses the Facebook political debate can be put at are framed in a public sphere that allows for technical creation of new audiences through algorithms, manipulation of existing ones through emotions and the orchestration of consensus according to the actor who pays for the service of having and playing with his/her own online public sphere of debate. This paying actor will be called a “public sphere owner”. The implications for democratic order are complex and multi-folded. I will further elaborate on the effects of this phenomena on democratic action.

The purpose of the debate is, regardless to the actor that is in control of it - a paying owner or a non paying performative individual, virality of orchestrated meaning. The quality of consensus is not important, as long as the desired message gets across as many as possible. In this respect, when opposite arguments than the desired ones are met, the public sphere acts according to its owner (either marketeer, either identity performer, sometimes both). The individual arguing against the established consensus has his statement swiped away by the crowd. The effect on the opposing individual is either convincing him that he/she was wrong through the power of the lemming effect⁷¹, either not convincing him/her was wrong, but still silencing him/her. Lemming effects lead to polarized people, polarized debates (Hendricks and Hanse, 2015) and political extremist performative identities(Dahlgren, 2016; Marichal, 2012). On the other hand, silencing individuals without convincing them of their wrong beliefs leads to more extremism or self-censorship.

Moreover, performative identity makes the individual focus on sketching arguments of a theoretical solution, rather than deepening one's understanding or further developing the empirical frame of political change. Being constructed by individuals who use arguments as identity stunts in front of social pressure of the public sphere, the debate becomes time pressured and superficial.(Hendricks and Hansen, 2015; Marichal, 2012) As Hendricks and Hansen argue, *“it becomes clear that people mostly subscribe to the conviction due to the social proof or social influence bias rather than personal preferences, convincing arguments and truthful information, the bubble may burst or deflate just like in finance.”* (Hendricks and Hansen, 2015 : 287) This type of debate is therefore leading towards a fragile basis of real support for a cause. Having so little time allocated to a cause and getting distracted by other suggestions or ads, the identity of the online activist is limited to merely debating and never acting with more than clicks (White, 2010; Morozov, 2011). Hence, Facebook numbs out the true agency of users by keeping them occupied with subjectivity loops.

⁷¹ See section 4.6.2. In Chapter 4

In conclusion, it can be argued that the debate, in Facebook terms, either works as a tranquilizer for action, either as an enabler for irrational extremist one. The effects on democratic actions are therefore connected to encouraged political extremism and self-censorship. Deliberative democracy based on these premises becomes an opportunity for those who can pay to learn how to gain and exercise social power in their own interest.

Using Facebook as a public sphere of debate is therefore far from meeting the normative and moderate ideal for democratic agency in the public sphere. Rather than developing communicative power against the pitfalls of social power, Facebook uses social power strategically to produce more political and economical power. Rationality, neutrality and embrace of pluralism are all driven by economic and political imperatives masked through orchestration of consensus via communicative use of social power.

5.4. Limitations

The normative and moderated ideal for democratic agency in the public sphere was developed on Flynn(2004) critique of Habermas' reading of communicative power and Arendt's theorization of the concept as an antidote to Foucault's strategic power. While Habermas borrowed the term from her, he was also criticized by Flynn(2004), but no explanation was given on how Flynn(2004)'s critique affected the initial arendtian concept. A section explaining how Flynn(2004)'s wide reading of Habermas' communicative power connects to Arendt's view would have added value to the theory developed by this thesis.

Secondly, after finding out how did Facebook constructed itself into being used a public sphere of debate through a study of consent and valence of power, more research into the productive dimension of power could have added further insights into the topic within the second research question. Due to the social setting in which deliberation occurs on Facebook, looking at power from a strategic - productive point of view would have provided understanding of the self-empowering sharing norms the platform is supporting.

Moreover, as communicative power is , according to the normative, moderated ideal of agency in the public sphere, used to fight the strategic utilization of social power, it would have been sound to understand how social power can also be used in a communicative way. In this respect the ideal could have been enriched with a more thorough understanding of social power.

Finally, an enriched technological understanding of the complex algorithmic system and Facebook tools could have bettered this analysis of the power relations. This could have been

used when describing the effects of power relations on one's identity formation when using Facebook as a public sphere. For example, understanding how exactly does Facebook prioritize some interests over others in making suggestions of content to the user. Technological knowledge could have also been used better when developing the extended and moderated ideal of agency in the public sphere so that the gap between its theoretical side and empirical application could be reduced to a minimum.

Chapter 6 - Discussion

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the moderated and extended normative ideal for democratic agency is built on Hannah Arendt's theory and critics of the public sphere with an emphasis on Flynn's wide reading of communicative power. Both of these two topics have been discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4 of Chapter 3 and the ideal was developed in 3.5. But in order for the ideal to be implemented correctly, as Allen (2002) suggests, one has to understand the genealogy of what brought a system into being. This was what the first research question aimed at. On top, the paper went further and explored the effects of using Facebook as a public sphere of deliberation and what is the new pseudo-sphere characterised by.

Firstly, Facebook's business model based on algorithms and advertising was not one that users consented for, but it enabled virality stunts of created meaning that appealed to political publics. By inscribing meaning into users and convincing them that clicks equal action, Facebook managed to subjectify its users. The effect was performance identity (Marichal, 2012) that translated into clicktivism (White, 2010) and further into political extremism due to polarized identities (Hendricks and Hanse, 2015) and spirals of silence due to hidden identities. (Stoycheff, 2016) The second research question characterised the public sphere as promoting irrational behaviour due to emotional framing of content and lack of neutrality when setting the context of one's identity formation based on money and political power. Further, plurality is only embraced so masses can be reorganized, hence consensus is orchestrated. The debate takes place in a market of attention⁷², having as a purpose its virality, rather than quality of argument. Performative identities render the life of such debates and hence public spheres, temporary.

In order to apply the ideal of democratic agency on an online platform of deliberation, one has to use communicative power to legitimize laws but also to fight, according to Flynn (2004), social power, not only economical and administrative one. The inquiry into the Facebook case proved that social power is used in a strategic manner to render a pseudo public

⁷² See section 4.2.4. In Chapter 4

sphere possible and alive. The following application of the theoretical ideal will therefore use knowledge from this paper's findings, Arendt's theory of communicative power and suggestions made by Flynn (2004).

6.1. Proposed model

Flynn(2004) called for weak publics to use communicative power in order to battle both economic and administrative functions, but without overtaking their functions. For an online platform that would live up to this paper's extended and mediated normative for democratic agency, separation between social, political and economic dimension. As mentioned at the end of the second research question, the public sphere dimension of Facebook is situated in a market of attention⁷³. This market of attention is one incorporating social, political and commercial content. For an online public sphere to function, it can not be situated at the crossing of these three domains.

6.1.1. Differentiating between contexts

While having a social and political environment can not be forbidden due to freedom of speech, political expression should not be encouraged by the platform. Political content is sensitive to be brought out in the public because, as mentioned by Flynn(2004), social power can be turned into political power by manipulation of public opinion. For example, Kim Kardashian starting to talk about her preference for Hillary Clinton as the next US president due to feminist reasons⁷⁴ can have an important effect over election results.⁷⁵ Secondly, commercial content should never interfere in the online public sphere of debate due to the post-westphalian world order described in the introduction of this thesis. A platform that allows the two coming together will, as Facebook did, allow also for online political campaigns to take the shape of online targeted marketing. This is exactly what Flynn(2004) referred to when he stated that fighting social power with communicative power should not take the functions of economic power. It therefore applies market principles on political issues that should be dominated by democratic imperatives, rather than those of capital. Moreover, the competitiveness of the framework would do deteriorate the rationality of the arguments and change the purpose of the

⁷³ See section 4.2.4. In Chapter 4

⁷⁴ <http://www.bustle.com/articles/167405-kim-kardashian-comes-clean-about-her-political-leanings-she-has-a-unique-perspective-on-the>

⁷⁵ Considering that her Facebook page has over 29 million likes (!), when confronted with Kim's choice, a considerable percentage of her supporters might start thinking Hillary Clinton is indeed the right choice. When entering a debate on the topic, their argument might be that "Feminist Kardashian said so". One can therefore understand how the quality of a debate would be affected and that of democratic election in consequence.

debate. The third combination of commercial and social sphere does not represent the object of this paper, but if the two contexts are to be merged, consent over one's data processing should be the focus of thorough investigations from different bodies. Below a recommendation of content separation online for ideal democratic deliberation is suggested:




Fig. 14

6.1.2. Homogeneity and Consensus

Facebook's analysis proved that bringing like-minded online users together does not benefit deliberative politics due to polarization and rise of extremism, among others. The ideal democratic platform should, therefore, allow for nonhomogeneous environments, despite users' desire to express opinions to audiences that agree with them. Oppositional voices should be embraced and used as constructive criticism, instead of being pushed aside because of not getting enough supporters, as in the case of lemming effects described by Hendricks and Hansen (2015). Hence, consensus should not be the end point of a debate, nor its focus. Instead, the quality of the debate itself should be the goal and all efforts should be directed towards ensuring that arguments are rational, true and relevant. This would also involve the death of algorithms that suggest content based on past activity and consequently of communities of sameness that violently remove any form of discontent. By letting users argument for their views against opposing ones without making use of emotional heavy points, performative identities would be discouraged. Identity formation would take place in a context of political debate that not only requires valid and relevant information, but also sound debating

skills. All sides could benefit by bringing their arguments to the table and learning from their mistakes.

Learning from mistakes, rather than striving for consensus is what the value of homogeneity is perceived here as. Communicative power should be used by making reference to Arendt's (in Allen, 2002) differentiation between political thinking and philosophical thinking. While the first one relies on pre-set common sense and is mere opinion, philosophical thinking aims at eliminating frames of thought and turn into a conversation with oneself (ibid.). Therefore, when the individual is encouraged to learn from his mistakes, it should be done so without making reference to what the outcome of the process should be in political terms or what is considered as being politically-correct by the community.

In what concerns one's awareness of his/her debate techniques, the online platform could facilitate the public sphere with a tool of logging users' deliberation activity. For example, if a user's arguments have been deemed as valid/invalid by the community, he /she would only get his feedback logged if the community also specifies the reasons for (lack of) validity. The user can therefore look at the mistakes he makes, learn from them and understand where his flaws in the debating process arise. For example, if the user takes on the role of customer instead of the citizen during a debate and this attitude is reported, he/she should think about what interests made him/her take this stance, regardless of the community. In the illustration below, all column should be made accessible to the public but the last one which could be made accessible if the user desires to.

Forum no.	Topic	Community Feedback	Personal feedback
453	Gold mining in Romania	Solid argument due to mentioning of.. when in the context of..	Awesome, going to type of argument again
92	Evaluation of educational system	Weak argument due to mentioning of.. in the context of...	Maybe it is my school where I learnt that there's just one way of doing things right and groupwork is cheating

Fig. 15

The mechanism suggested above would not only allow the user to track his arguments and their quality, but also others' ones. Trolls would be easily spotted therefore.

6.1.3. Neutrality

In order for the online platform to allow neutral public spheres of deliberation to function, it should be put under scrutiny and provide all necessary tools to be scrutinized. Such tools are to be constituted by encouraged critique and transparency. The necessity of transparency is connected to critique in that if one is to offer a critical account of a topic/situation as described in the section above, it has to be able to analyse the situation in a non-framed context of information disclosure. While the above section mentioned critique towards oneself and others, the following section points at critique towards the platform as an indicator of its neutrality.

Transparency

Procedural and normative transparency in regards to decision - making process, the identified conflict of interests of its members, who decides and what constitutes criteria of validity of arguments. Procedural and technological design should be available for all to research and understand in an effort to build trust in the platform and to attract positive criticism that enhances its neutrality. Hence, the suggestion is that, technologically speaking, the platform should be based on open-source software that allows for proposals and organized interventions on how can it be bettered and protected from hacks. Moreover, consent would therefore have to be actually obtained, not orchestrated as the Facebook case proved to be. The user would have to explicitly choose to opt in rather than opt out particular settings and features. Hence, default privacy settings would have to be closed and let the user decide on who his/her data should be available to. Moreover, information should not be sorted by the platform according to algorithms unless chosen by the user. For example, on a public sphere's newsfeed, there should be an option for the user to choose the display of posts according to date, popularity, relevant words. In this way, consent would be required constantly on the use of individuals' data. Nevertheless, the user should have the option of not using any of these sorting mechanisms, therefore not giving consent, and simply scroll through in a chronological order.

On the other hand, the platform should promote transparency on its members' declared conflicts of interests, on how is the decision making process being conducted and what is the criteria of choosing an argument over the other. It should be made clear by the public sphere that some exercises of power were done in a strategic way and that is the reason they were rejected. The online user should be able to differentiate between strategic and communicative

power. Differentiating the two and further understanding their goals would also mean that communicative power can fight the strategic use of social power⁷⁶ described in Flynn's wide reading. Debate would therefore seek not only at economic and administrative power, but more importantly at social power - the negative effects of Facebook caging the political identity of the individual, based on social proof.

In order to avoid strategic action, such requirement would help detect biases that might appear and counteract them with the help of the community. If one user suggests that social proof rather than political legitimacy brought an argument into place, those supporting it should be able to prove otherwise. The role of the moderator is again crucial in such circumstances. Such transparency could also help a public sphere avoid polarization by opening up their procedures to critical stances. The public sphere should also be transparent about the differences between strong and weak publics and make those differences understandable for all participants. The different techniques and access to resources should be evident for those debating. For example, on Facebook, even though political activists and politicians could have the same access to big data, they do not have the same access to resources granting them this access. Hence, if a political campaign has 300 paid employees behind keyboards, an NGO might have 30 volunteers.

Based on such transparent dynamics, a critical account should be accepted towards how does the public sphere come into being, genealogically speaking. This should allow the agent not only to choose a public sphere based on the interest discussion revolves around, but also on the history of the public sphere itself. As Allen (2002) suggested, one first has to understand the strategic use of power relations involved in the appearance of a sphere in order to understand how communicative power should be applied correctly. The online user should have knowledge of the sphere's history, funds' source etc.

6.1.4. Law implementation, not just creation

This paper suggests that, instead of promoting this online campaigning based on social power and supposedly empowering weak publics, the online platform should disempower the strong ones by regarding social power as toxic. Those with power of decision-making should not be given data that, turned in information, could be used to subjectify weak publics. Weak publics should gain, following Flynn's (2004) suggestion, power of decision making.

⁷⁶ When social power is used in a repressive way towards communicative power and turns into political power by influencing the administration and public opinion (Flynn, 2004)

In order for the weak publics to gain power of decision making, weak publics have to have the real support strong public have for their cause. While the administrative is paid for their involvement and stance in the debate, online activists are doing this out of voluntary civic spirit. When Flynn(2004) described the communicative and organizational structure of the public sphere, he noted that the sphere is only alive as long as there is continuous involvement of individuals and organizations. Therefore the first step would be ensuring that the public sphere actually exists in the real sense of the word, based on engagement, not just likes. Online engagement can be measured with the mechanism in Fig15. The online platform should also encourage instances of offline activism and perhaps propose a system of civic hierarchy based on offline action. In this way, when a debate is carried out online, the actors would be able to tell how likely is that online support translates into offline support from a user. The public sphere would have a track record (Fig.16) on those who do involve themselves in more than just self-expression and decide to take action further than their words. Arendt's (1959) theorization of identity creation in the public sphere that includes both self-expression and deed in the same time will be closer to be put in practice.

Forum no. 92 - Evaluation of the educational system	
City Hall meeting 09.10.2015	Absent
Demo @ Parliament	Present
Ed. Ministry open debate	Present

Fig. 16

Clicktivism is therefore discouraged by situating action in the offline sphere and therefore obliging the supporter to commit with more than just a click. Identity performance (Marichal, 2012) are discouraged by such a system too. Another way of discouraging this effect and also encourage communities' co-operation towards reaching viable solutions for identified issues would be a community-focused design of the platform. While not completely eliminating the user profile, the platform should limit its functions and instead develop tool for self-policing of the communities for the sake of a rational debate.

6.2. Further Research

The extended and moderated ideal of democratic agency has been based on a combination between theory of Flynn(2004) in respect to Jurgen Habermas and Allen(2002) regarding Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt. Further theoretical research that investigates the the procedural implementation of communicative power in the light of this thesis developed ideal is needed. Hence, offering communicative power as a tool for not only legitimizing laws, but counteracting social power should be looked at in more depth. Moreover, empirical research on how communicative power can be applied is also needed. The discussion around this thesis ' topic has only been based on theoretical grounds. The proposal this paper made on how could an online platform develop neutral, rational, critical, efficient public spheres is just planting the seed of an idea. Therefore business models for such products would have to prioritize democratic agency ideal over profit. Further research in the field of social entrepreneurship around digital issues, for example, can help point at the conflicts arising in developing such business models and hence ways of battling them.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Starting from a critique of the Habermasian public sphere ideal that does not match the social framework of the post Westphalian digital world, this paper investigated the effect of Facebook on democracy. Firstly, it sought to identify the type of power relations that rendered the use of Facebook as a political sphere of deliberation. Facebook's business model based on algorithms and advertising was not one that users consented for, but it enabled virality stunts and meaning creation that appealed to political publics. By inscribing meaning into users and convincing them that clicks equal action, Facebook managed to subjectify its users. The effect was performance identity (Marichal, 2012) that translated into clicktivism (White, 2010) and further into political extremism due to polarized identities (Hendricks and Hanse, 2015) and spirals of silence due to censored identities. (Stoycheff, 2016) Strategic use of social power is what brought Facebook to be used as a public sphere of debate. Investigating social power historically (Allen, 2002), the question shed light onto how social power is exercised in current settings too. The second research question characterised the public sphere as promoting irrational behaviour due to emotional framing of content (Berger and Milkman; Hendricks and Hansen, 2015) and lack of neutrality for allowing tools that manipulate the context of a debate based on money and political power. Further, plurality is only embraced for the sake of reorganization, hence consensus is orchestrated and dissent strategically removed. The strategic use of social power is the enabler of these characteristics. The debate takes place in a market of attention, having as a purpose its virality, rather than quality of argument. Deliberative democracy based on the above premises becomes an opportunity for those who pay with their money or identity to create meaning. In return, they learn how to gain and exercise social power in their own interest. Debate ends up either working as a tranquilizer for democratic action, either as an enabler for irrational extremist one.

Further, the thesis took a normative stance and applied the extended and mediated ideal of democratic agency developed in Chapter 3 on the case of online platforms. First, a separation between online commercial, social and political spheres has to be made. Homogeneity should be embraced for constructive criticism. Learning from mistakes, rather than striving for consensus should be the priority of the debate. Arendt's philosophical thinking is offered as a method of inquiry into this constructive criticism, independent of pre-set common sense. A critical mindset towards others and oneself should be pursued. A system of tracking one's debating skills should be in place through which the user can understand what he did good or wrong. In this way, other users can evaluate the deliberative potential of a public

sphere's individuals. The public sphere's structure and design should also be scrutinized by its members. For this to be possible, technological and procedural transparency should be allowed for. Consent is key to ensuring the autonomy of the user online. From a privacy design point of view, the platform should have default opt-in rather than opt-out sharing settings. Algorithms would only be allowed when search results are displayed, with as much choice of the user regarding the display of results (e.g. date, popularity, rating etc). Finally, the user should have and develop power to implement, not only propose and legitimize laws. Even though this is acknowledged as a long process, the first step would be ensuring the degree of engagement online equals the one offline. Logging users' participation in offline events would be one way of doing so..

The importance of this paper's findings helps weak publics, sociologists and social entrepreneurs alike. In order to be fruitful, online deliberation should strive to eliminate the misuse of social power, rather than that of political power. Moreover, it has been made clear that the effects of information dissemination channels ruled by algorithms based on past activity increase the chances of extremist political views and impede the formation of sound political identity. By understanding this paper and taking its normative section as a starting point, an alternative online platform for deliberation can be developed. A new way of thinking about this topic would be by situating it in an entrepreneurial framework and developing research into the conflicts arising when social imperatives have to be prioritized over financial ones.

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Appendix

Fig 1 - Advertising on Facebook Newsfeed

Fig 2 - Ads profile

Fig 3 - Facebook privacy default settings in 2005

Fig 4 - Facebook privacy default settings in 2009

Fig 5 - Facebook privacy default settings in 2010

Fig 6 - Photo Tagging Suggestions Settings

Fig 7.1 and Fig 7.2 - Facebook for Politics

Fig 8 - Avaaz signed petition follow up screen

Fig 9 - Facebook Profile and Timeline - about

Fig 10.1 and Fig 10.2 - Facebook data collection




Fig. 1 (Photo: www.digitalnewsasia.com)




Fig. 2




Fig.3 (<http://mattmckeeon.com/facebook-privacy/>)




Fig 4. (<http://mattmckeeon.com/facebook-privacy/>)




Fig. 5 (<http://mattmckeeon.com/facebook-privacy/>)

Provide, improve and develop Services.

We are able to deliver our Services, personalize content, and make suggestions for you by using this information to understand how you use and interact with our Services and the people or things you're connected to and interested in on and off our Services.

We also use information we have to provide shortcuts and suggestions to you. For example, we are able to suggest that your friend tag you in a picture by comparing your friend's pictures to information we've put together from your profile pictures and the other photos in which you've been tagged. If this feature is enabled for you, you can control whether we suggest that another user tag you in a photo using the "Timeline and Tagging" settings.

<https://www.facebook.com/policy.php>

Timeline and Tagging Settings			
Who can add things to my timeline?	Who can post on your timeline?	Friends	Edit
	Review posts that friends tag you in before they appear on your Timeline?	On	Edit
Who can see things on my timeline?	Review what other people see on your timeline		View As
	Who can see posts you've been tagged in on your timeline?	Friends of friends	Edit
	Who can see what others post on your timeline?	Friends	Edit
How can I manage tags people add and tagging suggestions?	Review tags people add to your own posts before the tags appear on Facebook?	On	Edit
	When you're tagged in a post, who do you want to add to the audience if they aren't already in it?	Only Me	Edit
	Who sees tag suggestions when photos that look like you are uploaded? (this is not yet available to you)	Unavailable	

<https://www.facebook.com/settings?tab=timeline>

Fig.6

Fig 7.1 and Fig 7.2. below

Politics



Win your election


Whether you're an elected official, a challenger, a political party or a political action group, Facebook can give your campaign an edge during every phase of the election. From organising supporters and raising money to persuading and turning out key voters, it's never too early to start using Facebook to connect with the people who matter most to your campaign.

Success Stories



Obama For America

Raising funds and reaching swing state voters



BC Liberals

Winning the vote

Organise between elections


Engage your supporters between elections to maximise your impact on Facebook when campaign season begins.

1. Reach every voter through a friend

Encourage supporters to like your Page in campaign literature, at events and with adverts so that you can reach virtually all of your voters with a friend's endorsements, which typically requires at least 2-4% of your eligible voters to like your Page. Through boosted posts and targeted adverts, specific groups of people will see their friends who are supporting your campaign.

2. Deepen your connections

Connect with people at the right time, in the right place. Learn more about the people who like your Page and reach out to them with meaningful targeted messages where they're already engaged: in their News Feeds.



Activate the people who love what you're doing


Facebook has a complete direct response marketing solution to help build your email list, raise money and activate people to support your campaign on Facebook and in their communities.

1. See the results of your Facebook Adverts

Conversion pixels help measure the granular results of the actions people take on your website when they engage with a Facebook Advert. They also help lower your cost by optimising the delivery of adverts to the people most likely to take action.

2. Bring in existing supporters

Upload your email lists to create **Custom Audience** segments. Target your existing supporters with fundraising and specific requests for volunteer help. To keep communications clear and streamlined, you can exclude existing supporters from your list-building advert campaigns. Then use **Lookalike Audiences** to reach, organise and activate people who are similar to your existing supporters.




Help people decide

Introduce yourself to undecided voters. Let them know who you are, what's at stake and how you're different.

1. Find all the right people

You can advertise to people across devices based on their age, gender, location, interests and more. See this [PDF](#) for details on Facebook's top targeting options for political campaigns. You can even create Facebook Adverts based on a [postal mailing list](#).



2. Post and promote persuasive content

Likes and shares are great. Votes are better. Authentic, timely, visual **photo** and **video** posts on your Facebook Page help you connect and make a compelling case for your campaign or political organisation. Promoting your posts to specific targets can help make sure that you reach all of the people who matter to your campaign.

Let's get out and vote!

Facebook allows you to scale your "get out and vote" effort. You can rally your supporters by reaching them on their desktop and mobile devices with a reminder to cast their ballot.

1. Help new voters register

Use **Page Post Link Adverts** to drive likely supporters to tools and resources to register to vote.

2. Let people know exactly how to vote






Promote Page posts that link to resources about when, where and how to vote in the election – in person or by post, if applicable.

3. Inspire and thank people for their actions

Underscore what's at stake in the election and make sure your supporters know that you're depending on them to vote and to encourage their friends to vote, too.



Thank you for taking action to free West Papua!

RECENT SIGNERS	
22 seconds ago	 Andreea Belu, Romania
12 hours ago	 tjana, Australia
yesterday	 Edward, Australia
3 days ago	 wells, Australia
4 days ago	 Sara Hirtenstein, United Kingdom

Thanks for joining the campaign.

The more of us join, the stronger our call becomes! **Please help spread the word using the Facebook and Email tools below** and forward the original email from Avaaz!

Tell Your Friends

 facebook	10K	Share this campaign on Facebook.	 email	967	Open a new email on your computer.
 twitter	1147	Share this campaign on Twitter			

Fig. 8




Fig. 9



What kinds of information do we collect?

Depending on which Services you use, we collect different kinds of information from or about you.

Things you do and information you provide.

We collect the content and other information you provide when you use our Services, including when you sign up for an account, create or share, and message or communicate with others. This can include information in or about the content you provide, such as the location of a photo or the date a file was created. We also collect information about how you use our Services, such as the types of content you view or engage with or the frequency and duration of your activities.

Things others do and information they provide.

We also collect content and information that other people provide when they use our Services, including information about you, such as when they share a photo of you, send a message to you, or upload, sync or import your contact information.

Your networks and connections.

We collect information about the people and groups you are connected to and how you interact with them, such as the people you communicate with the most or the groups you like to share with. We also collect contact information you provide if you upload, sync or import this information (such as an address book) from a device.

Fig 10.1

Device information.

We collect information from or about the computers, phones, or other devices where you install or access our Services, depending on the permissions you've granted. We may associate the information we collect from your different devices, which helps us provide consistent Services across your devices. Here are some examples of the device information we collect:

- Attributes such as the operating system, hardware version, device settings, file and software names and types, battery and signal strength, and device identifiers.
- Device locations, including specific geographic locations, such as through GPS, Bluetooth, or WiFi signals.
- Connection information such as the name of your mobile operator or ISP, browser type, language and time zone, mobile phone number and IP address.

Information from websites and apps that use our Services.

We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites and apps that use our Services (like when they offer our Like button or Facebook Log In or use our measurement and advertising services). This includes information about the websites and apps you visit, your use of our Services on those websites and apps, as well as information the developer or publisher of the app or website provides to you or us.

Information from third-party partners.

We receive information about you and your activities on and off Facebook from third-party partners, such as information from a partner when we jointly offer services or from an advertiser about your experiences or interactions with them.

Facebook companies.

We receive information about you from companies that are owned or operated by Facebook, in accordance with their terms and policies. [Learn more](#) about these companies and their privacy policies.

Fig 10.2