


Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea

Thesis 2021



Source: the Washington Post

Name: Mira Rølle Attermann

Exam number: 16961

Course: Master thesis

Program: International Business and Politics

Date: 15th of January 2021

STU count (incl. spaces): 173.447

Abstract

This dissertation explores the concept of sustainable peace and discusses ways of creating sustainable peace in areas of conflict, thereby improving unstable and tenuous relations and bringing support to areas in need. Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods, Wæver's securitization theory, Galtung's theories of peace and Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture serve as theoretical fundament for the dissertation, each emphasizing key components critical to sustainable peacebuilding. By means of the four theories, this dissertation argues that sustainable peacebuilding is dependent on whether the approach to peacebuilding manages to reach beyond the mere symptoms of conflict and rather solve the underlying issues of conflict by taking into considerations the unique context of the area subject to conflict.

The introduction of peacebuilding into a conflict scenario is a complicated and multilayered process, relying on various factors to be ripe for conflict resolution, i.e., objective and subjective conditions, the means of achieving peace, the conditions of the policy environment, the underlying structures of past conflicts and recognition of victims of violence. To examine the underlying structures of sustainable peace and the extent to which peacebuilding takes different forms depending on the particular context, the peacebuilding process between Ethiopia and Eritrea serves as case study, providing the dissertation with empirical evidence. Conflict has dominated the shared history of Ethiopia and Eritrea for centuries, turning the idea of peace into a fragile hope. Attempts at peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea have taken various forms and both cases of externally mediated processes and processes driven by internal dynamics have occurred, each representing a unique set of advantages and shortcomings. In light of the most recent peacebuilding process, the absence of direct violence and the increasing level of stability have injected hope into the peace process. However, the recent relapse into conflict attests to the unsustainable nature of peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea and serves as a reminder of the vulnerability of the peacebuilding process that is strongly impacted by the tensions of past conflicts. Through the examination of the peacebuilding processes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the dissertation reveals the complexity associated with the concept. In its essence, peacebuilding is not about the imposition of models of peacebuilding, rather it is about acknowledging the contextual setting of each conflict and adapting the peacebuilding efforts to the particular scenario. Thereby, peacebuilding transforms into a creative, responsive, organic, unpredictable and open-ended process of maturing objective and subjective conditions while taking into consideration their uniqueness.

Table of Content

1: Introduction and Research Question.....	4
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation	5
1.2 Choice of Theories	6
1.3 Use of Empirical Data.....	7
1.4 Delimitations of the Dissertation	8
2: Philosophy of Social Sciences	10
2.1 Philosophy of Social Science Perspectives.....	10
2.1.1 Critical Realism.....	11
3: Introduction to Key Terms	14
3.1 Peace and Conflict	14
4: Introduction to the Case of Interest.....	15
5: Theories and Concepts	20
5.1 Scoones' Concept of Sustainable Livelihoods.....	20
5.2 Wæver's Securitization Theory	23
5.3 Galtung's Theories of Peace	28
5.4 Dawson's Theory on the Politics of Memory and Post-Conflict Culture	31
6: Analysis and Discussion of Sub Research Questions	33
6.1 How and to what extent was peace initially reached following the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea? ..	33
6.1.1 Scoones' Concept of Sustainable Livelihoods	34
6.1.2 Wæver's Securitization Theory.....	40
6.1.3 Galtung's Theories of Peace	45
6.1.4 Dawson's Theory on the Politics of Memory and Post-Conflict Culture	47
6.1.5 Conclusion on Research Question 6.1	48
6.2 What are the impacts of the recent Tigray-conflict on the peace process?	49
6.2.1 The Tigray-conflict	49
6.2.2 What went Wrong and Why?	50
6.2.3 Memories of Conflict	53
6.2.4 International Intervention.....	55
6.2.5 Conclusion on Research Question 6.2	58
7: How is sustainable peace created in areas of conflict, and what is the capacity of peace?	60
7.1 Discussing Peace	60
8: Conclusion	65
9: Bibliography	69

1: Introduction and Research Question

The introduction of the concept of peace into a conflict scenario is a complex and multilayered process. Over the years, not many concepts have been used or misused at the same extent as is the case for the concept of peace, which has been and remains to be subject to a high degree of misinterpretation. Following the complexity of the concept, fostered by its numerous and distinct definitions, the way in which peace is introduced in a zone of conflict as well as the extent of its success vary from one scenario to another. Whether peace is perceived as successful or not is highly dependable on a number of different variables like former tensions in the area of conflict and theories about the future. That being said, the inability to incorporate all its features when introducing peace in an area of conflict is not necessarily damaging to the peacebuilding process, as the mere notion of the concept of peace may itself build a common basis, which may over time transform conflict into peace. Yet, a large number of cases around the world provide evidence to the continuous misuse of the concept with the consequences being severe. In opposition to the systemic Chinese suppression of Tibetans, Buddhist Tibetan monks have over the past year set themselves on fire, and a peaceful demonstration by Tibetans has ended in a fatal collision with Chinese security forces (Information 2012). Meanwhile in Colombia, years after the peace agreement was adopted, peace has yet to become peaceful. Some FARC-members have rejected the peace agreement, as a result of the government not upholding their end of the agreement and FARC-members consequently fear for their own security (Information 2018). As for the FARC-members who have accepted the agreement, they have been forcibly relocated to demobilization camps preparing them for their return in society. However, personal testimonies of former guerilla soldiers speak of prison conditions (Information 2018). Both of these scenarios point toward the fragility and tenuousness of peace when driven by fear. At the end, the free will of the people subject to peacebuilding processes is fundamental to ensuring sustainable peace. But how do we get there, and how do we manage to adapt the concept of peace to distinct scenarios of conflict to secure sustainable peace?

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concept of sustainable peace and discuss proper ways of building sustainable peace in areas of conflict, thereby improving unstable and tenuous relations and bringing support to areas in need. In the absence of a well-defined strategy on how to develop sustainable peace, peace is at risk of becoming ambiguous or even illusory. In relation to this, the general research question will be:

How is sustainable peace created in areas of conflict, and what is the capacity of peace?

To examine the underlying structures of sustainable peace and the extent to which the concept takes different forms depending on the particular situation, the peacebuilding process between Ethiopia and Eritrea will serve as case study and provide empirical evidence to the study. The general research question will be answered through an analysis and discussion of the following sub questions:

- 1. How and to what extent was peace initially reached following the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea?*
- 2. What are the impacts of the recent Tigray-conflict on the peace process?*

By applying a critical realist approach, the principal argument of the dissertation will be that the achievement of sustainable peace is dependent on whether the approach to peacebuilding manages to go beyond the mere symptoms of the conflict and rather solve the underlying issues of the conflict by taking into considerations the unique context of the area subject to conflict. This argument will be presented as a conclusion to the analysis and discussion of the four theories applied in the dissertation.

1.1 Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation will be initiated by a brief introduction to the three prevailing perspectives in philosophy of social science, i.e., naturalism, constructivism and critical realism. Throughout the dissertation, critical realism has been chosen to serve as scientific perspective, and more attention will thus be given to this particular perspective. Following the choice of critical realism as scientific perspective, observatory findings will throughout the dissertation be assessed through context-specific examinations. In the opening section of the dissertation, important key terms will be clarified upon to ensure full comprehension of the analysis and discussion. The dissertation will then move on to address research question 6.1 by applying Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods, Wæver's securitization theory, Galtung's theories of peace and Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture to the empirical case. The scope of research question 6.1 is the years between 2000-2018. In the assessment of research question 6.1, a hypothesis will be presented, claiming peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea to be a case of negative peace. Primarily

focusing on the years from 2018 till present day, research question 6.2 will commence by validating the findings of the hypothesis presented in research question 6.1. Subsequently, a discussion will be undertaken by using the analytical findings as a fundament in the assessment of research question 6.2. The dissertation will then move on to address the general research question from a more philosophical stance with only brief references to the case study. The dissertation will be concluded in a summary of key components to the Ethiopia-Eritrea peacebuilding process, followed by an overall conclusion

1.2 Choice of Theories

The concept of sustainable peace has been subject to widespread research and debate resulting in various interpretations of its core components and an extensive number of suggestions on how to apply it. This dissertation recognizes and critically reflects upon existing knowledge and conclusions that have previously been made about the nature of the topic, and the study should thus be seen as an extension of current debates. By applying the theories on peacebuilding to the case study of peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the study examines the concept over time, unlocking critical insights of the nature of the concept. Particularly interesting in regard to this case study, is that it contains various aspects of peace – from non-peace to negative peace – which enables an examination of peacebuilding in its many and different forms. With the recent outbursts of violence in the Tigray region in Ethiopia, the case study adds to the debate on peacebuilding and is an interesting opportunity that provides the dissertation an ideal empirical setting for assessing the concept from a new perspective that reaches beyond current thinking on the topic. As all forms of peacebuilding between non-peace and negative peace have been covered extensively, the Tigray-conflict offers a way of exploring new ways of approaching the concept in a more creative space that is not dominated by existing thinking about peacebuilding. Accordingly, the case study provides the dissertation an ideal empirical setting for assessing the concept of peacebuilding from various perspectives – including a new and more creative perspective.

Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods, Wæver's securitization theory, Galtung's theories of peace and Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture serve as fundament for the dissertation, each emphasizing key components that are critical to answering the general research question. At first, Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods will clarify on the accessibility of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people to necessary resources that enable them to satisfy

basic needs and pursue a way of living that secure their survival and well-being. By examining the development in accessibility over time, Scoones' approach helps identify to what extent livelihoods are sustainable and whether or not conditions are ripe for conflict resolution. Second, Wæver's securitization theory links securitization to particular power structures of Ethiopia and Eritrea thereby critically examining the conditions of the policy environment and identifying instances of exploitative patterns. Securitization theory thus takes into consideration the context of respectively Ethiopia and Eritrea and addresses potential limitations to sustainable peacebuilding. Third, Galtung's theories on peace will be applied to examine the context-specific mechanisms of peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Within this examination, the theory will contribute to a fuller understanding of limitations to sustainable peace. Finally, Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture will add to the framework of Galtung by integrating the past into current and future processes of sustainable peacebuilding. Similar to Galtung, Dawson's theoretical work will clarify on limitations to peacebuilding.

Accordingly, the theories of this dissertation will serve as critical counterparts to one another, thereby extending the debate on sustainable peacebuilding. In this way, the theories are applied as interrelated components, each of them adding to the understanding and answering of the general research question. By means of the four theories, it can thus be argued that subjective and objective conditions, the means of achieving peace, the conditions of the policy environment, the underlying structures of past conflicts and recognition of victims of violence all are important components that will help strengthen peace and make sustainable peace more likely to occur. However, every scenario is unique, thus peacebuilding must necessarily remain adjustable to different contexts.

1.3 Use of Empirical Data

This dissertation will be founded upon a combined effort of primary and secondary sources, enabling the examination of multiple perspectives on the subject of peace studies and conflict transformation and the minimization of potential bias that exist in the collection of data. Yet, recalling the intransitive dimension of critical realism, neither the primary nor the secondary sources should be perceived as unbiased. However, by drawing on a combined effort of primary and secondary sources, while taking into consideration their shortcomings, a solid foundation for argumentation is created, and the drawbacks of each type of source are kept at a minimum. In this dissertation, primary sources are numerical data presented in the application of Scoones' concept of

sustainable livelihoods. These data are supported by the secondary sources, i.e., textbooks and academic journals, which provide the tools for comprehending the observed findings of the primary data from a theoretical standpoint.

1.4 Delimitations of the Dissertation

The dissertation is not an attempt at making any universal claims about the importance of subjective and objective conditions, the means of achieving peace, the conditions of the policy environment, the underlying structures of past conflicts and recognition of victims of violence to peacebuilding processes. To generate value, these components need to be placed in a context-specific perspective. The complex nature of the main issues examined in this dissertation does not allow for an absolute truth to be discovered. Consequently, the dissertation should merely be seen as an attempt to uncover a generalized pattern of various component's impact on sustainable peacebuilding.

One of the major problems encountered during the research phase of the dissertation follows the limited data availability about Ethiopia and in particular Eritrea and the difficulties in accessing existing data about the countries. COVID-19 as well as the current violent conflict between the Ethiopian government and TPLF have extensively contributed to the issue of data collection, as the pandemic has made travels to Ethiopia difficult, complicating data collection further. To account for this, I have reached out to a number of individuals, among these; William Davison, Senior Analyst, Ethiopia, at Crisis Group; Aly Verjee, Senior Advisor at United States Institute of Peace and; Abel Abate Demissie, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, at Chatham House. However, this has not resulted in any interviews, and the dissertation thus solely builds on the primary and secondary data accounted for in the section on empirical data. The issue of data availability will be referred to throughout the dissertation, as the problem arises.

Further emphasizing the issue related to the limited amount of available data, Scoones' sustainable livelihoods approach when placed in the context of chronic instability requires an overwhelming quantity of data. Undertaking such data gathering is rather complex, thus part of this process includes a prioritization of what to include and what not to. Therefore, factors assessed in the examination of Scoones' five indicators need to be considered in light of this. The approach has been implemented in full awareness of its delimitations.

An operational constraint that needs to be considered in the collection of data is the many and distinct interpretations of reality that may exist. This is the case in all data gathering scenarios. However, in the case of political instability, concerns about security may keep people from sharing their stories, and moreover people may be more inclined to portraying the truth in certain ways that suit their self-interests. Political instability may thus increase the existence of bias.

When examining the concept of sustainable peacebuilding, other areas of interest become visible. The first includes the differing interests that exist internally to the different organizations, parties etc. present in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The decision to give less weight to this issue follows the lack of relevance of the issue to the dissertation's main objective of uncovering a generalized pattern of the various components' importance to sustainable peacebuilding. Turning to another area of interest, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is key to the future development of the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea has large-scale implications for a number of other countries. Yet, this dissertation is limited to solely focusing on the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea and will thus not attempt at making any assumptions about the remaining countries affected by the conflict and peacebuilding. In extension to this, in regard to Scoones' theoretical framework it has been decided not to further analyze the role of global linkages and long-distance effect. The livelihoods in one part of the world may create unsustainable conditions for future livelihoods or for people living in another part of the world. However, due to the scope of this dissertation, this issue will not be included in this dissertation.

2: Philosophy of Social Sciences

This section will introduce philosophy of social science and its three predominant perspectives: naturalism, constructivism and critical realism. Among the three, critical realism has been chosen as the main approach. This section will thus include an explanation to this choice as well as a clarification of the shortcomings of the two remaining approaches.

2.1 Philosophy of Social Science Perspectives

Plato said: “*What we shall see is something like a battle of gods and giants going on between them over their quarrel about reality.*” (Plato: p. 246). Put another way, the nature and understanding of reality take many forms, and following the distinct intrinsic nature of the social world, and the different ways of coming to understand that world, the ways of knowing have been subject to debate for as long as can be recalled.

Philosophy of social science seeks to examine “*the nature of the world and how it should be studied*” (Moses, Knutsen 2012: p.1). While there are three major philosophy of social science perspectives – naturalism, constructivism, and critical realism – it is the choice of philosophical perspective that indicates whether something has scientific validation or not. In other words, what one perspective defines as ‘the truth’, another will undermine or reject. Each philosophical perspective comprises three building blocks referred to as ontology, epistemology and methodology, and depending on the choice of perspective, they all have different impacts on the outcome when approaching a particular project. Consequently, assumptions about ‘the truth’ vary with the choice of philosophical perspective, and ‘the truth’ is thus retrievable in a number of different ways. In the study of philosophy of social science, ontology examines the phenomena of existence and reality (Moses, Knutsen 2012) while the epistemological branch examines what constitutes knowledge (Hatch 2018). The two branches are interrelated, as epistemology serves as an indicator of the type of knowledge that can be used to address what ontology establishes as real. Finally, methodology refers to the investigation of theories and concepts, as it examines how knowledge is acquired (Moses, Knutsen 2012).

In this paper, neither naturalism nor constructivism have been applied as the philosophical approach. The rejection of the naturalist perspective should be seen in extension of the critique by Karl Popper that the world is simply too immense and complex for a universal and certified truth to

exist (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). The recognition of human perception as diversified undercuts the naturalist principle of universal laws, as the presence of subjectivity enlarges the risk of bias as well as inaccuracy in systematic observations. The process of sustainable peacebuilding is not merely a matter of uncovering one singular and definitive road to sustainable peace. Rather, sustainable peacebuilding is correlated with a broad variety of context-specific determinants impacting the output of each attempt at reaching sustainable peace. With the inability to capture the significance of context-specific truths, the naturalist approach thus reveals its incapacity to explain the process of sustainable peacebuilding. A fundamental limitation of the naturalist approach lies within the existence of simple 'real world', which is largely undermined by the complexity of the world.

Similar to naturalism, it has been decided not to base this paper on the constructivist perspective of philosophy of social science. Following its infinite number of interpretations and its rejection of the idea of an independently existing reality, the constructivist approach appears to be too relativist. The extensive weight on subjectivity, and the inability of the approach to distinguish the researcher's personal beliefs and values from the findings that have been uncovered (Moses, Knutsen 2012), brings scientific research at risk of generating outcomes that prove insufficient in terms of reliability and verification.

While the naturalist and constructivist perspectives lack the components to explain the process of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, the philosophical perspective of critical realism is capable of capturing the complexity of such processes. As the chosen philosophical approach, critical realism will be explored in the subsequent section.

2.1.1 Critical Realism

Critical realism – which is most closely associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar – was the third major perspective within philosophy of social science to gain attention. Prior to the 1970s, the two prevailing perspectives, naturalism (positivism) and constructivism (interpretivism), were dominating the field with their philosophical components being in great contrast to one another (Benton and Craib 2011). Critical realism, a new approach, bridged elements of naturalism with features of constructivism, transformed the intellectual arena, and today the movement is recognized as an international and multidisciplinary practice (Moses, Knutsen 2012). By revealing fundamental structures and mechanisms, the focal objective of critical realism is to clarify on social

phenomena and events. From an ontological point of view, critical realists identify with one of the fundamental principles of naturalism and adopt the idea of an independently existing reality. However, in contrast to the naturalist approach, reality is stratified, and getting to its core is complex (Benton and Craib 2011). While the existence of causal mechanisms is acknowledged, critical realists continuously emphasize context as an important constituent, as different contexts may produce different outcomes to causal processes. Accordingly, critical realists aim at uncovering structures and mechanisms that generate causal relationships between actual events and social phenomena, meanwhile remaining skeptical toward the concept of universal laws and the falsification method.

When examining critical realism's epistemology, critical realists embrace certain aspects of naturalism in their attempt at producing explanations capturing the truth. However, they make it clear not to assume to have discovered 'the truth'. Turning to its methodology, while keeping in mind the inaccessibility of one universal truth, knowledge accumulation is believed to be a social and infinite process in which absolute knowledge is impossible to reach.

Keeping in mind that uncovering 'the truth' is a complicated and endless process, the acknowledgement of reality as stratified or layered follows that the observable world does not necessarily mirror the 'real world'. Bhaskar provides two explanations to this in his theory on the transitive and intransitive dimension of knowledge with the first referring to the social process of knowledge accumulation, and the latter referring to the independently existing objects of knowledge (Benton and Craib 2011). The stratified view of reality explains why the world according to critical realists is denoted by a high level of complexity. Arising from this complexity that critical realists associate with the world is an infinite number of contexts and interpretations. Accordingly, science is a social practice that uncovers scientific knowledge, i.e., social products (Benton and Craib 2011), thereby implying that existing beliefs remain open to alteration in the light of continuous cognitive efforts.

Assessing Bhaskar's ontology, three fundamental layers of reality are identified: the real, the actual and the empirical (Benton and Craib 2011). The real level represents the world of structures, predispositions and mechanisms, not directly accessible to experience, which science seeks to uncover. The actual level of reality refers to flows, events and phenomena that either are produced

under experimental conditions or under more complex and unpredictable settings in the ‘real world’. Last, the empirical level refers to the observations that constitute only a minor picture of the actual level. Within Bhaskar’s work, it is recognized that the experimental method merely shows that “*there must be underlying causal mechanisms and powers*” (Benton and Craib 2011: p. 126) – the process of uncovering these is a matter for the expansion of human knowledge through scientific research and examination. In summation, the three layers of reality thereby imply that critical realists attempt at uncovering the generative causes of things, which provides a view of science as the effort to explain the “*wholes in terms of the parts of which they are composed*” (Benton and Craib 2011: p. 127). However, the stratification of reality does not end here, but continues in the hierarchical arrangement of the human biological level as the foundation, followed by the psychological level, and with the social level at the top (Benton and Craib 2011). Based on this hierarchical order, people’s choice of navigation along with their conscious decisions are molded by society, but simultaneously people’s beliefs and choice of actions are shaping future society. Further assessing this perspective, the fact that “*all of these things and relationships are produced, reproduced or transformed as elements in the overall metabolism of society*” (Benton and Craib 2011: p. 129) gives weight to the proposition that a complex interaction takes place among the different layers.

Following its ability to bridge observational findings with underlying assumptions and reasoning, it has been chosen to base this paper on the philosophical science of critical realism. Numerical data about the case study as well as the effects of peacebuilding processes can be retrieved, but a more complex world needs to be placed under the scope, if the underlying structures and mechanisms that drive sustainable peacebuilding are to be uncovered. To critical realists, context provides meaning, thus the observer is compelled to examine things in relation to something else in order for it to make sense.

3: Introduction to Key Terms

3.1 Peace and Conflict

Throughout time, the concept of peace has been subject to many distinct interpretations. In this dissertation, peace shall be defined by three key principles identified by Galtung: 1) peace refers to social goals that are accepted by many or most, 2) these goals may be complicated to reach, but they cannot be unattainable, and 3) peace essentially corresponds to the absence of violence (Galtung 1969). In addition, the definition of peace, which has been embraced throughout this dissertation, denotes a presence of positive interaction, i.e., and element of human contact and cooperation (Galtung 1969). Moreover, in this dissertation, sustainable peace and positive peace share the same meaning.

Peacebuilding then should be understood as short-term or long-term initiatives fostering and supporting sustainable structures that ultimately improve opportunities of peaceful coexistence and reduce the likelihood of violent conflict in any forms (Keating & Knight 2004). Thereby, peacebuilding should be seen as a two-fold process of both deconstructing structures of violence and constructing sustainable structures of peace.

Meanwhile, the definition of conflict follows the definition provided by Kenneth Boulding who describes conflict as “*inherent in human relations*” (Barash & Webel 2014: p. 67), meaning that conflict is unlikely to be eliminated.

Peace and conflict are ultimately two intertwined phenomena, each depending on one another. Thereby, when addressing the process of peacebuilding, it is important to take into consideration the notion of conflict (General Assembly). Recognizing peace and conflict as intertwined phenomena, the study of peace in this dissertation has expanded into covering the nature of conflict in addition to its attention to peacebuilding.

4: Introduction to the Case of Interest

The significance of sustainable peace is best explained via its potential of preventing conflict from reemerging. Accordingly, the absence of such peace is critical in any area of the world. Following two years of war from 1998 to 2000 and subsequently 16 years of ‘no war, no peace’, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is an example of such scenario where sustainable peace has yet to prove successful. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the process of creating sustainable peace has been complex and subject to numerous outbursts of old tensions, which has made the attempt at sustainable peace a long and problematic endeavor.

For many years, the political climate of Ethiopia has been defined by a state of political repression, violent uprising and civil war. From the time of Emperor Haile Selassie in the late 1960s to 1974 and to the end of the Derg military regime in 1991 (Tessema 2020), violence has been the common response to political upheaval. In the late 1960s, violent repression was the regime’s response to a peasant rebellion in Bale and later on the Gojjam Uprisings were met by the same autocratic enforcement – a strategy intended to deter any future revolts (Tessema 2020). This strategy was continuously implemented in the years to come as a response to any opposition to the regime. With the end of Haile Selassie’s regime in 1974, the practice of political repression was ended abruptly and years of repression by the regime and violent rebellion by the opposition ended. However, with the Derg military regime seizing power in 1974, Ethiopia entered a new and far worse phase of political violence. Internal disagreement within the Derg soon created a divide between the different groups of the regime, leading to unprecedented political violence and the killing of the Derg’s chairman, General Aman Andom (Tessema 2020). Throughout the 17 years in which the Derg military regime remained in power, continuous political repression against any forces opposing the regime’s rule was the norm. Among the Derg military regime’s opponents were the two organizations the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (AESM), also known as MEISON. While MEISON started as an opponent of the Derg military regime it later transformed into a loyal supporter of the Derg, as conflict began to emerge between the EPRP and MEISON. Aside from EPRP and MEISON, the opponents included the rebellious movements in northern parts of the country, the TPLF (representing the Tigray people) and EPLF, as well as OLF and ONLF (Tessema 2020). As a response to the opposition against its rule, the Derg military regime labelled the EPRP as an enemy of the people and in 1976 it initiated a campaign entitled “Red Terror” against the EPRP and later on also against its remaining

opponents (Tessema 2018). The campaign introduced the Amharic term “netsa irmija” – meaning “license to kill” – allowing the killing of counterrevolutionaries, i.e., anyone suspected of being an EPRP member or sympathizer (Tessema 2018). In addition to the conflict between the Derg and its opponents, the rebellious movements were also engaging in conflict with one another (Tessema 2020). During the rule of the Derg military regime, Ethiopia witnessed the imprisonment, displacement and migration, suffering and death of an alarming number of people.

The TPLF’s struggle against the Derg military regime partly stemmed from its ambition of creating a Republic of Tigray. The TPLF believed its survival to be heavily reliant on Eritrea, partly because of Tigray’s dependence on access to the sea, which was solely possible through the lands of Eritrea. Accordingly, it was in the interest of the TPLF to secure a relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1990 the Ethiopian statesman and later President of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, summarized the dependence of Ethiopia on Eritrea as such: *“Whether Eritrea is part of Ethiopia or independent, we need this access and, therefore, must have close ties. There are many Tigrayans in Eritrea. They are concerned. They don’t want to be treated as foreigners there. There has always been close connections between Tigray and Eritrea for the highland people are all the same. They have the same history”* (Bereketeab 2019: p. 30). Following the independence of Eritrea and TPLF’s rise in power in Ethiopia, Eritrea became of even greater importance to TPLF’s continuous domination in Ethiopia. As TPLF only represented a small part of the EPRD government and the population of Tigray amounted to only 6 percent of the total population in Ethiopia (Bereketeab 2019), the future domination of TPLF became reliant on TPLF’s ability to act on its promise of providing Ethiopians access to water. Eritrea thus became essential to TPLF’s efforts to sustain power.

With the end of the Derg military regime, the post-1991 era marks the end of a period defined by extensive political violence. The belief was that former oppressive strategies would finally cease to dominate the political sphere of the country. Nonetheless, under the leadership of the TPLF-dominated Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, previous patterns of violence continued to exist. In 1995 the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) was adopted (Tessema 2018). The FDRE consisted of several ethno-nationalist groups that had all played their part in overthrowing the former military government and filled in the power gap in the following years of transitional process between 1991 and 1995. Accordingly, the 1995-adoption was regarded as an institutionalization of the political agenda of the ruling

TPLF/EPRDF. However, the legitimacy of the political processes of Ethiopia remained questionable with elections, electoral bodies and the judiciary being highly contested (Tessema 2020).

In 1998, the trust between the TPFL-dominated EPRDF government in Ethiopia and the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) government in Eritrea broke and resulted in the outbreak of war between the two nations (Bereketeab 2019). The war was sparked by disputes over the territorial claim to the city of Badme that – without any valuable natural resources within its territory – became the center of the war (BBC 2018). The conflict gained ground as both parties turned to extreme measures to remove one another. During the war, the EPRDF government sought to demolish the Eritrean state through economic, diplomatic, political and international campaigning with the objective of isolating Eritrea (Bereketeab 2019). In 2000 the Algiers Agreement was adopted as a peace agreement between the two governments, bringing an end to the border war. The agreement was mediated by a number of international actors, i.e., the UN, OAU, EU and the US (Bereketeab 2019) and all took upon themselves the responsibility of ensuring that the agreement was implemented to its full extent. However, when the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) in 2002 declared the city of Badme – the inferno of the conflict – as Eritrean territory, Ethiopia rejected the verdict, which was supposed to be final and binding (Bereketeab 2019), thereby failing to honor its commitment and making a fulfilment of the agreement impossible. Instead of intervening and taking a strong position against Ethiopia by calling for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN Chapter VII), the representatives of the international community turned to silence (Bereketeab 2019). Accordingly, the end of the war did not correspond to a peaceful union of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Rather, the stalemate of the border issue generated a situation of 'no war, no peace', with the conflict between the two countries yet to be resolved. In the years following the end of the war, prominent leaders of the Eritrean PFDJ who had criticized Eritrea's President, Isaias Afewerki, for his way of handling the war and for his unwillingness to take responsibility, were imprisoned, and their whereabouts to this day are a mystery (BBC 2018).

During the early years of 2000, the TPLF had adopted alternative strategic measures involving the efforts of economically strangling Eritrea, hoping for the emergence of political discontent and ultimately the collapse of the Eritrean state. However, the efforts by the TPLF failed and instead the

organization fought for the UN to impose sanctions on Eritrea (Bereketeab 2019). The accusations that were made against Eritrea to facilitate such sanctions included allegations of human rights violations, support of extremist groups, undermining of peace in the region and an attempted bombing of an African Union summit meeting (Bereketeab 2019). In 2009 the TPLF succeeded in its endeavor with the UN Security Council's endorsement of sanctions on Eritrea and later, Ethiopia managed to block an activation of Eritrea's membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Bereketeab 2019). In its response to the efforts by Ethiopia to isolate and destroy its state, Eritrea discouraged Ethiopia from any military activities by strategically utilizing the Ethiopian rebels living on its grounds (Bereketeab 2019). With Eritreans and Ethiopians located alongside one another along the common border, an open war would also include harming Ethiopians. In addition, Eritrea has used the conflict with Ethiopia as an excuse to suspend the constitution, ban free press and suppress any opposition (BBC 2018). While Ethiopia was targeting Eritrea, the internal situation in Ethiopia was also threatened by continuous unrest. The uprising against TPLF and EPRDF was joined by a number of young people of Ethiopia's major ethnic groups (Bereketeab 2019) whose protests threatened TPLF's future domination. As a reaction to the uprising, EPRDF declared a state of emergency and arrested tens of thousands of civilians, activists, journalists etc. to settle the unrest (Bereketeab 2019). As a consequence of the zero trust between Eritrea and Ethiopia, any attempt at settling the conflict was perceived as a dishonest attempt at overthrowing the other party.

It wasn't before 2018 with the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship that an important change in power occurred. With the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, representing the Oromo region, there was not only a shift in personality and party but a more important geographical shift from the north in Tigray to the south in Oromo, away from Eritrea's borders, and a shift in power from the TPLF to OPDO, with the latter representing the Oromo people (Bereketeab 2019). These shifts changed the rules of the game, as they contributed to a reconfiguration of the countries' relationship to each other, and most importantly a reconfiguration of the conflict between them. With Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali seizing power, the Eritrean issue was for the first time handled outside of Ethiopia, and the relationship with Eritrea was no longer controlled by the TPLF, pursuing the interests of Tigray. Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali initiated his rule by announcing his government's embracement of the EEBC's verdict on the border issue and declaring an unconditional implementation of the findings

(Bereketeab 2019). In addition, the Prime Minister invited the Eritrean government to a meeting, settling all disputes and restoring peace. The invitation was accepted by the Eritrean government and on June 20 the two parties sat down together and engaged in a discussion on how to resolve their differences and build a better relationship. The Agreement on Peace and Friendship soon followed, outlining five key points: 1) an end to the state of war, 2) cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural and security issues and the opening of embassies in the respective capitals, 3) links in trade, communication and transport, 4) implementation of the border decision, and 5) joint work toward peace and security in the region (Bereketeab 2019). Following the agreement and as a great symbol of the peace between the Ethiopia and Eritrea, roads were opened between the two countries, facilitating the movement of goods and people (Bereketeab 2019). The internally driven rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was met by celebration among the populations of the two countries, emphasizing the significance of the conflict and the depth of the desire to finally reach agreement and peace.

5: Theories and Concepts

In the following section the four theories, Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods, Wæver's securitization theory, Galtung's theories of peace and Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture, will be assessed and applied to the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

5.1 Scoones' Concept of Sustainable Livelihoods

In the following, livelihoods approaches will be introduced as a tool for analysis that both capture the central elements comprising the complex livelihoods of people at a particular point in time and the dynamics of change in livelihoods over time. As the approach generates both a description of the present and includes an element of change, it will be applied as a tool for comparison between different points in time in order to identify and clarify any improvements to the quality of livelihoods following an increase or decrease in conflict. In addition, the approach will provide important insight into local coping strategies, as an important component in the survival strategies of people that are caught in areas of conflict (Schafer 2002). With the identification of opportunities for improved assistance, the livelihoods approach provides the necessary information for improvements in humanitarian interventions to take place.

Among the poorest people and countries in the world are those subject to chronic conflict and political instability. These countries have been damaged by the combined forces of globalization and marginalization, and the poverty that they are experiencing is both the cause and effect of political instability. Some of these countries carry with them distorted national boundaries and divided polities as a direct product of colonial rule, while others are involved in harmful regional geopolitical intrigues (Schafer 2002). A critique of current humanitarian efforts directs attention to the lack of emphasis on *“how or why potential for conflict is translated into actual conflict”* (Schafer 2002: p. 21). It takes the combined forces of political economy approach and livelihood analysis to gain knowledge of the dynamics of collective and individual conflicts, and to identify ways of resolving conflicts sustainably. While political and economic macrostructures are crucial in identifying the context within which conflict arises and uncovering who are the winners and losers of such conflict, they fail to explain how and on what terms different groups of people are drawn into conflict, and how their livelihood patterns are transformed and shaped by such conflict. Moreover, they lack the potential of identifying whose livelihoods should be supported in order to avoid situations where support nourishes exploitative patterns. This is where livelihood approaches

come into play. While the majority of research and practices within development studies follow a top-down approach, Robert Chambers argues for the implementation of an alternative approach placing the subject of chronic conflict and political instability as its starting point, thereby *“correcting the inevitable biases introduced by outsiders deciding what was best for poor people”* (Schafer 2002: p. 13). As Hazel Johnson puts it, *“if actions from above cannot ‘get it right’ (or may not necessarily intend to ‘get it right’ for the rural poor), it is tempting to think that actions ‘from below’ may have a chance – that the rural poor know what their problems are and seek rational solutions to them”* (Schafer 2002: p. 13). It is within this context that livelihood approaches first gained ground.

Unique to the livelihoods approach – which in this paper builds on the work of Scoones – is its starting point, which abandons any existing knowledge of grand theories and shifts the attention to *“where people are, what they have and what their needs and interests are”* (Schafer 2002: p. 14). A lack of recognition of the level that is subject to analysis may result in scale issues, as there is an important difference between the individual, household and village level in terms of access to livelihood resources and pursuit of livelihood strategies. The scale at which an assessment takes place is thus key to the livelihood approach. However, although the approach identifies the local level as its starting point, it does not exclude policies and practices at higher levels. Rather, the approach recognizes the interrelation between the two, and acknowledges the need for action to be taken at higher levels than the local one (Schafer 2002). In the sustainable livelihoods approach, emphasis is placed on both the development of a policy environment to support the livelihood strategies of peoples’ choosing, and an increase in the means required by people in order for them to achieve their livelihood outcomes. Thereby, the livelihoods approach is not merely a method for eradicating poverty, but rather a fundamentally better way of advocating development, as it builds on the notion of positive freedom in its reference to *“what their needs and interests are”*, i.e., desired livelihood outcomes. In contrast to an economic focus on development, income and production-based measures are defined as inadequate measurement units, as they fail to capture the quality of living and the issue of entitlement, i.e., the individual’s access to fundamental resources (Schafer 2002). Accordingly, ‘access’ has been adopted as a more valid unit of measurement, as it explains the opportunity of an individual to use a particular resource (Schafer 2002).

With livelihoods approaches becoming more mainstream in development studies, a range of principles have been added to the approach, one of these being the principle of sustainability (Schafer 2002). The Department for International Development defines the term by the introduction of four dimensions: environmental, economic, social and institutional. The first dimension refers to any improvements of the productive resource base, the second refers to the securement of a basic level of economic welfare, the third refers to the minimization of social exclusion and maximization of social equity, and the fourth and final dimension refers to the ability of structures and processes to perform their functions over the long term (Schafer 2002). With the introduction of sustainability, the attention of livelihoods approaches thereby reaches beyond the actions taken by individuals to achieve a desired livelihood and adds a second aspect to its process, which examines *“the extent to which individual livelihoods and livelihoods in the aggregate affect the ability of other people to achieve their own livelihoods, both now and in the future”* (Schafer 2002: p. 15). Livelihood resources have the potential of being combined in a range of creative ways that foster more livelihoods in a certain area. An example of such is the accumulation of natural capital from new investments in damaged land. In this paper, the definition of sustainable livelihoods builds on the work of Scoones whose definition of livelihoods can be narrowed down to the following description: *“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shock, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base”* (Scoones 2015: p. 5).

Scoones' sustainable livelihoods approach displays how sustainable livelihoods are achieved in different contexts through access to livelihood resources, i.e., natural, economic, human and social capitals (Scoones 2015). Most significant to his theoretical work is the identification of five key indicators: 1) creation of working days, 2) poverty reduction, 3) well-being and capabilities, 4) livelihood adaption, vulnerability and resilience, and 5) natural resource base sustainability (Scoones 2015). The creation of working days has three aspects to it: income (the employee's wage), production (employment providing a disposable output), and recognition (where employment provides recognition for being occupied in something meaningful). The income/production aspect captures the ability of a particular grouping of livelihood strategies to provide gainful employment with 200 days a year being the minimum level to create a livelihood. Turning to poverty reduction, the poverty level is a key criterion in the assessment of livelihoods.

When assessing well-being and capabilities, capabilities refers to what people can do or be with their entitlements, while well-being captures the ability of people to define which factors are of greatest importance. The notion of well-being and capabilities thus broadens the scope for the livelihoods concept, as it may incorporate a variety of factors, e.g., self-esteem, security, happiness, stress, vulnerability, power, exclusion and a range of material concerns. Livelihood adaption, vulnerability and resilience describes the ability of a livelihood to cope with and recover from shocks triggered by conflict. Those who are unable to cope by temporary adjustments during change or fail to adapt to long-term impacts on livelihood strategies are defined as vulnerable and less likely to achieve sustainable livelihoods. Lastly, natural resource base sustainability refers to the reliance of rural livelihoods on natural resources and explains the ability of a system to remain productive when undergoing disturbance (Scoones 2015). Aside from the five key indicators, another important component of Scoones' framework is the analysis of formal and informal organizational and institutional factors that directly or indirectly influence sustainable livelihood outcomes (Scoones 2015). A central element of the framework is thus the institutional processes that mediate the ability to carry out livelihood strategies and achieve or not achieve particular livelihood outcomes.

Although the sustainable livelihoods approach provides valid information about the quality of livelihoods, Scoones warns against any postulations claiming that objective measuring of sustainable livelihoods is a simple matter (Scoones 2015). For the approach to be valid, the analysis must necessarily be executed in a way that complements its many dimensions, high diversity and richness of the livelihoods, which it attempts to analyze. This includes that analysis is carried out at a variety of levels and across different groups of people to certify that no relevant information is omitted, and to reduce the risk of inaccuracy following the variation that occurs in livelihood strategies. In addition, the analysis should be executed over time to capture the dynamics of change and include an examination of the transformations that take place in familial, communal, social, collective and policy institutions (Schafer 2002), which makes it possible to identify potential entry points for humanitarian intervention.

5.2 Wæver's Securitization Theory

The theory on the politics of securitization allows for political events to be studied empirically as social phenomena, and the theory will thus be applied in order to further assess the limitations to

sustainable peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By linking securitization to the specific power structures of society, the theory sheds light on the presence of any exploitative patterns of the ruling coalition of Ethiopia and Eritrea. With the securitization of a public issue, wider state powers as well as intensive mobilization of resources are legitimized as tools for responding to an alleged security threat. This provides credence to the ruling elite and allows leaders to exercise more control over the people. When assessing the issue of securitization in relation to the implementation of democracy and sustainable peace, it is thus evident that the securitization of democracy has provoked the emergence of an alternative type of politics, which provide the ruling coalition with a higher degree of control. In light of the emergence of such politics, a major concern has unfolded, bringing attention to the effects of such politics on the emergence of authentic democratization. Accordingly, the application of Wæver's securitization theory provides the tools for examining the exploitation of power by the ruling elite by looking into the extent to which a matter of security has been politicized to a degree where it allows leaders to take more control over the people. By examining the extent to which power is exploited by the ruling elite, Wæver provides a political aspect to the debate and thereby contributes to the examination of elements hindering the implementation of authentic democracy and sustainable peace.

The debate on security has been subject to many interpretations, which has triggered a multitude of different understandings of the concept. This has fostered a debate over its core components and raised a number of questions about its origins, how it is comprised and who it relates to. The study of security first gained ground in the aftermath of World War II (Buzan & Wæver 2003) and the following years the study presumed the ontological groundwork of realism and limited its focus to a military one through the continuous emphasis on protection of the state. However, with the Cold War new directions within the discipline emerged, one of them being from the Copenhagen School with Wæver as one of its main contributors. Central to this approach was the definition of three key elements with the first being the development of an approach observing security threats in one of five sectors, i.e., military, environment, economic, social and political. The second element includes the formulation of a regional focus, challenging the existing state focus. The third and final element captures the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of securitization and refers to a confrontation with the traditional and more objectivist view of threats (Wæver 2004). This supports the realist version of security previously dominating the field.

According to Wæver's conceptualization of the concept of security, which he labels securitization, the term refers to the intersubjective formation of an existential threat, which requires an immediate response and demands extraordinary resources to overcome the particular threat (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998). At its core, securitization theory explains the move of an issue from non-politicized to politicized to securitized. Accordingly, this process explains how an issue goes from being insignificant to becoming a matter of public debate and finally being presented as an existential threat that requires immediate measures (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998). This allows for politics to be framed as extraordinary or exceptional thus exceeding established rules. Moreover, the social interaction between a securitizing actor and an audience should be seen in relation to an object, referred to as the referent, and the threat that is posed to this referent. Accordingly, the study of securitization attempts at achieving "*an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)*" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: p. 32). In its essence, securitization is thus a mode of analyzing security processes.

Within his theoretical framework, Wæver outlines three distinct types of politics of securitization: political securitization practices, the political in securitization analysis, and the politics of securitization theory (Wæver 2011). The first aspect refers to the empirical studies of political processes of securitization and desecuritization, i.e., the knowledge about politics. Emphasis is placed on the examination of securitization and to whom it refers, and the purpose is to uncover knowledge about "*who does what kind of securitization, how, with how much success and what side-effects, and resisted by whom*" (Wæver 2011: p. 466). Meanwhile, the second aspect explores the concept of politics implied in securitization theory, i.e., how politics are defined. This aspect has fostered a debate on whether the theory "*includes a problematic, decisionistic bend, or whether it celebrates some kind of 'normal politics' as an idylized contrast to emergency measures*" (Wæver 2011: p. 466-467). Finally, the third aspect captures a more strategic dimension and refers to the political moves invested in the theory, i.e., how a theory can be political. This aspect builds on the notion that all academic work is political, and thus not necessarily a reflection of reality. Humans decide for themselves what to say and when to say it, and their choices have implications. Accordingly, one way in which theoretical work can be viewed is in terms of its political implications (Wæver 2011), which leaves us with the question of what a particular theory does politically. In answering such question, Wæver warns against two particular models that fail to

paint the full picture on their own. This warning targets models that provide standards of judgement for specific cases, as they reduce politics to outcomes and define theory as dependent on a former political program, and models that set out to demonstrate a given theory's dependence on some philosophical premises thereby placing philosophy as hierarchically superior to theory, as they fail to emphasize the importance of what the theory does rather than what it says (Wæver 2011). Rather than limiting oneself to the adoption of such models, it is within an analysis of the joint effort of the three aspects that provides the opportunity of gaining knowledge about how features of the theory systematically shape the political effects of using that specific theory. Accordingly, to Wæver an analysis of the politics of a theory means to "*track the kind of analysis it can produce and whether such analysis will impact in any systematic way on real-life political struggles – which are always unique, complicated and open-ended*" (Wæver 2011: p. 468).

Returning to the question of what securitization theory does politically, Wæver divides the theory into three effects. The first explains securitization as an act or a discontinuous reshaping of a social state, and his work thus builds on Hannah Arendt's notion of the concept, which claims that "*politics is productive, irreducible and happens among people as an unpredictable chain of actions*" (Wæver 2011: p. 468). Thereby, politics cannot be explained simply by someone taking power or producing an output. Action depends on prior actions and understanding of the significance of a particular act thus relies on the history to be concluded. Consequently, the incentive and result of an action can only be fully comprehended when the action itself as well as the potential chain of events, which it sets in motion, have unfolded. Accordingly, history is not created by the agenda of one man carrying out his plan. Rather, it is the product of an infinite number of chain reactions. Furthermore, following Arendt's notion of securitization, power is explained as an internal concept, which plays out in the sphere between people, making it impossible to "*reduce away politics by deriving it from objective threats or causal explanations at the particular point of securitization*" (Wæver 2011: p. 468). According to Wæver, securitization theory thus builds on a structure that highlights responsibility and protects politics. This argument is further enhanced by the approach's emphasis on ethical concerns such as why it is possible to call something a security issue, and what the implications are for doing so or not doing so (Wæver 2011).

Moving on to the second effect, Wæver distinguishes between securitization and desecuritization with the first being of preference in the case of concrete situations while more abstract situations call for the latter (Wæver 2011). In contrast to securitization, desecuritization is embedded in the logic of more politics and less security and captures the process of shifting back issues from the sphere of emergency politics to normal politics (Buzan & Wæver 2003). Fundamental to Wæver's theoretical work is the existence of causal mechanisms that bring attention to the negative impacts of securitization – the logic of necessity, the narrowing of choice and the empowerment of a smaller elite – and the analytical set-up, which enables empirical analysis of the potential gains that arise from dealing with challenges within both security and non-security (Wæver 2011). Wæver explains desecuritization as a tool for critically assessing the drawbacks of securitization meanwhile acknowledging its potential for handling challenges through limitation of focus and mobilization of resources (Wæver 2011), thereby improving society.

The third effect highlights a particular security rationality referred to as Huysmans' dilemma. To Huysmans, an understanding of the performative role of language, requires that one acknowledges that language cannot be reduced to merely a communicative instrument reporting on the world outside of language. Rather, language should be understood as a defining force and mediating instrument which “*brings social practices into a particular communicative, institutionalized framework*” (Huysmans 2002: p. 44). Language is thus perceived as a defining force, which integrates social relations. This means that all those who engage in security processes through speaking or writing become involved in the knowledge accumulation associated with a security issue and thus become involved in the political technology that is applied to manage it (Huysmans 2002). This indicates that all those who engage with the study of security is also at risk of reproducing and strengthening certain subjectivities of fear and order (Huysmans 2002). As a consequence, security can be used to produce subjectivities of fear, which is most often expressed in the form of repressive and anti-democratic acts or social and political exclusion (Huysmans 2002). In summary, the decision to create change will be at the risk of further securitization of an issue, as “*security formation simultaneously constrains and empowers the authors to make serious security statements*” (Huysmans 2002: p. 47). In other words, security studies are at constant risk of strengthening security even when they are deliberately anti-security. The dilemma thereby captures a duality within the study of security: on the one hand the emphasis on one particular security

rationality supports the commitment to reveal what security language actually does, and on the other hand it increases the potential of strengthening the exceptionalist end of politics.

5.3 Galtung's Theories of Peace

In this dissertation, Galtung's theories on peace will be applied as a tool for examining and explaining the peacebuilding process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Thereto, the theory will be applied to consider potential limitations to the particular approach to peacebuilding that has been implemented in the case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. Keeping in mind the intrinsic elements of critical realism, the dissertation attempts at uncovering the fundamental role of peacebuilding theory on a general level, meanwhile engaging with the work of Galtung on a more practical level by applying it to the peacebuilding process between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Galtung declares that "*there is no place to start and certainly non place to end policies for peace*" (Galtung 1996: p. 3), thereby denoting that generating peace is a continuous process – corresponding to the methodology of critical realism in which knowledge accumulation is defined as a social process in which true knowledge is unattainable. In Galtung's theoretical framework, all actors are carriers of peace strategies. Although, when examining the state-system, certain issues arise, as "*the means for peace that appear to be relevant often end up in the manifestation of violence and we end up with 'sticks and carrots'*" (Galtung 1996: p. 7). Meanwhile, other issues can be associated with the non-state as a carrier (Marien 1990). With the non-state as carrier of peace strategies, the problem arises from the underlying assumption that humans are in fact complex and not always peaceful creatures. Humans have at their disposal primarily cultural power, and following the notion of Galtung, the cultural power signifies the starting point of a key causal relationship moving via structural to direct violence (Marien 1990). Accordingly, below the surface of these structures transferring violence, culture is generating legitimacy for some while delegitimizing others. As a consequence, violence becomes deeply embedded in both the culture providing legitimacy, as well as in the structures channeling the violence (Marien 1990). As a result, peacebuilding is reliant on the development of a new architecture if conflict is to be prevented from resurfacing. This claim further validates the saying by Galtung: "*know about peace to know about violence*" (Galtung 1996: p. 195). Accordingly, the solution to conflict does not solely rely on a response to the symptoms of conflict, i.e., the violence itself. Rather, the

achievement of sustainable peace requires for conflict resolution to approach the underlying structures of the conflict (Galtung Institute for Peace Theory and Peace Practice).

Galtung's framework for peacebuilding builds on the notion of two distinctive views on peace, i.e., negative and positive peace (Galtung 1967). He moves on to identify three typologies of violence: direct, structural and cultural (Tilahun 2015), which are of relevance to his distinction between negative and positive peace. Galtung explains direct violence as dramatic and observable. This type of violence works much faster than structural and cultural violence. Meanwhile, structural violence is deeply embedded in the very nature of societal institutions and tends to deny people their right to economic wellbeing, equality at all levels and a sense of self-worth. This type of violence is expressed by famine, political repression, psychological alienation and so forth. Finally, cultural violence lies at the core of structural violence where it legitimizes the activation of violence through language, art, science, law, media and education (Galtung 1996).

Returning to the distinction between negative and positive peace, in his description of negative peace, Galtung refers to the term as the absence of direct violence and war and the presence of a level of stability and safety. Yet, negative peace occurs in scenarios in which the underlying issues of a particular conflict has yet to be resolved, thus negative peace is to a large extent defined by its probability of relapsing into conflict. Meanwhile, he defines positive peace as the scenario in which the underlying structures that initially led to violence have been attended to, i.e., the integration of human society, thus positive peace is *"the absence of structural and cultural violence and prevalence of justice, harmony and equality"* (Tilahun 2015: p. 1). In such scenario emphasis is not on the absence of violence but rather on the presence of cooperation and integration, which creates the potential for sustainable peace to take form. Galtung divides the search for peace into two different approaches: *"the search for the conditions for the absence of negative relations, and the search for conditions that facilitate the presence of positive relations"* (Galtung 1967: p. 14), indicating his association of positive peace with the existence of a number of values of positive relations, referring to the presence of cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism and dynamism (Galtung 1967). These values can be applied both at the level of individuals and the level of nations. The creation of positive peace is a long and complex process, which requires a high degree of involvement and commitment from all sectors and layers of society.

In contrast to positive peace, negative peace has the potential of being achieved much faster. However, following the notion of Galtung, positive peace is dependent on the existence of negative peace, and it thus cannot survive in the absence of the other without being torn to pieces (Baruch 2012).

As peace and conflict are complex components, determining when peace has been achieved is not without difficulties. To avoid further complications of this issue, Galtung offers a way of clarifying on whether peace is in fact present or not. He does so by identifying fright and hatred as tools for measuring the strength and capacity of peace with fright referring to the urge to flee and hatred as a “*psychological foundation for violence*” (Baruch 2012). In his examination of violence, Galtung offers two ways of navigating in the likelihood of violence – hurt or be hurt. Following the notion of Galtung, these options tend to expand into a larger number of options when the case is one of conflict transformation. In such scenario, the need to be psychologically prepared is of less importance, thus “*hatred is for the mind what adrenaline is for the body*” (Baruch 2012). Thereby, Galtung presents the argument that the presence of peace is to be determined by the extent of fleeing and fighting, i.e., a decrease in these components must necessarily correspond to an increase in the degree of sustainable peace.

In his theoretical work on conflict outcome and conflict processes, Galtung stresses the importance of neutrality from the mediator’s perspective. Without neutral mediators to guide the process, conflict resolution is undermined. He moves on to examine the concept of conflict between two parties through the connotation of two boys (boy A and boy B) fighting over an orange. In this connotation Galtung presents five general types of outcomes: 1) boy A gets the orange and boy B gets mad and seeks revenge, 2) boy B gets the orange and boy A gets mad and seeks revenge, 3) the two boys share the orange and both are only partly satisfied by the result, 4) the orange is disposed of and none of the boys get it, and 5) the boys press the orange, share the juice, sow the seeds in a new, shared orange plantation and enjoy the fruits together in the future (Galtung 2000). The first two outcomes are the same and mean that one party prevails. The third outcome is a case of withdrawal, the fourth refers to a compromise, and the fifth is a case of transcendence, i.e., a redefinition of the situation so that “*what looked incompatible, blocked, is unlocked, and a new landscape opens up*” (Galtung 2000: p. 14). Thereby, creativity becomes key to transforming the conflict by unlocking what is blocked.

5.4 Dawson's Theory on the Politics of Memory and Post-Conflict Culture

In the below section, Dawson's theory on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture will add to the theoretical framework of Galtung through an integration of the past into the process of sustainable peacebuilding. In his theoretical work, Dawson shifts between context-specific stories of victims of violence and more general cultural frameworks that shape violence. Similar to the subsequent section on Galtung's theories of peace, the work of Dawson will be applied to shed light on potential limitations to the particular approach to peacebuilding that is implemented in the of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The concept of conflict memory aims at exploring the relations of power shaping the ways in which conflict can be remembered (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper 2013). The memory of a conflict can be captured in a range of different ways and the choice of how to portray and remember the particular conflict has important implications for the process of rebuilding. Also, the act of remembering may not only take different forms but also it may occur at different levels. One way of depicting past conflict is in the form of public commemoration orchestrated by the nation-state, while another takes the form of personal testimonies by victims of violence with their stories being expressed and honored in films, plays and novels or by juridical investigations (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper 2013). Keeping in mind how the composition of remembering and suffering differs from one individual to another, the study of conflict memory signifies the – often unequal – struggle to install particular memories of a conflict at the center of a cultural world, often at the expense of those in society who are marginalized or neglected (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper 2013). The framing of conflict memory can be explained as a selective process in which the nation-state exercises its power to acknowledge and integrate within its national narrative only certain conflict memories and not others.

Accordingly, the nation-state's ability or inability to recognize violence is fundamental to the construction of the national narrative and the framing of the official memory of the nation-state, which in turn impact the rebuilding of society in light of conflict.

Central to the work of Dawson is the attention on the politics of memory and post-conflict culture, which he addresses by examining the interrelations between memory, narrative, lived experience and identify (Dawson 2017). In an investigation of the past, the concept of trauma surfaces and emphasizes the significance of psychoanalysis. The concept of trauma helps to identify past traumas

that remain unresolved, and consequently has a negative impact on current processes of peacebuilding (Dawson 2017). The mere introduction of the concept of trauma implies that severe suffering has taken place, and both the victims of violence as well as the societal response to their pain should be examined, as they are both vital components in the process of peacebuilding. In his work, Dawson is to a great extent inspired by the Indian anthropologist, Veen Das, and his concept of ‘poisonous knowledge’, which describes an unnarratable experience that is present in our minds merely as a fixed moment to which suffering remains attached and thus is kept alive (Dawson 2007).

In regard to peacebuilding processes, Dawson poses a warning against the risk of exposing victims of violence to social and political pressures, which may arise when the recovery process of the victims of violence and the peacebuilding process are out of sync. Such scenarios are most likely to occur when the commitment to moving on and finding closure take over, and there is a lack of public recognition of the damages of the past conflict. In addition, the collective pressure imposed on the victims of violence is at risk of disregarding the contextual settings that are unique to each case. Dawson labels such instances as ‘traumatized community’ (Campos 2017), which he uses to describe a community missing the reflection about the past, and therefore still suffering from its past. In such scenarios, Dawson offers ‘reparative remembering’ as a tool for constructively addressing the past, which unlike closure and in contrast to ‘defensive’ memory, signifies an *“active, open, and ongoing integration of a painful and disturbing past, improving our living relationship with it”* (Campos 2017: p. 31). Thereby, the opportunity of gaining a fuller and more rich relationship with the past arises. The recognition and acknowledgement of painful, traumatic events thereby provide meaning and dignity to the victim of violence. Dawson moves on to suggest ‘storytelling’ as a way of breaking the cycle of conflict and initiating the healing process following an exposure to traumatic events with still-present consequences (Dawson 2017).

6: Analysis and Discussion of Sub Research Questions

In the following section, research question 6.1 applies the theories of respectively Scoones, Wæver, Galtung and Dawson in an analysis and discussion of the case of peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Subsequent to the analysis and discussion, a conclusion will summarize the findings of research question 6.1, implying that peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case of negative peace. By assessing the impacts of the recent conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the process of peacebuilding, research question 6.2 will serve as a means of validating the postulation presented in the conclusion to research question 6.1.

6.1 How and to what extent was peace initially reached following the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea?

The following section covers the years from the commencement of the border war up until 2018 with the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship that spurred dramatic development changing the political landscape of the entire region. The purpose of this section is to clarify the factors enabling the development toward peace by critically assessing objective and subjective conditions in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the alteration of the concept of peace during this period.

In his remarks on the union of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018, the Secretary General of the UN, António Guterres, noted that “*the signature of the peace agreement between the President of Eritrea and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia is indeed a historic event. We have seen a conflict that has lasted for decades ending, and that has a very important meaning in a world where we see, unfortunately, so many conflicts multiplying and lasting forever*” (United Nations Secretary General 2018). The general perception on the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was that it was without solution, thus the statement by the Secretary General captures the appearance of hope prompted by the trajectories of unexpected and dramatic change. The reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea was celebrated across the world and the population of the two countries embraced the rapprochement in the form of celebration, emphasizing the desire for peace and the significance of the conflict coming to an end. But was the peace installed by the Agreement on Peace and Friendship sustainable?

6.1.1 Scoones' Concept of Sustainable Livelihoods

Following Scoones' definition, livelihoods encompass the ways in which people access and mobilize resources enabling them to satisfy basic needs and pursue a way of living that secure their survival and well-being. As an integral part of this approach to livelihoods is the emphasis on reducing the vulnerability that arise with conflict. Accordingly, rather than focusing on the concept of sustainability – which is most common in development studies – this definition centers its attention on reducing the degree of vulnerability. Thereby, the definition applies to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as it is first and foremost a case of conflict. Furthermore, by starting at the point of conflict, the definition follows the approach of Robert Chambers who emphasizes the risk of overlooking the marginalized or neglected people when attention is not placed on the true subject of conflict. In the case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, emphasis should thus be put on the people of the two countries, as these are inevitably subject to the vulnerability caused by the conflict. The underlying argument is that the people know best what their problems are and what solutions can fix these problems. Accordingly, when applying Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods to the case of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the starting point is associated with “*where people are, what they have and what their needs and interests are*” (Schafer 2002: p. 14). When applying the theory of Scoones, the scope of analysis is thus the Ethiopian and the Eritrean people. However, as the theory attests, policies and practices at a higher level should not be excluded from the analysis, as the purpose of the livelihoods approach is to develop a policy environment, which supports the livelihood strategies of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people. Accordingly, the different levels are deeply embedded in one another. This is also how the livelihoods approach ends up reaching beyond its focus of eradicating poverty and takes the form of a development approach. Thereby, the concept of sustainability, which was initially left out in order to fully focus on the reduction of vulnerability, reappears as an important feature at the later stages of the livelihoods approach.

With the recognition of the people of respectively Ethiopia and Eritrea as the starting point of the analysis, an assessment of their access to natural, economic, human and social livelihood resources is key to evaluating whether or not basic needs are being met. In his theory on sustainable livelihoods, Scoones offers five key indicators that help define the extent to which a livelihood is sustainable. In the following examination of these five key indicators, the scope of the analysis is the years prior to the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the

Agreement on Peace and Friendship – thus the years between 2000-2018, the so-called “no war, no peace” period. While the first three indicators refer to livelihoods, the last two indicators incorporate the concept of sustainability and thereby the analysis complements the notion of including the sustainability component. Important to remember is the distinctiveness of these five indicators in terms of their scope. While some of the indicators can be measured through very precise measures, amenable to quantitative assessment, others are more complex and can only be measured through the application of more qualitative measures. The complexity of measuring livelihoods is embedded in the intrinsic nature of the concept, which is composed by a broad range of distinct ideas and interests. People are different in their way of thinking and prioritizing thus any fixed definition of measuring livelihoods is considered inappropriate. Accordingly, Scoones’ definition does not include a straightforward way of measuring livelihoods, and the concept thus remains open to negotiation. The following analysis should thus be seen merely as one suggestion of assessing livelihoods.

Addressing the first indicator – creation of working days – it is income, production and recognition that determine whether the situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea provides the people with the capabilities, assets and activities that are required for a means of living. As recognition ties to the individual’s unique perception of what qualifies as worthwhile employment, the assessment of this aspect is based on more qualitative measures, while quantitative measures are applied in the assessment of income and production. In regard to income and production, the Ethiopian unemployment rate – measured as the number of people actively looking for a job as a percentage of the labor force – amounted to 2.338 percent in 2010 (World Bank A) while the Eritrean unemployment rate was at 5.41 percent for the same year (World Bank B). Examining these numbers, it is important to take into account that many Ethiopian and Eritrean employees are working within the informal sector where wages are often low and working hours vary to a great extent. Despite this, these employees are not statistically counted as unemployed (Danish Trade Union Development Agency), and with 86 percent of total employment characterized as ‘vulnerable employed’, i.e., less likely to have formal work arrangements (Danish Trade Union Development Agency), a much higher percentage of unemployment is likely to be the case. This indicates that in 2010 a significant portion of the Ethiopian and Eritrean population was incapable of reaching the minimum of 200 working days per year, as many of them were without job. In addition, a frustration with the lack of access to formal jobs is expressed in Ethiopia. The inability of people to

access jobs is captured by the argument presented by Scoones in which inaccessibility corresponds to basic needs not being met. Turning to the aspect of recognition, the absence of a minimum wage in Ethiopia as well as the in general low wages of both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Danish Trade Union Development Agency), which are fostering a negative attitude toward work within the labor market, add to the effects that the inaccessibility to work may have on people's perception of their employment being worthwhile.

Moving on to the second indicator, i.e., poverty reduction, the share of the Ethiopian population living below the poverty line was cut in half between the years 1995-2010, corresponding to a percentage decrease from 60.5 to 29.6 (International Monetary Fund 2015). Meanwhile, with a Gini index – measuring relative inequality – of 30 in 1999 and 33.2 in 2010 (World Bank C), the rapid growth of Ethiopia's economy did not result in any significant increase in inequality, thus Ethiopia maintained its definition as an egalitarian country. However, despite successful efforts to reduce poverty and maintain its status as an egalitarian country, poverty has remained a critical issue in Ethiopia (UNDP 2018). Shifting the attention to Eritrea, poverty is an issue of concern to the country. However, the lack of accessible data on the degree of poverty and inequality in Eritrea complicate the demonstration of quantitative evidence. The most recent available survey from 1996/1997 shows a poverty rate of 70% (World Bank D), and with poverty remaining widespread today (World Bank D), the assumption thus is that basic needs are not being met in the case of Eritrea.

The third indicator calls for a more qualitative measure, as the notion of well-being and capabilities builds on the understanding of the individual's capabilities to be or do in a way that constitutes a valuable life to that particular individual. Thereby, the third indicator is best measured through an examination of the potential of securing and developing people's capabilities in order to facilitate the achievement of what they consider as valuable lives. In the years between 2000-2018 in Ethiopia, the extent to which people could achieve the lives of their liking was limited by a number of factors. Among these were the blocking of roads between Ethiopia and Eritrea limiting the mobilization of goods and people, and the poor education system making worthwhile employment inaccessible to people (UNDP 2018). To a specific portion of the population, the occurrence of violence at the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea likewise kept people from pursuing ideal lives. These are just a few of the conditions that may have prevented people from pursuing their idea of

valuable lives. To further strengthen the argument that people's capabilities were limited to an extent to which people were incapable of achieving lives that in their perception were defined as valuable, Ethiopia's human development index (HDI) value was in 2015 0.448 (UNDP 2018), placing Ethiopia within the low human development category. While the HDI does not reflect components like inequality and poverty, it captures the average achievement in crucial dimensions of human development, i.e., a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living (UNDP A). In comparison, Eritrea's 2015 HDI value was 0.454 (UNDP 2020) placing the country with Ethiopia in the low human development category. In addition, like with Ethiopia there were a variety of factors limiting the people's achievement of valuable lives in the years between 2000-2018. Aside from the violence at the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the limitation of mobility resulting from the lack of roads between the two countries, these included among others limited access to clean water with solely 48.6 percent of the rural population having access to improved water resources in 2015 (Samuel 2015) and inconsistency in public education with a total of 27.2 percent of school-aged children not attending school in 2014 (UNICEF 2014).

Examining the fourth indicator, the concept of sustainability is introduced. Those who are not able to cope or adapt in the face of shocks are unlikely to achieve sustainable livelihoods. The coping or adaption mechanism of people is examined through an assessment of historical experiences of responses to shocks. As both Ethiopia and Eritrea are cases of vast conflict and war, they offer an ideal setting for analysis. Similar to the remaining indicators, the subject of this analysis will be the population of respectively Ethiopia and Eritrea. As people's responses to shocks tend to take many different forms depending on the uniqueness of the particular individual and the specific shock, the following should be seen as an attempt to offer reasoned assumptions based on a critical assessment of certain events qualifying as shocks and the responses they have provoked. Keeping in mind the introduction to the case of interest, four scenarios capture the responses by the people to particular shocks in society. What comes to mind when assessing the violent history of Ethiopia is the many uprisings and protests responding to the actions of autocratic regimes that throughout the years have dominated the political landscape of Ethiopia. These events trace all the way back to the 1960s and the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie where a peasant rebellion in Bale and the Gojjam Uprisings express the Ethiopian people's response to the repression carried out by the regime. Although Ethiopia has a history of repression by the ruling elite, demonstrations and rebellions have likewise been an integral part of the population's responses to repression, implying a resistance among the

people. The later protests against TPLF and EPRDF by Ethiopia's major ethnic groups are other examples giving further strength to this argument. Turning to yet another scenario of shock, in the midst of the "Red Terror" campaign, the encouragement by the TPLF to kill EPRP members or suspected members as well as their sympathizers have most likely provoked responses of fear. However, this may both have triggered the people's tolerance of the situation in an attempt to avoid further suffering or their resistance in attempt to fight off the situation and overthrow the ruling political elite.

Another assumption builds on the notion that the mistrust between the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea at some point made its way through the populations of the two countries, especially at the border where mistrust and suspicion between the two populations became more engrained in everyday life. The fight over Badme provides volumes to the argument of a division between the Ethiopian and Eritrean population, as the city ended up becoming a symbol of victory to both parties – the one ending up with Badme as its territory won. In this way, Badme is the orange of Galtung's theory, and Ethiopia and Eritrea are the two boys who need to find a solution to who gets it. The disagreement over Badme thus implies a divide between Ethiopia and Eritrea that may reach beyond the level of politics and impact the perception of the individual Ethiopian and Eritrean. Thereby, the 'no war, no peace' phrase has another aspect to it, as it tells a story of great suspicion and caution between the two populations. Moreover, the sanctions on Eritrea evoked by Ethiopia and the efforts of economic strangulation of Eritrea by Ethiopia may as well have contributed to resentment by the Eritrean population against Ethiopians. All of the above examples – although reasoned – are mere suppositions and thus cannot be confirmed without further assessment. However, keeping in mind the intrinsic nature of critical realism, knowledge accumulation is a continuous process that can never offer knowledge that is absolute. Thus, no algorithm for objectively measuring the mechanisms of coping and adapting enables the generation of a final truth about their nature.

Addressing the fifth and final indicator, the degree to which the Ethiopian and Eritrean population rely on the natural resource base of the two countries is examined. Such examination is carried out by looking into the ability of a system to remain productive when subject to disruptions. This indicator thus stresses the importance of preventing diminishing supplies of natural resources from experiencing a more permanent decline where the natural resource base becomes incapable of

providing livelihoods with useful products and services. When measuring the sustainability of the natural resources, several factors come into play: indicators of resource depletion or accumulation, the ability to recover from disturbances, and the needs of livelihoods (Scoones 1998). Assessing the case of Ethiopia, with more than 80 percent of the population living in rural areas (International Monetary Fund 2015), dependency on agriculture is high, and securing livelihoods is inextricably connected to the exploitation of the natural resource base. The pressure on the natural resource base stemming from this exploitation is high and has put Ethiopia at risk of an ecological imbalance, causing overgrazing, deforestation, soil erosion and soil fertility decline, water scarcity as well as livestock feed and fuelwood crisis (Dejene 2003). These are all strong indicators of resource depletion. The issue of resource depletion is most severe in the Ethiopian highlands (Dejene 2003) which are also subject to disturbances in the form of famine caused by the combined efforts of natural disasters like drought and internal as well as external conflict. Prior to 1974, there was an absence in government policy on the conservation of natural resources (Dejene 2003). However, with severe famines threatening the livelihoods of people, emphasis was placed on the linkage between soil erosion and the sustainability of the agricultural sector, leading to larger investments in soil conservation and land rehabilitation efforts (Dejene 2003). This expresses an ability to address disturbances and implies the integration of temporal dynamics of resilience into the system.

To Scoones, the needs of livelihoods translate into an “*assessment of whether natural resource change results in ‘effectively permanent declines in useful products and services’*” (Scoones 1998: p. 7). However, the aspect of infinity that is associated with the term ‘permanent’ makes the measurement of this factor notoriously difficult, as the methodological notion of critical realism does not acknowledge the existence of permanent components, as these would inevitably be incompliant with the continuousness of knowledge accumulation. With that being said, the case of resource depletion in Ethiopia, which among other consequences has resulted in famines, supports the argument that the change in the natural resource base has generated long-lasting declines in useful products and services. To make this argument more powerful, rainfall and water availability are highly variable, and issues of water scarcity, flooding and droughts emphasize the country’s vulnerability to water-related shocks. Adding natural resource change to the equation, it is evident that decreasing rainfalls and increasing temperatures (The Conversation) will cause for a worsening of the availability of water in the future. In turn, this implies that water access will become more challenging for human needs such as drinking, sanitation and hygiene. Thereby, the climate changes

have long-term effects on the livelihoods of people and cause a change in livelihoods, forcing people into adaption to new circumstances. Although the natural resource bases of Ethiopia are rich, they are yet to be developed sustainably. Moreover, despite economic growth, Ethiopia remains one of the least developed countries across the globe (UNDP B) – a status which has solely increased the country's vulnerability to climate variability and change. In turn, such vulnerability makes the scenario of long-lasting declines in useful products and services more likely to occur. In summation, it can thus be argued that the natural resource change in Ethiopia has resulted in long-lasting declines in useful products and services. As Eritrea is geographically located in the same area as Ethiopia, it is assumed that to a large extent they are subject to the same natural resource change. Accordingly, the above section is also applicable to the case of Eritrea.

Applying Scoones' sustainable livelihoods approach to the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the years of 2000-2018, it is evident that access to resources that are key to satisfying basic needs was somewhat limited by a variety of factors, e.g., poor access to work, the degree of poverty despite increasing economic growth, the inability of people to live and do as they please as a result of components that can be associated with low HDI values, and the vulnerability to climate change and variability. The livelihoods approach argues of the presence of a high degree of vulnerability stemming from these factors, implying that during the years of analysis livelihoods of Ethiopians and Eritreans in general did not meet the criteria of sustainability. Yet, there are certain exemptions, namely the absence of inequality and the ability of the people to cope and adapt to shocks about which it is difficult to make any final postulations. However, based on the analysis of Scoones' sustainable livelihoods, there appears to be a lack of access, which minimizes the ability of the people to pursue different livelihood strategies and create valuable lives.

On a final note, by making the population of Ethiopia and Eritrea the subject of analysis, the risk of overlooking the needs and interests of the subject has been minimized.

6.1.2 Wæver's Securitization Theory

In this dissertation, the application of Wæver's theory on securitization provides clarity to the issue of exploitation by the ruling elite. Following the notion of Wæver's theoretical framework, the securitization of a public issue enables the legitimate use of wider state powers and intensive mobilization of resources in response to alleged security threats. Thereby, securitization provides

credence and more control to the securitizing actor. In an application of the theory of securitization to the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the following section addresses one of the major dilemmas within securitization theory, which emanates from the issue of whether it is possible for democratic practices to be built in the realm of politics of exception. The purpose is thus to examine the level of interaction between the practices of securitizing and the democratization processes of Ethiopia and Eritrea between the years 2000-2018.

When placing the theory of securitization in the context of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the theory is moved away from the Western context in which it was initially shaped and placed in the context of the developing world. This move captures an important shift in contexts, as the Western world and the developing world are highly distinct from one another. As the theory has been developed around Western security dilemmas, the question remains whether its components are a fit for the context of the developing world, more specifically Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although the theory has been developed around Western politics and security dilemmas, the notion of critical realism reminds us that knowledge cannot be absolute, and thus allows for further development of the theory.

As securitization theory seeks to explain the move of an issue from non-politicized to politicized to securitized, one of the major objectives of securitization theory is to identify the criteria for a particular issue to be securitized. Wæver offers such criteria in his notion of securitization where he identifies a security issue as an issue that poses an existential threat to a referent by a securitizing actor who thus enables the authorization of emergency measures, i.e., measures that reach beyond the law. In the description of a threat as 'existential', securitization theory identifies the concept of security as an issue of mere survival, which further validates the practice of emergency measures. Thereby, a security issue exceeds normal politics and becomes a case of exceptional politics, which enables urgent measures that suspend normal politics.

With the addition of environmental, economic, social and political issues to a military one, the theory of securitization broadens the security agenda, thereby exploring the logic of security, allowing for a definition of the concept that makes it distinct from any other threat. The inclusion of other areas than the military, results from the recognition that threats may arise in all areas. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, threats have appeared in for example the political and societal sectors. Starting with the political sector, the uprisings against the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government in

Ethiopia was by the government perceived as an existential threat to the organizational stability of the state, the government system and the ideology of the government and was thus made a security issue. By making the uprisings a security issue, the TPLF was able to declare a state of emergency, which authorized the arrest of tens of thousands of civilians, activists and journalists. Keeping in mind the definition of the securitizing actor as someone with authority, acting with reference to the nation and claiming to speak on the nation's behalf, in this scenario, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government qualifies as the securitizing actor. Another instance of securitization within the political sector is the case of the "Red Terror" campaign during the Derg military regime in Ethiopia. In response to the opposition against its regime, the Derg labeled the EPRP an enemy of the state, thereby defining the EPRP as an existential threat, making it a security issue. In the light of doing so, the Derg regime carried out the "Red Terror" campaign, which required the implementation of exceptionalist politics. In this scenario, the Derg military regime qualifies as the securitizing actor. Turning to Eritrea, a case of securitization within the political sector is Eritrea's use of the conflict with Ethiopia as an excuse to suspend the constitution, ban free press and suppress any opposition. Recognizing the conflict with Ethiopia as a security threat, the Eritrean government was able to engage with exceptional politics enabling measures exceeding the politics of the constitution. Yet another case within the political sector is the more recent accusations by the Eritrean government of certain political prisoners claiming them to be endangering national security (BBC 2018), i.e., defining them as an existential threat to the state. This has enabled the application of urgent and exceptional measures by the government of Eritrea, which keeps the prisoners from appearing in front of a court and prevents any form of visitations (BBC 2018). Turning to the societal sector, both Ethiopia and Eritrea experienced existential threats to their collective identity. For Eritrea, it was the economic strangulation of it carried out by Ethiopia, which led to the employment of exceptionalist politics, making room for military targeting of Ethiopia. In this case, the Eritrean government is the securitizing actor.

Addressing the role of the securitizing actor and keeping in mind the previous formulation of the securitization process as an intersubjective formation of an existential threat, the theory implies that the presentation of a security issue itself is what provides meaning to the understanding of security in a particular context. Accordingly, an issue evolves into a security issue in the very practice of securitizing. The reason for an issue to become securitized depends on the securitizing actor, and an issue may thus be securitized for a number of reasons – not all of them necessarily relating to the

existence of an existential threat. This implies that an issue may count as a security issue merely on the ground of it being presented as an existential threat. Turning to the aforementioned cases of securitization of issues in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the act of declaration of emergency and the labeling of EPRP as an enemy to the state are both efforts of the securitizing actor, i.e., the ruling elite, to make the issues of uprisings qualify as security issues. Thereby, the act of speech is intertwined with the practices of securitizing. Moreover, what is interesting in this sense is the questions relating to when and why a particular securitizing actor is able to achieve enough authority for the audience to accept violations of the rules that would otherwise prevail.

In his distinction between securitization and desecuritization, Wæver defines desecuritization as the practice of moving backwards, more specifically by taking a securitized issue and desecuritizing it. The politics of the security issue thereby transform from exceptional to normal politics. As a security issue requires an immediate response and demands extraordinary resources for it to be overcome, it lies within the intrinsic nature of securitization itself that its practice is most often associated with modes of thinking linked to factors like emergency and exemption. The politics applied in such scenarios thus need to correspond to the level of emergency invoked by the particular issue. The result is a situation of emergency within which the conduct of normal politics is restricted, and the application of normal politics, i.e., negotiating, compromising and agreeing, are only poor responses and no match for the level of emergency that is present. In times of crisis, normal politics lose power, making exceptional politics more ideal as emergency responses. In summation, the adoption of exceptional politics thus results in the loosening of the law, which enables the use of force. The TPLF's declaration of emergency in Ethiopia, the Derg's labeling of the EPRP as an enemy of the state, Eritrea's suspension of the constitution, and the mutual threat experienced by Ethiopia and Eritrea to their collective identities are all examples of such cases.

Keeping in mind these particular instances of exceptional politics, the application of the theory to the empirical case confirms the defining components of exceptional politics, which are emphasized by the power of the executive exceeding the rule of law, a mode of thinking associated with the use of force, the reduction of civil and political rights as well as the priority of (in)security over normal politics. The practices following the adoption of exceptional politics can thus be described as undemocratic. Thereby, for democratic practices to take place, the need for security issues to be desecuritized and returned to the realm of normal politics in the face of conflict is stressed. The

priority of desecuritization over securitization partly stems from the perception of security as a failure of normal politics. The significance of desecuritization is thus closely tied to its logic of more politics and less security, which enables more democratic practices.

The undemocratic practices associated with exceptional politics cause people to question the existence of such politics, especially in cases of developing countries – like Ethiopia and Eritrea – where democratic practices are already vulnerable. In the case of Ethiopia, a great divide between the political elites has dominated the country's history, resulting in many differing views on what is to be perceived as an existential threat. From the introduction to the case of interest, it is evident that Ethiopia has a history of conflict, war and undemocratic practices. The end of both the Derg military regime and the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government inspired the hope for Ethiopia to finally be put on the road to democracy. However, as it turned out one autocratic regime tended to replace the other, creating a prolonged situation of either conflict or “no war, no peace”. Recalling the conceptualization of security, this qualifies as a scenario in which securitization can more easily take place, thus the adoption of exceptionalist politics is more likely. Following the protracted conflicts of Ethiopia, the question is whether the country has remained within the realm of exceptionalist politics, limiting its use of normal politics, thereby preventing the development of democratic practices. This highlights the question of whether the move from undemocratic practices to democratic practices can be accomplished in a context of exceptional politics.

Embracing the argument that the prolonged state of emergency in Ethiopia has fostered the engagement in exceptional politics, while keeping in mind that the presence of exceptional politics corresponds to an absence of normal politics, the question remains whether processes of democratization can co-exist with the politics of exception. When examining the composition of democracy, it is the adoption of normal politics that facilitates the construction of democracy, implying that negotiation, compromise and agreement are key constituents in the establishment of democracy. As Huntington explains it: *“How were democracies made? They were made by the methods of democracy, there was no other way. They were made through negotiations, compromises and agreements”* (Shapiro 1996: p. 176), meaning that democracy is unlikely without the methods of democracy. As the features of democracy – defined by Huntington – greatly differ from the features of exceptional politics, the co-existence of democracy and exceptional politics is

complicated. Returning to the case of Ethiopia, this argument thus presents a very poor prognosis for democracy in Ethiopia.

The application of the theory of securitization to the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea provides power to the argument that for a sustained period, the ruling elites of the countries have applied securitization practices to build and maintain autocratic and militarized regimes. Thereby, the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes have gained from the securitization of certain issues and used the process to build and maintain their domination. However, as exceptionalist politics cannot exist within the realm of normal politics, and as the components of exceptionalist politics reject democratic practices of negotiation, compromise and agreement, the adoption of exceptionalist politics have in both scenarios resulted in the lack of democracy. Instead, there has been a flourishing of anti-democratic regimes. Thereby, the theory argues that the countries' engagement with securitization by the ruling elite adopting exceptional politics, democracy – and thus sustainable peace – have not unfolded and is unlikely to do so.

6.1.3 Galtung's Theories of Peace

In the following section, Galtung's theoretical framework is applied to the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea to examine the process of peacebuilding and its components.

Addressing the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the question remains to what extent sustainable peace has been attained during the period of 2000-2018. On one hand, armed conflict has been a dominating factor throughout the entire history of Ethiopia and Eritrea, segregation of communities at the Ethiopian and Eritrean border continuous to dominate within society, and outbursts of violence still occur. At the same time, there is strong indication of continuous vulnerability and lack of accessibility to important resources, implying that livelihoods are not sustainable. On the other hand, armed conflict has drastically decreased in recent years and economic growth has increased, indicating a level of stability, and with the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship, "*there is a wind of hope blowing in the Horn of Africa*" (United Nations Secretary General 2018).

Yet, recalling Galtung's definition of hatred and fear as key indicators of the level of conflict, conflict must be assumed still to be present in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Thus, although the Ethiopia-

Eritrea conflict has been addressed to the extent that the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship has provided some degree of stability and decreased violence, peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea is fragile, as the underlying structures of the conflict remains unresolved. Moreover, keeping in mind Galtung's definition of direct, structural and cultural violence, all types of violence have been present in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. With direct violence referring to dramatic and observable violence, the many cases of violent outbursts serve as examples, indicating that there have indeed been cases of direct violence during the conflict. Meanwhile, the numerous occasions of political repression, psychological alienation and famine – resulting from climate change but also conflict – imply that there is a presence of structural violence as well. The presence of cultural violence is evident in the adoption of exceptional politics, which have legitimized the activation of violence. Thereby, the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea corresponds to what Galtung defines as negative peace. Accordingly, positive peace has yet to be attained.

Recognizing the Ethiopia-Eritrea situation as a case of negative peace, it can be argued that the peacebuilding process itself is a case of conflict management or resolution rather than transformation, which should be understood by its association with deeper structural mechanisms that may lead to tensions and violence. Thereby, conflict transformation stresses the importance of assessing the core structural issues of the particular conflict and not merely the symptoms of conflict in the attempt at sustainable peace. Similar to positive peace, conflict transformation is thus a more time-consuming and complex endeavor, which as its main objective has the creation of stability and sustainable peace.

The fact that this is a case of conflict management and not transformation can be explained via Galtung's examination of violence in which he clarifies upon two distinct ways of acting in times of conflict: hurt or be hurt. Following the notion of the theory, these transform into a larger number of options in the face of conflict transformation. As this has not happened in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict where actions continuously take form of hurt or be hurt, it is assumed that conflict transformation is not present.

6.1.4 Dawson's Theory on the Politics of Memory and Post-Conflict Culture

The relevance of Dawson's theory to conflict transformation becomes evident in his identification of the five key features of peacebuilding. Central to Dawson's work is the significance of the historical aspects of the particular conflict – there cannot be peace if the underlying mechanisms of the conflict have not been resolved. From a historical perspective, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been born out of conflict, and their common history follows a path of violence and disagreement. Although efforts have been made to turn around the path of violence and conflict, it has not been possible to effectively deal with the national narrative of Ethiopia and Eritrea and their inheritance of conflict. As an example, the disagreement over Badme has been a continuous obstacle to peace between the two countries – last with Ethiopia's rejection of EEBC's verdict supporting Eritrea's claim of the city. Another example is the missing whereabouts of the prominent PFDJ-leaders who were detained because of their skepticism of the Eritrean President's handling of the war. The disappearance of these leaders makes it difficult to examine the grounds at which they were detained and make up for any possible injustices and wrongdoings by recognizing their detention as unjust. In general, political prisoners in Ethiopia and Eritrea, accused of endangering their country's national security, are rarely allowed to appear before courts, and many visitations have been cancelled (BBC 2018). This suggests a lack of recognition of the past conflict and indicates that the recovery of victims and the peacebuilding process itself are at different paces. Thereby, Ethiopia and Eritrea both fulfill the criteria of a traumatized community, implying that pressure has been placed on the population to get closure and move on in order for peacebuilding to take place. However, as Dawson explains, assessing a trauma is not a simple matter, and it requires the tools of reparative remembering to facilitate the process of healing. In the years following the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship, the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea has to a large extent been categorized as a success. However, certain key aspects to peacebuilding are lacking in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peacebuilding process. Thereby, it can be argued that it is a case of conflict management rather than transformation.

In Galtung's thinking, sustainable peace is solely attainable if the underlying structural issues of the conflict are attended to as they have direct implications for both present and future peacebuilding. Dawson's theoretical framework builds on this concept, as he makes his argument about the tenuous relations of the past transforming into traumatic events that act as poisonous knowledge to

any future attempt at building peace. Accordingly, for conflict transformation to happen and for positive peace to emerge, there is a need of recognition of past events and an embracing of the national narrative of respectively Ethiopia and Eritrea. Without acknowledging the past conflict, it is not possible for victims of past violence to recover from their trauma. Consequently, it can be argued that the past remains an obstacle to present peacebuilding.

6.1.5 Conclusion on Research Question 6.1

Conflict and violence have been inherent components of the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The continuous conflict between the two has resulted in vast destruction of both nation-states, but despite both internal and external efforts to bring the conflict to an end, the years between 2000 and 2018 have still not witnessed long-lasting peace. This implies that objective and subjective conditions have not been right for the conflict to be resolved. This notion is elaborated upon in the application of Scoones' theory in which an examination of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people's ability to access and mobilize resources, enabling them to satisfy basic needs and pursue a way of living that secure their survival and well-being, finds such access to be limited. This limitation stems from both the natural, economic, human and social capitals, and the result is a vulnerability, which, following the many years of conflict, has become an integral part of society. The examination of Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods thereby addresses objective conditions meanwhile including a deeper subjective layer, as the theory includes the element of vulnerability. Wæver's theory of securitization contributes to the argument by declaring democracy unachievable under the continuous employment of exceptional politics. Meanwhile, Galtung points toward unresolved underlying structures of the conflict as another explanation to why conflict has not come to an end, while Dawson addresses the subjective conditions and highlights the need for recognition of the damages of conflict and collective healing.

However, with the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the signature of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship, the situation suddenly changed. In a statement capturing the turn of events in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN General Secretary, António Guterres, referred to the scenario as the end of a decade-long conflict and labeled the signature of the peace agreement as historic. The emergence of peace implies that there has been a change in the objective and subjective conditions, which has facilitated the emergence of peace. Still, with peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea being defined as negative peace, it is likely that conflict will

eventually resurface. In this case, the celebration of the peace by UN Secretary General was slightly premature. In addition, this would mean that no significant changes have occurred in the objective and subjective conditions. Research question 6.2 will take this into consideration, as it examines the impacts of the Tigray-conflict on the peacebuilding process.

6.2 What are the impacts of the recent Tigray-conflict on the peace process?

The situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is assumed to be a case of conflict management and negative peace. The reasons behind this assumption relate to the indication of vulnerability and weak access to essential resources in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the fact that democracy – and thus sustainable peace – has been deemed impossible due to the continuous securitization of issues, the complications of resolving the underlying structures of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and the lack of efforts to incorporate the historical impacts of the conflict into the process of peacebuilding. Within this characterization is the continuous risk of a relapse into conflict. Following the assumption that peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea is not sustainable and keeping in mind that the underlying structures of the past conflict have yet to be resolved, such relapse is likely to happen if the introduction of new societal structures with past implications happen to stir old tensions and reawaken emotions of the past.

The following section will begin with a brief introduction to the Tigray-conflict. Subsequently, potential changes to the objective and subjective conditions will be examined to clarify on the opportunities for conflict resolution to occur. Meanwhile, the emergence of the Tigray conflict will serve as a test of Ethiopian-Eritrean peace and help to validate whether or not the hypothesis of peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea being a case of conflict management and negative peace is valid. Finally, the role of international intervention will be addressed in an examination of the effectiveness associated with externally mediated versus internally driven peacebuilding.

6.2.1 The Tigray-conflict

The road to peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea has been one of turmoil, and uncompromising political forces threaten to tear apart the countries, and reverse the progress made in recent years. The Tigray conflict, which broke out in November 2020, is essentially a conflict between the government of Ethiopia and the TPLF with Eritrea siding with Ethiopia. Conflict emerged when the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, ordered a military offensive against the regional forces in

Tigray – a response to an attack on a military base in Tigray where government troops were located (BBC 2020). This escalation of the conflict came after months of clashes between the Ethiopian government and TPLF. The crisis stems from the power struggle between the Ethiopian government and TPLF, the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the removal of key Tigrayan government leaders from their offices, and the push for political reform, which was resisted by Tigray. In September, the Ethiopian government postponed national elections due to COVID-19. Meanwhile, Tigray defied the government with the claim of such decision being illegal and held its own election (BBC 2020). The clashes further escalated in October, when the government cut ties with Tigray and suspended funding – a move that was by Tigray seen as a declaration of war (BBC 2020). Since November, there have been reports of civilian massacre and missiles fired into Eritrea, and the Ethiopian government has declared a six-month state of emergency in Tigray. Moreover, during the short time span of the conflict, it has resulted in the displacement of thousands of civilians and hundreds of deaths (BBC 2020).

6.2.2 What went Wrong and Why?

Examining Scoones' concept of sustainable livelihoods in the years after the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship, it is evident that not much has changed. Although, there have been important developments, change is not a simple matter, and with the Tigray-conflict development has suffered vast setbacks.

Examining the numbers of 2018 and forward, it is evident that Ethiopia and Eritrea have not witnessed any significant changes in the accessibility to jobs. With a weak wage system and a relatively static unemployment rate, which in 2020 was measured to be 2.082 percent (World Bank A), the situation has not changed much. With low wages and an unemployment rate of 5.127 (World Bank B), the same is the case for Eritrea. Moreover, there is no indication of a change to the efforts of poverty eradication in Ethiopia, which over the last years have resulted in a decrease in the poverty level (World Bank E). Still, with the offset of the Tigray conflict, it cannot be assumed that the conflict will have zero implications for the nation's future attempts at reducing poverty. Also, the economic growth of the country has become uneven between urban and rural areas (World Bank E), implying a higher degree of inequality. In regard to Eritrea, poverty remains to be a critical issue (World Bank D). In regard to people's capabilities of being and doing as they want, some changes have occurred following the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister, one of them being the facilitation of mobilization with the opening of roads between Ethiopia and

Eritrea. However, directing attention to life at the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, the Tigray-conflict has caused new incidents of violence. Although, some factors have changed, making it easier for people to achieve valuable lives, HDI values remain low and violence continues to limit the ability of people to be or do as they please. Accordingly, the lack of access remains an obstacle to people's pursuit of diverse livelihood strategies and valuable lives.

Following the epistemology of critical realism, the existence of an absolute truth is not possible, thus knowledge is under continuous development. This notion is in disagreement with the definiteness, which securitization theory assigns to exceptional politics' limitation of democracy. Accordingly, the very nature of critical realism excludes the argument that the long-term engagement with exceptional politics by Ethiopia and Eritrea has locked the countries in a series of anti-democratic practices and caused for the countries to be out of reach of democracy. The rejection of such argument is further supported by the developments taking place following the election of Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali as Prime Minister and the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship. For Ethiopia, an important effect of the peace process has been the negotiations with rebel groups in the region of Asmara in Eritrea, which previously constituted a security threat to the country. In this case, the art of negotiation has replaced the previous use of force. Meanwhile, the most important effect of the peace process for Eritrea has been the end of war itself, implying a respect for its sovereignty and its territories, and a removal of the sanctions that had previously been imposed on it. These shifts from undemocratic practices to democratic practices can be explained as the development from exceptional politics to normal politics, i.e., desecuritization. Thereby, it can be argued that there has indeed been a transition from conflict to peace.

Yet, in the midst of the Tigray-conflict, both the Ethiopian government and the Tigray region have designated each other illegitimate (BBC 2020), claiming each other to be a security threat, allowing the employment of military force from both sides. This strongly indicates the return of patterns of securitization. The current government of Ethiopia has employed various measures to resolve conflict and create peace, resulting in the Prime Minister being awarded with Nobel's Peace Prize. However, by the declaration of a military offensive against TPLF, the government has initiated a military campaigning against Tigray (New York Times 2020), and thus engaged in exceptional politics. By its definition, the adoption of exceptional politics is a step backwards in terms of the pursuit of democracy and the achievement of sustainable peace.

With the Tigray-conflict, the displacement of thousands of civilians and the death of hundreds denote an increase in the degree of fighting and fleeing – Galtung’s components for measuring the level of peace versus conflict. Along with the engagement of exceptional politics, these observable increases in the level of people fighting and fleeing support the argument that there is no evidence of sustainable and positive peace. The emergence of the Tigray-conflict thereby confirms the hypothesis presented in research question 1, arguing that the situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case of negative peace. Moreover, following the definition of negative peace as the absence of direct violence and war and the presence of a level of stability, the post-2018 scenario in Ethiopia and Eritrea fits the criteria of negative peace. Comparing the situation to the criteria of positive peace, not all criteria are met, as while there is a degree of cooperation present, this cooperation does not include the TPLF – one of the major parties of the conflict. In addition, while economic growth and development have occurred, there is still evidence of fear, exploitation and injustice. However, as Galtung expresses the need for negative peace in order for there to be positive peace, the steps that have been taken toward further development of democratic practices and sustainable peace should not be disregarded. These efforts have secured a level of stability in the form of negative peace, and although development may have been hindered by the emergence of the Tigray-conflict, it implies that peacebuilding efforts have not been entirely unsuccessful.

Yet, the question remains why the Tigray-conflict so easily could obstruct the peacebuilding process? This question is partly answered by the vulnerability of the peacebuilding process itself. As argued in the assessment of Scoones’ theory on sustainable livelihoods, inaccessibility to important livelihoods resources keep people from satisfying basic needs and securing their survival. This implies a degree of vulnerability to conflict. In addition, the long-term adoption of exceptional politics, i.e., engagement with undemocratic practices, increases the likelihood of a relapse into securitizing practices. Thereby, the risk of being dragged back into old patterns is high, which makes development and democratization even more fragile. Another explanation to this question emphasizes that the underlying structures of the conflict have not been attended to. With the implementation of negative peace, the symptoms of violence – being violence itself – were addressed, but the emergence of the Tigray-conflict indicates that old tensions have resurfaced. By not solving the underlying structures of the conflict, conflict can resurface at any point in time. The situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is an example of such a case. Although new actors have emerged, the current Tigray-conflict is rooted in past tensions and disagreements. Moreover, as positive peace was never reached, and the underlying issues of past conflicts were not resolved, healing has not

been an option. Not only does the new conflict revive past tensions, it adds to them, as it creates new waves of violence.

6.2.3 Memories of Conflict

The peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea resulted in widespread benefits for both of the countries. It resolved one of the longest and deadliest conflicts in Africa, and the abruptness of the reconciliation was a shock. The speed of the process can to some extent be explained by the war fatigue and desire of the populations of Ethiopia and Eritrea to see peace unfold between them. The excitement of the people was expressed in the form of large celebrations taking place following rapprochement. Another cause of celebration among the people results from the opening of road links between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The area around the border is highly populated and the military checkpoints at the border were keeping people from having any sort of contact with one another. Accordingly, the removal of the military at the border and the opening of roads, enabling mobilization, caused for celebration among people living at the border. Many people living close to the border are related to people on the other side but haven't been able to see each other for 20 years – as long as the conflict lasted – from 1998-2018 (BBC 2018). Conflict or no conflict, it is key to the future peace and stability between Ethiopia and Eritrea that the relationship between Ethiopians living on one side of the border and Eritreans living on the other side of the border is harmonious. But with many years of conflict and psychological alienation, the mistrust between the executives of the two countries has been transferred to the people, resulting in tensions that can easily be rejuvenated.

However, following Dawson's thinking, by enabling families to reunite, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have an opportunity of redefining people's memory of conflict by offering them a new ending to their memories. For example, by opening the roads and removing the military from the border, enabling the unity of families, the governments make it possible for people to access conflict memories and develop them, so they now include the reunion of their family as well. Assuming that the memory of conflict is captured by the segregation of families, the unity of families thus allows people to access their memories of conflict in new ways and from a less painful position. Thereby it can be argued that within the act of enabling mobilization, Ethiopia and Eritrea has managed to recognize the suffering of victims of the conflict and construct a national narrative and frame the official memory of the nation-state in a way that positively impacts rebuilding. This stresses the strategic and physical significance of the border in regard to nation-building.

While the aforementioned example is a case of recognition of the victims of conflict, there are also examples of the opposite. Although it led to approximately 1 million refugees since its beginning in 1998, the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea had gone almost unreported in British media (Ashplant, Dawson & Roper 2013). This expresses a lack of recognition of the damages of the conflict, and with a simultaneous continuity of peacebuilding efforts, thus there is a risk of the recovery process of the victims of violence and the peacebuilding process being out of sync. Moreover, even when recognizing the damages of conflict, the articulation and recognition of war memories can take various forms, and as Dawson explains the choice of how to portray and remember the particular conflict has important implications for the process of rebuilding. One way of depicting past conflict is in the form of personal testimonies, as it is done in the book “Shallow Graves: A Memoir of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War” by Richard Reid where he offers his personal account of the war. Another is in the form of public commemoration, e.g., memorial sites, orchestrated by the nation-state. However, with both forms – in particularly the latter – certain challenges may arise. When the tragedies and sufferings of victims of conflict are presented at memorial sites, e.g., a museum or otherwise, an aspect of appropriation arise. Even if the memorial site is built on a desire to acknowledge past wrongdoings and remember the conflict to avoid any similar happenings in the future, with the selling of tickets or efforts to create branding, inspiring more people to visit the site, it can be argued that the tragedies and sufferings of the victims of conflict to some extent are transformed into a commodity.

In Ethiopia, memorial sites include the “Red Terror Martyr’s Memorial Museum” and the “Tank Graveyard” that both appear in guides like Trip Advisor and Lonely Planet. However, with free access to both sites, it can be argued that efforts have been made to keep the victims of conflict from becoming a commodity. To further support this argument, at the “Red Terror Martyr’s Memorial Museum” victims of the Derg regime are sharing their stories in person. Moreover, both sites are running on donations, and Trip Advisor recommends visitors to leave a gift upon their visit (Trip Advisor). With the victims of conflict sharing their stories with visitors at the memorial site, there is a transfer of direct memory into cultural memory. This transfer captures the success of the memorial site in its endeavor of turning individual recognition of past conflict into a collective one, thereby making sure that the memory of conflict does not end up being lost. Thereby, there are both negative and positive aspects to recognizing war memories, and the way in which it is done has severe implications for both nation-rebuilding and future peacebuilding.

Accordingly, there is a battle over memory going on, and as there are as many versions of the story of war as there are individuals, not all will end up with their story being recognized and incorporated into the national narrative, thereby becoming a part of the official memory of the nation-state. As Dawson puts it, the framing of conflict memory can be explained as a selective process in which the nation-state exercises its power to acknowledge and integrate within its national narrative only certain conflict memories and not others.

With the outbreak of the Tigray-conflict, previous conditions have returned at the border where people are fighting to stay alive and keep their families safe and together (Reuters 2020). The recent violent outbursts have a negative effect on rebuilding, as not only are the new outbursts of violence producing new traumas, they may also reactivate existing ones. In the case of the Tigray-conflict, the reactivation of people's traumas is not unlikely. During the period of "no war, no peace", the TPLF was dominating the politics of Ethiopia and the initiator behind several violent encounters. With the reappearance of the TPLF as a threat to the people and the nation-state of both Ethiopia and Eritrea, past sentiments are more easily awoken. As with memorial sites, some efforts of remembering may reactivate the harmful and destructive forces buried within the memory itself – even if the act of remembering is carried out in an entirely different context – while other efforts of remembering may help both people and the nation in the healing process.

6.2.4 International Intervention

This section addresses the role of humanitarian intervention, as peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case of both the presence and the absence of humanitarian intervention. Covering the years from 2000-2018, the first attempts at peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea exemplify an externally driven peacebuilding process, meanwhile the more recent attempts at peacebuilding correspond to a process driven by internal mechanisms.

What comes to mind when examining international intervention in regard to peacebuilding are considerations about what constitutes an appropriate level of intervention. In the case of peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea, there is no question that the latter attempts at peace – in which peace has been driven by internal dynamics – have been more successful than prior attempts at peace in which external mediation has played an essential role. Still, the question remains to what extent peacebuilding should comprise elements of external mediation – if any at all – in order for peacebuilding to be the most effective.

The international community's commitment to the principle of the responsibility to protect implies an obligation of the international community to end worst forms of violence and persecution (UN). The question is thus not if but how humanitarian intervention should take place. Following Galtung's line of thinking, neutrality is essential to conflict resolution, meaning that intervention is ideally implemented by neutral parties. This implies that neutrality is an important feature of humanitarian intervention. Two other features of humanitarian intervention are worth mentioning: intervention typically requires large investments in resources for an extensive period of time, and the choice and the outcome of intervention highly depend on rich Western countries (Keating & Knight 2004). However, these features can be argued to be in conflict with one another. The high costs associated with intervention would most likely not be tolerated if the intervention was of no gain to the countries behind the investment. Following that humanitarian intervention is to some extent dependent on the investments of rich Western countries, it must thus be assumed that intervention is partly driven by some degree of self-interest. Recalling the importance of neutrality, a dilemma arises from this assumption, as the criteria of neutrality excludes any mediator's attention to self-interests. However, it can be argued that a level of self-interest is beneficial to humanitarian intervention because of the motivation it inspires, encouraging the drivers of the intervention to keep investing, driving intervention forward. Accepting an element of self-interest as an inevitable aspect to humanitarian intervention is thus necessary to proceeding.

However, from the above dilemma another problem arises, as rather than need being the determinant of intervention, self-interest may end up becoming a more dominant factor. This implies a level of inconsistency to humanitarian intervention, as the level of commitment by the international community can be measured from the level of self-interest that is satisfied from the particular intervention. Following this line of thought, humanitarian intervention must become independent of the financial support of Western countries if they are not to be controlled by the self-interests of Western nations. Actors with no self-interest are most likely to confine to universalist moral principles, while actors with an interest tend to give more power to an intervention and facilitate both resource access and mobility, i.e., the unlocking of critical objective conditions. In the case of Ethiopia, US humanitarian intervention is driven by the level of importance that Ethiopia has for "*the success of U.S. initiatives in the greater Horn of Africa*" (USAID). Efforts of US intervention in Ethiopia are thus closely tied to the strategic position of the country as well as its

implications for the Horn of Africa, which is of strategic interest to the US, which seeks to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and other transnational Jihadist groups (Council on Foreign Relations). Despite intervention being driven by self-interests of the US, US intervention in Ethiopia has proved to be effective. In response to droughts in the country, USAID managed to deliver effective humanitarian assistance and emergency relief, as well as drought recovery loans and food security programs, and during the rule of the Derg regime, US provided humanitarian assistance (USAID). Turning to an example of more ineffective international intervention, Somalia has in spite of the severity of their conflict been lacking the attention of the international community. Accordingly, the many failed international interventions may be attributed the lack of political, economic and geographical commitment by Western countries. This implies that where self-interests are absent, there is a lack in the determination to create effective intervention. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of international intervention in the case of Somalia implies that self-interest is critical to an interventionist regime.

What can be extracted from the debate on international intervention is that it is highly complex. There is strong indication that the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention relies on the amount of self-interest of the intervening parties. When assessing the initial attempts at reaching peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea and analyzing the effects of the international intervention that took place, there is indication of a lack of interest by the mediators to keep the process running. When the EEBC presented its final and binding verdict, declaring Badme to belong to Eritrea, the international actors who mediated the Algiers Agreement abstained from acting when Ethiopia denounced the verdict. As there are strong indications of efforts of international intervention being proportionate with the level of interest by the intervener, this inactivity can be argued to be a result of disinterests. Accordingly, the inability of externally mediated peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea to result in sustainable peace may result from the lack of self-interest of the intervening countries. This assumption is supported by the success of the internally driven peacebuilding process, which in 2018 resulted in the adoption of the Agreement on Peace and Friendship. However, this does not mean that international intervention should be avoided. Doing something – even if the effects of such actions are relatively insufficient – is arguably better than doing nothing, accepting violence to unfold to its full extent. Although, when engaging with international intervention, one should be aware of the complexity of its nature and pay attention to the context and power of the national interests that drive the process.

6.2.5 Conclusion on Research Question 6.2

The emergence of the Tigray-conflict can be seen as a validation of the hypothesis presented in research question 6.1 claiming peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea to be a case of negative peace. This can be explained on the basis of the current conflict, which has its roots in past disputes, meaning that tensions of the past have resurfaced. By comparing previous objective and subjective conditions to current conditions, Scoones explains what went wrong in the most recent peacebuilding process. An examination of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people's ability to access and mobilize resources shows that access to a large extent has remained limited. Although some important developments have taken place, e.g., the opening of roads, which enable mobility, lack of access remains an obstacle to people's pursuit of diverse livelihood strategies and valuable lives.

However, there are certain positive features of the peacebuilding efforts. For Ethiopia such features are highlighted in the form of negotiations with rebel groups in the region of Asmara in Eritrea, which previously constituted a security threat to the country. For Eritrea such features correspond to a newly found respect for its sovereignty and its territories by Ethiopia as well as the removal of sanctions that had previously been imposed on it. More importantly, these benefits of the peacebuilding process capture a shift from the use of violence to the use of democratic practices, i.e., a move from exceptional politics into the realm of normal politics. Moreover, the absence of direct violence and the increased level of stability in light of the peacebuilding process implies a transition from conflict to negative peace. While this is an improvement, it suggests that peacebuilding has not yet been entirely successful, as it remains in a stage of negative peace.

However, with the Tigray-conflict there has been a relapse into violence, corresponding to a step backwards in terms of the pursuit of democracy and the achievement of sustainable peace. With the resurfacing of conflict, the Tigray-conflict both reinforces past tensions and promotes new structures of violence.

Taking into consideration the role of mediating forces and international intervention, the question remains: what constitutes an appropriate level of international intervention? Peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea captures both an example of externally mediated peacebuilding and peacebuilding driven by internal dynamics. Each scenario holds certain advantages over the other.

While externally mediated peacebuilding processes are in risk of being dominated by national interests of Western countries, internally driven processes may turn out inefficient if old conflict gets in the way of peacebuilding. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, peacebuilding driven by internal dynamics has proved most successful, but the extent to which one approach is more efficient than the other depends on the particular context in which peacebuilding is implemented. Thus, although peacebuilding driven by internal dynamics has proved most successful for the time being, conditions may change, fostering a setting more suitable for a process that is externally mediated. Important to keep in mind is thus contextual setting.

7: How is sustainable peace created in areas of conflict, and what is the capacity of peace?

So far, analysis and discussion of peacebuilding have been directed to the case of peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea has been portrayed as a complex matter, highly impacted by the lack in accessibility to resources that are necessary in order for people to attain valuable lives, the ruling elites' continuous employment of exceptional politics hindering democratic practices, the incapability of the countries to address the underlying structures of the conflict, and the insufficient efforts of dealing with the countries' inherent history of violence, which has become deeply embedded in the national narrative of the nation-states of Ethiopia and Eritrea. All of these point toward peace in the two countries as an example of negative peace and conflict management, and not only do they impact the rebuilding of the nation-states, they also delay and obstruct any future peacebuilding efforts.

In the following section, the discussion will direct its efforts more explicitly to an assessment of the intrinsic nature of peace. Aside from brief references to the case study, this section will take a more philosophical approach in its study of the concept of peace.

7.1 Discussing Peace

The starting point for the following assessment is straightforward: if sustainable peace has not been reached, old tensions will eventually emerge, and conflict will resurface, which is indeed what happened with the Tigray-conflict. On the contrary, if sustainable peace is created, following the notion of Galtung, new conflicts will emerge at some point in time – only these conflicts will have no links to past conflicts. In other words, conflict is inevitable. Humanitarian tragedies and disputes will happen again, and while keeping in mind the complexity of international intervention, apathy is not an option. The case study of peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea clearly indicates that previous attempts at peacebuilding have been insufficient in their objective of creating sustainable peace. Meanwhile, the discussion on international intervention highlights important shortcomings of the interventional approach. If apathy is not an option, then how should peacebuilding take form in order to effectively address the conflicts that will inevitably continue to arise?

Recalling the first of Galtung's three key principles to peace, which defines peace as social goals that are accepted by many or most, peacebuilding is not about the imposition of particular models of conflict transformation. Rather, it is about the creation of sustainable structures of peace, which

broadens the space for acting, that under the presence of violence was restricted to the option of hurting or being hurt. Thereby, peacebuilding is about acknowledgement of the uniqueness of particular conditions, and it is about creating, shaping and nurturing these conditions – objective as well as subjective – so that they mature into sustainable conditions that enable sustainable peacebuilding. The idea is to avoid any commodification of the peacebuilding process itself. There are two shortfalls to such scenario. First, such commodification is based on a “one size fits all” type of thinking, and in the case of peacebuilding such thinking would be inappropriate taking into account the many unique features associated with the distinct cases of conflict around the world. Peacebuilding must necessarily adapt to the unique conditions of each context it addresses. Any attempt at peacebuilding that does not acknowledge the particular objective and subjective conditions is likely to fail. Second, the commodification of peacebuilding implies an objectification of the process, transforming the process of peacebuilding into a final product or model. This transformation from process to product corresponds to an alteration of something ongoing, making it motionless. Such finality is incompatible with the intrinsic nature of critical realism, and moreover conflicts with Galtung’s perception of peacebuilding, which is founded on the idea that *“there is no place to start and certainly non place to end policies for peace”* (Galtung 1996: p. 3). Accordingly, for peacebuilding to become successful, every single conflict scenario must necessarily be placed under scrutiny, and the following peacebuilding efforts should commence by creating, shaping and nurturing the identified conditions, making them right for conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the resurfacing of past tensions implies that conditions have not been right for sustainable peacebuilding.

According to Wæver, one particular action must be seen as a part of the whole if it is to be fully understood. This illustration of action emphasizes the importance of causality and requires that all chains of events set in motion by that very first action are played out before comprehension can be reached. Thereby, the significance of a particular act can solely be understood based on the entirety of causation. From this perspective, peacebuilding in general as well as in the particular case of Ethiopia and Eritrea thus cannot be fully understood before all actions have played out. While causal mechanisms are acknowledged within critical realism, it is stressed that outcomes to causal processes may change depending on the specific context. This gives further power to the belief that understanding of the significance of one particular action cannot be reached before history has unfolded and revealed the true nature of that action. Nevertheless, recalling the continuity, which

critical realism builds upon, history will never reach a point where it can be defined as final. The very nature of the concept of “process” – a fundamental element of peacebuilding – supports this idea, as it corresponds to something infinite. Although there can be attempts at capturing the truth, i.e., the significance of one particular action, it can never be claimed that such truth has been discovered, as reality is stratified, and universal truth is inaccessible. Thereby, existing beliefs remain open to alteration in the light of continuous cognitive efforts.

Accordingly, from the point of perspective expressed in the preceding section, peacebuilding becomes a creative, responsive, organic, unpredictable and open-ended process, contributing to its complexity. In order to ensure that the efforts made have sustainable impacts, every step forward in the peacebuilding process should include an evaluation of the degree of sustainability of past efforts. Thereby, the process allows for changes to occur in the conditions which it attempts at maturing, and the risk of commodification is kept at a minimum. Recalling the mixed motives that may arise from international intervention, although national interests may increase the speed and impact of the peacebuilding process, it is critical that such interests do not end up dominating the process, as this may have counterproductive effects on peacebuilding. The debate on who to place behind the steering wheel of peacebuilding questions the basic nature of state-nations and thus becomes a battle between realism and idealism, i.e., national interests and security versus general interests of humanity. Placing NGOs in the driver’s seat, peacebuilding is at risk of lacking the necessary financing for creating positive peace. Meanwhile, with nation-states driving peacebuilding, the process is at risk of being dominated by the interests of nations that have no further stake in the success or failure of the peacebuilding process. Leaving peacebuilding to be handled internally by the conflicting parties – although ensuring an investment in the process – past sentiments and bad blood is at risk of blocking rebuilding and future development. The scenario in Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case of the latter. As Galtung argues in his connotation of the two boys’ fight over an orange, there is a need for another solution – a solution corresponding to what Galtung describes as the “fifth solution”, which is of a more creative nature: the boys press the orange, share the juice, sow the seeds in a new, shared orange plantation and enjoy the fruits together in the future. Rather than limiting efforts to take place within the establishment of peacebuilding, the “fifth solution” seeks to challenge the known and create more opportunities, enabling new ways of addressing the conflict as well as conflicts in general. Peacebuilding essentially becomes about

maturing objective and subjective conditions and identifying the “fifth solution”, which holds the key to unlocking sustainable peace.

Peacebuilding in Ethiopia and Eritrea has taken many forms – it has been externally mediated and it has been driven by internal dynamics – but no attempt at building peace has carried with it solely positive impacts, and positive peace remains to be achieved. This brings into attention the use of force in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. There are both examples of peacebuilding processes with negative impacts and instances in which the use of force has eventually contributed to the development of some version of peace. Peacebuilding in Colombia is an example of peacebuilding with negative effects, as current outbursts of violence can be directly attributed to the peace agreement of 2016 (Globalnyt 2020). Meanwhile, turning to the Israeli conflict, force has been a major tool in attaining a level of stability. These examples both direct attention to the question of whether force is an inevitable part of the peacebuilding equation. Keeping in mind Galtung’s definition of peace as the absence of violence, what does it then mean if the road to such peace has been constructed on the premises of violence? More concretely, does the end justify the means? As Huntington explains: “*How were democracies made? They were made by the methods of democracy, there was no other way*” (Shapiro 1996: p. 176), denoting that democracy is unlikely if not founded on the methods of democracy. From this perspective, democracy cannot be created upon anything but democratic practices, and why should it be any different for peace? Wæver contributes to the debate by ruling out democracy as an option, as long as there is engagement with exceptional politics. For Wæver, security issues must be desecuritized, facilitating a return to the realm of normal politics in which democratic practices are the responses to issues, and in which there is an opportunity for creating democracy and sustainable peace. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the engagement with exceptional politics is thus problematic. Accordingly, from this perspective, it is not so much that the end does not justify the means, rather it is that the means shape the end to an extent where the end becomes a direct product of the level of force employed by the means. In other words, if the means are violent, the end cannot be truly peaceful, i.e., sustainable peace cannot be obtained through violent measures.

The above section offers one way of approaching the idea of force in peacebuilding. Meanwhile, another approach to the predicament emphasizes effectivity – understood as more flexible in its responsiveness and less time-consuming – as a significant aspect. Focusing on effectivity, the use of

force can be argued to increase the speed of the process. In Ethiopia, the “Red Terror” campaign was launched by the Derg regime to fight off counterrevolutionaries and decrease opposition. Likewise, the arrest of tens of thousands of civilians in a response to the uprising against its government was carried out by the TPLF, thereby settling the unrest. Both of these scenarios are examples of the effectiveness that arise from using force. The idea of force as more effective than diplomatic efforts and democratic practices is what makes securitization intriguing. For peacebuilding processes, the use of force may thus in a more rapid creation of a stable environment in which tools of conflict prevention and peacebuilding can eventually take form. However, recalling that sustainable peace cannot arise from violent measures, “forceful peace” may not be ideal despite its effectivity. Holding a gun to someone’s head, may result in that person bending to one’s will, but within the act of pointing the gun arises a “hurt or be hurt” situation, and mistrust is born, making it impossible to ever lower the gun without risking one’s life. Although effective, such scenarios create no room for sustainable peace.

8: Conclusion

In the summation of key findings of this dissertation, the conclusion will follow two paths with the first addressing important findings related to the case, while the second will address the concept of peace and the notion of peacebuilding from a more general perspective. In the following, these will be addressed simultaneously.

Conflict and violent outbursts have been dominating the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea for centuries, turning the idea of peace into a fragile hope. Throughout time, attempts at building peace have been witnessed. However, whether peacebuilding has been externally mediated or driven by internal dynamics, none have proved capable of successfully maturing the objective and subjective conditions and create positive peace. Turning to the latest attempt at peacebuilding, the eagerness of the Ethiopian and Eritrean population to see peace following generations of war and an increase in the trust between Ethiopia and Eritrea have contributed to a more successful attempt than has previously been seen. Yet, with the emergence of the Tigray-conflict, old tensions have been enflamed and resurfaced, exposing that the DNA of the contemporary Tigray-conflict traces back to former conflict, implying that conditions have not been ripe for conflict resolution after all.

In this dissertation, Scoones, Wæver, Galtung and Dawson all contribute to an enhanced understanding of what went wrong. Applying the methods of Scoones' sustainable livelihoods approach to the case study, it becomes evident that the policy environment is not fit to support livelihood strategies of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people. Assessing Scoones' five indicators for sustainable livelihoods at two distinct points in time – prior to 2018 and post-2018 – provides clarity on potential developments to the policy environment of the two countries. High unemployment and inaccessibility to work continue, indicating that people are not being provided with the capabilities, assets and activities that are required for a means of living. In regard to poverty reduction, no significant changes have been registered. However, economic growth in Ethiopia has become uneven, indicating an increase in inequality. Some positive developments can be identified when examining the well-being and capabilities of people. Following the Agreement on Peace and Friendship, the opening of roads has enabled mobilization and the unity of families. Yet, HDI values remain low. Thereto, with the majority of people living in rural areas, there is a high dependency on agriculture and the natural resource base, making Ethiopians and Eritreans more vulnerable to shocks. Overall, the lack of access to resources is continuously an obstacle to

people's pursuit of diverse livelihood strategies and valuable lives, implying that conditions are not ripe for conflict resolution.

Assessing the case study from the theoretical perspective of Wæver, securitization and the use of exceptional politics remain a barrier to democratic practices. Accordingly, change needs to take place in the policy environment in order for democracy and sustainable peace to take form. Recalling the theory of Galtung and Dawson, the emergence of the Tigray-conflict suggests that certain underlying structures of past conflict have not been properly addressed and healing from past traumas is hindered by the general lack of recognition of the victims of violence. The theoretical insight of Galtung and Dawson thereby offer important insight into the failure – to the extent that it has not generated positive peace – of the peacebuilding process.

Although the latest attempt at building peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea did not manage to create positive peace, and although the process has now been obstructed by the emergence of the Tigray-conflict, the peacebuilding process did succeed in creating a version of peace, identified as negative peace. Following Galtung's classification of negative peace as the absence of direct violence and war and the presence of a level of stability, the peacebuilding process between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be declared a complete failure. Also, as positive peace cannot exist in the absence of negative peace, the peacebuilding efforts are assumed to carry with them some value.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean example captures the complexity of peacebuilding. It is clear from the Ethiopian-Eritrean example that objective and subjective conditions, the means of achieving peace, the conditions of the policy environment, the underlying structures of past conflicts and recognition of victims of violence are all important components in the process of peacebuilding. However, of similar importance is the recognition of contextual settings and their implication for the success of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is not about the imposition of models of peacebuilding, rather it is about recognizing the uniqueness of each conflict and adapting peacebuilding efforts to the particular scenario. What is required is thus not a top-down approach. Rather, peacebuilding needs to take into account the unique context of the indigenous people and integrate them in the process. In this way, peacebuilding becomes a continuous process of maturing objective and subjective conditions while taking into account their uniqueness. Thus, peacebuilding fosters and supports sustainable structures that ultimately improve opportunities of peaceful coexistence and reduce the

likelihood of violent conflict in any form (Keating & Knight 2004). Such perception of peacebuilding embraces the intrinsic components of critical realism in which knowledge accumulation is infinite and absolute truth is inaccessible.

Although positive peace has yet to emerge in Ethiopia and Eritrea, recognizing knowledge accumulation as continuous gives hope to peacebuilding in these two countries as well as across the globe. Galtung reminds us that “*there is no place to start and certainly non place to end policies for peace*” (Galtung 1996: p. 3), implying that peace processes are first and foremost that: processes. Conflict is inevitable and depending on whether there is negative or positive peace, it will either resurface or emerge in new forms. What is important is that peacebuilding is not commodified but kept as a creative, responsive, organic, unpredictable and open-ended process that can be adapted to whatever form conflict may appear in.

Following the complexity of peacebuilding and the extent to which the contextual setting of the particular scenario defines the form that the peacebuilding process may take, no general conclusions can be made on the concept of peacebuilding. As the imposition of general models of peacebuilding is incompatible with contextual nature of the concept, it may be difficult to reach any concluding remarks on what constitutes successful peacebuilding. At some points, what works and what doesn't work may seem random. However, observing different peacebuilding approaches and their impact on the level of conflict, it becomes evident that a range of factors tend to appear across conflict scenarios. Accordingly, there may be critical learnings to achieve from an examination of other peacebuilding processes. While acknowledging the unique contextual settings of conflict scenarios, recalling critical realism, existing beliefs remain open to alteration in the light of continuous cognitive efforts. This suggests continuous cognitive efforts as a doorway to expanding current thinking, potentially discovering what Galtung labels the “fifth solution”.

Accordingly, a continuous examination of the concept of peacebuilding as it manifests across different scenarios of conflict is important. Comparing peacebuilding between Ethiopia and Eritrea to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics – an entirely different context – a range of factors turn out to be similar. As with the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, peacebuilding has been obstructed by an inability to properly address the underlying structures of past tensions, resulting in a resurfacing of conflict. Thereto, a lack of recognition of the victims of

violence has complicated healing processes. Thus, while acknowledging the importance of contextual settings, the examination of other peacebuilding processes may result in a valuable spillover of knowledge, inspiring new ways of approaching peacebuilding. Remaining curious about the nature of peacebuilding and continuously examining its different possible scenarios, may help in facilitating an important move from thinking about it in terms of what is already known to thinking about peacebuilding as a creative space for opportunity.

9: Bibliography

Ashplant, T.G., Dawson, Graham & Roper, Michael, 2013: *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*. Routledge.

Barash, David P. & Webel, Charles P., 2014: *Peace and Conflict Studies*. Third Edition. SAGE

Baruch, Ben, 2012: An Interview with Johan Galtung. Article posted on Peace Insight:
<https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/interview-johan-galtung/?location=sudan&theme=peace-education> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

BBC, 2018: Remembering Eritrea-Ethiopia border war: Africa's unfinished conflict. By Tesfalem Araia. 05.05.2018: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44004212> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

BBC, 2020: Ethiopia's Tigray crisis: The long, medium, and short story. 17.11.2020:
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Benton, Ted and Craib, Ian, 2011: *Philosophy of Social Science – the philosophical foundations of social thought*. 2nd edition. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bereketeab, Redie, 2019: *The Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement. Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa*. The Nordic Africa Institute. Policy Dialogue No. 13.

Buzan, Barry & Wæver, Ole, 2003: *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole & de Wilde, Jaap, 1998: *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campos, Ângela, 2017: *An Oral History of the Portuguese Colonial War. Conscripted Generations*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Council on Foreign Relations: U.S. Policy Shift Needed in the Horn of Africa:
<https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/us-policy-shift-needed-horn-africa> [15.01.2021]

Danish Trade Union Development Agency: Labour Market Profile 2020 Ethiopia:
https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Etiopien_imp_2020.pdf [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Dawson, Graham, 2017: *The meaning of 'moving on': From trauma to the history and memory of emotions in 'post-conflict' Northern Ireland*. Issue number 1. Irish University Review.

Dawson, Graham, 2007: *Making Peace with the Past? Memory, Trauma and the Irish Troubles*. Manchester University Press.

Dejene, Alemneh, 2003: *Integrated Natural Resources Management to Enhance Food Security. The Case for Community-Based Approaches in Ethiopia*. Sustainable Development Department. Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.

Galtung, Johan, 2000: *Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)*. United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme.

Galtung, Johan, 1996: *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Sage Publications.

Galtung, Johan, 1969: *Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*. SAGE

Galtung, Johan, 1967: *Theories of Peace – A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking*. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

Galtung Institute for Peace Theory and Peace Practice: <https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/home/johan-galtung/> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

General Assembly 2018: UN Secretary General António Guterres on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_Clvef5bZg&feature=emb_title [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Globalnyt 2020: Bølge af vold rammer Colombia. Af David Rich. 02.09.2020: <https://globalnyt.dk/content/boelge-af-vold-rammer-colombia> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Hatch, Mary J., 2018: *Organization Theory – Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern Perspectives*. 4th edition. Oxford University Press.

Huysmans, Jef, 2002: *Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security*. Alternatives 27 (2002), Special Issue, 41-62.

Information 2018: To år efter fredsaftalen i Colombia: Hvem har sagt, at freden skulle være fredfyldt? Af Janet Morales. 15.12.2018: <https://www.information.dk/moti/2018/12/to-aar-fredsaftalen-colombia-hvem-sagt-freden-vaere-fredfyldt> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Information 2012: To version af uroen i Tibet. Af Martin Gøttske. 03.02.2012: <https://www.information.dk/udland/2012/02/to-versioner-uroen-tibet> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

International Monetary Fund, 2015: *The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. IMF Country Report No. 15/326

Keating, Tom & Knight, W. Andy, 2004: *Building Sustainable Peace*. The University of Alberta Press & United Nations University Press.

Marien, Michael, 1990: *Future Survey Annual 1990: A Guide to the Recent Literature of Trends, Forecasts, and Policy Proposals*. World Future Society.

Moses, J. and Knutsen, T., 2012: *Ways of Knowing – Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*. 2nd edition. Macmillan Education.

New York Times, 2020: Why is Ethiopia at War with Itself? By Abdi Latif Dahir & Declan Walsh. 05.11.2020: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-explained.html> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Plato, *The Sophist*, p. 246.

Reuters, 2020: War in Ethiopia's Tigray wrenches families apart. By Seham Eloraby & Baz Ratner. 04.12.2020: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-sudan-family/war-in-ethiopias-tigray-wrenches-families-apart-idUKKBN28E2I7> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Samuel, Emily, 2015: Cultural and Behavioural Barriers Analysis for Positive Sanitation and Hygiene Practise and Material Development. UNICEF.

Schafer, Jessica, 2002: *Supporting Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability: Overview of Conceptual Issues*. Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.

Scoones, Ian, 2015: *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods – A Framework for Analysis*. IDS Working Paper 72.

Shapiro, Ian, 1996: *Democracy's Place*. Cornell University Press.

Tessema, Y. N., 2020: *Political discourses and the securitization of democracy in post-1991 Ethiopia*. 2020.05.07. Universiteit Leiden.

Tessema, Y. N., 2018: *Prosecution of Politicide in Ethiopia: The Red Terror Trials*. International Criminal Justice Series Book 18. Asser Press.

The Conversation: Ethiopia's future is tied to water – a vital yet threatened resource in a changing climate. 22.08.2019: <https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-future-is-tied-to-water-a-vital-yet-threatened-resource-in-a-changing-climate-121844> [15.01.2021]

Tilahun, T., 1015: *Johan Galtung's Concept of Positive and Negative Peace in the Contemporary Ethiopia: an appraisal*. Inter. J. Polit. Sci. Develop.

Trip Advisor: https://www.tripadvisor.dk/Attraction_Review-g293791-d2357654-Reviews-Red_Terror_Martyrs_Memorial_Museum-Addis_Ababa.html [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UN: Responsibility to Protect: <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml> (Last viewed: 15.01.2021)

UN Chapter VII: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UNDP A: Human Development Reports: Human Development Index (HDI): <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UNDP B: Climate Change Adaption: Ethiopia: <https://www.adaptation-undp.org/explore/eastern-africa/ethiopia> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UNDP 2020: Human Development Report: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report. Eritrea: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/ERI.pdf [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UNDP 2018: Paper to be presented to the Inter-Agency Group Meeting on the “Implementation of the Third United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2018-2027)”: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/04/Ethiopia's-Progress-Towards-Eradicating-Poverty.pdf> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

UNICEF 2014: Overview: Basic Education: Eritrea: <https://www.unicef.org/eritrea/education.html> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

United Nations Secretary General, 2018: Remarks at press conference with Foreign Minister Adel Ahmed Al-Jubeir of Saudi Arabia: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09->

[16/remarks-press-conference-saudi-arabia-foreign-minister-adel-ahmed-al](#) [Last viewed: 15.01.2021].

USAID: History of USAID in Ethiopia: <https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia/history-usaid-ethiopia> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021].

Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/rebel-tigrayans-fire-rockets-at-neighboring-eritrea-in-escalation-of-ethiopia-conflict/2020/11/15/651855c4-273b-11eb-9c21-3cc501d0981f_story.html [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

World Bank A: Total Unemployment for Ethiopia:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2020&locations=ET&start=1991&view=chart> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

World Bank B: Total Unemployment for Eritrea:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2020&locations=ER&start=1991&view=chart> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

World Bank C: Gini Index Ethiopia:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.POV.GINI?locations=ET> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

World Bank D: Overview Eritrea: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/eritrea/overview> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

World Bank E: Ethiopia Poverty Assessment: Poverty Rate Declines, Despite Challenges:
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/publication/ethiopia-poverty-assessment-poverty-rate-declines-despite-challenges> [Last viewed: 15.01.2021]

Wæver, Ole, 2011: *Politics, security, theory*. Special issue on The Politics of Securitization. Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. SAGE.

Wæver, Ole, 2004: *New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery*.
Aberystwyth, Paris. Paper presented at International Studies Association Conference, Montreal.