

# **Bureaucracy for the 21st Century**

## **Clarifying and Expanding Our View of Bureaucratic Organization**

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**Bureaucracy For the 21st Century:  
Clarifying and Expanding Our View of Bureaucratic Organization**

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**ABSTRACT**

This review aims to redress the growing gap between the receding discourse on bureaucracy and bureaucracy's continuing presence as the predominant organizational form. Reviewing a century of organizational research on bureaucracy, we find three main perspectives, which developed in succession but persist in parallel: bureaucracy as an organizing principle, as a paradigmatic form of organization, and as one type of structure among others. We argue that these three perspectives should be brought into closer dialogue and expanded, so we can overcome the de-contextualized, reified, and atomized ways in which bureaucracy is often viewed. To that end, we offer three pathways to stimulate future research on bureaucracy in its wider context, bureaucracy in action, and bureaucracy's interdependencies and configurations. Finally, we discuss how we can better understand the various guises in which bureaucracy continues into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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*“The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest groups, endowments, clubs, and many others [...] The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the realm of administration.” (Weber 1978: 223).*

## 10 1. WHY BUREAUCRACY?

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Technological, competitive, and political changes in recent decades have reconfigured the organizational landscape, and in this context, bureaucracy has been receding in both general and scholarly discourse (see Figures 1 and 2). This shift, however, is in stark contrast to the reality on the ground: bureaucracy has proven remarkably durable in management practice. Most organizations still rely on core features of bureaucracy such as hierarchies of authority, specialized functions, and formalized processes (Marsden, Cook, & Kalleberg, 1994), and their relative performance still depends on how thoroughly they implement those elements (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). Walton’s (2005) meta-analysis of 64 primary statistical studies found a high level of covariance among structural characteristics of bureaucracy and found no evidence that this coherence had diminished over time in the studies published between 1960 and 1999. In both public and private sector organizations, especially larger ones, instrumental rationality remains the predominant “regime of justification,” and the legitimacy of a hierarchy of authority remains taken for granted (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). Bureaucracy continues to flourish even in settings where we might imagine it is irrelevant, such as grassroots initiatives (Florian, 2018), hippie-like collectives (Chen, 2009), terrorist groups (Shapiro, 2013), technology start-ups (Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 1999), and online communities (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). Thus, while much of what we read would have us believe otherwise, Weber’s view quoted in the epigraph above might well still be valid. Therefore, it is urgent that we renew our efforts to understand this organizational form.

<put Figure 1 about here>

<put Figure 2 about here>

A renewed effort is not only urgent but also important, because, notwithstanding the considerable accumulated volume of research, key empirical questions about bureaucracy remain unresolved. Debate continues on whether bureaucracy is adaptable and flexible enough to absorb dynamic and unpredictable change (Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Gittell, 2001; Heckscher,

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3 2015; Lee & Edmondson, 2017). Scholarship remains conflicted on the relation between  
4 bureaucracy and innovation (Craig, 1995; Damanpor, 1996; Dougherty & Corse, 1995), on the  
5 relationship between bureaucracy's efficiency rationale and its cultural il/legitimacy (DiMaggio  
6 & Powell, 1983; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Meyer & Bromley, 2013), and on the impact of new  
7 technologies as either strengthening or obsoleting it (Faraj, Pachidi, & Sayegh, 2018; Kellogg,  
8 Valentine, & Christin, 2020; Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, & Höllerer, 2017a). Whether  
9 bureaucracy has a positive or negative effect on alienation and satisfaction remains in dispute  
10 (Finlay, Martin, Roman, & Blum, 1995; Miller, 1967; Organ & Greene, 1981; Shantz, Alfes,  
11 Bailey, & Soane, 2015). The extent to which "new" or "alternative" organizational forms have  
12 replaced bureaucracy—rather than simply giving it a new appearance—remains a thorny theme  
13 (Clegg, Harris, & Höpfl, 2011; Courpasson & Reed, 2004; Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994a;  
14 Turco, 2016). And the role of bureaucracy in responding to the "grand challenges" and "wicked  
15 problems" of our time is also under debate (Adler, 2015; Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015;  
16 Kattel, Drechsler, & Karo, 2019).

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19 To address the divide between discourse and reality and resolve these persistent empirical  
20 questions, we need, first, to take our distance from the widely despised stereotypes of  
21 bureaucracy. Many people love to hate bureaucracy, whether in the management press (e.g.,  
22 Hamel & Zanini, 2017), in popular culture (such as in Terry Gilliam's movie *Brazil*), or political  
23 discussions (see Lopdrup-Hjorth & du Gay, 2020). This animus often seeps into scholarly work,  
24 where bureaucracy appears too often not as a possible predictor or outcome variable but as a  
25 pejorative term synonymous with red tape, administrative burden, or wasteful overhead.

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28 Putting aside stereotypes and reviewing the past century of scholarship, we find that  
29 much of the confusion concerning bureaucracy's prevalence and effects stems from differences  
30 in the conceptualization of bureaucracy itself. Bureaucracy has been understood variously as an  
31 organizing principle, as the paradigmatic form of modern organization, and as one type of  
32 structure among others. These three perspectives, along with variants within each, emerged in  
33 succession and have persisted in parallel, leaving our field with a confused and confusing body  
34 of research.

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37 The goal of this review is therefore to clarify the competing understandings of  
38 bureaucracy and chart some directions for a revitalized program of research that can help us  
39 engage more effectively with the reality of bureaucracy today. We start by outlining the scope  
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3 and spirit of our review, then discuss the three main perspectives on bureaucracy that we have  
4 found in the literature and the variants within each. We note their evolving shares of publications  
5 in U.S. and European organization and management journals, and we argue that they are best  
6 understood as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. We suggest that by bringing these  
7 three perspectives into closer dialogue with each other, we can avoid de-contextualized, reified,  
8 and atomized views of bureaucracy. We offer three research pathways to overcome such  
9 limitations and discuss how a renewed understanding allows us to make better sense of the  
10 current organizational landscape, where bureaucracy in its various guises coexists with—and  
11 appears to be holding its own in competition with—alternative forms of organization.  
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## 20 **2. SCOPE AND SPIRIT OF THE REVIEW**

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22 Our review focuses on bureaucracy as a form of organization, rather than the  
23 administrative arm of government (“the bureaucracy”), or the specialized staff functions found in  
24 larger formal organizations (Blau & Scott, 1964; Scott, 2007). We target literature in the field of  
25 management and organization studies, and we include scholarship in sociology and public  
26 administration where it is relevant. Given our focus, we leave for future research the specific  
27 organizational challenges of government bureaucracies and staff functions.  
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32 Our research proceeded in two phases. The first phase was exploratory and aimed to  
33 provide us with a panorama of the evolution of research on bureaucracy. We used a snowball  
34 process, looking for the most influential texts that have shaped the way bureaucracy has been  
35 understood and studied. This included not only management journal articles but also a wide  
36 range of monographs and publications in the broader social sciences. In a second phase, we  
37 mapped in more detail the evolution of research on bureaucracy in leading management and  
38 organization journals. We used the Web of Science platform to compile all the papers using the  
39 term “bureau\*” in the abstract, title, or keywords in leading U.S. (*Administrative Science*  
40 *Quarterly*, *Academy of Management Journal*, *Academy of Management Review*, and  
41 *Organization Science*) and European journals (*Organization Studies*, *Journal of Management*  
42 *Studies*, and *Human Relations*) from their first year of publication to 2019.<sup>1</sup> A potential  
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53 <sup>1</sup> We also examined *Strategic Management Journal* and *Management Science*. Our search in the former  
54 yielded only nine papers, which only two fit our scope; and in the latter, it yielded seven papers, none of  
55 which fit our scope.  
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3 limitation of this sampling strategy is that it did not allow us to capture papers that may address  
4 aspects of bureaucracy in the body, but do not refer to the concept in the search fields.  
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6 We put aside the publications in which bureaucracy is used in its pejorative meaning (i.e.,  
7 red tape), appears only incidentally in the text, or where it falls outside our scope. The result was  
8 a corpus of 187 papers. We read and analyzed these publications according to how bureaucracy  
9 was understood and studied. Specifically, we coded papers according to their conceptualizations  
10 of bureaucracy; analytical goals; and research foci and findings. This analysis, together with the  
11 insights gleaned from our broader reading of the literature in the first phase, revealed three  
12 distinctive perspectives on bureaucracy. We then coded all papers according to the perspectives  
13 (outlined below). Appendix 1 presents the complete list of papers coded according to the  
14 different perspectives, and Appendix 2 provides examples of different characterizations of  
15 bureaucracy across perspectives.  
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### 25 **3. THE STARTING POINT: MAX WEBER**

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27 Elements of bureaucracy arose millennia ago, with the emergence of the first cities, but  
28 the modern bureaucratic form dates back about two centuries (Crooks & Parsons, 2016; Schott,  
29 2000). And it was through Max Weber, especially his magnum opus *Economy and Society* (e.g.,  
30 Weber, 1978 [1921]), that the study of bureaucracy entered management and organization  
31 scholarship.  
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35 While the term had been previously used pejoratively to refer to government officials and  
36 rule by such officials, Weber approached it with scientific neutrality: examining bureaucracy as a  
37 form of organization, he identified its distinctive features, and pointed out that they were  
38 common to both the public and private sectors (Albrow 1970). While extraordinarily rich in  
39 theoretical and empirical insights, most of *Economy and Society*, including its “Bureaucracy”  
40 chapter (Chapter 11), is un-systematic and was left unfinished. It only came to us through the  
41 efforts of his wife and scholar in her own right, Marianne Weber (Hanke, 2009). The work  
42 entered English-language scholarship through translations by Parsons (Parsons, 1937; Weber,  
43 1948), Gerth and Mills (Weber, 1946) Shils and Finch (Weber, 1949), and Roth and Wittich  
44 (Weber, 1978). In this process, it suffered significant changes in meaning, which encouraged  
45 multiple interpretations, as discussed below (see for previous discussions on translation and  
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3 interpretation issues: Baehr, 2001, 2001; Du Gay, 2008; Gajduscsek, 2003; Hennis, 1983;  
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5 Schreurs, 2000; Tribe, 2007, 2019; Weiss, 1983).

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7 In most of his work, Weber addressed bureaucracy as an “ideal-type”—that is, “neither  
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9 an empirical generalization nor a normative value, but a ‘reference point’” (Albrow, 1990: 149–  
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11 157). Weber’s use of ideal-types has generated considerable debate (Hekman, 1983; Swedberg,  
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13 2018). For the present purposes, however, it suffices to say that his bureaucratic ideal-type is a  
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15 model which, if fully developed, would be the most “efficient” form for a complex  
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17 organization—i.e., the most instrumentally rational, the most effective in meeting the  
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19 organization’s goals, whatever they may be. In Weber’s evolutionary view, the early  
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21 bureaucracies of ancient Egypt or China were bureaucracies only in germ form: they had a  
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23 hierarchy of authority and division of labor, but they were not fully rationalized neither in their  
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25 formal structure nor in their informal relations. Instead, they were based on traditionalism or  
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27 charisma, combined with expediency and brute force. An adequate concept of bureaucracy,  
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29 Weber argued, must be based not on the features common to bureaucracy across the ages, but on  
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31 the features which characterize its “most advanced” form—the instrumentally-rational ideal-  
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33 typical bureaucracy.

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35 Box 1 shows Weber’s list of characteristics of the bureaucratic ideal-type in *Economy*  
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37 *and Society*’s Chapter 3 (“The Types of Legitimate Domination”), and Box 2 reproduces the list  
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39 of bureaucracy’s features that opens Chapter 11 (“Bureaucracy”). Subsequent authors have  
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41 offered distillations of these original lists, usually highlighting the following features: (i)  
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43 individuals fulfill specialized roles; (ii) there is a hierarchy of offices, with higher levels  
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45 supervising lower ones; (iii) written rules and procedures cover regular operations; (iv) hiring  
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47 and promotion are based on technical competence; and (v) there is a general attitude of  
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49 impersonality in one’s conduct in the sphere of work, a sphere that is understood as separate  
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51 from the sphere of private life. These features, however, represent but one aspect of the  
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53 Weberian conceptualization.

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**<put Box 1 about here >**

**<put Box 2 about here >**

Weber studied bureaucracy as an organizational, cultural, and political phenomenon, with  
different aspects coming into focus in different discussions. He examined bureaucracy’s



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3 variation across space and time—in China, the ancient Roman Empire, and contemporary  
4 Europe. He identified not only structural features (e.g., hierarchy of offices, written files, salary),  
5 but also governing precepts (e.g., precision, obedience, secrecy), and intended outcomes (e.g.,  
6 goal-fulfillment, impartiality). He brought together analysis of the social basis of bureaucracy  
7 (e.g., development of the rule of law), the functioning of bureaucratic organizations (e.g., its  
8 legitimation as well as potential dysfunctions associated with tenure in office), and the position  
9 and work of bureaucrats/administrators in them (Bendix, 1998 p. 418). Bureaucracy also  
10 appeared in different roles in his theorizing, sometimes as the effect of socio-historical processes  
11 (e.g., mass democracy) and sometimes as a mechanism driving those processes (e.g., an engine  
12 of rationalization). The result was a concept that came to organization and management studies  
13 as multi-dimensional (structural, behavioral, cultural), multi-faceted (work control, labor  
14 conditions, personal conduct, inter-personal relations), and multi-layered (socio-historical,  
15 organizational, occupational).

16  
17 As the study of bureaucracy developed in our field, scholars responded to this complexity  
18 in different ways. Specifically, as noted in the Introduction, our review found three perspectives  
19 that emerged more or less successively over time and that have persisted in parallel. In the first,  
20 bureaucracy appears as the expression of an organizing principle, with variants focusing  
21 respectively on instrumental rationality, value rationality, and domination. In the second, it  
22 appears as the paradigmatic form of modern organization in both its formal and informal  
23 dimensions, with one variant focusing on its dysfunctions, and the other seeing more positive  
24 potential. In a third, bureaucracy is seen as one type of organization structure among others.  
25 Table 1 provides an overview.

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45 In the next three sections, we present each perspective in turn. The distinction among  
46 these perspectives is analytical: some studies combine two or more. For the main part, however,  
47 research in each of the perspectives has paid little attention to work in the others. By making  
48 these differences explicit, our review makes it possible to read the literature in a more informed  
49 way and dispel some of the confusion around the concept. Echoing the lesson of the parable of  
50 the blind men and the elephant, we argue that each offers valuable insights, and that our  
51 scholarship would be stronger if we exploited their complementarities.  
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## 4. BUREAUCRACY AS THE EXPRESSION OF AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE

The first perspective sees the bureaucratic form of organization as the expression of a distinctive organizing principle. Here, the specific organizational features listed by Weber expressing that principle are secondary. The principle itself has been understood in three different ways, leading to three variants of this perspective. The first and most widely adopted variant takes rationalization, specifically instrumental and formal rationality, as the central characteristic that both underpins modern bureaucratic administration and differentiates it from pre-modern and pre-capitalist counterparts. The second contests the first's exclusive focus on instrumental and formal rationality, and argues that in Weber, as in real bureaucracies, value-rationality plays a critical—albeit supporting—role. Here, bureaucracy is characterized by a distinctive professional comportment and ethos, one that is underpinned by distinctive values of impartiality and impersonality in the performance of one's duties. The third sees bureaucracy as a system of domination legitimized by appeals to instrumental rationality.

This Principle perspective is common in the wider field of social theory (e.g., Bauman, 1988; Giddens, 1971). And, as we will show in a later section, it is more common today in European than in U.S. management journals, possibly because organization studies in Europe has preserved stronger ties with that wider field. In the sections below, we identify the key ideas in each variant in turn.

### 4.1. Bureaucracy as instrumental rationality

Weber saw capitalism and bureaucracy as the “two great rationalizing forces” (Weber, 1978: 698), and rationalization itself as the defining feature of modernity (Collins, 1988).<sup>2</sup> Specifically, he saw bureaucracy as a way of organizing that blossoms when “instrumental” rationality is established as the modal form of social action in organizations and in economic transactions. Instrumental rationality refers to the pursuit of given goals via the most efficient

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<sup>2</sup> Rationalization has, of course, been studied in relation to many spheres of life beyond administration—such as the arts (Martindale & Riedel, 1958, XXII), religion (Kalberg, 1990), law (Jennings, Schulz, Patient, Gravel, & Yuan, 2005)—and connected to various carriers besides bureaucracy, such as asceticism (Kieser, 1987), accounting tools (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991) and even the operating principles of McDonalds (Ritzer, 1993).

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3 means available. Where instrumental rationality prevails, the ends of action are given and not  
4 themselves under discussion. In contrast, value-rational action is based on commitment to some  
5 ultimate value and involves conscious deliberation on the concrete meaning to be attributed that  
6 value in the given circumstances. These two rationality-based types of action can be contrasted  
7 with affectual action, based on emotion, and traditionalistic action, based on habit and respect for  
8 customs (Weber, 1978: 24–26).  
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14 Weber portrays bureaucracy as a form of organization based on instrumental rationality  
15 in a context of legally legitimated authority.<sup>3</sup> Deliberation on the ends of action is here reserved  
16 for actors at the top of the hierarchy of authority: subordinates take those ends as given by  
17 authoritative command, and they understand their task as pursuing the most rational and efficient  
18 way of realizing those ends. By contrast, in charismatic organizations, authority is legitimized by  
19 appeals to affectual commitments to an inspiring leader and their vision. In traditionalistic  
20 organizations, authority is legitimized by sacred customs. And in collegial organizations,  
21 authority is diffuse, and action is based on a common value-rational commitment to some shared  
22 ideals (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Satow, 1975). The last of these is not, in Weber's view, a  
23 scalable form of organization, because it grants no-one command capacity (Nass 1986). These  
24 are all ideal-types: real-world organizations exhibit a mix of all of them, just as the four types of  
25 social action are typically intermingled in real-world interactions.  
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Weber's contrast of instrumental- and value-rationality parallels his distinction between  
formal and substantive rationality. Formal rationality is operative where the procedure for  
making the decision is rational by virtue of its reliance on formal rules and calculation.

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<sup>3</sup> Reliance on law is important in Weber's account because his discussions of bureaucracy were primarily in the context of government agencies, where laws often codify the agency's goals, and sometimes codify procedures for achieving those goals that reflect the legislature's intent. The term legal-rational might make us wonder if the concept of bureaucracy is relevant for private-sector business organizations. Weber and subsequent scholarship address this affirmatively, because business organizations too rely on laws—in particular, the legal authority invested in the Board and CEO to set goals, as well as the firm's own private laws, in the form of rules and procedures that codify prescribed ways of achieving those goals. The diffusion of bureaucracy from the public to the private sector—and back again—as well as the diffusion across the private sector have been the object of a rich body of scholarship. These works have identified various vectors of diffusion including actors such as industrial engineers (Shenhav, 1995), personnel experts (Dobbin & Kelly, 2007), and consultants (Wright, Sturdy, & Wylie, 2012), as well as management tools such as performance measurement (Townley, Cooper, & Oakes, 2003) and process methodologies (Adler, 2005; Adler & Kwon, 2013).

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3 Substantive rationality prevails where the content of the decision is judged rational insofar as it  
4 supports some higher-order goal (Albrow, 1970; Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). In its most  
5 advanced form, instrumentally-rational bureaucracy embodies both legal and formal rationality  
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7 (Kalberg, 1980).  
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10 Bureaucracy as the organizational form stemming from instrumental rationality has  
11 continued as a theme in the broader social sciences. We see it in investigations of social  
12 movements (Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000), of the form of nation-states (Silberman, 1993), and of  
13 cross-national bodies (Deflem, 2000). We see it in studies of modernization (Weiker, 1968), and  
14 industrialization (Walton, 1987). And it figures in research on the similarities and differences  
15 between capitalism and socialism (Kocka, 1981; Stark, 1989). Some of this work touches on  
16 organizational matters, such as in the program advanced by John Meyer and colleagues on world  
17 society, which, among other themes, examines the socio-cultural processes underpinning the  
18 diffusion of rationalized organizational forms (Bromley & Meyer, 2015; Meyer & Bromley,  
19 2013; Meyer, Krücken, & Drori, 2009).  
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27 In organization studies, scholars have examined bureaucratic rationalization in public  
28 organizations (e.g., Roy, 1981) and in specific organizations and industries (e.g., Adler, 2006;  
29 Cooper et al., 1996). Langton (1984), for example, examined the bureaucratization of the British  
30 pottery industry during the industrial revolution. He analyzed the emergence of specialized tasks  
31 and career paths, the formalization of work processes and work-time norms, and the concomitant  
32 decline of the guild-based, traditionalistic spirit. Other scholars have studied the  
33 bureaucratization of employment relations (Baron, Jennings, & Dobbin, 1988; Jacoby, 1985),  
34 financial accountability (Hwang & Powell, 2009), decision-making (Espeland, 2000; Piiparinen,  
35 2008), staffing (Hensby, Sibthorpe, & Driver, 2012), roles (Räisänen & Linde, 2004), and  
36 general administrative operations (Bordua & Reiss, 1966). Bureaucratic rationalization has also  
37 been a key object of studies in research on professions such as accounting, law, and medicine  
38 (Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 2008; Berg, 1997; Brivot, 2011; Eckberg, 1987; Freidson, 1984;  
39 Montagna, 1968; Powell, Brock, & Hinings, 1999; Racko, 2017; Scott, 1965), and occupations  
40 such as software development (Adler, McGarry, Irion-Talbot, & Binney, 2005; Greenbaum,  
41 1979).  
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53 Scholars who see bureaucracy as rationalization have also explored the way instrumental  
54 rationality interacts with other forms of social action and conditions, sometimes generating  
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3 “hybrid” forms of bureaucracy (e.g., Delany, 1963; Smith, 1957). Espeland (2000), for example,  
4 studied how a marginal group of bureaucrats from a U.S. federal agency pursued a form of  
5 rationality premised on the balancing of multiple interests—rather than the procedural  
6 implementation of government directives—and how their success generated an organization with  
7 a surprisingly democratic decision-making process. Noteworthy here is early organizational  
8 research which focused on the foundations and variation of (Weberian) bureaucracy across  
9 socio-cultural contexts (e.g., Ehrmann, 1961; Katz & Eisenstadt, 1960; Liu, 1959; Soemardjan,  
10 1957; Weiker, 1968). For example, in a study of the Turkish coal industry, Presthus (1961)  
11 showed how instrumental rationality combined with traditionalistic values created a “welfare  
12 bureaucracy” that balanced Weberian bureaucracy’s principles of competence and impartiality  
13 with welfare principles of cooperation and social benefits.  
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## 23 **4.2. Bureaucracy as value rationality**

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25 The second variant of the Principle perspective brings important nuances to the first:  
26 while bureaucracy relies on instrumental rationality, a well-functioning bureaucracy also relies  
27 on a distinctive comportment that embodies a certain value rationality (Du Gay, 2000, 2005). To  
28 occupy a bureaucratic office is to assume responsibilities that override other social and personal  
29 commitments (McDonnell, 2020). The modern bureaucrat, Weber writes:  
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34 “takes pride in preserving his [sic] impartiality, overcoming his own inclinations and  
35 opinions, so as to execute in a conscientious and meaningful way what is required of him by  
36 the general definition of his duties or by some particular instruction, even—and particularly—  
37 when they do not coincide with his own political views” (Weber, 1994: 160).  
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41 While bureaucrats—and by extension, anyone performing a formal role in a bureaucratic  
42 organization—function under a general norm of instrumental rationality, they do not relinquish  
43 their commitment to value and substantive rationality expressed in this ethos. Indeed, they  
44 should appeal decisions when they seem incorrect or at variance with the mission of their office  
45 or the wider organization. But their action is circumscribed by a structure based on instrumental  
46 and formal rationality, such that if their appeal is rejected, they are legally and ethically bound to  
47 implement the decision (or resign) (Weber, 1978: 1404).  
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53 When Weber was writing in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, this ethos represented an emerging  
54 accomplishment. A century later, this aspect of bureaucracy appears taken for granted as the  
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3 appropriate conduct in the workplace. So much so that in everyday (as distinct from the  
4 theoretical) language, we might describe this ethos simply as “professionalism,” which the U.S.  
5 Department of Labor defined as “conducting oneself with responsibility, integrity,  
6 accountability, and excellence” (U.S. Department of Labor. n.d.). In reality, of course, such  
7 professionalism is an ideal, realized only partly in many organizations where favoritism and  
8 discrimination, personal appropriation of office prerequisites, and other forms of “misconduct”  
9 abound (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010; Vaughan, 1999).

10  
11 This variant highlights the emancipatory potential of the bureaucratic values of  
12 meritocracy, universalism, and neutrality, which contrast so strongly with traditionalistic  
13 patronage ties (Olsen, 2006; Tribe, 2019 p. 66) and the arbitrary character of authority in  
14 charismatic orders (Adair-Toteff, 2014). The latter are still found in personnel practices, often  
15 undermining employee trust and commitment (Pearce, Branyiczki, & Bigley, 2000). De-  
16 bureaucratizing efforts in the name of agility and market responsiveness often lead to scandalous  
17 breakdowns—breakdowns that remind us that the benefits of the meritocratic and universalistic  
18 values of bureaucracy should not be taken for granted (Du Gay, 2017).

19  
20 As in the other two variants of this perspective, here the structural features listed by  
21 Weber (Boxes 1 and 2 above) are secondary: the values and ideals of bureaucracy—typically  
22 embodied by those working in a bureaucracy as a *Lebensführung* (“life conduct”)—are primary.  
23 Scholars working in this variant see the formal structures typically associated with bureaucracy  
24 as important only insofar as they support the development of a distinctive comportment: a  
25 bureaucratic ethos. They point out that Weber devoted far more space to the latter than to the  
26 former (Du Gay, 2000; McDonnell, 2017). This variant sees Weber as a historical anthropologist  
27 concerned with the development of a distinctive form of life and of character—a concern most  
28 clear in his essays on vocation (Byrkjeflot & Du Gay, 2012; du Gay, 2018; Hennis, 1983;  
29 Thomas, 1998; Tribe, 2007). It is also an emic viewpoint for many people working in public  
30 organizations, where expertise, professional discretion, and a sense of calling are often highly  
31 valued.<sup>4</sup> While this viewpoint is quite far from many characterizations of modern

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<sup>4</sup> Weber understood professional expertise as a fundamental aspect of bureaucracy equating higher hierarchical standing with superior knowledge and competence (see, e.g., Toren, 1976). Yet, this link progressively disappeared in the debate on bureaucracy. This seems partially due to the differentiation between professional and bureaucratic forms of organization prevalent in the US and UK (see Meyer,

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3 bureaucracies—especially those that highlight rigid, “Taylorist” standardization and separation  
4 between conception and execution—it helps make sense of cases where bureaucracy coexists  
5 with a shared sense of commitment and purpose (Adler, 2006; Ritz, Brewer, & Neumann, 2016).  
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8       Approaching bureaucracy in this more positive light, scholars in this variant typically  
9 seek to understand the (contextual) conditions for the emergence and effectiveness of the  
10 bureaucratic ethos. For example, early research explored how bureaucratic values develop and  
11 square with non-bureaucratic ones (e.g., religious morality) (Denhardt, 1968; Liu, 1959). More  
12 recently, research examined the importance of behavioral mechanisms, such as the development  
13 and maintenance of a sense of duty (du Gay & Pedersen, 2020), and the role of structural  
14 elements such as career systems (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). In a study of state organization  
15 in developing countries, McDonnell (2017) explored the social and cultural conditions which  
16 fostered the bureaucratic ethos of impartial and effective administration within a wider  
17 patrimonial context.  
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20       Beyond their effort to identify mechanisms and patterns, scholars in this variant have  
21 engaged in the defense of government bureaucracy against “neoliberal” reforms. From this  
22 perspective, “new public management” and similar reforms are typically seen as undermining the  
23 ethos that is critical to the effective functioning of a modern state bureaucracy (Clegg et al.,  
24 2011; Lopdrup-Hjorth & Obling, 2019; Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014;  
25 Olsen, 2008; O’Reilly & Reed, 2011). Across public and private sectors, authors have discussed  
26 the diffusion of market or “enterprising” principles which fuel an anti-bureaucratic spirit (Gay &  
27 Salaman, 1992; Salaman & Storey, 2008; Sturdy & Wright, 2008) and erode some of the  
28 safeguards that bureaucracy can provide (Russell & McCabe, 2015).  
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31       A focus on rationality as highlighted by this variant and the previous one helps us put in  
32 perspective some important debates about the darker sides of bureaucracy. For example, some  
33 critics of modernity interpret as prototypically bureaucratic the Nazis’ habit of meticulous  
34 record-keeping in their management of the program of extermination of Jews, homosexuals, and  
35 other “undesirables” (Bauman, 2000). But to qualify that administration as bureaucratic is to  
36 ignore the Weberian ideal-type’s grounding in its distinctive ethos of meritocracy, universalism,  
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1995). It also reflects Parsons’ famous critique of Weber which contested the necessary link between  
administration based on expertise and authority (for an analysis and critique, see Nass, 1986).

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3 and neutrality (Clegg, 2006; Du Gay, 2000). It is better understood as darkly charismatic: the  
4 Nazis dismantled and politicized the public administration, leading to ill-defined offices and  
5 departments. Officials paid little heed to their superiors' orders, doing instead whatever they  
6 thought it would take to please the *Führer* (Gerth, 1940; Kershaw, 1987, 1993).  
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### 10 11 **4.3. Bureaucracy as domination**

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13 In the third variant of the Principle perspective, the focus is on the fundamental power  
14 relation that undergirds—and is reproduced by—bureaucracy. This broadens the variety of  
15 organizational forms that count as bureaucratic beyond the ideal-typical form based on  
16 comprehensive instrumental rationality, to include forms where bureaucracy appears as the  
17 administrative arm of a traditionalistic or charismatic leader (Albrow 1970; Constan 1958).  
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21 In both the narrower and broader sense, bureaucracy is a means of domination—in  
22 Weber's German term, *Herrschaft*, literally rulership or domination by the master (see Weber,  
23 2019: 417–472). Indeed, while Weber saw modern bureaucracy as a form of organization  
24 legitimated by appeals to instrumental rationality, this rationality was, in his view, merely the  
25 means by which the ruler at the head of the organization could guarantee that their orders were  
26 reliably executed.<sup>5</sup> He wrote: “Without exception, every sphere of social action is profoundly  
27 influenced by structures of domination. [...] [T]he structure of domination and its unfolding is  
28 decisive in determining the form of social action and its orientation towards a ‘goal’” (Weber  
29 1968: 941). Authors such as Bendix (1956, 1960) did much to bring domination into focus (see  
30 also Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005, p. 502; Perrow, 1986, p.5), but it was an uphill battle against  
31 the legacy left by the first English translations of Weber, such as Parsons', where *Herrschaft* was  
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46 <sup>5</sup> In the third chapter of *Economy and Society* Vol I, Weber examines how rulers ensure reliable  
47 domination over their subjects, that is, how they ensure that their subordinates obey their orders. As  
48 Weber presents the matter, people comply with orders for various reasons. Some reasons render  
49 compliance unreliable: here, Weber mentions simulated and hypocritical obedience, opportunism, and the  
50 mere absence of alternatives. Compliance is somewhat more reliable when based on material interests  
51 (such as in the agency theory's image of the organization) and idealistic motives such as shared goals  
52 (value-rationality). The most reliable compliance, he argues, arises when the subordinate sees the orders  
53 themselves as legitimate. Weber then identifies three bases of such legitimacy—instrumental/rational-  
54 legality, tradition, and charisma. And of these three, Weber argues that the instrumental/formal-legal form  
55 is the most advanced, most flexible, and most effective. But it is still a form of domination.  
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3 translated as authority or leadership, thus downplaying its power dimension (Cohen, Hazelrigg,  
4 & Pope, 1975).

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6 Scholars starting from domination have sought to synthesize Weber with other theories of  
7 power and politics, such as those advanced by Michels (e.g., Courpasson & Clegg, 2006),  
8 Tocqueville (e.g., Clegg & Courpasson, 2004), or Foucault (e.g., Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, &  
9 Samuel, 1998). This leads them to contrast the monocratic hierarchy of bureaucracy with  
10 democratic and polyarchic forms of organization (Courpasson & Clegg, 2012; Courpasson &  
11 Dany, 2003). This angle of attack has been popular among scholars working in the critical  
12 management studies tradition (Alvesson, Bridgman, & Willmott, 2009).

13  
14 An understanding of bureaucracy as domination underpins research on the tension  
15 between bureaucracy and individual or collective self-expression and autonomy. Exemplary here  
16 is the body of scholarship studying bureaucracy as a vehicle for the “proletarianization” of  
17 professionals and as a threat to the autonomy of professional decision-making (e.g., Ben-David,  
18 1958; Daniels, 1969; Freidson, 1984; Hall, 1968; Larson, 1977; Mills, 2002).<sup>6</sup> Both the effect of  
19 the incorporation of professionals into bureaucratic organizations and the infusion of  
20 bureaucracy into professional organizations have been the object of substantial literature.  
21 However, the related empirical research has yielded mixed results (e.g., Robertson & Swan,  
22 2004). In some studies, bureaucratization eroded autonomy and shifted control to managers (e.g.,  
23 Huising, 2014), but other studies find that professionals are able to retain control in the face of  
24 bureaucratization and even enhance their power in this context (e.g., Brivot, 2011; Vaast, 2007).

25  
26 The recognition of bureaucracy as domination has also served as a platform to examine  
27 changes in bureaucracy’s structural expression, usually coupled with skepticism towards claims  
28 that its underlying substance has been superseded (Courpasson & Reed, 2004). For these authors,  
29 decentralized project structures (Clegg & Courpasson, 2004), empowerment programs (Hales,  
30 2002), cultural forms of control (Kärreman & Alvesson, 2004), and the shift toward  
31 casual/temporary contracts (Morris, Farrell, & Reed, 2016) do not displace bureaucracy. Rather,  
32 they are refinements that give bureaucracy a “soft,” “light,” or “neo” appearance (e.g.,  
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<sup>6</sup> This was mainly an Anglo-American concern. Whereas in much of the rest of the world, professionals in fields such as medicine and law are often employed by the government, in the U.S. and U.K. they were traditionally more often in “private practices” and enjoyed considerable freedom from hierarchical constraints in their daily decision-making (Freidson, 1970).

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3 Courpasson, 2000; Hales, 2002; Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2015), while leaving untouched its  
4 core as domination. Indeed, starting from domination helps bring into focus bureaucracy's  
5 plasticity and its ability to digest resistance (Courpasson, 2011). Viewed through these lenses,  
6 many apparently anti-bureaucratic mechanisms—such as project management (Hodgson, 2004),  
7 knowledge management (Kamoche & Maguire, 2011), communities of practice (Swan,  
8 Scarborough, & Ziebro, 2016), or change programs (Sturdy, Wright, & Wylie, 2016)—are  
9 arguably better understood as extensions and adaptations of bureaucracy, making it more flexible  
10 and collaborative as a form of domination (Clegg, 2012; Clegg et al., 2011; Hassard, Morris, &  
11 McCann, 2012).

## 20 **5. BUREAUCRACY AS THE PARADIGMATIC FORM OF**

### 21 **ORGANIZATION**

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24 By the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the USA, with the ascendancy of large-scale business  
25 and the growing importance of the public sector, bureaucracy had become ubiquitous as a  
26 standard organizational template—the paradigmatic form of organization (Chandler, 1977;  
27 Jacoby, 1985; Meyer, 1995).<sup>7</sup> With this institutionalization of bureaucracy as the model for  
28 larger formal organizations, researchers' attention was drawn from bureaucracy's immanent  
29 principles to its concrete reality. Partly inspired by the “discovery” of informal organization by  
30 Barnard (1938) and the Hawthorne studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939), the focus of  
31 research shifted from the exploration of the principles underlying bureaucracy to empirical  
32 studies of bureaucracy in both its formal and informal aspects (see for a conceptual discussion  
33 Selznick, 1943).

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36 This perspective comes in two variants. The first takes bureaucracy as a more or less  
37 unitary phenomenon and seeks to understand its intrinsic failure modes. The second adopts a  
38 more expansive approach and aims to identify how the formal dimension of bureaucracy can be  
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51 <sup>7</sup> Bureaucracy had been a template for organizing since much earlier days in Europe where public  
52 bureaucratic functionaries trace back centuries; administrative centralization and bureaucratization were  
53 constitutive of the nation states; industry administration followed the model of public bureaucracy; and  
54 most professional groups emerged and worked under public bureaucracy's jurisdiction (for a comparison  
55 between US and Continental Europe, see Meyer, 1995).  
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3 associated with a more congenial informal organization generating more positive outcomes. We  
4 review them in turn.  
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### 7 8 **5.1. Bureaucracy as a dysfunctional organizational paradigm** 9

10 The hallmark of this first variant is an understanding of bureaucracy as an inherently  
11 dysfunctional form of organization, echoing the pejorative, colloquial view. Weber was far from  
12 deaf to the common attacks against bureaucracy: he described the bureaucratization of social  
13 order as “the polar night of icy darkness” (Weber, 1994: xvi). While this negative view has  
14 accompanied the concept from its pre-Weberian origins (Albrow, 1970; Starbuck, 2005), the  
15 work in this category is distinguished by its effort to characterize, more specifically,  
16 bureaucracy’s dysfunctions and theorize their causes.  
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22 Robert Merton was among the first researchers to take up bureaucracy’s dysfunctions  
23 from a theoretical perspective. His social-psychological approach highlights the power of  
24 bureaucratic settings in encouraging an over-conformist type of “bureaucratic personality”  
25 (Merton, 1940). Some of Merton’s mentees pointed to related failings of prototypical  
26 bureaucratic organizations—e.g., ritualism and resistance to change (Blau, 1963), conflict  
27 between management and workers (Gouldner, 1954), institutionalization of bureaucratic  
28 mechanisms beyond their technical value (Selznick, 1980)—even though they were more  
29 agnostic regarding the necessary link between bureaucracy and dysfunction (see discussion  
30 below).  
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37 This pessimistic perspective also developed in a distinct stream of scholarship that starts  
38 with Herbert Simon (1947) and extends through works such as March and Simon (1958) and  
39 Cyert and March (1963) and studies such as Allison’s classic book on the Cuban Missile Crisis  
40 (Allison, 1971). Here the focus is on decision-making, and the theory mobilizes social-  
41 psychological insights to identify how decision-making in bureaucracies escapes the strictures of  
42 instrumental rationality and is shaped by psychological processes like satisficing and political  
43 processes like inter-departmental rivalry.  
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49 With a more sociological focus, Crozier (1964) studied a clerical agency and an industrial  
50 monopoly, and documented the frustrations, power games, and alienation that color work life in  
51 those bureaucratic workplaces. He documented the social basis and political dynamics that  
52 blocked the bureaucratic organization’s ability to “correct its behavior by learning from its  
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3 errors” (Crozier, 1964, p. 187). His research traces bureaucracy’s failings to contextual and  
4 interactional causes, rather than structural features.

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6 Among bureaucracy’s many purported dysfunctions, “alienation” figured prominently in  
7 earlier scholarship (e.g., Miller, 1967), and as the study of organizations migrated from sociology  
8 to management departments, attention shifted and broadened to include related variables like  
9 work satisfaction (Snizek & Bullard, 1983). Bureaucracy’s centralization of decision-making and  
10 standardization of work practices were often said to be intrinsically disempowering (e.g., Aiken  
11 & Hage, 1966; Hoy, Blazovsky, & Newland, 1983; Kohn, 1989). We should note, however, that  
12 as empirical research on this theme progressed, the causal link between bureaucracy and these  
13 outcomes became less clear, particularly when bureaucracy as the independent variable is  
14 understood in purely structural terms. Kohn (1976) found that higher levels of bureaucratization,  
15 measured by the number of layers of hierarchy, correlated with *lower* levels on the three of the  
16 four main dimensions of alienation—experienced powerlessness, self-estrangement, and  
17 normlessness (but higher levels of cultural estrangement). And beyond alienation, Kohn (1989)  
18 showed that higher degrees of such bureaucratization predict greater, not less, self-directedness  
19 and ideational flexibility. Shantz et al. (2015) found that alienation was unrelated to decision-  
20 making autonomy and driven instead mainly by task variety and task identity.

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22 Finally, several scholars have recently argued that “Weberian” bureaucracy is empirically  
23 less common than its “Kafkaesque” cousin, where power games, misbehavior, and rule-breaking  
24 are not deviations or anomalies but the norm (Hodson, Martin, Lopez, & Roscigno, 2013;  
25 McCabe, 2014; Nisar & Masood, 2020). Integrating previous studies on the dysfunctional  
26 features of bureaucracy—such as the classic work of Jackall (1988)—Hodson and colleagues  
27 (Hodson et al., 2013) argue that as bureaucracy became the hegemonic form of organization over  
28 the past century, formal rules became façades hiding financial wrongdoing, environmental  
29 destruction, and social domination.

## 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 **5.2. Bureaucracy as a flexible organizational paradigm**

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50 In contrast to the pessimistic portraits offered in the variant just discussed, some scholars  
51 argued that bureaucratic structures can be associated with other kinds of informal social patterns,  
52 and that such configurations could yield far more positive outcomes. Two main strands of  
53 scholarship contributed to this variant of the Paradigm perspective. We call them strands rather  
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3 than variants because they are differentiated more by research focus than by a distinctive  
4 conceptualization and analytical project.  
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6         The first of these strands is exemplified by the work of two of Merton's mentees—Alvin  
7 Gouldner and Peter Blau—who examined daily work and labor relations in bureaucratic  
8 organizations (see review by Haveman, 2010). Gouldner (1954) identified three patterns of  
9 bureaucracy—punishment-centered, mock, and representative—in the same organization. The  
10 first two represented relatively dysfunctional forms, while the last was, in his view, a more  
11 emancipatory one. He showed that bureaucratic rules are sometimes a disciplinary means of  
12 domination by management and the source of grievances by workers (punishment-centered); and  
13 they are sometimes announced but ignored (mock); however, they sometimes embody an  
14 effective, mutually agreed-upon solution between managers and workers to the tasks at hand  
15 (representative).  
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24         Similarly, Blau (1963) contrasted two government departments that were equally  
25 bureaucratic in their formal structuring, one of which demonstrated the expected dysfunctions,  
26 while the other was remarkably competent, dynamic, and adaptive. He identified five  
27 prerequisites for the latter kind: employment security, a professional orientation toward the  
28 performance of duties, established workgroups that command the allegiance of their members,  
29 the absence of basic conflict between workgroup and management, and organizational needs that  
30 are experienced as disturbing. Contrasting patterns of workplace informal relations yielded  
31 different performance outcomes across organizations whose formal structures were equally  
32 bureaucratic.  
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39         Several other scholars followed this path, arguing that the formal structure of bureaucracy  
40 could be associated with specific patterns of informal relations to generate more positive  
41 outcomes. For example, Adler (Adler, 1999; Adler & Borys, 1996) contrasted two types of  
42 bureaucracy based on whether formal features of bureaucracy were associated with enabling or  
43 coercive social relations. Here the formal structure of bureaucracy was presented as an  
44 organizing technology—a technology that, like material technologies, can be designed and  
45 implemented either to reduce managers' reliance on employees' skills and initiative or to  
46 leverage them. Cardinal et al. (2017) reviewed research making this kind of distinction among  
47 systems of control and confirmed its explanatory value. Echoing a comparable concern for  
48 empowerment and participatory goals, Ashcraft (2001) empirically demonstrated how a feminist  
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3 bureaucracy was able to leverage the formal apparatus of bureaucracy towards more collectivist  
4 ideals typical of feminist organizations. Similarly, Gittell and Douglas (2012) conceptualized  
5 what they called a “relational bureaucracy” as a “hybrid” form in which the formal structure of  
6 bureaucracy is infused with positive relational norms.  
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10           The second strand in this variant shows that bureaucracy does not always and everywhere  
11 lead to dysfunction because people, in their everyday work, deploy bureaucratic structures in  
12 ways that prevent that outcome. For example, in an early study, Landsberger (1961) discovered  
13 that cross-functional interactions are surprisingly frequent in a bureaucratic organization and  
14 often reflect a collective effort to improve organizational performance rather than power games.  
15 More recently, Canales (2013) showed that some loan officers did not allow formal rules to  
16 entirely displace discretion in their decision-making, and were able to find a productive balance  
17 between standardization and flexibility. Similarly, several studies suggest that given an  
18 appropriate type of informal organization, the formal structure of bureaucracy could support, or  
19 at least not impede, flexibility or innovation in contexts such as lean manufacturing (Adler, 1993;  
20 Adler et al., 1999), fire-fighting (Bigley & Roberts, 2001), trauma teams (Klein, Ziegert, Knight,  
21 & Xiao, 2006), and healthcare delivery (Briscoe, 2007). And in a recent chapter of the long-  
22 lasting debate of professional autonomy and bureaucracy, Bechky and Chung (2018) suggest a  
23 model of pragmatic accommodation—instead of struggle over control—in which occupational  
24 groups make bureaucracy work for them.  
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## 37 **6. BUREAUCRACY AS ONE TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AMONG** 38 39 **OTHERS** 40

41           The third perspective extends the discussion of varieties of bureaucracy by taking into  
42 consideration a wider range of types of organization. This work is premised on two ideas: first,  
43 bureaucracy is just one type of organization among others, and second, the relative performance  
44 of each type depends on contingent factors. The key insight driving this perspective is that  
45 factors that are beyond the control of a given manager—“contingencies” such as the nature of the  
46 competitive environment, the available technology or workforce, and the strategic choices and  
47 task assignments decided at a higher hierarchical level—influence the relative performance  
48 potentials of the various possible types of organization. Debates over Weber and alternative  
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3 interpretations become less relevant here, as the focus shifts to identifying alternatives to  
4 bureaucracy and conditions in which they might prove superior.

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6 This perspective found great resonance as the center of gravity of organizational research  
7 shifted from sociology departments to business schools (Hinings, 1988). Here, the attention of  
8 scholars tended naturally towards finer-grained differentiations across alternative ways of  
9 organizing and their relative advantages in different settings. We found three strands of research  
10 in this contingency-theoretic perspective.  
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15 The first strand emerged in field research by Burns and Stalker (1961), and was then  
16 further theorized by scholars such as Woodward (1970), Thompson (1967), Lawrence and  
17 Lorsch (1967a), and Galbraith (1977), and extended by scholars such as Miles and Snow (1978)  
18 and Burton & Obel (2006). Burns and Stalker's book, *The Management of Innovation*, remains  
19 the foundational reference for this body of work. This study famously contrasted "mechanistic"  
20 and "organic" types of organization, with the former equated to bureaucracy. Here we see two  
21 competing types of organization, each characterized by distinctive formal and informal features  
22 (see Burns and Stalker, 1961, p. 108).  
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29 In Burns and Stalker's account, the formal structure of mechanistic/bureaucratic  
30 organizations is characterized by narrow specialization, strictly defined responsibilities assigned  
31 to individuals, and extensive hierarchical, top-down control. Their informal organization is such  
32 that strategic knowledge is restricted to top executives and horizontal interactions are limited.  
33 Their norms privilege obedience, and attention is focused on intra-organizational rather than  
34 external issues. Conversely, organic organizations are characterized by a more spontaneous  
35 structuring of activities, less-narrowly defined task boundaries, diffuse responsibilities, and  
36 norms that encourage both cosmopolitan externally-facing relations and collegial intra-  
37 organizational relations.  
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45 Critically, Burns and Stalker argued that economic performance would call for a more  
46 mechanistic or a more organic type of organization depending on the external circumstances,  
47 most notably on the demand for innovation and change. Woodward (1970) offered some survey-  
48 based support for this basic argument, showing that mechanistic bureaucracy was more common  
49 in the mass-production industry, and that both small-scale unit-production and continuous-  
50 production systems typically adopted a more organic form. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b)  
51 argued similarly, that more predictable contexts called for a more bureaucratic type of  
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3 organization, and that such organizations should, as a result, recruit employees who will be  
4 satisfied working in such regimented jobs. In parallel, a sizeable body of research confirmed the  
5 importance of contingencies in explaining these types in terms of differential effects on  
6 efficiency, innovation, and job satisfaction (see Kessler, Nixon, & Nord, 2017 for a review).<sup>8</sup>  
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10         Whereas this first strand retains something of Weber’s balanced focus on the structural  
11 and informal aspects of bureaucracy, the second strand focuses on the former aspect. Understood  
12 in this, more parsimonious manner—as the length of vertical chains of hierarchical control, the  
13 extent of specialization of subunits and individuals, the degree of standardization and  
14 formalization of working procedures, etc.—bureaucracy is more easily measured and compared  
15 (see Donaldson & Luo, 2014; Walton, 2005). Udy (1958) was an early proponent of this shift: he  
16 examined a sample of 150 production organizations across the world to ascertain the extent to  
17 which elements of Weber’s ideal-type were correlated—specifically, hierarchical authority  
18 structure, an administrative staff, and differential rewards according to office. Similarly, Hall  
19 (1962) measured different levels of bureaucracy by comparing structural variation across  
20 departments and hierarchical layers, paying less attention to the “informal, or unofficial work  
21 arrangements which are at variance with the officially prescribed structure” (p. 299).  
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31         The U.K. Aston group took this approach further in scope and rigor, statistically  
32 validating their organization structure constructs via a survey of organizations in the English  
33 Midlands (see for a review, Donaldson & Luo, 2014). These scholars differentiated “full”  
34 bureaucracy from cases where bureaucratic structuring characterized only the work process (in  
35 “workflow bureaucracies”) or only the employment relations (in “personnel bureaucracies”), and  
36 mapped their prevalence and evolution across sectors (Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; Pugh,  
37 Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). Hage and Aiken (1967) offered another influential model of  
38 this kind of work yet more focused on task-level and workforce characteristics (Donaldson,  
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48 <sup>8</sup> Critiques of contingency theory subsequently argued that the technical-economic efficiency argument  
49 for the mechanistic/bureaucratic type missed (and thus served as an apologia for) the political nature of  
50 the organization design choices made by senior executives (Child, 1972). One strand of criticism  
51 contributed to the Type perspective, framing bureaucracy as just one form of control over labor, and  
52 contrasting bureaucratic with “simple,” “technical,” and “normative” control regimes (Edwards, 1979;  
53 Kunda, 2009). Another strand argued that contingency theory overlooked the institutional conformance  
54 pressures that often drove the diffusion of this form of organization regardless of its efficiency (DiMaggio  
55 & Powell, 1983).  
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3 2001: 93). Mintzberg theorized a “professional” variety of bureaucracy in contrast to the  
4 “machine” variety. In the former, control over the work of specialized professionals relied on the  
5 standardization of their skills and not of their work processes (Mintzberg, 1979). These studies  
6 inspired a host of others exploring the connection between structural dimensions, their effects on  
7 organizational outcomes in different contexts, and related phenomena such as entrepreneurship ,  
8 creativity (Hirst, Van Knippenberg, Chen, & Sacramento, 2011), learning (Bresman & Zellmer-  
9 Bruhn, 2013; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010), and innovation (Damanpour, 1991, 1992).

15 This structure-oriented strand yielded and continues to yield interesting results—some of  
16 which contradict the reigning anti-bureaucracy animus. Damanpour’s (1991) meta-analysis, for  
17 example, shows that innovation initiation (as distinct from implementation) is more likely where  
18 roles and structures are more specialized; that formalization and centralization have no  
19 statistically significant effects on initiation; and that none of these structural variables is  
20 statistically significant in predicting the likelihood of radical versus incremental innovation.  
21 Bunderson and Boumgarden (2010) show that even in smaller, self-managed teams, bureaucratic  
22 structuring—as defined by the Aston’s group in terms of the structuring of activities (i.e., high  
23 levels of specialization, formalization, and hierarchy)—can help create an environment that  
24 supports learning and continuous improvement. Looming over the work of this strand is the  
25 nagging suspicion that their lack of attention to the informal aspects of organization leads to  
26 under-specification and to spurious correlations (McEvily, Soda, & Tortoriello, 2014). Causal  
27 identification has also been a challenge here.

37 A third strand explores in more depth the various alternatives to bureaucracy. Some of  
38 these new types, on closer examination, appear to be variants of bureaucracy (more on this  
39 below). Of the types that depart more substantially from bureaucracy, many echo the  
40 organic/mechanistic contrast, such as post-bureaucracy (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994a),  
41 heterarchy (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006; Stark, 2011), and “boss-less,” self-managed  
42 organizations (Billinger & Workiewicz, 2019; Choudhury, Crowston, Dahlander, Minervini, &  
43 Raghuram, 2020; Lee & Edmondson, 2017; Martela, 2019; Puranam & Håkonsson, 2015).

49 Contingency theory provides a (tacit or explicit) underpinning for all these strands. The  
50 emergence of these new forms—and the purported obsolescence of bureaucracy—is seen as a  
51 response to the growing external pressure for fluidity, dynamism, and innovativeness (e.g.,  
52 Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). This idea is usually linked to observable changes in the structure of  
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3 the economy (growing relevance of service or knowledge-intensive sectors), in technology  
4 (growth of internet and social media), in the workforce (new generation of millennials)—and to  
5 the often-asserted but largely unproven assumption that the rate of change today is much greater  
6 than that which prevailed 50 and 100 years ago (Eccles & Nohria, 1992).  
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## 10 11 **7. THE CO-EXISTENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY OF** 12 13 **PERSPECTIVES** 14

15 A more quantitative assessment confirms that the three perspectives we have identified  
16 emerged more or less successively but have continued in parallel. The regional variation is also  
17 noteworthy (see Figures 3 and 4). In U.S. publications, while the Principle and Paradigm  
18 perspectives emerged in parallel, the more “sociological” Principle perspective never enjoyed  
19 much popularity and was soon overshadowed by the Paradigm perspective. Subsequently, we  
20 observe a pivot from the Paradigm perspective to the Type perspective, with interest in  
21 bureaucracy’s performance vis-à-vis alternative types peaking in the 90s. In Europe, all the  
22 perspectives emerged in parallel. However, the Principle perspective enjoyed more recognition  
23 and became increasingly predominant, potentially due to the stronger link between organization  
24 studies and social theory in European research traditions. We also see in Europe a pivot from  
25 Paradigm to Type perspectives, but this takes place later, in the 1990s to the 2000s.  
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35 *<put Figure 3 about here>*

36 *<put Figure 4 about here>*  
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39 Our review leads us to the conclusion that much of the confusion surrounding  
40 bureaucracy stems from differences in conceptualizing it. Each perspective helps illuminate  
41 different facets of this complex object: they are complementary, reflecting different scientific  
42 strategies associated with distinctive analytical foci (see Table 1 above). On the one hand, an  
43 expansive conceptualization of bureaucracy portrays its characteristics, starting with those  
44 identified by Weber, as evolving and historically situated manifestations of an underlying  
45 Principle or Paradigm. Here the strategy is holistic and the goal is usually to examine  
46 bureaucracy’s underpinnings and functioning. Conversely, the strategy of authors adopting the  
47 Type perspective prioritizes conceptual parsimony and empirical testability. They focus on one  
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3 or more of the characteristic features of the Weberian ideal-type and examine bureaucracy's  
4 antecedents and outcomes.

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6 These different strategies embody a common trade-off in organizational research between  
7 generality, accuracy, and simplicity (Weick, 1999). Testable constructs allow for more accurate  
8 analysis and greater simplicity and more comparable findings with fewer priors. On the other  
9 hand, a more holistic approach affords more generality and allows us to grasp the ways  
10 bureaucracy changes its appearance across contexts and the ways in which people repurpose it.  
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## 16 **8. THREE PATHWAYS FOR RESEARCH**

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18 As noted in the Introduction, there has been an overall decline in our field's attention to  
19 bureaucracy relative to other themes (see Figure 2 above). While some loss of "market share" is  
20 inevitable as a field evolves, it seems likely that a decline of this magnitude also reflects the  
21 popularity of the view that bureaucracy is a relic of an earlier industrial era that is not worth  
22 much of our research attention.  
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27 However, bureaucracy has not disappeared in the real world. Rather, what seems to have  
28 diminished is our ability to recognize the ways it continues, albeit in new guises, to scaffold  
29 work and organizations. In this section, we point to three factors curtailing our ability to grasp  
30 bureaucracy in its complexity, and we then suggest three corresponding pathways that could re-  
31 energize its study. The pathways each hinge on putting the three perspectives in deeper dialogue  
32 with each other and with the broader universe of organizational scholarship.  
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37 To preview the paragraphs below, we note, first, that scholarship, especially in U.S.  
38 publications, has increasingly focused on the bureaucracy's features while paying less attention  
39 to its social context (for some exceptions, see on employment relations Jacoby, 1985; see on  
40 technology and social context Kallinikos, 2004; see on historical context Meyer, 1995). This has  
41 been a concern of some authors in the Principle perspective, and our first pathway aims to bring  
42 attention to how different contexts may generate different formal and informal patterns  
43 underpinning distinctive forms of bureaucracy.  
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49 Second, scholarship often privileges bureaucracy's formal structure and too rarely  
50 explores its interplay with the informal side—values, norms, behaviors, meanings, practices, etc.  
51 (for some exceptions, see, on practices, Ashcraft, 2001; see, on meaning, Hilbert, 1987; see, on  
52 behavior, Morand, 1995; Selznick, 1943). An appreciation for the informal side of bureaucracy is  
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3 a hallmark of scholars in the Paradigm perspective. Building on that, our second pathway shows  
4 how broadening our view beyond formal structure may advance our understanding of  
5 bureaucracy.  
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8 Third, as our field has grown in numbers and density, we have seen a corollary increase  
9 in scholarly specialization thus leading to an atomized view of bureaucracy. Research today is  
10 more likely to focus on just one element of bureaucracy's formal structure, such as hierarchy or  
11 rules. Our third pathway proposes to leverage the Type perspective's attention to  
12 interdependencies and configurations for more insight into the interacting effects of  
13 bureaucracy's multiple elements and dimensions—how they complement or substitute for each  
14 other. Table 2 identifies some research directions in each of these three pathways: we discuss  
15 them below.  
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23 *<put Table 2 about here>*  
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## 25 **8.1. Bureaucracy in its wider context**

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27 Weber explored bureaucracy's different incarnations over time as well as the connections  
28 between its modern version and related developments in the wider society (Clegg, 1994;  
29 Kallinikos, 2004; Presthus, 1959). While early organization research within the Principle  
30 perspective embraced this problematic and explored bureaucracy comparatively and historically  
31 (Berger, 1957; Katz & Eisenstadt, 1960; Phelan, 1960; Presthus, 1961; Soemardjan, 1957),  
32 interest in such issues has waned in more recent decades, especially in the U.S. (Boyacigiller &  
33 Adler, 1991). To be sure, open system traditions have focused on the context of organizations  
34 (Scott, 2014). Neo-institutionalism, in particular, has yielded rich insights into how bureaucracy  
35 as a cultural artifact diffuses across organizations as they come under various social pressures  
36 (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Yet, this work has mostly studied bureaucracy as a homogenous  
37 social-cultural template.  
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46 Renewing attention to differences in social and cultural context would be fruitful because  
47 these differences are an important source of variation in ways of organizing. We suggest three  
48 research directions in this first pathway, addressing bureaucracy's variation across and  
49 embeddedness in (1) socio-cultural contexts and (2) historical periods, and (3) the role of  
50 bureaucracy in social and economic development.  
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3 First, consider what we can learn by studying variations in bureaucracy across socio-  
4 cultural contexts. Meyer (1995), for example, argues that in the U.S., bureaucracy was shaped by  
5 its early implementation in large corporations that operated in volatile markets in a cultural  
6 context that prioritized equality. This encouraged a form of bureaucracy that was flatter, less  
7 hierarchical, and more decentralized than in Europe. By contrast, in Europe, bureaucracy was  
8 shaped by its early implementation in government, and it diffused to industry in a more  
9 centralized, hierarchical, obedience- and loyalty-based form. Studies of French public  
10 organizations revealed the social-cultural roots of the bureaucratic dysfunctions often observed  
11 in that context: rigid operations traced back to state (hyper-) centralization, and social hierarchies  
12 in the workforce underpinned power conflicts (Crozier, 1964; d'Iribarne, 1994). Adler and  
13 colleagues (Adler & Borys, 1996; Adler et al., 1999) argued that Japanese automobile companies  
14 relied on a formal structure that was just as bureaucratic as their U.S. competitors, but the  
15 Japanese cultural context provided that structure with higher efficiency, greater flexibility, and  
16 stronger worker engagement. Numerous researchers have studied how that combination was  
17 adapted to a new cultural and institutional context when Toyota set up operations in the U.S.,  
18 examining how the more individualistic values of U.S. workers and their collective bargaining  
19 rights led Toyota to adapt their group-centered model of work organization (Liker, Fruin, &  
20 Adler, 1999). Social context—e.g., cultural norms, employment regimes, etc.—matters, and  
21 more research attentive to these dimensions is needed.  
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36 Second, a historical view expands further the variety of contexts that shape bureaucracy.  
37 Consider the development of the legal-rational bureaucratic organization over the past century in  
38 those parts of the world in which it was already more prevalent. Weber would probably be  
39 astonished at how often bureaucratic organizations today rely on teams and matrix reporting  
40 structures to support cross-functional integration; at how often officials at higher levels of  
41 authority consult middle-level and front-line personnel; and at how often value-rationality and  
42 “shared purpose” are infused into daily operations (Adler & Heckscher, 2018; Ashcraft, 2001;  
43 Gittell & Douglass, 2012; Selznick, 1957). We should not assume that the ideal-typical legal-  
44 rational bureaucracy defined by Weber is immutable. Future research might aim to document and  
45 theorize the historical trajectories of the various innovations by which the bureaucratic form has  
46 been modified and potentially rendered even more effective (building on work such as Barley &  
47 Kunda, 1992; Baron et al., 1988; Bodrožić & Adler, 2018; Jacoby, 1985).  
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3 We should also take a longer view. Bureaucracy can be found in many chapters of human  
4 history—in ancient Sumer (Smith, 2016), China’s Song dynasty (Liu, 1959), Ottoman empire  
5 (Weiker, 1968), revolutionary Indonesia (Soemardjan, 1957), France’s fourth republic (Ehrmann,  
6 1961), communist Soviet Union (Parks, 2016)—and it varied qualitatively across these contexts.  
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8 For example, in ancient China, the state bureaucracy was suffused by patrimonial domination,  
9 where the legitimacy of orders was grounded in the traditionalistic precepts and the traditional  
10 prerogatives of rulers.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, Ang (2017) argues that China today has developed a  
11 “bureau-franchising” form of bureaucracy, which introduces market-style incentives and controls  
12 in a decentralized legal-rational government bureaucracy. Constat (1958) argues that  
13 bureaucratic administrations have been historically deployed by authoritarian and charismatic  
14 leaders, even if in those contexts, administrative rationality is limited.

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16 Taking the longer view also allows us to see more clearly the specific form taken by  
17 bureaucracy under capitalist conditions. Here, bureaucracy is underpinned by a capitalist type of  
18 domination, where legitimate authority flows from the legally sanctioned ownership of society’s  
19 productive resources, such that the great majority of people need to work for those owners as  
20 employees. As a result, when people today express frustration with the alienation and domination  
21 they experience at work, we need to ascertain whether the problem lies in the bureaucratic form  
22 of management or its capitalist content. As Braverman cautioned, we should avoid the “evasive  
23 and unfortunate use of Weberian terminology” that “attributes to bureaucracy societal ills that  
24 are better understood as the specific product of capitalism” (Braverman, 1998: 83). Adler (2012)  
25 thus argued, along Marxist lines, that although bureaucracy could appear in more enabling or  
26 more coercive forms, workers in capitalist firms are generally in a structurally dominated  
27 position relative to the employer, and as a result, bureaucracy is always simultaneously enabling

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<sup>9</sup> This is based on Weber’s account of traditional Chinese state bureaucracy. Although built on a weak scholarly foundation (Creel, 1964; Junnan, 2015), his characterization of it as “patrimonial bureaucracy”—a mix of traditionalistic, non-rational and rational-legal types of domination—still appears fruitful. While the system was bureaucratic in its reliance on a relatively open system of national entrance examinations and career paths, even his critics agree that it lacked the ideal-type’s reliance on specialized areas of expertise: the examinations were mainly tests of candidates’ mastery of literature and Confucian thought, and bureaucratic officials were generalists rather than specialists, essentially governors of a region. Moreover, these bureaucrats, while ruling with a degree of impartiality in relation with their subjects, relied extensively on personal relations rather than formal processes in their interactions with others within the bureaucracy.

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3 and coercive—it is “sociologically ambivalent” (Merton & Barber, 1963). That is because  
4 bureaucracy, as found in capitalist enterprises, is caught between the two poles of a “real  
5 contradiction”: bureaucracy is both a technology for coordinating interdependent production  
6 activity and a technology of domination and exploitation.<sup>10</sup> This suggests that there are insights  
7 to be mined by exploring the tensions between the legitimacy of instrumental-rationality and the  
8 often arbitrary character of capitalist command (see, e.g., Adler, 2012). Doing so may reveal the  
9 mechanisms underwriting the endurance of darker forms of bureaucracy—exploitative,  
10 alienating, Kafkaesque, or simply underperforming.

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17 Third, research can be extended fruitfully to address the role of bureaucracy as a driver or  
18 enabler of economic and social progress. Bureaucracy appears to be an important factor in  
19 capitalist economic development. Specifically, the development of a legal-rational  
20 bureaucracy—replacing a traditionalistic patronage system with one based on office-holding  
21 officials and meritocratic promotion criteria—is an important facilitator of growth in developing  
22 economies (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Evans & Rauch, 1999). Some scholars  
23 argue that the key to development lies less in the structural elements of bureaucratic organization  
24 and more in the underlying values guiding the work of office-holders; others argue that  
25 development depends on the nature of the interaction between “Weberian” and “indigenous”  
26 modes of organizing (Lederer & Höhne, 2019; McDonnell, 2017). Further research is needed to  
27 examine which and how distinctive elements and forms of bureaucracy underwrite social and  
28 economic development.

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38 Looking beyond economic development, the emergence of bureaucracy relied on and  
39 reinforced the diffusion of egalitarian and meritocratic ideals. Given bureaucracy’s common  
40 shortcomings, it is easy to forget this positive value. For example, a considerable body of  
41 research documents the role of bureaucracy as a force for (gender) equality through its  
42 commitment to universalistic criteria and personnel procedures (Dobbin, Schrage, & Kaley,

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<sup>10</sup> On this foundation, the succession of management models analyzed by Barley and Kunda (1992) and Bodrožić and Adler (2018)—i.e., line-and-staff, Industrial Betterment, Scientific Management, Human Relations, Strategy-and-Structure, Quality Management, Business Process—can be read as successive partial syntheses of that contradiction. As bureaucracy evolves under the pressure of technological revolutions, each revolution gives rise, first, to a relatively more coercive model and then to a relatively more enabling one, to be overtaken eventually by a new revolution and a new cycle of more coercive and more enabling models.

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3 2015; Edelman, 1990; Jackson, 1998). Yet, there remains a lot more to unpack in the relation  
4 between bureaucracy, patriarchy, and social justice more broadly. For example: how do gendered  
5 assumptions about the reliable bureaucrat lead bureaucracies to undermine rather than advance  
6 gender equity (Acker, 1990; Billing, 1994; Martin, 2013)? Aiming to advance equality and  
7 equity, what is the efficacy of formal bureaucratic mechanisms relative to the efficacy of  
8 deliberate efforts to change the organization's informal structure (Dobbin et al., 2015)? And how  
9 can bureaucracies ensure that bureaucratic norms of neutrality and equality do not stand in the  
10 way of addressing inequities (Radoynovska, 2018)?

## 11 **8.2. Bureaucracy in action**

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20 Bureaucracy is often discussed using reified language. This is visible in the “iron cage”  
21 metaphor which emerged in Parson's translation of *Economy and Society* (Baehr, 2001) and  
22 subsequent mechanical and object-like imageries—e.g., “mechanistic” management system  
23 (Burns & Stalker, 1961), “machine bureaucracy” (Mintzberg 1979), or “machine” organizations  
24 (Morgan, 1986). These metaphors encourage a view of bureaucracy as a rigid and lifeless  
25 structure outside of—or above—social relations (see also Klagge, 1997 on the role of metaphors  
26 in our understanding of bureaucracy). This way of thinking of bureaucracy frames it as  
27 something with an existence independent from human activity.

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34 The second pathway takes aim at this reification, echoing the turn towards practice  
35 approaches in social sciences and the growing interest in the study of work as the foundation for  
36 our understanding of organizations and organizing (Barley & Kunda, 2001; Bechky, 2011;  
37 Cetina, Schatzki, & Von Savigny, 2005; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Nicolini, 2013). In doing  
38 so, we also get closer to the processual aspect of Weber's analysis that has recently been brought  
39 into prominence by a new translation of *Economy and Society* (Tribe, 2019). Organizational  
40 scholars, especially ones working in the Paradigm perspective, are closest to this pathway, as  
41 they have examined the fabric of social relations in bureaucratic organizations. Viewed through  
42 these lenses, the control, predictability, and efficiency of bureaucracy are revealed to be effortful  
43 and precarious accomplishments. This, in turn, helps us see more clearly how different  
44 bureaucracies, even with similar formal structures, produce different outcomes.

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53 We see at least five fruitful research foci under this broad heading: (1) the creative effort  
54 involved in producing, maintaining, or undoing bureaucracy, (2) the role of artifacts, tools, and



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3 (digital) technology in this process, (3) the interplay of bureaucracy's material and symbolic  
4 elements, (4) bureaucracy's sensorial dimension, and (5) emotional work in bureaucracy.

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6 First, while it has often been assumed that "once fully established ... bureaucracy is  
7 among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy" (Weber, 1958: 987), a practice  
8 sensibility brings into focus the creative effort involved in enacting bureaucracy and realizing its  
9 promises. For example, the reality of the authority hierarchy cannot be simply read from  
10 organizational charts or office layouts: it is continually reproduced and subverted in the ways  
11 people relate to each other (Zhang & Spicer, 2014). Bureaucratic values like impartiality do not  
12 emerge automatically from procedures or rules, but depend on socialization and the cultivation of  
13 a particular climate, or milieu (Du Gay, 2008), as well as effortful and creative ways of bringing  
14 personal engagement and empathy to the challenge of applying rules impartially (see, e.g.,  
15 Margolis & Molinsky, 2008). More research is needed to reveal the ingenious work involved in  
16 ensuring the effectiveness of bureaucracy.  
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26 This focus also draws our attention to bureaucracy's tacit dimension (Hadjimichael &  
27 Tsoukas, 2019). Bureaucracy is associated with formalized work procedures; yet the deployment  
28 of those procedures typically relies on tacit judgment, discretion, and rule-bending (Hampson &  
29 Junor, 2005; Lipsky, 2010). Attending to the shared tacit understandings of employees as they  
30 work and handle unexpected cases and breakdowns can reveal the priorities and values guiding  
31 them (Radoynovska, 2018; Zacka, 2017).  
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37 Second, thinking about bureaucracy as an activity brings into focus the tools through  
38 which it is accomplished (Carlile, Nicolini, Langley, & Tsoukas, 2013; Orlikowski & Scott,  
39 2008). Weber stressed the importance of technologies like the telegraph and telephone for  
40 bureaucracy (Weber, 2019, 352). How then does the introduction of ever more sophisticated  
41 digital technologies change or challenge bureaucracy? If the hallmark of bureaucracy is the  
42 dominance and legitimacy of instrumentally-rational, written procedures, what tensions arise  
43 with the introduction of algorithms that underpin decision-making and govern workers based on  
44 rules and criteria that are "not readily understood or available for interpretation and scrutiny"  
45 (Faraj et al., 2018: 68) (see also Delfanti, 2021; Kellogg et al., 2020)? These technologies also  
46 raise questions about impartiality that will need to be resolved.  
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54 Moreover, new information and communication technology such as social media  
55 simultaneously facilitates interactions across ranks and functional departments and makes those  
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3 interactions easier to monitor (Leonardi & Vaast, 2017). New technologies supporting remote  
4 work may challenge the separation between private and professional spheres that underpin  
5 Weber's ideal-typical bureaucracy (Hafermalz, 2021). We have much more research ahead of us  
6 to understand whether and how these developments undercut or reinforce bureaucracy's features.  
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8 Finally, the growth of online platforms has encouraged efforts to open up bureaucracies in  
9 various settings, from research labs (Lifshitz-Assaf, 2018) to city administration offices  
10 (Kornberger et al., 2017a). Future research is needed on how such bureaucratic organizations  
11 digest such changes, blending transparency with secrecy, expertise with crowd wisdom, and  
12 official spheres of responsibility with unexpected collaborators.  
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19 Third, approaching bureaucracy as a situated activity brings to the fore meaning and the  
20 interplay of the organization's material and symbolic elements. While research has concentrated  
21 on the effects of formal aspects of bureaucracy on various outcomes, meaning mediates those  
22 effects (Leibel, Hallett, & Bechky, 2018: 166–167). For example, Gouldner (1954) hinted at the  
23 role of stories in mythologizing a non-bureaucratic past and stigmatizing the bureaucratization  
24 process, but his insight has been rarely taken up in subsequent literature. Organizational  
25 researchers explored the effect of divergent interpretations of bureaucratic rules (Martin, Lopez,  
26 Roscigno, & Hodson, 2013), controls (Long, Bendersky, & Morrill, 2011 p. 1045), or goals  
27 (Thomas, Sugiyama, Rochford, Stephens, & Kanov, 2018 p. 750). Public administration scholars  
28 advanced the notion of “green tape” to account for bureaucratic rules whose purposes are  
29 understood as meaningful (DeHart-Davis, 2009). Future studies could extend these insights by  
30 examining how meaning and artifacts interact to produce bureaucracies that are experienced as  
31 alienating or empowering; and when and how “bureaucracy” appears as a stigmatized—and  
32 stigmatizing—category (Hudson, 2008; Llewellyn, 2004).  
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43 Fourth, we have much to learn about the sensorial dimensions of bureaucracy.<sup>11</sup> Most of  
44 us have filled out forms or stood in front of a service window, but the embodied and aesthetics  
45 aspects of these bureaucratic moments have been underexplored in organizational research  
46 (Baldessarelli, Stigliani, & Elsbach, 2021; Frederickson, 2000). Buildings' architecture and  
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53 <sup>11</sup> Bureaucraties, a photographic project of civil servants across eight countries by Jan Bannings  
54 documents in a visual way the ubiquity of our experience with bureaucracy and some of its aesthetic  
55 aspects. <https://www.janbanning.com/books/bureaucraties/>  
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3 office layout (Guillén, 2006; Rosen, Orlikowski, & Schmahmann, 1990) are central to our  
4 relation to bureaucracy—and intrinsic to the very etymology of the term. We may thus wonder if  
5 some of the characteristics usually attributed to bureaucracy (e.g., dullness and rigidity) reflect  
6 less the reality of the organizational form and more our experience of “boring” building designs  
7 or administrative paperwork. Combining the same organizational form with offices designed  
8 with more collaboration in mind may yield a very different experience. These and related topics  
9 are critical for examining the significance of bodies, space, and aesthetics in shaping our attitude  
10 towards different forms of bureaucracy.  
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17 Fifth, bureaucratic work is thought to depend on the suppression of emotion, or, more  
18 accurately, an impartial and “cool” affect—what Weber referred to as “sine ira et studio”  
19 (without anger and passion). Such “emotionless” states need closer study and theorization  
20 (Eggebo, 2013). While we know a lot about the emotional labor required of flight attendants and  
21 other occupations where a display of emotion is required (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Wharton,  
22 2009), we know too little how individuals learn to embody an impersonal (bureaucratic)  
23 compartment at work. Some studies have challenged the emotionless hypothesis, documenting  
24 emotional effects of bureaucratic organizing such as frustrations and anxiety (Gabriel, 1998),  
25 bounded forms of emotional expression in corporate bureaucracies (Martin, Knopoff, &  
26 Beckman, 1998), and the role of care and attachment in the work of bureaucrats (Graham, 2002).  
27 However, it is still unclear whether and how commitment and impartial emotional states mix.  
28 Understanding this process may help us better comprehend the conduct of individuals in  
29 bureaucratic organizations, including their non-bureaucratic actions in moments of change and  
30 crisis (e.g., Kornberger, Leixnering, & Meyer, 2019).  
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### 42 **8.3. Bureaucracy’s interdependencies and configurations**

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44 Research in the Types perspective reminds us that bureaucracy is a complex  
45 organizational form combining a number of organizational elements. Consider the range of  
46 formal controls reviewed by Cardinal et al. (2017), and consider too that any of these types of  
47 controls can be targeted at any of a broad set of possible phenomena. These targets can be  
48 classified broadly into input, behavior, and output; but it is clear from Cardinal et al.’s review  
49 that the effectiveness of controls in any organization hinges greatly on the mix of targets not only  
50 at that broad level but also at a much finer level of granularity, with the result that bureaucracy’s  
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3 effectiveness depends on the precise mix of these various forms of control. Gibson and  
4 colleagues (Gibson, Dunlop, & Cordery, 2019), for example, shows that formalization can help  
5 or hurt team performance depending on precisely what is being formalized: it helps when it  
6 clarifies roles and provides clear team boundaries, and it hurts when it limits the flow of  
7 knowledge and information within the team.  
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12 Further, while the specialization of our research agendas encourages us to study  
13 individual features, it is clear that those features are interdependent and that bureaucracy  
14 represents a distinct configuration of them. Understanding these interdependencies is critical for  
15 management practice as well as theory. In practice, managers must frequently contend with the  
16 fact that the changes they may make in one dimension of the organization are likely to have  
17 ripple effects on the effectiveness of choices made in other dimensions (Baron & Kreps, 1999;  
18 MacDuffie, 1995; Prætorius, Hasle, & Nielsen, 2018).  
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24 To deepen our understanding of bureaucracy, we therefore suggest renewed efforts to  
25 understand (1) how bureaucracy's formal elements complement and substitute each other and (2)  
26 how formal elements interplay with informal relations to produce key outcomes.  
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29 First, attending to interdependencies encourages attention to the functional equivalence  
30 among bureaucracy's formal elements. Consider centralization and formalization: the Aston  
31 group found that when processes are more formalized, there is less need for centralized decision-  
32 making: command and standards are often substitutes (Mintzberg, 1979; Pugh et al., 1968). In  
33 Simon's (1947) language, when the decision premises are more standardized, decision-making  
34 can be safely decentralized. If we study centralization without considering this interaction, our  
35 model is underspecified. If we notice in our data that hierarchies are flatter but overlook the fact  
36 that work processes are more formalized, we are likely to mistake what we see for the demise of  
37 bureaucracy.  
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44 Second, a key lesson of the Paradigm perspective is that the effect of bureaucratic  
45 elements is dependent on their interaction with features of the informal organization (McEvily et  
46 al., 2014). Focusing only on more formal elements of bureaucracy (e.g., written procedures) may  
47 afford a more parsimonious conceptualization and facilitate measurement, but it risks  
48 overlooking how they are enacted and interact with the informal organization, thus potentially  
49 generating unexpected outcomes. For example, studies of the role of formal policies in  
50 supporting equity and equality often reach pessimistic conclusions (e.g., Dobbin et al., 2015), but  
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3 it is important to consider the differences across organizations in the ways these policies are  
4 implemented and in the principles underpinning formal procedures. As Baron et al. put it, the  
5 “job evaluation, formalized performance appraisals, and the like can be implemented in ways  
6 that simply objectify and obscure ascription ... To be effective, bureaucracies must actually  
7 reflect a bureaucratic logic of universalism and meritocracy” (Baron, Hannan, Hsu, & Koçak,  
8 2007, p. 40). Similarly, the effects of centralization in decision-making depend to a considerable  
9 extent on whether the organizational culture affords lower-level personnel opportunities to  
10 participate in that decision-making (Mantere & Vaara, 2008).<sup>12</sup> Ditto for formalization: Adler  
11 and Borys (1996) show that participation in the formalization process by assembly-line workers  
12 can result in an enabling rather than coercive form of bureaucracy.

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15 More generally, while bureaucracy has been traditionally assumed to erode caring and  
16 collectivist relations, researchers have shown that bureaucratic structures can be infused with  
17 values and enacted in ways to make relations more pro-social and positive (Ashcraft, 2001;  
18 Gittell & Douglass, 2012). As Ashcraft (2006: 78) puts it, organizational forms “have tendencies,  
19 not destinies ... negotiated by real people under conflicted circumstances.” However, to the best  
20 of our knowledge, among the rich body of empirical survey-based work on culture (reviewed by  
21 Chatman & O’Reilly, 2016; Hartnell, Ou, & Kinicki, 2011), so far, none simultaneously  
22 measures the degree of bureaucratization of the formal organization or the interaction of culture  
23 and structure in shaping outcomes.

## 34 35 36 37 **9. BUREAUCRACY TODAY AND TOMORROW**

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39 Let us conclude by returning to the puzzle motivating this paper—the discrepancy  
40 between the declining scholarly interest in bureaucracy and the persistence of bureaucracy as the  
41 predominant form of organization. In this section, we draw on our multi-perspective  
42 understanding to better locate bureaucracy vis-à-vis other organizational forms. In this section,  
43 we first survey the current organizational landscape and then address tendencies that are likely to  
44 shape the future of bureaucracy as that landscape evolves.

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52 <sup>12</sup> Aston scholars measured centralization as the lowest level at which a decision could legitimately be  
53 made without referring it further up the authority hierarchy (Pugh & Hickson, 1976). By the same logic,  
54 participation can be understood as how far down an authority hierarchy (or across its subunits) decision-  
55 makers need to go in consulting others before they can legitimately arrive at a decision.

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3 Obviously, a great number of very small organizations operate without the formal  
4 structuring of bureaucracy. Yet, the organizing principle underpinning them varies: some  
5 embrace robust instrumental rationality—and to that extent, they might be considered proto-  
6 bureaucratic—while others are more traditionalistic, charismatic, or value-rational and collegial.  
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8 In all but the smallest organizations, formal structures are typically bureaucratic, due to both  
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10 internal pressures (the need to manage more complex interdependencies) and external demands  
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12 (for accountability, reliability, efficiency, order, and control) (Baron & Hannan, 2002; Baron et  
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14 al., 1999; Robertson & Swan, 2004; Turco, 2016). Marsden et al. (1994) report results from the  
15  
16 1991 National Organizations Study showing the very rapid increase in key indicators of  
17  
18 bureaucracy as organizations grow past 100 employees. Moreover, despite the fascination that  
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20 smaller, organic organizations exercise on many management scholars and leaders, large-scale  
21  
22 bureaucratic organizations have not disappeared. Most people work for big firms, and that  
23  
24 proportion is increasing, not falling—in the U.S., 45% of employees worked in enterprises of  
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26 over 500 people in 1988, and by 2017, that proportion had grown to 53% (U.S. Census Bureau,  
27  
28 2020) (for the longer trend and international trends, see Poschke, 2018).

29  
30 Yet, market elements have penetrated bureaucracies in various contexts. We noted above  
31  
32 the decentralized form of bureaucracy found in the contemporary Chinese government practice  
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34 of bureau-franchising (Ang, 2017). A homologous combination is common in many big  
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36 corporations, where business units compete with each other while simultaneously pursuing a  
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38 common strategy and broad range of common policies (e.g., Freeland, 1996; Makadok & Coff,  
39  
40 2009). Here, strategizing and policy-setting process is scaffolded by a bureaucratic structure.  
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42 Yet, market coordination sometimes goes further, such as in W. L. Gore (Halal, 1994; Hamel,  
43  
44 2011) or Haier (Denning, 2019), where the organization is decomposed into smaller, autonomous  
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46 business units that function as independent profit-centers pursuing independent strategies. In  
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48 these cases, bureaucracy has indeed been displaced, even if bureaucratic elements still play a  
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50 supporting role in the background.

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52 While neo-institutionalist theory has sensitized us to the symbolic legitimacy factors  
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54 contributing to the popularity and persistence of bureaucracy, we should not overlook the  
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56 technical efficiency factors also at work (Besharov & Khurana, 2015). Most notably, if, as  
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58 Weber argued, organizations that start as small collegial organizations governed by value-  
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60 rationality tend to evolve into bureaucracies as they grow, it is not only because bosses want to

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3 assert dominance, but also because this is a way to ensure productive effectiveness at that scale  
4 and complexity. The shortcomings of organic, “agile” software development methods in larger-  
5 scale, more complex projects testify to Weber’s wisdom in this regard (see Annosi, Foss, &  
6 Martini, 2020).  
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10           What then of the informal side of these larger organizations? Systematic data is hard to  
11 find, but a wealth of studies suggest important mutations are under way in the fabric of the  
12 informal organization. Purely instrumental rationality has always been a thin foundation on  
13 which to build employee commitment and engagement: where tasks are interdependent, no  
14 combination of formal procedures and financial incentives is as effective as voluntary  
15 cooperation. In the past, where competitive pressure was moderated, that voluntary cooperation  
16 has often been stimulated by traditionalistic paternalism; but over the past half-century and more,  
17 traditionalism has eroded (Heckscher, 2007). Where competitive performance pressure is more  
18 intense, instrumental rationality has often been supplemented if not displaced by charismatic  
19 leadership. Today, however, we hear much more about “shared purpose” and value-rationality.  
20 Adler and Heckscher (2018) argue that since Weber’s time, we have seen the emergence of a  
21 new, “collaborative” form of value-rational organization, one that deploys a family of  
22 management techniques to allow value-rationality to be scaled beyond the collegial form—even  
23 if, under capitalist conditions, consensus on that shared purpose is always precarious and the  
24 collaborative form therefore unstable.  
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### 37 **9.1.Looking forward**

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39           How, then, should we expect bureaucracy’s form and place in the organizational landscape  
40 to evolve under the impact of new technologies and management innovations? Looking  
41 backward, bureaucracy emerged in industry at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in a context where the  
42 reduction of transportation costs and the growth of mechanization created economic incentives to  
43 rationalize large-scale flows of goods. In this context, bureaucracy was the modal response. As  
44 Baldwin writes, this work regime “contained bottlenecks that required active managerial  
45 supervision, frequent intervention, and central coordination . . . The need to manage bottlenecks  
46 in turn provided strong inducements to design organizations subject to strong central control and  
47 direct authority” (Baldwin 2019). What are the prospects looking forward?  
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3 Technological change—most notably in the form of new information and computer  
4 technologies—is reducing the transaction costs associated with market coordination. Thus, some  
5 observers anticipate more reliance on market exchange, and a shift to smaller, less bureaucratic  
6 organizations, perhaps linked via platforms. On the other hand, technological change is also  
7 reducing the costs of hierarchical, bureaucratic coordination. The sparse evidence available  
8 suggests that, so far, these two effects have roughly counter-balanced each other (Dosi,  
9 Gambardella, Grazzi, & Orsenigo, 2008; Saunders, 2011), and it is not obvious that this balance  
10 will change in the future.

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17 New technologies have also enabled new types of organizations in which bureaucracy  
18 can take new forms or be combined with or displaced by other coordination mechanisms. The  
19 following paragraphs briefly sketch a few of them as seen through our multi-perspective lenses.

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22 Consider one currently-popular new organizational model: holacracy (Bernstein, Bunch,  
23 Canner, & Lee, 2016). Often presented as an unprecedented novelty in organization design, it is,  
24 we suggest, more plausibly understood as an updated, IT-enabled version of the workflow  
25 bureaucracy documented by the Aston group. Its extensive formalization and the idea of  
26 differentiating roles from the people who fill them will look familiar to anyone who has read  
27 Weber. Holacracy's commitment to the idea that work units should govern their internal work  
28 processes in a collegial manner was never excluded from Weber's ideal-type, and it was a key  
29 part of Blau's "dynamic" variety of bureaucracy (Blau, 1963). The novelty here is in how  
30 holacracies—in the pursuit of adaptability over reliability—forego strategic synergy and  
31 economies of scale and scope for market responsiveness and rapid incremental adaptation.  
32 Classic contingency theory suggests there are limits to how far such an organizational form can  
33 diffuse across the variegated economic landscape.

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43 Consider platforms such as Uber. On the one hand, the technology-enabled emergence of  
44 such platforms erodes the centrality of the bureaucratic firm. For Uber drivers, the notion of a  
45 full-time bureaucratic "office" loses most of its meaning, and the notion of career evaporates.  
46 Bureaucratic hierarchy seems to be displaced by market exchange. Yet, three considerations  
47 weigh against extrapolating from this to the demise of bureaucracy. First, it is far from clear that  
48 this platform-based "free agent" model will prevail outside a limited band of activities where  
49 work can be so rigorously individualized (Fleming, Rhodes, & Yu, 2019). Second, Uber relies on  
50 a centralized scheduling system and close prescription and monitoring of the work of its drivers.  
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3 The hierarchical employment relation here is only clumsily disguised as a market relation—  
4 largely a stratagem to evade regulation. To be sure, the automation of driving procedures and of  
5 monitoring changes the lived experience of this kind of control (Kellogg et al., 2020), but the  
6 instrumentally-rational principle behind it remains the same. And third, Uber, as a large and  
7 growing company, seems to be organized internally according to classical bureaucratic lines  
8 (Business Research Methodology, 2018; Hinings, Gegenhuber, & Greenwood, 2018).  
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11 Finally, consider not-for-profit “open-source” collaboration platforms like Wikipedia and  
12 Debian/Linux (Butler, Joyce, & Pike, 2008; Jemielniak, 2014; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). Here  
13 we see large-scale communities, often governed by value-rationality. Bureaucracy plays a  
14 subordinate but significant role: individual contributions are carefully screened according to  
15 increasingly elaborate and standardized procedures, and the governance of the community is  
16 assured by individuals in formally identified roles who draw on bureaucratic tools to organize the  
17 work (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). This is a very attractive model for certain tasks, and  
18 established organizations are experimenting with it. However, its diffusion runs into the limits of  
19 modularity: many products today are complex systems of interdependent components, and it is  
20 not often cost-effective to invest the effort to standardize the interfaces for all these components  
21 (Baldwin, 2019). It is much easier to modularize Wikipedia entries and Linux features than the  
22 parts and sub-systems of an automobile or a plane. There is surely scope for the growth of open  
23 source communities, but their place in the overall economy—and the role of bureaucracy in  
24 them—are open questions.  
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## 39 **10.CONCLUSION**

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41 Halfway in the last century, Gouldner highlighted the “pathos”—specifically, the tone of  
42 fatalism and pessimism—that was limiting scholarship on bureaucracy: bureaucracy was  
43 inevitable in the modern world, and that was depressing (Gouldner, 1955). More recently,  
44 Selznick commented on how organizational scholars, after decades of work, still struggled “to  
45 define bureaucracy in a more neutral way, recognizing that the pathologies of bureaucracy are  
46 real and endemic, but insisting that they should be considered contingent, not essential, subject to  
47 remedy, not inevitable” (Selznick, 1996: 276–177). Sadly, bureaucracy continues to be  
48 understood in essentialized terms. Authors in management and scholarly publications commonly  
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3 refer pejoratively to it and contrast unfavorably (a stereotyped form of) bureaucracy with “new”  
4 or “alternative” organizational forms.  
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6         The assumption is often that bureaucracy necessarily tends to lead to certain outcomes;  
7 and if some of those outcomes, such as reliability, might be positive, they are inevitably  
8 counterbalanced by negative ones, such as rigidity, conformism, or goal-displacement (e.g.,  
9 Bosk, 2007; Davis, 1948; Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994b; Merton, 1940). This pathos persists,  
10 notwithstanding research on the empowering potential of bureaucracy (e.g., Adler & Borys,  
11 1996; Ashcraft, 2001; Pheysey, Payne, & Pugh, 1971); notwithstanding the empirical research  
12 documenting the prevalence of creativity and cosmopolitanism, not just conformism, in  
13 bureaucracies (e.g., Kohn, 1971; Parks, 2016); and notwithstanding the studies showing some  
14 bureaucratic organizations’ capacity for flexibility (e.g., Adler et al., 1999; Bigley & Roberts,  
15 2001; Klein et al., 2006).  
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18         (Mis)understood in such a manner, bureaucracy appears outdated or irrelevant for current  
19 management theory and practice—only to have its effectiveness (re)discovered. Turco’s (2016)  
20 case study of a small social media organization illustrates this sequence, showing that the  
21 founders invested considerable effort in avoiding “bureaucracy” (understood in narrow and  
22 pejorative terms) only to rediscover its relevance (as highlighted by Bechky, 2018). This pattern  
23 was pointed out by Perrow decades ago: while people may lament the proliferation of red tape, in  
24 the next breath, many complain that “there ought to be a rule;” they grumble about hierarchy, but  
25 in the next breath ask, “who’s in charge around here?” (Perrow, 1986).  
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28         Such ambivalence is not fortuitous. Bureaucracy has been both a weapon of domination  
29 and the primary tool for realizing many of humanity’s most significant undertakings—from  
30 pyramids to space exploration and the administration of large organizations ranging from armies  
31 to social security agencies to gargantuan industrial enterprises. Our ability to meet the various  
32 challenges that confront us today—inter alia, pandemics, sustainability, poverty, inequalities—  
33 hinges on our ability to effectively leverage and further refine bureaucracy. For example, any  
34 sustained effort to mitigate or adapt to challenges such as climate change will require key  
35 features of bureaucracy—e.g., formalized triple-bottom-line performance indicators,  
36 sustainability standards, and an ethos of neutrality rather than favoritism in applying them. We  
37 therefore need to ensure that our deployment of bureaucracy against these grand challenges is  
38 emancipatory, and not an extension of domination.  
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In this context, we should recall Gouldner’s observation that “discussions of bureaucratic organization which are heir to the Weberian analysis must be understood as being, in part, a displacement of the controversy over socialism” (Gouldner 1955: 497). Indeed, socialists—including those concerned with the crises we face today (e.g., Lowy, 2007)—envisage a vastly enlarged public sector, with government bureaucracy controlling the entire economy directly or indirectly. On the one hand, many people today, like Weber in his time, fear socialism precisely because of this reliance on bureaucracy (Kilker, 1984). The classic statement is Hayek (1956), who decries the growth of the government sector because it cannot but constrain individual choice and undermine freedom (as he understands it). On the other hand, Gouldner and other Marxists (e.g., Adler, 2019) argue that a close analysis of bureaucracy in our current capitalist context suggests that a democratic and socialist form of bureaucracy is indeed possible in the future. Bureaucracy, they argue, can be a tool of democratic governance, and even massive government bureaucracies can be experienced as enabling by citizens and government workers alike—enabling the effective pursuit of our shared goals. Organizational research has a key role to play in shedding light on how we can employ bureaucracy effectively for the greater good.


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5 **Pedro Monteiro** is an assistant professor (tenure-track) at the Department of Organization of  
6 Copenhagen Business School. He received his Ph.D. from Warwick Business School with a  
7 thesis on the enabling roles of bureaucracy in collaboration across expertise domains based on  
8 ethnographic fieldwork in the aeronautical industry which won the Grigor McClelland Award  
9 and the Louis Pondy Award. His current work explores the organizational aspects of  
10 collaboration, knowledge, and expertise in the workplace as well as the functioning and  
11 dilemmas of bureaucracy.  
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20 **Paul S. Adler** is Professor of Management and Organization, Sociology, and Environmental  
21 Studies at the University of Southern California. He holds the Harold Quinton Chair in Business  
22 Policy. He has written extensively about bureaucracy including theoretical works inspired  
23 variously by Marx, Weber, Gouldner, and contingency theory, and empirical studies in  
24 manufacturing, healthcare, and software development.  
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## 11. TABLES AND FIGURES

**Figure 1. Frequency of the term bureaucracy over time**

(Source: Google NGram)



**Figure 2. Percentage of Papers on Bureaucracy vs All Papers Published in US and European Journals across Decades**







Figure 3. Perspectives on Bureaucracy across Decades in US and European Journals



**Figure 4. Volume of Papers on Bureaucracy across Decades in US and European Journals**

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3 **Box 1. Weber's list of characteristics of bureaucratic administrative staff in a legal-**  
4 **authority regime**

5 (Source: *Economy and Society*, Chapter 3, 220-221)  
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8 The purest type of exercise of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative staff.  
9 Only the supreme chief of the organization occupies his position of dominance (*Herrenstellung*) by  
10 virtue of appropriation, of election, or of having been designated for the succession. But even his  
11 authority consists in a sphere of legal "competence." The whole administrative staff under the supreme  
12 authority then consists, in the purest type, of individual officials (constituting a "monocracy" as opposed  
13 to the "collegial" type, which will be discussed below) who are appointed and function according to the  
14 following criteria:  
15

16 (1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official  
17 obligations.

18 (2) They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.

19 (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.

20 (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.

21 (5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested  
22 by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are *appointed*, not  
23 elected.  
24

25 (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions. Only  
26 under certain circumstances does the employing authority, especially in private organizations, have a  
27 right to terminate the appointment, but the official is always free to resign. The salary scale is graded  
28 according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and  
29 the requirements of the incumbent's social status may be taken into account.  
30

31 (7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.

32 (8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of "promotion" according to seniority or to achievement, or  
33 both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors.

34 (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without  
35 appropriation of his position.  
36

37 (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.

38 This type of organization is in principle applicable with equal facility to a wide variety of different fields.  
39 It may be applied in profit-making business or in charitable organizations, or in any number of other  
40 types of private enterprises serving ideal or material ends. It is equally applicable to political and to  
41 hierocratic organizations. With the varying degrees of approximation to a pure type, its historical  
42 existence can be demonstrated in all these fields.  
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**Box 2. Weber's list of characteristics of modern bureaucracy****(Source: Economy and Society, Chapter 11, p. 956-958)**

Modern officialdom functions in the following manner:

I. There is the principle of official *jurisdictional areas*, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. This means:

(1) The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are assigned as official duties.

(2) The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials.

(3) Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and for the exercise of the corresponding rights; only persons who qualify under general rules are employed.

II. The principles of *office hierarchy* and of channels of appeal (*Instanzenzug*) stipulate a clearly established system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to the corresponding superior authority. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office hierarchy is *monocratically* organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called "private" or "public." (...)

III. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (the "files"), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and upon a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials working in an agency along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files makes up a *bureau* (in private enterprises often called the "counting house," *Kontor*). (...)

IV. Office management, at least all specialized office management - and such management is distinctly modern - usually presupposes thorough training in a field of specialization. This, too, holds increasingly for the modern executive and employee of a private enterprise, just as it does for the state officials.

V. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the *full working capacity* of the official, irrespective of the fact that the length of his obligatory working hours in the bureau may be limited. In the normal case, this too is only the product of a long development, in the public as well as in the private office. Formerly the normal State of affairs was the reverse: Official business was discharged as a secondary activity.

VI. The management of the office follows *general rules*, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise which the officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, administrative or business management. (...)

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**Table 1: Three Perspectives on Bureaucracy**

	Perspective 1 Bureaucracy as a Principle			Perspective 2 Bureaucracy as a Paradigm		Perspective 3 Bureaucracy as a Type
	1.1 Bureaucracy as Instrumental- Rationality	1.2 Bureaucracy as Value- Rationality	1.3 Bureaucracy as Domination	2.1 Bureaucracy as a Dysfunctional Paradigm	2.2 Bureaucracy as a Flexible Paradigm	
<b>Conceptualization of Bureaucracy</b>	Bureaucracy broadly defined according to its premises beyond specific features			Bureaucracy understood holistically as the paradigm of modern organization		Bureaucracy defined through fixed features in counterpoint to other types
<b>Analytical Foci of Research</b>	The origins, foundations, and development of bureaucracy			The functioning of bureaucracy in both its formal and informal dimensions		Bureaucracy compared to other types of organization for different contexts
<b>Normative stance toward Bureaucracy</b>	Neutral	Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive	Neutral
<b>Keywords associated with Bureaucracy</b>	Rationalization, Instrumental, Legal, Formal Rationality	Values, Ethos, Conduct, Impartiality, Goal-Achievement	Power, Authority, Control, Hierarchy	Goal-Displacement, Rigidity, Conformism, Parochialism,	Dynamic, Hybrid, Enabling, Representative	New forms, Flexibility, Rapid environment, Mechanistic vs Organic
<b>Exemplary Work</b>	Soemardjan, 1957; Brown, 1978; Collins, 1988; Adler, 2005; Haveman et al., 2007; Hwang & Powell, 2009	Hilbert, 1987; Du Gay, 2000; Pearce et al., 2000; McDonnell, 2017; Lopdrup-Hjorth & Roelsgaard Obling, 2018	Langton, 1970; Burawoy, 1979; Nelson, 1993; Courpasson, 2000; Clegg, 2012	Merton, 1940; Crozier, 1964; March & Simon, 1958; Hodson et al., 2013	Gouldner, 1954; Blau, 1955; Adler & Borys, 1996; Ashcraft, 2001; Briscoe, 2007; Canales, 2013	Burns & Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1958; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pugh et al., 1969; Child, 1972; Mintzberg, 1979; Heckscher & Dannellon, 1994; Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2000;

**Table 2. Research Pathways for the Study of Bureaucracy**

Pathway	Research Directions	Possible Research Questions
<b>Studying bureaucracy in its wider context</b>	Variation across socio-cultural contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does bureaucracy vary across cultures, and how do these variants compare with the Weberian ideal-type?</li> <li>• How culturally specific (“Western”) is the Weberian conceptualization?</li> <li>• Can indigenous theories account for distinctive bureaucratic forms?</li> </ul>
	Variation over historical periods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does the Weberian ideal-type evolve over time?</li> <li>• How do the authority relations prevailing in the broader society shape the form and enactment of bureaucracy?</li> <li>• What are the distinctive features of bureaucracy that emerge under capitalist conditions?</li> </ul>
	The role of bureaucracy in social and economic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How does the emergence and form of bureaucracy support capitalist economic and social development?</li> <li>• What are the cultural effects of the development and diffusion of bureaucracy?</li> <li>• What is the role of bureaucracy in today’s grand challenges?</li> </ul>
<b>Studying bureaucracy in action</b>	The creative effort involved in producing, maintaining, and undoing bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What articulation work goes into making bureaucracy work?</li> <li>• How do workers resolve misalignments across bureaucratic features (e.g., between conflicting procedures)?</li> <li>• How does de-bureaucratization occur?</li> <li>• How are (shared) tacit values learned and diffused in bureaucracy organizations? How do they underpin discretion and rule-bending activities?</li> </ul>
	The role of artifacts, tools, and (digital) technology in bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the affordances of different technologies for work in bureaucratic settings? Do low vs. high tech tools afford particular discretion and opportunities for rule-bending?</li> <li>• What are the implications of using algorithms in bureaucratic organizations? How do they relate to bureaucratic principles of accountability, impartial administration, and egalitarianism?</li> <li>• How do social media tools reconfigure key bureaucratic aspects (e.g., record-keeping, secrecy, or hierarchical authority)? What forms of bureaucratic organization do they produce?</li> <li>• How do bureaucracies respond to social and political calls for openness? What bureaucratic aspects are re-worked, and new work patterns emerge when bureaucracies open up innovation, strategy, or decision-making?</li> </ul>
	The interplay of bureaucracy’s material and symbolic elements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are the effects of bureaucracy mediated by social understandings of it? How specific understandings undergird bureaucratic behavior, e.g., rule-following vs. rule-breaking?</li> <li>• How the interaction of symbolic and material elements produces particular bureaucratic regimes?</li> <li>• How symbolic elements legitimize or stigmatize particular bureaucratic arrangements?</li> </ul>

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	Bureaucracy’s sensorial dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How aesthetic experience influences our relationship with bureaucracy?</li> <li>• How are versions of bureaucracy related to particular building architectures and office layouts?</li> <li>• How playful office design, co-working spaces, or remote work produce new forms of bureaucratic organization?</li> </ul>
	Emotional work in bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How is bureaucracy’s impartial emotional disposition learned and enacted?</li> <li>• How impartiality mix with care and commitment? What are the varieties of emotional dispositions displayed and socially endorsed across bureaucratic settings?</li> </ul>
<b>Studying bureaucracy’s interdependencies and configurations</b>	Interplay among formal elements of bureaucracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which elements are central for bureaucratization in different contexts?</li> <li>• How formal elements of bureaucracy substitute for each other?</li> <li>• How new management techniques replace/augment traditional bureaucratic features?</li> </ul>
	Interplay among bureaucratic formal elements and informal relations to produce key outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which informal elements are central for bureaucratic ideals such as impartiality?</li> <li>• How are the effects of bureaucratic structures on equality and equity mediated by informal relations?</li> <li>• How informal work relations influence the capacity of bureaucratic organizations to adjust and improve?</li> <li>• Whether and how bureaucratic structure produces behavioral patterns such as conformism?</li> <li>• When and how are bureaucratic structure supportive of goals such as collaboration, learning and innovation?</li> </ul>

**Appendix 1: Appendix 1. Papers in Leading Journals per Perspective**

(1=Bureaucracy as Principle, 2=Bureaucracy as Paradigm, 3=Bureaucracy as Type)

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	1957	Soemardjan, S	Bureaucratic Organization in A Time of Revolution	ASQ
1	1958	Bendavid, J	The Professional-Role of The Physician In Bureaucratized Medicine - A Study In Role-Conflict	Human Relations
1	1959	Liu, J	11Th-Century Chinese Bureaucrats – Some Historical Classifications and Behavioral Types	ASQ
1	1959	Eisenstadt, S	Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization	ASQ
1	1960	Satow, R	Value-Rational Authority and Professional Organizations: Weber's Missing Type	ASQ
1	1961	Constas, H	The USSR - From Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Society	ASQ
1	1963	Delany, W	The Development and Decline of Patrimonial and Bureaucratic Administrations	ASQ
1	1970	Weaver, J	Value Patterns of a Latin-American Bureaucracy	Human Relations
1	1975	Satow, R	Some Sociological Observations on the Response of Israeli Organizations to New Immigrants	ASQ
1	1978	Brown, R	Bureaucracy as Praxis - Toward A Political Phenomenology of Formal Organizations	ASQ
1	1983	Weiss, R	Weber on Bureaucracy - Management Consultant or Political Theorist	AMR
1	1983	Conaty, J; Mahmoudi, H; Miller, G	Social-Structure and Bureaucracy - A Comparison of Organizations in The United-States and Prerevolutionary Iran	Organization Studies
1	1984	Langton, J	The Ecological Theory of Bureaucracy - The Case of Wedgwood, Josiah and The British Pottery Industry	ASQ
1	1984	Shenkar, O	Is bureaucracy inevitable - the Chinese experience	Organization Studies
1	1985	Astley, W	Organizational Size and Bureaucratic Structure	Organization Studies
1	1992	Du Gay, P; Salaman, G	The cult[ure] of the customer	JMS
1	1993	Nelson, R	Authority, Organization, And Societal Context in Multinational Churches	ASQ
1	1994	Tuckman, A	The Yellow Brick Road - Total Quality Management and The Restructuring Of Organizational Culture	Organization Studies
1	1994	Diribarne, P	The honor principle in the bureaucratic phenomenon	Organization Studies
1	1995	Lu, Y; Heard, R	Socialized economic-action - a comparison of strategic investment decisions in china and Britain	Organization Studies
1	1995	Grancelli, B	Organizational-change - towards a new east-west comparison	Organization Studies
1	1996	Du Gay, P; Salaman, G; Rees, B	The conduct of management and the management of conduct: contemporary managerial discourse and the constitution of the 'competent' manager	JMS
1	1997	Ten Bos, R	Essai: business ethics and Bauman ethics	Organization Studies

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	1997	Harley, S; Lee, F	Research selectivity, managerialism, and the academic labor process: the future of nonmainstream economics in UK universities	Human Relations
1	1999	Dijksterhuis, M; Van Den Bosch, F; Volberda, H	Where Do New Organizational Forms Come From? Management Logics as A Source of Coevolution	OrgSci
1	2000	Pearce, J; Branyiczki, I; Bigley, G	Insufficient Bureaucracy: Trust and Commitment in Particularistic Organizations	OrgSci
1	2000	Courpasson, D	Managerial strategies of domination. Power in soft bureaucracies	Organization Studies
1	2001	Grey, C; Garsten, C	Trust, control and post-bureaucracy	Organization Studies
1	2001	Ten Bos, R; Willmott, H	Towards a post-dualistic business ethics: interweaving reason and emotion in working life	JMS
1	2002	Armbruster, T; Gebert, D	Uncharted territories of organizational research: the case of Karl popper's open society and its enemies	Organization Studies
1	2003	Kallinikos, J	Work, human agency and organizational forms: an anatomy of fragmentation	Organization Studies
1	2003	Courpasson, D; Dany, F	Indifference or obedience? Business firms as democratic hybrids	Organization Studies
1	2003	Liu, S	Cultures within culture: unity and diversity of two generations of employees in state-owned enterprises	Human Relations
1	2004	Ballas, A; Tsoukas, H	Measuring nothing: the case of the Greek national health system	Human Relations
1	2004	Clegg, S; Courpasson, D	Political hybrids: Tocquevillian views on project organizations	JMS
1	2005	Hoogenboom, M; Ossewaarde, R	From iron cage to pigeon house: the birth of reflexive authority	Organization Studies
1	2005	Heugens, P	A neo-Weberian theory of the firm	Organization Studies
1	2005	Clegg, S.	Puritans, visionaries and survivors	Organization Studies
1	2006	Drori, Gs; Jang, Y; Meyer, Jw	Sources of Rationalized Governance: Cross-National Longitudinal Analyses 1985-2002	ASQ
1	2007	Vaast, E	What goes online comes offline: knowledge management system use in a soft bureaucracy	Organization Studies
1	2008	Harris, M	Digital technology and governance in transition: the case of the British library	Human Relations
1	2009	Hwang, H; Powell, W	The Rationalization of Charity: The Influences Of Professionalism In The Nonprofit Sector	ASQ

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
1	2010	Hodson, R	Work group effort and rewards: the roles of organizational and social power as context	Organization Studies
1	2010	Clegg, S; Baumeler, C	Essai: from iron cages to liquid modernity in organization analysis	Organization Studies
1	2011	Brivot, M	Controls of knowledge production, sharing and use in bureaucratized professional service firms	Organization Studies
1	2011	Jensen, T; Sandstrom, J	Stakeholder theory and globalization: the challenges of power and responsibility	Organization Studies
1	2011	O'Reilly, D; Reed, M	The grit in the oyster: professionalism, managerialism and leaderism as discourses of UK public services modernization	Organization Studies
1	2011	Kamoche, K; Maguire, K	Pit sense: appropriation of practice-based knowledge in a UK coalmine	Human Relations
1	2011	Fleming, P; Sturdy, A	'Being yourself' in the electronic sweatshop: new forms of normative control	Human Relations
1	2012	Segal, L; Lehrer, M	The institutionalization of stewardship: theory, propositions, and insights from change in the Edmonton public schools	Organization Studies
1	2012	Hassard, J; Morris, J; McCann, L	'My brilliant career'? New organizational forms and changing managerial careers in japan, the UK, and USA	JMS
1	2014	Kamoche, K; Kannan, S; Siebers, Lq	Knowledge-sharing, control, compliance and symbolic violence	Organization Studies
1	2015	Adler, Ps	Community and innovation: from Tonnies to Marx	Organization Studies
1	2015	Bleiklie, I; Enders, J; Lepori, B	Organizations as penetrated hierarchies: environmental pressures and control in professional organizations	Organization Studies
1	2015	Hirst, A; Humphreys, M	Configurable bureaucracy and the making of modular man	Organization Studies
1	2015	Russell, S; Mccabe, D	Regulators, conformers and cowboys: the enterprise discourse, power and resistance in the UK passive fire protection industry	Organization Studies
1	2015	Mangen, C; Brivot, M	The challenge of sustaining organizational hybridity: the role of power and agency	Human Relations
1	2016	Swan, J; Scarbrough, H; Ziebro, M	Liminal roles as a source of creative agency in management: the case of knowledge-sharing communities	Human Relations
1	2016	Morris, J; Farrell, C; Reed, M	The indeterminacy of "temporariness": control and power in neo-bureaucratic organizations and work in UK television	Human Relations
2	1957	Smith, E	Bureaucratic Organization - Selective or Saturative	ASQ
2	1957	Berger, M	Bureaucracy East and West	ASQ
2	1957	Coates, C; Pellegrin, R	Executives and Supervisors - Informal Factors in Differential Bureaucratic Promotion	ASQ

P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
2	1958	Gusfield, J	Equalitarianism and Bureaucratic Recruitment	ASQ
2	1959	Heady, F	Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration	ASQ
2	1960	Phelan, J	Authority and Flexibility in The Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy	ASQ
2	1961	Landsberger, H	The Horizontal Dimension in Bureaucracy	ASQ
2	1961	Presthus, R	Weberian V Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society	ASQ
2	1965	Thompson, V	Bureaucracy and Innovation	ASQ
2	1968	Denhardt, R	Bureaucratic Socialization and Organizational Accommodation	ASQ
2	1968	Kaplan, B	Notes on A Non-Weberian Model Of Bureaucracy – Case Of Development Bureaucracy	ASQ
2	1969	Pugh, D; Hickson, D; Hinings, C	An Empirical Taxonomy of Structures of Work Organizations	ASQ
2	1970	Engel, G	Professional Autonomy and Bureaucratic Organization	ASQ
2	1970	Samuel, Y; Mannheim, B	Multidimensional Approach Toward A Typology of Bureaucracy	ASQ
2	1971	Miner, J	Changes in Student Attitudes Toward Bureaucratic Role Prescriptions During 1960S	ASQ
2	1971	Rossel, R	Autonomy in Bureaucracies	ASQ
2	1973	Vosburgh, W; Hyman, D	Advocacy and Bureaucracy – Life and Times of a Decentralized Citizens Advocacy Program	ASQ
2	1973	Baker, S; Etzioni, A; Hansen, Ra; Sontag, M	Tolerance for bureaucratic structure - theory and measurement	Organization Studies
2	1974	Sorensen, Je; Sorensen, T	Conflict of Professionals in Bureaucratic Organizations	ASQ
2	1975	Maniha, J	Universalism and Particularism in Bureaucratizing Organizations	ASQ
2	1977	Bacharach, S; Aiken, M	Communication in Administrative Bureaucracies	AMJ
2	1977	Miles, R; Petty, M	Leader Effectiveness in Small Bureaucracies	AMJ
2	1977	Bozeman, B; Mcalpine, W	Goals and bureaucratic decision-making - experiment	Organization Studies
2	1978	Halaby, C	Bureaucratic promotion criteria	ASQ
2	1979	Jermier, J; Berkes, L	Leader-Behavior in a Police Command Bureaucracy – Closer Look at The Quasi-Military Model	ASQ
2	1985	Spicer, M	A Public Choice Approach to Motivating People in Bureaucratic Organizations	AMR
2	1985	Feldman, S	Culture and conformity - an essay on individual adaptation in centralized bureaucracy	Organization Studies
2	1991	Jermier, J; Slocum, J; Fry, L; Gaines, J	Organizational Subcultures in A Soft Bureaucracy: Resistance Behind the Myth and Facade Of An Official Culture	OrgSci
2	1991	Baum, Hs	Creating a family in the workplace	Organization Studies



P	Year	Authors	Title	Journal
2	1992	Stevens, F; Philipsen, H; Diederiks, J	Organizational and professional predictors of physician satisfaction	Organization Studies
2	1993	Robertson, D; Anderson, E	Control-System and Task Environment Effects on Ethical Judgment - An Exploratory-Study Of Industrial Salespeople	OrgSci
2	1994	Reinelt, C	Fostering empowerment, building community - the challenge for state-funded feminist organizations	Organization Studies
2	1994	Morgen, S	Personalizing personnel decisions in feminist organizational theory and practice	Organization Studies
2	1994	Harrison, M	Professional control as process - beyond structural theories	Organization Studies
2	1994	Slack, T; Hinings, B	Institutional pressures and isomorphic change - an empirical-test	Organization Studies
2	1995	Meyer, H	Organizational Environments and Organizational Discourse - Bureaucracy Between 2 Worlds	OrgSci
2	1995	Morand, D	The Role of Behavioral Formality and Informality in The Enactment of Bureaucratic Versus Organic Organizations	AMR
2	1996	Adler, P; Borys, B	Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive	ASQ
2	1996	Bresnen, M; Fowler, C	Professionalization and British management practice: case evidence from medium-sized firms in two industrial sectors	JMS
2	1996	Holmernes, M	Organizational identity and space of action	Organization Studies
2	1997	Hynes, T; Prasad, P	Patterns of 'mock bureaucracy' in mining disasters: an analysis of the westray coal mine explosion	JMS
2	1997	Linstead, S	Abjection and organization: men, violence, and management	Organization Studies
2	1998	Martin, J; Knopoff, K; Beckman, C	An Alternative to Bureaucratic Impersonality and Emotional Labor: Bounded Emotionality at The Body Shop	ASQ
2	1998	Uhl-Bien, M; Graen, Gb	Individual Self-Management: Analysis of Professionals' Self-Managing Activities in Functional and Cross-Functional Work Teams	AMJ
2	1999	Adler, P; Goldoftas, B; Levine, D	Flexibility Versus Efficiency? A Case Study of Model Changeovers in The Toyota Production System	OrgSci
2	2000	Burt, R; Hogarth, R; Michaud, C	The Social Capital of French And American Managers	OrgSci
2	2001	Barley, S; Kunda, G	Bringing work back in	OrgSci
2	2001	Ashcraft, K	Organized Dissonance: Feminist Bureaucracy as Hybrid Form	AMJ
2	2003	Brooks, I	Systemic exchange: responsibility for angst	Organization Studies

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2	2004	Llewellyn, N	In search of modernization: the negotiation of social identity in organizational reform	Organization Studies
2	2005	Currie, G; Procter, Sj	The antecedents of middle managers' strategic contribution: the case of a professional bureaucracy	JMS
2	2006	Elliott, D; Smith, D	Cultural readjustment after crisis: regulation and learning from crisis within the UK soccer industry	JMS
2	2007	Briscoe, F	From Iron Cage to Iron Shield? How Bureaucracy Enables Temporal Flexibility for Professional Service Workers	OrgSci
2	2007	Warner, M	Kafka, weber and organization theory	Organization Studies
2	2007	Mcgovern, G; Ferlie, E	Playing tick-box games: interrelating defences in professional appraisal	Organization Studies
2	2009	Waring, J; Currie, G	Managing expert knowledge: organizational challenges and managerial futures for the uk medical profession	Organization Studies
2	2012	Adler, P	The Sociological Ambivalence of Bureaucracy: From Weber Via Gouldner to Marx	OrgSci
2	2012	Gittell, J; Douglass, A	Relational Bureaucracy: Structuring Reciprocal Relationships into Roles	AMR
2	2013	Martin, A; Lopez, S; Roscigno, V; Hodson, R	Against the Rules: Synthesizing Types and Processes of Bureaucratic Rule-Breaking	AMR
2	2013	Hodson, R; Roscigno, Vj; Martin, A; Lopez, Sh	The ascension of Kafkaesque bureaucracy in private sector organizations	Organization Studies
2	2014	Canales, R	Weaving Straw into Gold: Managing Organizational Tensions Between Standardization and Flexibility in Microfinance	OrgSci
2	2014	Zhang, Zy; Spicer, A	'Leader, you first': the everyday production of hierarchical space in a Chinese bureaucracy	Organization Studies
2	2014	Mccabe, D	Light in the darkness? Managers in the back office of a Kafkaesque bank	Organization Studies
2	2015	Huising, R	To Hive or To Hold? Producing Professional Authority Through Scut Work	ASQ
2	2017	Kornberger, M; Meyer, Re; Brandtner, C; Hollerer, Ma	When bureaucracy meets the crowd: studying "open government" in the Vienna city administration	Organization Studies
3	1959	Stinchcombe, Al	Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production - A Comparative-Study	ASQ
3	1962	Hall, R	Intraorganizational Structural Variation - Application of The Bureaucratic Model	ASQ
3	1963	Pugh D, et al.	A Conceptual Scheme for Organizational Analysis	ASQ
3	1968	Pugh, D, et al.	Dimensions of Organization Structure	ASQ
3	1969	Pugh, D, et al.	The Context of Organization Structures	ASQ
3	1971	Pheysey, D. C., Payne, R. L., & Pugh, D. S.	Influence of Structure at Organizational and Group Levels.	ASQ
3	1972	Glueck, W; Dennis, D	Bureaucratic, democratic and environmental approaches to organization design	JMS
3	1973	Mansfield, R	Bureaucracy and Centralization - Examination of Organizational Structure	ASQ

<b>P</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Authors</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Journal</b>
3	1973	Reimann, B	Dimensions of Bureaucratic Structure - Empirical Reappraisal	ASQ
3	1973	Hlavacek, J; Thompson, V	Bureaucracy and New Product Innovation	AMJ
3	1978	Shamir, B	Between bureaucracy and hospitality - some organizational characteristics of hotels	JMS
3	1980	Ouchi, W	Markets, bureaucracies, and clans	ASQ
3	1980	Aiken, M; Bacharach, S; French, J	Organizational-Structure, Work Process, and Proposal Making in Administrative Bureaucracies	AMJ
3	1981	Grinyer, P; Yasaiardekani, M	Strategy, Structure, Size and Bureaucracy	AMJ
3	1981	Eccles, R	Bureaucratic Versus Craft Administration – The Relationship of Market-Structure to The Construction Firm	ASQ
3	1982	Pool, J	Research note - bureaucracy in hospitals - an empirical-test of halls theory in one organizational type	Organization Studies
3	1983	Cheng, J; Mckinley, W	Toward an Integration of Organization Research and Practice - A Contingency Study of Bureaucratic Control and Performance in Scientific Settings	ASQ
3	1988	Boisot, M; Child, J	The Iron Law of Fiefs - Bureaucratic Failure and The Problem of Governance in The Chinese Economic-Reforms	ASQ
3	1991	Wilderom, C; Miner, J	Defining Voluntary Groups and Agencies Within OS	OrgSci
3	1992	Bailey, D; Neilsen, E	Creating a bureau-adhocracy - integrating standardized and innovative services in a professional work group	Organization Studies
3	1993	Barker, J	Tightening the Iron Cage - Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams	ASQ
3	1993	Haveman, H	Organizational Size and Change – Diversification in The Savings and Loan Industry After Deregulation	ASQ
3	1993	Davisblake, A; Uzzi, B	Determinants of Employment Externalization – A Study of Temporary Workers and Independent Contractors	ASQ
3	1993	Alvesson, M; Lindkvist, L	Transaction costs, clans and corporate culture	JMS
3	1994	Daveni, R; Ravenscraft, D	Economies of Integration Versus Bureaucracy Costs – Does Vertical Integration Improve Performance	AMJ
3	1994	Gupta, P; Dirsmith, M; Fogarty, T	Coordination and Control in A Government Agency – Contingency and Institutional Theory Perspectives on Gao Audits	ASQ
3	1994	Miner, J; Crane, D; Vandenberg, R	Congruence and Fit in Professional-Role Motivation Theory	OrgSci
3	1994	Victor, B; Stephens,	The Dark Side of The New Organizational Forms - An Editorial Essay	OrgSci
3	1994	Alvesson, M	Talking in organizations - managing identity and impressions in an advertising agency	Organization Studies
3	1995	Spender, J; Kessler, h	Managing the uncertainties of innovation - extending Thompson (1967)	Organization Studies

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3	1996	Smith, A; Zeithaml, C	Garbage Cans and Advancing Hypercompetition: The Creation and Exploitation Of New Capabilities And Strategic Flexibility In Two Regional Bell Operating Companies	OrgSci
3	1996	Volberda, H	Toward the Flexible Form: How to Remain Vital in Hypercompetitive Environments	OrgSci
3	1997	Jarley, P; Fiorito, J; Delaney, J	A Structural, Contingency Approach to Bureaucracy and Democracy in Us National Unions	AMJ
3	1998	Schulz, M	Limits to Bureaucratic Growth: The Density Dependence of Organizational Rule Births	ASQ
3	1998	Chakravarthy, B; Gargiulo, M	Maintaining leadership legitimacy in the transition to new organizational forms	JMS
3	1998	Ashforth, B; Saks, A; Lee, R	Socialization and newcomer adjustment: the role of organizational context	Organization Studies
3	2000	Hill, S; Martin, R; Harris, M	Decentralization, integration and the post-bureaucratic organization: the case of R&D	JMS
3	2001	Adler, P	Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism	OrgSci
3	2001	Bigley, G; Roberts, K	The Incident Command System: High-Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments	AMJ
3	2001	Gittell, J	Supervisory Span, Relational Coordination, and Flight Departure Performance: A Reassessment of Post bureaucracy Theory	OrgSci
3	2001	Donaldson, L	Reflections on knowledge and knowledge-intensive firms	Organization Studies
3	2001	Cobb, At; Stephens, C; Watson, G	Beyond structure: the role of social accounts in implementing ideal control	Organization Studies
3	2002	Schneider, M	A Stakeholder Model of Organizational Leadership	OrgSci
3	2002	Boyne, G	Public and private management: what's the difference?	JMS
3	2004	Andersen, T	Integrating decentralized strategy making and strategic planning processes in dynamic environments	JMS
3	2005	Cliff, Je; Langton, N; Aldrich, H	Walking the talk? Gendered rhetoric vs. Action in small firms	Organization Studies
3	2005	Walton, E	The persistence of bureaucracy: a metanalysis of weber's model of bureaucratic control	Organization Studies
3	2006	Klein, Kj; Ziegert, J; Knight, A; Xiao, Y	Dynamic Delegation: Hierarchical, Shared and Deindividualized Leadership In Extreme Action Teams	ASQ
3	2006	Tengblad, S	Is there a 'new managerial work'? A comparison with henry Mintzberg's classic study 30 years later	JMS
3	2007	O'Mahony, S; Ferraro, F	The Emergence of Governance in An Open Source Community	AMJ
3	2007	Sorensen, J	Bureaucracy and Entrepreneurship: Workplace Effects on Entrepreneurial Entry	ASQ
3	2007	Frenkel, S; Sanders, K	Explaining variations in co-worker assistance in organizations	Organization Studies

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3	2008	Robson, M; Katsikeas, C; Bello, D	Drivers and Performance Outcomes of Trust in International Strategic Alliances: The Role Of Organizational Complexity	OrgSci
3	2009	Malhotra, N; Morris, T	Heterogeneity in professional service firms	JMS
3	2010	Bunderson, J; Boumgarden, P	Structure and Learning in Self-Managed Teams: Why "Bureaucratic" Teams Can Be Better Learners	OrgSci
3	2011	Hirst, G; Van Knippenberg, D; Chen, C; Sacramento, C	How Does Bureaucracy Impact Individual Creativity? A Cross-Level Investigation of Team Contextual Influences on Goal Orientation-Creativity Relationships	AMJ
3	2011	Long, C; Bendersky, C; Morrill, C	Fairness Monitoring: Linking Managerial Controls and Fairness Judgments in Organizations	AMJ
3	2011	Diefenbach, T; Sillince, J	Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of organization	Organization Studies
3	2012	Kacperczyk, A	Opportunity Structures in Established Firms: Entrepreneurship Versus Intrapreneurship in Mutual Funds	ASQ
3	2012	Dobrev, S	Career change and the iron cage: organizations and the early labour market experience of professional managers	JMS
3	2014	Meuer, J	Archetypes of inter-firm relations in the implementation of management innovation: a set-theoretic study in china's biopharmaceutical industry	Organization Studies
3	2017	Tan, D; Tan, J	Far from the tree? Do private entrepreneurs agglomerate around public sector incumbents during economic transition?	OrgSci
3	2018	Thomas, N; Sugiyama, K; Rochford, K; Stephens, J; Kanov, J	Experiential organizing: pursuing relational and bureaucratic goals through symbolically and experientially oriented work	AMR

**Appendix 2. Definitions of Bureaucracy across Perspectives**

<b>Perspective 1: Bureaucracy as a Principle</b>	1.1 Bureaucracy as Instrumental Rationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action (Weber, 1978: 987)</i></li> <li>• <i>“Rational bureaucracy” represents not so much a system of analytical categories as they do an attempt to capture the “spirit” of contemporary administration (Udy, 1959, p. 791-792)</i></li> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy maximizes formal rationality precisely by centralizing the locus of control at the top of the organization. (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p.518)</i></li> <li>• <i>Weber’s critique of bureaucratic rationalization is based on the distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality Because bureaucracy is fundamentally instrumentally rational in its operations (Waters, 1989, p. 949)</i></li> <li>• <i>We begin by exploring the multifaceted nature of the Progressive movement, and explain how one set of values—efficiency and rationality through impartial bureaucracy—came to over-shadow other values, notably the equitable dispersion of power. ... How could cold, calculating bureaucracy be accepted in an industry that valued community and mutuality? (Haveman et al., 2007, p. 119)</i></li> <li>• <i>The broader process of rationalization of which bureaucratic organization is an expression (Esmark, 2017, p. 502)</i></li> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy is a form of rational organization because every genuinely bureaucratic act, says Weber (p. 565), is based on a “system of rationally debatable ‘reasons’, namely either subsumption under legal norms, or a weighing of ends and means. (Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, &amp; Höllner, 2017b)</i></li> </ul>
	1.3 Bureaucracy as Value Rationality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Emphasis on subjective cause, on the bureaucratic mentality or the “spirit of bureaucracy, is not presented as complete or definitive rather to override conventional and, we believe misleading understandings of Weber’s bureaucracy as macro-social structure (Hilbert, 1987, p. 76)</i></li> <li>• <i>The general proposition universally applied within organizations has usually been the meritocratic one ... Universalistic organizational practices were first described in detail by Weber and labeled “bureaucracy” (Pearce et al., 2000, p. 149)</i></li> <li>• <i>Weber was not simply or exclusively interested in offering a formal organizational theory of ‘bureaucracy’ but rather ... with indicating the ethical-cultural attributes of bureaucratic conduct. In order to approach Weber’s work in this way—as an anthropologist of Lebensführung or ‘conduct of life’—it is first necessary to dispense with the detritus of the Parsonian (Du Gay, 2008, p. 337).</i></li> <li>• <i>The traditional public administration in continental European countries with its heritage of a legalistic and Weberian-style state bureaucracy ... is characterized by core values such as equity, professionalism, public interest, procedural safeguards, acceptance of superordination and subordination, impartiality, and neutrality. (Meyer et al., 2014, p. 865)</i></li> <li>• <i>Ideal-typical bureaucratic features were social technologies that—under the conditions Weber observed—cultivated that transformational bureaucratic ethos, facilitating impersonal administration ... Without the bureaucratic ethos, characteristic bureaucratic features often fail to achieve the ends of rational, predictable, effective administration. (McDonnell, 2017, p. 495).</i></li> <li>• <i>As Weber (1978: 959) makes clear, public bureaucracies are founded on and supported by an ethos and a number of foundational cultural values ... In light of this easily overlooked dimension, Willmott (2011: 258) highlights how the ethical discipline of bureaucrats ‘tends to be side-lined when discussions of bureaucracy and/or post-bureaucracy are directed primarily at their technical capabilities as organizational forms or socio-technical systems’ (Lopdrup-Hjorth and Roelsgaard Obling, 2018, p. 5).</i></li> </ul>
	1.2 Bureaucracy as Domination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy mainly as an instrument of power, of exercising control over people and over different spheres of life, and of continuous expansion of such power either in the interest of the bureaucracy itself or in the interest of some (often sinister) masters. (Eisenstadt, 1959, p. 303)</i></li> <li>• <i>Weber conceived of bureaucracy as an administrative structure based on legal domination .... The definition considered the effect of both the administrative structure ... and the physical structure, which includes the amount and types of supplies, tools, and large items of equipment with which work is performed (Engel, 1970, p. 13).</i></li> </ul>



		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy, then, was analyzed [by Weber] because it was the clearest example of the structural form taken by rational-legal domination (Weiss, 1970, p. 245)</i></li> <li>• <i>The creation of a bureaucratic organization, Weber (1978: 9) also stressed, demands not only calculation, but power and authority as well. Bureaucracy ... is establish only through the exercise of thoughtful, legitimate domination. ... As Weber (1978: 1934) emphasized, if the leadership of an organization is to be successful in its effort to bureaucratize its staff, it must be able to neutralize countervailing sources of power, which means that it must completely control the means of production and administration (Langton, 1984, p. 334).</i></li> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy is a tool, a social tool, which legitimizes the control of numerous people by the very few. (Perrow, 1986, p. 5).</i></li> <li>• <i>Max Weber regarded bureaucracy as the purest type of exercise of legal authority in society, and as the system of organization best suited to the success of modern capitalist societies. I use the term “system” because Weber understood bureaucracy to be more than just an organizational form. It was founded on certain social criteria that defined the selection, rights, obligations and remuneration of appointed officials who worked in an entirely separate role to that of ownership. (Child, 2015: 31)</i></li> </ul>
<b>Perspective 2: Bureaucracy as a Paradigm</b>	<p>2.1 Bureaucracy as a Dysfunctional Organizational Paradigm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The positive attainments and functions of bureaucratic organization are emphasized, and the internal stresses and strains of such structures are almost wholly neglected. The community at large, however, evidently emphasizes the imperfections of bureaucracy.” (Merton, 1940, p. 562).</i></li> <li>• <i>A bureaucratic organization is an organization where the feedback process, error-information-correction, does not function well, and where consequently there cannot be any quick readjustment of the programs of action in the view of the errors committed ... a bureaucratic organization is an organization that cannot correct its behavior by learning from its errors. Bureaucracy patterns of action, such as impersonality of the rules and the centralization of decision-making, have been so stabilized that they have become part of the organization’s self-reinforcing equilibria. (Crozier, 1964, p. 177).</i></li> <li>• <i>There is such an inherent and fundamental limitation of bureaucracy, one that derives from its very foundation in the speciation of offices: That is that people are responsible only for their own jobs. ... The paradigm of a bureaucrat’s attitude—a good one as well as a bad one—is “That’s not my job”; ... Improving bureaucratic management only makes this more true. (Heckscher, 1994, p. 20).</i></li> <li>• <i>Kafka’s bottom-up view of bureaucracy captures important dynamics that Weber’s more top-down formal-rational model does not. Moreover, the deviations from formal rationality he identifies differ from those identified by academic critiques of bureaucratic failings (e.g., bureaucratic rigidity, which has its origins in formal rationality). Instead, we argue that Kafkaesque elements represent forces in direct tension with core Weberian bureaucratic values of rationality and meritocracy and, in fact, often pervert seemingly formal-rational bureaucracy toward more narrow subordination to the interests of those at the top of organizations (Hodson et al., 2013, p 1253)</i></li> </ul>
	<p>2.2 Bureaucracy as a Flexible Organizational Paradigm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>The use of the term bureaucracy, not as designating an administrative organization as such, but rather some special characteristics of that organization, is common in the literature ...Bureaucracy is concerned with the behavior of officials... It is clear from this definition that the emphasis is on the informal structure as the mechanism or manifestation of bureaucratic patterns; it does not follow, of course, that those patterns are uninfluenced by the character of the formal organization (Selznick, 1943, p. 50).</i></li> <li>• <i>Weber’s views diverge sharply from the popular stereotypes which see bureaucracy as synonymous with governmental inefficiency. To Weber, bureaucracy was one of the characteristic and ubiquitous forms of administration in modern society, not confined to government by any means. Moreover, he held it to be one of the most efficient forms of organization which had historically developed, superseding the undependable amateur with the qualified specialist. (Gouldner, p. 1954).</i></li> <li>• <i>Weber conceived of bureaucracy as the social mechanism that maximizes efficiency in administration and also as a form of social organization with specific characteristics. (Blau, 1955, p. 251).</i></li> </ul>

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Bureaucratic patterns are so deeply ingrained in the culture that they mold not only the individual's work habits, but also his social designs, and even his expressions of religious belief (Denhardt, 1968, p. 441)</i></li> <li>• <i>Almost all modern administrative organizations (as well as some ancient ones) are bureaucratically organized (Blau &amp; Scott, 1962, p. 32)</i></li> <li>• <i>Bureaucracy is an organizational form that employs rational-legal means to pursue collective goals .... [it] has a budget, a professional staff, elected officers, an operations manual, formal committees ... and written policies, rules, and procedures (Martin, 2003, p. 283).</i></li> </ul>
	<b>Perspective 3: Bureaucracy as a Type</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Mechanistic systems (sc. 'bureaucracies') define his functions, together with the methods, responsibilities, and powers appropriate to them; in other words, however, this means that boundaries are set ... 'mechanistic, appeared to be appropriate to an enterprise operating under relatively stable conditions. The other, 'organic, appeared to be required for conditions of change. (Burns and Stalker, 1994 [1961], p. 5).</i></li> <li>• <i>It is more useful to regard bureaucracy as being characteristic of the structure of an organization and relate given organizational forms to group and individual behavior. We have been able to conceptualize six elements to be considered as dimensions of organizational structure. All these dimensions are in fact variables, and it will be possible for an organization to be rated at any point along the continuum (Pugh et al., 1963, p. 298).</i></li> <li>• <i>Bureaucratic vertical forms severely hamper the ability to respond to accelerating competition. Flexible forms, in contrast, can respond to a wide variety of changes in the competitive environment in an appropriate and timely way (Volberda, 1996, p. 359).</i></li> <li>• <i>The model of bureaucratic control discussed herein reduces many variables and relationships to a few relationships among key variables of formal structures. Hence, the topic becomes tractable rather than hopelessly complex (Walton, 2005 p. 571).</i></li> <li>• <i>Pugh and Hickson (1989) refer to a structure in which structuring of activities is high and concentration of authority is low as a "workflow bureaucracy." To be "bureaucratic," in this sense, is simply to be more highly structured. (Bunderson &amp; Boumgarden, 2010, p. 610)</i></li> <li>• <i>A useful way of thinking about a bureaucracy is that it consists of those positions or activities whose function is to service and maintain the organization itself. In short, we define bureaucracy as the existence of a specialized administrative staff. Like formalization and goal specificity, bureaucracy should be viewed as a variable; organizations vary in terms of the proportion of personnel they devote to administration as compared to production and service. (Scott, 2007: 45)</i></li> </ul>



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