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Introduction to special issue: Value, values, and anthropology

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Abstract

Anthropologists have spent tremendous effort developing value theory. We might generally understand value theory as a form of social theory concerned with what groups of people find important or worthwhile in life; how those groups of people, via their relationships, identify, seek, and create that which is valuable; how ideas of value and worth inhere in people and things; and how those people and things then circulate and meet other universes of value. This introduction specifically, and this special issue more generally, seeks to build on this bedrock conception of value theory to offer a series of implications and considerations one should take on board when thinking about value. We suggest that these considerations will allow social researchers to more ably understand the pressing issues that motivate their investigations.

KEYWORDS

crisis, value, value theory, values

WHAT'S IT WORTH TO YOU?

Insofar as economic anthropology has claim to some corner of the universe of abstract reasoning, that title would likely be to value theory. And when economic anthropologists talk about value, they are often concerned with the way different groups of people decide what is important, how that sense of importance manifests in objects and people, and, in turn, how those objects and people circulate, how they are cherished, used, and/or destroyed, as well as what happens when one regime of value meets another. What all this means is that when anthropologists talk about value, they are often operating at a fairly high level of social analysis and a broad level of generalization. While the authors of this special issue think that this heightened analytic vantage is a great place from which to look, think, and speak about humanity, the articles here will suggest that we have spent enough time at this rather high level of generalization to begin mapping out some of the specific implications for how we think about our world when we center questions of value. It is worth noting that this issue's intervention follows a tendency in recent work in *Economic Anthropology* seeking to theorize specific articulations of value theory, for example: as valuation manifests via “wealth in people” (Kusimba, 2020), and as valuation occurs on landscapes (Rissing & Jones, 2022). And, put a bit more simply, this special issue answers the following question: Once we accept the basic premises of value theory, what can we say that is more specific about how life works?

In reflecting on our discussions at the Annual Meeting of the 2022 Society for Economic Anthropology as well as on the articles collected in the following pages, we suggest that there are at least six ways we can become more precise with value theory:

1. In considering the ethical and ontological presuppositions that always precede the ascription of value (Field, 2023; Rivers, 2023);
2. In taking seriously the affordances that various qualia provide to specific things when they become valued (Graber, 2023);
3. In noting how the relationships that underscore value ascriptions shift when people find themselves relating not to other people but rather to imaginary social totalities such as states or national communities (Majeed, 2023; Phillips, 2023);
4. In appreciating the weird ways that value ascriptions are often sticky despite the best wishes of a given group of people (Majeed, 2023; Phillips, 2023);

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5. In accepting how value ascriptions are often retrospective and infused with certain claims about what the past was like (Khorasani, 2023); and
6. In reckoning with the fact that humans often occupy multiple contradictory value regimes at the same time (Dean, 2023; DuBois, 2023).

Taken together, these specific elaborations on anthropological value theory allow anthropologists a degree of specificity not usually present in work that talks about value.

One hallmark of contemporary social research is its keen attention to numerous and overlapping planetary concerns and crises, things such as ascendant fascism, great power belligerence, climate change, biodiversity loss, industrial pollution, hostility to migrants, and so on. In turn, a keener sense of the implications of studying humans via that which they value will allow us to better apprehend the large structures and big changes that seem to characterize our volatile present day, particularly in the context of the way different groups respond to these crises, the aspects of problems they emphasize, and the solutions they propose. It is in this context that the relationship between value and values—and the worth of anthropological explanations of this relationship—is most apparent.

To briefly illustrate the stakes of all this, we turn first to a few luxury items that allow us to illustrate the conventional operation of value theory and the way it is frequently opposed to disciplinary economics. From the perspective of economics, value is often seen (at least implicitly) as something that can be objectively revealed through market dynamics, and specifically through pricing. Anthropological accounts doubt this perspective when they pay close attention to the accumulation of people, places, rationalities, and things that co-constitute moments of valuation. For anthropologists, a price is never the final word, but rather is indicative of an often-sprawling social conjuncture. Then, after a discussion of some of these main currents of anthropological theories of value and values, we describe how the contributions to this special issue allow anthropologists to move on to more sophisticated and specific questions. We suggest our specific elaboration is in pursuit of implications inherent in the larger paradigm of value theory, which we basically accept as a grounding theory for how human social life works.

GOING, GOING, GONE: WHAT MAKES A LUXURY?

In 2022, a leather bag produced by the luxury fashion company Hermès, specifically a “Diamond Himalaya Birkin 30,” which retails for an estimated USD 300,000, sold at a Sotheby’s auction for more than USD 440,000, breaking the record for the most expensive handbag ever sold. Although this particular “Birkin Bag” was made of meticulously dyed crocodile skin and diamond-encrusted white gold hardware, Sotheby’s attributed the bag’s exorbitant price not to its components, but rather to its rarity. In addition to being a luxury, it was a collector’s item, and perhaps a work of art.

Similarly, a year earlier, a Patek Philippe, an automatic wristwatch made by hand in Switzerland, sold at auction for more than USD 6.5 million. Among watch connoisseurs, Patek Philippe is a hallowed brand, though aesthetically it is rather understated, characterized by solid and dull metallic tones with black or navy blue, or brown or gray faces. This particular watch, though, eschewed subtlety. It was designed in collaboration with the luxury jewelry brand Tiffany & Co and, consequently, had an ostentatious bright blue face, the polar opposite of the “stealth wealth” aesthetic that has recently informed pop-culture perceptions of the rich and famous.

Thinking through the value of these particular items, an odd bag and a loud watch, helps us see typical habits of anthropological thought when pondering value (see also and further Foster, 2007, 2008, 2013). Let’s start with price.

Whereas economists see something natural in an auction, a site where the “true value” of an object is revealed through the “discovery” of its market price, Haidy Geismar (2001) voices a common anthropological qualification, reminding us that prices are no simple thing, and auctions, far from distilling a true price, actually represent a dense social conjuncture. Auctions, she argues, are a “theatrical production of price” replete with market agents ranging from material artefacts to people, bringing to mind long anthropological experience with the spaces where people and things come together and redistribute (Geismar, 2001, 43). For the anthropologist, price in an auction is really a moment where value emerges and takes a specific immediate form “both grounded pragmatically and imaginatively constructed within a social hierarchy of information; both historical and momentary, material and abstract” (Geismar, 2001, 43).

So, while the particular prices that luxury objects like watches and purses fetch at auction might tell us a bit about their economic or, perhaps, their exchange value at a point in time, more than anything numerical, attention to such prices also allows us to consider larger forces at play: that we live in a world where some people can spend several lifetimes of wealth on trivial accessories; that there are whole industries coordinating massive amounts of scarce resources and expert labor to fabricate and validate such objects; that there are individuals who can control and marshal such labor and such wealth to purchase and then own such objects; and that there is a political and governing system in place that allows all of this to happen in public and to be widely reported, oftentimes aspirationally.

Anthropological analysis and its attention to social relationships allows us to say more. We might also say something about the audience such a buyer imagines for a given extravagant purchase, or assumptions that the purchaser has about the social, ethical, and political values of others. In reverse, we can imagine what the larger public thinks of that purchaser. How do other groups of people see the purchaser similarly or differently than the purchaser imagines? Perhaps a bit more philosophically, for whom are these things bought? Is the audience involved or entrained in the buying and allocation of wealth? Is there a realm where these objects are displayed and used? Or do the objects disappear to a collector's vault, their post public and spectacular life behind them with the last clack of the auction's gavel? Or are they merely vehicles for tax evasion and money laundering, like many contemporary art pieces, both physical and digital, are purported to be (see, e.g., Post & Calvão, 2020; Weeks, 2020)?

Our hypothetical buyer not only has to imagine and join a close social milieu in which people recognize and appreciate such extravagance, but also has to trust in the existence of a larger social scene in which their wealth is stable and secure, one in which they will not be assaulted or killed as a means to redistribute their consumptive audacity. They have to believe in some way that their wealth is legitimate, and that society will both protect and esteem them (Souleles, 2017).

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE AND VALUES

To the extent that the price of a watch or a bag tells us much about their value, value should be understood, following David Graeber's intervention more than two decades ago, as "the way in which actions become meaningful to the actor by being incorporated in some larger, social totality—even if in many cases the totality in question exists primarily in the actor's imagination" (2002, xii). Crucially, the value ascribed to a watch or handbag from the perspective of the actor who purchased it might be very different from the value ascribed to that same watch or handbag from the perspective of a person reading about these record-breaking auction prices in the news or on social media (or recycled a few years later in an academic article).

In that sense, it also seems right to follow the processual implications of Graeber's value theory with Fabian Muniesa's recent call for an anthropological critique of value that is grounded in the idea that "value" and "values" are "vernacular concepts" rather than "analytical categories" (2023, 170). Put another way, people talk about and ascribe value not just through rote social processes, but through active "vernacular" deliberation. Approaching value and values in this way, according to Muniesa, allows us to more fully account for the way these "vernacular concepts of value operate, in particular settings, as political technologies" (2023, 172). Through this kind of exercise, terms that on the surface seem rather straightforward—in Muniesa's case, terms like "investor" and "risk"—come to be seen as fundamental to the justification and organization of the "value of things" (2023, 173). Here, Muniesa gives us a way to think about the conversations that people have about a watch or a bag, that allows the formation of a social context and perhaps consensus concerning value.

Expensive purses and watches illustrate how price or exchange value are often good starting points for understanding ambient communities of value and the politics that attend them and make for the reliable anthropological transit from value to values. Using price as an entry point into value communities and their politics offers a way to understand big things like wars and geopolitical upheavals, often from the standpoint of an individual life or the close social scene that anthropologists generally start with.

For instance, the authors of this introduction, due to where they happen to live, have given a lot of thought to the pricing and affective worth of both Spanish tomatoes in British grocery stores post-Brexit or the more expensive natural gas and cooler Danish family homes in the war winter of 2023. Even in casual conversations, people are able to fluently connect the price of things as distinct as oil and oranges to things like geopolitical conflicts (the war in Ukraine) and far-right populism (Brexit), often enunciating a critique of capitalism and its enrichment of a continually smaller group of people in the process. People immediately recognize the messy entanglements of business and government, pointing to the tendency of large corporations—from energy companies to supermarket chains—to turn socioecological and political crises into exceedingly profitable investment opportunities.

Anthropologists have been interested in this relationship for much of the discipline's history, from the choice of empirical evidence we look for in our attempts to think about culture to the theories we use to make sense of that evidence. Mauss's ([1924] 2000) theory of the gift, for instance, can be said to be all about the relationship between value and values, as it interrogates the commensurability of the gift that would be necessary for its straightforward exchange value, while Marx's ([1867] 1992) critique of capital excavates not only the tension between use values and exchange values, but the (im) moral values that allow the system of capitalist exploitation and alienation to flourish. Malinowski's ([1935] 1978) famous exposition of Trobriand Islanders' yam houses was, among other things, an early reminder that the caloric value of a tuber is not easily commensurable with its socioeconomic value.

This foundational interest in the relationship between value and values, and the extent to which this relationship conditions the circulation of people and goods within and beyond a society, continued unabated. Bohannon (1955), for instance, famously claimed that the commensurability of different values is possible within certain spheres of exchange but causes a kind of moral rupture or panic when people attempt to commensurate values across different spheres.

Several decades later, Guyer problematized this claim with her argument that people are in fact always operating across different scales and registers of value. For Guyer, this observation demanded a shift of anthropological analysis away from the “boundedness” of distinct value spheres and instead toward a collective project of “link[ing] the creation of commodity categories and registers, modes of calculation and projection of gains, to the social organization of market expertise and market control” (Guyer, 2004, 94). Appadurai (1986) follows Simmel in thinking of the value of an object not as something inherent to the object itself, but rather as a judgement others make about it. Things are valuable, then, because they “resist” our desire to possess them (Simmel, 1978, cited in Appadurai, 1986). However, in studying the creation and destruction of value, Appadurai argued that it is important to temper the theoretical interest in the way people “encode things with significance” with a methodological focus on the way things move through the world, which sheds light on the “human and social context” of value and valuation (1986, 5).

Graeber (2002) resisted this approach, which he felt was overly economic and undermined the important links between value and values, opting instead for a reinvigorated labor theory of value that incorporates not just salaried work, but other creative actions undertaken by people in the formation and moderation of an object’s value (see also Sutton, 2004). Implicitly bridging these divides, Kockelman (2010, 151) offers a compelling theory of value as “life under interpretation,” where “each of our life-paths may be examined as the best evidence for the values we were following.”

Much of the recent work on the anthropology of value and values has adopted this or a similar high-level approach, focusing largely on the complicated and evolving ways that different communities of people understand value, while drawing on literatures not traditionally included under the rubric of “value theory” to push the conversation in interesting new directions. Gowlland (2009), for instance, draws on the anthropology of the senses to understand how artisan ceramicists working in an area of China famous for producing delicate teapots made from a specific local clay mediate the value they ascribe to the objects they produce and the value ascribed to those same objects by tourists who are unfamiliar with their craft. A growing literature on anticipation and speculation, drawing in part on the anthropology of time and temporality, shows how the expectation of value and attempts to estimate future values have profound impacts on some of the most fundamental structures of our social and ecological lives, from housing and infrastructure (Elliott, 2022), to the global financial system (Bear, 2020), to the way people adapt to climate change (Paprocki, 2019). Contributors to previous special issues of this journal drew from political ecology to show how the politics of value, values, and valuation can even become inscribed in physical landscapes (Rissing & Jones, 2022). Meanwhile, some scholars are mining earlier approaches to value for new insights, such as Angosto-Ferrández’s (2022) recent reappraisal of the Marxian labor theory of value.

One of the main goals of the conference and this resulting special issue was to bring together different perspectives on value, particularly from philosophy. In doing so, we found striking affinities between the anthropological scholarship on value(s) and how hermeneutic philosophy has imagined value and worth. Given this, there are likely future productive collaborations between anthropologists and both this tradition in philosophy and the philosophers who work within it.

Hermeneutics is interested in the varied conditions that allow for human understanding and knowledge. In turn, philosophical hermeneutics argues that the temptation to speak of values as distinct separate entities is unfortunate. Values are better conceived as vague and often inchoate understandings and commitments that guide actors in ways that are never fully transparent to their reflective consciousness (Gadamer, [1960] 1990; Heidegger, [1927] 1993). Philosophical hermeneutics takes a decisive step further by claiming that the most adequate epistemic access to values requires that understanding and commitments, which values express, are applied to the interpreter’s own self-understanding, and not merely reconstructed or described.

A bit more specifically, considering economic anthropology’s ongoing dialogue with Marxian theories of labor, there is an interesting prospect of interchange with contemporary forms of Marxist philosophy focusing not on the labor theory of value, but on the consequences of the social dissemination of the value-*form* under capitalism. Marxist value-form theorists thus emphasize “the impersonal and abstract domination of everyone—regardless of their class position—by the value form” (Mau, 2021, 6). Synthesizing and extending this line of research, a recent contribution explores how the capitalist relations of production rely on what Marx refers to in *Capital* as “the mute compulsion of economic relations,” and how this economic power is different from both ideology and violence (Mau, 2023). Economic power is a mediated form of power, that works on subjects only indirectly, by remolding “their social and material environment in a manner that forces [them] to act in accordance with the logic of valorization” (Mau, 2021, 8). This discussion of the “mute compulsion” of capitalist social relations, and how this compulsion constrains social reproduction to varying degrees, could help economic anthropologists take the impersonal forces of valuation more fully into account.

With this in mind, and given philosophy and anthropology’s common opposition to reductive theories of value, there is a potentially fruitful division of labor that might play out across future academic collaborations. The ongoing philosophical critique of the assumptions underlying *homo economicus*, the idea that humans are rational utility maximizers with stable preferences, can help to clear the way for anthropological investigations of how preferences are not given but culturally shaped and how motivations are not univocal and necessarily selfish, but complex and often even contradictory (Gersel & Thaning, 2022). In this way the philosophical critique of reductive theory, by freeing us from a certain abstract picture of

human practices that holds us captive, implicitly accentuates the usefulness of inductive theorizing and meets up with anthropology's typical way of working (Souleles et al., 2022).

Taken together, the above is an encapsulation of what anthropologists do when they do value theory and what they might do in the future: anthropologists move from value to values and back again, identifying the relationships and processes that allow ascriptions of value to function, typically at a high level of generalization. In this way, bags and watches become moments of social punctuation, instances where groups of people and different sorts of things converge and say something about worth. From here, and with this sort of theoretical baseline, the implications of further work are exciting.

INTO THE VALUE-VERSE

The above leads us to the contributions of this special issue. Specifically, we feel that the generic approach to value theory in anthropology is robust and well-established. Given this foundation, we now feel that there is the opportunity to build a larger and more specific agenda concerning anthropological approaches to value based on novel research presented at the 2022 meeting of the Society for Economic Anthropology.

First, we suggest that values are often built on underlying ethical and ontological premises about how the world works. To understand values, how they might change, and where they come from requires one to understand more basic ethical and ontological commitments that people have about their world. It is likely, too, that these more basic commitments are stickier than any given ascription of value or particular social relationship. To this end, Dawn Rivers (2023) highlights the difference between the financial values that play a significant role in structuring our engagement with “the economy”—including how we approach aspects of our lives like work and education—and the “human values” that often supersede and drive much of people's work lives. Crucial to Rivers's account are the ways that ideas about what is important in life and in relationships can lead to specific work choices that often supersede, frame, and then disrupt runaway profit seeking.

Similarly, Sean Field's (2023) contribution focuses on the work of the US oil and gas industry in the context of anthropogenic climate change. He specifically addresses how people understand and place themselves inside a given “way of life.” In turn, specific value judgments about one's work, politics, and consumption flow from one's overarching way of life. Crises like climate change, he argues, lead many people to reconsider what constitutes a good way of life and in turn what is valuable. Only by appreciating the superordinate conditions of a given way of life can Field then explain what is valuable or worth pursuing vis-à-vis fossil fuel production.

Second, ascriptions of value are contingent on specific physical and sensuous features of objects (qualia). Put another way, the semiotic specificity of signs and their recognition creates paths and limitations to how valuation can work. We might think of these specific qualia as “value affordances.” Turning to the value of cashmere, Kathryn Graber's (2023) contribution examines the relationship between the sensorial and the semiotic aspects of value and valuation. It is not just physical qualities of cashmere—lightness, softness, and strength—that give it value, but the combination of these qualities in a particular form. Polyester is light and strong and can even be quite soft, but is rarely afforded the value of cashmere. Thus, even the combination of different qualities does not explain the value of an object. Graber calls us to account for the semiotic properties of cashmere, attuning us to the history and authenticity of cashmere production, as well as more contemporary concerns about its social and environmental sustainability, and how these semiotic properties interact.

Third, though our generic template for the ascription of value has to do with reciprocal relations between people, mediated by objects, strange things start to happen when people apply norms of reciprocity to large institutional or imagined totalities such as states. What is more, people often take their relationships to imagined totalities as being of greater reality and importance than their everyday, immediate lives. In her analysis of often exorbitant (and widely unaffordable) energy prices in the US Deep South, Kristin Phillips (2023) takes the politics of these prices as axiomatic. From this starting point, she focuses on the way the public engages with the inherently political price of energy, particularly in the context of activists' contestations of seemingly indiscriminate price hikes. Her discussion of the different responses of consumers, regulators, politicians, and activists renders visible the complex negotiations around what counts as valuable, such as a preference among both energy companies and many environmental justice advocates for “green” energy solutions like solar power rather than energy efficiency enhancements like weatherization.

Similarly, Abdulla Majeed (2023) explains how Iraqi migrants in Jordan structure their residency around *faql*, a form of non-reciprocal hospitality, in this case granted by the Jordanian monarchy. Accounting for *faql* is no straightforward endeavor as it simultaneously (1) invokes amicable national relations between Iraq and Jordan; (2) sets up no specific legal guarantees to resources or work for immigrant Iraqis; and (3) leads to modest denials of its need on the part of Iraqis to begin with, thus showing individual Iraqis trying to opt out of *faql*'s gravitational pull. Complicating these invitations of guest friendship and denial is the fact that individuals find themselves reckoning their actions against the imagined totality of a national community, leading to an ever-present disappointment in *faql*'s promise.

Phillips's and Majeed's contributions also get at a fourth observation: namely, that which humans encounter as valuable often remains valuable despite their best wishes or fervent intentions otherwise. For the Iraqis that Majeed writes about,

because they are locked into a guest-friend relationship with a set of imagined social totalities, one nation to another, and with no guarantees, they are stuck, no matter how hard they try, being valued a specific way. They cannot make Iraq-ness or Jordan-ness, or their specific interpolation therein, go away. Similarly, the valuation of electricity, mediated as it is through opaque governing boards and aloof utilities, stays high or stays dirty despite political mobilization pushing for the opposite.

Fifth, temporality is important in understanding the ascription of value. Specifically, people often realize value in retrospect and make use of a specific apprehension of the past in evaluation. Danae Khorasani's (2023) contribution examines the conflict between valuing land via Native Hawai'iian familial relations and valuing land according to the settler colonial regime of the United States and the state of Hawai'i. As Khorasani demonstrates through an analysis of inheritance cases that worked their way through the state's court system, often to the detriment of the Native family involved, the intrusion of settler colonial jurisprudence leads to a "fracturing" of traditional understandings of ownership. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the history, and maybe especially the recent history of settlers acquiring huge swaths of land in Hawai'i—from pineapple barons to tech bros—this fracturing cleaves open a space for private finance to exert and enhance its power. Yet familial ties and an apprehension of what Hawai'iian family structure and land tenure was before settler colonialism allow an alternative valuation, beyond that of the ever-present settler regime.

Sixth and finally, people live within contradictory value schemes. And it is not just that there are different value regimes that compete with each other in tournaments of value (e.g., Appadurai, 1986) or some such, rather it is that people actually live inside of multiple value regimes simultaneously. This confusion and contradiction is often at the core of political and social life. In her keynote address to the Society for Economic Anthropology's 2022 meeting in Copenhagen, and in her subsequent contribution to this special issue, Lindsay DuBois (2023) takes up Jane Collins's notion of "valuation struggles" to problematize the taken-for-grantedness of the value of even the most familiar objects. She focuses on Argentina's conditional cash transfer, the AUH, teasing out a preoccupation with the price of designer sneakers among her interlocutors, which became a symbol for competing registers of value and conflicting experiences of social, political, and economic life. DuBois examines discussions about the value of these cash transfers across diverse scales, from casual conversations in local shops to parliamentary debates, shedding light in each case on the way different people and groups of people come to be seen (or not) as worth helping through government assistance.

Erin Dean (2023), in her article on resource management in Zanzibar, develops the idea of a "resource nexus" to theorize what happens when humans try to institutionalize and manage contradictory value demands. Her case describes Zanzibar's Ministry of Land, Housing, Water, and Energy, what she calls the "Department of Human Needs." Rather than identifying a winner or a loser in the competing priorities held by such a multimodal government agency, she suggests that we can instead identify numerous possible futures: "the possible extension of a colonial mentality that includes control of nature, opportunistic extraction, and increasing inequality; but also the possibility for cooperative creation, holistic livability, and systemic transformation" (2023, 253). For the Department of Human Needs, it is not so much one future or another, but rather many, and all at the same time.

MOVING ON

Given the flurry of work over the past several decades, it can feel difficult to say anything new about value theory. In the last few years alone, several special issues and edited volumes have been published on this very topic, with authors and editors making a similar point. DuBois and Salas, in their recent introduction to a special issue of *Dialectical Anthropology* on "value and politics," observe that "writers of introductions to collections about the anthropology of value struggle to clearly articulate common themes and to define what exactly is meant by value/s and its/their associated processes" and are often unable to "offer a common language that glosses the diverse articulations of value" (2021, 3). This, they argue, "is because the anthropological theory of value, in its best version, offers a holistic framework capable of bringing together the integrated character inherent in the social division of labor. It goes to the core of social relationships which keep people entangled in a given social formation" (2021, 3). The anthropological (not to mention the cognate) literature is so voluminous, the "landscapes of value" so overwhelmingly vast, that it can be difficult to decide which interventions to pursue and which trails to follow.

Trying to make sense of this literature—to summarize it and contribute to it—raises frustrating but important questions: Do we follow Graeber in thinking of value as the importance of actions, or Guyer in excavating the links between registers of value and social organization, or Muniesa in paying attention to the vernacular uses of "value" and "values"? Is there a way of studying value anthropologically that does not already combine elements of these approaches?

Our solution to these conundrums is to say that one might view Graeber, Guyer, Muniesa, and all other high-level value theorists as essentially articulating a common anthropological approach—one that operates with the goal of pan-human generalization while allowing for context-specific commentaries on social life. Rather than try and elaborate this further, we suggest that this is simply the larger paradigm that economic, and perhaps sociocultural, anthropology operates in presently. The good questions, fresh approaches, and big problems now exist in exploring the exciting and often quite weird implications of

this larger paradigm. This, then, is why we have sought to elaborate on the implications of value theory and show what value theory looks like when you use it to think about the big problems of our day.

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