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Beyond Policy: The Contributions of Formal and Informal Institutions on Urban Refugee Integration in Nairobi, Kenya

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Abstract

This paper examines the contribution of formal and informal institutions on the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. By examining the influence of the regulatory pillar, the normative pillar and the cultural cognitive pillar on urban refugees' integration, this paper argues that the formal institutions, embodied by the Kenyan government and the UNHCR are not strong enough to support sustainable integration and are emitting policies and restrictions that create barriers to integration. To compensate, informal institutions, such as norms and networks, fill the gap of the institutional void and offer opportunities for urban refugees to integrate. However, those opportunities for integration are limited and without a supportive regulatory pillar, urban refugees experience integration as a long-term process rather than as an attainable objective.

Keywords: *urban refugees, integration, humanitarian aid, institutional theory, social capital, social networks, institutional voids, Nairobi, refugee policy, critical realism,*

Table of Contents

Abstract 0
Table of Contents 3
List of Figures 5
List of Abbreviations 5
Introduction 6
Literature Review 7
The Institutional Theory 8
What is a Refugee? 12
Integration of Refugees 13
Social Capital Theory 14
Methodology 16
Philosophy of Science 16
Research Strategy and Design 18
Data Collection 19
Qualitative Research and Data 19
Doing Development Research from Home 20
Secondary Data Collection 25
Analytical Approach 27
Ethical Considerations 29
Limitations and delimitations 31
Context in Kenya and Literature around the Context 33
Refugees in Kenya and Refugee Laws and Programmes 33
Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya 36
Analysis and Findings 39
The Impact of Formal Institutions: The Regulatory Pillar 39
Kenya's Encampment Policy: A Coercive Model Induced by Fear 40
The 2021 Refugee Act: A Mitigated Impact on Urban Refugees' Integration 42
Provision for EAC Citizenship: Creating Nationality-based Barriers to Integration 42
Designated Areas and Settlements: An Alternative to Camps 44
Documentation as a Hindrance for Integration 47
Multiple Layers of Authority: An Opportunity for Urban Refugees' Integration 52
Humanitarian Aid as a Formal Institution 52

The Contribution of Formal Institutions to Sustainable Integration....56
The Influence of Informal Institutions....57
The Normative Pillar....58
Police Corruption: Favouring Day by Day Integration....58
Integration through Informal Work Ethics....60
The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar....62
The Importance of Having a Network....63
Cultural Integration and Discrimination....64
Urban citizenship: A Socially Constructed Reality....66
The Contribution of Informal Institutions to Sustainable Integration....67
Towards Sustainable Integration: A Holistic View of the Three Pillars....69
The Informal Institutions and Social Capital as a Response to the Institutional Void....70
The Institutional Void Is Not Only Impacting Urban Refugees....72
Opportunities for Sustainable Integration Now and in the Future....72
Discussion....73
Conclusion....79
Further Research and Reflections....81
Bibliography....83
Appendix 1: Interview Guide....90
Appendix 2: Derese Kassa....91
Interview with Derese Kassa....91
Appendix 3: Kevin Ngereso....105
Interview with Kevin Ngereso....105
Appendix 4: Allan Mukuki....113
Interview with Allan Mukuki....113
Appendix 5: Soli*City....123
Interview with Martin B. J & Óscar G. A....123
Appendix 6: Thesis Presentation and Objectives....136

List of Figures

FIGURE 1. Primary Data Collection…….....22
FIGURE 2. Secondary Data Collection…….26
FIGURE 3. Map of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Kenya…….....34
FIGURE 4. Timeline of the Laws and Historical Context of Kenya…….……36
FIGURE 5. Number of Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Nakuru, and Mombasa…..…….....37
FIGURE 6. Reasons for Leaving the Country of Origin…….....38
FIGURE 7. Statistical Summary of Refugee and Asylum Seekers in Kenya and Urban Areas…….....50
FIGURE 8. Services Offered by Agencies Working With Urban Refugees……...55
FIGURE 9. Reasons for Coming to Nairobi……...63
FIGURE 10. The Impact of Formal and Informal Institutions on Integration…….....70

List of Abbreviations

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CBS: Copenhagen Business School

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

DRS: Department of Refugee Services

EAC: East African Community

FIO: Faith-Inspired Organisation

HIAS: Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society

IB: International Business

ILO: International Labour Organisation

KRC: Kenya Red Cross

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council

RAS: Refugee Affairs Secretariat

RCK: Refugee Consortium of Kenya

RSD: Refugee Status Determination

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

As of 2022, there were 103 million forcibly displaced people world-wide. Out of those 103 million, 37,4 million are refugees and asylum seekers. Those numbers serve as a powerful reminder of the dire global crisis of forced displacement currently happening in the world. It also highlights the urgent need for countries to provide safe haven and support to the forcibly displaced populations, and to find long term, sustainable, and effective solutions to address the current crisis.

Refugees are widely considered to be an economic drain on a country and a burden on a country's citizens (Campbell, 2006, p. 396). Yet, 74% of refugees are located in low- and middle-income countries that have limited resources to manage and facilitate their stay (UNHCR, 2022). However, research proves that refugees can become an opportunity and a factor of growth in some countries, if given the right opportunities to integrate by the host country and the host community. Worldwide, there is a growing need that "*global refugee regime understands better refugees' economic activities and seek ways to enhance their integration into countries of first asylum, particularly by ensuring access to livelihoods and economic opportunities*" (Omata, 2020, p. 865). Integration can thus become a factor for refugees to unlock economic opportunities for themselves, but also for the host country.

Within refugee studies, there is an abundance of research and literature on refugee camps. One group that has been particularly neglected is the urban refugees in developing countries (Campbell, 2006, p. 397). The proximity of urban refugees to the labour market and the economic opportunities that can be found in a capital city, makes the analysis of the integration opportunities of urban refugees highly interesting. However, the institution needs to provide the necessary support for the integration to happen. We were curious to understand the role of institutions in the integration process and how institutions enhance or inhibit the integration process. Due to its location and proximity with politically unstable countries, Kenya is the fifth largest refugee-hosting country in the African continent (Operational Data Portal UNHCR). Kenya is also in an interesting case as the government has been enforcing a coercive encampment policy since the early 2010s and urban refugees have since then had an illegal and vulnerable status in urban areas and in Nairobi in particular.

Kenya being an important refugee host country with strict regulatory institutions, it represents the ideal case study to explore the challenges and opportunities for urban refugees to integrate the legal, economic, and social landscape of Kenya, and the influence of formal and informal institutions on this process. Using institutional theory, our thesis aims to answer the following question:

How do formal and informal institutions contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya?

The first part of this paper presents the literature and theoretical framework used for the research. To answer the research question, we used Scott's Institutional Theory in combination with Putnam's concept of social capital. In this section we are also defining the term refugee and introducing the concept of integration in a refugee context. The literature section is followed by the methodology, where the research design, data collection, and ethical considerations are presented.
The analysis and third section of this paper is built following the three pillars of the institutional theory. For each pillar, its contribution on refugee integration is analysed and presented. Our analysis concludes by a combined understanding of the three pillars and the analysis of their interdependent contribution to the integration of urban refugees.
The analysis section is followed by a discussion where we have the opportunity to discuss some of our findings and put them into perspective while critically reflecting on the theories used in light of the works of other researchers.
Finally, this thesis concludes by answering our research question and arguing the importance of having strong institutions supporting the integration process.

The objective of this research paper is to shed light on one of the major issues of modern history. The number of refugees is increasing each year and it has become critical to find sustainable solutions to refugee management. This paper argues that the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, is a complex process that is shaped by a range of formal and informal institutions. These institutions play a crucial role in determining whether refugees are able to integrate into the host community legally, socially, and economically. The use of Institutional Theory as a framework to analyse this topic shows the importance of enhancing sustainable integration through strong institutions that would benefit both the host country, the host community and the refugee community. Finally, we intend that this paper contains recommendations for policymakers and practitioners regarding the management of refugee affairs.

Literature Review

The following section is a comprehensive review of the literature used for the study. The first section provides an in-depth review of Institutional Theory, the main theory utilised for the following study. Secondly, the terms *refugee* and *integration of refugees* are defined to clarify the terminology used in the thesis. Lastly, the Social Capital Theory is introduced as a supporting theory to the three pillars of institutions.

The Institutional Theory

Institutions can broadly be defined as rules, formal as well as informal, that lay the foundation for political behaviour (Steinmo, 2001). We differ between *old institutionalism* and *new institutionalism.* Both stem from a concern with the absence of consideration given to institutions in neoclassical economics. While the two have identified similar causal factors and encountered the same issues, the main differences can be found within the narrative of institutions and the scope of analysis. Old institutionalism, or historical institutionalism, can be hard to define as it includes an abundance of different scholars and approaches. However, common notions within this line of research are seeking to define and analyse political outcomes based on historical institutional structures and reactions to these. It is broadly based on the assumption that institutional rules, constraints and responses shape the behaviour of political actors and policy-making processes (Scott, 2008, p. 428-429).

In newer literature, the term institutionalism can be described through three different approaches, each branching from different academic disciplines which seek to understand institutional change (Steinmo, 2001). Sociological institutionalists focus on cultural and ideational causes. Historical institutionalists typically place their focus on macro political determinants and highlight the importance of institutions in explanations. Lastly, political institutionalists argue that political processes and outcomes are shaped by the process of formation of states, political systems and party systems. These three branches of institutionalism all have different strategic research methods and, naturally, both advantages and disadvantages when conducting research and analyses (Amenta & Ramsey, 2011).

In 1977, John Meyer and his colleague formulated what was found to be the first neo-institutional arguments: a new theoretical perspective that invaded organisational sociology by exploring how formal organisational structures fit in, are shaped by and relate to societal, state, national and global environments. This differed from old perspectives of institutionalism by expanding the scope of analysis to include reflections of so-called “institutional forces”, which at the time was defined as rule-like frameworks and knowledge gathered through both formal and informal institutions. John Meyers' work pointed towards a new, more creative explanation for formal structures and encouraged the continuous research conducted by a growing number of scholars today (Scott 2008, p. 427).

Contemporary institutional theory concentrates on examining systems ranging from micro interpersonal interactions to macro global frameworks. This includes how structures, such as norms, cultures, rules and routines can become established as guidelines for social behaviour. Institutions are thus not solely regarded

as consensus and conformity, but should also include social structures and the change and conflicts within these (Scott *et* al., 2005).

During his work at Stanford University in the 19070's, W. Richard Scott recognized some of the limitations of existing institutional theories and drew on the work of early social scientists to include social- behaviour and structures. *"Norms of rationality play a causal role in the creation of formal organizations"* (Scott *et* al., 2005). In collaboration with numerous researchers, institutional theory reached a stage of including both cultural and network systems, which were found to be fields of strong institutional forces.

Based on these different approaches and multiple roots in social sciences, Scott attempted to construct a comprehensive framework that encompassed these different concepts and thus locate them within a broader theoretical framework. Scott differentiated between three types of institutions: cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative. According to Scott, the three institutions, combined with associated activities and resources, provide stability to social life (Scott, 2008, p. 428; Scott *et* al., 2005). These three pillars of institutions are composed of various elements, which can all be analysed as contributing, both mutually and individually, to the social framework. However, the pillars should also be differentiated to reach an in-depth understanding of the different dominant elements and individual mechanisms. Through the creation of these pillars, Scott managed to encompass the approaches of both economists, sociologists and cultural anthropologists (Scott *et* al., 2005).

The pillars are divided into formal and informal institutions.

The *regulatory pillar* stresses rule-setting, monitoring and sanctioning processes and activities, in which rules are established and enforced formally. Regulatory institutions can use coercive measures and may entail legal sanctions in situations of non-compliance. This institution is more formalised and explicit than some of the other pillars and thus also more easily manipulated. The formalisation of rule systems vary along three dimensions: obligation, precision and delegation (Scott, 2014). There is an emphasis on clear rules, planned incentives and surveillance. According to some critics, this pillar is strongest when supported by the normative and cultural-cognitive pillar (Scott, 2010).

The *normative pillar* consists of social norms, values and beliefs and play a vital role in constructing structures and behaviour in societies through goals and expectations. These arise in relations and interactions and shape what is seen as 'right' for the members of society (2010). Thus, the basis of compliance is based on social obligation and internalised commitments.

The *cultural-cognitive pillar* emphasises shared perceptions and meanings. These are constructed through words, gestures, symbols and interactions, and constitute the nature of social reality and thus the frames through which meaning is constructed (Scott et al., 2005). While some of these beliefs and assumptions may be somewhat superficial, others are deeply rooted within cultural beliefs and social structures (Scott, 2010). Thus, the cognitive component of institutions reflects the cognitive and cultural structures shared among individuals and encourages replicating patterns of activities with strong cultural support.

These three pillars stress the role of symbolic processes in social life, the relation between structure and behaviour and the tensions between freedom and order (Scott *et* al., 2005).
The distinction between the formal and informal pillar thus makes it possible to assess the different dynamics and how the conjunction of several factors and processes can affect the overall integration process of urban refugees in Nairobi.

The theoretical framework by Scott lays the foundation for the analysis of the following thesis, as the framework recognizes how varying forms of institutions stimulate different views of social reality. These institutional elements can elucidate how actors make choices and through which rationale said choices are made (Scott, 2014). This distinction is particularly important in developing countries, where weak institutions often fail to work in synergy and subsequently replace the roles of each other: meaning that, for instance, informal institutions can overtake the executive power in instances where formal institutions fail to do so. This may subsequently add a new dimension to the existing theory, as it mentions institutions individually and as a whole, however not as *substituting* or *responding*. For instance, in instances where there is an absence of regulatory institutions, alternative government mechanisms, which rely on normative and cultural-cognitive institutions, can arise. These substituting or overlapping institutions can thus result in new perspectives on learning and innovations in instances where formal institutions can struggle to penetrate, especially in developing countries (Hanekom & Luiz, 2017). Keeping this nuance to the existing theory in mind, the pillar structure may allow for a nuanced and structured analysis of the different institutional mechanisms and responses.
Furthermore, the theory by Scott underlines the importance of including resources in the analysis to include asymmetries in power and highlights the significance of resources in cultural schemas. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) will thus be used as a supporting analytical tool to institutional theory to highlight the importance of discourses in contexts and power relations.
The three pillars can thus be beneficial to analyse how both the regulative institutions as well as the social structures and orders in society can affect the integration process of urban refugees in Nairobi.

We recognize the importance of disregarding the assumption that each institution fits neatly into a typology, which de facto encourages the view that 'everything is an institution'. Many studies using this framework choose to focus solely on one institutional pillar, which subsequently may de-emphasize the influence of institutions in relation to actors and agencies. Thus, a holistic understanding of the three pillars in tandem should be employed to support longitudinal analysis of institutional change and the dimensions of each institution (Abdelnour *et* al., 2017, p. 1779).

Hamann et al. (2020) highlights the discussion of the use of Western managerial theories within African contexts and proposes a dialogical approach to foster contextual reflexivity in organisational theorising. The authors argue that the African continent is often seen as a blank slate without its own agency that can be analysed by the mainstream theories of the North. The main concern of the paper is that the continuing globalisation implies that knowledge and practices generated in the Western countries can be seamlessly transferred to other countries and thus seen as universal tools for analysis. Hamann et al. point towards the need for "decolonizing knowledge": meaning that theorists must embrace the opportunity to discover the variations of organisational life that we have not yet found through the Northern-based worldview. Theorists often point towards institutional voids as the greatest challenge for development in Africa, thus implying that the African institutions are not worthy of consideration on their own and should be compared to those of the South. This not only ignores the complex history of African colonialism, and thus the struggles the continent faced in creating well-functioning knowledge systems and institutions, but also forces Southern organisational dynamics to 'catch up' with the Northern mainstream.
To overcome these systemic biases in the Northern mainstream, the data collected for the Institutional Theory was carefully selected in an attempt to attend carefully to life-world contexts and consider the organisational variations in different contexts and thus seek enhanced theoretical validity (Hamann *et* al. 2020).

More recent developments to Institutional Theory involve examining the onset of the so-called deinstitutionalization and the destruction of structures and routines. Institutional arrangements require persistence and a continuing input of resources, making persistent institutions more the exception than the rule especially in developing countries (Delbridge & Edwards, 2007). This new element of Institutional Theory requires researchers to pay attention to both the construction and destruction faces of institutions to capture the nuances of conflicts and agencies (Scott *et* al., 2005, p. 22). Another recent contribution to the existing theory is the concept of institutional isomorphism; a concept deriving from organisational institutionalism, which refers to organisations', or institutions, alignment to cultural norms. This concept

states that units in a given population are forced to resemble other units facing the same environmental conditions by adjusting to a common meaning system and practices (Kontinen & Onali, 2017). Due to the nature of our research question in which current institutions and their impact, or lack thereof, is analysed, the three pillar framework is the favourable choice given its focus on current institutions and their dynamics together and apart. The concepts of deinstitutionalization and institutional isomorphism could have been beneficial if comparing the urban refugee situation in Kenya to that of another country or to analyse whether the institutional landscape in Kenya has weakened over time. This, however, is not the case for the following thesis.

What is a Refugee?

There are several terms that are used to talk about a person who had to flee their country of birth and move to another country. They can be referred to as forcibly displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants. Those terms are used interchangeably and yet, do not mean the same thing and, more importantly, do not carry the same subjectivity and connotation.

The term refugee was legally defined and embedded in universal law in 1951, when the Refugee Convention was signed by 149 states. The protocol associated with the Convention was signed in 1967. The Convention and its protocol define the status of refugees and outlines their rights (UNHCR, n.d.). To this day, the Convention and its protocol remain the centrepiece of refugee protection on a universal level. Initially, the 1951 Convention was subject to temporal and geographic limits, but the protocol amended the initial text to remove these limitations and give the Convention a universal coverage (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 2010). According to the Convention, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion (2010, p. 3). However, people having committed "*war crimes or crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes, or are guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations*" (2010, p. 3) will not be considered refugees by the Convention and will not be granted to rights associated with the convention.

The 1951 Convention distinguishes between two different kinds of refugees: the statutory refugee and the prima facie refugee.
A statutory refugee has fled their country due to fear of being persecuted for reasons such as race, religion, political opinion or sex and are, due to that well-rounded fear, unwilling or unable to return to the country of their former habitual residence.

A prima facie refugee has fled their country due to external aggression, occupation or events seriously disturbing the public order of a part or the whole of their country of origin and is compelled to seek asylum in another country (RCK, n.d.).

Two important rights that the Convention grants to refugees are that they should not be penalised for illegal entry or residence in a country and that the countries are subject to a non-refoulement principle: meaning, that refugees can enter a country without a proper visa without being penalised and that the country cannot force them to go "*to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom*" (Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 2010, p. 3). The Convention also stipulates that countries must provide "access to the courts, to primary education, to work, and the provision for documentation, including a refugee travel document in passport form" (2010, p. 3). UNHCR, in collaboration with the signatory states, are in charge of enforcing the Convention and its Protocol, and ensuring that the refugees' rights are respected.

For a matter of cohesion and exactitude, this paper will follow the terminology advocated by the Refugee Convention, and use the terms "*refugee*" and / or "*forcibly displaced person*" to refer to someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, regardless of whether the Government of Kenya and the UNHCR has officially recognized their status as a refugee or asylum seeker.

Integration of Refugees

The word integration, when used in a sociological context, refers to a process of effective participation by all members of a diverse society, both within economic, political, social and cultural aspects of life.
A refugee is a person who has fled war, violence and conflict and crossed international borders in the hopes of finding safety in another country (Hynie, 2018). Following this definition, the UNHCR, the official United Nations Refugee Agency, estimates the number of forcibly displaced persons in the world to have reached 103 million people in mid 2022. 32.5 million of these are categorised as refugees (UNHCR, 2022).
The UNHCR describes the integration of refugees as a two-way process, as it requires efforts not only from the people seeking asylum, but also from the host society (UNHCR, 2014; Strang & Ager, 2010). This includes a preparedness of the refugees to adapt to the new host society and learning how to engage in the new environment while maintaining one's cultural identity. Subsequently, the host communities must be ready to meet and support the needs of a diverse population (Robila, 2018). Integration is considered by the UNHCR to be one of the three resilient solutions to refugee problems and is regarded as the overall goal of the resettlement process (Kuhlman, 1991).

There is no single definition of integration as the word covers a great number of processes. Usually, such processes typically indicate some form of causality. However, the inter-relationship between these factors points toward a less rigid formulation. Strang and Ager (2010; 2008) instead use labelling of domains of integration. These are defined as 'foundation', 'facilitators', and 'means and markers'. Rights and citizenship are signalled as 'foundation', language, safety, and cultural knowledge as 'facilitators' and various means of social capital as well as factors such as housing, employment, and health as 'means and markers'.
The integration process for refugees is often challenged by discouraging national and local laws such as settlement policies. These policies can have direct effects on the wellbeing of refugees, both economically, socially, and institutionally. The interrelatedness of the integration process means that the more functional levels of integration, such as employment and housing, have a direct effect, and vice versa, on the social context such as public perceptions and attitudes (Hynie, 2018). This interrelatedness and the distinct influence of institutions have helped us narrow the scope of refugee integration in the following project to primarily economic and social integration.
Kuhlman (1991) proposes four criteria for assessing and defining economic integration: participation in the economy, an income allowing an acceptable standard of living, and lastly, access equal to that of the host population to those goods and services that are not determined by income level. Moreover, the term social integration can be defined as following: *"participation in a broad range of social relationships; including active engagement in a variety of social activities or relationships, and a sense of communality and identification with one's social roles"* (Holt-Lunstad, 2015). These definitions and criteria will be used as the points of departure for the following analytical section.

Social Capital Theory

Social capital has been of large interest to researchers for several decades due to it capturing the essence of several sociological concepts such as social support, social integration, norms and values (Dubos, 2017, p. vii; Manchin & Orazbayev, 2016). Social capital theory is linked to historical authors such as Marx and Weber, and later developed by three key authors Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam who contributed to the current multidisciplinary theory (Häuberer, 2011, p. 34).
This thesis will utilise the theoretical concept of Putnam (1993), which followed the concept of Coleman. Putnam's main idea describes how social networks contain resources for individuals and how these resources can be used to benefit the actions of the individual and thus influence the productivity of groups and individuals. Putnam explains how relations create networks, norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, which is the makeup of social capital. *"According to Putnam, social capital persists if trust prevails in relations. Trust itself is generated in networks of civic engagement and via norms of reciprocity constituting two additional kinds of social capital"* (Häuberer, 2011, p. 54).

Thus, social capital develops when people feel as if they share a sense of identity through similar values, trust and reciprocity, which together can help individuals to act efficiently to reach either political, economic or social goals. This can be especially beneficial for people with low human capital, such as refugees, as social capital can contribute to economic survival by acting as a substitute for conventional economic resources such as education and financial capital (Potocky-Tripodi, 2004, p. 63).
Although Putnam did not specifically apply the concept of social capital to refugees and development studies, social capital can arguably be of high importance for immigrants or refugees as social relations can be used as a substitute for economic capital (Boateng, 2010; Boyd, 1989).
Putnam highlights networks of civic engagement, referring to the expectation that civil society can strengthen the democratic performance of the state, referring in this case to a formal institution. The author explains how associations can contribute to democracy through the development of solidarity and participation among citizens which in turn can turn active individuals into community members (Häuberer, 2011, p. 54-55). Thus, the social capital theory integrates ideas from the institutional view due to its mediating position between the state and civil society by affecting both the cultural cognitive pillar, through social networks and shared perceptions, and the regulatory pillar through its ability to enhance democracy and, in turn, support the creation of trustworthy formal institutions. This makes social capital useful as a supporting theory when analysing the three pillars of institutions and how these are interrelated.

Three types of social capital have been identified as useful in refugee studies: bonding social capital, bridging social capital and linking social capital (Boateng, 2010). Bonding social capital connects homogenous groups and often exists among family members and close friends. Bridging social capital brings together more heterogeneous groups. This can for instance be the case of refugees with different backgrounds generating bridging social capital through their relations with their new host community. The term linking social capital was later added to refer to ties between different social and economic statuses (Boateng, 2010; Häuberer, 2011, p. 57). These three are interrelated in the sense that each ‘group’ can develop social capital for the other and vice versa.
Social capital theory will be used to support the institutional theory as well as to highlight our stance as critical realists by recognizing the importance of meaning in social life and the role of social capital and networks in providing information, connections to formal institutions, trust, and reciprocity.

This theory can arguably be beneficial for analysing the three pillars of institutions and exploring possible connections between social capital and sustainable social integration. However, the theory has been commonly criticised for not considering the negative possibilities of social capital such as exclusion of outsiders, downward levelling norms, and over benefiting in one group at the expense of another (Turner & An Nguyen, 2005, p. 1696; Mazzucato, 2000, p. 2). Just as social capital can provide opportunities for

insiders, it can also limit the access for outsiders. To limit such potential negative outcomes, the social capital theory will not be used on its own but rather as a means of triangulation to support the analysis of informal institutions within the Institutional Theory. As previously described, the cultural-cognitive pillar involves shared meanings and perceptions and how these constitute the social nature of reality within a society whereas the normative pillar places focus on social norms and how these arise in relations. Social capital can therefore be a useful tool to analyse these institutional pillars to understand the meaning of networks, trustworthiness and social relations in the urban landscape of Nairobi and how, or if, these factors have an impact on the process of sustainably integrating urban refugees. This will be done through an analysis of social phenomena and network relations among urban refugees in Nairobi.

Methodology

Following section is a comprehensive methodology with the intent of introducing the methods used in order to answer the research question. This includes the justification for choice and rejection of empirical research and its limitations as well as the general approach to the structure of the thesis.

Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of science is broadly defined as the study of foundations, methods, and implications of science. The study of methodology of science is at the centre of philosophy of science, as the study is centred around the qualifications, the reliability, and the overall purpose of science (Ladyman, 2002, p. 4). In research, the philosophy of science is essentially knowledge development in a particular field. Each stage of the research process is inevitably impacted by assumptions by the researcher. Personal assumptions about the nature of realities shape how research questions are understood, which methods to apply, and how to interpret the findings (Denzin, Lincoln & Guba, 1994, p. 107). The philosophy of science adopted by the researcher thus reflects the view of what is considered acceptable knowledge and how the further research process is constructed (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 128).

Understanding the philosophical approach to research can be very useful for the researcher, as it allows the researcher to make informed decisions about the design of the research and help gain an understanding of which designs will work and vice versa. Furthermore, the understanding of research philosophies can enable a better understanding of research limitations and thus provides a direction for the researcher to draw on (Pathirage *et* al., 2008, p. 8).

The philosophy of science for the following thesis takes point of departure in *critical realism*. This philosophical perspective is a branch of ontology, epistemology and axiology and underpins the collection and understanding of data. Critical realism is a philosophy that acknowledges that the world is only known under particular description and discourses and follows the notion that no one explanation is better than any other (Sayer, 2000, p. 2). Essentially, critical realism asserts that one single reality exists, but that multiple interpretations can be used to make sense of said reality (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 136). *"Critical realism claims that there are two steps to experiencing the world. First, there is the thing itself and the sensation it conveys. Second, there is the mental processing that goes on sometime after that sensation meets our senses"* (2012, p. 136). Sayer (2000, p. 3) states that critical realism recognizes the necessity of an interpretive understanding of meaning in social life and emphasises the contingency and variable character of social change. This supports our understanding of integration as a process affected by not only legislation, but also social phenomena such as culture, norms, and personal factors affecting one's sense of belonging.

Easton (2010) describes how *"critical realism is particularly well suited as a companion to case research. It justifies the study of any situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved, but only if the process involves thoughtful in depth research with the objective of understanding why things are as they are."* Compared to other philosophies of science, critical realism is compatible with a relatively large range of research methods, however it implies that the choices are dependent on the nature of the study and what one wants to learn about.
Furthermore, critical realists accept that any explanations are fundamentally interpretivist in character. This is particularly important, and can prove very complex, when analysing respondent-based data as the researchers are then required to include the understandings of the subject's understanding. Easton (2010) highlights the need for referencing, as studying expressions in itself does not provide sound explanations. This needs to be substantiated by collecting more data and by continuously asking the question "why?" until an epistemological closure, however flawed or temporary, is obtained.

Epistemologically, critical realism aims to explain the relations between events, experiences, and mechanisms. The emphasis in this branch of critical realism lies on the explanation of the constitution of empirical phenomena and thus do not seek predictions (Jeppesen, 2005, p. 5).
Sayer (2000, p. 17) describes these phenomena as intrinsically meaningful and elaborates by explaining how meaning has to be understood, not measured or counted, which subsequently means that there will always be an interpretive element in social science. Given the exploratory nature of this thesis to understand the links between institutions and integration processes of urban refugees, critical realism has been found to provide a sound philosophy of science for the chosen methodology.

Research Strategy and Design

This thesis utilises an abductive research approach in which data is collected to explore a phenomenon and identify themes and patterns with the aim of generating a new or modifying an existing theory (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 145). This research approach can be described as a mix between deduction and induction as it moves back and forth between data and theory, making the approach valuable in a context with a wealth of information in one context but far less in the context in which we are researching (2012, p. 147). Data collection in abduction is used to explore phenomena, identify themes and testing these through a framework through continuous data collection. Easton (2010) argues that this approach often goes hand in hand with critical realism.

Sayer (2000, p. 20) distinguishes between two kinds of research designs: namely, extensive and intensive. Following thesis is based on intensive research, which places focus on individual agents in contexts using interviews and qualitative analysis. This type of research studies causal groups and how these operate. The target group of the following thesis are urban refugees in Nairobi, which falls under the definition of a causal group due to their causal similarities. Intensive research designs can be used both on single case studies as well as other methods, thus aligning with the critical realist ontology (Easton, 2010).
This thesis follows a single case-study design, defined in Bent Flyvbjerg's (2011, p. 301) chapter on case studies as *"an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment."* Flyvbjerg describes how the decisive factor in defining a case as a case study is the choice of doing an individual study and creating its boundaries. Following thesis can be defined as a single case study, as the research question focuses on a single case within a real-life context. The general lack of research on institutions and their effect on urban refugees in Nairobi made it important to capture a holistic picture of the environment in the Kenyan capital and the different processes herein. The research question was thus limited to a specific demographic group to capture a deeper understanding of the refugees in Nairobi and the impact of institutions on their integration. The case study design can be described as embedded, in which there are more than one subunit of analysis. Yin (2009) explains how this allows the researcher to focus on multiple parts of a single case and thus allows for a more detailed level of inquiry. This was for instance the case with the choice of the interviewees, as they all contributed to knowledge within different subunits of our main research question.

Furthermore, the following thesis follows the idiographic research approach, which is characterised by studying the individual, whether this be a person, case or a specific setting, as a unique case (Gibbs, 2018, p. 6). The focus is on the interplay that is specific to the individual, referring in this case to the urban refugees in Nairobi. Qualitative research is often highly concerned with exploring the nature of specific phenomena.

The idiographic approach is particularly suitable for case studies as it stresses the uniqueness of the single case and simultaneously the holistic nature of the social reality in question (2018, p. 6).

The timescope of this case study follows Kenya's political initiatives to regulate refugees, starting from the 2006 Refugee Act and onwards. We chose to start in 2006 because the Refugee Act of Kenya was the first of its kind in this particular context, making it crucial to understand the legislative processes and mechanisms and how these have evolved over time. The major initiative introduced by the Act is Kenya's encampment policy that prohibits refugees to settle anywhere else but in camps. It is this policy that prevented urban refugees in Nairobi from getting a legal status in Kenya and that created the barriers for settlement in urban areas. The 2021 Act is, to this day, the latest law about refugees that was introduced by the Kenyan government. Our paper focuses on the evolution of the status of urban refugees from 2006 onwards. However, some ulterior data is mentioned such as the 1950 Convention and Protocol relating to the status of refugees that defines the universal status of refugee, and Kenya's independence in 1963 that marked the beginning of Kenya as a refugee host country.

Data Collection

Qualitative Research and Data

The following thesis uses qualitative research as a way of gathering data on the subject at hand to answer the research question. The choice of using qualitative research was made due to the non-quantitative nature of the topic and to the importance of understanding social phenomena and human behaviour to fully apprehend the topic.

The concept of qualitative research evolves with time and changes depending on the context, thus, there are numerous ways of defining it (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In their paper, Merriam and Tisdell define qualitative research as the process of "*understanding the meaning people have constructed; that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world*" (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 15). The following thesis is referring to qualitative research following this particular definition as it emphasises the importance of perceptions in qualitative research. Qualitative research as opposed to quantitative research because it uses words as data, and humans as objects of study (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 6). Additionally, qualitative research is a highly interpretative field and one of the inherent ideas to the practice of qualitative research is that objectivity can never fully be attained (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p. 7). To validate their findings and to ensure that their research is complete and as objective as possible, qualitative researchers use the method of triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p.

7). In this specific context, triangulation means using several different practices to gather data from different perspectives and ensure data complexity.

Since defining qualitative research is a challenging task, Merriam and Tisdell highlight four main characteristics that can be found in every qualitative research (2015, p. 15-18). Our research follows three of those four characteristics: the first characteristic is that qualitative research focuses on understanding a phenomenon from the interest of the community under study. This implies that researchers must take their own perspective away, and focus on understanding others perceptions and interpretations. The second characteristic is that in qualitative research, the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. The human capabilities of understanding and processing information makes the researcher the best to analyse qualitative data. However, the risk associated with that is that the researcher might bring their own biases into the research. The third characteristic is that the process of qualitative research is often inductive as the researcher starts from the data to build concepts and hypotheses, reinforcing existing theories or introducing new theories. Finally, the fourth characteristic is that the product of qualitative research is richly descriptive. In fact, words and descriptions will be used rather than numbers to describe a phenomenon. There are other characteristics inherent to qualitative research but those four are the ones observed in most cases.

Doing Development Research from Home

The following thesis is primarily based on secondary data and supported by primary data gathered through interviews. During the early process of constructing the thesis, the initial idea was to conduct field research within Nairobi to hopefully experience the dynamics and everyday-lives of urban refugees first hand. However, as our research question became clearer, we realised that it would make more sense for us to conduct the research from home, using mostly secondary data, since the phenomenon that we are investigating has a macro influence that could not have been captured holistically from interviews and discussions with micro-stakeholders. To fully comprehend the topic and answer our research question, it required an analysis based on previous work from other researchers. Additionally, to understand the effect of formal and informal institutions on the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, we needed to interview stakeholders belonging to those institutions and this was manageable to conduct online. Conducting interviews with refugees in Nairobi would have not allowed us to gather the type of data we needed to answer our research question.

In light of this decision, it was important to ensure that the quality of the data collected would not be negatively affected. Benefits from doing development research from home does not only include moral grounds, but can also be argued to *"spread the temporal scale of research"* (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 106).

This refers to the fact that a short trip overseas may provide a picture of processes at the exact moment, but fails to provide insights and the complexity of long-term processes and makes it difficult to return to knowledge to gain more data. Furthermore, while going to Kenya could have proved valuable through interviews, going abroad also entails risks: once in the country, one cannot be certain to gather the amount of data needed or meet the people one wished for, which in turn can affect the time period to gather alternative data instead. Working from home allowed us to plan what kind of data we wanted to gather and to look for alternatives when needed. Lastly, conducting research from home allowed us to look for data in English and our personal mother tongues. This ensured time-efficiency and limited the risk of data losses in translation, issues which could have been difficult to overcome when doing research in a foreign country.

Furthermore, it is crucial to be aware of the moral considerations that may arise when conducting field research in a developing country. Although in theory doing development research in the field is encouraging development and thus transforming the world for the better, "*in practice most researchers take out far more from such research trips than they give back to the people in whose communities they have been visitors*" (Unwin, 2006, p. 105). Thus, doing research from home is also a way of ensuring that the researchers do not take from the local communities under study without ever giving back.

Primary Data Collection

To supplement the secondary data collected from various databases, websites, books and research papers, interviews were conducted to gather information from professionals and experts with first-hand experience with the topic.

	Kevin Ngereso	**Derese Kassa**	**Martin Bak Jørgensen**	**Oscár García Agustín**	**Allan Mukuki**
Sector	Humanitarian	Academic	Academic	Academic	Legal
Occupation	Field Program Officer at Kenya Red Cross	Professor at Iona University, researcher, and author	Professor at Aalborg University and researcher in the Soli*City project	Professor at Aalborg University and researcher in the Soli*City project	Advocate at the High Court of Kenya and Chairman of HIAS
Country of residence	Kenya	US	Denmark	Denmark	Kenya

Figure 1. Name, sector, occupation, and country of residence of our interviewees.

It was important for the research strategy and data collection to ensure that success was not reliant on certain respondents, but rather to contact a diverse range of people to enhance the possibility of willing and interested participants (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 147). Our aim was to interview stakeholders from different industries and different backgrounds to get a more complete and holistic perspective on the topic. We decided to target three different sectors, hoping to get at least one interview per sector: the NGO sector, the academic sector, and the Kenyan legal sector. The interview with an NGO would allow us to get a very practical view on the situation of urban refugees in Nairobi and to understand the reality of the field. The interview with a researcher would allow us to get an in-depth perspective on trends and theories within the urban refugee situation. Finally, the interview with a lawyer or a member of the Kenyan legal authorities would allow us to get an institutional perspective and to understand Kenya's intentions regarding the management of urban refugees. Throughout the process, we managed to get an interview with a Kenyan advocate at the High Court of Kenya and chairperson of the HIAS board; an interview with a lecturer and author of a book on urban refugees in Nairobi; and an interview with researchers and members of the Soli-City initiative on urban sanctuaries for refugees.

Allan Mukuki, a Kenyan advocate, represented the Kenya legal sector as an advocate at the High Court of Kenya and a chairperson of the HIAS board. The interview with Allan Mukuki allowed us to gain a greater knowledge of the legal decisions and policies in Kenya through in-depth explanations of the two Refugee Acts and his views on the impact of these. His role as an advocate and his involvement in refugee affairs also

provided us with information that could not be found online. The academic sector was represented by Derese Kassa, a professor at Iona University, researcher, and author as well as Martin Bak Jørgensen and Oscár García Agustín, professors at Aalborg University and researchers in the Soli*City project. We contacted Derese Kassa after having read his book "Refugee spaces and urban citizenship in Nairobi: Africa's sanctuary city"; a book about the state-refugee relations in Nairobi with a focus on Ethiopian urban refugees. This book provided us with valuable knowledge through urban refugee interviews and an analysis of the struggles they face in Nairobi. Derese Kassa contributed with new political perspectives of urban refugees and social capital as well as personal experiences from Nairobi. Derese Kassa recommended us to contact Martin Bak Jørgensen and Oscár García Agustín, as the three of them participated in the Soli*City project together. While Martin and Oscár did not have any concrete experiences with urban refugees in Kenya, the two professors contributed with an academic and critical perspective to the analysis and discussion. Martin and Oscár were also able to provide knowledge on urban hospitality and the role of civil society actors. Lastly, Kevin Ngereso from Kenya Red Cross represented an active NGO in Nairobi and helped us gain an understanding of the work humanitarian actors conduct in Kenya and the extent of which this applies to urban refugees in Nairobi. While these interviewees are not working directly with our research question, they all contributed with knowledge that was useful for the purpose of our thesis.
With a total of four interviews we estimated that we had enough information to support our secondary data and to have a better understanding of the urban refugees situation in Nairobi.

To recruit the interviewees, we contacted authors of articles about urban refugees in Nairobi and members of NGOs on LinkedIn and via email, shared a post on LinkedIn about our project, and we benefited from the 'snowballing technique', where one contact suggests other possible interviewees and so forth, which allowed us to reach more diverse contacts with different perspectives on the research topic (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 148). Once contact was established and the interviewees agreed to an online meeting, we sent a short presentation of the purpose of the thesis (Appendix 6) as well as the structure of the interviews. This was done to establish clear expectations about the length of the interview as well as the objectives of the research (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 379).

Semi structured interviews were chosen over structured or unstructured interviews due to the broad nature of the research topic and the online format of the interviews. Semi-structured interviews are often used in exploratory studies, as this allows the interviewer to ask probing questions to encourage the interviewee to explain and build on their responses (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 378). Unstructured interviews were not considered since the interviews needed to be done online, following a specific schedule and with limited time to discuss. Thus, the conversations needed direction and some guidelines. Similarly, structured interviews were not considered since they do not leave enough room for discussion during the interview.

The interviews were based on an interview guide, in which the interviewer follows a predetermined schedule with suggested themes and questions with room for the interviewee to develop their responses and share their own thoughts (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 145). Probing questions were used to explore opinions while avoiding interview biases (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 392). We designed one overall interview guide with few deviations according to the experience and knowledge of the interviewees to grasp the nuance in everyone's discourse, based on their own experience of the topic (See Appendix 1-5). The majority of the questions were uniform through all interview guides to demonstrate the diversity, or resemblance, of the respondents and thus the dynamic nature of the study (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 151). The use of these interview guides varied depending on the organisational context and the flow of the conversation (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 374), and the use of terminology and theoretical concepts were considered according to each interviewee, since the understanding of such terms may differ.

One of the main concerns regarding interviewing involves issues around accuracy, representativeness and reliability (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 150; Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 382). Saunders *et* al. (2012) describes how findings from semi-structured interviews are not necessarily meant to be repeated, as they represent the reality of the interviewee at the time they were collected and are thus subject to change. Conversely, this can also represent a strength due to the dynamic and flexible nature of this type of research. The selection of interviewees arguably represent a wider group of researchers and their answers thus represent the context in which they are given.

The international nature of the research and the interviewees limited the ways of which the interviews could be conducted. As we chose to conduct our research remotely, the interviews were conducted online through video calls to create an as natural setting as possible. The interviews were recorded, with consent from the interviewees, and transcribed to avoid loss of the exact nature of the explanations and thus avoid interviewer bias and ensure reliable data (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 394). The interviews were transcribed using the recording and transcription function on the Teams software, then we corrected the transcriptions manually to ensure their accuracy. The transcriptions were kept in the variety of English spoken; if the interviewee used American English in their vocabulary and pronunciation, the transcriptions were made accordingly and vice versa. This was done to avoid loss of meaning in the transcription process.
Recording allowed us to focus solely on the interview without having to take notes, thus providing accurate and unbiased records. Furthermore, recordings can be beneficial as it allows us to return to any words or phrases that might have been missed or overlooked during the interview (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 150). This also allowed the use of direct quoting. Although online interviews are a great tool in cases of long

geographical distances and time management, the data collection may also entail difficulties such as noisy environments, technical issues and lack of face-to-face interactions.

Secondary Data Collection

The following thesis bases its analysis and findings mostly on secondary data. In fact, secondary data is a very valuable source of information allowing researchers to do development research from home (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 273). Secondary data collection also allows researchers to gather an amount of data that would have taken a lot of time to collect throughout interviews and observations (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 182). Our secondary data addresses the different theories introduced in our literature review, as well as the topic of our thesis: urban refugees in Nairobi.

To look for secondary data, we mostly used documents found through both online sources as well as physical sources. The term document is here used according to Merriam & Tisdell definition and refers to *"a wide range of written, visual, digital, and physical material relevant to the study"* (2015, p.162). Our main sources of data were libraries, databases, bibliographies of existing sources, websites of development agencies and NGOs, websites of governmental agencies, and various online articles and journals.

Type of Secondary Data	Number	Use
Books	24	To gather information about theories and frameworks, research methods and to gather detailed knowledge about the topic in question, including key information about issues and terminologies surrounding the topic.
Journals	31	Used to gather opinions and analytical perspectives from researchers and experts with practical knowledge on topics and theories in question.
Reports and Publications	11	To gather detailed information about the specificities of the different elements studied in this research. This is often from a practitioner's perspective rather than an academic.
Webpages	17	Used to gather data and information about particular events, organisations, and opinions.
Data Portals	9	To gather numerical data and statistics.
Working Papers	2	These papers are often based on on-going research, thus providing contemporary data embedded in environmental contexts.
Legal Documents	7	To create an understanding of the legal frameworks impacting the urban refugees in question.

Figure 2. Secondary data collection

Gathering secondary data to answer our research question proved simple since we quickly found an abundance of relevant documents. Throughout our research, we also found numerous articles and reports dating from the late 1990s and early 2000s. This pattern illustrates that the issues that we are currently investigating have been under the radar of researchers and academics for quite some time, thus validating our interest to analyse it. Additionally, looking at so many sources and documents allowed us to accumulate knowledge on the topic from different perspectives resulting in a very holistic and complete idea of the topic. Field work and primary data, especially in qualitative research, is often context dependent and embedded is subjectivity. Gathering secondary data from various sources ensures the objectivity of the analysis.

However, writing a thesis mostly based on secondary data also brings challenges. A very common responsibility associated with the collection of secondary data is to make sure that this data is appropriate (Desai & Potter, 2006, p.213). The appropriateness of secondary data sources can be ensured by looking at the authenticity of the source, the linkage to theoretical debates, the breadth of coverage, and the coverage of current events (Desai & Potter, 2006, p.213). In our case, the authenticity and the breadth of coverage of the source were the most challenging points and we had to pay extra attention to each source we found, as well as backing up websites and online articles using academic sources to confirm the events and arguments related to the first one. For matters of authenticity, the author of each article, paper, and document was verified and their expertise was evaluated as much as possible.
Additionally, there are a lot of academic sources on the matter of urban refugees in Kenya, but it can be difficult to get quantitative data on the topic. Since urban refugees are, for the large majority, not registered in Kenya, it is hard to get an exact number of the size of the population. Different sources would give different figures and we decided to rely only on the formal sources such as the UNHCR data portal to overcome this issue.

Another risk carried by the secondary data is the lack of accuracy and context related complexity. In fact, reality is never as truthfully and genuinely represented in papers than on the field. This challenge was overcome through triangulation of data and by using sources with different backgrounds to ensure a broad perspective. Additionally, most of the papers have been written by people from Northern countries, and not from people actually coming from the country of the research, making the data more prone to biases (Desai & Potter, 2006). One thing that secondary data does not allow in our specific research is to give us access to the population on which our topic focuses: refugees. However, through secondary data, we gained access to primary data collected by other researchers, which guaranteed contextual, in depth, qualitative data. For this thesis, we used primary data collected by other researchers, one of them who we have interviewed.
Finally, when collecting secondary data, one must keep in mind that the documents have not initially been published for this specific research and that they most of the time both contain unrelated information to the study and can prove to be incomplete from a research perspective (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 173-174;181). Thus, it is important during the examination of the document to only focus on the relevant information and avoid spending time considering all arguments.

Analytical Approach

Document analysis is a qualitative research technique that allows researchers to organise large amounts of data and subsequently identify the most relevant parts. This analysis can be used to examine and interpret data, both electronic and physical, to gain a deeper understanding of empiricism, and develop new knowledge (Bowen, 2009, p. 28).

Organisational and institutional documents have long been seen as a staple in qualitative research. These kinds of documents have been used as secondary data to gather information about legislation, history and other factual data for the thesis. As gathering and understanding large amounts of data can be quite time consuming, document analysis was applied to systematically review and evaluate documents.
This particular analytical approach was vital for collecting and interpreting factual documents, due to the considerations one must keep in mind when doing development research. One of these considerations is the 'cyber-geographies' of power, referring to the fact that most documents stemming from developing countries are most likely created by the 'elites' due to the limited reach of the internet in this part of the world. This makes it more complicated to gather the viewpoint of the poor or the marginalised if not triangulated with different data as well (Desai & Potter, 2006, p. 278). Furthermore, the internet is not a neutral technology and can thus be highly influenced by personal attitudes, political domination, and hidden agendas. This is not only the case with local articles and papers, but also online research journals which can be accessed and edited by anyone with access to the particular website (2006, p. 274).
This method was therefore used as a means of triangulation to seek convergence through use of different data sources. As both primary and secondary data was collected to answer our research question, triangulation of data was used to provide evidence and thus breed credibility (Bowen, 2009, p. 28-29).
This method was utilised in combination with thematic analysis, which is used to identify, analyse, and report patterns within datasets. This analysis is often not explicitly claimed as a method by researchers, as it is often implicitly used through other analytical frameworks. Thematic analysis can be used both to reflect reality and to unravel the surface of said and is often used in qualitative research. According to Virginia Braun and Victoria Clark, *"thematic analysis should be seen as a fundamental method for qualitative analysis"* (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 6). The following thesis will thus utilise theoretical thematic analysis, which is driven by the research question and therefore places focus on the aspect of the data that is relevant to the research in question.

Another analytical approach adopted for the following thesis is the *critical discourse analysis.*
The word discourse can be described as the general idea that language is constructed according to different patterns that people's expressions align with when taking parts in different domains of social life (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). A discourse analysis is used to analyse these patterns. There is not one single approach to discourse analysis nor a clear consensus on how to analyse different discourses, making the analytical framework differ from literature to literature.
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse in which the main concern is how language contributes to the reproduction or transformation of social problems. Essentially, CDA views language as a form of social practices that can have a great effect on social problems and constrain human flourishing. *"The concept of discourse, or the way in which language is used, is an aid*

to understanding the tendencies by which societies organize and understand themselves and how parts of society become organized by forms of language use." (Farrelly, 2019, p. 2). Thus, CDA seeks to use analysis of language in societies as a way of identifying and clarifying the causes of social issues as well as the possibilities to change these. This was useful for the following thesis to touch upon the possibility of integration of urban refugees as a social issue constructed by societal discourses. It is important to note that the analysis should not be used to provide complete solutions, but rather as a tool to provide insights for researchers or for those who can push for change (2019, p. 3).

One of the key-words of CDA is *social practices*. This not only includes the use of language, but also habits, social relations- and roles, ideologies, power relations and other types of semantic systems. Furthermore, CDA regards discourses as historical and should therefore be understood according to the context in question. This means that discourses are embedded in societies and culture and reversely constituted by these as well (Titscher *et* al., 2000, p. 146). This notion works conjointly with our philosophy of science where research is context-dependent.
As a theory, CDA distinguishes between discourse and text. Farrelly (2019, p. 5) explains how these both refer to language, but have characteristics that are methodologically important. *Text* is the language produced in discursive events, often in a unique setting, whereas *discourse* refers to the pattern of language use across a social practice. This distinction is an important basis for the analytical use of critical discourse analysis.

The critical discourse analysis was used implicitly throughout the following thesis as a tool to analyse the informal institutions in Nairobi, Kenya. Both the normative and cultural-cognitive institutions emphasise interactions, appropriate behaviour, words, gestures and other socially constructed practices in society. CDA will therefore be applied to the data collected, both secondary- and primary data, to critically interpret the language in use and thus elucidate the influence of discourses in transforming social problems. This analytical tool will be beneficial to gain an understanding of which features of a text (including transcriptions) are unique to the specific event and the extent of which they are a product of habits of a social practice. It is important to note that CDA was not used as a tool to create solutions, but rather to explore the meaning of discourses in refugee studies.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations in qualitative research, whether it is field research or research from home, is based on the recognition of the rights of the 'researched' (Brydon, 2006, p. 26). To follow ethical considerations in research is to care about the impact that the research may have on the 'researched'. In our case, our research and primary data collection consist of interviews. Thus, it is particularly important to be mindful of ethical considerations in the process of conducting interviews since the object of inquiry is one or several human

beings (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In an interview, the object of the research is participating actively in the research by being at the centre of it. The research thus has as much impact on them as they have on it (Brydon, 2006, p. 26).

The notions of informed consent and right to privacy are two very important topics to consider when doing interviews. Informed consent refers to the *"consent received from the subject after he or she has been carefully and truthfully informed about the research"* (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p. 70). The right to privacy refers to respecting the identity of the subject and inquiring about whether the subject wants their name included in the research or if they prefer that pseudonym be used. Asking for consent and ensuring confidentiality, if requested, can help establish credibility and gain the confidence of the interviewee (Saunders *et* al., 2012, p. 389). In our case, we informed all of the interviewees about the topic of the research prior to the interview via a short written presentation stating the research topic as well as the content of the interview and the expected topics of discussion (Appendix 6). At the beginning of each interview, the interviewee was given a short introduction of the research project and asked for permission to record the conversation as well as to use their name in our thesis. We also offered them the possibility of using a pseudonym instead of their name. All the interviewees gave their permission to both record the conversation and to use their names in our paper. The interviews were conducted online, on a meeting platform, and both the sound and the video were rerecorded. However, no trace of the interviewee's consent to record has been kept since it was asked orally and prior to recording. The recordings have only been viewed / listened to by the two researchers leading this research and they have only been used for academic purposes. The conversations have been transcribed using the Teams transcription software and afterward by hand to ensure the accuracy of the transcripts. They can be found in Appendix 2-5 of this thesis.

Additionally, it is important to consider how to give back to the people that have participated in the research, in our case, the interviewees, as interviews are not about the interviewee giving something to the interviewer, it is rather a partnership from which both parties should benefit. Looking into the institutions' influence on the integration of urban refugees has rarely been done before, thus our findings can benefit the researchers in the field of refugee management to know more about the interaction between institutions and integration, in a world where the number of refugees increases continuously.

Moving away from the ethical considerations during the data collection, there are also some important ethical considerations to have regarding the impact of the research on the topic at hand. This is particularly true in the field of development, as people undertaking development research do so with the intention that their work has a positive impact on the world. In the case of people from the First World doing development research on Third World phenomena, since the researcher is not part of the 'researched', it is easy to let their reflexivity and their biases impact the research (Berger, 2015, p.220). One way to avoid that is to be aware of

the impact that the self has in knowledge creation, and to reflect on the use that researchers make of the knowledge that is produced to ensure that it actually benefits the cause (Berger, 2015, p.220; Unwin, 2006, p.105). We believe that our paper gathers valuable information from different stakeholders and provides tools to understand the situation of urban refugees in Nairobi and the influence of institutions on their situation. We do not claim that our research will positively impact the situation of urban refugees in Nairobi and we are aware that although our topic focuses on a specific group of people, our research will never directly impact them, as it will rather provide information and reflection on their situation for experts and or researchers. Additionally, since we did not go to the field and instead gathered primary data directly from the group of people we are researching, it is important to remain mindful of the fact that this research stands from an organisational and academical perspective and not from a field perspective and should be handled as such. This affects our theoretical and analytical lens because it allows us to be more theoretical in our study of the social phenomena embedded in our topic, and less concrete on our findings and recommendations due to the sensitive and political nature of the topic.

Limitations and Delimitations

During the data collection part of our project, we faced numerous limitations.
The main limitation we faced was the fact that we were not able to collect primary data in Nairobi. This project idea was initially designed to rely mostly on primary data that would be collected throughout field research in Nairobi, Kenya but we had to modify our approach and conduct research from Denmark instead. The first reason why we did not conduct field research in Nairobi was because we did not have a local point of contact, or any local network, which is a critical factor of doing field research abroad (Brydon, 2006). In fact, to collect data in Nairobi we would have needed a point of contact, ideally an NGO, to introduce us to the urban refugee reality in Nairobi, advise us on the neighbourhoods to go to interview people, accompany us during our interviews for security reasons, and perhaps provide us a form of credibility in the eyes of other NGOs and governmental agencies. Partnering with an NGO would have also allowed us to witness their work and their direct impact on the life of urban refugees in Nairobi, giving us the data, we need for the thesis. Additionally, we needed a translator to ensure that we would have been able to conduct and understand interviews with refugees who come from a country where English is not the main language, like Somalia or Sudan. However, due to a lack of network we could not find any coordinator in the field, making the success of the field research very uncertain. In fact, it would have been harder to find potential interviewees, especially given the informality of the status of refugee. As urban refugees in Nairobi do not have a legal status in Kenya and are living in very precarious situations, coming there without the clearance of a contact point would have made it harder for us to gain their trust. Additionally, knowing where to find potential respondents and their traceability would have represented a challenge. There were also certain safety issues associated with conducting field research in Nairobi without a formal coordinator, as some of

the more known refugee areas in Nairobi have a history of crime (Dr. Omaha, 2016, p. 6). Thus, the lack of formal point of contact in Nairobi compromised the potential value added of conducting field research.
The second reason why we did not conduct field research in Nairobi is because it represents a heavy financial cost and we could not apply to any available grants as our project did not match any grants that we looked into. In fact, the deadlines of the applications did not match the time that we planned on going to Kenya, or the lengths of the field research required by the grant did not correspond to our trip. As an example, some grants would require us to stay three months in Nairobi when we only needed to stay around three weeks to gather our data.
The third reason why we did not conduct field research in Nairobi is because we realised that it made more sense to conduct this research from home, based on documents and secondary data, as well as online interviews with relevant stakeholders. On the one hand, there is a lot of valuable data available online, on the topic of urban refugees, making our research possible to conduct from Denmark without having to compromise on the quality of our findings. On the other hand, the stakeholders that we planned on interviewing were easier to interview online since they were located at different places in the world: Denmark, Kenya, USA. Thus, it did not make sense for us to travel to Nairobi to do interviews.
Therefore, we decided not to go on the field and to, instead, base our analysis on secondary data and primary data that would be collected through interviews with relevant stakeholders.

The second limitation we faced was that we had a low response rate on interview requests. Our goal was to conduct interviews with a minimum of one expert from the following sectors: the humanitarian aid sector, the Kenyan legal authorities, and the academic sector. Those three types of stakeholders were targeted in order to get a holistic perspective on the matter of urban refugees in Nairobi. We had a great response rate from researchers and Kenyan legal experts, however the response rate from the humanitarian aid sector was lower than anticipated. Between October 2022 and April 2023, we contacted nine NGOs and managed to do one interview. Two of the organisations we contacted answered that they did not have relevant expertise on the topic because they did not have any programs for urban refugees in Nairobi and the rest did not follow up on our request. Seeing that email and LinkedIn was not working, we went to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) office in Copenhagen to request a meeting, but it was unsuccessful. One of the reasons that we experienced low response rate from the humanitarian aid sector could be that NGOs and other humanitarian organisations provide low to no support to urban refugees in Kenya and concentrate their aid on the camps, thus having no information to share for our project. However, already having one interview with a representative from an NGO in Kenya, as well as a legal expert with knowledge on national and international humanitarian aid, we gathered enough data to go on with our research. Thus, while more interviews with humanitarian organisations could have provided a broader perspective on the context and the help they provide, the low response rate forced us to seek other forms of data around this area.

Our research was also very much delimited by the laws regarding refugees in Kenya. As a matter of fact, a lot of the literature stems from before the 2021 Refugee Act, which created difficulties with gathering data surrounding the new Act and the discussions it may have raised. Furthermore, as the 2021 Refugee Act is still in the process of being implemented and long-term effects have yet to show, this must be taken into consideration for the conclusion of the thesis.
Following thesis is therefore written with the allegation that most of the provisions within the 2021 Refugee Act will be executed to a certain extent.

Context in Kenya and Literature around the Context

Following section is created to outline the historical context of refugees in Kenya, including the different legislative processes, programmes and demographics, to create a sound point of departure for the analysis and findings.

Refugees in Kenya and Refugee Laws and Programmes

As of December 2022, Kenya hosts 573,508 refugees and asylum seekers and is the 5th largest refugee-hosting country in the African continent (Operational Data Portal UNHCR). This is due to its specific location and its proximity with the two main refugee producing countries: Somalia and South Sudan. Indeed, 56% of refugees in Kenya are from Somalia, 30% percent are from South Sudan, 7% are from the DRC, and 4% from Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2022). 43% of the refugees and asylum seekers are hosted in Turkana County, where the Kakuma Camp and the Kalobeyei integrated settlement are located; 41% are hosted in Garissa, where the Dadaab refugee complex is located, and the remaining 16% (90,918) of refugees are located in Nairobi (UNHCR, 2022). It should be noted that this number is only the official number known by UNHCR. We thus expect this number to be higher in reality as many urban refugees are unregistered and because the informality of this population makes it difficult to measure exact numbers.



Figure 3. Map of refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya. Source from UNHCR, 2023

Kenya is a signatory of several international policies regarding the status and rights of refugees. In fact, Kenya ratified the Refugee Convention and its Protocol in 1981, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention in 1992 (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, n.d.). However, until 2006 Kenya did not initiate any national policy or law regarding refugee management and until the end of the 80s, refugees in Kenya had the right to settle and work anywhere as long as they had a work permit from the authorities (Omata, 2016, p. 5).

Kenya gained independence in 1963 and started hosting refugees ever since (Refugee Consortium of Kenya). Between 1963 and 1989 there were around 20,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, most of them from Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. Refugees were allowed to move anywhere in the country and to receive a work permit. In 1967, the Immigration Act was created to regulate the entrance of refugees. This Act introduced the entry permits, but did not touch upon the terms of stay of refugees. Most of the refugees at this time could settle and work anywhere, resulting in high integration of refugees to Kenyan society (RCK, n.d.).

In the early 90s, the political instability in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia created an influx of approximately 200,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, overwhelming the management system. The government did not have the resources or expertise to manage such an intense wave of arrival and handed refugee management to the UNHCR. The Dadaab and Kakuma camps were set-up around the same time, close to the border of South-Sudan, Uganda and Somalia, as a temporary solution to welcome refugees directly.

Around the same time, refugees started to be perceived as a threat to national security and to the economy of the country. Hosting refugees started being seen by the Kenyan population and the authorities as the direct cause for the proliferation of arms, and the increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya (Omata, 2016, p. 6). Especially as the Somalia-based Islamist insurgent group, Al-Shabab, increased its terrorist attacks in Kenya

in 2013 and 2015, creating a fear of refugees amongst the Kenyan society, and particularly a fear of Somali refugees (RCK, n.d.). To answer this feeling of insecurity the government, Kenya initiated its first national policy regarding refugee management (Dr. Omata, 2016). The Refugee Act was approved in 2006 and became operational in 2007. It established institutions that would manage refugee affairs and it elaborated on the rights that refugees had in Kenya. As an example, the 2006 Refugee Act states that refugees have the right to work and earn a living by applying for a work permit. In 2012, the Government of Kenya added a new provision to the 2006 Act, which stated that all refugees were obligated to live and work in camps, subsequently sending refugees to remote and underdeveloped parts of the country with limited opportunities to leave the camps (Goitum, 2016, p. 201).

In 2021, Kenya signed a new Refugee Act that became enforced February 2022 and will provide future opportunities for economic and social integration of refugees in Kenya. The 2021 Refugee Act grants the rights to refugees *"to engage individually or in a group, in gainful employment or enterprise or to practise a profession or trade where he holds qualifications recognized by competent authorities in Kenya."* (Leghtas and Kitenge, 2022). But the practicalities of getting a job are not as simple as it seems because to get their qualifications recognised, refugees have to go and get a certification from the Refugee Affairs Secretariat located in Nairobi and hand them the relevant document that proves that they are qualified. However, most refugees do not have those documents on them and it usually takes a long time for them to get approval.

The 2021 Refugee Act also introduces the concept of designated areas as a replacement for camps. Refugees will be given the opportunity to get land in areas that the government calls "settlements". However, the working opportunities will most likely be outside of those designated areas and the refugees will have to apply for a movement pass with the Department of Refugee Services (DRS), formerly known as Refugee Affair Secretariat (RAS), to travel outside of camps and designated areas. A change compared to the previous Refugee Act since refugees could not own land before (Leghtas and Kitenge, 2022).

But the main difference that the 2021 Refugee Act brings regards the refugees from the East African Community (EAC) countries. The EAC countries are the following: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania Uganda, and the newest member, the DRC. According to the Act, the refugees from the EAC countries that are located in Kenya can choose to give up on their status of refugees and adopt the status of EAC citizens instead. This status grants them the right to move freely across the country and establish themselves where they want. Although they would still need to apply for a permit to work, they have the opportunity to work wherever in the country (Leghtas and Kitenge, 2022).



Figure 4. Timeline of the laws and historical context of Kenya regarding refugees.

Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya

To this day, refugees in Kenya are still required by law to live in camps or designated areas and cannot travel within the county without a permit. However, as we saw earlier, 16% of the refugees decide to establish themselves illegally in Nairobi (UNHCR). In fact, the Kenyan encampment policy allows few exceptions, and refugees can apply to resettle outside of the camps. However, those permissions are very hard to get and according to Allan M. Mukiki, 90% of the refugees living in Nairobi reside there illegally and in precarious situations where they often can get arrested (Appendix 4). When in Nairobi, and despite not having a legal permit to remain there, refugees still have the right to access education like any other Kenyan, however, they do not benefit from any humanitarian aid as the NGOs' initiatives to urban refugees are very limited due to their illegal status (Omata, 2016). The main refugee communities located in Nairobi are from the DRC, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan, with Congolese and Somalis being the biggest communities (UNHCR, 2023). Figure 5 shows the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya's biggest urban areas. However, it is important to keep in mind that not all urban refugees are registered, meaning that there are most likely even more refugees in urban areas than what the official numbers suggest (Muindi and Mberu, 2019).

Number of refugees and asylum seekers in Nairobi, Nakuru, and Mombasa						
	2018	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**2022**	**2023**
Somalia	22,558	21,214	21,583	22,813	23,649	23,691
South Sudan	5,858	8,426	8,458	8,473	8,557	8,541
DRC	28,980	30,046	30,711	31,148	33,752	34,018
Ethiopia	10,721	10,766	11,102	12,050	13,783	13,967
Burundi	3,237	3,791	4,228	4,239	5,268	5,404
Sudan	181	180	179	192	200	200
Uganda	846	906	875	859	955	971
Eritrea	1,607	1,793	1,851	2,149	2,511	2,545
Rwanda	1,117	1,129	1,165	1,166	1,283	1,295
Other	607	661	746	850	960	966
Total	75,742	78,912	80,898	83,939	90,918	91,598

Figure 5. Number of urban refugees in Nairobi, Nakuru, and Mombassa per nationality, from 2028 to 2013. Data retrieved from UNHCR 2023.

To analyse the situation of urban refugees in Nairobi, this paper uses the data and findings from several papers, including the 2016 and 2022 papers of Naohiko Omata and from the 2018 book by Derese Kassa. Omata writes about the Somali and Congolese refugees in Nairobi, while D. Kassa writes about Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi. Our paper uses those two resources to get a holistic and complete view on the situation of urban refugees in Nairobi and to understand the potential opportunities for integration for refugees from the three biggest urban refugee communities in Nairobi.

According to research by Muindi and Mberu, before moving to Nairobi, 61% of the 847 refugees they interviewed lived in the camps, meaning that the remaining 39% came directly from their country of origin (2019, p. 13). The main motive for refugees to resettle in Nairobi is the hope of accessing better employment opportunities, better education and better social services than in the camp or than in their country of origin (Omata, 2016; Kassa, 2018). In addition to economic reasons, refugees also move to Nairobi from the camps for security reasons since the camps can be a dangerous place for refugees from certain communities or tribes. As an example, Congolese refugees avoid going to Kakuma since they know that there will be other refugees from the DRC, potentially belonging to an enemy tribe (Omata, 2016). It is the same thing with

Ethiopian refugees that are more vulnerable to agents from the Ethiopian government in the camps (Kassa, 2018). Kassa introduces another motive in his book and argues that refugees are going to Nairobi only to transit to another country. Some refugees hope to transit to West European and North American countries and apply for a visa as economic immigrants. According to Kassa, economic immigrants are facing poor economic conditions in their home country and thus seek an improved standard of living by travelling across borders, legally or illegally. Nairobi represents the African entry point for those countries since a lot of international institutions responsible for immigration and visa are located in Nairobi (2018). Other refugees seek to transit to South Africa through illegal human trafficking networks from Ethiopia, through Nairobi and to South Africa. D. Kassa also emphasises the fact that the urban refugees in Nairobi are not all refugees according to the 1951 Convention definition. They are considered refugees by the Kenyan state because they do not have proper permits and visas to be there, but they are not all facing threats in their country of origin. Some of them have families, homes, jobs back in their countries, but they decided to come to Nairobi hoping to benefit from the better economic opportunities in Nairobi. Others came to reunite with family members, friends, or partners.



Figure 6. Reasons for leaving the country of origin. Source from Muindi and Mberu, 2019, p. 13.

The large majority of the Somali and Ethiopian refugees reside in the Eastleigh district and rely on their respective community to survive and find a job. In 2016, the Somali refugees in Eastleigh were estimated to be 30,000. They started to settle in Eastleigh after the civil war, shortly after 1990 and since then the neighbourhood has been recognized as one of the most economically dynamic areas of Nairobi.
In 2014, the informal sector represented 82% of employment in Kenya (World Bank Group, 2016), and "*As of 2006, nearly 70% of Nairobi's population was estimated to be working in the informal sector*" (Omata,

2016, p. 8). The size of the informal sector in Nairobi also gives various working opportunities to refugees that are not allowed to get a job in the formal sector.

Analysis and Findings

The following section is a comprehensive analysis of the formal and informal institutions in Nairobi and how these impact the integration of urban refugees in the capital city. To answer our research question the analysis has been structured in three main parts, following the framework laid out by Scott's Institutional Theory: First, the impact of Kenyan regulative institutions and international NGOs, considered in this paper as formal institutions, will be presented and analysed. Secondly, the findings in relation to the normative and cultural-cognitive institutions will be presented. This will include an analysis of social capital and social networks and their impact on the urban refugees.
The final section will provide a holistic view of the three pillars to highlight their interdependency and to conclude their impact synergistically and individually. The analysis and its findings is primarily based on secondary data. Primary data gathered from interviews is used to provide quotes and professional opinions to triangulate and support the secondary data collected.

The Impact of Formal Institutions: The Regulatory Pillar

As previously described, Kenya became the 5th largest refugee-hosting country in the African continent as of December 2022 (Operational Data Portal UNHCR). The country hosts approximately 573.500 refugees, of which almost 91.000 reside in the capital city, Nairobi (UNHCR, 2022). The main national institutions concerned with refugees are the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) and the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) which falls under the Government of Kenya. The UNHCR is the main non-governmental formal institution in the country and carries the main responsibility of refugee affairs management in Kenya. It was given the responsibility of refugee affair management in the early 90s, when Kenya experienced a heavy influx of refugees due to civil wars and conflicts in the neighbouring regions. At this time, the government did not have the resources nor the expertise to welcome and integrate so many refugees. The UNHCR is described as *"the cornerstone in the body of laws that establish standards for refugee protection"* (RCK, n.d.). Other large NGOs with presence in Kenya include the Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), HIAS, Kenya Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council and many others. These NGOs are not only stakeholders in governance, but function as a driving force for international cooperation and the mobilisation of public support for international agreements. NGOs can provide several services for refugees, both in the form of humanitarian aid but can also in some cases act as intellectual competitions to governments through efficient

decision-making processes and strategic alliances. This can be of particular importance in developing countries, as NGOs can have the skills and knowledge to respond more rapidly than national governments, can help strengthen international obligations and standards and offer knowledge to governments and politicians (Konzolo, n.d.). The Government of Kenya and the UNHCR are the two formal institutions with the largest say regarding the legislation, the formal responsibility of refugee affairs management in Kenya, and the sanctions that entail if these legislations are violated. The institutional context shaped by the NGOs and the host government is often framed as a "double-chain of administration" (Omata, 2020, p. 867). We will analyse this phenomenon and its impact on urban refugees in the following section.

Kenya's Encampment Policy: A Coercive Model Induced by Fear

The most notable initiative Kenya has introduced to their refugee policy since gaining their independence is arguably the encampment policy introduced in 2012 as a new contribution to the 2006 Refugee Act. This legislation required all refugees and asylum seekers to relocate to designated camps (Goitum, 2016 p. 201). Around a year before the encampment policy was proposed, the government and UNHCR started issuing alien certificates to urban refugees in Nairobi. These provided refugees the right to reside in Nairobi, served as an identification card and a vital documentation if wanting to obtain a business permit. These cards, if gained the status of mature alien certificates, also provided urban refugees a Kenyan exit visa which made it possible to travel to Western countries and hopefully settle there (Kassa, 2019, p. 56). While the process to obtain such a certificate is lengthy, this provided urban refugees the right to create a life for themselves in Nairobi. Around 4.000 urban refugees were given this alien certificate before the encampment legislation was enforced. The registration of new arrivals in Nairobi was officially discontinued in 2015, after the Westgate incident, and froze the issuance of new refugee certificates (UNHCR, 2015).
The 2013 Westgate incident, along with other attacks led by the Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab in Kenya, created a generalised fear of refugees amongst the Kenyans society. The encampment policy initially comes as an emergency response to the "p*opularization of the notion that refugees and asylum seekers present a threat to security, and that their presence in the country exacerbates occurrence of terrorist incidents*" (RCK, n.d.). Where refugees previously could be registered in urban centres and engaged in informal employment, this new addition to the law constrained their ability to move around in the country. It then officially became a criminal offence for refugees to live outside of Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, thus hindering urban refugees' integration (NRC, 2017, p. 9).

To enforce this law and overcome logistical challenges, the government issued a directive ordering all Kenyans to report any refugees living in the city and deployed an additional 500 law enforcement officers to Nairobi and Mombasa, another large city in Kenya, as a way of enhancing security and surveillance: in other

words, to enforce the new encampment policy (Goitum, 2016, p. 208). This, however, was declared unconstitutional and in violation of the refugee laws and conventions that Kenya are signatory to. To this day, urban refugees in Nairobi still live in fear of being repatriated or taken to camps (Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 9). This allocation of police points towards a somewhat desperate solution from the Government of Kenya to control the high number of refugees coming into the country and arguably creates a discourse of urban refugees as a dangerous population that should be contained. This creates a stigma of urban refugees as a threat to Kenyan security which fuels the fear, insecurity and xenophobia that some Kenyans may have towards urban refugees (Kassa, 2018, p. 39). Allowing this fear to grow can thus counteract sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi.

As a part of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Kenya acceded to the provision in the Convention on nonrefoulement stating that *"no State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture"* (Goitum, 2016, p. 202). However, as a part of Article 19 and 21 in the 2006 Refugee Act, any person can have their refugee status revoked, and thus not allowed to be in the country, if a commissioner has *"...reasonable grounds for regarding that person as a danger to national security or to any community of that country"* or if *"... the Minister considers the expulsion to be necessary on the grounds of national security or public order"* (Kassa, 2019, p. 53; The Refugees Act of 2006). If any person loses their refugee status, his or her family also loses their status. The law does not specify what "reasonable ground" constitutes nor where the expelled refugees are sent afterwards. Article 19 and 21 arguably contradicts the provision to the Convention of non refoulement, as these provide extrajudicial prerogatives to the DRA by allowing commissioners to expel refugees based on unclear definitions of national threats (2019, p. 53). In the year following the enforcement of the encampment policy around 350 refugees in Nairobi, in which a few were officially registered as urban refugees, were said to have been deported back to their country of origin (Goitum, 2016, p. 209).
Another notable provision was added in the 2014 amendment of the 2006 Refugee Act, which sought to drastically reduce the number of refugees in the country. Article 16A states that the number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay in Kenya shall not exceed 150 thousand (The Refugees Act of 2006), illustrating the government insecurity surrounding refugees as well as their incapacity to manage the large number of refugees in the country, which was also the issue in the early 90's.
In the year of the amendment, Kenya was the host of almost 600 thousand refugees (UN DESA, 2020). The implementation of this law would thus have resulted in the expulsion or refoulement of almost 400 thousand refugees. This amendment was deemed unconstitutional and thus ineffective by the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya in 2015 (Goitum, 2016, p. 209). These provisions to the 2006 Refugee Act are arguably examples of the country's reluctance to host refugees and asylum seekers and

their attempts to limit this number through strict, and occasionally unconstitutional, implementations of refugee policies.

It may be argued that the 2006 Refugee Act therefore represented an apprehensive and potentially ostracising discourse from the Government of Kenya, as several of the articles and amendments carried a negative connotation regarding the influx of refugees and their opportunities to make a life for themselves in Kenya and Nairobi in particular. The combination of the governments' insecurity surrounding urban refugees, the corruption of the police force and the weak, unconstitutional definitions in the 2006 Refugee Act arguably points towards a regulatory institution that has not been able to keep up with the large influx of refugees and instead enforced legal constraints that left urban refugees in Nairobi vulnerable to harassment and the fear of expulsion, either to refugee camps or their home country.

The 2021 Refugee Act: A Mitigated Impact on Urban Refugees' Integration

In November 2021, the President of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta signed the Refugee Act 2021. The Refugees Bill was developed in 2019 to respond to the current context of refugee management in Kenya, which was challenged by unconventional articles and difficulties with large-scale refugee management (RCK, 2022, p. 1). The Act affirms the commitment of the Government of Kenya to offer refugee protection in line with the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the OAU Convention and was operationalized in February 2022 (Leghtas & Kitenge, 2022). The new Act has made policy changes regarding economic inclusion, the RSD process and the ability for refugees to contribute to Kenya's economy. The New Act enhances urban refugee's integration depending on their nationality. Additionally, it introduced the concept of designated settlements which are an alternative to camps giving more freedom to the refugees but still preventing them from accessing Kenya's urban areas.

Provision for EAC Citizenship: Creating Nationality-based Barriers to Integration

Mr. Allan Mukuki, an advocate at the High Court of Kenya, described in an interview one of the main policy changes in the new Refugee Act of 2021: *"So what is going on now in the region, and Kenya is the first one in this, is for instance, there's a provision in Section 28 of the new Refugee Act that a refugee can now change their citizenry if they come from East Africa. They can now change their state, transform refugeeship to an East African citizen, so that you enjoy East African citizenship privileges"* (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

Essentially, The Act states that refugees from EAC countries (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, and Kenya) can decide to renounce their refugee status and use their status as EAC citizens instead. Refugees from these countries would thus benefit from free movement and the right to work in Kenya without obtaining the movement pass that remains in force for other refugees. The EAC citizens are

still required to obtain a work permit. According to statistics by UNHCR, the majority of the refugees living in Nairobi are Congolese, Southern Sudanese, Somalis, and Ethiopian (UNHCR, 2023). As Somalis and Ethiopian are not from EAC countries they cannot benefit from this new EAC citizen status that would have allowed them to remain in Nairobi legally. Although the new provision for EAC citizenship is positively influencing urban refugee's integration in Nairobi, it only benefits half of the ninety thousand urban refugees currently established in the capital city.

Mr. Allan Mukuki sees the recognition of the EAC community as a step in the right direction for local integration in the country, as the privilege of free movement will arguably make it less challenging for the EAC citizens to obtain their work permit and subsequently seek towards cities with appealing job prospects. In the long term, the number of refugees residing in informal settlements in Nairobi will naturally decrease, thus reducing the number of refugees that the few humanitarian aid organisations in Nairobi will need to provide aid for and perhaps diminish the idea of urban refugees as dangerous citizens and instead as contributing actors to society. This can then also lead to enhanced social integration in the society.

Mr. Allan Mukuki also expects that the new EAC citizen status will make it easier for this part of the refugee population to access financial services, such as saving accounts and obtaining loans, which will in turn boost their integration process and their contribution to the economy (Leghtas & Kitenge, 2022).

However, more than 60% of the refugees in all of Kenya and around 45% in Nairobi are non-EAC citizens (UNHCR, 2023). So how will these benefit from the new Act?

Another new provision provides that refugees *"…recognized under this Act shall have the right to engage individually or in a group, in gainful employment or enterprise or to practise a profession or trade where he holds qualifications recognized by competent authorities in Kenya"* (The Refugees Act of 2021, Article 28.5). This Article states that refugees must have their qualifications recognized by the Kenyan National Qualifications Authority to be able to work formally. The urban refugees in Nairobi arguably have easier access to this institution than the refugees in camps, as they will not have to go through the process of obtaining a permit to leave the camp beforehand. However, as many refugees have fled their home countries in fear of conflicts, most refugees are not in possession of all their diplomas and achievements received in their home country (Leghtas & Kitenge, 2022). This nuance has not been considered in the Refugees Act and therefore restricts the ability of refugees, urban as well as in camps, to obtain work permits and thus contribute formally to the economy: *"…so they do not have any documentation to show that they are refugees because if you have any documentation as a refugee, you are supposed to be in a camp, a refugee camp or a settlement"* (Kevin Ngereso, Appendix 3).

Therefore, the provisions introduced by the New Act regarding the EAC citizenship and the access to work permits only favours urban refugees from EAC countries who will be able to remain in Nairobi legally and

work outside or designated areas and camps. For the urban refugees from other countries, such as Somalia and Ethiopia, the New Act will not favour their integration and their status as urban refugees will remain illegal.

Designated Areas and Settlements: An Alternative to Camps

One of the most notable changes in the new Refugee Act is arguably the establishment of the so-called designated areas within specific counties declared by the Cabinet Secretary.
Since the publication of the new Act, many have speculated about the definition and execution of such designated areas and if these can contribute to sustainable integration of refugees to a greater extent than the old encampment policy. In 2021 the Government of Kenya announced their intention to work towards the closure of the refugee camps (UNHCR, 2021). This, however, is not mentioned in the new Act and there has been no further development of this statement, thus indicating that the Government of Kenya are commencing their old policy of encampment of refugees. While this provision does not directly impact the urban refugees in Nairobi, the execution and prospects might influence the decisions of refugees to seek towards the capital city for better opportunities.

Article 39 in the Refugee Act of 2021 states the requirement of refugees to reside in designated areas. This provision followed a meeting between the Government of Kenya and the UNHCR, in which the two institutions concluded that refugee camps were not a long-term solution to forced displacement and agreed to find alternative solutions and subsequently close the existing refugee camps (UNHCR, 2021). Later that same year the President of Kenya signed the new Act, which refers to *designated areas* instead of *refugee camps*, thus moving away from the initial announcement of closing camps and instead working towards creating new areas specifically for refugees. These areas are defined as any reception areas, transit points or settlement areas as declared by the Cabinet Secretary (Leghtas & Kitenge, 2022). The Commissioner works with the national and county government authorities to enforce the legislation and ensure the protection of the designated areas.

According to Article 31 (The Refugees Act of 2021), *"Any refugee or asylum seeker residing outside a designated area at the commencement of this Act shall, as soon as is practicable after the commencement, notify the Commissioner in the prescribed manner of his or her situation and the Commissioner shall make such orders as may be necessary in the circumstances"*. The Act does not describe which circumstances or situations allow for urban refugees to reside in Nairobi, nor a guideline as to how to obtain this knowledge. As in the 2006 Refugee Act, urban refugees will thus still have to go through the process of obtaining a movement pass with the DRS to reside in Nairobi legally. *"So there is some level of incentives that are*

provided to these individuals, and they can be able to settle in any of our urban refugee areas as long as they have documentation to show that and be able to freely access services as other Kenyans" (Kevin Ngereso, Appendix 3).

Any refugee who fails to comply with these orders will be found guilty of an offence under the Refugee Act. As a result, urban refugees residing in Nairobi may face a review of their reasoning for residing in the city and could legally be forced to move to any of these designated areas. This article in the new Act does therefore not affect the livelihood of urban refugees in Nairobi in more or better ways than the 2006 Act, as the wording of the articles still implies that the government prefers to keep refugees within a specific land to be able to manage them and to preserve security measures in the country.

There is no data suggesting that the project of designated areas have become operationalized yet, nor which land the Government of Kenya plans to allocate to this project. However, Mr. Allan Mukuki was able to shed light on the process of this provision:

"So, I just got approached yesterday or the day before by UNHCR. They would like me to help them develop a Marshall Plan. So, what we're doing is, we're developing a Marshall Plan of converting refugee camps like Kakuma into settlement areas, so the Ugandan format. So, they can be able to work, they can be able to own land, they can be able to have a household and everything. So again, that's, that's the transformation that is coming. And economically it would really make more sense for it to happen that way for it to convert to a settlement just like the Ugandan aspect" (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

According to Mr. Allan Mukuki, the World Bank has donated around 50 million dollars to buy the land intended for these designated areas, or settlements as referred as by Mr. Mukuki, which are supposedly inspired by the Ugandan context in which refugees can enjoy the freedom of movement and the right to employment, health, education, and to start a business (Momodu, 2019). While the extent and upcoming regulations of these areas are yet to be known, the concept of settlements as an alternative to camps is not entirely new in Kenya.

After a large influx of Somalian refugees due to a renewed conflict in the country, the UNHCR requested an allocation of land to expand the Kakuma Camp. At this point, the camp hosted more than 180 thousand individuals, compared to its actual capacity of 70 thousand, making it imperative to decongest the camp. In 2015, a site was allocated in the Turkana County close to Kakuma to create a settlement intending to promote the self-reliance and overall livelihood of refugees. This settlement is called the Kalobeyei Settlement and is a part of the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDP) developed by the UNHCR. The objective of this programme is to contribute to the socio-

economic conditions of refugees and the host communities as well as to reduce the over-dependence on humanitarian aid (UNHCR, n.d.). UNHCR described how this site was to be developed as an urban centre by using the same development techniques as in the larger cities to create economic inclusion and thus employment generation in Kalobeyei. According to research created by the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, this model was designed to differ from camps like the nearby Kakuma by offering cash-based interventions to meet housing and nutritional needs, training to support entrepreneurship, and agricultural projects to support self-reliance (Bett *et* al., 2019, p. 4). The research found that very few of the refugees residing in Kalobeyei are characterised as self-reliant as the availability of employment opportunities is low, making the refugees heavily reliant on aid to support their every-day lives and small businesses. However, the study concluded that Kalobeyei is associated with overall better well-being and is more effective in enhancing interaction between the refugees and the host community (2019, p. 31).

These settlements could arguably be an opportunity for urban refugees to reside legally within a city, gain work training and interact with the host community which in turn could positively support a higher level of refugee integration. Yet the lack of settlements similar to Kalobeyei and the limited capacity of the settlement makes it difficult to point towards settlements as a sustainable alternative for urban refugees. Furthermore, the continual restrictions on free movement of labour places a constraint to the labour market access for refugees and thus arguably poses a hindrance for sustainable integration. By limiting the access to work, the settlements arguably also impede the possibility of self-reliance and thus heightens the burden on local and international NGOs (ILO, 2022, p. 22).

"And it is not an ideal policy for, I'll give you a few reasons. One. People would be feeling that their mobility is restrained. Right. And they will not have the option of integrating with the host community. So usually they cannot go to school. You know they cannot open up business, they cannot intermarry and have kids with the locals, right. So the host countries usually see it as a way of preventing refugees from integrating into the community, which, you know, the refugees if you give them the opportunity, may do.
It's only human, you know.
And so it restricts mobility. It denies opportunities for economic integration and cultural integration with the host community"
(Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

It may thus be argued that these settlements, as we have seen them previously, do not satisfy the needs that urban refugees seek towards Nairobi to gain; namely, better employment opportunities and better social services than those provided in the camps.

If the Government of Kenya wants to draw inspiration from the Ugandan format, the freedom of movement could arguably be of highest importance.
As earlier found, urban refugees seek towards Nairobi due to larger availability of employment opportunities. To be able to meet this need of the urban refugees in a settlement like Kalobeyei, significant investments would be needed from the government to enable the settlement to export to the wider Kenyan economy and thus create sustainable opportunities for businesses (Betts *et* al., 2019, p. 33). For instance, the Kalobeyei settlement is placed in Turkana County, which is a fairly remote area with poor soil, which increases production and transportation costs and thus increases the cost of the products they manufacture. This makes the small-scale businesses run by refugees in these areas unable to compete with larger businesses around the country and subsequently more reliant on aid to maintain their business (2019, p. 33). Larger investments from the formal institutions could arguably make the proposed designated area more appealing for a part of the urban refugee population, as they could then reside legally, interact with the host community and contribute to the Kenyan economy without being heavily reliant on aid.

Documentation as a Hindrance for Integration

"The reason why it became very imperative for host states to safely quarantine refugees, was from the perspective of national security, right, there was this notion that people who fled from other countries could be threats. They could be dangers for the national security of the host state, right? So what do you do? You confine them. You feed them there. If possible, you provide them basic amenities like clean water or some sort of a shelter. And you try to keep them as long as possible, making sure they don't integrate into the Host countries' society and then hopefully they get lucky. They would settle down for what we call third country settlement" (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

As previously indicated, documentation is one of the main hindrances for urban refugees to reside and work in Nairobi and thus formally integrate the Kenyan society. While there are differences between the Refugee Act of 2006 and 2021, both emphasise, explicitly as well as implicitly, the need for proper documentation to legally enjoy the rights of these Acts.
Article 28.6 in the 2021 Refugee Act states that a refugee *"shall have the right to engage individually or in a group, in gainful employment or enterprise or to practice a profession or trade where he holds qualifications recognized by competent authorities in Kenya"* (The Refugees Act of 2021). While the first part of this article stipulates that urban refugees have the same right to work as any other Kenyan, the latter half of this statement is noteworthy as it emphasises the need for formal documentation for refugees to enjoy the right to work.

This Article demonstrates the possibly self-contradictory stance of the Government of Kenya in regards to urban refugees: on one hand, they talk of inclusion and equal rights, while on the other, they highlight the need for somewhat unattainable documentation that thus restricts these rights and forces refugees to be excluded and confined in camps. Derese Kassa refers to this as *"governing strangers"* (Kassa, 2019, p. 70), and uses it to describe how the government has gone far by recognising and articulating a national Act of Refugees and draws heavily from UN conventions, but simultaneously erode the basic rights and freedoms of urban refugees by forcing them to live in fear and few opportunities to create a new life for themselves.

The displaced population, particularly in the urban areas, has throughout the years been linked to the increase in the proliferation of weapons and connected to terrorist attacks in the country, leading to growing hostility and intolerance towards refugees (Omata, 2016, p. 6). Following the large influx of refugees in the beginning of the 1990's, the Government of Kenya began a process of refugee registration through the Refugee Registration Determination process.

As previously mentioned, this became the primary responsibility of UNHCR after the Government of Kenya was no longer able to carry out the process (NRC, 2017, p. 9).

The Refugee Status Determination process determines whether the displaced person seeking protection meet the national and international legal definitions of a refugee and allows then the right to reside in Kenya until it is safe for them to return to their country of origin or travel to a third country (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 15). In Kenya, this process is carried out by the UNHCR and DRS and usually grants asylum seekers a refugee status to register at camp-level. Only few cases are conducted in Nairobi, as the refugees need to have "compelling and adequate reasons" to not register in the camps and thus gain the right to travel to the larger cities. These *compelling and adequate* reasons are not further elaborated upon, which points to the idea that the government is trying to reduce the number of refugees living outside of the camps. After having registered, the refugee will need to attend formal appointments and proceed to an interview, after which DRS officers will determine whether the refugee will successfully gain the legal document showing that the person has official 'Refugee Status'. This process can take up to a few years before the displaced person officially has the proper documentation to reside in the camps due to a limited capacity of the DRA office. Prima facie refugees are exempted from this process and only must register and confirm his or her country of origin (Goitum, 2016, p. 207). During the RSD process, asylum seekers are protected from prosecution for unlawful presence (RCK, n.d.).

"So you can imagine waiting for so long for a refugee pass, an alien pass, then waiting for another year

again before you get a work permit. You have to wait for three to six years before work, so yes, they are able to come to the city centre, but what usually happens from a social perspective is they only do informal jobs. So they cannot be employed formally because of these limitations of documentation…" (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

The complexity and length of the RSD process has been found to be one of the main reasons why urban refugees in Nairobi are living as unregistered refugees and thus have no official documentation of their status or the right to reside in the country (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 17: NRC, 2017, p. 11). Many urban refugees face challenges with obtaining their documentation due to issues of missing certificates and educational documents, a common obstacle for refugees who have fled their home countries, but also because of suspensions in the issuance of their documentation and lack of clear information from DRS and UNHCR about the next steps in the documentation process (NRC, 2017, p. 12). Figure 7 presents the total size of the population who had applied for official refugee status at the end of 2022, both nationally and in urban areas. These numbers illustrate the small percentages of the population who have required the necessary documentation and the large number of refugees whose application is still under the RSD process. Comparing number 1. *Applied*, which is based on applications in total in 2022, to number 4. *Pending* illustrates the length of the process and explains the small number of registered refugees in the country. The lack of rejected applications further questions the length of the RSD process, as all applicants have seemingly been accepted eventually.

31 December, 2022	Total Refugee and Asylum Seeker Population	Urban (Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa)
Refugees and Asylum Seekers	573,508	90,918
Registration	36,140	7,706
Refugee Status Determination		
1. Applied	15,883	5,579
2. Recognized	4,816	1,471
3. Rejected	0	0
4. Pending	69,023	32,587

Figure 7. Statistical summary of refugee and asylum seekers in all of Kenya and in urban areas in December 2022. Data retrieved from UNHCR 2022.

These barriers to formal documentation forces most urban refugees to work informally (ILO, 2022, p. 11). In 2021, the informal sector in Kenya employed roughly 15.3 million individuals, which corresponds to more than 80% of the total number of people employed in the country (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). This number has increased around 3 million since 2015 and continues to grow (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 22). The size of the informal economy and higher flexibility surrounding proper paperwork makes it appealing for urban refugees to find work within family or community networks to be able to earn for a living, either while waiting for their proper documentation or simply settling for a lower salary than what their work is worth (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 22). The need for formal documents and work permits may thus be described as a reason as to why urban refugees seek employment in the informal economy, where employers are more lenient with documentation. The sheer size of the informal economy and the large number of urban refugees working within this economy points towards urban refugees as producing members of Kenya's economy (Omata, 2016, p. 10), but the lack of work permits and citizenship leave them with few claims to economic rights and future opportunities.

However, formal documentation is not only necessary to find formal jobs. Alien cards and refugee status certificates have been found to be an important safety measure for urban refugees in Nairobi. As previously

mentioned, urban refugees are living in fear of being sent to one of the refugee camps, being arrested or facing expulsion or refoulement (NRC, 2017, p. 27).
The aspect of security and documentation is thus both of high importance for the Government of Kenya as well as the urban refugees in Nairobi, but can be found as the result of two different perspectives: The Government of Kenya utilises the RSD process and the requirement of proper documentation as a means of protecting national security in a country surrounded by warzones and as a way of preventing terrorist attacks as seen in the past. At the same time, urban refugees see proper documentation as a security measure for them in the society to avoid corrupt police officers and diminish the negative perceptions of refugees among the city population (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 17). Difficulties of obtaining proper documentation can therefore work as a hindrance for both social and economic integration of urban refugees in Nairobi. Conversely, if no documentation was needed to be recognized as an urban refugee, the perception of urban refugees as threats to society may become more widespread which in turn could lower the level of trust in the society, thus creating an even larger barrier to social integration.

It may therefore be argued that the RSD process and the issuing of proper documentation can be beneficial for both the Government of Kenya as well as the urban refugees, as both parties can gain a sense of security from the refugee registration process and the formal identity cards. However, the long and somewhat disconcerting process of obtaining these formal documents can work as a hindrance for the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi both socially and economically and can arguably be attributed to inefficient, perhaps unresourceful, formal institutions that fail to recognise refugees and their rights and interests (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 33: NRC, 2017, p. 35). By improving the RSD processes, registration and providing more information to the urban refugees, a greater part of the urban population could benefit from the Refugee Act and thus potentially enhance integration, economic as well as social.

"So again, these are some of the politics that are going on in the region, where UNHCR seems to have the statistics up to January 2023. But the Kenyan government has their last statistic in 2012. So we find there are a lot of discrepancies and UNHCR tends to use up a lot of the government powers. And UNHCR, because they have to get funding, they have a lot of tokens in, it becomes difficult to overpower them. So this 1% that finds themselves with proper documentation, then become the lucky lot in Nairobi, they're able to apply for jobs and everything. The rest end up in the informal sector. Or employed by the private sector. So I'll give an example. Safaricom is the biggest telecommunication company in Kenya and eastern Central Africa. So Safaricom has 500 internship opportunities for refugees. But guess what, up to date no refugee has been hired because it's so hard to get this work permit. It's so hard to get this refugee alien card. So if

you don't have that, you can't be employed, even if it's for an internship or such" (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

Multiple Layers of Authority: An Opportunity for Urban Refugees' Integration

Formal institutions can have several layers of authority (Omata, 2020, p. 875). In the case of refugee policy, we have seen that the national authority was very coercive regarding urban refugees. However, the local authority can be more accepting and accommodating regarding urban refugee's situations. Local authorities can be defined by authority at the city level, as well as authority at a neighbourhood level. During his field research, Omata interviewed several local government officials in Nairobi and they argued that most local governments did not pay particular attention to the legal status of refugees in their area. This tolerance from the local authority enhances urban refugee's integration in Nairobi, and in particular from an economic point of view. As an example, refugees struggle to get work permits, as they are delivered by the national authority and require numerous documents. Without this work permit they cannot access a job in the formal sector. However, urban refugees can more easily get a business licence delivered by the Nairobi City Council. In fact, the Nairobi City Council does not consider the refugee status when assessing the demands for business licences, providing the refugees with an opportunity to own a legally registered business in the capital (2020, p. 876). This illustrates how formal institutions are sometimes divided on an issue and can have different impacts. However, the opportunity offered by the local formal institutions does not compensate fully by the lack of support from the formal institutions to urban refugee's integration. In fact, although refugees can own businesses, they are still subject to the national laws stipulating that it is illegal for them to reside outside the camps, and thus they must suffer the consequences to not abide by this law.

The fact that local authorities provide opportunities for refugees to integrate against the law stated by the national authority has not been researched extensively in development literature. Therefore, although we can see its influence in the context of urban refugees in Kenya, it is not possible to draw too many conclusions about the impact of this phenomenon. We are choosing to state it in this paper because it sheds light on a very important aspect of the formal institutions that is the multiple layers of authority and how they impact refugee integration differently. However, more research would need to be conducted on that matter to understand the importance of that impact.

Humanitarian Aid as a Formal Institution

Due to the encampment policy, which is still active until initiatives are taken to operationalize the new designated areas, aid from the government, NGOs and other humanitarian organisations are mainly channelled to camps, as the government and agencies shy away from doing anything in Nairobi and other

urban areas that might counter the Refugee Act and attract more urban refugees (Dix, 2006). Most self-settled refugees in Nairobi must thus largely give up their access to aid (Omata, 2016, p. 8)
Naturally, the encampment policy gives NGOs a prerogative to prioritise the provision of humanitarian aid in camps, but the high mobility of urban refugees in the cities also makes it more challenging for agencies to identify and reach them (Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 9).
As previously mentioned, the UNHCR, an international NGO committed to provide international protection to refugees and to supervise the application of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, is one of the main NGOs working with the Government of Kenya and oversees the RSD process. The profuse influx of refugees in the 1990's overwhelmed the capacity of the Kenyan Asylum System, which resulted in handing over the responsibility to the UNHCR (Omata, 2016, p. 5). Moreover, the UNHCR also provides operational support, capacity building and technical advice to the Kenyan authorities (UNHCR, 2022), providing the NGO with a large responsibility and thus a large say regarding refugee management in Kenya. This illustrates how in cases of weak regulatory institutions, particularly in developing countries, substitute government mechanisms can arise and help address a gap of which the national institutions cannot. This places a premium in the hands of the substitute institution, UNHCR in this case, as they then have the responsibility to not replace policies, but rather contribute to and reinforce socio-economic development by fostering domestic capacity and leadership (Hanekom & Luiz, 2017; Hamann *et* al., 2020).

However, despite the large involvement of UNHCR in refugee management and the large donations made from national governments worldwide, the continued increase in camp population has made it difficult to provide enough aid to adequately support all the camps, let alone the urban refugees living in the bigger cities (Utsch, 2020). Before 2005, UNHCR would not provide any assistance to urban refugees (Stoddard, 2015, p. 28). Each refugee coming to register in Nairobi had to sign a paper indicating that they were recognised as refugees but not entitled to receive any humanitarian support in Nairobi. It's only in 2005, due to "*increasing numbers of urban refugees facing dangerous living conditions, limited access to services, and varying degrees of discrimination*" (Stoddard, 2015, p. 28) that the UNHCR launched its first ever urban refugees support initiative, called the Nairobi Initiative. As of today, the UNHCR describes their work with urban refugees on their webpage as following:

"UNHCR's main interventions for urban refugees focus primarily on ensuring equitable and timely access to services based on clearly defined criteria and in accordance with existing standard operation procedures. A very small percentage of persons of concern (PoCs) assessed as extremely vulnerable or having specific

protection needs (PSNs) is targeted for assistance and only for a specified (limited) duration." (UNHCR, 2020).

According to the UNHCR Urban refugee programme, the NGO mainly caters for the urban refugees who are described as *persons of concern*: a term that is used to describe refugees who are extremely vulnerable and in need of critical, live-saving needs. Aside from these specific individuals, the UNHCR refer to the campsites, Moreover, the UNHCR budget for refugee relief in Kenya has decreased with around $100 million USD from 2015 to 2023 with actual expenditure much lower than originally budgeted (Budget and Expenditure, UNHCR). The determined focus on refugee camps combined with the decreased budget does thus not leave much excess for urban refugees in Nairobi.

The present evidence demonstrates that the UNHCR, functioning as an authoritative body in the realm of refugee management in Kenya, is currently offering inadequate support, if not completely withholding assistance, to refugees residing in urban areas. Furthermore, it also illustrates that the UNHCR approach is aligned with the government's, whereby both regulatory actors have declined to support urban refugees as they do not abide by the national encampment policy.

Other NGOs and civil society organisations, national as well as international, do their best to fill the gap left by the UNHCR and accommodate some of the needs of the urban refugee population despite the often-illegal nature of many of the urban refugees' residence. Kevin Ngereso, a health programme coordinator with the Kenyan Red Cross, describes how the KRC mainly helps urban refugees with health issues and try to restore links with the refugees' family back in their country of origin or in the camps as well as to facilitate linkages to UNHCR and the DRS to initiate the RSD process: *"... when they move without any documentation, and even any acknowledgement by UNHCR as refugees, they run into a lot of challenges with regards to accessing health services"*(Kevin Ngereso, Appendix 3).

HIAS, the oldest refugee agency in the world, accounts for the highest proportions of services provided in Nairobi (Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 29; HIAS, n.d.) and provides support for community mental health, legal support, and works to end gender-based violence. HIAS reached almost 9000 urban refugees in Nairobi in 2021. In 2021, HIAS reached around 9000 refugees in Nairobi (HIAS, n.d.), corresponding to around 10% of the urban refugee population. As the biggest provider of refugee services, this small percentage illustrates the scarcity of the aid provided to urban refugees.

Caritas Nairobi, a local catholic institution, has established the Refugee Economic Solidarity Initiative to promote livelihood opportunities for young urban refugees through talent harnessing and development of

capabilities (Caritas Nairobi, n.d.). Refuge Point has developed the Urban Refugee Protection Programme to support the stabilisation of vulnerable refugee households and enhance micro-business development (Refuge Point, n.d.).

Since arriving in Nairobi, around 40% of urban refugees reported to have received help from an NGO with provision of education and food as the most common form of agency support (Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 29). While these are only a few of the agencies working with urban refugees in Nairobi, this demonstrates the ability of NGOs to meet the needs of the refugees that the Government of Kenya are not able to. Although one of the major actors UNHCR aids extremely vulnerable persons, this service is only offered for a short duration of time and is therefore not a sustainable solution for many urban refugees.



Figure 8. Services offered by agencies working with urban refugees. Source from Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 29.

It may thus be argued that NGOs and local agencies can play a vital role for sustainable integration of urban refugees where the Government of Kenya is unable to. The services of the government and the UNHCR are mainly directed towards the camps to enforce the encampment policy and diminish incentives to seek towards urban areas.

There is also a need to differentiate the UNHCR from other NGOs and humanitarian aid organisations. In fact, due to its influence in Kenya, UNHCR is recognized more as a regulatory institution than as an NGO, on the same scale as KRC, or HIAS for example. "*But I guess, you probably need some kind of topology or classification of NGOs. Because there's also, I mean, NGO encompasses a lot of very different actors where you have, you know, the really major ones being more like a transnational business corporation compared to smaller ones that still would be classified, or characterised NGOs. So I guess it's also a matter of sorting*

between different actors, all sort of captured by this label." (Martin Bak Jørgensen, Appendix 5), Different NGOs also do not play the same role in refugee management. While UNHCR manages refugee affairs, other organisations provide emergency support or even a network to refugees. This is especially true in the case of urban refugees that receive limited support from NGOs. Thus, if UNHCR has an impact on their legal status as refugees, other smaller organisations, especially Faith-inspired organisations (FIOs), have a more cultural impact providing them with a network, and their impact would be considered more normative or cultural (Stoddard, 2015, p. 28).

The Contribution of Formal Institutions to Sustainable Integration

The analysis of formal institutions' role in sustainable integration for urban refugees' points towards unresourceful regulatory institutions that do not have the capacity to manage the large influx of refugees seeking asylum in Kenya and that uses coercive regulations to reinforce national security. Additionally, the UNHCR plays an important role as a regulatory institution providing immediate support to camps and designated areas rather than investing in sustainable integration in urban areas. One of the main barriers to integration raised by formal institutions is the lack of legal documentations provided to urban refugees, thus denying them a legal status in Kenya. However, the existence of multiple layers of authority within Kenya's formal institutions creates minor opportunities for refugees to benefit from, increasing the level of integration.

Both the 2006 and the 2021 Refugee act as coercive attempts to manage the large refugee population and heighten national security. Where the 2006 Refugee Act enforced the encampment policy, the 2021 Refugee Act has done little to show that the new *designated areas* are going to become a more sustainable solution to forced displacement. These new areas or settlements need to be supported by government investments to support employment creation and thus limit the reliance on aid to satisfy the main needs urban refugees seek towards Nairobi to gain. These strict measures on labour, movement and registration contribute to a dichotomy of the society in which urban refugees are seen as threats to national security, which thus limits the possibilities of sustainable social integration.

Furthermore, the difficulties with obtaining proper documentation and work permits drives most urban refugees to work within the large informal economy, in which they function as contributing members to the Kenyan economy. By allocating more resources to the RSD process and thus intensifying the formal registration process, more urban refugees could gain employment in the formal economy and thus actively, and legally, work as contributing members of society. This would arguably heighten economic integration, as the urban refugees could become less reliant on humanitarian aid and create a more stable livelihood for

themselves and their family. However, by introducing the opportunity for refugees from EAC to access the status of EAC citizens, the Kenyan government improves the integration and livelihood of more than half the current urban refugee population in Kenya. Moreover, all the refugees from EAC countries in camps will be able to leave the camps and increase their integration. Thus, the New Refugee Act has a significant and positive impact on the integration of urban refugees, although it only benefits half of the urban refugee population and forty-one percent of the total numbers of refugees in Kenya: 241,618 out of 588,724 refugees and asylum seekers according to the UNHCR Operational Data Portal (2023).

Additionally, the Government of Kenya is highly reliant on UNHCR to support refugee management in the form of registration and provide additional government support through capacity building and technical advice. We thus argue that UNHCR plays a large role as a regulatory institution by filling an institutional weakness in the state. However, as the large NGO has lowered their annual budget and the number of refugees continuously increases, the UNHCR does not have the means to provide sufficient aid and opportunities to the refugees in camps. This contributes to the number of refugees fleeing camps to seek towards urban areas, in which they believe they have better opportunities to create a life for themselves. While urban refugees largely give up their access to aid, humanitarian aid agencies in Nairobi attempt to support the livelihood of urban refugees through training, health services and linkages to the Government of Kenya.

To compensate for this lack of regulatory support and address the need for integration, the next section discusses the informal institutions' influence on urban refugees.

The Influence of Informal Institutions

Institutional Theory divides informal institutions into two pillars, namely the *normative* and the *cultural-cognitive* pillar. These pillars can be seen as less tangible than the formal regulatory pillar, as these rules are not written down nor formally enforced. These are instead characterised by norms, beliefs, perceptions and are constructed through expectations, behaviour, and relations (Scott, 2010). These informal institutions can be difficult to measure and quantify as they are often deeply rooted within the culture of a society, but have found to play a just as important role as formal institutions: *"While informal institutions are generally not codified, they are widely accepted as legitimate and are, therefore, rules in use rather than just rules on the books"* (Jütting *et* al., 2007, p. 31). In this section, we will see that the informal institutions provide urban refugees with opportunities for day-by-day integration, while subsequently generating barriers for sustainable integration. Additionally, the influence of informal institutions is analysed in combination with the role that

social capital plays in urban refugee integration. By combining the two, we get a holistic view of the integration mechanisms of urban refugees in Nairobi and how they can compensate for the lack of support from the regulatory powers.

The Normative Pillar

As stated in the Institutional Theory, the normative pillar consists of social norms, values, and beliefs and play a vital role in constructing what is seen as 'right' for members of society. These often arise in relations and the basis of compliance is based on social obligation and internalised commitments, meaning that people often conform to norms as these are seen as implicit rules among the population (Scott, 2010).

Police Corruption: Favouring Day by Day Integration

While the deployment of additional law enforcement officers was issued with the intent of enforcing the encampment policy, many urban refugees describe their relationship with their police as "*playing hide and seek"* and describe the police officers as corrupt and rogue (Kassa, 2018, p. 61).

> *"Police harassment and corruption is not something primarily driven by xenophobia. I think the police are paid very poorly and they think refugees have a lot of money. It is also easy for them to racially profile Ethiopians and Somalis who have a lighter skin complexion with tall and skinny figures. Hence, they usually set out to get money misusing their official position. But police harassment does not go into excesses like assault or beating. They usually let you go free once they get money"* (Quote by an Ethiopian urban refugee gathered by Kassa, 2018, p. 63).

This quote illustrates how corruption runs through the formal civil force of the state and how bribes are a part of the everyday lives of urban refugees in Nairobi who are trying to avoid encampment, indicating how normative institutions affect the upholding of legislations and thus weakening the trust and credibility of this regulatory institution.

The aforementioned instances of corrupt police officers are not solely a sign of weak regulatory institutions, but also deeply rooted within the social norms of the urban refugee population. *"So one of the constant sources of irritation and violation of refugee rights comes from the national security apparatus of the host states, particularly the police. And this is not exceptional to Kenya"* (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2). Police corruption is a well-recognised challenge in Kenya and research shows that bribery remains especially prevalent (NRC, 2017, p. 25). Bribe from police officers often occurs in Nairobi, where the legal status of urban refugees is precarious therefore leaving this part of the population particularly vulnerable. Research shows that that bribes occur regardless of documentation, and it is a common norm among the urban refugee

population to pay police officers to drop any charges: *"Every time you encounter the police you have to pay a bribe"* (Stated in an interview with a Somali refugee in NRC, 2017, p. 25). These bribes are often extracted through threats to confiscate documents, expulsion, or have them sent to the refugee camps and the amount demanded can vary depending on the police officer and the skin colour of the refugee; stereotypically, Somalis have more money than other refugees and are thus often pressured into paying higher bribes (2017, p. 26). These bribes also occur during monitoring of standards and sanitation within refugee businesses (Kassa, 2018, p. 38). As previously found, the corrupt Nairobian police force can be attributed to the xenophobic and racist institutional practices within the regulatory institutions in Kenya and is rooted within a fear of threats to national security. However, the corrupt and rogue nature of the police officers is arguably also affected by the normalisation of paying these bribes. The fear of expulsion, arrest or being sent to camps is deeply rooted within the population of urban refugees, which thus makes them more prone to seek informal ways of avoiding legal sanctions, whether these are justified or not. This subsequently becomes an increasingly entrenched part of the culture thus making the illegal nature of the situation less questioned. One of the reasons why bribe has become prevalent in the society can therefore be attributed to the fear and insecurity of the refugees which makes them more likely to accept unjust acts (Kassa, 2018, p. 64; Muindi & Mberu, 2019, p. 19). Some refugees fault their fellows for surrendering to these illegal practices and highlight the need for urban refugees to stand up to their rights and seek legal advice in situations of injustice (Kassa, 2018, p. 64).
This solution is however often dismissed, as it can be difficult to capture the immediate attention of legal advisors, such as UN officials, resulting in having to wait in jail while their case is litigated.

The intensity of police harassment also varies according to the social status and the wealth of the refugees (Campbell, 2006, p. 405). In fact, some refugees have more wealth than others, especially in the Somali community and in the Eastleigh business community. Some of the wealthier refugees are able to benefit from the corrupt system and to find a profitable arrangement with the police whereas poorer refugees, representing the majority of urban refugees, are more vulnerable to harassment and extortion.

This norm of bribe can represent an intermingling of the regulatory- and normative pillar, as the norm originates from a weakness in the regulatory institutions. This norm both favours urban refugees' integration and weakens it.
On the one hand, bribing has become a way for refugees to bend the law and to remain in Nairobi although it is illegal. The presence of corrupt police officers within the national security system signifies a deficiency in institutional capacity, thereby compromising its efficacy. Additionally, it does give urban refugees an

alternative to being arrested and sent to camps, thus allowing for a day-by-day solution to remain in the city. Nonetheless, it is not a sustainable situation for refugees to rely on corruption to remain in Nairobi. Bribing police officers prevents them from accumulating resources and building a comfortable living situation, thus hindering integration in the long term. Moreover, each bribery provides the refugees an extra day in Nairobi, but it is not guaranteed to work every time.

On the other hand, the fear of public authorities is arguably a result of the Government of Kenya's apprehensive refugee policies and negative perceptions of urban refugees, which thus places urban refugees in a precarious situation where they are highly vulnerable to harassment and bribes. Furthermore, the corrupt police officers also point towards some form of gap within the regulatory institutions, as a large part of the police force exploits vulnerable parts of the population and thus infringes the law. This could be attributed to low salaries or lack of proper training regarding refugee laws and affairs (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 18). It may therefore be argued that bribes and corruption within the police force represents a case where formal institutions take part in the creation of implicit social norms and play a large role in constructing what is seen as ordinary behaviour. This constant fear and exploitation of urban refugees creates a lack of trust in the judicial authorities, sustains the negative perception of urban refugees, and makes this part of the population even more vulnerable, thus negatively affecting both social and economic integration.

Integration through Informal Work Ethics

In developing countries, large parts of the population are typically highly dependent on the informal economy to support their livelihood, whether this is through employment, groceries, transportation, and many other day to day activities (Blades *et* al., 2011, p. 1). The International Labour Organisation defines the informal economy as referring to *"all economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements"* (ILO, 2012). The dynamics and size of the informal economy is highly affected by the political and economic landscape of a country (Cling *et* al., 2014, p. 2), but just as deeply affected by the social norms and networks of the communities surrounding it (Meagher, 2005, p. 217). The Nairobian informal economy has blossomed since Kenya gained its independence and has since employed large parts of the population of Nairobi (Macharia, 2007, p. 150).

"Kenyan restrictions on refugees' engagement in formal work have meant that many cannot meaningfully contribute to the local economy, nor can they foster their households' health and well-being" (Muindi and Mberu, 2019, p.7). As Muindi and Mberu states in their report, and as discussed in the regulatory pillar section of this paper, the majority of the refugees cannot access work in the formal sector due to difficulties with obtaining proper documentation and work permits. Thus, they have to find employment in the informal

sector, and the ways of doing this differ according to the different communities. For instance, Somali refugees rely mostly on social capital to find a job in Somalian or Somali-Kenyan businesses, as Somalis are often bonding based on clanship and believe in helping each other as best as possible. On the other hand, Congolese mostly work for Kenyans in the construction sector and in the textile industry by hawking clothing. The Congolese speak Swahili, making it easier to communicate and work with Kenyans (Dr Omata, 2016, p. 9). According to the research of Omata, Somali refugees in Nairobi are doing better financially than Congolese refugees which illustrates that social capital is a big factor for economic integration, especially in the informal sector. However, the dispersal of the Congolese urban refugees and their tendency to work among the Kenyan population arguably heightens the possibilities of social integration, as this provides the Congolese urban refugees with networks outside of the refugee communities and thus new access points for information and help.

The large presence of Somali urban refugees and their tendency to support each other in finding employment offers the refugees a space for 'segmented assimilation' in the urban communities in Nairobi. One example is the Eastleigh district, a prime example of how urban refugees have created a vibrant commercial and business centre, which both individuals and larger commercial businesses in Kenya are reliant on (Pavanello *et* al., 2010, p. 23): *"…if Eastleigh is closed in one day, Kenya's economy would collapse because of the amount of money that comes from that area, in fact, now they have the biggest mall in East and Central Africa in that area. So again, it shows you that refugees are actually a positive addition to the economy"* (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

Almost all businesses of Somali refugees take place inside this district, thus offering an opportunity for Somali urban refugees to seek employment and network opportunities when arriving in Nairobi (Omata, 2016, p. 10). While this way of finding employment does not enhance communication with the local residents of Nairobi and thus fully contribute to social integration, it contributes to economic integration as Somalis can strengthen their social capital and more easily overcome the barriers to access for employment.

The two other large communities of urban refugees, Ethiopian and Congolese, often work within transportation, construction, clothing, and casual labour such as cleaners (p. 11). Unlike Somalis, most of the Ethiopian and Congolese urban refugees work alongside Kenyans and are thus more likely to create some kind of relationship with their Kenyan neighbours. By working alongside the host communities, urban refugees can thus both utilise their skills and training from their country of origin as well as obtain new ones. For instance, working in transportation can allow urban refugees to learn the local language and working as a maid can teach them how to prepare traditional dishes (Kassa, 2018, p. 32). These skills arguably contribute to the integration process of urban refugees, as obtaining local skills, being exposed to the host society, and learning their language can prove beneficial for facilitating interactions and work opportunities (Omata, 2020, p. 868).

These examples of large communities of urban refugees illustrate how the norms of working within the informal economy allows refugees to use social capital, cultural similarities and work experience from their country of origin to overcome formal barriers to employment. *"Because people are active human agents, as you know, human beings, they find ways of working around laws. They will find policies, institutions we try to curtail them off and they beat the odds"* (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

While it was previously found that the number of urban refugees working informally could potentially be reduced by allocating more resources to the RSD process and thus intensify the process of obtaining a work permit, the large informal economy also represents an opportunity for urban refugees to more easily overcome the barriers to access for employment in Nairobi.
It may thus be argued that while primarily being able to work in the informal economy limits the livelihood of urban refugees in terms of salary and variation in employment opportunities, the large informal economy and the various parts of the population working within it represents a way for urban refugees to participate in employment and is thus an important step in the process of sustainable integration.

The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar

Integration of urban refugees is very much impacted by the cultural-cognitive pillar of the informal institutions. The cultural-cognitive pillar is characterised by perceptions and meanings rooted in cultural beliefs and social structures inherent to every country or community (Scott et al., 2010). In this paper, we have decided to support our analysis of the role that the cognitive pillars play in the integration of urban refugees with the social capital theory. Networks and cultural beliefs of a community are often highly linked, and the networks that one has can greatly influence their integration in a given community (Boeteng, 2010). Thus, one way that cultural-cognitive institutions play a role in the integration of refugees is through social networks. Social capital and network can favour the economic integration of refugees, offering them support in accessing services. However, it can also represent a barrier to integrate within the host community of Nairobi. In this section we will analyse the impact of social networks on urban refugees' well-being, the discrimination that urban refugees may face from the host community but also within the different urban refugee communities, the impact of culture and religion on providing a network to urban refugees and lowering the integration barrier, and finally, we will discuss the status of urban citizens as a socially constructed alternative to national citizens.

The Importance of Having a Network

The three biggest urban refugee communities in Nairobi are from the DRC, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Their motivation to move to Nairobi, either from the Kenyan camps or directly from their country of origin, can differ depending on each community, as stated in Figure 9.



Figure 9. Reasons for coming to Nairobi. Source from Muindi and Mberu, 2019, p. 14.

The influence of social networks is clearly illustrated in this figure since having family in Nairobi is the main reason for Ethiopians and Somalians refugees to come to Nairobi, and the second main reason for Congolese refugees. We can also clearly see that for some communities, the social capital influence is stronger than for others. 40% of Somali refugees come to Nairobi because they have family in Nairobi, as opposed to only 25% for the Congolese refugees. The DRC community is 50% motivated by security. In fact, the Congolese refugees avoid going to camps, and more particularly Kakuma, since they fear that there will be other refugees from the DRC, potentially belonging to an enemy tribe (Omata, 2016, p. 9). Their main motivation for coming to Nairobi is thus to access some sort of security and avoid other Congolese refugees in the camps. It is the same pattern with Ethiopian refugees, that are more vulnerable to agents from the Ethiopian government in the camps (Kassa, 2018).

The factors of “job/business opportunity” and “have family in Nairobi" are also very interdependent since usually when refugees have members of their family in town, they benefit from their network to get a job (Omata, 2016). As an example, the Somali community is a strong urban refugee community that relies heavily on bonding social capital. The majority of the Somalis in Nairobi is residing in the Eastleigh neighbourhood, one of the most economically dynamic neighbourhoods in the capital with high rise residential units, whereas Congolese refugees reside in different slums neighbourhoods such as Kawangware and Umoja/Kayole (Muindi and Mberu, 2019, p.7). According to Omata's research, there is a strong sense of

community and clan among the Somali refugees as they support each other to access jobs and education. This strong sense of community supports the Somalis' economic and social integration in Kenya and can be referred to as bonding social capital (Boeteng, 2010). For Somali refugees in Nairobi, bonding social capital compensates for the scarce amount of humanitarian aid that urban refugees receive, providing education, job opportunities, and healthcare through networks (Omata, 2016; Muindi and Mberu, 2019).
It is a different story about the Congolese refugees who rely way less on bonding social capital than the Somalis, but more on bridging social capital. In fact, urban refugees from the DRC are not located in one neighbourhood as the Somali community, they are scattered across Nairobi because there are a lot of disputes between the different communities from the DRC and they can represent threats for each other (Omata, 2016). The dispersal of Congolese refugees is mostly based on security reasons, as they are cautious of drawing too much attention to themselves (2016, p. 9). Due to the dispersion, Congolese refugees are benefiting more from bridging social capital as they are better integrating amongst the host community and finding jobs within Kenyan businesses (Omata, 2016).

The type of social capital experienced by urban refugees is different for each community. In this paper, our findings mention two different types of social capital. On the one hand, Somali refugees experience bonding social capital as their network consists of other Somali refugees and Somali-Kenyans citizens. They remain within the same community, surrounded with people that have the same experiences, the same background, and the same social status as Somali refugees or descendants of Somali refugees. On the other hand, Congolese refugees experience bridging social capital as their network consists of Kenyans. As we have seen in this section, Congolese refugees do not depend on Congolese networks, and rather work with Kenyans and thus arguably have a larger chance of integration into the host-community.

Cultural Integration and Discrimination

Refugees face different levels of cultural integration depending on the community that they belong to. For example, the Congolese refugees are able to adapt among Kenyans better than the refugees from Somalia or Ethiopia, who are facing more xenophobia (Omata, 2016; Muindi and Mberu, 2019; Campbell, 2006). This is explained by several factors such as physical features and similarities, language, and religion. In fact, Congolese look physically similar to Kenyans while Somalis and Ethipians have different features, making them easy to identify as refugees. Additionally, Swahili as is one of the four national languages in DRC (Translator without borders), thus they speak the same language as the Kenyans. Finally, a majority of Congolese are Christian, just like Kenyans. The language spoken in Somalia is Somali and the language spoken in Ethiopia in Amharic, making it more difficult for Somalis and Ethiopians to understand or be understood by Kenyans. The predominant religion in Somalia is Islam, while Ethiopia has christianity as its first religion, with one third of the population being muslim. These cultural differences between Kenyans and

Somalis can explain why Somali refugees mostly rely on social capital to overcome the cultural barriers that they are facing in Nairobi. The less culturally integrated people are, the more they use their network to compensate.

However, despite the differences in religion, faith seems to be a form of social capital that plays a large role for urban refugees. Faith-inspired organisations (FIOs) and institutions not only function as a place of worship for the population of Nairobi, but are also directly involved through provision of support (Kassa, 2018, p. 40; Stoddard, 2015, p. 28). For instance, the Eastleigh Fellowship Centre (EFC) offers sport activities for young Christians and Muslims to build relationships across ethnic and religious divides. The conflicts between Somalis and the host community is in majority related to religion differences, thus, the EFC fosters integration and community links by providing such services. Other churches host Sunday School to enhance education, help urban refugees link up with health care services, and some have founded charity associations to collect voluntary contributions to support urban refugees in Nairobi (Stoddard, 2015, p. 29). The engagement of the churches as well as the network the urban refugees may gain from them points to the distinct effect of social capital in sustainable integration. During the police raids of 2014, faith communities also supported children of refugees after their parents had been arrested and sent back to camps (2015, p. 27). FIOs provided emergency aid for the children and helped reunite the families while supporting their reestablishment in Nairobi.

Discrimination is impacting refugees' well-being in their everyday life. For example, they are facing discrimination to access healthcare, housing services, and job opportunities (Muindi and Mberu, 2019). As we have seen, discrimination against refugees can be fueled by cultural differences. But it also takes its roots in the culture of fear and mistrust installed by the government towards refugees, and especially Somali refugees. In fact, "*refugees are often perceived to rely on money acquired illicitly through Somali pirates and al-Shabaab to finance their stay in Kenya*" (Omata, 2020, p. 870). Additionally, "*some Nairobians see the refugees as taking their economic opportunities*" (Stoddard, 2015, p. 29). As seen earlier in our paper, Nairobians are also struggling to thrive economically and to find job opportunities to sustain their well-being.

However, this discrimination from Kenyans towards refugees introduces some reflections about the entity responsible for the existence of this discrimination. *"It sort of takes the responsibility away from more formal actors by saying that the discrimination is something that happens between people. "Oh that guy is racist and so on". But it's also obviously an institutional problem and I don't think it's necessarily something that can be solved only on a social level"* (Martin Bak Jørgensen, Appendix 5). As mentioned by Martin Bak Jørgensen, the discrimination towards refugees is embedded in fear and rooted in this broad consensus

introduced by the state that refugees represent a threat to society. In fact, since the increase in terrorist attacks in Nairobi in the 90s, the government has treated refugees as potential threats to security, thus sharing a negative perception of refugees to the population of Kenya. Due to the securitisation of refugees by the host state, society therefore expects urban refugees to be dangerous. The Kenyan government benefits from this generalised fear of refugees and often uses them as scapegoats for various social and economic issues in Nairobi (Campbell, 2006, p. 401). In conclusion, discrimination towards refugees initially exists as a movement created by a formal institution and has a direct impact on refugee integration and refugee livelihoods.

According to Muindi and Mberu, one situation in which refugees face less discrimination and integrate without barriers is education. Children of refugees are integrating in school better, and since they are raised in Nairobi, language is not a problem as much as it is for their parents. *"In fact, some of the kids consider themselves as Kenyan, they speak perfect Swahili. They feel that Kenya is home and they don't wanna go back to Ethiopia or they don't wanna go resettling in another country, which is very fascinating"* (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2). In the Eastleigh district, the Church World Service (CWS) is also supporting schools to welcome the refugee students, and to ensure a lack of conflict between the parents of the students (Stoddard, 2015, p. 29). Children of urban refugees are also the main demographic which the little aid provided by UNHCR in Nairobi is focused on, thus helping children to quicklier feel socially integrated in the big city (UNHCR, 2015). Thus, due to their access to education and humanitarian support, children have a better chance of integrating in Nairobi compared to adult urban refugees.

Urban citizenship: A Socially Constructed Reality

In his book, Derese Kassa (2018, p. 45) explores the idea of urban identity, or urban citizenship, that urban refugees can acquire. We argue that refugees in camps can also acquire this type of unique and informal identity inherent to displaced populations that are not granted legal citizenship in their host country. However, the notion of urban identity is of particular interest in the topic of urban refugees, as this part of the population is more exposed, to a certain extent, to the dynamics and structures of urban spaces.
This identity is created based on the location that refugees establish themselves rather than on the country. As an example, when settling undocumented in Nairobi, refugees are not considered Kenyans by the state, and thus do not identify as Kenyans; however, they can, and in some cases do, identity as 'Nairobians'. Especially in the case of children of urban refugees, who do not have legal documentation from the state but have lived in Nairobi their entire life. These children have only experienced what it means to live in Nairobi and therefore often feel a larger sense of belonging in Nairobi than the country from which their parents fled. Even though this identity is not recognized by any formal institution, it still exists: *"There's what a lot of people in citizenship studies called substantive citizenship. It's not formal and procedural. It's not about, you*

know, documents and what have you, but that experience. That experience itself, and it's very hard to qualify it, that experience, that cultural million that you grew up with. That's a proof good enough that integration is happening, you know" (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

We can thus speak of a socially constructed reality in which networks, interactions and a general sense of belonging can contribute to a feeling of being an urban citizen, even though formal documents may say otherwise (Purcell, 2002, p. 100). The introduction of the EAC citizenship carries a few of the aspects of this notion, as this provision will provide refugees from the EAC the same rights as any Kenyans, despite them not being actual citizens of the country. This can then enhance integration as this citizenship arguably enhances a community-like feeling through networks and culture. *"In Sudan, if a refugee comes from Yemen, they are not registered as a refugee because Muslims do not believe they should call their brothers and sisters refugees. So they are called brothers and sisters, so they are never registered as refugees. Because they're Muslims and they're coming to a Muslim country. So again, these are the dynamics that would apply in this region"* (Allan Mukuki, Appendix 4).

This, however, does not apply to the 45% of urban refugees in Nairobi that are from non-EAC countries, and no policies or government attitudes indicate that this will change in the near future (Leghtas & Kitenge, 2022). For these citizens the sense of belonging is a step in the direction towards integration, but arguably not as sustainable as it may prove to be for the EAC citizens.

This idea is also supported by Omata's findings that have been discussed in the regulatory section of this paper. The findings show that although the national government of Kenya is tough on urban refugees, the local authorities in the different neighbourhoods of Nairobi can be rather accommodating to the refugees' situation and can look past their illegal status (2022, p. 875).

This has not been researched extensively in literature, but could be further explored in the field. It especially makes sense to discuss it through the cultural-cognitive pillar lens using Scott's theory, as this phenomenon is embedded in practices and perceptions, however not tangible or regulated by formal institutions.

The Contribution of Informal Institutions to Sustainable Integration

The contribution of informal institutions to sustainable integration is both favouring integration of urban refugees and creating barriers for them to access a decent livelihood.

The normalised existence of the informal economy in Nairobi allows urban refugees to have access to jobs and to earn money to sustain their livelihoods, even without having the legal rights to work in Kenya. Thus, the informal sector is acting as a safety net for refugees to integrate economically into Nairobi. Social capital is also favouring economic integration as some urban refugees benefit from their network and ethnic bonds to find a job or an economic activity (Omata, 2016, p. 9; Omata, 2020, p. 868). Having a network also makes it easier for them to access basic services such as health and housing services. Networks are often based on

communities from which urban refugees originate from, like the Somali community for example. For refugees with less strong ethnic bonds such as the Congolese refugees, their common language and similar culture with the host community facilitates their access to work (Omata, 2020, p. 868).
Informal institutions, supported by social capital, create space for urban refugees to integrate socially and economically. Nevertheless, this integration remains partial. In fact, refugees benefiting from their own networks to compensate for the lack of support from the government and the UNHCR does not enhance integration within the host community. In fact, it only allows for integration to happen in their own community and network. Bonding social capital only offers a way for urban refugees to ameliorate their livelihood but not to reach a sustainable integration.

The harassment that refugees experience from the police is creating a barrier for them to integrate because it is very costly and prevents them from accumulating money since the police take what they earn as bribes (NRC, 2017, p. 25). It also fosters a feeling of fear among refugees, making them feel like they do not belong in Nairobi, that they are treated differently than everybody else, and that they must hide to survive. However, the fact that refugees can bribe the police in order to get away from the law is an opportunity in itself because it allows them to remain in Nairobi while being unregistered and illegally residing in the city. If it was not the norm to bribe the police, refugees would be sent back to camps or to their own country, thus preventing any type of integration from happening. Police bribery is a norm in Nairobi and is not enforced by law and thus is included as a consequence of informal institutions. However, what it really represents is arguably the weakness of legal institutions to provide proper, formal services to the population. By becoming a norm, this informal response is thus a consequence of the regulatory pillar.

Harassment from the police is not the only type of discrimination that urban refugees face. They also face xenophobia rooted in cultural differences and injustice. In fact, there arguably exists a consensus introduced by the government that refugees are dangerous and represent a threat to Kenyan society. Amplified by cultural differences between the different refugees, it favours xenophobia. But some Nairobians are also claiming that refugees are stealing their economic opportunities (Stoddard, 2015, p. 29). Therefore, it strengthens the barrier between the refugee community and the host community. However, some stakeholders like religious and civil society groups are trying to appease this cultural conflict (ibid.).
Children are also exempted from those discriminations, and they integrate easier in the community through education "*because their experience of what it means to grow up, is to grow up in Kenya*." (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

Although, urban refugees cannot formally identify as Kenyans due to the illegality of their status, they can identify as Nairobian. Urban citizenship is a socially constructed idea that benefits integration and offers

refugees an alternative to their lack of status (Kassa, 2018, p. 45). This concept explores the idea of a new way of belonging, "*in other words, can we reconfigure the idea of belonging and citizenship at the urban scale and not necessarily the national scale?*" (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

Finally, it is important to consider that since 2022, the situation has also changed for urban refugees from the DRC since they can now benefit from a status of EAC citizen. Thus, the Congolese urban refugees will not be considered illegal by the formal institutions, and the impact of informal institutions on their integration will be different than it was before. In fact, due to their newly granted legal status, their economic and social integration should be enhanced. In fact, they will be able to work in the formal sector, they might face less harassment from the police as well as less xenophobia and discrimination from the local population who will not view them as dangerous anymore. However, this new law has only been introduced recently and its effects on the integration of Congolese urban refugees have not yet been witnessed.

Towards Sustainable Integration: A Holistic View of the Three Pillars

According to Scott, the three pillars of institutions are interdependent, and the formal institutions are stronger when supported by the informal institutions (Scott, 2010). Thus, it makes sense in the context of our research to address their interdependent effect on the integration process of urban refugees in Nairobi. We are here referring to integration according to the definition introduced by the UNHCR and in the context of refugee resettlement, where integration corresponds to the goal of the resettlement process and towards which both the refugee and the host community must work towards in collaboration. In our findings, we have noticed that the normative and cultural pillars are not supporting the regulatory pillar, but instead, occupy the void left by it. In the context of urban refugees in Nairobi, our findings point towards unresourceful regulatory institutions that use coercive regulations to manage refugee affairs and provide very limited opportunities for integration, thus putting pressure on the informal institutions to compensate and provide refugees with alternative opportunities for integration. The effects of informal institutions are also complimented using social capital to compensate for the lack of a robust regulatory pillar. Yet, our findings point towards the idea that sustainable integration needs to be supported by a formal, regulatory pillar for urban refugees to fully access the rights as citizens of Kenya. These findings are supported by Crisp (Campbell, 2006, p. 409), who argues that the urban refugees in Nairobi might be economically integrated to some extent, due to their participation in the informal economy and their use of networks, but not legally integrated due to contradictory policies and exploitation by the authorities.
Thus, the effect of the informal institutions is limited, resulting in the refugees never being fully integrated, therefore not reaching a sustainable form of integration. Figure 10 summarises our findings regarding the contribution of formal and informal institutions to the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya.



Figure 10. The impact of formal and informal institutions on the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Informal Institutions and Social Capital as a Response to the Institutional Void

In Nairobi, the life of refugees, their economic space, and their integration into the host community are shaped by both formal and informal institutions (Omata, 20202, p. 880). Through our analysis, we have noticed that the formal institutions had a heavy impact on the informal institutions' response to refugee integration. In fact, informal institutions, in combination with social capital and networks support the urban refugees where the regulatory agencies are unable to.

Institutional voids are putting pressure on the informal institutions to compensate. It creates space for norms and culture to replace the regulatory pillar. The existence of a strong and important informal economy in Kenya acts as a consequence of the institutional void and illustrates the informal institutions' mechanisms to compensate. Not only does the informal economy provide economic opportunities for urban refugees, but it also employs most of the Kenyan population, around 80% of the total number of people employed in the country (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). Therefore, the informal economy represents an alternative for urban refugees to make a living and improve their livelihood since they cannot access formal employment. By being an informal institution, the informal sector is thus compensating for the lack of support from the formal institutions. However, the informal sector does not provide a long-term solution for urban refugees to economically sustain their livelihood. The lack of stability inherent to this sector can only compensate for immediate economic needs.

As another example, police corruption is also a consequence of weak formal institutions and illustrates the informal institutions' mechanisms to compensate. Since the introduction of the encampment policy in 2012, urban refugees are suffering from police harassment: some refugees more than others, depending on their ethnicity (Omata, 2020). The police are threatening to arrest the refugees and send them to refugee camps, because they do not have the right to live anywhere else. However, a way for refugees to avoid being arrested is to bribe the police. Police corruption is a direct consequence of the weak institutional environment in Kenya; however, it is also an opportunity for refugees to continue living in Nairobi. Bribing becomes a solution to remain in Nairobi and bypass the laws set by national authorities. Once again, this phenomenon is both an opportunity and a barrier since harassment, insecurity and fear cannot enhance sustainable integration. Bribing a police officer is a way for refugees to gain short term integration, but it is partial, and it comes with consequences.

Finally, there are several layers of authority within the Kenyan formal institutions. As a consequence of the institutional void, the multiple levels of authority are not aligned on their responses and attitudes regarding refugee management, creating loopholes for refugees to benefit from. As an example, at the national level, refugees cannot live outside of camps and thus cannot work outside of camps. However, at the municipal level, the Nairobi City Council delivers refugees the licence to own a business. This disparity in regulations illustrates the void in Kenyan institutions and creates space for refugees to integrate socially and economically. It also allows for another identity to be created, an identity embedded in local belonging and supported by local formal institutions. This form of urban identity is a socially constructed concept that is answering a need for a new form of citizenship when national citizenship cannot be accessed.

Social capital plays a role in both the normative and the cultural cognitive pillar of the informal institutions. *"In the absence of adequate national and international attention and assistance, refugees in Nairobi have established community networks and initiatives that, over the past two decades, have provided vital social safety nets and services"* (Pavanello *et* al., 2010 p. 33). If we take the example of Somali refugees in Eastleigh, they are overcoming the barriers to integration by relying on their community. They are overcoming discrimination and police harassment by relying on their community to find jobs and opportunities. Thus, the importance of social capital for urban refugees emphasises the role that informal institutions play in refugee's integration. However, integration based on informal institutions is limited. In fact, Somali refugees in Nairobi are integrated into their neighbourhood and among their Somali or Somali-Kenyan network, however, they are arguably not fully socially integrated amongst Kenyans due to their illegal status and to the widespread discrimination that they are experiencing as a result of harsh regulatory refugee policies.

The Institutional Void Is Not Only Impacting Urban Refugees

One final aspect that needs to be considered is that in some cases, urban refugees' needs are overlapping with the host community's needs. In fact, a lot of Kenyans also face barriers to access health and housing services, and a lot of Kenyans also work in the informal sector. As stated before, *"as of 2006, nearly 70% of Nairobi's population was estimated to be working in the informal sector"* (Omata, 2016, p.8). Additionally, a lot of Nairobi citizens do not have the resources to find correct housing and must reside in slums. This illustrates that the barriers faced by urban refugees are also faced by Kenyan citizens and that the government is failing to address the basic needs of the population (Muindi and Mberu, 2019). This enhances the difficulties of integration of refugees, since the needed infrastructure is not available at all, not even for the citizens. It also enhances the discrimination and xenophobia towards urban refugees. Due to the lack of economic opportunities for the local population, refugees in urban areas are seen as an economic threat, *"taking over jobs and markets that should belong to the local population"* (Campbell, 2006, p.401). Therefore, since both the refugees and the host community are struggling to meet their basic needs, it increases the hostility between both when the Kenyan formal institutions would be to blame. "*And you could say, if you don't have that capacity at a state level for your own citizens, how would you expect it to be extended to outsiders?*" (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

Opportunities for Sustainable Integration Now and in the Future

This research considers integration as the goal of resettlement. However, the findings point towards integration as a process, rather than as an objective. In fact, in the current Kenyan context, urban refugees do not have the necessary support from both the formal and informal institutions to fully integrate into Kenyan society. Although the informal institutions and social capital are acting as enablers, it only allows for partial integration to happen, since the refugees remain refugees in the eyes of the government of Kenya if not formally registered. For sustainable integration to happen, it is necessary that both the government and the UNHCR, as Kenya's formal institutions for the management of refugee affairs, intervene.

Since the introduction of the 2006 Refugee Act and the following encampment policy, the formal institutions have not been enhancing sustainable integrations of urban refugees in Kenya. Urban refugees' status has been weakened by the regulatory pillar, making their life increasingly difficult. However, as of 2021, and with the introduction of the New Refugee Act, the formal institutions of Kenya will enhance refugee integration in a major way. In fact, in the 2021 New Refugee Act, the government introduced a provision regarding refugees from EAC countries that will be able to change their status of refugees to EAC citizenship. This new status also echoes the notion that there is not only one type of citizenship depending on the national level. As discussed earlier in the paper, it allows for other types of citizenship to be created, corresponding here to a

regional citizenship and going beyond the nationality and the rules associated with it. As EAC citizens, they will not be affected by the encampment policy, and they will have the legal rights to travel and settle anywhere in Kenya. This new provision represents a real positive impact on urban refugee integration since all refugees from EAC countries will be able to live and work legally in Nairobi, with the support of the formal institutions. As of 2023, urban refugees in Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru represent 48,934 refugees or 53% of urban refugees in Kenya (UNHCR data portal 2023). This new provision thus will increase the integration and livelihood of half of the current population of urban refugees in Kenya. However, since the New Act just got initiated in 2021, no impact has been observed yet.

Discussion

The following section will discuss the use of our chosen literature considering the analytical findings and the interactions between these. Furthermore, the combination of Institutional Theory and social capital to analyse integration will be discussed to elucidate the shortcomings and new perspectives these might bring. Thirdly, the definition of integration and its underlying assumptions will be discussed, and lastly, recommendations for practitioners and future research will be presented

The Institutional Theory by Scott distinguishes between three pillars of institutions: regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive, whereby the former represents a formal institution and the normative and cultural-cognitive represent informal institutions. According to Scott, these institutions, along with associated activities and resources, provide stability to social life (Scott, 2008, p. 428; Scott et al., 2005). The regulatory pillar compromises rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctions and is enforced by formal entities such as governments, the police force and formal agencies. As refugees in Nairobi fall under the mandate of the Government of Kenya and are governed by several policies, one could assume that this pillar has the largest impact on the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. Contributions to Institutional Theory stipulates that the regulatory pillar is strongest when supported by the informal institutions.
However, the findings of this thesis point towards a less structured framework of institutions than first assumed. Through an analysis of the three pillars, both individually and mutually, the findings show how the lines between what is formal and informal are blurred. Where formal rules, sanctions and rights struggle to advance and effectuate, informal institutions are somewhat overlapping, or supporting, these weaknesses through informal responses to formal weaknesses. The above research points towards a higher reliance on informal institutions as the rule-setting mechanisms in society, which to some extent undermines the formality of the regulatory pillar in Institutional Theory.

This research thus arguably contributes with a reverse point of focus on Institutional Theory: where other researchers study formal institutions to understand the enforced rules, processes and dynamics of a society, this thesis highlights the large impact of informal institutions and how these can somehow prove to have a more influential role than firstly anticipated. Scott explains how the pillars in Institutional Theory each assess and analyse the different institutional dynamics in a society, but arguably neglects the idea of institutions as *responses* or *substitutions* in cases of absences. This nuance is arguably of high importance in studying the formal and informal institutions' contributions to sustainable integration for refugees, as this changes the usual causality of integration processes. Applying the *domains of integration* by Strang & Ager (2010), the weak formal institutions reduce the *foundations* and *means and markers* of integration, referring to rights, citizenship, health, and employment, which in turn highlights the need for the informal institutions through *facilitators* of integration such as social capital, language and cultural knowledge.

While Institutional Theory is useful for assessing and understanding the different mechanisms of societal actors and how these stimulate different views of social reality, Hamann et al. (2020) point towards the need for diverse representation of global scholarly perspectives.

In the theory article "Neither Colony nor Enclave: Calling for dialogical contextualism in management and organisation studies", Hamann et al. (2020) express their unease with the so-called "Northern mainstream", in which Northern perspectives and theories tend to trivialise Southern contexts and thus using knowledge and practices generated in Western countries as a "one size fits all". The authors highlight the use of the phrase "institutional voids", as they argue that the phrase reflects the tendency of Western authors to emphasise absences in Southern contexts based on concepts originated from and premised upon Northern contexts (2020, p. 10). This phrase arguably carries a connotation that the institutions in the South are not worthy of consideration on their own terms, which can be problematic as it causes contextual mismatches and disregards the historical context of the South: *"…it replicates colonial patterns that disregard or trivialise knowledge and practices of the former colonies in the Global South"* (2020, p. 4). The phrase "institutional voids" is therefore prone to highlight the absence of formal institutions as seen from the Western perspective and often fails to explore the presence of alternative institutions. While this argument can seem critical towards the idea of dividing institutions into pillars, as the analysis of each pillar respectively can be influenced by personal assumptions and premises from the Northern context, it also emphasises the importance of analysing the pillars holistically to understand the effects and responses of the formal and informal institutions, as seen in this thesis.

The combination of Institutional Theory, our findings, and the perspective of Hamann *et* al. arguably creates

a new perspective on institutional voids and the contributions of formal and informal institutions in the integration process of urban refugees in Nairobi: namely, that while the informal institutions are attempting to fill the formal institutional voids of the regulatory pillar, the void is only satisfied on a short-term basis. The informal institutions try to adapt and respond to the frail formal institutions, but cannot fulfil the obligations and expectations of regulatory institutions fully. Khanna & Palepu (2010) highlights the need to understand the different mechanisms and shapes of institutions in developing countries and emerging markets, where informal institutions often function as market intermediaries in cases of frail formal institutions. This poses the question of whether a formal institutional void can be fully fulfilled by any other entity than formal institutions? And if so, which standards should these institutions be analysed from to avoid Western biases and capture the institutional complexities of African countries? Hamann *et* al. (2020) also argues that Southern critics may also revert to the opposite by relying solely on historical contexts to describe phenomena in the South and in doing so, underexpose other important dimensions of institutions. These contradictory characteristics of the Northern scholars and the Southern critics both essentialize context based on the assumptions of their theoretical point of departure and their everyday lives. The authors thus highlight to carefully attend to how our theoretical contexts shape assumptions and to do so through enhanced theoretical validity.

In most research, Institutional Theory tends to be used in organisational studies and can, on its own, be useful in describing and analysing the persistence and homogeneity of phenomena (Dacin *et* al., 2002). As the research question is concentrated on integration of urban refugees, we chose to utilise the theory of social capital as a supporting theory to further explore the dynamics in the informal institutions and emphasise the role of these within a developing country. This arguably brings a new perspective to the three-pillar structure, as it highlights the value of the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars rather than seeing them as institutions to support the regulatory pillar. Nevertheless, there is a broad discussion among researchers about whether the study of international migration, in which the topic of urban refugees in Nairobi falls within, transcends disciplinary divisions and therefore cannot be analysed within a single scholarly approach (VandenBelt, 2020).

Most International Business literature surrounding refugees and migration is concentrated on the social network aspect of social capital and emphasises the role of these networks both at home and abroad and how, or if, these contribute to integration (Manchin & Orazbayev, 2016; Boyd, 1989). This literature reflects on the maturation of immigration streams stimulated by social networks consisting of family, friendship and community ties and the way that this shapes migration outcomes, ranging from no migration, to integration,

or to return migration (Boyd, 1989). While this literature is not focused solely on refugees, it elucidates the important role of families and communities as a geographically dispersed social group that creates networks across borders and in turn influences migration and integration decisions. This role is especially evident in labour markets, which our findings have found to play an important part in the integration process of urban refugees. In her journal article "Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas", Boyd (1989) explains how migration flows reflect the establishment of networks of information and obligations which develop between migrants in the host society and relatives in the sending area. These networks connect populations in origin and receiving countries and shape the effect of social and economic structures between areas through network resources: as the length of the residency of a migrant increase, the likelihood of family reunification grows, which in turn increases the existence of family based networks in the host society. These growing network ties affect the subsequent cohorts of migrants, as they will enter an area with more relatives, kinships and contacts. This is especially important in host societies that view migrants as temporary, as the dependency on social networks thus increases. These large networks and the dependency they have on each other can result in isolated communities within the societies, thus inhibiting interaction with the society surrounding them (Boyd, 1989). Family and personal ties only represent a small part of a larger web of networks in international migration studies, including political and economic ties.

As previously described, much of the literature surrounding social capital emphasises bridging- and bonding social capital. However, it may be argued that linking social capital is of particular importance in the context of urban refugees and institutional voids. According to Boateng (2010), linking social capital refers to the ties between different social and economic statuses and has the advantage of helping individuals and groups gain access to information and resources that they otherwise would not. This is especially important for urban refugees in a setting where the formal institutions fail to provide services and guidance, thus forcing urban refugees to seek information and assistance elsewhere. This could for instance be through remittances from abroad to help support refugee livelihoods or through links with NGOs (Boateng, 2010). In this particular context, UNHCR, the main NGO mentioned, provides limited linking social capital to the urban refugees as they have been found to supply an insufficient amount of help in Nairobi. Linking social capital through remittances or strong, supportive formal organisations can therefore be an important element of social capital in the context of urban refugees in Nairobi.

The large amount of research on social networks within international immigration studies and IB literature proves that much more could be written about the importance of social capital and networks within the study

of urban refugees and integration processes, particularly in contexts with formal institutional voids. Nonetheless, we argue that the choice of social capital as a supporting theory to Institutional Theory proves the validity and relevance of this research across different academic disciplines.

The two above mentioned theories and frameworks were utilised to analyse and assess the contributions of institutions to sustainable integration and if this was the case for urban refugees in Nairobi. As previously described, UNHCR describes integration of refugees as a two-way process that requires efforts from both the displaced persons as well as the host society. This therefore requires refugees to be willing to adapt to the new host society whilst maintaining their cultural identity as well as the readiness of the host society to meet and support the needs of a diverse population. UNHCR describes integration as the main goal of the resettlement process (UNHCR, 2014; Strang & Ager, 2008). However, the findings of this thesis questions the viewpoint of integration as a goal in the Kenyan context and rather highlights integration as an ongoing process, in which integration happens less explicitly and gradually over time.

Institutional Theory framework divides institutions into three distinct pillars based on formal or informal mechanisms. In cases of fixed institutions, in which both the formal and informal institutions positively contribute to social life, integration remains stated as a policy goal and is seen as the outcome for projects working with refugees. Using Strang & Ager's (2008) domains of integration, this would refer to a situation in which refugees could gradually work their way through *means and markers, social connection, facilitators,* and *foundation* to reach the goal of integration. These domains of integration can also represent the formal and informal institutions as seen in the Institutional Theory. Refugees would thus participate in key activities in the public arena such as education and employment, create social connections across social classes and communities, learn how to engage in the new society while maintaining their own cultural identity and lastly, apply for formal citizenship and enjoy the same rights as the rest of the population (Strang & Ager, 2008; Häuberer, 2011). However, in cases of weak formal institutions, a part of these domains become unattainable for refugees as the formal institutions do not have the capacity, resources or policies to support integration as a sustainable goal. The institutional void thus forces this process, or these domains, to change, as informal institutions will have to counterbalance what the formal institutions fail to provide. In the case of urban refugees in Nairobi, the prospects of gaining the proper documentation to become a registered refugee and obtaining a work permit are frail, thus increasing the importance of supportive informal institutions such as social capital, networks and the Kenyan proclivity to work informally. Furthermore, the findings point towards a high precariousness among urban refugees in Nairobi, due to widespread corruption among the police force, which once again has an adverse effect on integration as personal safety is a

paramount for many refugees (Strang & Ager, 2008). The process of integration thus becomes less of a structural process with an end goal, but more a mingling of different informal institutions in which each adds value to the short-term integration process of the urban refugees.

The large involvement and impact of UNHCR on refugee affairs in Kenya makes it valuable to base our initial understanding of the concept of *integration of refugees* on their definition. This highlights the fundamental vision of one of the large actors in this context and provides us a topical tendency to base the analysis upon. Nevertheless, when conducting development research and investigating impacts on integration, it is important to consider the contextual and individual meaning of the word. Integration has an abundance of definitions, each based on the different values and underlying assumptions of the individual who defined these. It is therefore essential to acknowledge that what might be the definition and preferred process of integration for some, might be the diametrically opposite for others. The findings of this research are thus dependent on the meaning that we associated with the concept of integration. This research could thus be based on a different definition of integration of refugees which might result in different results: regardless, both outcomes would arguably articulate the same reality around the impact of institutions on the integration of refugees in Nairobi. Although the definition of integration can differ depending on the refugee or on the researcher's perspective, the role that institutions play in the life of urban refugees in Nairobi remains the same.

This section therefore recommends future research on immigration, refugees and integration to focus on the *process* of integration rather than the entry point and the end goal. Through the above analysis and discussion, we found how, despite strict regulatory measures that intend to prohibit and restrict refugee immigration and integration in Nairobi, urban refugees have still managed to settle and find alternative methods to create a living for themselves in the capital city. While we found the possibilities of full integration to be a goal with long prospects, this research calls for attention to the underlying mechanisms and dynamics that take place in between the entry point and the end goal. Strengthening the registration process and making it more accessible could be an efficient way of improving urban refugees' livelihood and facilitating their integration. By having legal documents allowing them to be in Nairobi, refugees would have access to basic services and the harassment and corruption they face from the police would arguably decrease. The EAC provision in the New Refugee Act is also a great first step in that direction since it provides a legal status to certain refugees and allows them to settle anywhere in the country. The New Refugee Act is also presenting a lot of improvement for refugees' integration. The introduction of

settlements rather than camps also represents an improvement. However, for this provision to really make a difference, refugees should be authorised to work outside of the settlements. That way they could access real economic opportunities, contribute to the economy of the country, and integrate amongst the society. Refugees represent an important workforce in Kenya from which the government could benefit if the urban refugees were not working in the informal sector, but rather actively, and formally, contributing to the formal workforce.

Conclusion

Following section is a comprehensive conclusion with the intent of summarising the conclusions made in the previously constructed thesis as well as answering the research question: *How do formal and informal institutions contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya?*

To answer the research question, this thesis was based on a critical realist approach, which asserts that one single reality exists but with multiple interpretations of said reality. This approach allowed us to explore the relations between events, experiences, and mechanisms and subsequently gain a deeper understanding of the links between institutions and integration. Institutional Theory by Scott was used in combination with the social capital concept of Putnam to elucidate and analyse the contributions of three institutions to the integration of urban refugees in Nairobi: namely, the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive pillar. The data collected to analyse these pillars stem mainly from secondary data through journals, books, data portals and online articles. This information was triangulated and elaborated upon through four interviews with academics and experts with knowledge of the topic.

Each of Scott's institutional pillars were analysed in-depth to elucidate the individual mechanisms and dominant elements that affect or contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees.
The regulatory pillar points towards the conclusion that the Government of Kenya is providing only temporary solutions for refugees seeking asylum, rather than investing in sustainable approaches to answer the global crisis of forced displacement that the country is experiencing. This can be seen through the somewhat hostile refugee policies and the efforts to minimise the number of urban refugees in Nairobi and thus gather all refugees in camps. The often-ostracising discourse of the Government of Kenya and the lack of clearly defined and sustainable solutions point towards unresourceful regulatory institutions that do not have the capacity to manage the large influx of refugees seeking asylum in Kenya. The presence of the large NGO UNHCR has been found to have little impact on the urban refugees, as their main resources are allocated to the refugee camps and do not contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees.
The 2021 Refugee Act represents an opportunity for sustainable integration of EAC citizens, as a new

provision allows them to renounce their status as refugees and use their status as citizens of East Africa instead. This would allow this part of the refugee population to enjoy the same right as any Kenyan through free movement and the right to work anywhere in Kenya without the constraints of long processes to obtain registration and proper documents.

The contributions of informal institutions, described as the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars by Scott, have found to be somewhat contradicting: these are both supporting the integration of urban refugees and creating barriers for them to access a decent livelihood. The main mechanisms within the normative pillar were identified as corruption and the norm of working informally.
These mechanisms were found to be directly related to the findings of the cultural-cognitive pillar, which highlighted the importance of social capital and social networks as a safety net for urban refugees in Nairobi and subsequently a way for these refugees to integrate socially and economically. This pillar found social capital and social networks to play a large role in accessing the informal labour market, having a sense of community, and can work as an alternative support in areas where formal institutions are absent.

Through a holistic view of the three pillars, the analysis and findings indicate that the normative and cultural-cognitive pillar are not working as supporting mechanisms for the regulatory pillar, as initially presumed, but rather responding to the institutional void left by it. The very limited latitude provided to the urban refugees through provisions and ineffective procedures forces the large number of urban refugees in Nairobi to rely on other mechanisms to get by. However, we found these responses to the institutional voids to be a temporary solution. Through social capital, networks and the large informal economy, urban refugees have opportunities for economic integration of a certain extent, but remains partial in social integration, as the strong dependency on social networks arguably creates secluded communities, and legal integration, due to the lack of strong, resourceful regulatory institutions.

We therefore disregard our initial understanding of integration as a goal of resettlement and rather point towards integration as a process in which both formal and informal institutions play a crucial role. In the case of Nairobi, most urban refugees are a part of social networks and rely on these to gain access to the informal labour market, housing and basic livelihood needs. This points towards integration as a process that happens from 'bottom-up' as the efforts of the refugees themselves and the communities surrounding them arguably play a larger role in the integration process than any formal institutions. *"It's the best of times and it is the worst of times. At the same time. So there's integration happening from below, but there's a lot of encampment securitization, profiling and exploitation happening top down from this. And as it happens, oftentimes governments in Africa lag way behind their people"* (Derese Kassa, Appendix 2).

These barriers to integration faced by the urban refugees in Nairobi are often overlapping with the everyday struggles of Kenyan citizens living in Nairobi, including access to housing, healthcare, and availability of

jobs within the formal sector. This supports our findings of institutional voids as the challenges impacting urban refugees are not solely based on constrictive refugee policies, but also arguably the result of a larger inability from formal, regulatory institutions to meet and support the needs of their citizens.

The findings of the thesis indicate that sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi is not fully achievable without the support of a formal, regulatory pillar to create an inclusive environment where refugees are seen as contributing to society rather than as simply transiting through. The impact of informal institutions contributes to integration through social capital and network which can contribute to sustainable integration as a long-term process rather than an end goal.

Further Research and Reflections

This thesis placed focus on the contribution of formal and informal institutions on sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi in one point of time in the ever-changing refugee crisis, particularly in the Global South. This is therefore consequently not the complete reporting on the integration process or the full indications of the livelihoods of the urban refugees in Nairobi. The newly introduced 2021 Refugee Act has not been fully implemented at the present time, making it interesting to further develop this study once the full extent of the new refugee law is known and the effects of these can be analysed adequately. The extent and implementation of the so-called designated areas could be of particular importance, as this could arguably create a large shift in the refugee policy towards a policy of 'self-reliance', or conversely, perhaps prove to be an attempt comparable to the current encampment law.

Furthermore, this thesis briefly touches upon the influence of the local government in the integration process of urban refugees. This aspect was brought to our attention by the interviewees from the Soli*City project, Martin Bak Jørgensen and Óscar García Agustín, who talked about the importance and influence of solidarity from the civil society and local government perspective. This aspect of international migration could be interesting to analyse further to investigate the impact and approaches of local governments and municipalities to urban refugees and whether this differs from the approaches of the national government. This could also further explore the idea of urban citizenship, where one could analyse the opportunities of integration from bottom-up instead of top-down. As previously mentioned, these nuances of urban refugee research are arguably under-represented in research and would thus most likely require the researcher to conduct fieldwork in Nairobi to fully investigate and understand the different mechanisms of local governments and civil society groups and the impact of these on urban refugees. These local institutions and influence also introduce the concept of local belonging as a replacement for national citizenship. This could create opportunities for forcibly displaced people to identify as citizens on a more local level rather than a national. Additional research would be required to establish the validity of this concept.

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Appendix 1: Interview Guide

1. Introduction of us and our project
    a. *How do formal and informal institutions and humanitarian aid contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya?*

2. For efficiency and clarity purposes, I (Sofie/Emma) will be the one asking the questions and leading the interview today and Emma/Sofie will have more of an observer role.

3. Can we record and transcribe this meeting? - For academic purposes only. (Both the video and the sound will be recorded)
    a. Can we use your real name in our thesis?

4. Could you please present yourself and your professional occupation.

5. Do you often work with matters related to the situation of refugees in Kenya?

6. Integration is one of the main focus points in our thesis. What does integration of urban refugees mean to you? How would you describe it?

7. In your experience, why do you believe that some refugees seek urban areas instead of camps?

8. What role do governments and legal actors play in the integration of refugees in urban areas? Give examples if you have.
    a. What do you think motivates national policies towards refugees?
    b. How could government and legal actors enhance refugee integration in urban areas?

9. Which kind of help would you say humanitarian organisations provide to urban refugees and how does it enhance their integration process (if applicable)?
    a. Do you have any examples of this?

10. Do you know if urban refugees are active in the labour market? If yes, could you please describe what kind of activities they are doing and how they are integrating the labour market?
    a. Informally or formally?
    b. How does the New Act (2021) affect the urban refugees' access to the labour market?

11. Can you talk a bit about social integration of urban refugees in Nairobi? What are the challenges that they face? What are the opportunities?
    a. Potential challenges: skin colour, language, religion, status
    b. Do cultural differences represent a barrier to the integration of refugees in urban areas? Give examples if you have.

12. Do you have anything else to add? Anything that we didn't cover during this interview and you think we might need to look upon?

13. Do you know other researchers, authors or organisations that would be interesting for us to interview? Any you could refer us to?

Appendix 2: Derese Kassa

Dr. Derese Kassa is a researcher, author and professor of sociology.
The transcription has been kept in American English, as this is the tongue of the interviewee.

Interview with Derese Kassa

Transcript
[Sofie Mortensen] We can start with a small introduction of ourselves. My name is Sofie and this is Emma. We are two students from Copenhagen Business School and currently in the process of writing our master thesis within our programme, Business and Development Studies. Our initial thought for this project was that refugees represent an opportunity for economic and social development of countries if they succeed in becoming sustainably integrated to their host countries. So, essentially, we want to know how governments, policies, NGOs, and other actors enable refugees to sustainably integrate to their hosting country and really participate in the economic and social context of the country.

[S.M] Before I forget, can we use your name in our thesis?

[Derese Kassa] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Absolutely.

[S.M] OK, great. So to get started, would you mind presenting yourself?

[D.K] Presenting myself, like introducing myself.

[S.M] Yes.

[D.K] Well, my name is Derese Getachew Kassa. I'm originally from Ethiopia. I, you know, was educated at Addis Ababa University. That's where I got my first degree in sociology. I used to work there and then I did my masters in the UK, went back, worked for four years before I ended up in the United States to do my pHD, OK. So I'm interested on issues that have to do with migration, displacement and cities. I'm, you know, particularly interested in how you know when people, for whatever reason, leave their place of origin and they come into the cities, how do they impact the livelihoods of the cities? Right. You know, it could be the economics of the city. It could be the politics of the city or even the cultural makeup of the city. That's my area of interest and that has to do with my upbringing. You know, I was born in the western parts of Ethiopia. But then when I was around 10-11, we moved into the capital city, Addis Ababa, which is like, you know, the biggest city in Ethiopia, and right about 1992-1993 you know, because the Civil War broke out in Somalia, thousands of refugees started to come into Ethiopia. And a lot of them settled in this very neighborhood where I was growing up.

And you know, so I lived all my high school days and then my undergrad days in Addis watching this, you know, real time transformation of what was a very sleepy residential neighborhood at the outskirts of Addis Ababa, totally being transformed by the Somalis.
And then I always had that at the background in my mind, I was like, at one point, I wanna come back and do some study around this. Well, I didn't do it in Addis for reasons that I'm not gonna tell you if it's a long story, but that's exactly what I did in Nairobi. I went there and I looked at, this time around, how did Ethiopian urban refugees transform urban spaces in Nairobi?

[S.M] Why Nairobi in particular then?

[D.K] You're making me answer that question. Well, you know, I had this other incarnation, another life. You know, I was a little bit of a human rights and a political activist in Ethiopia before I came to the US and outside Ethiopia as well. So it was not politically, you know, safe to go back during those days and do study in Addis for me personally.
There were political consequences, so I felt like, OK, I can't do it in my home.
Why not do it in the neighboring country, which is right next door to Ethiopia?

[S.M] Well, we're happy you did because that made it extra relevant for us.

[D.K] Yeah. How did you find the book?

[S.M] Well, it's one of the first things that come up when you search for urban refugees in Nairobi online. It's not very, we found that it's not, we can't find a lot of online data on the topic. So your book was one of the first ones that popped up.

[D.K] Are you guys going to Nairobi to do that study?

[S.M] Well, we wanted to go to Nairobi to do this, but we couldn't. We weren't able to find either the resources or key individuals who could help us. And also we found out that you need a research certificate to go there and to be able to interview people and that apparently was very costly.

[D.K] Oh really?

[S.M] Yeah, so we had to rearrange our plans a bit and then try to do it as best as possible from home.

[D.K] Ohh, I'm sorry to hear. When I did that.. I went there.. so that book came out in 2018. It literally was a spin off from my PhD dissertation and I was doing my field work, I can't believe this is like, wow, it's like 11 years ago. It was 2012. I. Yeah. And when I did that, there was nothing like, you know, nobody asked me to go find a certificate. What I did was, there was this agency known as the Kenya Refugee Consortium. It's like a nonprofit, an NGO, which really help Ethiopian, not just Ethiopian refugees, but a lot of refugees in Nairobi. What I did was, I contacted them and through them I managed to find refugees and interview them and collect my data.
And it was not official. You don't have to go to a government agency or whatever. So what you're telling me is, like, maybe they change the system afterward, you know?

[S.M] Well, it sounds like it. If we would have known before, maybe that would have been a bit easier.

[D.K] Yeah, yeah. But you guys have been to Nairobi before?

[S.M] No.

[D.K] Emma, have you been there?

[Emma Revilliod] Yeah. I loved it, but it was not for studying or researching or anything. It was just to visit.

[D.K] To visit Kenya then. OK, I see. I see. Yeah. OK. I see. So you're not planning to do field work in Nairobi for this. So you're just gonna do desktop research? OK, fair enough.

[S.M] And hopefully talk to more people like you who are willing to share their knowledge with us.

[D.K] Yeah. OK. Let's do it.

[S.M] So, we read your book and found it very interesting. We also found it very interesting that you focused on urban refugees instead of the people who live in camps. So, from your experience, why do you think that some of these refugees seek the urban areas instead of the camps?

[D.K] Yeah. Let me start by saying this.
Sofie, when you look at the original UN conventions on refugees, OK, encampment was not proposed. You know, it was not a policy major which was endorsed and which agencies like the United Nation encouraged host governments to do, because encampment has a historic baggage to it. Think about Auschwitz and the refugee camps in Poland and in Germany, right? Think about the internment camps in the United States when the Second World War broke out, the United government started to arrest Japanese Americans, suspecting them of spying and working for Imperial Japan. These were ordinary American citizens and all of a sudden they became prisoners. And so the idea of putting and confining refugees who fled persecution from a neighboring country or for whatever reason, and then quarantining them in that sort of a setting came during the Cold War.
The reason why it became very imperative for host states to safely quarantine refugees, was from the perspective of national security, right, there was this notion that people who fled from other countries could be threats. They could be dangers for the national security of the host state, right? So what do you do? You confine them. You feed them there. If possible, you provide them basic amenities like clean water or some sort of a shelter. And you try to keep them as long as possible, making sure they don't integrate into the Host countries' society and then hopefully they get lucky. They would settle down for what we call third country settlement. So usually European countries or America is willing to take them on board. So they end up as immigrants or refugees settling in the United States or in Norway or in Denmark or what have you. So it was this national security imperative which pushed the host countries to go down that road of encampment. OK, but that logic also works the other way around. Sometimes, interestingly, these refugee camps could also be grounds on which a host country can recruit refugees and turn them into fighters. Rebels. Let's say, you know, Sudan and Ethiopia are not in good books. Right. There are Ethiopian refugees that fled Ethiopia and that ended up in Khartoum, in Sudan. So what does the Sudanese Government do? They recruit these young people politically educate them, arm them and then dispatch them back as rebels into Ethiopia or into Kenya. Right. So, sometimes they consider them as threats to the country, which is welcoming them, and other times they use them as weapons to destabilize another country which is in the neighborhood. So you know, it was

the politicization of refugees, which actually gave us this model of encampment. And it has never been in the books. And it is not an ideal policy for, I'll give you a few reasons. One. People would be feeling that their mobility is restrained. Right. And they will not have the option of integrating with the host community. So usually they cannot go to school. You know they cannot open up business, they cannot intermarry and have kids with the locals, right. So the host countries usually see it as a way of preventing refugees from integrating into the community, which, you know, the refugees if you give them the opportunity, may do. It's only human, you know.
And so it restricts mobility. It denies opportunities for economic integration and cultural integration with the host community. But most importantly, it's not safe. A lot of these refugee camps are places where robbery is commonplace, gender based violence, especially against female refugees, rampant right rape, gender based violence, assaulting women. And what have you? So all of that is a big problem and the governments in the host countries feel like they don't care because they think, you know, the camp is there. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees is in charge of these refugees. So they feel like it's not their mandate to protect the safety and well-being of refugees. So you're out on your own in that camp and you cannot even protect yourself. Right. So for all these practical reasons, refugee camps are not ideal for the well-being of refugees.

[S.M] Yeah. When you speak of this harassment and this prejudice towards these refugees, you also mention that it happens in the urban areas.

[D.K] Yeah.

[S.M] So who would you say that harasses these refugees? Is it the locals, is it the police? Where do we see this harassment?

[D.K] Do you mean in camps or in urban centers?

[S.M] In the urban centers.

[D.K] Oh yeah, I mean there is prejudice. There could be some level of feeling unsafe or experiencing discrimination and violence from community members, be it in camps or in the cities. Now, I'm sure you've read, there's a chapter in my book where I talk about policing with prejudice, right, how folks in the Nairobi Police Department, usually they literally pray on refugees.
They identify them because there are some physical features of Ethiopians and Eritreans, and Kenyans that they can easily look at and guess whether that is an ethnic Ethiopian or Somali. So they profiled them and then they threaten them, saying if you don't give me this amount of money, I'll literally, you know, scoop you up and then drop you in jail, right.
Other times it's very blatant, they know the places where these refugees may go to say, for instance, pick up a check, right? Maybe that refugee has a relative in Copenhagen or Oslo and they sent them down money to pay for rent or what have you. And these folks are going into the bank or to the ATM machine to withdraw money. And the police would be waiting outside.
And at gunpoint, the police take the money off of these refugees, right? Mind you, you know it's not robbers, it's the police who do this.
So one of the constant sources of irritation and violation of refugee rights comes from the national security apparatus of the host states, particularly the police. And this is not exceptional to Kenya. You know, you will see it in Ethiopia. You will see it in Uganda. You probably would see it in Tanzania, right?

And you know, push that argument further down the road. Well, it's not like the police respect the law for the locals as well. There's a lot of corruption. There's a lot of rights violations on the part of these agencies of the state, these arms of the state violating the rights of the locals, fellow Kenyans, fellow Tanzanians. In fact, sometimes you would hear Kenyans saying, well, these policemen, they treat the refugees better than they treat us.
I don't want to give you the impression that the police are doing this only to refugees or stateless people, OK.

[S.M] Do you think this kind of profiling, not only from the police, but maybe locals as well, do you think it affects the social integration of the urban refugees in Nairobi? Is it one of the challenges they face?

[D.K] No. Yeah. You know, what fascinates me is locals. Like people who are not into the state apparatus. They're so open. They're so welcoming. They open their houses, their apartments, they, you know, they let refugees rent their spaces. I know they get money, but they can also choose to say, I'm not gonna rent it for a foreigner, but they don't do that. Kids go to school. Kenyan Schools, public schools. I'm talking about the children of Ethiopian refugees. Right. And one thing that struck me is I kept asking parents and children whether they felt or experienced any sort of prejudice or discrimination in school because they happen to be refugees, I could not find one respondent.
In fact, some of the kids consider themselves as Kenyan, they speak perfect Swahili. They feel that Kenya is home and they don't wanna go back to Ethiopia or they don't wanna go resettling in another country, which is very fascinating.
As a sociologist, it tells you how much our identity is shaped by our media. The context within which we grow up, and we develop, right? For instance, you know refugees can go have an open bank account, right? And they can. They can open businesses. Actually, Nairobi allows you to operate on and operate a business as a refugee. All you gotta do is pay a talking fee to do that. So all of these tells you there's a lot of openness and integration happening from the bottom up, right? The only places where you see a lot of resistance and pushback, profiling prejudice, literally predating on and exploiting refugees, is from the security arm of the state.
OK. And so what you have is two things happening at the same time. It's the best of times and it is the worst of times. At the same time. So there's integration happening from below, but there's a lot of encampment securitization, profiling and exploitation happening top down from this.
And as it happens, oftentimes governments in Africa lag way behind their people.

[S.M] So how would you say that the Kenyan government and the legal policies are affecting or impacting the integration of these refugees in the urban areas?

[D.K] Umm, so Kenya is a signatory to, is it the 1951 or 1953 refugees convention, the UN Convention. They signed the 1967 Protocol as well. They are signatories to the African unions, you know, legislation on the upkeep of refugees. And in 2003, the last time I was there, they passed the refugee law. And then they established bodies on how they take care of refugees and the quest for refugees, for local integration and all that.
And you know, as you always see, when you read the documents, you know they're very rosy documents. They're really nice. I mean, they spell out the rights and the dignities of refugees. The problem is, oftentimes what is written in the document does not get translated into practice.
And much could be said about the state. You know, for instance, you can ask is this because Kenya is a very young nation, which is only what, 60 years old?

A postcolonial state struggles to have the bureaucracy, the institutional capacity to translate and interpret these laws into practice, right? Or is this about the democratic deficit of the Kenyan state itself? Like ordinary Kenyans don't have much power about what the politicians are doing. And you could say, if you don't have that capacity at a state level for your own citizens, how would you expect it to be extended to outsiders? Outsiders, who are usually seen as potential threats to the Kenyans, especially Somali refugees because there were a lot of terrorist attacks in Nairobi beginning from 1998 and they were conducted by ethnic Somalis who belonged to this terrorist group called Al-Shabaab.
And Al-Shabaab feels like it's in this existential global war between Christianity and and Islam, and Kenya is a target. They would have bombings in church. There were bombings at the US embassy. And so the Kenyan police and the Kenyan intelligence services are very nervous and wary of refugees in general and urban refugees in particular, because when they're urban, that's where they pose a threat. Right. If you put them in the cam, you can actually monitor and surveil them.
If they are in the city, you can, it's like putting a needle in a haystack and you're trying to find a needle, right? So, you know, I don't wanna be too skeptical about this state and the government because I know they also face real time imminent threats to the security of the people. Right. And so, you know, you have to be balanced in the way you view the capacity and the threats to the Kenyan state in general.

[S.M] You also mentioned - you speak of a double bind within the Kenyan Act of Refugees. There is a whole chapter about this. Would you mind explaining what you mean by this term?

[D.K] Sofie, It’s been a long time since I wrote that book, I'm not even...
Alright, OK, so if I remember well, I say the double bind because you know, it allows for integration of refugees, right? It recognizes their rights. It puts in place mechanisms on how the refugee affairs should be managed. But you look at the bodies. Right. So I remember I outlined about this, like for instance, there is a Department of Refugee Affairs and they had this thing called Refugee Affairs Council or the Refugee Affairs Committee. And if you look at the names of all the representatives, they represent the national security arms, the police, the intelligence services, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There's no representation whatsoever by the refugees themselves.
In fact, when you look at the Kenyan refugee law, it says when these bodies find that a refugee in question is a threat to the Kenyan state, it says it retains the right to literally purge them out, expel them.
The fascinating thing is, where do you expel them to?
It's not like you say, OK, it's a problem to Kenya. And hey, Ethiopia, would you be willing to take over this guy, which is so bizarre, you know?
So that's what I meant. Like the lens through which the Kenyan state views refugees is security, security, security.
But like I say, at the same time, it offers them the chance to go to school, to open up businesses to, have mobility in the city. There's no explicit policy that bans refugees from coming from refugee camps to cities. They do that.
Right. And then that's what I meant by a double bind. Yeah.

[S.M] Yes, alright. Since we just spoke about the Kenyan Act of Refugees from, I think, 2006, and since..

[D.K] Six. OK, yeah, you’re right. I thought it was 2003. OK, 2006, go ahead.

[S.M] I think it is six, don't quote me, but I think so. So since then, there has been an updated, or a new act, where they speak more of designated areas outside of camps. Where refugees can kind of build their own new life.

[D.K] OK, good, good. Wow.

[S.M] Do you think this is a step towards more sustainable integration or does it sound more welcoming than it actually is?

[D.K] To be honest with you, I think it's the opposite. Since I left, a lot of things have happened. I think a year or two after I came, there was a shooting in Garissa, no, in the West Mall, the shopping mall in Nairobi, where Al Shabaab's formed and took over and they killed a lot of people and unleashed terror and that made the Kenyans a lot more hawkish.
Like they're like, we have to put a dent in this crisis. Our city cannot just be a playground for terrorists where they can literally walk into a shopping mall and maul down people. So what does that mean? That means ramping up security, making sure a lot of refugees do not come to the city and intensifying surveillance and monitoring of neighborhoods in Nairobi, which are known to be hosting refugees as one bustling neighborhood. You all know it easily.
Right, so this whole idea of building new designated areas for refugees, for me that's like glorified refugee camps, that's saying refugee camps in another way. The purpose is containment. The purpose is surveillance, it's monitoring and it's containment.
So I don't think that's progress, Sofie. I don't. I think it's actually a reversal of the process. The other problem though is, I don't know if you guys would touch this on.
There was a lot of pressure on the part of the European Union to push countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, to retain as many refugees as possible and not send them over to Europe. And how did they do that? They pay these countries.
Right. OK, so do not bring them to us and dump them on European shores. We'lll give you whatever money you want. Feed them in your refugee camps. Send them to your own schools. In other words, European countries now have a refugee and immigration policy. They want to turn the countries into refugee camps. Which is really sad. It's happening. And these poor African countries are like, OK, if you give us the money, that's good.
Right now, they thought of this guy Museveni's refugee policy as like, wow, urban refugees are being integrated and all that. And I'm like, one of the reasons why Museveni and Company are doing this is because there's a lot of European Union funds coming in, and there's a reason why they Europeans are doing this. They don't want to shoulder the responsibility of bringing in and providing integration and settlement. You remember what happened when the Syrian crisis unfolded?
In Germany, Merkel was first very welcoming and there was a nationalist backlash like, how dare you bring this? People from the Middle East. And you have this wave of far right wing nationalist parties in Europe. It happened in Denmark, It almost happened in Norway. It happened in Sweden, right? The far right wing took seeds in the Bundestag like never before last election. So much so that the Socialists and the Christian right could not even form a government for such a long time. You know, it happened in Spain. It happened in Italy, right?
I'll tell you what, like I look at Europe right now, I'm a student of history. So I'm like, this continent pretty much feels like the eve of the Second World War.
It feels like it. And then you had this unfortunate war with Ukraine and Russia.

So I want you to understand the international political architecture, where these powerful countries of Europe and America are pressuring African states themselves to serve as de facto refugee camps.

[S.M] So it's not only the national state and national institutions, it is the global picture?

[D.K] No, no, no, no. It's global. It's very global.

[S.M] So now, since we see so many urban refugees in Nairobi, you mentioned through a lot of your interviews in the book that many of them are actually active in the labor market. Could you describe what kind of activities they're doing and how they're integrating into society through the labor market?

[D.K] There were folks who owned restaurants. There were people who had beauty shops and hair salons. They were folks who had taxi cabs. Some of them started off as the Azure's to these matatus, the minibusses which are very popular and then they save money and then they buy their own matatu. Sometimes they partner with the Kenyan and they buy, because you know the CAP, they may not have as much money. And that's the thing about Kenya, it's such an outlier because it's like the Switzerland of East Africa.
I'm telling you, the Kenyans are so much into commerce and business and investment. It's such an open society. And then so, you don't see that sort of vitality if you go to Addis or if you go to Khartoum and for something. And there's a lot of history behind that. And that's probably one reason why I don't wanna live in Addis Ababa. I wanna live in Nairobi when I retire, but yeah, so, so they are involved in a lot of economic activities.
I know of a guy, and I remember I wrote down about him because he had such an amazing history of transformation from a refugee into, you know, he got his education in Nairobi and then he started working for the United Nations Environment program and then he retired and he has some money. He opened up a hotel in South Sudan. He's a millionaire now.
And then I'm like, wow, this is a fascinating story, of someone, who fled the country with nothing but a pair of clothes, and he literally refashioned himself and worked not just in Kenya, but Sudan, South Sudan and so, there are amazing histories of these integration. And I call it integration from below.
Because people are active human agents, as you know, human beings, they find ways of working around laws. They will find policies, institutions we try to curtail them off and and they beat the odds- you know. So yeah, many instances. But I don't remember a lot. I'm sorry.

[S.M] No, no, that's fine. But did you find that a lot of these refugees received any kind of help from humanitarian organisations? For instance, we spoke with the Red Cross last week, who are big in Nairobi, and you also mentioned an NGO earlier.

[D.K] Yeah. When I was there, until the early 2000s, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, they never wanted to help urban refugees.
They were saying this is not in our mandate, blah, blah, blah. There were a few organisations. The most work was done by the Danish Refugee Council.
I don't know if you guys have contacted them, they do an extremely good job. Not just in the camps, but in the urban centres, right. I remember interviewing one of the leaders of the agency and they have a fancy place in Nairobi. So if you guys go, you gotta go there. OK. And tell them it's the taxpayers money. I'm Danish. Anyways, yeah. So they're big there. There is, I think Oxfam does some work too, but this is the thing though, Sofie and Emma. I am so conflicted about the role of these humanitarian agencies.

On the one hand, they bring much needed capital. They give you seed capital, they provide scholarships and all that. They try to help address the immediate needs of refugees, right? And they fill a critical gap and we should recognize that.
On the other hand though, the aid industry in Africa is an industry that literally thrives on the constant misery of the people.
If these people are not around, then they don't have any reason of existence. You see, these agencies do not exist at all.
The next humanitarian crisis is the next project grant. It's the next fund. It's the next money, right? And so you have this situation where Africans are always paraded as poster children for aid. Let's go help these needy Africans. Let's go feed. And there's this mentality of rescuing these helpless Africans and so in that sense, the aid industry recycles. You know the same notion of the developed West, Europe, the enlightened, the modernised, going and doing its imperial charity to these helpless, uneducated, illiterate masses, who find themselves in all kinds of problems in Africa.
And it does not help us, it does not help it, in fact sometimes it makes things worse. And so I'm so torn. I'm so conflicted.
I teach a class in sociology and we talk about, oh, you guys are business development students. So there's this thing that we call in sociology, of organisation goal displacement.
Have you guys heard of it before, which is like you establish an organisation for a goal and then midway, you don't know it, but you've already displaced the goal. I'll give you an example. If I establish a nonprofit called Hope For the Hungry.
And it's headquartered in Addis. And I'm getting money from the European Union, from USAID or World Bank, and I have a bunch of kids that I'm feeding on a day shelter.
A lot of these organisations, I don't know if you guys know this, most of them, they spend more than 80% of their money on recurrent expenses.
80%, buying filled vehicles, renting expensive apartment villas, sending their kids to the most fancy international school in Nairobi or in Addis Ababa. And a lot of them come from foreign countries. Imagine 20 percent, 25-30 percent of all the money which is in that project goes to the locals.
Right. And you just wonder, is this hope for the hungry or is this hope for me in the name of the hungry? So this is a classic example of goal displacement. You have these humanitarian agencies which set out to help refugees, but you actually look at how they function and operate. They're helping themselves.
Right. And so that's a structural problem and it's not just about refugees. That's in general about the aid sector.

[S.M] This is gonna sound like a big question, but do you think there’s any way that these organisations could turn it around, so they’re actually enhancing integration instead of reaching for their own goal? If you can put it like that.

[D.K] Oh my God. They find it so difficult, you know, because usually they start with this assumption that the locals don't know what they want. And it's not true.
You know, it's not true. And so, when you start out with that sort of a very paternalistic attitude, I know it and this is what you gotta do. And I got these checkboxes for you to fill out and I'm gonna give you €50,000 every year.
That guy wants the €50,000, but he also knows that most of these check boxes that you want him to fill out are maybe useless, but he will take it anyway.

So one thing they can do is - that's a very good question and I see it in your generation, younger people are more understanding of this - is to understand that whatever transformation development should happen, in Africa, or among refugees or any other vulnerable population.
You have to always think that the agency of the people should be at the centre.
They are responsible for their fate.
Our role should be to be allies, good allies, right? Our role should be to listen in, to tell them what we can do and what we cannot do and help facilitate that intervention. We should not be the drivers. And then a lot of the time we have that temptation and by the way, this is not only about, you know, Europe versus Africa or aid agencies versus vulnerable populations. It's usually about, I guess even among urban Africans, folks who are modern educated, folks like myself. We think we know better than a peasant.
So you know, I like to go and tell him this is how you grow your plants and this is how and he's like, who the hell do you think you are? Like he just came by from the capital city. You've never had your feet in a farming plot and you wanna lecture me about how I grow my crops. It's a paradigm problem, Sofie.

[S.M] And do you think this is why many people seek urban areas to kind of, maybe escape is a big word, but to go around these large humanitarian organisations?

[D.K] Could be, could be, but urban centres give you that agency, you know, like urban centres give you options, right? You can start up a business. You can do this, you can go to school. So in rural areas, like in camps, nothing happens.
You're just sitting there and waiting on and on and on until the UNHCR finds you a host country. And when interviews happen. And usually these interviews take place like, you gotta wait maybe for three 4-5 years until the UNHCR calls you. So what do you do over those 5-6 years? Just sit there and get wasted.
So camps are literally places where possibilities are either nonexistent or die. You don't have any possibility of, these are not incubators. These are not startups. So urban centers on the other hand, they provide you with these options of mobility, options of innovation and ideas and people doing things by themselves and usually doing things that they love doing.
You know, it's not only about having a job or whatever. It's also about, is this something that you love to do?

[S.M] So we've talked about integration a lot through this whole conversation and it's also one of the key words in our thesis. So what would you describe integration as, how do you understand the term?

[D.K] Wow. That powerful question. Wow. OK. You got me thinking now.
OK, so the most immediate thing for me is economic integration, right?
If a refugee has to always wait for a handout from an NGO or a host government or someone else outside, a relative, just to get by to have three meals a day, to pay for rent, then that's a state of helplessness and idleness and unemployment. For me, if you can get rid of that through economic integration by providing employment opportunities for refugees. That for me, is the biggest piece of integration.
But. There's a debate, though. If you do that, some folks would come back at you and say, aren't you blurring the distinction between an immigrant and a refugee?
Right, because now people would say, are they gonna pay taxes? OK, so they're staying here forever. They're getting married. They're having kids and grandkids, and they have become one of us. When they came, the plan was for us to host them for a few days. And then despite them out, they've now become Kenyans.
Right. And then and then so people are saying, if you push that policy of economic integration, you're actually incentivizing de facto immigration.

There's a lot of debate around what we are trying to do here when we say integration, but OK, let's talk about the other aspects. The other aspects come naturally. Like culture, for instance, those Ethiopian refugees and their children in Nairobi. Their kids speak fluent Swahili.
They date Kenyan girls and they go party at Kenyan clubs, right? The chances are they would find a job there. And so, for them, Ethiopia is a figment of their parents' imagination. Ethiopia is not a desirable place to go back to. They don't know any Ethiopia to go back to. There's no Ethiopia for them.
Maybe their parents have nostalgia. You know, I left my country and all that. The kids don't think like that. Because their experience of what it means to grow up, is to grow up in Kenya.
Right. And so, you know, you don't even need a program for cultural integration for these. These things happen organically. So when you provide that economic space, cultural integration also happens. I'm a student of sociology. I love when it happens organically like that. The sticky part, though, is political integration, because you're also thinking about a pathway to citizenship, right? Like, for instance, one of the most progressive things about that refugee law you talked about in Kenya, was they left the door open, slightly open on how refugees could actually leave for a given number of years and apply for naturalization of citizenship, which I find to be really, really progressive. Right, because a lot of African countries don't have this right.

[S.M] Yeah, there was this thing about naturalization of citizenship. You could live there for seven years and then you could apply …

[D.K] Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Even the Kenyan constitution has that, you know that, children of foreigners who were born in Kenya can actually claim citizenship by birth.

[S.M] So that would be a step towards embracing integration?

[D.K] Absolutely, absolutely. And even for people who lived there for a number of years, they can actually apply and seek Kenyan citizenship. So I find that very progressive, you know, to be honest with you. Because there are some countries, very developed, affluent liberal democracies where this is not yet a possibility.
If you are a child of Turkish immigrants who migrated to Germany after the end of the Second World War, you still remain an ethnic Turk. You can vote for the President in Istanbul, but you'll never vote for the Chancellor of Germany.
Right. Unless you officially change your citizenship, because they brought them with this guest worker arrangement with Turkey after the end of the war. Right. And so there's that possibility. Another possibility is what I call urban citizenship, which is sometimes integration into the national space. It takes a lot of time. So you can work from urban centers like, for instance, if I were to declare these Ethiopian refugees as citizens of Nairobi.
I don't care if they vote for the President of Kenya or not, but they will vote for the Mayor of Nairobi. Because they're paying taxes, they're sending their kids to these schools, right? So just by virtue of being a resident and a taxpayer of the city of Nairobi, can we imagine a possibility of them being Nairobians but not Kenyans?
In other words, can we reconfigure the idea of belonging and citizenship at the urban scale and not necessarily the national scale?
Because when you go to the Nationals game, because I, I can bet my money, I flew through Copenhagen but never been to Denmark. Copenhagen, I'm sure, is not Denmark, you know, or Stockholm is not Sweden. The

dynamics of urban politics are very, very different. If you drive an hour or two away and end up in a rural county.
Somewhere in you know, I don't know. I've been to Norway a lot. So if you end up in Tromso in Trondheim, they don't look like Oslo. You know, so that's what I'm saying.

[S.M] Yeah. I guess there is also this sense of belonging that doesn't go away just because you don't have citizenship, right? It's like a mental state.

[D.K] Yeah. Yeah, you know citizenship in, you can take people's passports away. You cannot take their experiences.
You know if a girl grew up, let's say she's a child of Haitian refugees in New York cities and documented immigrants. All her formative experiences in Brooklyn, in New York, right. She may not have a US passport. And let's say the US immigration officials deport her back down to Haiti. Are you gonna call that a complication?
She's a New Yorker. But governments like to think in terms of passports and documents. You know, papers. It's one of the addictions of the state. The state likes to document. That's why, you see, they take our, what do they call them now? Biometrics and fingerprints and blood cells and whatever. The way the state feels strong is when they fix you.
If they don't fix us, if they don't know our zip code, our Social Security number, our blood cells, our biopic pictures, they feel weak. It just comes naturally. So. But like you say, it's, you know, there's what a lot of people in citizenship studies called substantive citizenship. It's not formal and procedural. It's not about, you know, documents and what have you, but that experience.
That experience itself, and it's very hard to qualify it, that experience, that cultural million that you grew up with.That's a proof good enough that integration is happening, you know.

[S.M] Definitely. I don't know how much time you have left. Just so we're not taking up your time.

[D.K] What time is it? So we were planning to do this from 10 to 11, right?

[S.M] Yeah.

[D.K] I'll have 10 more minutes because this is fun doing.

[D.K] Emma, do you have any questions for me or is it Sofie asking the questions?

[E.R] We usually try to separate the work, so sometimes it's Sofie asking the questions and sometimes it's me. And today I'm taking notes.

[D.K] Oh yeah, OK, OK. Fair enough.

[S.M] Well, I think actually, do you have anything to add Emma before we wrap this up?

[E.R] When we had the interview with the KRC, the Kenyan Red Cross, the guy talked about informal refugees in urban centres. But there were also some more formal refugees that were welcomed by the government because they were usually Somalians coming from Europe, they said, and the government knew that they would receive some kind of money from their families in Europe.

Did you also notice that kind of distinction between formal urban refugees and informal urban refugees?

[D.K] OK, so he's saying that the formal ones are the ones who come from abroad?

[E.R] Sofie, can you explain in detail since my video keeps freezing.

[S.M] As far as we understand, some people see Nairobi as like a middle step to reach the Western countries. Some of them are then sent back, but still receive money from families abroad. Our interviewee from the Kenyan Red Cross described these as formal urban refugees, because the government welcomed them more because they receive some kind of beneficiaries or money from outside the country.

[D.K] OK, I see. I see. Well, that's another thing though. I mean, like maybe if I were him, I would not use the word formal refugees.
Because what's your criterion of defining a group of people as formal or informal?
That's, that's an issue, right? But you know. So, these same refugees, when they usually resettle in a third country. Let's say these are Somali refugees. They lived in Nairobi for three years and they migrated to, I don't know the UK or Germany, right? So, the chances are they would have friends and relatives or family members who are still waiting for resettlement, right, or they may have friends and business partners that they worked with in Kenya. They have now connections in Kenya. And so, they usually come back to invest in Kenya. Come back to invest in Nairobi.
I don't know if we can call them refugee diaspora, right? But it's a fascinating concept because they've now become a diaspora in the sense that they had this experience at the middle spot, the country of transition, and they resettled in a third country. Right. But they're coming back.
They are repatriating, that's a fascinating thing because, you know, think about it. Usually we talk about refugee outflows from places of conflict and places where there are less opportunities into other places of greener pastures. But the reverse is also taking place. These refugees are coming back and giving back money. It could be a remittance income transferred to a family member in Nairobi or it could be buying property and investing in Nairobi. Now, as you know, you're an ethnic Somali who has a UK passport. But you were a refugee five years ago in Nairobi, right? And then, so you straddle these three identities. Now you are ethnic Somali, you are a Kenyan urban refugee and you are now a UK citizen.
But you're interested in Nairobi.
Right. But when you come back though, like I mean like he said, the Kenyan government would be more than happy to host them because these are folks who have money now, right? And then, you know, they smell opportunities. And so, they would say, oh, we will give you this land. We'll give you these tax breaks. We'll, you know, let you open this hotel and then all that. So the way I look at it, maybe formal informal may not be the right way of qualifying that relationship, but. Yeah, today's refugees become tomorrow's investors. So you can look at it in terms of that.

[S.M] OK, yeah. I think we're going to wrap this up. Before I say anything else, do you have something that you think we should look into or anything else you want to add?

[D.K] So, this would be interesting, what we just mentioned about repatriation of refugees, the return of refugees and what do they bring back? That would be an interesting line of investigation for you. Another thing is, uh, did you guys meet Maria? Did you happen to make contact with her?

[S.M] We did, but we're still in a talking process.

[D.K] OK, because when you guys reached out to me, I was excited because It so happened we're now involved in this research project, which is based in Canada, and it has hubs all over. There's an Africa hub, there is a European hub, Latin America and North America hub, which deals with the issues of refugees, sanctuary cities, immigration and what have you. I am a member of the Africa Hub, even though, you know, I'm located in the US and the guy was very kind enough to bring me on board.
I met these guys, Martin and Oscar, who are professors at Aalborg. They're really fun guys. I was in Berlin in September, really welcoming, really nice guys. And when you guys reached out to me, I'm like, they should link up with them.
Who knows? You guys may think about doing your PhD in this area, right? And they may have the funding opportunities and just to get to know what they do and what they're interested in. Or you could be a bridge between the Europe hub and the Africa hub because you would be looking at it from the point of view of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, but also the point of view of Denmark and Germany and Norway and refugee policies, immigration policies. OK, so. And I wouldn't mind converting you into sociologists, so you'll join the tribe of sociologists. So just reach out to them, OK? And I would love to read your thesis when you're done with it. And good luck with it. Yeah. If you guys have any questions, should I?

[S.M] I have one more question, just formal. As said, we read your book and found it very interesting.

[D.K] Yeah, I'm honestly. I'm so glad you did. Because you know, it's not a book that sells a lot, you know, because it's a lot. It's very technical. But I'm so glad you did. And I'm so glad you found it interesting. OK, so thank you.

[S.M] Of course. We just want to make sure that we can use the data you put in your book.

[D.K] Yeah, yeah. So long as you cite and reference it properly, absolutely, absolutely.

[S.M] Of course. We just wanted to be sure.

[D.K] OK. Well, yeah, absolutely, no worries.

[S.M] Thank you. Well, I think that’s it for us, right Emma?

[D.K] Alright. Thank you so much and good luck and keep in touch, OK.

[S.M] Thank you so much for talking with us.

[E.R] Thank you so much. Bye.

[D.K] Ciao.

Appendix 3: Kevin Ngereso

Kenya Red Cross

Interview with Kevin Ngereso

Transcript

[Emma Revilliod] OK. Thank you. So I'm gonna do just a little introduction of us and put you in the context of the subject. I don't know if you had the chance to see the little, you know, PDF that we send about the questions and the topic of our thesis?

[Kevin Ngereso] I think I might have missed that in the shared package because it was a forwarded email, so I didn't get a chance to have that in the shared email. I think I'm looking at it right now, yeah.

[E.R.] OK. OK. So I'll just do a short introduction. So my name is Emma and her name is Sofie, and we're students at Copenhagen Business School. And we are in a Masters degree and we're writing our thesis about urban refugees in Nairobi. The question that we wish to answer with our thesis is how do formal and informal institutions and humanitarian aid contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees, in Nairobi, Kenya? And we are finding online data to answer this question, so we're reading papers. But we're also trying to interview humanitarian aid organisations to get their perspective since they're on the field and working in Nairobi, and with urban refugees. We're trying to get a sense of what they know to gather our primary data. So that's also why we wanted to interview you today, to talk about this topic.

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, I think that's OK. And yeah, myself, this is Kevin Ngereso. I'm a health program coordinator with the Kenya Red Cross, based at the headquarters in Nairobi. But I've also had an opportunity to work with urban populations. More specifically, in Nairobi's informal settlements. So I would say I have a good understanding of urban programming, especially around resilience building and all that, yeah.

[E.R.] OK, nice. Thank you. How long have you been working with Nairobi's urban settlements?

[Kevin Ngereso] So that should be 6 years. I worked with them for six years in different programming.

[E.R.] OK. Can you talk a little bit about the program that Kenya Red Cross has?

[Kevin Ngereso] So the program we have has been in partnership with the Danish Red Cross and with funding I think from Danida in the background. And basically what we are doing is that we are working with communities that are vulnerable because they're living in informal settlements, and in Kenya informal settlements are basically illegal settlements within urban settings. And therefore do not have access to the basic infrastructure, basic services that they would need to be able to support themselves as human beings, and also with regards to livelihoods and dignity and all that. So what the project has been doing is to work with local structures and also government systems to be able to build the capacity of these communities. Hopefully you guys can hear me clear.

[E.R.] Yeah, yeah we hear you very well.

[Kevin Ngereso] OK, so we are working with the community structures with regards to building the capacity to be able to identify what we call hazards. So local hazards that directly impact them when they develop into emergencies or disasters, so they're able to identify these hazards, be able to put in place community actions that can be able to reduce the risk of disaster, as well as the impact of those disasters, if they ever occur. And we've also been working with the government side and more so the Nairobi City County government, to try and have a sort of a special programming for these informal settlements, who ideally from their end are illegal settlements, but still it's a large population that needs a lot of services. And if these services are also not provided, it will be predisposing the rest of the Nairobi population, so to say, especially around diseases, security and all these are the issues. So we are working with the government, just to ensure that they put in place policies, especially around the planning, so that there's a sort of special planning for these settlements to ensure that they have access to the right services, the right infrastructure. And also, working with the government with regards to providing emergency response systems and infrastructure, and also social protection, because these are some of the services that can better be provided by the government than any partner because of sustainability and all that.

And the other thing that we are also working with the government is just to ensure that they have that linkage with the community to ensure that they are responding to the needs of the community. Not in sort of a reactive way, but in a systematic way where they can be able to have a long term impact on the community through systemic development or policy issues that will be beneficial for these communities. So those are some of the areas under the thematic areas that we are looking at. One huge area is disaster risk management. We are also looking at health and of course health, we have different aspects under that, from communicable diseases to non communicable diseases. We are also looking at youth, so the other sector we are looking at is youth and also environment considering climate change and all that yeah and informal…

[E.R] Sorry, if I can just come back to the informal settlements. Is it in Nairobi that those informal settlements are? Is it in different urban areas in Kenya?

[Kevin Ngereso] So Nairobi is the biggest city in Kenya, with a population of around 4.3 million people. And unfortunately, 60% of that 4.3 million are living in informal settlements. So the biggest population of people living in informal settlements, it's in Nairobi. But of course, with the devolution we've been able to see several cities and towns come up in the country and. The challenge we are seeing is that they're also coming up with the informal settlements, so we have four or five major cities, but all of them also have informal settlements, but not as big as Nairobi. So we have Mombasa, which also has informal settlements. We also have Kisumu, which also has informal settlements. We have Nakuru. We also have which other? What am I forgetting? Yeah so I said, Mombasa, Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru. So those are the cities we have and all of them have informal settlements, even the smaller towns too.

[E.R.] And in the population in those informal settlements, is it Kenyans or is it refugees fleeing from other countries around? Do you have an overview of who's living there?

[Kevin Ngereso] So the majority of these people living in informal settlements are Kenyans. But over the years we've also seen a considerable surge in refugee populations who are also coming into these settlements. So Kenya as a country, we are within a region that is currently experiencing a lot of political violence and conflict. So the majority of these people that are fleeing from these communities are coming to Kenya, maybe for safety and all that and a few of them find themselves in our cities. So we have roughly around 90,000 urban refugees. So these are refugees that are living within Kenyan and urban centres with Nairobi holding the majority of them. If you go to the website, the UNHCR or Kenya Refugee Affairs website, you'll

be able to find the actual numbers with regards to. So in fact, if I may read for you, we have 90,918 urban refugees. So 16% of the refugees that are in Kenya are living in urban centres, yes.

[E.R.] And does Kenya Red Cross has a specific program for those urban refugees? Or is it more that they have a program for, you know, urban informal settlements, but not only for the urban refugees.

[Kevin Ngereso] So as an organisation, we also have a very big role around protection and also protection of refugees. We have a big role in the two camps within the country that is in Dadaab and Kakuma basically providing health and protection services. In urban centres, we are currently supporting restoring of family links. So basically ensuring that these communities can be able to link up with their families back at home or in the respective camps, the two camps within the country. And also facilitate linkage to UNHCR and Kenya Refugee Affairs secretariat who are the biggest jurisdiction when it comes to refugees within the country. The other programming that we've been doing around urban refugees is around health. And mostly non communicable diseases. So we realised that these refugees have chronic conditions including diabetes, hypertension, cancers and many other chronic diseases. And when they move without any documentation, and even any acknowledgement by UNHCR as refugees, they run into a lot of challenges with regards to accessing health services. And then people who are living within cities are supposed to be constantly on some form of care to assure their health and all that. So we have been trying to bridge the gap with regards to ensuring that they have proper access to health services and more so in urban areas with focus on diabetes and hypertension. Yes, basically those are the areas that we are trying to focus on in urban refugees. It's a program that is still growing and we hope considering the needs we can be able to expand our programming to meet their needs.

[E.R.] In your experience, why do you believe that… because we know that Kenya has big camps for refugees, but in your experience, why do you believe that some refugees seek urban areas rather than going to camps?

[Kevin Ngereso] So Kenya has a very… previously, Kenya had a very strict encampment policy. So basically meaning that if you are a registered refugee within the country, you should be in a camp, in a refugee camp. But over time, because of that and a strict policy, some of the refugees needed some level of freedom and access to civilization and all that. So majority of them would come to urban areas and then already. UNCHR also has a program where some of the Somali refugees are being resettled from Europe to Kenya. So I think this is one of the motivations that some of these refugees are having to come to Nairobi. But the key issues, or rather the key attractions that are pulling these people to urban areas is mainly because of access to services. And also the freedom that they perceive to have within these urban centres.

[E.R.] OK. So the reason why they usually go for urban areas, if I understand correctly, is that they perceive it as more free, so they perceive they will have more freedom, or they use it as a platform to leave Kenya and access the more western country like in Europe. And they think that there will be more services in urban areas, they have access to more services, right?

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, yes, those are the key issues that are contributing to urban refugees.

[E.R.] OK. And our thesis is also very much focusing on integration of urban refugees. We distinguish integration of urban refugees versus integration of refugees in camps because it's harder to integrate the country, of course, when you're in a camp where the laws and the policies are a bit different. So, what does it mean for you, integration of urban refugees? How would you describe it?

[Kevin Ngereso] So the, the other and maybe that would be the other fourth point is that we have refugees that are being resettled back in Kenya and back from Europe into Kenya. So you find that a majority of them will be settled in urban areas. So you would find that from the 90,000 refugees in urban centres, the majority of them have been formally resettled in urban centres. But of course we have other unregistered refugees who are also settling in urban areas, and they find refuge in informal settlements because the government's reach in those informal settlements is not that perfect. So the resettlement in urban centres would be something that is facilitated both by UNHCR and also the Department of Refugee Affairs in in Kenya, which of course I believe also with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, because these are refugees that are being seconded to us from foreign countries, where they were initially settled. So there is some level of incentives that are provided to these individuals, and they can be able to settle in any of our urban refugee areas as long as they have documentation to show that and be able to freely access services as other Kenyans.

[E.R.] OK, so there's a difference in the resettlements in an urban centre and then informal settlements. Right?

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, yes. So the majority of those that are in formal settlement are unregistered urban refugees. So they do not have any documentation to show that they are refugees because if you have any documentation as a refugee, you are supposed to be in a camp, a refugee camp or a settlement, yes.

[E.R.] Yes, of course. And and and how is the government facilitating or impacting these resettlements for the refugees that don't want to be in camps and that rather be in urban centres or settlements?

[Kevin Ngereso] So from us it I feel that's where there is a gap. So the Department of Refugee Affairs, like I said, is strict on encampment. And most recently, a law was passed that would see refugees resettled in Kenya, so you would find that within the major hosting communities in Dadaab and Kakuma, those communities will provide land and mainly land where the refugees will be resettled in settlement schemes. So instead of camps, refugees will be given a piece of land, and be able to be facilitated to settle in some sort of a settlement scheme. This is something that is still under engagement of different stakeholders because also land is a very motive thing in Kenya. So because there's a big resource for Kenyans and a lot of engagement still needs to be done to allow for safety of resettlement of refugees within Kenyan borders. But for urban refugees, because the government is not incurring any direct, should I say costs, except for the overall costs that are serving the public in terms of infrastructure and all services and all that they do not incur any cost in settling a refugee that had been resettled in Kenya, maybe from Europe or another country. So you find that the refugee has to take care of their own housing. They have to take care of their own basic services and all that. So the government does not incur any cost on that. And the other motivation is that these urban refugees that are formally resettled in Kenya do receive a lot of disbursements from outside the country and reinvesting in Kenya, so that has some sort of economic motivation to that and for the country that is.

[E.R.] Is it the urban refugees that are located in informal settlements that receive that kind of money from outside the country?

[Kevin Ngereso] No. The formal ones, the formal ones. They're the ones that have been settled formally.

[E.R.] OK. OK, they're being settled for money. And where do they settle? In the land that is close to Dadaab and Kakuma?

[Kevin Ngereso] No, no, no. So two things. So the reserve, the law that was passed for resettlement is yet to pick up, so is yet to start to be implemented. So there is still engagement that is ongoing and these refugees will be resettled within the host communities that they are currently encamped. But those that are here are in urban centres, these are refugees that have been accepted by the government formally through engagement between Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR to be settled in Kenya from a foreign country, could be Canada, Europe or the Americas. So when they come to Kenya, they now take care of their own costs with regards to staying in Nairobi or whichever urban centre. So one of the biggest motivations that the government is having, majority of these people have relatives and other people that they left in Europe and they're sending them money to start businesses within these urban centres. And of course this is contributing to our medium and small scale entrepreneurship and all that. So the ones resettled formally are the ones that have some sort of benefit to the government.

[E.R.] But so you said they were coming from Canada or the US or whatever, but what are… what is their… Are they Kenyans?

[Kevin Ngereso] No, they're not Kenyans. Majority of them are coming from Somalia.

[E.R] OK. So the majority of them are from Somalia. Then they moved to other countries in Europe or in Western and then they came back to Kenya.

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes then they are resettled back to Kenya.

[E.R.] OK. That's very interesting. Super interesting. We didn't know that so that's also why I'm asking you a lot of follow up questions to make sure I really understand.

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, and that's OK. So the, the, the other thing is also that some of these refugees have personal preferences to be resettled in Kenya, which would be geographically closer to their home countries. So they would want to be resettled as… we call them as…. there's a specific word that is not for them in the streets, but then the are being resettled in Kenya to freely live in Kenya, enjoy the safety and some of the amenities that are in some of the urban centres, but still be closer to their homes, where a few of their relatives are still there. So there's some level of personal safety being closer to home, but also being safe in a place that is not far from home.

[E.R.] And are they considered? Refugees, or are they considered citizens?

[Kevin Ngereso] They are not considered their citizens, so they are refugees, so they would have a Kenyan passport. But they will be given documentation to live in Kenya, which is renewed after every two years. So they're given documentation to live within Kenya. But those documentations are supposed to be reviewed after a period of time.

[E.R.] OK. So apart from those who had gotten a special deal from the government to formally resettle in urban centres, all of the other urban refugees in Kenya are illegal in a way that they should be into camps, right?

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, exactly.

[E.R.] But since, you know, Kenya Red Cross and other NGOs, they know that those urban refugees are here informally, do they receive any kind of help or for example access to education, or legal approval to work or anything? Or do they really have to do their own thing on their own?

[Kevin Ngereso] So humanitarian actors are trying to come in and meet some of the needs that they have, but mainly from a humanitarian perspective or in urban centres because it's not a camp, so they do not have that, should I say opportunity, to be able to enjoy services that are mainly meant for refugee populations. So they have to use the same services that are being used by Kenyan nationals and some of these services would incur cost on their end and they are not exempted from that as refugees. If they were otherwise in camps, that cost would not have been on their end. For example accessing health services, accessing education, you know and all those kinds of things. So you would find some of these refugees will be sort of relocated from urban centres, to government directives and all that back to the camps. But you find maybe refugees who are in camps who would also want to move from the camps to the urban centres, so they illegally exit from the camps and come to urban centres where they feel they can be able to do businesses, they can be able to enjoy other amenities that are within urban centres and not in the in the camps.

[E.R.] And in your experience, what do you think would be best for refugees? To be in urban centres, to work and live just as any Kenians, or would it be better for them and their integration to stay in camps? From a humanitarian, and NGO perspective?

[Kevin Ngereso] Yeah. So from a humanitarian point of view both communities… Let me just text the other meeting that I'm delaying for a few minutes and then respond to that. 30 seconds.

[E.R.] Yeah. Sorry. Thank you. Thank you.

[Kevin Ngereso] OK. Thank you. So I have 15 more minutes, so that should be.

[E.R.] Yeah, that's perfect. We're going to soon be done.

[Kevin Ngereso] Yeah, no worries. So you had asked whether from a humanitarian perspective it would be good to perceive this access services even within urban centres. Was that the question?

[E.R.] Yeah. Which one? You know where refugees have the best opportunities for integration within the country? Is it in camps or is it in urban informal settlements?

[Kevin Ngereso] So now maybe this argument will be in the background of the government law that has just been passed where refugees will be legally allowed to reintegrate in the country. But of course this will be restricted within the counties or the communities where they are currently being hosted. In urban centres, because we've already seen a majority of the formal returnees or refugees being settled, I also feel that if a refugee household feel that they would best reintegrated in Kenya, in an urban centre, then that should be something that should be considered. But we have these refugees that have preference to stay in urban settlements but do not have the sufficient resources to be able to sustain their stay within these urban centres. These are the most vulnerable groups. It's a small population compared to the larger refugee population that we have in the country, but still is a huge population of 90,000 who are desperately in need of humanitarian assistance, much more than those that are in refugee operations.

The challenge for urban refugees is documentation. So you would find that that number could even be much higher because the majority of urban refugees are unregistered refugees, so basically there are people who

are illegally here, but they are refugees or are asylum seekers, so they've not put in enough formal requests as asylum seekers to be considered as refugees. And I feel this is the population that we will really need support, especially with regards to accessing protection services, because we've seen some of them being exploited economically so they would be employed. But of course, what they get from that employment is way lower than what a Kenyan would get. So they're being exploited on that front and then you would find that they are also excluding themselves from the rest of the population. So this of course is increasing their vulnerability where you find that they would wish to stay in a certain informal settlement within urban centres where they would feel more safety, You know being with their nationals, being with the other refugees where they would feel safe. This of course exposes them because they are in informal settlements that do not have the basic services and which are not prioritised in any of the government programs that we have. So as a humanitarian worker, these are the population that need a lot of engagement on humanitarian assistance with regards to health protection, education, and also trying to restore links with some of the family members. Because you'll find some of the refugees in urban centres would leave their families in the refugee camps to come and stay in Nairobi, especially the young ones they come and stay in Nairobi, for example, or any other open centre where they feel they can be able to get some level of employment. Because camps do not have employment opportunities and they would want to come to urban centres where they can get some level of employment. Also higher education if they wanted, or any form of service that may not be available in the camp.

[E.R.] And the final question, where do you see that Kenya Red Cross has the greatest impact for those urban refugees?

[Kevin Ngereso] So our biggest impact is around protection, so protection and health. So protection in the sense that we have a program which we are doing with the International Red Crescent. Red Cross and Red Crescent. So we are working with these refugees to ensure that we restore family links, we link them to service providers that will be providing a service that we are not providing. For example, if this individual would be requiring any legal support, would be requiring any service around protection, for example, some of them are sexually violated and all that. So we try to ensure that they're linked to the right service so that they can be able to get the appropriate service. The other, of course, where we just started in the past one year is ensuring continuity of care for people living with chronic conditions and more so non communicable diseases. So ensuring that they can be able to get health services from the government system and the infrastructure. And also be able to mobilise themselves with regards to access to resources, to meet their needs with regards to treatment and care.

So those are the two areas I feel we are doing well and of course the other one, general one, which of course I don't want to. Forget a lot of these informal settlements are predisposed to a lot of emergencies, so you'll find the majority of them will be experiencing sporadic and frequent fire outbreaks, disease outbreaks and all that. So Kenya Red Cross being the lead agency for emergency responsible in the country, we've also been reaching out to these communities with regards to access emergency relief services. There are some innovations that we've tried to put in place to win trust from these communities. One is having special identifiers for these communities. Remember from the initial discussion we just had was that these are informal, should I say unregistered refugees? So they do not have a refugee number, they do not have any refugee documentation and all that. So the Red Cross has been trying to come up with alternative identifiers which can be able to allow them access services and more. So humanitarian services, so that at least you can link them to services without giving someone else a service that was meant for someone else.

[E.R.] OK, yes. And do you maybe have any organisation that is dealing with those refugees in informal settlements in urban areas that we could contact to have this kind of interview? Or do you have anybody to reference to us?

[Kevin Ngereso] So we have, I wish my colleague was here, but of course I can reach out to you later on that. But we have UNHCR who are the main humanitarian service provider for refugees in Kenya, so they're still providing their refugee services to this population. There is also the Department of Refugee Affairs in Kenya because these people are within their jurisdiction, they're also sort of facilitating access to services, but which of course, sometimes means reallocating or relocating these populations back to the camps. We also have the International Organization for Migration, IOM who in Nairobi are providing medical services for the refugee operations. And then of course us who are targeting them with regards to protection, health services and the emergency response.

[E.R.] Ok, well, thank you very much for your time during this interview and we really appreciated your answers. It was very, very interesting.

[Kevin Ngereso] Thank you so much.

[E.R.] And sorry that we got a bit over time.

[Kevin Ngereso] No, no worries, no worries.

[Sofie Mortensen] And do you have the email of the person you want to refer to us?

[Kevin Ngereso] Yes, I can. Let me just send it to you in the chat. So he will mainly talk about the protection bit and the emergency bit. So let me just look for his email and share on the chat right away. So I'll alert him that you guys will be reaching out to him so that you can have his perspective on refugee programing in Nairobi and in urban centres.

[E.R.] Thank you and. Do you have emails that, for example, somebody in your UNHCR or the the Department of Refugee Affair? Or IOM?

[Kevin Ngereso] Let me consult with a colleague of mine who has been working with them with regards to health programming. And then for the others, for UNHCR and the Department of Refugee Affairs, Rajab will provide because he's closely working with them. But for IOM, I'll have to consult a colleague on this. Thank you.

[E.R.] Perfect. Thank you so much, Kevin.

Appendix 4: Allan Mukuki

Allan Mukuki is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya and a Commissioner for Oaths.

His professional background includes Research Fellow for the African Region and the European Research Council Grant Project on the interpretation of customary international law as well as consultancy positions at NRC and Red Cross.

Interview with Allan Mukuki

Transcript

[Sofie Mortensen] We can start with a small introduction of ourselves. My name is Sofie, and this is Emma. We are two students from Copenhagen Business School and currently in the process of writing our master thesis within our programme, Business and Development Studies. Our initial thought for this project was that refugees represent an opportunity for economic and social development of countries if they succeed in becoming sustainably integrated to their host countries. So, essentially, we want to know how governments, policies, NGOs, and other actors enable refugees to sustainably integrate to their host country and participate in the economic and social context of the country. Your professional background and knowledge are particularly interesting for our project, as we have found some of the laws to be quite complex and difficult to understand, which is why we are very happy to speak with you today.

[S.M] Firstly, we would like to ask if we can use your name in our thesis or if you prefer us to use a pseudonym?

[Allan Mukuki] You can use my name. I don’t mind.

[S.M] To get started, would you mind presenting yourself and your professional occupation?

[A.M] . Allan Mukuki is my name and I am an advocate by profession of 9 years now. But other than that I teach law at Strathmore University Law School where I handle Public International Law and National Humanitarian Law as well as Refugee Law. I’m currently doing my thesis, I’m in my final year and a half in Navarra, Spain. I have a, well I would not say a heavy experience on refugee matters, but I have a somewhat good knowledge of it. I’m currently drafting a treaty for IGAD, the Intergovernmental Development Agency for the whole of Africa for the management of refugees within the IGAD region. I help develop the one for the East African Region. I did some work with Refugee International to get refugees to be able to access the right to work and also access to livelihoods for them. And it was a success, especially with the private sector. I've worked with refugee research evidence facility from SOAS and University of Manchester and an EU grant for the whole of Africa again. So I focused mainly on Ethiopia, Somaliland and Somalia, on matter of migration and IDP. I am in charge of.. I'm the chairman of the Board of Directors of HIAS Kenya, so there's HIAS, and then there's HIAS Kenya, so I'm also involved with that, especially with urban refugees in the region. In the country. So that's just a bit of my experience when it comes to matters of migration and policy development.

[S.M] OK. So would you say you have more experience with refugees in camps or urban refugees?

[A.M] I would say both. I have been involved in both aspects. I have been able to work with refugees in Kakuma in Kenya, I was able to meet refugees in Uganda, the Bidibidi refugee camp. I've also worked with pro bono refugee matters in Kenya. It's urban refugees, especially refugees, that need representation, and they can't afford to go to court. So usually we use NGOs and advocates like myself who can be able to represent them on a pro bono basis.

[S.M] OK, great. So integration is one of the main topics in our thesis. How do you understand integration of urban refugees? What does that mean to you?

[A.M] Interestingly, so is it to me or legally?

[S.M] We can do both if you like. If they're not the same.

[A.M] I think to me. First of all, legally, let me start with the legal aspect where integration entails including refugees in national development plans and integrating them into the society. This has happened well, especially I think Uganda has been one of the most successful stories about integration of refugees, where refugees, for instance, are allowed to own land, are allowed to get work permits and work, are allowed to own property as well, so that's proper integration in the proper sense. But that's the legal definition where refugees are able to access the livelihood and rights as a human being first and also as a person who has found themselves in a different country under very strenuous circumstances. Then they are allowed to integrate into that society, especially where going back home is not an option at that point. According to me, integration on the other hand is of course what you kinda have done, but also equating rights of refugees with rights of citizens of any particular country as such. And when you talk about integration, it's just basically treating this refugee as a human being as they should be treated or civilians of any country that they go to without any exception as such, of course.

[S.M] So when we talk about integration, we are looking at three different kinds in our thesis. One is social, one is economic and then we are touching upon political integration as well. As far as we understand, there was an encampment policy enforced by the 2006 Refugee act in Kenya, but we still see some of these refugees leaving the camps to go live in Nairobi. So if we look at it from a legal point of view, are they actually allowed to be in Nairobi? Are they allowed to live there, find jobs, get an education?

[A.M] That's the difficulty when it comes to integration in Kenya. So now we have a new refugee act 2021 that now provided a provision on integration of refugees and it now tries to adopt the Ugandan format of giving refugee rights and livelihoods. The only problem is that while the law is well meaning and is well written, the practicality of it is almost impossible. A reason being, if you are a refugee and you've come to Nairobi, you've been fast. You are a refugee, you are in Dadaab or Kakuma and you want to leave to come to Nairobi. You're not allowed to leave Dadaab or Kakuma without an alien pass or a refugee pass that will allow you to get to Nairobi. The bottleneck to get that pass will take you almost five years of being registered at the camp, so again, you spend a lot of time there before you are allowed to move. They're trying to lessen that period of time so that registration happens immediately. Now this is a success story of Rwanda, where Rwanda has zero pending applications for refugees, they deal with them on a rolling basis and in my tours around the different East African countries and IGAD countries, everyone keeps saying we want to be like Rwanda. So definitely, they need us to hasten the process. Now once that refugee leaves the camp and they

come to Nairobi. And they want to live in Nairobi, for instance. You need that alien card, and then you need a tax bill, personal identification number. So before you're able, for instance, to get a place to live in, if you want to get a job, you need to also apply for a work permit before you get it so that you can work. And this can take over a year to do. I mean it's free for them, but can take over one year before you're able to get it. So you can imagine waiting for so long for a refugee pass, an alien pass, then waiting for another year again before you get a work permit. You have to wait for three to six years before work, so yes, they are able to come to the city centre, but what usually happens from a social perspective is they only do informal jobs. So they cannot employ formally because of these limitations of documentation, and once they are able to be formally registered to instance, you get your pin, what you call the Caribbean Kenya Revenue Authority, personal identification number and Alien Pass, or a refugee card …

[A.M] Sorry, I just had a blackout. Yeah, I just had a blackout.
Yeah, but I know we have started draining heavily. So with rain, all these blackouts follow.
[Emma Revilliod] So you don't have electricity?

[A.M] Yeah. So anyway. Yeah, but it should be back in 2 minutes or three minutes once the generators kick in, but usually that's what happens. It's common in Nairobi, the rain and black outs usually. It's common. So I know in Europe you don't know what black outs are, right? I lived in the Netherlands for two years, so it's on this side. Let me just open one other curtain. So that it's a bit brighter.

[E.R] Of course.

[A.M] Yeah. So, where was I about social. So after this period … so you can imagine one has to wait almost 6 years before you get this documentation. From a social perspective, it's impossible. Now, from an economic perspective on the other hand, you find that the livelihoods of refugees, especially in refugee camps, is run by refugees. The economy there is basically, the refugees are the engines of this economy. So you find it informal. So despite them being only employed informally, for instance, they are tailors, they are shopkeepers, all these informal jobs. Then you find it becomes much easier for refugees to get a livelihood for themselves, and interestingly in the areas that they are staying in, refugees tend to be the engine of the economy in those areas. So I just got approached yesterday or the day before by UNHCR. They would like me to help them develop a Marshall Plan. So what we're doing is, we're developing a Marshall Plan of converting refugee camps in Kakuma into settlement areas, so the Ugandan format. So they can be able to work, they can be able to own land, they can be able to have a household and everything. So again, that's, that's the transformation that is coming. And economically it would really make more sense for it to happen that way for it to convert to a settlement just like the Ugandan aspect. So from a political point of view, on the other hand. Refugee situation is a political scenario. It's always a political issue. It will always be a political issue and the reason being is. People play politics because of the funding involved when it comes to refugee matters. You find the EU, you find the World Bank akin to give, especially this Marshall Plan on settlement of refugees. The World Bank has given $50 million to make this possible, to buy the land and everything. So again, there's a lot of interest in this. So of course, politics come into play, and when governors and government people hear these money, of course, corruption permeates into the system and this money gets lost somewhere. So again, those are some of the challenges that come by when it comes to this issue of refugees. Yes, Emma, I see your hand is up..

[E.R] Yes, you said that it was… So, refugees usually work in the informal sector and they still are able to make a livelihood and usually the neighbourhood kind of relies on them. Is it true only in the camps or is it also true for urban refugees in Nairobi? Are they able to integrate the economy? Are they able to work?

[A.M] Yes, those who are able to permeate the system all the way to Nairobi eventually even become employers. We have scenarios and cases of refugees being employers of other refugees, and that's why we have a lot of emphasis in Kenya on refugee led organisation area laws. That's what we call them, where you find companies or shops or anything, any business run by a refugee, tends to receive a lot of support from NGOs and intergovernmental organisations to support this kind of initiatives. So, those who make it to Nairobi end up having good businesses and also employ others, but that's usually a small percentage. Most of the others end up being employed in the informal sector as they try to get a livelihood and that's why now, at least with this, there's a new law on credentialing. Where if you've come from Somalia, for example, then you found yourself in the dub and you were able to find yourself in Nairobi. And let's say you are, you are a teacher in Somalia. But then you didn't. No one as a refugee thinks that oh, wait, I'm running away, I need to carry my documents, no. So at times you always find that you've left your certificates and everything. So, what happens with the credentialing system in Kenya is the recognition of skills that you have and if you say you are a teacher, you are taken through training for a period and you do an exam and if you show that you have that skill, then you're able to be employed in that sector if you have the requisite documents, the work permit, the refugee card, and the carry pin. So again, these are some of the dynamics that have to play around.

[E.R] I'm so sorry, Sofie, I just have another question and then I'll give you back the word.

[S.M] I have construction going on outside, so please go ahead. I'll just turn off my mic.

[E.R] OK, there are currently 90,000 urban refugees in Nairobi. How many of them or what's the percentage of them that have the alien certificate, that have the number and that are legally living here compared to the percentage of those people who could not wait for six years to get all their documentation, but that still decided to move to Nairobi to try to find a job and to leave the camps. What is the spread of this population?

[A.M] I would say maybe 1% of 90 thousand. Reason being is… for instance, Kenya has not registered any refugees since 2012, but UNHCR has registered them. So again, these are some of the politics that are going on in the region, where UNHCR seems to have the statistics up to January 2023. But the Kenyan government has their last statistic in 2012. So we find there are a lot of discrepancies and UNHCR tends to use up a lot of the government powers. And UNHCR, because they have to get funding, they have a lot of tokens in, it becomes difficult to overpower them. So this 1% that finds themselves with proper documentation, then become the lucky lot in Nairobi, they're able to apply for jobs and everything. The rest end up in the informal sector. Or employed by the private sector. So I'll give an example. Safaricom is the biggest telecommunication company in Kenya and eastern Central Africa. So Safaricom has 500 internship opportunities for refugees. But guess what, up to date no refugee has been hired because it's so hard to get this work permit. It's so hard get this refugee alien card. So if you don't have that, you can't be employed, even if it's for an internship or such.

[E.R] Yeah. OK. So, can they get a place to live? Are they harassed by the police? Do they have to hide in fear that they will be sent back to the camps?

[A.M] Yes, usually, Kenya has a law where if you are arrested, you have to show your identification and at times most of these people have run away from camps to Nairobi. If they run away from camps to come to Nairobi and then you are arrested by the police, you then have to be deported back to where you came from, which is a refugee camp. So again, there is usually a lot of harassment for them, especially where documentation are delayed. You can imagine for a minute where you have to wait for six years, five years or three years for an ID card to come out. And that means for those three years you were, you are useless. You're just sitting waiting for a ration, for food and WFP, sleep and you have a family. At that time, you can't work, so again, most of them end up finding themselves in that scenario where they run away from camps into the urban area. And we try to provide assistance to them through maybe linking them with private sector companies that are involved in helping refugees, and they get maybe informal jobs through them. Mostly, if you have a sponsoring entity sponsoring your work permit, then it usually comes out faster rather than you're applying for yourself. So you find some organisations have started taking to at least help these refugees get internships. So MasterCard Foundation and Equity Bank have done that so well, at least in Nairobi.

[S.M] OK. Thank you. Thank you. So if we go back, you mentioned the New Refugee Act of 2021. Which, as far as we understand, points towards a more sustainable integration of refugees. But what we had trouble understanding is what are the actual differences between the 2006 and the 2021 act? Because as far as we understand, it's not making it any easier for the refugees to gain their work permits, they call them their designated areas instead of camps, so it just seems like new words for the same measures?

[A.M] What has happened with this is that the law has come into change some perspective. So for instance, yes, they're called designated areas, but now we are seeing efforts from units here, World Bank and the government, to now call them settlement areas. So now that means we are now moving from encampment policies to settlement areas, like what has happened in Uganda. So that's a very positive step. Two, there is also the spirit of the East African Community where, compared, and I always give this example: You are in Europe. If you leave Europe today, you live, you are in Copenhagen. That's in Denmark, right? Or if you leave Denmark today and you go to France, will you be required to register?

[E.R] No.

[A.M] Because you're a European citizen. Now the interesting story of these African communities is. Most of the refugees in the East African Community are East African themselves. So what is going on now in the region, and Kenya is the first one in this, is for instance, there's a provision in Section 28 of the new Refugee Act that a refugee can now change their citizenry if they come from East Africa They can now change their state, transform refugee ship to an East African citizen, so that you enjoy East African citizenship privileges. So again, that's something new because it was not there before. Three, the aspect of local integration was also not there. Now it has been added where now it's deliberate in terms of the local integration of refugees into the citizenry of this country, and that's why these settlements are now being started. So again, this is also a blast that was not there before. So again, these are some of the wins that come through when we talk about the changes in the Refugee Act. We're waiting for the regulations to come out and they should be coming out sometime in April, May, to now show us how this works generally.

[S.M] But what about the refugees who are not from the Eastern African Community, like the Somalians or the Ethiopians, they're not within this community, right? What about those refugees, they don't have any new rights in this new act or?

[A.M] They do have a right, just that they'll be in different… What do you call it? They'll be treated differently because they're not citizens of the East African Community, so that way it would be different for them in terms of the law, how the law parades. But again, Kenya is moving away from an encampment policy to a settlement policy, so they would end up being settled in the settlement area where refugees should be settled in and we are now moving towards an area where East African citizens don't need to stay at the camp. They can move within the country or within the region however they want.

[S.M] OK. So are there any of these new provisions that you find more or less important than others, any that you think are really a step in the right direction for refugees?

[A.M] I think the aspect of settlement is a step in the right direction because we move away from encampment. Also, the rights to work that are now being provided for, albeit in a negative sense, where the losses refugees who do not pay taxes shall be held liable for violating the laws. So basically it means refugees have to work to pay taxes. So it doesn't say refugees have a right to work, just one provision that says if you don't do not pay taxes, you will be held liable. So I read that in a negative way. The right to work is put in a negative sense that if you don't pay taxes, you will be arrested, which means then you have to work to pay tax to get money to pay taxes in a sense. So again, that's also a positive aspect. They should have just put it directly that you pay taxes and. And then you should have the right to work and you should pay taxes instead of going all the way around. Also, the aspect of the East African Community recognition that also plays a positive role. The reason why this is important is, you can imagine some money is joining the East African Community by end of this year. Ethiopia and Sudan have applied as well to join the East African Community. These are members of IGAD also coming into the East African Community. Most of the refugees in the region are Somalis. Now, does it mean then if we come to this, and that's what my PhD is on and also what I'm doing for England and I've done for East African Community, if we decide we are going to have no refugees in the East African region, if you're from the region, then does this mean then any refugee who exists now in the settlements, camps and the likes are no longer refugees? They're East African citizens, like in Europe. If you can move from Denmark to France or Netherland without being asked, and you can apply for a job and you only have one card which is recognized all over. Then, the same thing would happen in the East African region, and that will eliminate the need of refugees in the camps and the like. So again, it's a step in the right direction following the EU format, but now in a more sustainable manner and that's why the aspect of local integration has really been employed in Kenya. Other countries, like Sudan and South Sudan don't like the word local integration. They call it local... I forgot the term. But they don't like the word local integration because they say refugees should not be remaining in their country. They should be aiming to go home. And interestingly, a census was carried out and a questionnaire was carried out in Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and refugees were asked if they would rather stay in the place they are in, or would they rather go back home. So if they stay in, they'll get citizenship. If not, they can go back home. And interestingly, 96% of refugees say they would rather go back home than get citizenship of that country. So again. These are some of the dynamics you're having when it comes to refugee management in the region and in the country as well.

[S.M] Yeah, yeah. Are there any vital points that you think are missing in the new act? Anything, if you could recommend it to the state, that you would add?

[A.M] I think the greatest challenge I'm having is the local integration concept from the, with the risk of sounding differential, the European approach or the American approach of a comprehensive refugee response

framework. This is what, when you talk about local integration, Uganda has been doing it, Kenya has been doing it just in different formats, but what ends up happening is that this gets shifted when Europeans and the Americans come into the country, and now we are told, stop all that you are doing there. Is this GCR global compact for refugees and the CRF, you should change it. My view has always been that it should be used and integrated in the system that already exists. That way it should, it will be easier for it to work. Otherwise, there's a lot of, and this is from my personal experience, going around the seven East African countries and the seven IGAD countries and all of them have the same view that when these people, when Europeans come and says no, stop what you're doing, we are now going the CRF way or the GCR way. And what that means is, basically they try to replace what is very African. If I may use that term. I always say African solutions for African problems. It's easier that way because it's a community and that's why, for instance, the East African Community Treaty talks about good neighbourliness. Even the FAU Treaty and good neighbourliness means a climate migrant will appear on the doors of Kenya. Climate refugees are not recognized in international law. But Kenya, for instance, has accepted over 100 to 200 thousands of money climate migrants into Kenya on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. So again, there's a lot of Africanness in it in how we operate from our refugee management perspective in urban areas and refugee camps. Another example I could give is, for instance, in Sudan, I know your focus is on Kenya, but just this is just an example for you to see. In Sudan, if a refugee comes from Yemen, they are not registered as a refugee because Muslims do not believe they should call their brothers and sisters refugees. So they are called brothers and sisters, so they are never registered as refugees. Because they're Muslims and they're coming to a Muslim country. So again, these are the dynamics that would apply in this region. Kenya helping Somali refugees come in and we have a town here in Nairobi called Eastleigh and it's full of Somalis. And they come from the camps and come here. And if Eastleigh is closed in one day, Kenya's economy would collapse because of the amount of money that comes from that area, in fact, now they have the biggest mall in East and Central Africa in that area. So again, it shows you that refugees are actually a positive addition to the economy. It's just how it's managed. So also as we look at local integration, also look at the government's role in it and what the government should do better. The law is good, its implementation where the problem is usually a mess, yeah.

[S.M] We also saw that you worked as a consultant for the NRC.

[A.M] Yes, yes, yeah.

[S.M] Which kind of help would you say that some of these humanitarian organisations provide for these urban refugees? And do you think they help enhance the integration process?

[A.M] Yes, they do. But, yes and no. Yes, because they play a major role when it comes to lifting the burden of the government in terms of helping refugees get jobs, get involved in different things, and also involving private sector players. But also no on the other hand, because there is a lot of gatekeeping because of funding, UNHCR, NRC all want to do all this so that they get funding from Europe and they are able to keep doing research and churn out papers for publication. To show how much work they're doing and I've had a problem with that because I've released two very good reports for NRC, but then what came out of those reports, they were shelved and nothing happened. Yet a lot of money was spent on that. So again, there's a lot of that happening. So there is a need to actually hold these organisations accountable in a sense. So that at least it's able to, we are able to have results, practical results out of this and. That's why I'm happy about this World Bank initiative, for instance, of $50 million of changing refugee camps into settlement areas. This will basically transform the refugee landscape in the country.

[S.M] I don't know how far this plan is yet, but do you know if any of these settlement areas will be in Nairobi? Or if they're outside of the city, like Kakuma?

[A.M] They'll be within the camps. So as we talk of, the first approach is Kalobeyei, which is in Kakuma. So they want to change it to a settlement area so that one will be one of the places where we will see how settlement areas transform from the camps and if they will be self-sustaining. The aim of this is to create sustainability for the camp so that they no longer rely on donors and everything and it becomes a town on its own, with its own word leader, politicians and the likes and who's able now to provide all these services without them being in camps so they can apply for jobs and everything.

[S.M] And do you think the creation of these settlement areas will make less people seek towards Nairobi?

[A.M] Yes, it will really help because now there will be opportunities in this settlement. The reason why people move to Nairobi is because Nairobi is seen as the hub of opportunities and the like. So if you are able to get this sorted at the camp level, then they do not need to move because they have water, they have food, they have jobs, they have electricity and that way they don't need to move to the city centre for that.

[S.M] OK, and what about education and training? Would that be in the settlements as well, or would you need to see towards the larger cities?

[A.M] So again, the government is trying to also insist that even this settlement will have schools and universities as well. There are some of them in those areas, so again with our devolution government then you find that it's much, it will create more opportunities for this. To create more opportunities for these people to actually remain where they are instead of having to come all the way to Nairobi.

[S.M] OK, just to be clear, you believe that these new settlement areas, once they are in place, will enhance the possibilities for refugees to contribute more to the labour market and contribute more to economic development?

[A.M] Exactly.

[S.M] OK. Yeah.

[E.R] But not really to social integration or cultural integration, because they will still be with other refugees in settlements and separated from Kenyans in a way?

[A.M] Not quite. When you talk of settlement, we are talking of… Let me give an example. So when we talk about the Kalobeyei settlement, there are people who live, for instance, in the Turkana region and Turkana is a county on its own. Now, that means these people are within the ambient of Turkana County, which has a governor, it has a senator, it has the MP's and members of parliaments and the like. So what this settlement would do then, one is integration and social cohesion with the community that already exists. So integration goes both ways. One as you're integrating these people to be part of your citizenry, you're also asking your citizenry to embrace them wherever they are settled. They're settling in, so again, at that point, you find that there's a lot of social cohesion work that needs to be done so that they are able to intermingle. Some of the conflicts that exist in this region are usually a fight for resources between refugees and the host community. Now to bring them together, then makes it much better, because then they end up sharing responsibility.

Then you find refugees can also employ people from the host community. The host community can also employ refugees, so there's a lot of intermingling. That's local integration and integrating them into the local community that exists in the country in that particular region.

[S.M] OK. Thank you. Do you have anything else, Emma?

[E.R] I was just wondering, you were on the board of HIAS, right? Of HIAS Kenya. We have interviewed KRC, so the Kenya Red Cross, but we would also love to interview other NGOs to be able to ask them questions because they are on the field and they talk to the urban refugees and they are together with them. So we were wondering if you could reference us to someone from HIAS who works with this?

[A.M] Yes, I can be able to link you. I can send an email to the HIAS team, then the HIAS director, then the director will be able to give you the right person or tell you who is in the field. Mostly at the board level, we tend to just make decisions of the organisation to make sure it's afloat.
The finances are OK, their mandate is being achieved per year, but I can connect you with the right people in HIAS, OK.

[E.R] Thank you. And do you know HIAS work with urban refugees, or do they only work in camps?

[A.M] They work in both, OK. I can also connect you with the Refugee Consortium of Kenya, RCK. They do a lot of camps, urban refugees and also other camps.

[E.R] Yeah, great. Thank you. It would be very valuable for us to try to talk to as many stakeholders as we can.

[A.M] So maybe what you could do is send me an e-mail with what you need and I will just copy what you sent me.

[E.R] Perfect. That's amazing.

[S.M] Great. Thank you so much.

[A.M] No problem. I'm glad to help.

[S.M] Do you have anything you want to add before we wrap it up?

[A.M] I don't know. I think for me, I'm glad with what you're doing. I hope it's going to be a good end to the project, to the thesis that you're writing. And in case you need any more information, you can just shoot me an e-mail and I'll be glad to assist where possible.

[S.M] Thank you. This was highly helpful. It's nice to get a new perspective on things, especially because it can be a bit difficult to understand.

[A.M] Yeah.

[E.R] Have a great evening.

[A.M] You too. Thank you so much.

[E.R] Thank you so much.

[A.M] And all the best to you.

[E.R & S.M] You too.

[A.M] Thank you. Bye bye.

[S.M] Thank you. Bye.

Appendix 5: Soli*City

Interview with Martin Bak Jørgensen and Óscar García Agustín
Martin and Óscar are researchers in urban solidarity and a part of the Soli*City project: An Urban Sanctuary, Migrant Solidarity and Hospitality in Global Perspective partnership between 36 academic and partner organisations. These academics and organisations co-develop and share their knowledge on policies and practices of accommodating vulnerable migrants and refugees in urban centres in Africa, Europe, North America and Latin America.

Interview with Martin B. J & Óscar G. A

Transcript

[Emma Revilliod] Yeah. And it's gonna be me mostly talking here, because for efficiency purposes, there's just one person leading the interview and another person taking notes. And of course, Sophie, don't hesitate to jump in if I miss something or if there's something you wanna follow through ok?

[Óscar García Agustín] And it's going to be only Martin that is going to speak. Yeah. I mean, if I may say something about the Soli*City project because we were at like this meeting in Berlin last year, right Martin it was.. Yeah. So they were talking about like… because they said urban focused but basically in this idea of sanctuary solidarity cities and something that was important is that when we are where people from different regions Europe South America Africa was like a lot of differences about the language we use to talk about the different forms of solidarity in the cities and some might comes like sanctuary cities, solidarity cities didn't exist in Africa. Such experiences were similar, but they don't name it in the same way, because also like the role of the local communities are different, also the connection between the central state and the local government was also different. But we can talk about that later. But just because you mentioned that about the Soli*City, that there is sort of like common ground, but also like a lot of regional differences for sure.

[E.R.] Yeah, definitely no, definitely. But then can I start by asking you to present yourself and your role, and of course the project.

[O.G.A.] Yeah, well, myself, so I'm Oscar and I'm a professor of democracy and social change at Aarhus university and I have been doing what you call urban migration solidarity research with Martin in the last, I don't know many years. So we started with some social movements research, connecting different types of activism, and became more and more interested in urban or more spatial dimension of solidarity and if you don't know that, we wrote a couple of books about solidarity and I'm connecting like different scales and focus on local and international solidarity and also some ideas that we're still working on, like how connect like local and global, through cosmopolitanism, sort of key concept. So the idea of solidarity, cosmopolitanism from below has been quite important, not just to rebuild solidarity from the civil society perspective. So we have, I have done something about what you call formal institutions but mainly about non formal actors, like civil society, social movements, and so on.

[E.R.] OK, great. Thank you.

[M.B.J.] Yeah. My name is Martin. I'm also a professor, but in the processes of migration. But in academic terms, we are kind of twins. So yeah, what Oscar said that's what I'm working on as well, right. So these issues and topics and so on and in these Soli*City project we are co-leading the European Hub. I mean the

responsibility is shared between Osnabruck University and Aalborg University. Right now it's Aalborg University but at some point it might change to Osnabruck. But I mean we have, yeah, like game hub leaders, original hub leaders you could say. But I mean the activities in the European hub has mainly been Aalborg and Germany so I don't know who we are leading really, but that's at least the formal role.

[E.R.] OK. Can you please talk about the Soli*City project and the initiatives that fall into that project and that you're creating as part of this?

[M.B.J.] I can start or…?

[O.G.A.] Yes, sure. Go ahead.

[M.B.J.] I think Oscar already said a little bit, right. It's like a global network of scholars and also practice partners, although until now it's mainly been academics who have been talking at these meetings we've had and so on. And it's about, I mean, I think the formal title is urban hospitality, solidarity, welcome, practice, something like that, right. So it's basically about how to accommodate the newcomers, not only people with formally recognized papers, but also illegalized migrants and so on, and how this is done on different scales. I mean, one thing is how society does it, but what we've been looking at in particular as Oscar also said, is like the urban politics, I mean how for instance municipalities and so on go about these issues. So, right now we are in phase two of the project or the network. It's not as much a project funding as a network funding, and it lasts for seven or eight years and the funding allows for smaller research projects but not like big scale research projects. And they're very different. I mean, like, in Toronto, as far as I know, they're looking at accommodation of illegalized students in public schools, for instance. We don't have anything like that Oscar and I. Together with well, at least now it's just us, but also, at least in a longer run together with a German guy, Simon, we're looking at networks of cities, for instance, as like a concrete small project. How cities with similar kind of policy approaches join up in networks like solidarity cities or in Latin America, its cultural cities, and so on. So, I wouldn't say that it is like one large project characterising Soli*Cities, it's more like a bunch of smaller niche initiatives that also connect to the research we were already doing beforehand. Yeah. And Oscar I don't know if you wanna say…

[O.G.A.] Yes, you explained that quite well. So just to add something, it was like a strong focus on civil society actors, not only but also some institutional actors. But there is also something that I think that hard about that that is the Pio put the network summarised with his book like sovereignty or solidarity that we look at these types of urban solidarity as a sort of contestation against the nation states. So there is this assumption that migration integration policies are not very well managed, but the national states and actually that hindering some progressive politics. So how can you challenge that from urban areas and how you can organise civil society, sometimes cooperating with local institutions in order to overcome the shortcomings from national policies? So it's a way of imagining globalisation, but not from the role of a nation state, but from the role of the cities. And I think that that is also an important point. So we talk about the African region, but we focus on some cities. The same in Chile or other places in Latin America. So they do also the same. So there is also this idea that it is possible just to have a sort of different picture of globalisation that is based on urban societies instead of policies carried out by the government.

[E.R.] OK, but of course the policies carried out by the government still also impact the refugees because otherwise they wouldn't be able to enter the state and to reach out to this solidarity city, right?

[O.G.A.] Yes, absolutely. So that's part of it that also like they mixed some regional differences like in the case of the US or Canada that they put the states, not the nation state, but the states are more autonomous and they have, like, more legislative capacities compared with the countries in Europe where it's like more centralised. So there are some differences. But of course there's always this tension you are mentioning between some nation state policies, sometimes also some international organisations like the European Union and at the local level. So it's not because the local level became autonomous and they can just do what they want to do, but they do that sometimes in intention with the national state. But there are some realities that the refugees, irregular migrants are coming to Europe, to Colombia, to many places, and the cities have decided to manage that as a reality. So that's another picture of the migration that is not through the national lenses but through urban ones.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, you can say that the cities cannot, for instance, grant asylum to asylum seekers. But they can still offer people without recognized refugee status access to health, to school, to education and so on, by not, for instance, asking into the status or opening institutions and so on or housing and so there are some, some both local level structures that are still can be opened for refugees, for instance, without recognizing the refugees as such formally, as that's the state prerogative.

[E.R.] This kind of touches upon also the situation in Kenya. I don't really know how familiar you are with the refugee situation in Kenya so I'm just gonna say a bit, and if you don't know, then it's fine, we'll just move on to another question. But there's a very strict encampment policy in Kenya, where the state wants all the refugees or asylum seekers to be into camps, which makes it very illegal and it's rare for refugees to actually go into the urban centres. There are still some who leave the camps to do it, but then of course, they don't have access to any humanitarian help as opposed to in the camps where they actually have access to humanitarian help. They don't have access to education, it's a bit harder to get a job because they don't have a legal status there. How do you think these rules and welcoming by municipalities play in a country where there is a strict encampment policy.

[O.G.A.] The question is in general, or in the case of Kenya?

[E.R.] Uh, in the case of Kenya, if you know anything, if you know specifically about it; but in general otherwise.

[O.G.A.] It's just back to the point before it is not, of course it doesn't make the situation easier, but it doesn't create an obstacle to organise the side of urban reality that is against deportations or camps, and so on. So we know that in many countries that there are well organised civil society actors that are contesting these practices and they are also doing that, protesting within, out of the camps. So they make public… try to make public opinion aware of this situation. So we see that you don't need to have a progressive government in order to have waves of solidarity, waves of organising urban solidarity or movements. But it is difficult just if you want to think in terms of success, of course it makes it difficult just to get more influence. But I would say that in all these cases, there is always contestation from some civil society. And sometimes this sort of transnational dimension, like in the case of Greece, like 2015, was so quite clear that they were like many volunteers and people coming from other countries in order to support refugees and migrants coming to Europe. So I would say that it doesn't solve the whole problem, but creates awareness about that. So, we say that of course the conditions are that all the structures are more complicated and more difficult, but it doesn't exclude the possibilities of creating agency or responses against that.

[M.B.J.] Yeah. I very much agree. I was also going to to mention Greece as an example and the idea of, I mean housing people in camps and not only I mean something we see in Kenya, we also I mean in Germany, I mean you have the lack of system and so on, right? I mean people are not prisoners of course. So they're allowed to leave for shorter or longer whiles, right. I mean, there's some geographical limitations of how far people can go and so on but it's still the same kind of system at least. During 15 16 17 and so on, right. And there's not much the municipality as like a governance level can do about that I mean but as Oscars said I mean it doesn't mean that other kinds of campaigning and so on are not existing. I mean, we do see a yeah, an attempt to create awareness and so on to contest and in the case of Greece from civil society, also to provide some alternatives, I mean one of the cases we wrote a little bit about is this - it's closed now - but like very famous squat, uh City Plaza Hotel, for instance, which was a was an attempt also to challenge this encampment of of asylum seekers and so on and provide an alternative right. And that was not meant to be like the solution at large that all you know refugees should be put in squatted hotels, not at all, but it was an example on how… I mean, things could be done differently, I mean.

[E.R.] OK. So just to have an overview, do you have a specific knowledge on the refugees in Nairobi and how welcome they are, for example, or the type of services they have access to or how they integrate?

[M.B. J] No, not me.

[O.G.A.] No no we are… you know, and also like South America but Africa is… we can't cover everything unfortunately.

[E.R.] OK, yes, of course, of course.

[O.G.A.] That's why we have you. So you can, yes.

[E.R.] Hopefully.

[M.B.J.] I mean I know Derese's book, but that's probably it and I read a little bit of Loren Landau stuff, he also wrote about Nairobi I think and urban hospitality and stuff like that but that's more or less my knowledge.

[E.R.] OK. No worries, it was just to know if we could extract more information.

[O.G.A]. Sorry about that.

[E.R.] No worries. However, one of the main focuses of our thesis is integration of urban refugees. Can you please tell us what does integration of urban refugees mean to you or how would you describe it?

[M.B.J.] Umm, I mean I'm probably what you call a little bit politically sensitive to use the word integration too much, I mean, because it's for me at least the connotations that comes from the institutional and and policy settings in Europe where very much is like a one way direction, right, something that state demands or does, and so on, to a group of people, and not really any kind of mutual process so… And if we sort of take away these connotations, I still think integration probably describes something in that people staying for a very long time and perhaps settling for good or something like that, and then and the kind of groups we've been looking at perhaps, I mean, we're not necessarily talking about groups who are going to stay for… sorry, my phone, my daughter is, just…

[E.R.] No worries.

[M.B.J.] Yeah. So it's the snowstorm, it's taking a… sorry. So, so integration for me, it's a very kind of institutionalised word that probably is set in a more formal setting than many of the groups and people, individuals we're talking about here. But Oscar, you might have other opinions about this.

[O.G.A.] Actually, just before this meeting, I was having an oral exam with this master thesis, and it was about integration. There was mention of integration like 1000 times and every time it was mentioned I was thinking what does it mean? Because it has so many different meanings and sometimes it's like more cultural, sometimes it is more like labor market oriented. So there are like so many meanings, and I think that I agree with Martin when he's saying that the maybe the thing is if we can avoid using integration because I don't like either the connotations also like the idea of that is a good citizen or something like that which you have to integrate that is a previous standard with this being called citizen and you have to adapt and that's more or less what integration means. So we can just try to change the language but it's difficult to avoid that. I think that just going to talking about the urban citizenship, inclusive citizenship, like there are different ways of… something about the creating community or it could be like different ways that you are trying to create more equal relations between refugees, migrants and locals or nationals. But the point is that is still quite difficult not using that word and not talking about integration. So there are some contradictions in that. So I would say that the integration should be like as Martin was implying rephrase to something that is being producted from both sides and that is something that is not a pre-existing category, but is the result of interaction between people that are coexisting or living together. So try to move from that one sided vocabulary and trying to find something that is more inclusive. But I agree that it is quite difficult and when you move to the policy level, I'm talking about national policies, not talking about integration is quite difficult. But we have been quite aware about the implications of the performative uses of integration. What does it mean? It means that there is the good way of of being a citizen and bad ways that are not accepted culturally. So I mean, have like a sort of critical standpoint about that.

[E.R.] It’s super interesting. Would you both say the use of the word integration and also the connotations of it? And I think it's indeed very important to be critical about that and that's gonna be a very important part of our thesis as well because we mentioned it a lot also. So we reflected on that as well and we came up with a kind of a framework for a definition of integration to make it a bit more clear and a bit more concrete. And also talking with Derese, we also mentioned that with him. So we said that there were different levels of integration. We’re talking about cultural integration, political integration and economic integration. So the cultural part would be, as you said, Oscar it’s more about interactions with the people that you live with and your neighbors or the people in the same country as you. Economic would be more on the job market, it's more of an integration regarding money and regarding ways of earning money and being part of a country economically. And then political, of course, refers to the very legal term of integrating a country, being a citizen, having legal rights of being here. What do you think about that kind of different level of differentiation?

[O.G.A.] Yeah, I think that you need to distinguish for sure because there is a huge difference between the cultural integration and the economic one. So that's quite clear and some part of the mainstream discourse is about integration mainly about the cultural differences and this type of things. So I think that it is necessary and also in order to do an analysis, you need to operationalize integration and I think that's one of the mistakes with… you are recording that… one of the mistakes with the master thesis I just evaluated…

[E.R.] It's OK. We don't know his name. We don't know the topics, so it's OK.

[O.G.A.] OK, so something but it was like it was not conceptualized. So it was just using the word integration many times and that's why I was wondering what does it mean because it was not a definition or a conceptualization of that. So I think that is quite necessary. I think that also thinking that Kymlicka, for instance, he talks about different types of solidarity and they are quite similar: economic solidarity, political solidarity, and I can't remember, civic solidarity. There are like three of them. But the idea is quite similar. But again back to our point, solidarity is creating a sort of equal relation between people who are living together and integration still have this sort of connotation that you need to be part of a group. But I think for sure you need to reflect on the concept and on operationalize the concept, because otherwise we are missing the nuances and the analysis. If you check integration as a whole, without any dimension.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, yeah, I absolutely agree. And I would probably pick up on the last one you just said Oscar. I mean, I would probably see it as dimensions rather than levels not to sort of indicate some kind of hierarchical relationship that economic integration should be more important than and so on and so forth. So they are all dimensions, all being there at the same time, right. And equally important. And then I mean something that's often forgotten, but perhaps it's part of your then political integration, I mean, I think it's important also to address the kind of structures the state has against the discrimination and so on. I mean to actually be able to have some kind of equality and equity and so on. So political integration is not only about the access to voting and so on. It's also actually being able to enjoy the rights people have, regardless of citizenship and so on. And how, I mean, what kind of structures are set up to combat discrimination or secure that people are getting equal pay for equal jobs and stuff like that right? But perhaps it's already in your like legal dimension or legal level, but at least I would also pay attention to that part.

[O.G.A.] Yeah. And also just following up your arguments, if you give like you know citizenship but not like a new approach to citizenship dimension that is also quite important because sometimes you are expecting that people are going to become integrated culturally but without having rights like political rights and it creates some tensions or contradictions. So talking about the different levels and dimensions rather than levels that's true because political integration in this sense, if you have the right to vote, it comes quite late in Denmark and you get a lot of problems before, you take a long time before you get that. But in the meanwhile you are expected to be integrated culturally, socially, your network and so on, so I think that there are like this dimension of citizenship or active citizenship that is integrating people differently, that is not defined by the state, but about how you become part of the community. And again what Martin was saying that this is more dimensions rather than levels in order to avoid the hierarchy or how you become good citizens. So you have like 10 steps and when you achieve this one you are very good integrated in the community.

[E.R.] I think the reason why those dimensions seem also appealing is because it very much corresponds to the concept of formal and informal institution as well as that you can kind of compare both and look for the causality of 1 or the other, which is what we're also looking for in this. So now the following questions are gonna kind of compare the informal institutions, the formal institutions to the different dimensions of integration that we just mentioned. As an example, what role does government and legal actors play in the integration of refugees in urban areas? If I was to ask you this question.

[O.G.A.] Yeah. I have actually a previous question because I was just listening to you when you were talking about formal and informal institutions. So you are having, like, sort of an institutional approach to your thesis.

[E.R.] Yeah, we're using Scott.

[O.G.A] OK.

[E.R.] Why are you laughing?

[O.G.A.] Yes. Because you are combining that with integration theory and so on.

[E.R.] Yeah.

[O.G.A.] OK. And you've tried just to create your own model or idea about how you analyze different types of integrations connecting with different types of institutions

[E.R.] Yes. So the main theory is Scott, it's the institutional theory and then we have integration theory as well. But the political - was it a theory or Sophie, the political, cultural and economic? No, that was not a theory. That was more a model that we kind of came up with. So it's not really in the theory, it's backed up by theories as well, but it's not really in the theory, it's more of a model that we kind of want to test as well with the thesis. Does it answer your question?

[O.G.A.] Yes, it does, yeah, because my first thought when you're talking about informal, formal was like actors, but you mentioned institutions and yeah.

[E.R.] No institutions, yeah.

[O.G.A.] And I forgot the question now. So your question was about the…

[E.R.] The question was what role do governments and legal actors - so formal institutions - play in the integration of refugees in urban areas?

[O.G.A.] Urban, yes? Not national, right?

[E.R.] Yeah, urban.

[O.G.A.] Yeah. So like a good example or you mean like in general?

[E.R.] Yes, if you have an example that's perfect.

[O.G.A.] Just to advertise our book, so I just post the link. For us, a good example if you are capable, so to say, to have formal institutions that are at the same time supporting some formal institutions at the local level. So if you have the municipality for instance or City Council that is capable just to open up some policies integrating like NGOs or neighbourhoods or units, and possibly civil society, and also attending to the needs of migrants like the real ones, including them in the sort of like local larger policymaking processes. So that would be like the best example about how you create the key combination of both how municipalities can support that and also get some influence in some informal institutions because they are also going to the very, very local level like the neighbourhoods and the local practices when they are already existing norms and values.
Both negative and positive because we were in Ecuador like last month or a couple of months ago and they talk about the neighbourhoods as places for solidarity, but also places for racism and so on. So, there are some real practices norms existing there but you can use that at least like the positive and integrate that into formal institutions, if you open up some deliberative or like integrative processes. So that could be like a

good example. And we talk about the case of Barcelona in our book as one example of that. But of course if you don't have this very nice City Council… So it depends. It depends about how you know… I think that the question is how you reach the informal dimension from more realistic policies. So at least you need an openness to civil society or not formal actors. So probably if you do that you have more possibilities to come closer to some existing local values. But I can imagine that this is complicated in some cases when there are very top down decisions of them just implementing some national policies without just trying to adapt into local realities.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, I think it's a really good example you mentioned Oscar. I mean, I don't know if I have any other examples. I'd rather have examples of what happens when the kind of local support structures from local authorities are not there. If you see something like the Safe Harbor campaign in Germany for instance. I mean, many German cities, I think 18 cities or something like that are part of it, but it's not really the city frameworks sort of endorsing it or doing any active implementation, it's more civil society groups. But it also shows there's very little power really in this campaign, because very few of the cities actually, I mean, took this idea of supporting… I mean, you know, the campaign, right? I mean, the search and rescue refugees picked up in the Mediterranean. I mean, different cities went together and yeah, all that. So in reality, very few people who are rescued at sea actually have been transferred to these cities who are at least using a city branch to present some kind of openness as it's only been a similar society, right? And then we see the difference between, let's say Hamburg, there's a very strong social movement scene and strong civil society and so on, a leading actor in this Sea campaign. But the institutional framework and local government level of Hamburg as a city was not interested at all. So nothing really happened, right? Compared to Barcelona which is a different case because their local authorities have tried to actively answer these issues right and provide concrete frameworks and initiatives and so on.

[E.R.] So what you're saying, basically, with those two examples… are you showing that we can see that civil society initiatives are enhanced when the municipality is backing them up? The difference between, you know, Germany and Barcelona.

[M.B.J.] Not only backing up, but also creating policy frameworks. I mean, yes, a joint collaboration almost right? I mean the Barcelona framework was not only built from above by, I mean Barcelona, but also through the civil society movements and so on. So it's more the interrelations between civil society and of course there can be tensions also at local level. But I think it definitely enhances chances of success if we wanna call it that if there are like productive, collaborative processes between local level politics and civil society. But if your question was what governments I mean or states, institutions, are doing, I'm not sure they're doing much on the local level really I mean.

[O.G.A.] Yeah, I don't know. Because something that I can't remember now, but something that also some smaller African scholars mentioned, we have some scholars working in Ghana, and there were members of the Soli*City that mentioned that the idea of community was quite different from Europe. So the local government was quite different from our European understanding of that. So probably in our case we select the state detached from the local level. So probably there are different dynamics about how to connect the local and the national depending on the regions. But again, there's more, iIn your case it probably is different or I don't know.

[E.R.] I mean, we didn't hear anything about or we didn't hear or read anything about municipality levels or more local level policies support initiatives whatever. It's either the national government, so the institution in

charge of the refugees for the entire country of Kenya, or the humanitarian organisations that can start initiatives.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, I think we have a research assistant, then formal thesis student Mashudu, he's from Accra or from Ghana, and he did his thesis on similar kind of issues that you're looking at where he compared to Copenhagen and Accra, and his results were more or less the same, that in the case of Accra, there is a state and the state is sort of defining the policy framing, but there's no local level of policy implementation. There is the humanitarian organisation, many of them international and so on and civil society, but no sort of intermediate link. As a municipality sort of having a framework of its own and so on. You could also talk to him if you want. But I mean it's Ghana, it's not… but it's Africa, though, at least, but…

[O.G.A.] Coming closer, but not totally.

[E.R.] Yes. Yeah, exactly. But we had a plan to reach out to the… because I know they gave us the contact for the head of the African hub of Soli*City. So we had a plan to reach out to them. However, if the thesis of this student is public and if we can find it, I think we would love to read it. Do you know, maybe the name of the student, if we can try to find it?

[M.B.J.] Yeah, yeah. I don't know if it's, but you can just, I mean, get his email. He's very talkative. So he would love to talk. His name is Masyado Salifu.

[E.R.] Do you know if you can write it in the chats? Maybe.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I'll just give you his email.

[E.R.] OK, great. Thanks.

[O.G.A.] There was a it was not like the idea of local governance was like a quite popular but also quite top down applied in Africa, mainly through NGOs and international institutions. So at least what I'm trying to recall about it was that it was not very implemented in local realities, but it was more like this idea of local governance.

[E.R.] That's what we seem to witness as well. For now, we haven't found anything about the local governance, but it's very interesting that we're discussing this topic right now because the difference between how it works in Europe and how it works also maybe in other countries like in Africa for example. But now let us move from the legal organisations and the governments to humanitarian aid, if you have, I'm gonna ask you the exact same question, but just with humanitarian aid and NGOs instead of legal governments. What role does humanitarian aid play in the integration of refugees in urban areas? And if you have any examples of that?

[O.G.A.] Depending on the organisation I guess that there are some constraints like if you look at some European Union frameworks, so they say there are some constraints about how much they can, and sometimes also strategically just to consider how if it is worth it, if they can continue this cooperation within the framework. And you were mentioned like the sea during, or after the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis. And there's also the criminalization of solidarity like in the seas and the Mediterranean Sea particularly. And it was like the discussion about the NGOs if they just adapt, if they exist in the norms to cooperate with the European Union, or if they just would try to do something else that was illegal. And I think that it is a good example that some of the limits about humanitarian aid depend on how you adjust your

strategy or tactic according to your goals, if you think that you need some sort of institutional support, and cooperation about that and this limits probably the scope or the change you want to implement. But the discussion is if how much you are going to get for that is good enough. But I would say that there is some potential in that and they are doing something positive and good. But also yes, also constrained by that cooperation with institutions and existing legislations and so on.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, I think it is also a huge difference between the regions of the world, really. I mean the role played. I mean, I think it's probably lesser in Europe than it is in Africa and to some degree Latin America. And there is also, in the European context, one thing we learned about the refugee crisis was also that there is a lot of tension between - especially in Greece and Italy - really established, high level NGOs and more like on the ground solidarity work taking place. There is a lot of criticism from people about the way the last NGOs worked on these issues right? They used so much money for nothing, right? It was a very democratic system and so on, it was very inefficient and it was insensitive to particular local context, knowledge kind of things, right? I'm not saying that the grassroot organisations are right in the critic, but I think at least these debates are interesting because it tells us something about how NGOs and small organisations, networks, and so on go on the ground very differently, and the kind of discursive difference. In a country like Denmark, I mean NGOs or humanitarian NGOs play, I mean a disappearing, small role. I mean, I don't think they have any role at all, I mean, of course, the Red Cross does some work, but not I mean not of the kind. I guess you're asking my opinion at least. So I think that there are these very big regional differences, but probably also differences within the region, I mean.

[O.G.A.] It's also depending on the perspective because at least Martin mentioned that if you look at the case of Latin America, humanitarian aid is so criticised, related to some critique of post colonial or colonial view that is imposed through this sort of universal values and how they are reproducing some economic interests and so on. And I guess that in the case of Africa, at least the critical side of humanitarian aid could be quite similar today. If you look from the European point of view, if we think about how humanitarian aid is supporting or not supporting some processes, but from the receivers, the point of view is completely different. So, humanitarian aid is not detached from some values and norms and everything you are analysing. Just producing, reproducing some values, pre existing systems of values and so on. So in your case, probably has also some relevance and interest just to look at this.

[E.R.] Yeah, it's a very powerful actor that plays a big role in the, I'm not gonna say integration, but I'm just gonna say refugee affairs in African countries, especially in Kenya. But it's very hard to get a grasp of the good that they're actually doing or how much they're actually fueling this integration, there I'm gonna use it. And we have talked to one human humanitarian association, but it's quite hard to get a hold of the others. There are a lot and mainly big, solely big, I would say international humanitarian organisations, but they are also mainly working in camps. Uhm, because it's easier to provide help to people that are all in the same place, right? Then in the urban areas they don't have any reach. So that's a big part of our thesis as well because they are powerful actors, but it's a bit hard to know the perspective to take on their work.

[M.B.J] But I guess, you probably need some kind of topology or classification of NGOs. Because there's also, I mean, NGO encompasses a lot of very different actors where you have, you know, the really major ones being more like a transnational business corporation compared to smaller ones that still would be classified, or characterised NGOs. So I guess it's also a matter of sorting between different actors, all sort of captured by this label.

[E.R.] OK. Yeah, also true. I mean, in the ones that we look at most of them are doing the same kind of work. It's providing health services, it's providing water, it's providing food, basic human needs coverage, I would say. But you know nothing that helps, that helps them, for example, fill in their legal papers or to ask for citizenship or to resettle and find an apartment or land or something like this.

[O.G.A.] Yeah, that was that dilemma we're talking about. Sometimes you can do something, you can make a difference, but it's limited. And also as people say when you are analysing NGOs, just look at the funding, where are they getting the money from?

[E.R.] Umm. And then finally the last part. Can you please talk a little bit about social integration of refugees in urban centres? For example, what are the challenges that they face and what are the opportunities? As an example, the challenges that some refugees face in Kenya, in Nairobi is that there are distinctive differences between Kenyan and somebody from Somalia, so they can face racism or discrimination. And that prevents them because there is this idea that refugees are dangerous and represent the threat to society. So of course, if as soon as they are labelled as this by their peers or their neighbours or people in the city, then they face challenges to integrate.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, I think it's a little bit interesting that you place issues of discrimination and racism as problematic related to social integration and not more like the legal aspects. It just sort of goes back to one of my former comments right, because it a little bit sort of takes responsibility away from more formal actors by saying that the discrimination is something that happens between people. "Oh that guy is racist and so on". But it's also obviously an institutional problem and I don't think it's necessarily something that can be solved only on a social level, whatever that is. When I think about social integration, I probably go back to something Oscar said about again, some of our former work on solidarity and so on as mutual relations between different actors that tries to identify new commonalities and forms of cohabitation and so on, and inclusion not sort of singling out differences, but trying to sort of more address what makes us alike right. But I'm not necessarily, yeah. But if you're talking more like about formal processes of social integration, about really sure what's what's to point to. And in my understanding.

[E.R.] No, I don't think it's a formal process. It's more, do you have examples? For example, if you studied like a city and the integration of refugees in that city. The level of intimacy or community that they're able to reach.

[O.G.A.] That's social integration, and I was also a bit insecure. I was a little bit lost. I don't think that we do this type of analysis, but it must be like the network analysis and this sort of ideas of belonging.

[E.R.] Social capital theory, things like that.

[O.G.A.] Exactly. It's sort of, yeah. So I would say that this is more like how they are grouping or creating their own community and groups and networking them. So I think that this is more like part of this type of analysis, we don't look specifically about how migrants are connecting through like other national migrants or or through like a family reunion or so. So we are not looking as much as that as part of our research. We are more like this sort of connection between civil society and refugee migrants.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, yeah, of course there's also this whole literature and proximity and distance and so on, but it's not something that I've worked a lot on, you know. I mean, of course, the social capital, but it's, I don't know, for me, many of these studies have been tied up too much with integration as like my understanding a bit, the

negative version of that literature, right? As Oscar said, it's more like a civil society perspective and those kinds of relations. And so I don't really have a lot to say unfortunately to that question.

[E.R.] No worries, it's OK. It was the last formal question I would say. Is there anything that you want to share? You feel like we didn't cover, one last thing you wanna scream out loud?

[O.G.A.] I think that sounds interesting like creating some sort of typology or model or whatever you're working with this institutional approach and different dimensions of integration. Could be quite interesting just to have that and to try to apply that systematically to this type of analysis. And the thing is you also have a format but you also have many types of actors like from NGOs to local governments. I don't know if you are analysing also like individuals, but to master a sort of question about how you connect the relations between all of these actors like international, national and local actors - NGOs, governments and so on. So how do you integrate that knowledge just to have a sort of coherent analysis?

[E.R.] How do we make the link between all the actors you mean?

[O.G.A] Yes. In order to not move to a free for all project.

[E.R.] That’s true.That's a good point.

[O.G.A.] But you are probably many pages because you are two, I don't know how many pages.

[E.R.] 120.

[O.G.A.] OK, that I'm not so many.

[E.R.] It depends who you ask.

[O.G.A.] Yeah, of course.

[E.R.] Seems a lot to me.

[O.G.A.] But I mean, the approach you have sounds interesting and narrow it down and not try to to have like too many topics. Because you have so many interesting dimensions this of course as case studies also an opening to comparative studies but it's not a comparative study so it's the case single case study but it could be quite useful just to reflect in the conclusions about the potential for further comparative analysis and to check like this local dimension with regional specificities but also with the comparative potential in other regions.

[M.B.J.] Yeah. And then one thing I was thinking was of course, there's also, I mean the specific almost geopolitical context to the refugee situation in Kenya and Nairobi right, I mean which is different from what we perhaps see in Europe and the kind of refugees coming to Europe, right? I mean it's not the same refugee populations and so on. So there's also local context and almost strategic uses of refugees in some of the neighbouring countries, I mean pushing refugees from one country to the other and so on. In a way I guess you also have to just be a little bit sensitive towards right? I mean that refugees are not just refugees. I mean, I guess you are already working on it but it is, yeah it's a particular context the kind of geographical location of Kenya and the kind of refugee population. And also the situation in both Kenya and Tanzania is very protracted, it's been going on for decades. Some of the camps have been there for 50-60 years. I mean it's it's

really insane thing about that, you can, you know, meet people who are born there and in the 50s, more, less or 60s and still have a life in a refugee camp, right? Anyhow, I shouldn’t start up with more topics.

[E.R.] Yeah, yeah, we need to. We need to narrow it down.

[O.G.A.] But that's at the very interesting topic and what you're saying in the beginning and then you talk about the I don't know how you formulate that, but but I think that the fact that you are working on this topic is it makes the topic relevant also now in Denmark or in Europe, when you are doing that. So it's how you move from the institutional to the sphere of the production of knowledge and how disturbing is becoming relevant. And it has to be discussed but has been sort of invisible. So I think that it is also quite important that you are just doing this sort of analysis and bringing that topic into the international context. So I think that that is also like a way of moving from the local to the more international level. So that makes it very relevant work to do.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, I would love to. To see your faces when it's done, I mean.

[E.R.] We will. We'll see if we get a good grade.

[M.B.J.] Yeah, just just ask them to use one of us as a sensor then.

[E.R.] Exactly. But thank you so much for your time. Can you think of anybody that you know that has expertise in that domain except Derese? Because we already interviewed him? Of course. But if you, if you come across anyone, don't hesitate to just talk about us and then send their email because we're always looking for more interviews. So yeah. Thank you.

Appendix 6: Thesis Presentation and Objectives

Presentation of our thesis and interview objectives. This pdf was shared on LinkedIn to search for experts within our topic and sent to interviewees as a way of presenting our thesis and the topics of discussion for potential interview.

Our master thesis | Urban refugees and the opportunities for sustainable integration: A case study of Nairobi, Kenya



Our topic

Using the institutional theory, we aim to research the impact of urban refugees on the development of Kenya, focusing on sustainable integration of refugees in the social and economic landscape of Nairobi, Kenya.

Our research question

How do formal and informal institutions and humanitarian aid contribute to sustainable integration of urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya?

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Our objective | To gather primary data by interviewing experts and professionals on the refugee situation in Nairobi

Purpose

- To collect insights on the reality of urban refugees in Nairobi
- To understand the impact of policies and legal measures on urban refugees' integration

Example of the topics that will be covered during the interviews

- The urban refugee situation in Kenya, and more precisely in Nairobi
- The difference between urban settlements and camps
- The government measures and policies regarding urban refugees (e.g. the impact of the Refugee Act, 2021)
- The level of urban refugee integration in the socio-economic context of Kenya / Nairobi: access to employment and education
- How do urban refugees benefit to the Kenyan economy?
- The impact of humanitarian aid on urban refugees and on the Kenyan economy
- The context of urban refugees in Kenya: their story, why Kenya compared to other surrounding countries, why settlements rather than camps?
- What kind of restrictions do refugees in Nairobi, Kenya face?

Practicalities

- Between 15th of February and 15th of March
- Online interviews
- 1 hour
- Semi-structured interviews based on a written questionnaire that will be sent to the respondent in advance
- The respondent's answers will only be used for academical purposes

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Our profile | Two students from Copenhagen Business School, writing their master thesis



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In the process of writing our master thesis

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